186 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
186 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e ,
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I n c o r p o r a t e d
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Presents:
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999 4444
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"Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in 'Self-Regarding Suicide'"
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by Otis
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----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #94 -----
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----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 -----
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Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in "Self-Regarding Suicide"
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Sketching arguments for or against specific moral practices typically proves
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a difficult affair, given, if conclusions are sought in the manner of logical
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deductions, the need to assert premises. These premises themselves often take
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the form of unjustified presumptions, taken as "obvious" or "self-evident" when
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in fact they are not. If not, then it often occurs that the justifications upon
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which these premises are based are themselves problematic, unjustified, or even
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unjustifiable. Once the truth of the premises is questioned, the utility of the
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logical implication from them to the conclusions in establishing truth will also
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come under suspicion.
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In "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View," Thomas E. Hill
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attempts to construct an argument against the practice of suicide using Kantian
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claims as premises. Yet, upon reflection, it is not at all certain that his
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premises are true and would imply the conclusion. In establishing the truth of
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a conditional statement, two tests must be performed: the first checks the
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soundness of the implication on logical grounds, demonstrating that if the
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premises were true, the conclusion would also be true, thus creating a
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theoretically true conditional statement; the second test verifies the empirical
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truth of the premises, creating a conditional statement that is true not merely
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theoretically but empirically. Thus, my project herein is to assail the
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empirical truth of the premises, not the logical truth of the argument itself,
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whereby I hope to block the application of the implication to the world
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understood empirically. However, this distinction in focus should not lead one
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to assume that I have accepted the logical merits of the argument. Rather, I
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have simply chosen to attack the premises because of their potential application
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in manifold arguments; essentially, my aim herein is to assail the foundations
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of Kantian ethical argument through an investigation of two of Hill's premises
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in "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View." Hill maintains as
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critical to demonstrating the moral wrongness of suicide the following Kantian
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position: "An essential feature of our humanity is that we are rational agents
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with autonomy of the will."
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Curzer already observes the problematic nature of the use of the term
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"essence" in his brief response to this premise, and, I see no need to attack
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the notion of essence here, though again this should not be interpreted as
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tacit acceptance.
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Allowing that our "humanity" can have any "essential" features, why should
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the fact that "we are rational agents with autonomy of the will" be one of them?
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Why should reason enter essentially into the determination of a human being? If
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a man happens to lose his ability to reason through some accident, does he cease
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thereby to be a human being? If he does, this event is no mere metaphysical
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distinction, no simple nomenclatorial change. He, upon forfeiture of his
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humanity, further forfeits everything to which he possessed a claim by means of
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that humanity. For example, if he ceased to be human, he would as a consequence
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lose the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the eyes of
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American law, for such rights are commonly denied non-humans such as animals.
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Yet, we do not allow the unpunished killing of mental patients who appear to
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have lost a capacity for reasoning; thus, we still allow them the right to life,
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though we place restrictions on other rights to protect them and others from
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them, and in this way we reaffirm their humanity in spite of their deficiencies.
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I have no qualms with considering reason to be the mark of a normal human being
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and to treat those without reason as deficient human beings, so long as those
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without reason remain human beings, albeit deficient ones. To employ another
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instance, consider newborn human children, whose ability to reason is
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significantly less than that of many advanced primates. At this point, should
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they not be considered human, since they lack the "essential" component of
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reason? But if they are not human, why should we provide them with the same
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sorts of rights that we provide adult humans under the aegis of "human rights"?
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Therefore, I do not see why being "rational" should be or is an "essential"
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feature of humanity, though I of course leave open the possibility that it could
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be. I am merely insisting that it is not self-evident or grounded on the
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empirical attitudes of society that reasoning should be used to distinguish
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human beings from non-human beings. Hill also holds that human beings are
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"agents with autonomy of the will." The notions of "agency" and "autonomy of
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the will" presuppose that we are free in a meaningful sense of that rather
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difficult word.
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However, in a deterministic universe, such as that envisioned by the Stoics,
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no such "agency" or "autonomy" would be possible, unless mental acts are being
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considered. This vision of the universe, though it might lead to complacency
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or the inability to hold others responsible for malicious actions, might
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nevertheless obtain. Sure, we conceive of ourselves as making choices all the
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time, but might we not be deluded as to that freedom by something akin to the
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Cartesian demon? Perhaps every "choice" we make, we were obliged or "destined"
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to make by something beyond ourselves. Such a view is not as radical as it
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might at first appear. It is common to hear, especially in religious discourse,
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that certain things were "meant to be" or that a tragic loss was part of a
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"divine plan." In traditional Christian doctrine, God, as omniscient, knows
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both the past and the future; thus, in some sense, we are not free to choose our
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future, since the future is already determined in the mind of God. Furthermore,
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legal discourse often supports a deterministic account of an event over a more
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mainstream intentionalist account; such accounts occur in insanity defenses as
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well as when courts use provocation as a mitigating factor in homicides. If
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"autonomy of the will" were an essential feature of humanity, then if at any
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moment we ceased to be autonomous, we would no longer be human; therefore, if we
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commit an action that was beyond our control not to commit (evidencing a lack of
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autonomy, however temporary), we cannot be held legally responsible for that
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action, since human law seemingly does not apply to non-humans. Therefore, I
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can neither confirm nor repudiate the essentialist claim that Hill/Kant makes,
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since it remains possible despite my skepticism, though, because of that very
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skepticism, I cannot endorse it as unjustified empirical truth. Before deducing
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the moral wrongness of suicide from Kantian principles, Hill states the
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following Kantian premise:
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A fundamental moral principle, one to which any rational being with
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autonomy would commit himself, is: always act so that you treat humanity
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(that is, autonomy and rationality) never simply as a means, but always
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as an end in itself (that is, as something with "unconditional and
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incomparable worth"). (1)
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I do not believe that it is true that any "rational being with autonomy" would
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place humanity above all else; I think that rational, autonomous people might
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choose, after deliberation made freely, to forfeit reason and autonomy in return
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for an infinite amount of pleasurable sensation. Furthermore, it seems people
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commonly use their humanity as a means to obtain other things; for example, the
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Dedclaration of Independence allows Americans to use their humanity to garner
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certain "inalienable rights." Oppressed groups, particularly in our country,
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have appealed to their humanity to gain possession of other goods, such as
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freedom and suffrage.
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Additionally, it must be asked if rationality and autonomy are worthwhile in
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themselves. Why would someone want reason, if not that it might allow him to
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enjoy what Mill calls the "higher pleasures" of contemplation and knowledge?
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Perhaps only the most obstinate of philosophers would want reason for its own
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sake and not for the pleasures that can be gained by it. What is the value of
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being free if not to be free to pursue happiness? I would think most rational
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people would assent to being under the dominion of another rather than retain
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absolute freedom. In fact, Hobbes thinks that if everyone lived in complete
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freedom from one another, their lives would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
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and short" (2). In order to be able to enjoy a life free from constant worry
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about the actions of others, it was found necessary, according to Hobbes and the
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"social contract" philosophers, for man to give up a portion of his freedom to
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act as he will to a sovereign body in exchange for protection against others.
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Thus, the ability to enjoy a secure existence, which makes possible the
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sustained experience of pleasure, seems to be more valuable than freedom, since
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it appears evident that most rational beings would exchange absolute freedom for
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a more limited but secure one. Thus, it is dubious as to whether the above-
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cited principle is indeed "fundamental" in any meaningful sense of that term or
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that anyone would "commit" himself to following it. I do not deny that a
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rational being may choose to act on that principle when so doing would benefit
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him, but I doubt that anyone would "commit" himself to following that principle
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despite the greater appeal of pleasure.
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Herein I have tried merely to cast doubt on a pair of Kantian principles
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that Thomas E. Hill uses to demonstrate the moral wrongness of suicide. I do
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not assert that he, and Kant for that matter, might not be right, but rather the
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weaker claim that they could very well be wrong and need to produce greater
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empirical support to garner my philosophical assent.
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-----
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-=[Footnotes]=-
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1. For the purposes of the argument, Hill presupposes that we are free
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physically.
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2. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Trans. A.T.A.B., Amsterdam, 1667. 89.
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-----------------------------<GwD Command Centers>------------------------------
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GwDweb: http://www.GREENY.org/
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GwD Publications: http://gwd.mit.edu/
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ftp://ftp.GREENY.org/gwd/
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GwD BBSes: C.H.A.O.S. - http://chaos.GREENY.org/
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E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org
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* GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 *
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"Don't throw in the towel cuz your life ain't shit, no take the towel and hang
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yourself with it." - Bloodhound Gang, "Lift Your Head Up High and Blow Your
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Brains Out"
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-+- F Y M -+-
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GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s
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MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\
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copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :SHIT YOUR PANTS:
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copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD :
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All rights reserved \---------------/
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