248 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
248 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD
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T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e ,
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I n c o r p o r a t e d
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Presents:
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__ __ 999999999 666
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_____ ____ _| |__| |_ 9999 9999 666
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// | \ |_ __ _| 999 999 666
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|| ____ | || | | | | | 9999 9999 6666666666
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|| || \ / | || | _| |__| |_ 9999999999 6666 6666
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\\___// \/\/ |____/ |_ __ _| 999 666 666
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999 666666666
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"A Look at Hardin's Attack on Contemporary Theories of Color" by Otis
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----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #96 -----
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----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 -----
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C.L. Hardin attacks several current theories of color in "Color and
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Illusion" that attempt to explain color in physical terms, including a purely
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physical account that depends on wavelength to determine color, promulgated by
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Armstrong, a dispositionalist account that utilizes the concepts of "normal
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observer" and "standard conditions," and an account that uses spectral
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reflectances to arrive at an explanation of color phenomenon. I will examine
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each in turn, though I have little to say about Hardin's treatment of the
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wavelength theory of color.
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I. Hardin's Attack on the Wavelength Theory of Color
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The wavelength theory of color, promulgated by Armstrong, appears to have
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been supplanted by the more sophisticated reflectivist theory of Averill and
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Hilbert. Hardin's arguments against this theory are devastating, given what we
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now know about the connection between wavelengths and actual visual appearance.
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To attack this theory, which appears antiquated, seems to be much like beating
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a dead horse, if I might be appropriate this apropos proverb; consequently, I
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find this section of "Color and Illusion" to be of little interest.
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II. Hardin's Problem with Dispositionalism
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After discoursing on the seemingly fatal flaws of Armstrong's physicalist
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reduction of color to wavelengths, Hardin next considers dispositionalism as
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endorsed by J.J.C. Smart and David Lewis. Hardin does not appear to be at odds
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with the eponymous idea of dispositionalism, namely that objects possess
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dispositions to appear as certain colors, as his concentration in this portion
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of the essay is directed elsewhere. However, this idea is not the terminal
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point of the dispositionalist account, and it is the concluding concept that
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Hardin finds sufficiently problematic for investigation, if not utterly
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erroneous. These dispositions that produce color "cause us to be in particular
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perceptual states under particular circumstances," (1) where "particular
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circumstances" are typically assumed to be constituted of a "normal observer" in
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"standard conditions." Hardin undermines these latter components of the
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dispositionalist account insofar as they cannot be upheld under the scrutiny of
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philosophical observation.
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Hardin produces an elaborate defense of this assault on the basis of the
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phenomenon of metamerism and the problem of actually determining a "normal
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observer" and "standard" set of viewing conditions. His main contention rests
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on the inability to justify a choice of these latter elements, which is required
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given that a viable set does not emerge from experience without difficulty and
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without alternative.
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Before doing so, however, Hardin does maintain that a "normal observer" and
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"standard" set of viewing conditions can be justifiably produced for pragmatic
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purposes in color science. Why, then, cannot the same be done outside the realm
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of colorimetry, where it then appears to be valid? Why must a "set of conditions
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for determining the 'true' or 'real' colors of objects...[not be] construed non-
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pragmatically and in more than a rough-and-ready sense" (2)? If such a method
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has practical application, though a single set of viewing conditions does not
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enter into the picture, what is the basis for rejecting it? Many philosophical
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claims that are found to be practically useful are accepted without a complete
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verification of their truthfulness, which may not even be possible; in fact,
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both Peirce and James promoted a theory of truth that depended essentially on
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pragmatism. Thus, pragmatic concerns should not be ruled out outright in
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determining the validity of a concept. Furthermore, why must a single set of
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viewing conditions that can be applied universally be the only possibility for
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the dispositionalists? Though it is clear that this application would represent
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a greater achievement than to relegate color to quasi-relativism, it is not at
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all clear whether or not this is even possible.
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At this point, Hardin seems to contradict his own philosophical strategy
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throughout the article, that of questioning the foundation of beliefs. While
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demanding a justification for a choice of "normal observer" and "standard
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conditions," he has no qualms about rejecting the set of viewing conditions
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employed by colorimetry, though valid and useful by his own admission, to meet
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the needs of the dispositionalist without justification of his own. Perhaps
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making a claim of this sort would be acceptable given a claim's immediate
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obviousness, but that quality seems highly doubtful in this case. The entirety
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of his following argument against dispositionalism rests on the inadequacy of
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the colorimetric methodology for dispositionalism, but an account as to the
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reason for labeling the methodology as inadequate is never provided. Thus, his
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attack against dispositionalism can be redirected as an attack against his own
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position.
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His criticisms regarding the search for a "normal observer" and "standard
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conditions" are compelling and plentiful, though they possess force only if his
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assumption concerning the inability of colorimetry to provide general sets of
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viewing conditions for dispositionalism is correct.
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III. Hardin's Criticism of the Spectral Reflectance Theory of Color
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The definition of color as a disjunction of the spectral reflectances that
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the surfaces of objects possess is a physicalist approach updated from the more
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primitive Armstrong approach and has been put forth by Edward W. Averill and D.
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Hilbert. Hardin admits the merits of this way of viewing the problem of color,
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though he recognizes "two tasks that remain to be carried out by the
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reflectivist before he can claim that his is an adequate theory of color" (3).
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Hardin maintains that the first component of this "adequacy" is that the
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theory must "cover chromatic physical phenomena that do not depend upon the
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reflection of light" (4). The obvious question, considering the thrust of my
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attack on Hardin, is this: why must an adequate theory of color cover sources of
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color not dependent on light? What special authority does Hardin possess that
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enables him to determine what a theory of color needs to have to be adequate?
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To use his words, "by virtue of what principle does one" (5) say what a theory
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of color does or does not need? Thus, according to some criteria, the
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reflectivist theory is adequate, while according to other criteria, it is not.
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Who is to choose between the two criteria? Hardin's second objection appears
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preposterous on the face of it, though perhaps this apparent absurdity is the
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result of a naive reading: "Surely he [the reflectivist] has not [given an
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adequate theory of color] until he has told us about red, and green, and yellow,
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and blue" (6). But has this aim not already been achieved by accepting colors
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as being the disjunction of different spectral reflectances of objects that are
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perceptually identical? When one asks the reflectivist what "red" means, he
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will answer that it is the color one sees when viewing an object with spectral
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reflectance s1, s2, etc., where sx is a spectral reflectance that perceptually
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corresponds to the color of red. If one then inquires what "spectral
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reflectance" means, a definition could be provided, satisfying the original
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definition by not being indefinable and consequently having suitable explanatory
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capacity. At first glance, the original definition appears circular, but I do
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not think it is. If someone inquires further and asks for an illustration of
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red, one of the objects that has one of the spectral reflectances that
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compromises the disjunction that is red can be shown him. In this way, a link
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between the definition and empirical evidence can be established and a circular,
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uninformative definition can be avoided. In what other sense does the
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reflectivist need to "[tell] us about red, and green, and yellow, and blue"(7)?
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The first objection that I wish to make here is one that I have insisted on
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throughout this work, namely that of Hardin's lack of justification. Who is
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C.L. Hardin to determine when an adequate theory of color is reached? To
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proceed with this line of attack further seems trivial, given its fuller
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explication in its previous incarnations in this document. A further objection
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is the conclusion drawn from the above illustration of the definitive capacity
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of the reflectivist theory: does not the reflectivist theory define color? When
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one asks what a car is, another could respond by saying that a car is a vehicle
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comprised of such-and-such parts; further inquiry into the nature of these
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components can be satisfied with their own appropriate definitions that can in
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turn be defined, presumably as far as the minutest particles of the physical
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world revealed by physics. Is this not an adequate definition for "car" and
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parallel in structure to the definition provided for "red" under the
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reflectivist theory? If the answer to this query is yes, then Hardin's second
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objection to the current reflectivist account must be discounted.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
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Hardin's proposal for an adequate theory of color, though not explicitly
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drawn out, occurs in the final pages of "Color and Illusion:"
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Redness, greenness, yellowness, and blueness...depend upon quite a few
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more variables than just their wavelength profile...the reflectivist
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theory, like the wavelength theory, suffers from an irremediable
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underdetermination: too many of the mechanisms essential to the
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production of the colors that we see lie within the bodies of the
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perceivers. (8)
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To begin with, Hardin appears already to have gotten at the nature of color,
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given the declaration made in the second half of the above statement: how does
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he know that whatever mechanisms that aid in the production of colors are
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essential to the production of color? It seems that the only way to determine
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if mechanisms that "lie within the bodies of the perceivers" are essential to
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the production of colors is to see if color remains after the removal of these
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faculties. The obvious answer seems to be: well, close your eyes, and color
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fades. But though you may no longer see color, it may in fact continue to exist
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and consequently is not essentially bound to your visual capabilities. Thus,
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even if all of humanity were to lose their visual capabilities, we would be at a
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loss to know if color still existed or not, a determination which would further
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require a definition of existence. By saying this, Hardin presumes to have
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already determined the truth of the matter, which is in fact far from
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determined.
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In reference to the first half of the above quotation, how can one ever
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determine when all the variables that enter into our perception of color have
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been located? Even though a large number of variables have been discovered to
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be at work in color perception, their existence does not rule out the existence
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of other, undiscovered variables; nothing, it would seem, could do such a thing.
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Furthermore, the reflectivist theory makes no claims as to being perfect, only
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to being adequate. Hardin seems to suggest that the only theory of color that
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he can countenance is one that takes into account the totality of the phenomenal
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experience of seeing color, an account that may in fact be impossible. Though
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the remarkable advances in science would seem to cut against this claim, it
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remains a possibility that some of the components of the visual process may not
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be ultimately explainable and end in a brute fact. Thus, can we not have a
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theory of color until we have achieved a finished science of the visual process?
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Again, who is to determine whether we can or not, and by virtue of what
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principle?
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Hardin's concluding comments suggest that color may in fact be an illusion,
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a possibility that this reader is able to countenance. Then again, a
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possibility it must remain in the absence of undeniable evidence in support of
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it.
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As to Hardin's position within the continuing realism/anti-realism debate,
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he appears in the concluding paragraph of "Color and Illusion" to want to try
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and hold both a realist and an anti-realist view of color. The realist
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perspective manifests when Hardin alleges that the experience of color "depends
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essentially upon processes that take place within the confines of the head...
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[and] the stuffings of the head are, after all, material, and the whole process
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of color perception is physical, determinate, and lawlike from beginning to
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end" (9). Then, however, what Hardin wants to say acquires an anti-realist
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dimension, when he claims that "physical objects need not have colors of their
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own" and reduces color sensation to illusion, which, given the non-being of
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illusion, is anti-realist.
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-----
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-=[Footnotes]=-
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1. Hardin, C. L. "Color and Illusion." Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings.
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Ed. Steven D. Hales. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
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1999. 310.
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2. Ibid. 310.
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3. Ibid. 314.
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4. Ibid. 314.
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5. Ibid. 307.
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6. Ibid. 314.
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7. Ibid. 314.
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8. Ibid. 315.
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9. Ibid. 315.
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"The pile of shit has a thousand eyes." - Corey Feldman's character
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in _Stand By Me_
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-+- F Y M -+-
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GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s
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MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\
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copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :LICK MY ASSHOLE:
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All rights reserved \---------------/
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GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD96
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