2639 lines
131 KiB
Plaintext
2639 lines
131 KiB
Plaintext
From armitage@dhp.com Sun Sep 25 19:27:05 1994
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Date: Sun, 25 Sep 1994 15:48:12 -0400
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From: armitage@dhp.com
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To: dtangent@fc.net
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% T H E E M P I R E T I M E S %
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% ------------------------------- %
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% The True Hacker Magazine %
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% %
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% August 20th, 1992 Issue III %
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Editor in Chief: Albatross Co-Editor: {Spot is Open}
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Email: bbs.Alby@goonsquad.spies.com Staff: {Spot is Open}
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Dist. Center: The Empire Corporation
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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# Phile Description Size Author or Group
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- ------------------------------------------------ ---- ---------------
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1 Introduction 1k Albatross
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2 Warez Vs. Hackers 4k Daemon
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3 ATM Thieft '92 Style 20k The Raven
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4 How to Build a BUG Detector 3k The Gremlin
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5 Hacking on the Milnet 7k Dispatar
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6 What is CyberSpace 18k Hyperion
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7 Summary of CFP-2 41k Steve Cisler
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8 A Bit on Cordless Telefones 25k Tom Kneilel
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9 Hacking Renagade & Teleguard BBS's 4k King Pin
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10 Listing of Media Fax Machines in the USA 5k {Unknown}
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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-=- The Empire Times -=-
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Volume 1, Issue 3, File 1 of 10
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Introduction
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Sorry for the phile to be so late but Hey Good Info is
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Hard to Come by and all ya'll wanna be hackers just sit around
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waiting to look kool with your latest copy of The Empire Times.
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That's Why I say, c'mon folks gimme the best of what ya know
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and show you fame and forture buy getting your name in a K00l guy
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mag like this and running around to all your buddies and telling
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them about how you know your shit (Or think you do) instead of
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Bullshit everybody.....
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WARNING: There is about a 80% chance that most boards in the
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Washington Metro area (202,703,301,410) has had there
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security compromised by either the FBI or the NSA due to
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the fact the NSA is located in Fort Meade,Md (Howard County),
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and the FBI HQ located in Washington, D.C.
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But this msg isn't to alarm anybody, all it is, is to note that
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any and all Highly secret info you might have, I'd suggest
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never talking about it on Boards or the IRC for the reason being
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is that some serious attention might be drawn to you..
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Let me note that this info is for a FACT true... Just be
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very careful in what you say......... And ohh yes, Please
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send me any and all info you want published to me Albatross
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on The Empire.. I also can be reached on The Blitzkrieg BBS
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in Kentucky.....
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-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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"I recognize that a class of criminals and juvenile delinquents has
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taken to calling themselves 'hackers', but I consider them irrelevant
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to the true meaning of the word; just as the Mafia calls themselves
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'businessmen' but nobody pays that fact any attention." rab'90
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-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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-=- The Empire Times -=-
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Volume 1, Issue 3, File 2 of 10
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Warez vs. Hackers
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If you call P/H BBS's, chances are you have seen
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the constant insults towards the so named "Warez D00ds".
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You also may have seen people going the other way, or
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talking about pirates or k0dez kidz. Well, what I'm trying
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to do is sort out all the classifications that are known to
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the hacking world, so that you may educate yourself towards
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the people of the hacking world. However, you must remember
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THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS. No one will always classify in one
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group and people do change.
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1. Hackers vs. Pd
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Pd, or public domain, users, are the people you
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find walking down the street, sitting in the park, or
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serving you fries. The title "Pd" also generally refers to
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those modem users who are strictly legal, and usually know
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nothing of the underground beyond pirating. The only
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concern they have to hackers is their closeness with the
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police. These are the people that will report something if
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they see someone illegally login to a UNIX or something, or
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if their fone line starts acting weird. However, they also
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are the easiest of people to convert into our world.
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2. Hackers vs. Pirates
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Pirates are the people who use copied versions of
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software illegally. The software can range from the latest
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copy of Uninvited to a nice copy of Turbo C++. Many hackers
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will use pirated versions of compilers, or other such useful
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software, but have to remember : if you are going to use
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someone else's software, something should come of it. Don't
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pirate unless it will benifit more then just you. Pirates
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are the tie between Pd users and Warez D00ds, which will be
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explained later. These people are on the line between easy
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and difficult to convert.
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3. Hackers vs. Warez D00ds
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Warez D00ds are the people who use pirated and
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cracked versions of games. They are generally seen as
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people who waste their time playing games, with nothing
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better to do with their life. Because of this, they are
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looked down upon the most. What seperates them from pirates
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is that warez d00ds usually stick to games. These are
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almost the hardest to convert, however, they are not
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dangerous to us. As it has been said, they can serve as a
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buffer, and make people more worried about pirates then they
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are about hackers.
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4. Hackers vs. Crackers
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These people are the intellegent and curious of
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the warez d00ds. These people are the ones that use their
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programming skils to remove the protections on games and
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such. They also are the people that "hack" into normal BBSes.
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Since this is almost pointless, it is obvious as to why it
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remains in the cracking realm. Hackers can use the skills if
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there happens to be a protect on a file that they want to use,
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but it is rare that this happens. Since these have the
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curiosity, they are easier to convert then warez d00ds.
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They are also the less mentioned of those in the underground,
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due to the fact that they are not too common, and not as easy to
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catch as the warez d00ds and pirates.
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5. Hackers vs. K0dez Kidz
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K0dez kidz are the greatest danger to hackers and
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the underground world as we know it. These are the people
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that learn of how to hack into a UNIX system, or how to
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tamper with the fone lines, but do not take neccessary
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precautions and alert the Fone company and Pd users that
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hackers exist and are a danger. These are the people that
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cause the fone company to escalate their security. These
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are the prime example of power given to ignorance (next to
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P. Bush, that is). These are the most difficult to convert,
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and are not worth trying, as they do not have the neccessary
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drive or curiousity to push them into the hacker world.
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This is just a informative article, meant to help
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you with your move to create a better world for us hackers,
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and to help you find out who's your friend and who isn't.
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There is no copyright on this, all rights wronged, all fun
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meant to be explored, every route meant to be taken.
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- Daemon
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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-=- The Empire Times -=-
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Volume 1, Issue 3, File 3 of 10
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ATM's '92 Style
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AAAAAAA TTTTTTTTT MMM MMM '''
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A A TT MMMM MMMM '''
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A A TT M M M M ' SSSS
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AAAAAAAAA TT MM M M MM S
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A A TT MM MM MM SSSS
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A A TT MM MM S
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A A TT MM MM SSSSS
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THE REAL FILE FOR ATM THIEFT IN 1992!!
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WRITTEN BY: THE RAVEN
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-===--=-=-=-=-=-=
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NOTE: There has been a few files written about how to 'RIP OFF' ATM's of
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some sort but this file will not contain technical shit on the card tracks
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or a xxxyyyooo17ss type of format. This text will tell you how to rip off
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ATM's with out all of that technical stuff that you can't really use because
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most of the stuff are too hard. So I give you methods on how you can defeat
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ATM's with things you may or may not need to pay a-lot for! This file is
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real unlike a file I came accross that a user uploaded on Blitzkreig called
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KRAD#1 which I feel was written by 10year olds. That file is totally SHIT!
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Now there was a-lot of Valid writers on the subject of ATM's but I feel
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they were on the subject of PINs & PANs which is very hard to do right.
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NOTE II: ATM theift is a Federal Crime and the Government doesn't like
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there funds fucked with. The author does not, DOES NOT bare
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responsiblity for the misuse of the information, if you are
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able to commit any of the crimes listed then your able to be
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responsible for your own damn actions! Dont tell'em I made you
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do it!
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THE RAVEN
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+=======+
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INDEX
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-----
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I. Con Jobs
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II. Physical Methods
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III. Electronic & Computer Scams
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IV. Bogus Cards, Getting PINs
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V. Authors Note
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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I. CON JOBS
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New York City (My Home!) is the leader in ATM con jobs. Altogether, about
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2,000 Citibank users were victimized by ATM con artist in one years time
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for a tune of $495,000!!So I'm going to spread some light on what and how
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these cons are pulled off.
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Method 1: THE "DEFECTIVE ATM" CON
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A con method popular with Citibank ATMs netted one con artist $92,000-
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with the unwitting assitance of his 374 victims. The scheme works in
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lobbies with more than one ATM, and a service phone. The well dressed and
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articulate con man poses as a legit user and stands between two ATMs,
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pretending to be talking to the bank service personnel over the service
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phone. After a user inserts his card into the ATMs card reader slot he
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tells his that the machine is not working. The user withdraws his card
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leaving the ATM activated. THe con man then observes theuser enterring his
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PIN into the adjecent ATM. Then, still holding the phone, the con man
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enters the users PIN into the first ATM. In make-believe conversation with
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the bank, the con man acts like he is receiving instructions from the bank.
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To complete the theft he talks the user (major social engineering!) into
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entering his card into the first ATM again to "test" or "clear" the ATM. He
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claims that bank personnel think that the user's card "locked up" or
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"jammed" the ATM and or that ATM may have made the users card defective,
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and the insertion of it is required to "unlock" or "unjam" the ATM and/or
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to verify that the user's card is still vaild. After the users leaves, the
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con manenters into the keypad and withdraws the maximum daily amount from
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the users account.
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This only works on Citibank ATMs cause they don't take the users card,
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but once the card is slipped in the ATM is activated.
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Method 2. PHONE PIN-EXTRACTION SCAMS
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Another popular con is for the con man to call up an ATM user whose card
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he's found or stolen. He identifies himself as a police officer, and
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obtains the PIN from the user by stating that it is required by law to
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verify the card owner. This works really well if you can bullshit them
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good like act like you have to do something and tell them to call you
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right back (on a loop!) and have a friend answer as the police
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station!
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Method 3. THE BANK DICK CON
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A subject was recently was recently convicted in N.Y. and Boston of
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defrauding ATM accounts of $150,000. He dubed over 300 ATM users into
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believing he was a bank security officer who needed assistance in the
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apprehending of a dishonest bank employee. The users were convinced to
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leave their bank cards under the locked door of the bank. The con man
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would then "fish" the cards out. The next morning the con man would
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have someone make a phone call to the card holder saying that they have
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caught the employee and dective "hacker" would like to thank you to.
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But since the employee did come is contact with there card the bank is
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going to give them a new PIN # after the get the old one! Then the con
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man's helper would say come pick up your new card and we will tell you
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your new PIN #.
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II. Physical Methods
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Some folks just dont like to outsmart a system or person. They prefer the
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more physical approach by either breaking or removing the ATM. The
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hazards are obvious-several built-in silent alarms,heavy stainless steel
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safe like construction, the amount of commotion and noise that results
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from their efforts, hard to dispose of evidence, etc. Those who have the
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most success with physical methods, plan and execute their operation as if
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it were commando mission.
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The methods described below can also be used on night depositories,
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payphones, dollar changers, candy machines, parking meters,etc. Physical
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attacks must be completed within 10 minutes as ATMs abound with vibration,
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heat and proximity detectors, and most are silent.
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To defeat any internal alarm mechanism,refer to the phone tapping approach
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(described in detail later) that hooks-up both the ATM and main computer
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to a programmed micro. So while Hood one is ripping-off or -up the ATM, the
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micro is whispering sweet nothings to the main computer. NOTE that not all
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ATM alarms transmit thru the ATM como lines, particulary with thru-the-wall
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ATMs. To minimize the noise and commotion, heavy blankets(used by movers)
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can be drapped over the ATM.
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Method 1. SUPER COLD GASES
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Liquid nitrogen can be used. It is simply poured onto or into the offending
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part of the ATM and when it hits 100 degrees or so, a sledge or a ballpeen
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hammer is smartyl slammedin to. THe metal SHOULD shatter like glass. Then
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one just simply reaches in and examines the untold riches stored inside.
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Super-cooled gases can also wreck havoc on electronics, cameras and films,
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and bullet-proof glass, and can be purchased from suppliers of medical and
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chemical supplies.
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Method 2. WATER & ICE
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We have also herd that pouring warm water into an isolated ATM on a very
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cold night is effective. When water freezes, it expands with a terrific
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force, and will shatter or tear apart anything made by man. The water is
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poured or pumped in thru the card slot or cash dispenser. It is heavily
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mixed with wood shavings or fiberglass to stop-up any drainage hole in the
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ATM. Leaks can also be plugged up with window putty or bubble gum.
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Method 3. MORE FREEZE METHODS
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ATMs use ACE locks (the ones found on most vending machines, the circle
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type lock) Freon works on these locks. Somw outlaws empty a can of freon
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into an ATM lock, pound a screwdriver into the key way, and wrench the lock
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out. And motor-driven ACE lock pick will vibrate pins into the right
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positions withine a few minutes. The ACE lock picks can be aquired from
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STEVE ARNOLDS GUN ROOM call (503)726-6360 for a free catalog they have
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a-lot of cool stuff!
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Method 4. ACETYLENE & DRILLS
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ATMs are notorisly vulnerable to attacks using acetylene torches. With most
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ATMs no more than 5 minutes are required for the entire job! And most ATMs
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can be drilled out in under 15 minutes, using carbide bits and high rpm
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drills (check on my SAFECRACKING text to see more about drilling.).
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Method 4. SHAPED CHARGES
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Placing shaped charges on each support and detonating them all at the same
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time liberates the ATM. You can firgue this out by yourself.You can also
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check most BBS's to find out how to make explosives but I wouldn't recommed
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it, since most of the expolsive files I've seen are inaccurate and leaves
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out MAJOR measurements and cautions! Your best best is to use black powder
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that you can get form almost all gun stores.
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Method 5. BLOCKING THE DISPENSER
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Some ATMs use money drawers. The ATM outlaw screws or epoxies the drawer
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solidly shut, at the onset of a busy three-day holiday. At the end of each
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night he returns and he removes the money by unscrewing or with a hammer &
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chisel, shatter the epoxy bond.
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III. ELECTRONIC & COMPUTER SCAMS
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Scarcely a week goes by that I don't hear about one scheme or another
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successfully used by phreaks & hackers to penetrate large systems to access
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data banks and to perform various manipulations.
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Although we have only been able to verify one or two of the methods that
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we will discribe, numerous cases have arisen in recent years in which an
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ATM was defrauded with no evidence of a hardware or software bug to account
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for the robbery.
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The outlaw can use several approaches. One is to use wiretapping. Another
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is to obtain the secrets of the cipher, or hardware or software defeats to
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the system and proceed accordingly. Another one that works with banks is to
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set up phony debit accounts and program the computer to beleive that the
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debit accounts are full of money. Then when a three day weekend comes around
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proceed with friend to deplete all of these debit accounts by making various
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rounds to ATMs.
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Electronic frauds of ATMs require an excellent technical understanding of
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phone and-or computers all of which you can obtain from worthy underground
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news letters such as TAP, and 2600, etc. OR from a H/P BBS.
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"Tapping" or "wiretapping" consists of the unauthorized electronic
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monitering of a signal (voice or digital) transmitted over a phone or
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computer (commo) circuit. A "tap" is the monitoring device that does this.
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Athough a tap is usually placed somewhere on a phoneline or junction box,
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it may be placed inside of a phone, modem or computer.
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With the advent of isolated stand-alone ATMs (with vulnerable phone lines,
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including POS terminals) and computer technology. The phone circuits that
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connect ATMs to their host computer (located in the banks data processing
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center) can be tapped anywhere between the two.
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An "invasive tap" is one in which a hard electronic connection is made
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between the tap and the commo circuit. A "non-invasive" tap is one in which
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an induction loop or antenna is used to pick up the EMI generated by the
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signal, and there is no physical connection between the commo circuit and
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the line.
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A "passive tap" is one in which the tap simply tramits to a recorder or
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directly records the tapped signal and in no way interfers with it. An
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"active tap" is one in which the tap ALSO interferes (changes,adds to or
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deletes) the tapped signal in some way. Active taps are more sophisted. A
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typical ATM active tap is one that records a signal, the later plays it
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back over the line.
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Be sure to look for my text "HIGH TECH TOYS" it lists were to get things
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that are VERY hard to get or things that you may need a license to obtain
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without those hassles all you need will be money!
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Method 1. PASSIVE TAPS
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All tapped ATM transactions are recorded over a period of time (but not
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interfered with). Once the serial protocal and MA codes are understood,
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the transmitted data is decrypted (if encrypted) using known entry data
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to the ATM. Note that some systems use a MA code that is complex and
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very difficult to crack.
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Messages to and from the ATMs host computers are composed of various
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fields. One field identifies the transaction type, one the PIN, one the
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PAN, one the amount, one the approval code, one the transaction number
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and perhaps other fields. In most systems, either nothing is encrypted
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or only the PIN field. In others, the entire message is encrypted.
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The ATM/host circuit is monitored over a period of time to deterive
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PINs,PANs and other entry data of other ATM users based upon (decrypted)
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transmitted data. Phony debit cards are then made to defraud ATM
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accounts with known PINs and PANs.
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Method 2. ACTIVE TAPS
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Active tapping is one method of spoofing. The c4ritical part of the host
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computer's message are the approval and amounts fields. The critical parts
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of the ATMs transmission are the continuous transmission it makes to the
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host computer when NO one is using it to indicate that it is OK, and the
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PIN and amount fields. Booth good and bad cards and good and bad PINs are
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entered at various times and days to differentiate between the various
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massage components. Various quiescent periods is also recorded.
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Once the message structures are understood, a computer is then substituted
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to act as both the host computer and the ATM. That is, a computer is then
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connected between the ATM and the host computer. This computer acts like
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the host computer to the ATM, and like the ATM to the host computer.
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An accomplice uses the ATM to go thru the motions of making legitimate
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transactions. If his procedures are correct, the ATM communicates, with
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the host computer for permission to discharge the money. Several methods:
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(A) The phreaker changes the approval field in the hosts message to OK
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the transaction regardless of its real decision. The phreaker may interdict
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the message regardless of iits real decision. The phreaker may interdict
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the message from the ATM to tell the host that the ATM is inactive while it
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||
interdicts the host message to tell the ATM to disburse the cash. Since the
|
||
ATM is no longer connected to the host computer, and the host computer
|
||
believes that it is talking to an unused ATM (or one engaged in balance
|
||
inquiry transaction), no monies will be deducted from any debit account, no
|
||
denials will be made based upon daily maximum limits, and no alarm will be
|
||
sounded due to suspicious behavior. Even if the ATM sounds an alarm, the
|
||
host computer wont hear it as long as the phreaker is whispering sweet
|
||
nothings into its ear. Also by using this method, as long as the PIN & PAN
|
||
check digits are legitimate ones based upon the ATMs preliminary and cursory
|
||
checks, the PINs and PANs themselves can be phony because the host won't
|
||
be there to verify legitimacies! That is no legal PINs and PANs need be known
|
||
nor the algorithm for encrypting PINs.
|
||
|
||
(B) The ATMs message is replaced by a previously recorded legitimate
|
||
transaction message played back by the phreaker. The cash is despense as
|
||
before. The play back method won't work if the encryption or MA process
|
||
embed a transaction, clock or random code into the message, making all
|
||
messages unique.
|
||
|
||
(C) The phreaker/hacker changes the PIN field in the ATMs message to a
|
||
legitimate PIN of a fat-cat like DONALD TRUMPs account. The phreaker/hacker
|
||
then withdraws someone else's money.
|
||
|
||
(D) The phreaker/hacker changes the amount field in the ATMs message to a
|
||
much lower one, and then changes the amount field in the host's message
|
||
back to the higher amount (debit transactions- the opposite changes are made
|
||
for credit transactions). Sooo the phreaker can withdraw $200 from his
|
||
account with only $10 actually debited from it by the host. He can then make
|
||
many withdrawals before the host cuts him off for exceeding the daily max.
|
||
|
||
Method 3. TEMPEST IV
|
||
A thin induction pick-up coil, consisting of many turns of one thickness
|
||
of #28 or thinner enamel wire sandwiched between two self-adhesive labels,
|
||
no larger than a debit card, can be inserted at least part way inside the
|
||
card slot of most ATMs. This coil is then used to "listen in" on the
|
||
electrical activity inside of the ATM to try to determine which signals
|
||
control the release of money. Using this same coil as a transmitter
|
||
anteenna, these signals are then transmitted ti the realse logic to activate
|
||
it.
|
||
It is believed that a thin coil about the size of a dime can be maneuvered
|
||
quite a ways inside most ATMs for sensing purpose, and that small metal
|
||
hooks have also been fed into ATMs to obtain direct hookups to logic and
|
||
power circuits.
|
||
It is believe that some outlaws have obtained ATM cards. They then machined
|
||
out the inside of the cards, except the magnetic strip. They then place flat
|
||
coils inside the machined out area. They then monitor the coils during
|
||
legitimate transactions. They can also use the coils to transmit desired
|
||
signals. This is kind of the method used in TERMINATOR 2.
|
||
|
||
IV. BOGUS CARD, GETTING PINs
|
||
|
||
Almost all credit cards now come with either a hologram or an embedded chip
|
||
("Smart Card"), and are thus nearly impossible to counterfeit to date.
|
||
However, since most debit cards are not optically read by ATMs, they are
|
||
much easier to counterfeit. To counterfeit a card the following is needed:
|
||
(1) A card embosser, which can be readily obtained from commercial
|
||
sources (see "Embossing Equipment and Supplies" or similar in the Yellow
|
||
Pages) without question asked. A used, serviceable embosser ran use $210 +
|
||
shipping & handling. (2) A magnetic stripe decoder/encoder (skimmer), which
|
||
can be purchased from the same company as the embossing equipment or just
|
||
look in the back of Computer Magazines. (3) PIN checkers are not known to be
|
||
available to the general public. However, if one were stolen, the user could
|
||
guess at card PINs by trial-and-error effort based upon the knowledge of how
|
||
PINs are derived. (4) PANs,PINs and ciphers, which can be obtained from a
|
||
number of ways usually involving theft. About 50% of ATM users write their
|
||
PINs either on their debit card or somewhere in there wallet or purse. And
|
||
most user-chosen PINs are easily guessed. The encrypted PINs can be directly
|
||
lifted or read from the magnetic stripe, and the encryption scheme determined
|
||
by comparing the encryption with the known PIN # of a dozen or so cards.
|
||
|
||
V. NOTE
|
||
|
||
Now this text covers the file that I have put together on ATMs but I know
|
||
that there is more on the subject that I have left out either because I dont
|
||
want to put it or because my staff: The High-Tech Hoods did get or know the
|
||
info. now I am open to suggestions for ATM 2 but I dont want any ideas I
|
||
want proof. !! Then I'll publish it and give credit where credit is due.
|
||
I can be reached on the following bbs's:
|
||
Blitzkreig (502) 499-8933
|
||
|
||
RIPCO (312) 528-5020
|
||
|
||
Those bbs's get my files first run!!! C Ya and remember dont get caught!!
|
||
|
||
Look for my other files: Burglar Alarm Bypass prts. 1,2 & 3
|
||
SafeCracking
|
||
Van Eck Phreaking (will appear in TAP)
|
||
Counterfeiting prt 1. & prt 2
|
||
High-Tech Toys Sources List
|
||
The Raven Reports 1-???
|
||
|
||
Comming Soon: Stopping Power Meters
|
||
KW-HR METERS ^
|
||
Liberate Gas & Water Meters
|
||
Cons & Scams
|
||
Shoplifting
|
||
and what ever you want info on!
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE RAVEN
|
||
+=======+
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 4 of 10
|
||
Building a Anti-BUG
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
This file Presented by METRONET system (301)-944-3023 The bug's that this
|
||
device detects are Infinity transmitters, read the Infinity transmitter
|
||
bulletin for more info.
|
||
|
||
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
|
||
: :
|
||
: How to build a Bug Detector :
|
||
: :
|
||
: by :
|
||
: :
|
||
: The Gremlin :
|
||
: :
|
||
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Warning: This formatted for 80 column and upper/lower case capabilities...
|
||
|
||
][][][
|
||
Basic theory
|
||
][][][
|
||
|
||
Because most bugs are triggered through certain frequencies, it is very simple
|
||
to build a small sweeping device that will trigger any bug present. The two
|
||
IC's are what create the oscillating tone. The IC1 operates at .8 Hz where the
|
||
IC2 runs at about 10 Hz. Frequency is determined by this formula:
|
||
|
||
f=1.44/(R1+2R2)C)
|
||
|
||
f measured in Hertz, R in megohms, and C in microfarads
|
||
|
||
The oscillation can be varied by the voltage placed upon pin #5. This is how
|
||
we create the wave sound. When voltage goes up, so does the frequency, and
|
||
vice-versa.
|
||
|
||
Normally, the output pin 3 is a square wave. Since we need varying wave at pin
|
||
#5, we need a triangular wave. We get this through integrating the square wave
|
||
created at pin #3 of IC1. It is acheived by D1, D2, R3, R4 and C2.
|
||
|
||
This varying output is fed into the phone line by transformer T1 which has an 8
|
||
ohm winding going to pin #3 of IC2 and the 500 end to a 0.1 microfarad capaci-
|
||
tator at the phone line.
|
||
|
||
Enuf talk..let's get movin!
|
||
|
||
|
||
][][][
|
||
Schematic Design
|
||
][][][
|
||
|
||
|
||
+9v
|
||
|
||
__________|_____________________________
|
||
| _|__|_ _|__|_ |
|
||
R1 | 4 8 | _|<D1__R3__ | 4 8 | R5
|
||
| | | | | | | |
|
||
+-----+2 3+---+ +-+5 2|--+----+----+
|
||
| | | |_>|R2__R4__| | | | |
|
||
R2 | ic1 | | | ic2 | R6 D3
|
||
| +-+6 | ___| | 6+-+ | V
|
||
| | | | | | | | | -
|
||
+---+-+7 | | +--+3 7+-+-----+----+
|
||
| |___1__| | | |___1__| |
|
||
| | | | | C4
|
||
| | | | | ^
|
||
C1 | C2 T1 _|_._C3|(_. |
|
||
^ | ^ 8--500<_|_. |
|
||
|_________|______________|__|______|__________|
|
||
|
|
||
-G-
|
||
|
||
|
||
][][][
|
||
Parts List
|
||
][][][
|
||
|
||
C1 10-uF electrolytic capacitator 25 WDVC
|
||
C2 300-uF electrolytic capacitator 25 WDVC
|
||
C3 0.1-uF capacitator
|
||
C4 0.068-uF capacitator
|
||
D1-D3 1N914
|
||
IC1,IC2 555 timers
|
||
R1, R4-R6 1-kilohm resistors
|
||
R2 91-kilohm resistor
|
||
R3 22 kilohm resistor
|
||
T1 500-to-8 ohm audio output transformer
|
||
|
||
][][][
|
||
Construction
|
||
------------
|
||
|
||
When building this unit, it is very useful to use a breadboard or vector board.
|
||
I suggest that leads being connected to phone line (T1, C3) end in a jack or a
|
||
modular connector to make the hookup easier. To test it, hook it to the phone
|
||
line (not the suspected line) and call the line you suspect is being bugged.
|
||
The party you are calling should not answer the phone. Now, the unit is
|
||
activated. 3 times, every 4 seconds, the oscillator will go up to 10 kHz and
|
||
back down again..like a bell curve..If there is a frequency sensitive bug on
|
||
the line, the phone will stop ringing, and you will be able to hear everything
|
||
said in the room. If the phone keeps ringing, chances are that all is
|
||
fine..unless the bug requires a multi-frequency trigger..but these are very
|
||
rare..
|
||
|
||
So, we can see that 415-BUG-1111 really does work! It creates the tone..any
|
||
click heard is the Phone Co's (or whoever is bugging) speaker/tape recorder
|
||
picking up!
|
||
|
||
|
||
Have phun, and hope it helped!
|
||
|
||
The Gremlin
|
||
|
||
...call the Gremlin's Lair..201-536-7794..today!...
|
||
|
||
[Thanks again Metronet!]
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 5 of 10
|
||
The Milnet
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
][=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=][
|
||
][ ][
|
||
][ Finally it's here.......... ][
|
||
][ /\/\ /\/\ ][
|
||
][ / \ / / ][
|
||
][ \/\/\/il\/\/et ][
|
||
][ by: ___ __ ______ ][
|
||
][ __) / _` / ____/ ][
|
||
][ __)rigadier \__eneral / /wipe ][
|
||
][ ______________________/ / ][
|
||
][ /_______________________/ ][
|
||
][ (aka: Dispater) ][
|
||
][ ][
|
||
][ Thanx to: no one! G.D.I. (God Damn Independant) ][
|
||
][ ][
|
||
][=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=][
|
||
Into:
|
||
-----
|
||
First of all Milnet is a system used by the Air Force and the Pentagon for
|
||
communication use. You know you are on milnet when you see that infamous
|
||
TAC login xxx. Milnet is run out of the University of Southern California,
|
||
(this might give some of you some ideas who live around there).
|
||
Logon Info
|
||
------------
|
||
The Milnet number is 1-800-368-2217.
|
||
The ISI MASTER DIAL UP IS 213-306-1366.
|
||
This is a more tricky logon procedure but if you got balls, you're using a
|
||
trunk box, or you are just S-T-U-P-I-D here goes:
|
||
ISIE MASTER LOGON PROCEEDURE
|
||
----------------------------
|
||
1> call 213-306-1366
|
||
2> when the phone stops ringing you are connected
|
||
3> enter location number (9 digits) + 1 or 0
|
||
4> hang up and it will call you
|
||
5> pick up the phone and hit the '*' on your phone
|
||
6> hit a carriage return on the computer
|
||
7> at the 'what class?' prompt hit RETURN!!!
|
||
8> then a 'go' prompt will appear and log on as you would the 800 number.
|
||
MILNET LOGIN PROCEEDURE
|
||
-----------------------
|
||
If you have trouble connecting try 300 bauds instead of 1200. It's a bite in
|
||
the ass but, sometime the connection will fuck up if you don't.
|
||
When you first connect you will see:
|
||
'WELCOME TO DDN. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.TAC LOGIN
|
||
CALL NIC 1-800-235-3155 FOR HELP
|
||
WRPAT TAC 113 #:36
|
||
(you type)
|
||
@o 1/103
|
||
YOU ALWAYS TYPE @o then other connections are:
|
||
ISIA 3/103
|
||
ISIB 10:3/52
|
||
ISID 10:0/27
|
||
ISIE 1/103 (THE EXAMPLE)
|
||
ISIF 2/103
|
||
VAX A 10:2/27
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Next you will see a 'USER-ID' promt. The first 4 characters vary but it is
|
||
is always followed by a '-' and what ever connection you choose.
|
||
User-Id: (example) CER5-ISIE or MRW1-ISIE
|
||
The first three letters are the initials of the user followed by a random
|
||
number (1-9).
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Access Code: (example) 2285UNG6A or 22L8KK5CH
|
||
An access code will never contain a ( 1, 0, G, Z).
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
@ USERNAME + PASSWORD IE USERNAME SAC.305AREFW-LGTO
|
||
THE USERNAME EXPLANATION:
|
||
The first 3 letters will be SAC. This stands for Strategic Air
|
||
Command.
|
||
Followint that is a '.' Then the squadron number and the prime mission.
|
||
In this case '305AREFW', (305TH AIR REFULING WING). Then a '-' and the
|
||
Individual Squadron name 'LGTO' (LOGISTICS GROUND TRANSPORATION OPERATIONS),
|
||
a fancey name for the motor pool. I'll try and get a list of these there are
|
||
tons of names.
|
||
The password will not be echoed back and should be entered after a
|
||
the username.
|
||
The new user password as a default is: NEW-UZER-ACNT
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
+-------------+
|
||
THINGS TO DO: PROGRAMS AVALIABLE TO SAC USERS:
|
||
+-------------+ and what they are for
|
||
copied direcly from the help manual
|
||
ADUTY aids in management of additional duty assignments.
|
||
(International help - use the ? and <ESC> keys, HELP.)
|
||
ARCHIVE requests files to be stored on tape for later retreval.
|
||
(Type HELP ARCHIVE <RET> at TOPS-20.)
|
||
CHAT Provides near real time communication between terminal users on the
|
||
same host computer.
|
||
(Use ? with CHAT.)
|
||
DAILY Executive appointment scheduleing program
|
||
DCOPY Handles output on DIABLO and XEROX printers
|
||
EMACS Powerful full-screen text editor
|
||
FOLLOW Suspense follow up program
|
||
FTP provides file transfer capabilites between host computers
|
||
FKEYS allows user to define function key (real spiffaruni)
|
||
HELP the command used by stupid generals or hackers that have never used
|
||
milnet before
|
||
HERMES E-Mail
|
||
NCPCALC spreadsheet program
|
||
PHOTO saves transcripts of sessions
|
||
REMIND sends user-created reminders
|
||
RIPSORT a sophisticated data sorting program
|
||
(Described in SAC's User manual (sorry))
|
||
SCRIBE a powerful text formatter for preparing documents.
|
||
(ISI's manual, SCRIBE manual - soon on MILNET V.2)
|
||
SPELL text file spelling checker.
|
||
(HELP at TOPS-20 and <DOCUMENTATION> directory international help -?)
|
||
SUSCON allows the creating, sending, and clearing of suspenses.
|
||
(international help - ? and <ESC>, HELP command)
|
||
TACOPY used for printing hard copies of files
|
||
(international help - ?)
|
||
TALK pretty much the same as chat.
|
||
TIPCOPY predecessor of TACOPY
|
||
TEACH-EMACS (SELF EXPLANITORY: GIVES LIST OF COMMNADS)
|
||
TN Tel-Net provides multi-host access on MILNET.
|
||
(HELP at TOPS-20 and <DOCUMENTATION> directory,
|
||
international help - use ? and <ESC>)
|
||
XED line oriented text editor.
|
||
(HELP at TOPS-20 and <DOCUMENTATION> directory)
|
||
LOGGING OFF
|
||
------------
|
||
TYPE: @L (PRETTY TOUGH HUH?)
|
||
+------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
|
||
The Milnet ID card If you should be trashing somewhere and find a card that
|
||
+------------------+ looks like this, then save it. (it will be blue & white)
|
||
_______________________________________
|
||
/ \ It's also wallet sized so you may
|
||
HOST USC-ISIE 26.1.0.103 wish to mug someone who you know
|
||
HOST ADMINISTRATOR GORDON,VICKI L. is in the air force..haha!
|
||
--------------------------------------- (just kidding!)
|
||
DDN CARD HOLDER:
|
||
REID, CALVIN E, 1st LT.
|
||
CARD 118445
|
||
---------------------------------------
|
||
USER ID:CER5-ISIE
|
||
ACCESS CODE:2285UNG6A
|
||
USERNAME: SAC.305AREFW-LGTO
|
||
PASSWORD: NEW-UZER-ACNT
|
||
\_______________________________________/
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 6 of 10
|
||
What is CyberSpace
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
What is Cyberspace?
|
||
|
||
David G.W. Birch & S. Peter Buck, Hyperion 1
|
||
|
||
|
||
WHAT IS CYBERSPACE?
|
||
Introduction
|
||
In a recent issue of the Computer Law & Security Report [1], Bernard Zajac
|
||
suggested that readers might want to peruse some of the "cyberpunk"
|
||
novels-in particular the works of William Gibson-in order to gain an
|
||
insight into the organisation and behaviour of hackers. While wholly
|
||
commending the incitement to read Gibson's work, we feel that this view
|
||
understates the breadth of vision of the cyberpunk genre and could mislead,
|
||
because the "console men" and "keyboard cowboys" of Gibson's works are not
|
||
really the same people as the hackers of today.
|
||
We thought it might therefore be both entertaining and stimulating to
|
||
provide readers with an overview of the world of cyberspace and to draw
|
||
attention to some elements of the works where we feel that there are indeed
|
||
some points worth further analysis and discussion. Is it possible that,
|
||
like Arthur C. Clarke's much vaunted prediction of the communication
|
||
satellite [2], Gibson has produced works which are not so much science
|
||
fiction as informed prediction?
|
||
Gibson is not the only cyberpunk author, but he has become probably the
|
||
most well-known. Essential reading includes his books Count Zero [3],
|
||
Neuromancer [4], Burning Chrome [5] and Mona Lisa Overdrive [6]. For
|
||
readers new to the subject, Mirroshades [7] is an excellent anthology of
|
||
cyberpunk short stories which gives an overview of the spectrum of
|
||
cyberpunk writing.
|
||
Cyberspace
|
||
Description
|
||
Cyberspace is an extension of the idea of virtual reality. Instead of
|
||
seeing computer data converted into pictures that come from human
|
||
experience (as in a flight simulator), or extensions from human experience
|
||
(such as the "desktop" metaphor used with personal computers), cyberspace
|
||
comprises computers, telecommunications, software and data in a more
|
||
abstract form. At the core of cyberspace is the matrix or the Net:
|
||
"The Net... joins all of the computers and telephones on Earth. It is
|
||
formed by radio, telepho and cellular links with microwave transmitters
|
||
beaming information into orbit and beyond. In the 20th century, the Net
|
||
was only accessible via a computer terminal, using a device called a modem
|
||
to send and receive information. But in 2013, the Net can be entered
|
||
directly using your own brain, neural plugs and complex interface programs
|
||
that turn computer data into perceptual events" View From the Edge, [8].
|
||
In several places, reference is made to the military origin of the
|
||
cyberspace interfaces:
|
||
"You're a console cowboy. The prototypes of the programs you use to crack
|
||
industrial banks were developed for [a military operation]. For the
|
||
assault on the Kirensk computer nexus. Basic module was a Nightwing
|
||
microlight, a pilot, a matrix deck, a jockey. We were running a virus
|
||
called Mole. The Mole series was the first generation of real intrusion
|
||
programs." Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
"The matrix has its roots in primitive arcade games... early graphics
|
||
programs and military experimentation with cranial jack" Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
Gibson also assumes that in addition to being able to "jack in" to the
|
||
matrix, you can go through the matrix to jack in to another person using a
|
||
"simstim" deck. Using the simstim deck, you experience everything that the
|
||
person you are connected to experiences:
|
||
"Case hit the simstim switch. And flipped in to the agony of a broken
|
||
bone. Molly was braced against the blank grey wall of a long corridor, her
|
||
breath coming ragged and uneven. Case was back in the matrix instantly, a
|
||
white-hot line of pain fading in his left thigh." Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
The matrix can be a very dangerous place. As your brain is connected in,
|
||
should your interface program be altered, you will suffer. If your program
|
||
is deleted, you would die. One of the characters in Neuromancer is called
|
||
the Dixie Flatline, so named because he has survived deletion in the
|
||
matrix. He is revered as a hero of the cyber jockeys:
|
||
"'Well, if we can get the Flatline, we're home free. He was the best. You
|
||
know he died braindeath three times.' She nodded. 'Flatlined on his EEG. Showed me the tapes.'" Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
Incidentally, the Flatline doesn't exist as a person any more: his mind
|
||
has been stored in a RAM chip which can be connected to the matrix.
|
||
Operation
|
||
So how does cyberspace work? As noted previously, you connect to the
|
||
matrix through a deck which runs an interface program:
|
||
"A silver tide of phosphenes boiled across my field of vision as the matrix
|
||
began to unfold in my head, a 3-D chessboard, infinite and perfectly
|
||
transparent. The Russian program seemed to lurch as we entered the grid.
|
||
If anyone else had been jacked in to that part of the matrix, he might have
|
||
seen a surf of flickering shadow ride out of the little yellow pyramid that
|
||
represented our computer." Burning Chrome, [5].
|
||
"Tick executed the transit in real time, rather than the bodyless,
|
||
instantaneous shifts ordinarily employed in the matrix. The yellow plain,
|
||
he explained, roofed the London Stock Exchange and related City entities...
|
||
'Th's White's,' Tick was saying, directing her attention to a modest grey
|
||
pyramid, 'the club in St. James'. Membership directory, waiting list..."
|
||
Mona Lisa Overdrive, [6].
|
||
Is this view of operating computers and communications networks by moving
|
||
around inn ethereal machine-generated world really that far-fetched? When
|
||
the first virtual reality (VR) units for personal computers will probably
|
||
be in the shops by next Christmas? If you still think that VR is science
|
||
fiction, note that British television viewers will shortly be tuning in to
|
||
a new game show (called "CyberZone") where the digital images of teams of
|
||
players equipped with VR helmets, power gloves and pressure pads will fight
|
||
it out in a computer-generated world (built using 16 IBM PCs fronting an
|
||
ICL master computer).
|
||
Cyber World
|
||
Organisation
|
||
The world of cyberpunk is near future (say, 50 years at the maximum) Earth.
|
||
Nation states and their governments are unimportant and largely
|
||
irrelevant. The world is run by giant Japanese-American-European
|
||
multinational conglomerates, the zaibatsu. Gibson frequently uses Japanese
|
||
words and Japanese slang to reinforce the expanding role of Japan in the
|
||
world and in society. In the same way that business has agglomerated on a
|
||
global scale, the mafia have merged with the Japanese gangs, the yakuza.
|
||
The zaibatsu are in constant conflict and the yakuza are their agents:
|
||
"Business has no stake in any political system per se. Business
|
||
co-operates to the extent that co-operation furthers its own interests.
|
||
And the primary interest of business is growth and dominance. Once the
|
||
establishment of Free Enterprise Zones freed corporations from all
|
||
constraints, they reverted to a primal struggle, which continues to this
|
||
day." Stone Lives, [9].
|
||
Far fetched? Again, not really. Even as we sat down to write this
|
||
article, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Nomura (the world's largest
|
||
financial institution) were resigning because of their links with organised
|
||
crime:
|
||
"Sceptics say that four decades of accommodation between police,
|
||
politicians and yakuza will not be overturned simply by new legislation.
|
||
There are believed to be almost 100,000 full-time gangsters in Japan, a
|
||
quarter of whom belong to the Yamaguchi-Gumi, a mammoth organisation with
|
||
900 affiliates and a portfolio of operations ranging from prostitution,
|
||
drugs and share speculation to run-of-the mill protection rackets" [10].
|
||
Herein lies a major feature of Gibson's books. The cyber jockeys are not
|
||
student pranksters or teenage hackers messing about with other peoples'
|
||
computers for fun or mischief (The Lord of the Files, [11]): by and large
|
||
they are either working for the zaibatsu or the yakuza and their (for
|
||
profit) activities revolve around industrial espionage and sabotage.
|
||
Information
|
||
A fundamental theme running through most cyberpunk literature is that (in
|
||
the near future Earth) commodities are unimportant. Since anything can be
|
||
manufactured, very cheaply, manufactured goods (and the commodities that
|
||
are needed to create them) are no longer central to economic life. The
|
||
only real commodity is information. In fact, in many ways, the zaibatsu are the information that they
|
||
own:
|
||
"But weren't the zaibatsu more like that, or the yakuza, hives with
|
||
cybernetic memories, vast single organisms with their DNA coded in
|
||
silicon?" Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
Naturally, with information so vital, the zaibatsu go to great lengths to
|
||
protect their data. In Johnny Mnemonic, one of Gibson's short stories, the
|
||
eponymous "hero" has data hidden in his own memory to keep it safe from the
|
||
yakuza:
|
||
"The stored data are fed in through a series of microsurgical contraautism
|
||
prostheses.' I reeled off a numb version of my standard sales pitch.
|
||
'Client's code is stored in a special chip... Can't drug it out, cut it
|
||
out, rture it out. I don't know it, never did." Johnny Mnemonic, [12].
|
||
With information so fundamental to the business world, the mechanics of
|
||
business are vastly different from those we know at present. In our
|
||
current product- and service-based business world, we are used to dealing
|
||
with items that can be stamped, traced, taxed, counted and measured. When
|
||
the primary commodity is information, these attributes no longer apply and
|
||
the structure of the business world is different. This has already been
|
||
recognised by many people, including the well-known management consultant
|
||
Peter Drucker [13]:
|
||
"So far most computer users still use the new technology only to do faster
|
||
what they have done before, crunch conventional numbers. But as soon as a
|
||
company takes the first tentative steps from data to information, its
|
||
decision processes, management structure and even the way it gets its work
|
||
done begin to be transformed."
|
||
Net Running
|
||
Hacking is too trivial and undescriptive a term to use for the unauthorised
|
||
and illegal activities of the cyber jockeys in cyberspace. A much better
|
||
terms is "Net running".
|
||
"They found their 'paradise'... on the jumbled border of a low security
|
||
academic grid. At first glance it resembled the kind of graffiti student
|
||
operators somimes left at the junction of grid lines, faint glyphs of
|
||
coloured light that shimmered against the confused outlines of a dozen arts
|
||
faculties. 'There,' said the Flatline. 'the blue one. Make it out?
|
||
That's an entry code for Bell Europa. Fresh, too." Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
Everywhere in the Net, there is "ice". Ice is security countermeasures
|
||
software. The Net runners spend most of their time in the matrix
|
||
encountering, evaluating and evading these countermeasures. The encounters
|
||
with ice are brilliantly described in many of Gibson's books:
|
||
"We've crashed her gates disguised as an audit and three subpoenas, but her
|
||
[the organisation being attacked] defences are specifically geared to deal
|
||
with that kind of intrusion. Her most sophisticated ice is structured to
|
||
fend off writs, warrants, subpoenas. When we breached the first gate, the
|
||
bulk of her data vanished behind core command ice... Five separate
|
||
landlines spurted May Day signals to law firms, but the virus had already
|
||
taken over the parameter e... The Russian program lifts a Tokyo number
|
||
from unscreened data, choosing it for frequency of calls, average length of
|
||
calls, the speed with which [the organisation] returned those calls.
|
||
'Okay,' says Bobby, 'we're an incoming scrambler call from a l of hers in
|
||
Tokyo. That should help.' Ride 'em cowboy." Burning Chrome, [14].
|
||
The best ice contains elements of artificial intelligence (AI):
|
||
"'That's it huh? Big green rectangle off left?' 'You got it. Corporate
|
||
core data for [another organisation] and that ice is generated by their two
|
||
friendly AIs. On par with anything in the military sector, looks to me.
|
||
That's king hell ice, Case, black as the grave and slick as glass. Fry
|
||
your brains as soon as look at you." Neuromancer, [4].
|
||
These descriptions cannot be seen as predictions: they are just
|
||
straightforward extrapolations based on current technology and trends.
|
||
Predictions
|
||
So what are the core "predictions" of cyberpunk and do they have relevance
|
||
to security strategies today?
|
||
Computer and communications technology is already at a point where the Net
|
||
is only a few years away. Charles L. Brown, the CEO of AT&T, put it like this:
|
||
"The phone system, when coupled with computer technology, permits a person
|
||
almost anywhere to plug in to a world library of information... Just around
|
||
the bend is an information network that would increase the range of
|
||
perception of a single individual to include all of the information
|
||
available anywhere in the network's universe." [15].
|
||
The development of the corrate world so that information becomes the
|
||
primary commodity is already underway. This does have implications for
|
||
planning, because too many existing risk management policies are
|
||
asset-based. As it is easier to value a computer than value the
|
||
information it holds, too much effort has gone into valuing and protecting
|
||
physical assets rather than information assets. Already, there is a good
|
||
argument for saying that the information assets are the key [16]:
|
||
"A new concept of business is taking shape in response to the info-wars now
|
||
raging across the world economy. As knowledge becomes more central to the
|
||
creation of wealth, we begin to think of the corporation as an enhancer of
|
||
knowledge."
|
||
How will the information assets be valued? How will the world of mergers
|
||
and acquisitions deal with the problem of rate of return on "intangible"
|
||
assets. An interesting parallel can be drawn with the relatively recent
|
||
attempts to value brand names and include the brand names as assets on
|
||
balance sheets.
|
||
The legal sector is probably even further behind than the security sector.
|
||
With the legal system already struggling to catch up with the developments
|
||
in computer and communications technology, it is hard to imagine how it
|
||
could come to terms with cyberspace:
|
||
"As communications and data processing technology continues to advance at a
|
||
pace many times faster than society can assimilate it, additional conflicts
|
||
have begun to occur on the border between cyberspace and the physical
|
||
world." [17].
|
||
In fact, these conflicts are already causing many problems as evidenced by
|
||
recent events and court cases in the U.S. [18]:
|
||
"Do electronic bulletin boards that may list stolen access codes enjoy
|
||
protection under the First Amendment?"
|
||
"How can privacy be ensured when computers record every phone call, cash
|
||
withdrawal and credit-card transaction. What "property rights" can be
|
||
protected in digital electronic systems that can create copies that are
|
||
indistinguishable from the real thing."
|
||
" Ten months after the Secret Service shut down the [electronics bulletin
|
||
boards], the Government still has not produced any indictments. And
|
||
several similar cases that have come before the courts have been badly
|
||
flawed. One Austin-based game publisher whose bulletin board system was
|
||
seized last March is expected soon to sue the Government for violating his
|
||
civil liberties."
|
||
Summary
|
||
We hope that this brief overview of the world of cyberpunk has done justice
|
||
to the excellent books from which we have quoted and encouraged some
|
||
readers to dip into the collection.
|
||
So is Gibson's work an example of a science fiction prediction that will
|
||
prove to be as accurate as Clarke's prediction of the communications
|
||
satellite? Not really: the world that Gibson writes about is more a well
|
||
thought out extension of the situation at present than a radical
|
||
prediction. After all, as Gordon Gekko (the character played by Michael
|
||
Douglas) says in the film Wall Street, "The most valuable commodity I know
|
||
of is information. Wouldn't you agree?"
|
||
References
|
||
1. Zajac, B., Ethics & Computing (Part II). Computer Law and Security
|
||
Report, 1991. 7(2).
|
||
2. Clarke, A.C., Extraterrestrial Relays, in Wireless World. 1945, p.
|
||
305-308.
|
||
3. Gibson, W., Count Zero. 1987, London: Grafton.
|
||
4. Gibson, W., Neuromancer. 1984, New York: Ace.
|
||
5. Gibson, W., Burning Chrome. 1987, New York: Ace.
|
||
6. Gibson, W., Mona Lisa Overdrive. 1989, London: Grafton.
|
||
7. Sterling, B., ed. Mirrorshades. 1988, Paladin: London.
|
||
8. View from the Edge-The Cyberpunk Handbook. 1988, R. Talsorian Games Inc.
|
||
|
||
9. Fillipo, P.D., Stone Lives, in Mirrorshades, B. Sterling, Editor. 1988,
|
||
Paladin: London.
|
||
10. Japan's Mafia Takes on a 6bn Business, in The Guardian. 1991, London.
|
||
11. Girvan and Jones, The Lord of the Files, in Digital Dreams, Barrett,
|
||
Editor. 1990, New English Library: London.
|
||
12. Gibson, W., Johnny Mnemonic, in Burning Chrome. 1987, Ace: New York.
|
||
13. Cane, A., Differences of Culture and Technology, in The Financial
|
||
Times. 1991, London. p. European IT Supplement.
|
||
14. Gibson, W., Burning Chrome, in Burning Chrome. 1987, Ace: New York.
|
||
15. Wurman, R.S., Information Anxiety. 1991, London: Pan.
|
||
16. Toffler, A., Total Information War, in Power Shift. 1991, Bantam Books:
|
||
London.
|
||
17. Barlow, Coming in to the Country. Communications of the ACM, 1991.
|
||
34(3).
|
||
18. Elmer-Dewitt, P., Cyberpunks and the Constitution, in Time. 1991, p.
|
||
81.
|
||
Authors
|
||
David Birch graduated from the University of Southampton and then joined
|
||
Logica, where he spent several years working as a consultant specialising
|
||
in communications. In 1986 he was one of the founders of Hyperion. He has
|
||
worked on a wide range of information technology projects in the U.K.,
|
||
Europe, the Far East and North America for clients as diverse as the
|
||
International Stock Exchange, IBM and the Indonesian PTT. David was
|
||
appointed Visiting Lecturer in Information Technology Management at the
|
||
City Univeristy Business School in 1990 and was one of the founder members
|
||
of the Highfield EDI and legal security business research group. His
|
||
Cyberspace address is 100014,3342 on Compuserve.
|
||
Peter Buck graduated from the Imperial College and spent 10 years with the
|
||
International Stock Exchange, where he was co-architect of SEAQ, the
|
||
computer system that was at the heart of the City's "big bang" He then
|
||
joined Hyperion, where he is a Senior Consultant working in the field of
|
||
advanced communications. His work on the application of satellite and
|
||
mobile communications-for clients including Mercury, Dow Jones and
|
||
SWIFT-for business has put him at the leading-edge of work in these fields.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 7 of 10
|
||
Summary of CFP-2
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY-2: A REPORT
|
||
by Steve Cisler (sac@apple.com)
|
||
|
||
|
||
[The opinions and views expressed are those of the author, Steve Cisler,
|
||
and not necessarily those of Apple Computer, Inc. Misquotes of people's
|
||
statements are my responsibility. Permission is granted for re-posting
|
||
in electronic form or printing in whole or in part by non-profit
|
||
organizations or individuals. Transformations or mutations into
|
||
musicals, docudramas, morality plays, or wacky sitcoms remain the right
|
||
of the author. This file may be found on the Internet in ftp.apple.com
|
||
in the alug directory.
|
||
-Steve Cisler, Apple Computer Library.
|
||
Internet address: sac@apple.com ]
|
||
|
||
The Second Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy, (March
|
||
18-20, 1992. Washington,D.C.).was sponsored by the Association for
|
||
Computing Machinery and thirteen co-sponsors including the American
|
||
Library Association and a wide variety of advocacy groups.
|
||
|
||
The diversity of the attendees, the scope of the topics covered,
|
||
and the dynamism of the organized and informal sessions gave me a
|
||
perspective I had lost in endless conferences devoted only to library,
|
||
information, and network issues. I can now view the narrower topics of
|
||
concern to me as a librarian in new ways. Because of that it was one of
|
||
the best conferences I have attended. But there's a danger of these
|
||
issues being re-hashed each year with "the usual suspects" invited each
|
||
time to be panelists, so I urge you, the readers, to become involved and
|
||
bring your own experiences to the next conference in 1993 in the San
|
||
Francisco Bay Area.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Wednesday, March 18
|
||
|
||
The day began with concurrent tutorials on the following topics:
|
||
Getting on the Net (Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier
|
||
Foundation);
|
||
Making Information Law and Policy (Jane Bortnick, Congressional
|
||
Research Service);
|
||
Communications and Network Evolution (Sergio Heker, JVNCNet),
|
||
Private Sector Privacy (Jeff Smith, Georgetown University);
|
||
Constitutional Law for Non-lawyers (Mike Godwin, EFF);
|
||
Computer Crime (Don Ingraham, Alameda County (CA) District Attorney);
|
||
Modern Telecommunications: Life After Humpty- Dumpty (Richard
|
||
Wolff, Bellcore);
|
||
International Privacy Developments (David Flaherty, Univ. of
|
||
Western Ontario);
|
||
|
||
and the one I attended...
|
||
Information Law and Policy: Jane Bortnick,
|
||
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
|
||
|
||
In Bortnick's tutorial, she covered the following points:
|
||
1)Setting information policy is not a linear process, and it's
|
||
not clear how or when it is made because of many inputs to the process.
|
||
2) Many policies sit on the shelf until a crisis, and the right
|
||
technology is either in place, or certain people grab it.
|
||
3)Events create renewed interest in information policy.
|
||
4)Industry, academic, or non-governmental groups play an
|
||
important role by testifying before committees studying policy and by
|
||
lobbying.
|
||
5)CRS is the institutional memory for Congress because of the
|
||
rapid turnover in the staff on the Hill.
|
||
6) The challenge is to develop policy that does not hinder or
|
||
hold things up, but there is a high degree of uncertainty, change, and
|
||
lack of data. The idea is to keep things as open as possible throughout
|
||
the process.
|
||
|
||
Bortnick said that the majority of laws governing information
|
||
policy were written in an era of paper; now electronic access is being
|
||
added, and Congress is trying to identify fundamental principles, not
|
||
specific changes.
|
||
Because of the economic factors impinging on the delivery of
|
||
information, members of Congress don't want to anger local cable, phone,
|
||
or newspaper firms.
|
||
To get sensible legislation in a rapidly changing environment you
|
||
have to, paradoxically, slow down the legislative processes to avoid
|
||
making bad laws. Nevertheless, in a crisis, Congress can sometimes work
|
||
very quickly.
|
||
We have to realize that Congress can't be long term because of
|
||
annual budget cycles and because of the hard lobbying by local
|
||
interests.
|
||
In making good policy and laws, building consensus is the key.
|
||
|
||
The current scope of information policy:
|
||
-spans broad range of topics dealing with information
|
||
collection, use, access, and dissemination
|
||
-global warming has a component because new satellites will dump
|
||
a terabyte a day: who is responsible for storage, access, adding value
|
||
to all of this data?
|
||
-many bills have the phrase: "and they will establish a
|
||
clearinghouse of information on this topic"
|
||
-information policy has increasingly become an element within
|
||
agency programs
|
||
-impact of information technologies further complicates debate
|
||
-result=more interested players from diverse areas.
|
||
|
||
Congress has many committees that deals with these issues. CRS
|
||
gets 500,000 requests for information a year: 1700 in one day. After
|
||
"60 minutes" is broadcast CRS gets many requests for information. from
|
||
Congress.
|
||
|
||
Jim Warren asked several questions about access to government
|
||
information. There was a general discussion about how the Library of
|
||
Congress would be digitized (size, cost, copyright barriers). It was
|
||
noted that state level experiments affected federal activity, especially
|
||
the states that are copyrighting their information (unlike the federal
|
||
government).
|
||
|
||
The discussion about Congressional reluctance to communicate via
|
||
electronic mail with constituents: a new directory does not even list
|
||
some fax numbers that had been quasi-public before some offices felt
|
||
inundated with fax communications.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
|
||
Keynote Address:
|
||
Al Neuharth, The Freedom Forum and founder of USA Today
|
||
"Freedom in cyberspace: new wine in old flasks"
|
||
|
||
Lunch, following the tutorials, was followed by an address by Al
|
||
Neuharth. The high points were:
|
||
1. First amendment freedoms are for everyone. Newspaper publishers
|
||
should not relegate anyone to 2nd class citizenship or the back of the
|
||
bus.
|
||
2. The passion for privacy may make our democracy falter.
|
||
3. Publishing of disinformation is the biggest danger, not
|
||
information-glut.
|
||
|
||
Commenting on American Newspaper Publishers Assn. to keep RBOCs
|
||
out of information business, Neuharth noted that the free press clause in
|
||
the Bill of Rights does not only apply to newspapers. Telcos have first
|
||
amendment rights too. "ANPA is spitting into the winds of change", he
|
||
said, and some newspaper publishers are not happy with this stance, so
|
||
there is a lot of turmoil. People should get their news when, how and
|
||
where they want it: on screen or tossed on the front porch. Telcos have
|
||
yet to demonstrate expertise in information gathering and dissemination;
|
||
they have an outmoded allegiance to regulation .
|
||
|
||
He strongly criticized the use of anonymous sources by newspapers.
|
||
Anonymous sources, he said, provide misinformation that does irreparable
|
||
harm. The Washington Post is the biggest user of confidential sources.
|
||
Withholding of names encourages fabricating and misinformation. Opinions
|
||
and style should not be hidden in news pages but kept on the editorial
|
||
page.
|
||
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Wednesday Afternoon Session: Who Logs On?
|
||
Given by Robert Lucky of Bell Labs:
|
||
|
||
Speaking personally, Lucky covered the following points:
|
||
1. Fiber to the home: who pays for it?
|
||
The consumers will pay and the consumer will benefit. How much
|
||
they will pay and how much they will benefit is what matters.
|
||
We must to install wideband switching and we will.The drama is
|
||
mainly economic and political, not technical. It will happen in 40
|
||
years. Asked what fiber will bring that copper will not, Lucky took the
|
||
Field of Dreams approach: supply of bandwidth will create demand.
|
||
2. Access and privacy.
|
||
This is a personal quandary for Lucky. Intimate communications
|
||
will be coming-- individual cells on each pole and an individual number
|
||
for each person. "I like to call anybody from my wrist, but I hate
|
||
having people calling me."
|
||
If you have access, you can't have privacy. The right to be
|
||
left alone takes away from the 'right' from other people. Lucky was the
|
||
first of many to raise the problems of the FBI recommend legislation,
|
||
the Digital Telephony Amendment, that would require re-design of present
|
||
network so that surveillance could take place, and that the cost of
|
||
doing this would be 20 cents a month per subscriber. It will be hard to
|
||
find conversations, but you will pay for this. He viewed this with
|
||
grave concern; it's a bad idea. He is all for getting drug kings but he
|
||
wants his privacy.
|
||
|
||
3. Lucky's observations on the Internet/NREN:
|
||
One of the wonderful things is the sense of freedom on the
|
||
Internet. Anonymous ftp. There are programs and bulletin boards. Sense
|
||
of freedom of information and freedom of communication, but nobody seems
|
||
to pay for it. It just comes. As a member of AT&T, this needs to be
|
||
transitioned to a commercial enterprise. Government is not good at this;
|
||
intellectual property lawyers will build walls, and hackers may screw
|
||
it up too. "I still want all the freedom in the commercial enterprise."
|
||
|
||
Linda Garcia of the OTA (Office of Technology Assessment) spoke
|
||
about access issues and said it was a cost/benefit problem. Rural areas
|
||
should be able construct a rural area network (RAN). Take small
|
||
businesses, educators, hospitals and pool their demand for a broadband
|
||
network. Government could act as a broker or community organizer and
|
||
transfer the technology. Rural communities should not be treated the
|
||
same way as urban areas. The regulatory structure should be different for
|
||
rural Maine than for lower Manhattan. See her OTA reports "Critical
|
||
Connections and Rural America at the Crossroads" for in-depth
|
||
treatments of these issues.
|
||
|
||
Al Koppe of New Jersey Bell outlined the many new services being
|
||
rolled out in NJ at the same time they are maintaining low basic rates.
|
||
--In 1992 there will be narrowband digital service for low
|
||
quality video conferencing; in 1994 wideband digital service.
|
||
--Video on demand, entertainment libraries and distance learning
|
||
applications will be coming along soon after.
|
||
--Koppe predicted a 99% penetration by 1999 with complete fiber
|
||
by 2010. This will be a public network and not a private one. It will
|
||
still be a common carrier.
|
||
This is a very aggressive and optimistic plan, an important one
|
||
for all of us to watch. Lucky said he had never seen a study that shows
|
||
video on demand services can be competitive with video store prices. The
|
||
big question remains: how does a business based on low-bandwidth voice
|
||
services charge for broadband services? It remains a paradox.
|
||
|
||
Brian Kahin, Kennedy School of Government, discussed the growth of
|
||
the Internet and policy issues:
|
||
--points of access for different users
|
||
--network structure and current NSFNet controversy
|
||
He said the NREN debate is one between capacity (enabling high end
|
||
applications) and connectivity (number of resources and users online).
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Afternoon Session: Ethics, Morality, and Criminality
|
||
|
||
Mike Gibbons of the FBI chaired this session which was one of the
|
||
central themes for all present. In the same room we had law enforcement
|
||
(LE) representatives from state, local, and federal governments, civil
|
||
libertarians, and convicted computer criminals, as well as some victims.
|
||
|
||
The FBI views the computer as a tool, and Gibbons told a story
|
||
about the huge raid on Lyndon LaRouche's data center in Virginia where
|
||
400 LE types took part. I had the feeling that Gibbons was telling his
|
||
own hacker story because the audience would appreciate the challenges
|
||
that faced him more than LE supervisors without a technical knowledge of
|
||
computers would appreciate it. He was also involved in the Robert Morris
|
||
case.
|
||
|
||
Mike Godwin of EFF agrees that it is not ethical to access other
|
||
people's computer without permission, but Mike represents those who may
|
||
have acted unethically but still have rights.
|
||
|
||
Case involving Craig Neidorf of _phrack_ who felt that his
|
||
publication of a Bell South document was within the 1st amendment .
|
||
Bell South pegged the Document cost was $70K because it included the Vax
|
||
workstation and the software in the cost! There was a question whether
|
||
that document was property at all. LE folks can make good faith
|
||
mistakes, but Craig had to spend $100,000 and that the prosecutor and
|
||
Secret Service never admitted they were wrong.
|
||
|
||
Jim Settle from FBI sets policy on computer crime and supervisor
|
||
of computer crime squad. Background in Univacs in 1979. There is not a lot
|
||
of case law on computer crimes. LE was computer stupid and is not out
|
||
there to run over people's rights. They discuss moral issues even when
|
||
an action was legal.
|
||
|
||
Don Delaney of the New York State Police: He has been dealing with
|
||
PBX and calling card fraud; he talks to students about perils of
|
||
computer crime, and works with companies who have been hit. Every day at
|
||
least one corporation has called him. $40,000 to $400K loss in a short
|
||
time. He has found glitches in the PBX software; he complained that few
|
||
PBX salespeople tell the customers about remote access units through
|
||
which criminals gain access. Once this happens the number is sold on the
|
||
street in New York at about $10 for 20 minutes. Even Westchester County
|
||
Library was hit. People used binoculars to read the PIN numbers on
|
||
caller's cards as they dialed in Grand Central Station. Delaney called
|
||
this 'shoulder surfing' and noted that cameras, camcorders, and
|
||
binoculars are being used regularly.
|
||
|
||
Mitch Kapor raised the issue of the Digital Telephony Amendment.
|
||
It is proposed legislation to amend 18 USC 2510 (government can intercept
|
||
communications on showing probable cause as they did with John Gotti)
|
||
Settle of the FBI asked: "What happens if the technology says you can't
|
||
do it? You change the tech. to allow it or you repeal the law that
|
||
allows wire tap. Don Parker of SRI said it is essential to have
|
||
wiretap ability as a tool for LE.
|
||
|
||
The FBI under the Department of Justice has authority to use
|
||
wiretaps in its operations. This has been one of the most effective
|
||
tools that law enforcement has, but with the advent of digital telephony
|
||
such as ISDN, the LE community is worried that no capability exists to
|
||
intercept these digital signals, and this will preclude the FBI and
|
||
other LE officials from intercepting electronic communications.
|
||
|
||
The FBI proposes an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 to
|
||
require electronic services providers to ensure that the government will
|
||
e able to intercept digital communications. There are a number of parts
|
||
to the bill:
|
||
1. the FCC shall determine the interception needs of the DOJ and
|
||
issue regulations 120 days after enactment.
|
||
2. Service providers and pbx operators to modify existing telecom
|
||
systems within 180 days and prohibit use of non-conforming equipment
|
||
thereafter, with penalties of $10,000 per day for willful offenders.
|
||
3. Gives FCC the authority to compensate the system operators by
|
||
rate structure adjustment for required modifications. That is, the user
|
||
will pay for this decreased security desired by the government.
|
||
|
||
Godwin said he believes that wiretap is okay when procedures are
|
||
followed, but you have to decide what kind of society you want to live
|
||
in. The FBI asked, "Are you going to say that crime is okay over the
|
||
phones and that it should not be controlled?" He implied that not making
|
||
changes to the law would leave cyberspace open to sophisticated
|
||
criminals, many of whom have more resources for technology that does the
|
||
LE community. For more information on this there is a 10 page
|
||
legislative summary.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
The Evening of Day One:
|
||
|
||
There were Birds of a Feather (BOF) sessions that were less formal
|
||
and with less attendance. Nevertheless, they were some of the high
|
||
points of the conference.
|
||
|
||
Where else would one find the law enforcement types switching
|
||
roles with computer intruders who had to defend a system against an attack?
|
||
Kudos to Mike Gibbons for setting this up.
|
||
|
||
There was also a panel of hackers (I use the term in the broadest
|
||
and non-pejorative sense) including "Emmanuel Goldstein"--the nom de
|
||
plume for the editor of 2600: The Hacker's Weekly; Craig Neidorf,
|
||
founder of phrack; Phiber Optik, a young man who recently plea bargained to
|
||
a couple of charges; and Dorothy Denning, chair of the CS department at
|
||
Georgetown University.
|
||
|
||
Goldstein (this was a character in Orwell's 1984 who was a front
|
||
for the establishment!) sees hackers as intellectuals on a quest for
|
||
bugs which, when corrected, help the system owner.He is extremely
|
||
frustrated over media treatment of hackers, yet he was open to a
|
||
Japanese camera crew filming the casual meetings of 2600 readers that
|
||
took place in the hotel lobby throughout the conference. He said that
|
||
hackers and system administrators work together with each other in
|
||
Holland.
|
||
|
||
As an example of lax system management there was a military
|
||
computer during the middle east war had a password of Kuwait'. Don
|
||
Parker of SRI believes that Goldstein should not continually blame the
|
||
victim.
|
||
|
||
Many of the hackers and publishers strongly believed that
|
||
"knowing how things work is not illegal." The current publisher of Phrack
|
||
said, "I believe in Freedom of Speech and want to tell people about new
|
||
technology."
|
||
|
||
Most librarians would agree, but much of the problem was what some
|
||
people did with that knowledge. An interesting discussion followed about
|
||
who was responsible for security: vendors, system administrators, or
|
||
public law enforcement personnel. Phiber Optik is now maintaining a Next
|
||
machine on the Net and complained that answers to technical questions
|
||
cost $100 per hour on the Next hotline.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Electronic Money: Principles and Progress
|
||
Eric Hughes, DigiCash
|
||
|
||
Electronic money uses public key encryption. People can recognize
|
||
your digital signature, but cannot read it. The goal is to create a bank
|
||
on the Internet that only uses software and affords the user complete
|
||
anonymity. There is the bank, the buyer, and the seller. Money flows
|
||
from the bank in a money loop. Bank does not know what is signs but it
|
||
knows that it did sign it and will honor the electronic check. This would
|
||
allow financial transactions and privacy for the buyer.
|
||
|
||
In a library setting this would mean I could buy an item
|
||
electronically (a document, image, code) and nobody could link it with
|
||
my name. My buying habits would be private, and a person roaming through
|
||
the transactions might see that someone purchased the computer simulation
|
||
"Small furry animals in pain" but would not know the name of the
|
||
purchaser.
|
||
|
||
Doing private database queries will become more and more important
|
||
as the network is used for more business activities. The DigiCash scheme
|
||
has multi-party security and is a safe way of exchanging files and
|
||
selling them in complete privacy. It's also very cheap and the
|
||
unlinkability is very important.
|
||
|
||
In the discussion session the issue of drug lords using the system
|
||
was raised. DigiCash has limited its transactions to less than $10,000,
|
||
and most would be far less. A British attendee said that stores had to
|
||
keep extensive records for VAT tax audits, so EEC and US regulations
|
||
would conflict with the goals of DigiCash.
|
||
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Thursday Morning Sessions
|
||
|
||
For Sale: Government Information
|
||
|
||
This was staged as a role playing advisory panel where a grad
|
||
student made a broad and complicated request for information in a
|
||
particular format. The panelist made short statements about their
|
||
interests and then tried to answer the pointed questions from George
|
||
Trubow of John Marshall Law School.
|
||
|
||
Dwight Morris (LA Times):
|
||
His job is to get government data and turn it into news stories.
|
||
He noted that the FOIA is a joke; it's a last resort. Vendors are foia-ing
|
||
the agencies and then trying to sell those foia requesters software to
|
||
read the data tapes!
|
||
|
||
Ken Allen of the Information Agency Association:
|
||
The government should not elude the appropriations process by
|
||
selling information, nor should the agency control content. The IIA is
|
||
against exclusive contracts.
|
||
|
||
Mitch Freedman,Westchester Co. Library ALA Coordinator for Access to
|
||
Information:
|
||
Are many people asking for access for this information, or will
|
||
the coding benefit many users in the long run? He mentioned of WINDO
|
||
program, freedom of access, and its link to informed democracy.
|
||
|
||
Franklin Reeder, Office of management and Budget:
|
||
He observed that unusable databases in raw form mean that choice
|
||
of format is irrelevant. There may be broader demand for this information,
|
||
and the database should be provided with interfaces for many users.
|
||
Government agencies should not turn to information provision for
|
||
revenues; it becomes an impediment to access. "I don't think the public
|
||
sector should be entrepreneurial. "
|
||
|
||
Costin Toregas, Public Technology, Inc.--owned by cities and counties in
|
||
U.S. and Canada:
|
||
We should re-examine our language when discussing information and
|
||
access. How do you recover the costs of providing the new technological
|
||
access mechanisms. The provision of this should be high priority.
|
||
|
||
Robert Belair, Kirkpatrick and Lockhart, deals in FOIA and privacy
|
||
issues:
|
||
Choice of format is an issue, and in general we are doing a bad
|
||
job. Belair notes that FOIA requests are not cheap. There are $2-4,000
|
||
fees from government agencies--even more than the lawyer fees!
|
||
|
||
Questions:
|
||
|
||
Denning: no view of where technology is taking us. Why not put the
|
||
FOIA information online?
|
||
Freedman says the Owens bill handles this.
|
||
Weingarten says that one agency is planning for a db that has no
|
||
equipment to handle it yet.
|
||
Belair: we will get change in FOIA and the Owens bill is good.
|
||
Toregas: A well-connected community is crucial.
|
||
|
||
Harry Goodman asked Ken Allen if he still believed that "libraries
|
||
be taken off the dole."
|
||
Allen denied he said this but Goodman had it on tape! Allen said
|
||
privatization is a red herring. Government agencies might not be the
|
||
best way to provide the access to information. Allen says it should be by
|
||
diverse methods.
|
||
|
||
Glenn Tenney, running for Congress in San Mateo County (CA), said
|
||
he had trouble getting information on voting pattern of the members of
|
||
Congress and to buy it would have cost thousands of dollars.(
|
||
Ken Allen replied that a private company had developed the
|
||
information from raw material, but others thought this was basic
|
||
information that should be available to all citizens. Other people
|
||
wanted the Congressional Records online (and cheap); others wanted the
|
||
private sector to do it all and to get the government to partner in such
|
||
projects.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Free Speech and the Public Telephone Network
|
||
|
||
Jerry Berman of the EFF:
|
||
--Do telcos have the right to publish over their own networks?
|
||
--What are the implications of telcos as newspapers vs. telcos
|
||
as common carrier? Aren't safeguards needed to compel free access for all
|
||
players?
|
||
--There is already discrimination on the 900 services (provision
|
||
or billing for porno businesses).
|
||
--When the public finds out what is on the network, there will
|
||
be a big fight.
|
||
--Will we follow the print model or the broadcasting model?
|
||
--How can a new infrastructure secure a diversity of speech and
|
||
more participants, and how we can break the deadlock between cable,
|
||
papers, and telcos.
|
||
|
||
Henry Geller, Markle Foundation (FCC/NTIA) :
|
||
-- The key is the common carrier nature of the telephone
|
||
networks and that they should carry all traffic without determining what is
|
||
appropriate.
|
||
--Congress can't chose between warring industries, so it won't
|
||
act on some of these telecomm issues.
|
||
--Broadband area: if the bits flowing are TV programming, the
|
||
telco is forbidden to provide. Print model is a good one to follow, not
|
||
the cable or broadcast model. He mentioned CNN's squelching of NBC
|
||
cable channel.
|
||
|
||
John Podesta (Podesta Associates):
|
||
--There are forces that are trying to push messengers off the
|
||
road and keep the network from being diverse.
|
||
--We need a network with more voices, not just those of the
|
||
owners.
|
||
--We will be faced with censorship by the government and network
|
||
owners (MCI, US West);
|
||
--There will be more invasion of privacy
|
||
Six things have to happen:
|
||
1. More competition via open platform. Personal ISDN at low
|
||
tariffs.
|
||
2. Structural safeguards
|
||
3. Common carriers should be content neutral when providing access
|
||
4. Originators should bear responsibility for obscene or salacious
|
||
postings.
|
||
5. Protect net against invasion of privacy. Debate is whether it
|
||
will be easier or harder to wiretap in the future.
|
||
6. Don't adopt broadcast or cable model for network; both are more
|
||
restrictive with regards to First Amendment issues.
|
||
|
||
Bob Peck (ACLU):
|
||
--Government ban on RBOCs providing information is a first
|
||
amendment issue, but there is also an issue of access. How do we make
|
||
sure that everyone gets charged the same rates?
|
||
--The Rust vs. Sullivan decision could affect network use;
|
||
abortion clinics could not answer any questions about the topic. US
|
||
Govt. claimed: "We paid for the microphone; we just want to be able to
|
||
control what is said." This is being argued in other cases by DOJ
|
||
and should be resisted.
|
||
|
||
Eli Noam (NYU):
|
||
--Coming from state government he tried to be an oxymoron, a
|
||
"forward-looking state utility commissioner".
|
||
--Telcos say: If anyone can use the common carrier, why not
|
||
themselves.
|
||
--Free speech is rooted in the idea of scarcity and restraints
|
||
to access.
|
||
--When you have 9000 channels, who cares?
|
||
--There will be no scarcity. He predicts people will be video
|
||
literate. Video will have new obscene phone calls.
|
||
--We are over-optimistic about the short term and too cautious
|
||
about long term effects.
|
||
--Telecommuting is already happening on a significant scale.
|
||
--We will have telecommunities, subcultures of special interest
|
||
groups.
|
||
--Our political future is based on jurisdiction. Is there a new
|
||
form of political entity emerging that transcends time zones?
|
||
--Information glut: The key issue will be how you filter and
|
||
screen it.
|
||
--Handling the information will be a big issue.The user's brain
|
||
is the ultimate bottleneck.
|
||
--Internet news is about 18 MB a day.
|
||
--Screening will be by the network itself or by user groups and
|
||
telecommunities.
|
||
--Rights of individuals vs. the governments. Is the first
|
||
amendment a local ordinance?
|
||
--We need power over international interconnection. Fly the flag
|
||
of teledemocracy.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Lunch with Bruce Sterling
|
||
|
||
Bruce Sterling, author of The Difference Engine (with William
|
||
Gibson) and a new title, The Hacker Crackdown, gave an outstanding
|
||
performance/speech entitled "Speaking the Unspeakable" in which he
|
||
represented three elements of the so- called computer community who were
|
||
not at CFP-2.
|
||
|
||
--The Truly Malicious Hacker:
|
||
"Your average so-called malicious user -- he's a dweeb! He
|
||
can't keep his mouth shut! ....Crashing mainframes-- you call that
|
||
malice? Machines can't feel any pain! You want to crash a machine, try
|
||
derailing a passenger train. Any idiot can do that in thirty minutes,
|
||
it's pig-easy, and there's *nothing* in the way of security. Personally
|
||
I can't understand why trains aren't de-railed every day."
|
||
|
||
--A narco-general who has discovered the usefulness of his
|
||
contacts with the North American law enforcement communities--and their
|
||
databases:
|
||
"These databases that you American police are maintaining.
|
||
Wonderful things....The limited access you are granting us only whets
|
||
our appetite for more. You are learning everything about our
|
||
criminals....However, we feel that it is only just that you tell us
|
||
about your criminals.....Let us get our hands on your Legions of Doom. I
|
||
know it would look bad if you did this sort of thing yourselves. But you
|
||
needn't."
|
||
|
||
--A data pirate from Asia:
|
||
"The digital black market will win, even if it means the
|
||
collapse of your most cherished institutions....Call it illegal, call it
|
||
dishonest, call it treason against the state; your abuse does not
|
||
matter; those are only words and words are not as real as bread. The only
|
||
question is how much suffering you are willing to inflict on yourselves,
|
||
and on others, in the pursuit of your utopian dream."
|
||
|
||
Sterling's speech was a hilarious, yet half-serious departure from
|
||
the usual fare of conferences and is well worth obtaining the audio or
|
||
video cassette. I also recommend you attend the American Library
|
||
Association conference in late June 1992 when Sterling will address the
|
||
LITA attendees.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Who's in Your Genes
|
||
|
||
Who's in Your Genes was an overview of genetic data banking, and a
|
||
discussion of the tension between an individual's right to privacy and
|
||
the interests of third parties. DNA forensic data banks and use of
|
||
genetic records by insurers were explored. Madison Powers was
|
||
chair. Panelists included John Hicks, FBI Lab; Paul Mendelsohn,
|
||
Neurofibromatosis, Inc.; Peter Neufeld, Esq.; Madison Powers,
|
||
Kennedy Center for Ethics, Georgetown University.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
|
||
Private Collection of Personal Information
|
||
|
||
This was another role-playing session where the participants took
|
||
positions close to those they would hold in real life. Ron Plessor of
|
||
Piper and Marbury acted as the 'scene setter and facilitator'. It was he
|
||
who posed the broad question "Should the government have a role in the
|
||
privacy debate?" and asked the panelists to debate about the
|
||
establishment of a data protection board (as proposed by Congressman
|
||
Wise in H.R. 685d).
|
||
|
||
Janlori Goldman of the ACLU enthusiastically embraced the role of
|
||
general counsel to the Data Board. She questioned the representatives
|
||
from the fictitious private enterprises who were planning a supermarket
|
||
discount shoppers' program where all items are matched with the
|
||
purchaser and mailing lists would be generated with this fine-grained
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
"It would be good to come to the board before you start the
|
||
service." Her tone was very ominous, that of a friendly but all powerful
|
||
bureaucrat. "Bring your papers and come on in to discuss your project.
|
||
Let's keep it informal and friendly this time to prevent the more formal
|
||
meeting." She even alluded to making subpoenas and getting phone
|
||
records of the direct marketeers. She would not offer the marketeers
|
||
assurances of confidentiality in their discussion, and even though this
|
||
was role playing, several people around me who had thought the idea of a
|
||
board would be useful, changed their mind by the end, partly because of
|
||
her fervor.
|
||
|
||
At the Q&A session about 25 people dashed for the microphones,
|
||
making this session the most provocative of all. At least it touched a
|
||
chord with everyone.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
On the evening of March 19, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||
presented the EFF Pioneer awards to those individuals who have done the
|
||
most to advance liberty, responsibility, and access to computer-based
|
||
communications. I was honored to serve as a judge and read the large
|
||
number of nominations. Each person or institution made a strong
|
||
impression on me, and it was difficult to narrow it down to five people.
|
||
The recipients each made a very moving statement after they were called
|
||
to the podium by Mitchell Kapor of the EFF.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
March 20
|
||
|
||
Privacy and Intellectual Freedom in the Digital Library
|
||
Bob Walton of CLSI, Inc.
|
||
|
||
Walton discussed the transformation of libraries as collections of
|
||
books into digital libraries with falling technological costs and
|
||
volatile questions of intellectual property and reimbursement.
|
||
|
||
Gordon Conable, Monroe (MI) County Library system, spoke of
|
||
libraries as First Amendment institutions, ones where Carnegie saw the
|
||
provision of free information as a public good. However, the economics
|
||
of digital information are quite different, and this causes problems, as
|
||
does the government using the power of the purse to control speech (Rust
|
||
vs. Sullivan).
|
||
|
||
I spoke about the case of Santa Clara County (CA) Library
|
||
defending its open access policy when a citizen complained about
|
||
children checking out videos he thought should be restricted. It was a
|
||
good example of how the whole profession from the branch librarian on up
|
||
to the California State Librarian presented a unified front in the face
|
||
of opposition from some parts of the community and the San Jose Mercury
|
||
News, the local paper that waffled somewhat on its own stance.
|
||
|
||
Jean Polly of Liverpool Public Library spoke about the problems
|
||
running a library BBS where religious fundamentalists dominated the
|
||
system, but outlined her library's many activities (smallest public
|
||
library as an Internet node) and her plans for the future.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
|
||
Who Holds the Keys?
|
||
|
||
In a sense the cryptography discussion was one of the most
|
||
difficult to follow, yet the outlines of a very large battlefield came
|
||
into view by the end of the session. The two sides are personal privacy
|
||
and national security. Should the government be allowed to restrict the
|
||
use of cryptography? (Only weakened schemes are allowed to be legally
|
||
exported.) What legal protections should exist for enciphered
|
||
communications?
|
||
|
||
David Bellin of the Pratt Institute stood up and spoke in code. He
|
||
thought encrypted speech was protected and that he should have the right
|
||
to associate with his peers through encryption (to prevent snooping). He
|
||
did not believe the technology is controllable, nor that there is safety
|
||
and one end and freedom at the other.
|
||
|
||
Jim Bidzos of RSA Data Security said we need a review of
|
||
cryptographic policy. The long term effects of the current
|
||
confrontational relationship will be bad. John Gilmore of Cygnus Support
|
||
felt that the public should discuss cryptographic issues and not behind
|
||
closed doors. This is a good time for network people, manufacturers, and
|
||
the government to work together. John Perry Barlow sees encryption as an
|
||
answer to the problem of having lots of privacy. Using the drug war
|
||
rationale to prohibit export is a bad idea. Whitfield Diffie, of Sun
|
||
Microsystems gave an excellent overview of the philosophy of encryption
|
||
and why it's important as we move from face-to-face communications to
|
||
electronic. There are a number of policy problems:
|
||
--a bad person might be able to protect information against all
|
||
assaults. In a free society a person is answerable for your actions,
|
||
but a totalitarian society uses prior restraint. What will ours become?
|
||
--Can a so-called 'free society' tolerate unrestricted use of
|
||
cryptography? Because cryptography can be done on standard processors
|
||
with small programs, and because covert channels are hard to detect,
|
||
enforcement of a strong anti-crypto law would require drastic measures.
|
||
|
||
I asked Jim Bidzos about the government agencies beating their
|
||
swords into plowshares by looking for new roles in a world without a
|
||
Soviet threat. He thought NSA could use budget hearings to say that with
|
||
a lean/mean military budget, a modest increase in crypto capability
|
||
might give the government more lead time in an emergency.
|
||
|
||
One member of the audience challenged Bidzos to go ahead and
|
||
export RSA outside of the US. Barlow responded "Come on, Jim. The
|
||
Russians are already using RSA in their <missile> launch codes." To
|
||
which Bidzos replied, "My revenue forecasts are being revised downward!"
|
||
<laughter> Barlow answered, "You would not have gotten any royalties
|
||
from them anyway." <more laughter> Bidzos: "Maybe..." <even more
|
||
laughter>
|
||
|
||
With only a partial understanding of some of the technology
|
||
involved (cryptography is a special field peopled mainly by
|
||
mathematicians and intelligence officials), I think that this will be
|
||
the issue of the 90s for libraries. It may be a way to protect both privacy
|
||
and intellectual property in the digital libraries of the future.
|
||
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Final Panel:
|
||
Public Policy for the 21st Century,
|
||
moderated by Mara Liasson, National Public Radio
|
||
|
||
"How will information technologies alter work, wealth, value,
|
||
political boundaries?... What will the world be like in a decade or
|
||
two?... What public policies now exist that may pull the opposite
|
||
direction from the economic momentum and will lead to social tension and
|
||
breakage if not addressed properly?"
|
||
|
||
Peter Denning, George Mason University:
|
||
People used to have faith that strong governments would bring
|
||
salvation through large programs (he named failures). The poor track
|
||
record of government and changes in comms technology have accelerated
|
||
the decline of the faith.
|
||
|
||
Mitchell Kapor:
|
||
He sees digital media as the printing press of the 21st century.
|
||
The WELL and others make us realize we are not prisoners of geography,
|
||
so our religious, hobby, or academic interests can b shared by the enabling
|
||
technologies of computers. "Individuals flourish from mass society with
|
||
this technology" Openness, freedom, inclusiveness will help us make a
|
||
society that will please our children and grandchildren.
|
||
|
||
Simon Davies, Privacy International:
|
||
"There is possibly a good future, but it's in the hands of
|
||
greedy men. I see a world with 15 billion beings scrambling for life,
|
||
with new frontiers stopping good things. For 14 billion they are very
|
||
pissed off, and that our wonderful informational community (the other
|
||
billion) becomes the beast. It will be something most of the world will
|
||
do without. If we recognize the apocalypse now we can work with the
|
||
forces."
|
||
|
||
Esther Dyson, EDventure Holding, Inc.:
|
||
She thinks that cryptography is a defensive weapon. The free-
|
||
flow of cryptic information is dangerous to the powerful. She want more
|
||
markets and less government. Large concentrations of power makes her
|
||
suspicious. Global protected networks will help those in the
|
||
minority(disagreeing with Davies). We don't have one global villages but
|
||
many. How do we avert tribalism of class?
|
||
|
||
Roland Homet, Executive Inc.:
|
||
Homet was more conciliatory. America has a penchant for ordered
|
||
liberty. It uses toleration and restraint to keep forces working
|
||
together.
|
||
|
||
++====================================================================++
|
||
|
||
Lance Hoffman, of the George Washington University and organizer of the
|
||
conference, deserves a great deal of credit for a smooth running yet
|
||
exciting three days.
|
||
|
||
There will be a CFP-3 in the San Francisco area next year. If you find
|
||
these issues to be a major force in your professional life, we hope you
|
||
will be able to attend next year. Traditionally, there have been
|
||
scholarships available, but these depend on donations from individuals
|
||
and firms.
|
||
|
||
End of Report/ Steve Cisler sac@apple.com
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 8 of 10
|
||
Cordless Fones
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
This file is a work of fiction. Everything in it is fictitious.
|
||
Any resemblance to persons living or dead, magazines, companies, products,
|
||
trademarks, copyrights, or anything else in the real world is purely
|
||
coincidental, and you should see a shrink about your over-active imagination
|
||
if you think otherwise.
|
||
|
||
- \/\/ O M B A T -
|
||
presents:
|
||
|
||
Cordless Telephones: Bye Bye Privacy!
|
||
#####################################
|
||
|
||
by Tom Kneitel, K2AES, Editor
|
||
=============================
|
||
|
||
A Boon to Eavesdroppers, Cordless Phones Are as Private as Conversing in an
|
||
Elevator. You'll Never Guess Who's Listening In!
|
||
|
||
(originally published in Popular Communications, June 1991)
|
||
|
||
OK, so it took a while, but now you've accepted the fact that your cellular
|
||
phone conversations can easily be overheard by the public at large. Now you
|
||
can begin wrestling with the notion that there are many more scanners in the
|
||
hands of the public that can listen to cordless telephone calls than can tune
|
||
in on cellulars.
|
||
|
||
Monitoring cellular calls requires the listener to own equipment capable of
|
||
picking up signals in the 800 to 900 MHz frequency range. Not all scanners
|
||
can receive this band, so unless the scannist wants to purchase a new scanner,
|
||
or a converter covering those frequencies, [see February and March issues of
|
||
Radio-Electronics for a converter project -\/\/ombat-] they can't tune in on
|
||
cellular calls. And let's not forget that it's a violation of federal law to
|
||
monitor cellular conversations. Not that there seems to be any practical way
|
||
yet devised to enforce that law, nor does the U.S. Dept. of Justice appear to
|
||
be especially interested in trying.
|
||
|
||
On the other hand, cordless telephones operate with their base pedestals in
|
||
the 46 MHz band, and the handsets in the 49 MHz band. Virtually every scanner
|
||
ever built can pick up these frequencies with ease. Cordless telephones are
|
||
usually presented to the public as having ranges up to 1,000 feet, but that
|
||
requires some clarification. That distance represents the reliable two-way
|
||
communications range that can be expected between the handset and the
|
||
pedestal, given their small inefficient receivers and antennas, and that they
|
||
are both being used at ground level.
|
||
|
||
In fact, even given those conditions, 1,000 feet of range is far more
|
||
coverage than necessary for the average apartment or house and yard. Consider
|
||
that 1,000 feet is a big distance. It's almost one-fifth of a mile. It's the
|
||
height of a 100-story skyscraper. The Chrysler Building, third tallest
|
||
building in New York City, is about 1,000 feet high, so is the First
|
||
Interstate World Center, tallest building in Los Angeles. When someone uses a
|
||
sensitive scanner connected to an efficient antenna mounted above ground
|
||
level, the signals from the average 46 MHz cordless phone base pedestal unit
|
||
(which broadcasts both sides of all conversations) can often be monitored from
|
||
several miles away, and in all directions.
|
||
|
||
Some deluxe cordless phones are a snoop's delight. Like the beautiful
|
||
Panasonic KX-T4000. Its range is described as "up to 1,000 feet from the
|
||
phone's base," however the manufacturer brags that "range may exceed 1,000
|
||
feet depending upon operating conditions." When you stop to think about it,
|
||
what at first seems like a boast is really a somewhat harmless sounding way
|
||
of warning you that someone could monitor the unit from an unspecified great
|
||
distance. In fact, just about all standard cordless phones exceed their rated
|
||
ranges. But the KX-T4000's main bonus and challenge to the snoop is that it
|
||
can operate on ten different frequencies instead of only a single frequency.
|
||
The BellSouth Products Southwind 170 cordless phone suggests a range of up to
|
||
1,500 feet., depending on location and operating conditions. The ten-channel
|
||
Sony SPP-1508 has a built-in auto-scan system to select the clearest channels.
|
||
|
||
What with millions of scanners in the hands of the public, a cordless
|
||
telephone in an urban or suburban area could easily be within receiving range
|
||
of dozens of persons owning receiving equipment capable of listening to every
|
||
word said over that phone. Likewise, every urban or suburban scanner owner
|
||
is most likely to be within receiving range of dozens of cordless telephones.
|
||
Many persons with scanners program their units to search between 46.50 and
|
||
47.00 MHz and do listen. Some do it casually to pass the time of day, others
|
||
have specific purposes.
|
||
|
||
Not Covered
|
||
===========
|
||
|
||
The Electronic communications Privacy Act of 1986, the federal law that
|
||
supposedly confers privacy to cellular conversations, doesn't cover cordless
|
||
telephones.
|
||
|
||
A year and a half ago, the U.S. Supreme Court wasn't interested in reviewing
|
||
a lower court decision that held that some fellow didn't have any
|
||
"justifiable expectation of privacy" for their cordless phone conversations.
|
||
It seems that man's conversations regarding suspected criminal activity were
|
||
overheard and the police were alerted, which caused the police to investigate
|
||
further and arrest the man after recording more of his cordless phone
|
||
conversations.
|
||
|
||
Yet, even though (at this point) there is no federal law against monitoring
|
||
cordless phones, there are several states with laws that restrict the
|
||
practice. In New York State, for instance, a state appellate court ruled that
|
||
New York's eavesdropping law prohibits the government from intentionally
|
||
tuning in on such conversations.
|
||
|
||
California recently passed the Cordless and Cellular Radio Telephone Privacy
|
||
Act (amending Sections 632, 633, 633.5, 634, and 635 of the Penal Code,
|
||
amending Section 1 of Chapter 909 of the Statutes of 1985, and adding Section
|
||
632.6 to the Penal Code) promising to expose an eavesdropper to a $2,500 fine
|
||
and a year in jail in the event he or she gets caught. Gathering the evidence
|
||
for a conviction may be easier said than done.
|
||
|
||
There may be other areas with similar local restrictions, these are two
|
||
that I know about. Obviously listening to cordless phones in major population
|
||
areas is sufficiently popular to have inspired such legislative action. There
|
||
are, however, reported to be efforts afoot to pass federal legislation
|
||
forbidding the monitoring of cordless phones as well as baby monitors. Such
|
||
a law wouldn't stop monitoring, nor could it be enforced. It would be, like
|
||
the ECPA, just one more piece of glitzy junk legislation to hoodwink the
|
||
public and let the ACLU and well-meaning, know-nothing, starry-eyed privacy
|
||
advocates think they've accomplished something of genuine value.
|
||
|
||
Strange Calls
|
||
=============
|
||
|
||
On April 20th, The Press Democrat, of Santa Rosa, Calif., reported that a
|
||
scanner owner had contacted the police in the community of Rohnert Park to say
|
||
that he was overhearing cordless phone conversations concerning sales of
|
||
illegal drugs. The monitor, code named Zorro by the police, turned over
|
||
thirteen tapes of such conversations made over a two month period.
|
||
|
||
Police took along a marijuana-sniffing cocker spaniel when they showed up
|
||
at the suspect's home with a warrant one morning. Identifying themselves,
|
||
they broke down the door and found a man and a woman, each with a loaded gun.
|
||
They also found a large amount of cash, some cocaine, marijuana, marijuana
|
||
plants, and assorted marijuana cultivating paraphernalia.
|
||
|
||
In another example, Newsday, of Long Island, New York, reported in its
|
||
February 10, 1991 edition another tale of beneficial cordless phone
|
||
monitoring.
|
||
|
||
It seems a scanner owner heard a cordless phone conversation between three
|
||
youths who were planning a burglary. First, they said that they were going to
|
||
buy a handheld CB radio so they could take it with them in order to keep in
|
||
contact with the driver of the car, which had a mobile CB rig installed.
|
||
Then, they were going to head over to break into a building that had, until
|
||
recently, been a nightclub.
|
||
|
||
The scanner owner notified Suffolk County Police, which staked out the
|
||
closed building. At 10:30 p.m., the youths appeared and forced their way
|
||
into the premises. They were immediately arrested and charged with
|
||
third-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools.
|
||
|
||
I selected these two examples from the many similar I have on hand because
|
||
they happen to have taken place in states where local laws seek to restrict
|
||
the monitoring of cordless telephones.
|
||
|
||
Most of the calls people monitor aren't criminal in nature, but are
|
||
apparently interesting enough to have attracted a growing audience of
|
||
recreational monitors easily willing to live with accusations of their being unethical, nosy, busybodies, snoops, voyeurs, and worse.
|
||
|
||
As it turns out, recreational monitors are undoubtedly the most harmless
|
||
persons listening in on cordless phone calls.
|
||
|
||
They're All Ears
|
||
================
|
||
|
||
A newsletter called Privacy Today, is put out by Murray Associates, one of
|
||
the more innovative counterintelligence consultants serving business and
|
||
government. This publication noted (as reported in the mass media) that IRS
|
||
investigators may use scanners to eavesdrop on suspected tax cheats as they
|
||
chat on their cordless phones.
|
||
|
||
But, the publication points out that accountants who work out of their homes
|
||
could turn up as prime targets of such monitoring. Their clients might not
|
||
even realize the accountant is using a cordless phone, and therefore assume
|
||
that they have some degree of privacy. One accountant suspected of preparing
|
||
fraudulent tax returns could, if monitored, allow the IRS to collect evidence
|
||
on all clients.
|
||
|
||
Furthermore, Privacy Today notes that this has ramifications on the IRS
|
||
snitch program (recycle tax cheats for cash). They say, "Millions of scanner
|
||
owners who previously listened to cordless phones for amusement will now be
|
||
able to do it for profit. Any incriminating conversation they record can be
|
||
parlayed into cash, legally."
|
||
|
||
In fact, in addition to various federal agents and police, there are private
|
||
detectives, industrial spies, insurance investigators, spurned lovers, scam
|
||
artists, burglars, blackmailers, and various others who regularly tune in with
|
||
deliberate intent on cordless telephones in the pursuit of their respective
|
||
callings. If you saw the film Midnight Run, starring Robert DeNiro, you'll
|
||
recall that the bounty hunter was shown using a handheld scanner to eavesdrop
|
||
on a cordless phone during his effort to track down a fugitive bail jumper.
|
||
|
||
No, cordless phone monitoring isn't primarily being done for sport by the
|
||
incurably nosy for the enjoyment and entertainment it can provide. The
|
||
cordless telephone has been recognized as a viable and even important tool for
|
||
gathering intelligence.
|
||
|
||
Intelligence Gathering?
|
||
=======================
|
||
|
||
In fact, there are differences between cordless and cellular monitoring.
|
||
When a cellular call is monitored, it's quite difficult to ascertain the
|
||
identity of the caller, and impossible to select a particular person for
|
||
surveillance. These are mostly portable and mobile units that are passing
|
||
through from other areas, and they're operation on hundreds of different
|
||
channels. Sometimes the calls cut off right in the middle of a conversation.
|
||
The opportunities for ever hearing the same caller more than once are very
|
||
slim.
|
||
|
||
Not so with cordless phones. These units are operated at permanent
|
||
locations in homes, offices, factories, stores. Most models transmit on only
|
||
one or two specific frequencies, and while a few models can switch to any of
|
||
ten channels, that's still a lot fewer places to have to look around than
|
||
scanning through the hundreds of cellular frequencies. So, with only minor
|
||
effort, it's possible to know which cordless phones in receiving range are
|
||
set up to operate on which channels. And you continually hear the same
|
||
cordless phone users over a long period of time. They soon become very
|
||
familiar voices; you might even recognize some of them.
|
||
|
||
The diligent, professional intelligence gatherer creates a logbook for each
|
||
of the frequencies in the band, then logs in each cordless phone normally
|
||
monitored using that frequency. Then, each time a transmission is logged from
|
||
a particular phone, bits and scraps of information can be added to create a
|
||
growing dossier picked up from conversations. With very little real effort,
|
||
it doesn't take long to assemble an amazing amount of information on all
|
||
cordless phones within monitoring range.
|
||
|
||
Think about the information that is inadvertently passed in phone calls that
|
||
would go into such files. Personal names (first and last) which are easily
|
||
obtained from salutations, calls, and messages left on other people's answering
|
||
machines; phone numbers (that people give for callbacks or leave on answering
|
||
machines); addresses; credit card numbers; salary and employment information;
|
||
discussions of health and legal problems; details of legit and shady business
|
||
deals; even information on the hours when people are normally not at home or
|
||
will be out of town, and much more, including the most intimate details of
|
||
their personal lives. Anybody who stops for a moment to think about all the
|
||
things they say over a cordless telephone over a period of a week or two
|
||
should seriously wonder how many of those things they'd prefer not be
|
||
transmitted by shortwave radio throughout their neighborhood.
|
||
|
||
Cordless phone users don't realize that these units don't only broadcast
|
||
the phone calls themselves. Most units start transmitting the instant the
|
||
handset is activated, and will broadcast anything said to others in the room
|
||
before and while the phone is being dialed, and while the called number is
|
||
ringing. Using a DTMF tone decoder, it's even possible to learn the numbers
|
||
being called from cordless phones. [see the classified ads in Popular
|
||
Communications for DTMF decoders; also for books on how to modify scanners to
|
||
restore the cellular frequencies, and more! -\/\/ombat-]
|
||
|
||
One private investigator told me that part of a infidelity surveillance he
|
||
just completed included a scanner tuned to someone's cordless phone channel,
|
||
feeding a voice-operated (VOX) tape recorder. Every day he picked up the old
|
||
tape and started a new one. The scanner was located in a rented room several
|
||
blocks away from the person whose conversations were being recorded.
|
||
|
||
Hardware Topics
|
||
===============
|
||
|
||
Many people are under the impression that the security features included in
|
||
some cordless phones provide some sort of voice scrambling or privacy. They
|
||
don't do anything of the kind. All they do is permit the user to set up a
|
||
code so that only his or her own handset can access the pedestal portion of
|
||
his own cordless phone system. In these days of too few cordless channels,
|
||
neighbors have sometimes ended up with cordless phones operating on the
|
||
identical frequency pair. That created the problem of making a call and
|
||
accessing your neighbor's dial tone instead of your own, or your handset
|
||
ringing when calls come in on your neighbor's phone.
|
||
|
||
The FCC is going to require this feature on all new cordless telephones, but
|
||
it still won't mean that the two neighbors will be able to talk on their
|
||
identical-channel cordless phones simultaneously. Such situations allow
|
||
neighbors to eavesdrop on one another's calls, even without owning a scanner.
|
||
The FCC is attempting to relieve the common problem of too many cordless
|
||
phones having to share the ten existing base channels in the 46.50 to 47.00
|
||
MHz band. These frequencies are 46.61, 46.63, 46.67, 46.71, 46.73, 46.77,
|
||
46.83, 46.87, 46.93, and 46.97 MHz. Each of these frequencies are paired with
|
||
a 49 MHz handset channel.
|
||
|
||
Manufacturers are going to be permitted to produce cordless phones with
|
||
channels positions in between the existing ten frequency pairs. Cordless
|
||
phones will now be permitted operation on these additional offset frequencies
|
||
to relieve the congestion.
|
||
|
||
A date for implementing these new frequencies hasn't yet been announced, but
|
||
it should be soon. The FCC feels that the life expectancy of a cordless phone
|
||
isn't very long, and they'd like these new phones to be ready to go on line as
|
||
the existing phones are ready to be replaced. The new model phones are going
|
||
to have to also incorporate the dial tone access security encoding feature I
|
||
mentioned.
|
||
|
||
Let's hope the new batch of cordless phones is less quirky than some of the
|
||
ones now in use. We understand that the transmitters of some cordless phones
|
||
switch on for brief periods whenever they detect a sharp increase in the
|
||
sound level, such as laughter, shouting, or a loud voice on the extension
|
||
phone.
|
||
|
||
Privacy Today tells of the cordless phone that refused to die. They noted
|
||
it was reported that the General Electric System 10 cordless phone, Model
|
||
2-9675, just won't shut up. It broadcasts phone calls even when they are made
|
||
using regular extension phones!
|
||
|
||
As for receiving all of these signals, any scanner will do. Antennas that
|
||
do an especially good job include 50 MHz (6 meter ham band) omnidirectional
|
||
types, or (secondarily) any scanner antenna designed for reception in the 30
|
||
to 50 MHz range.
|
||
|
||
There is a dipole available that is specifically tuned for the 46 to 49 MHz
|
||
band, which you can string up in your attic (or back yard) and get a good shot
|
||
at all signals in the band. This comes with 50 ft. of RG-6 coaxial cable
|
||
lead-in, plus a BNC connector for hooking to a scanner. This cordless phone
|
||
monitoring antenna is $49.95 (shipping included to USA, add $5 to Canada) from
|
||
the Cellular Security Group, 4 Gerring Road, Gloucester, MA 01930. [you can
|
||
build one yourself for much less $; look in the chapter on antennas in the
|
||
ARRL Radio Amateur's Handbook -\/\/ombat-]
|
||
|
||
The higher an antenna is mounted for this reception, the better the range
|
||
and reception quality, and the more phones will be heard.
|
||
|
||
Zip The Lip
|
||
===========
|
||
|
||
Once you understand the nature of cordless phoning, you should easily be
|
||
able to deal with these useful devices. Let's face it, it isn't really
|
||
absolutely necessary for all of your conversations to achieve complete
|
||
privacy. You are perfectly willing to relinquish expectations of
|
||
conversational privacy. You do it every time you converse in an elevator, a
|
||
restaurant, a store, a waiting room, a theatre, on the street, etc. You take
|
||
precautions not to say certain things at such times, so you don't feel that
|
||
you are being threatened by having been overheard. Think of speaking on a
|
||
cordless phone as being in the same category as if you were in a crowded
|
||
elevator, and you'll be just fine. It's only when a person subscribes to the
|
||
completely erroneous notion that a cordless phone is a secure communications
|
||
device that any problems could arise, or paranoia could set in.
|
||
|
||
Manufacturers don't claim cordless phones offer any privacy. Frankly,
|
||
because they instill a false and misleading expectation of privacy, the
|
||
several well-intentioned but unenforceable local laws intended to restrict
|
||
cordless monitoring actually do more harm than good. The laws serve no other
|
||
purpose or practical function. It would be far better for all concerned to
|
||
simply publicize that cordless phones are an open line for all to hear.
|
||
|
||
So, cordless phones must be used with the realization that there is no
|
||
reason to expect privacy. Not long ago, GTE Telephone Operations Incorporated
|
||
issued a notice to its subscribers under the headline "Cordless Convenience
|
||
May Warrant Caution." Users were told to "recognize that cordless messages
|
||
are, in fact, open-air FM radio transmissions. As such, they are subject to
|
||
interception (without legal constraint) by those with scanners and similar
|
||
electronic gear... Discretion should dictate the comparative advisability of
|
||
hard-wired phone use."
|
||
|
||
Good advice. We might add that if you are using a cordless phone, you don't
|
||
give out your last name, telephone number, address, any credit card numbers,
|
||
bank account numbers, charge account numbers, or discuss any matters of a
|
||
confidential nature. Moreover, it might be a good idea to advise the other
|
||
party on you call that the conversation is going through a cordless phone.
|
||
|
||
Some people might not care, but others could find that their conversations
|
||
could put them in an unfortunate position. Harvard Law School Professor Alan
|
||
M. Dershowitz, writing on cordless phone snooping in The Boston Globe (January
|
||
22, 1990), said, "The problem of the non-secure cordless telephone will be
|
||
particularly acute for professionals, such as doctors, psychologists, lawyers,
|
||
priests, and financial advisors. Anyone who has an ethical obligation of
|
||
confidentiality should no longer conduct business over cordless phones, unless
|
||
they warn their confidants that they are risking privacy for convenience."
|
||
|
||
That's more good advice. Not that the public will heed that advice. People
|
||
using cellulars have been given similar information many times over, and
|
||
somehow it doesn't sink in. But _you_ got the message, didn't you? Zip your
|
||
lip when using any of these devices. And, if you've got a scanner,you can
|
||
tune in on everybody else blabbing their lives away, and maybe even help the
|
||
police catch drug dealers and other bad guys -- well, unless you live in
|
||
California or some other place where the local laws are more protective of
|
||
cordless phone privacy than the federal courts are.
|
||
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
|
||
That's it. There wasn't much high-tech intelligence there, but it was
|
||
a lot more readable than something copied out of The Bell System Technical
|
||
Journal, right?
|
||
|
||
Think about the implications: Someone who'd turn in their neighbours for
|
||
enjoying recreational chemicals would probably narc on phreaks, hackers,
|
||
anarchists or trashers as well. It isn't just the FBI, Secret Service, and
|
||
cops you have to worry about -- it's the guy down the street with a dozen
|
||
antennas on his roof. The flip side is that if you knew someone was listening
|
||
in, you could have a lot of fun, like implicating your enemies in child
|
||
prostitution rings, or making up outrageous plots that will cause the
|
||
eavesdropper to sound like a paranoid conspiracy freak when he she or it talks
|
||
to the cops.
|
||
|
||
On the more, uh, active side, the potential for acquiring useful information
|
||
like long-distance codes is obvious. Other possibilities will no doubt occur
|
||
to you.
|
||
|
||
Cordless phones also have the potential to allow you to use someone's phone
|
||
line without the hassles of alligator clips. With a bit of luck you could buy
|
||
a popular model of phone, then try various channels and security codes until
|
||
you get a dial tone. Since many phones have these codes preset by the
|
||
factory, one might have to capture the code for a given system and play it
|
||
back somehow to gain access. The ultimate would be a 10 channel handset with
|
||
the ability to capture and reproduce the so-called security codes
|
||
automatically.
|
||
|
||
This subject requires further research. Guess I'd better get a scanner.
|
||
Most short-wave receivers don't go past 30 MHz, and they generally don't have
|
||
FM demodulators. Looking in the Radio Shark catalog, any of their scanners
|
||
would do the job. Some scanners can be modified to restore cellular coverage
|
||
and increase the number of channels just by clipping diodes. If you're going
|
||
to buy a scanner, you might as well get one of those. The scanner modification
|
||
books advertised in Pop Comm would help, or check out Sterling's article
|
||
"Introduction to Radio Telecommunications Interception" in Informatik #01.
|
||
He lists many interesting frequencies, and has the following information on
|
||
the Radio Shark scanners:
|
||
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
Restoring cellular reception.
|
||
|
||
Some scanners have been blocked from receiving the cellular band. This
|
||
can be corrected. It started out with the Realistic PRO-2004 and the PRO-34,
|
||
and went to the PRO-2005. To restore cellular for the 2004, open the radio
|
||
and turn it upside down. Carefully remove the cover. Clip one leg of D-513
|
||
to restore cellular frequencies. For the PRO-2005, [and for the PRO-2006
|
||
-\/\/ombat-] the procedure is the same, except you clip one leg of D-502 to
|
||
restore cellular reception. On the PRO-34 and PRO-37, Cut D11 to add 824-851
|
||
and 869-896 MHz bands with 30 kHz spacing.
|
||
|
||
All these are described in great detail in the "Scanner Modification
|
||
Handbook" volumes I. and II. by Bill Cheek, both available from Communications
|
||
Electronics Inc. (313) 996-8888. They run about $18 apiece.
|
||
==============================================================================
|
||
(reproduced from Informatik #01, file 02)
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 9 of 10
|
||
Hacking Renegade & TeleGuard
|
||
BBS Systems
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
This file will teach you the basic methods in hacking Renegade and
|
||
TeleGuard Bulletin Board Systems. There will, also, be a few commands listed.
|
||
With more sysop's modding their bbs's for their specific tastes, familiar
|
||
youself with the system before you plan to hack it! Look for similar commands
|
||
in the menus if the particular command is not listed as in this text.
|
||
|
||
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
Disclaimer:
|
||
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
This file is for informational purposes only. None of the information
|
||
contained herin is practiced by the author. The author is in no way
|
||
responsible for any liabilities. This file should remain in its entireity. Any
|
||
reproduction of this file should be reported to the author, immediatly.
|
||
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
|
||
A couple of things to do before we get started to hack a Renegade/
|
||
TeleGuard BBS system.
|
||
|
||
1) Get in good with the sysop before you plan to hack his
|
||
board.
|
||
2) Cover your tracks when you login as a New-User and when you
|
||
begin to hack your way on his system. Do this to ensure safety of not getting
|
||
your ass busted.
|
||
3) Make sure the sysop has a few things set before you begin
|
||
to hack his board.
|
||
|
||
The first thing is is to make sure the sysop has the Auto-Validate all
|
||
new files set to 'ON'. You can check this very easily by uploading any file
|
||
and see if that file has an 'Unvalid' word next to the file's name. If it has
|
||
this you will have to wait until he validates the file. Or if the file has a
|
||
number or the size of the file, you're in luck.
|
||
The next step, make sure the sysop has an 'Archive Menu'. Some sysops
|
||
choose to have this privelage to only "Quality" users. The command switch for
|
||
the archive menu is either 'A' or '/A', but it could be under any other name.
|
||
If the sysop doesn't have the menu then you can't hack his board, and you're
|
||
SoL! There are other ways to hack Renegade/TeleGuard board, but I won't go
|
||
into them.
|
||
The most effective way to hack yourself into the sysop's DoS is to use
|
||
the PKZIP.BAT method. To do this read the instructions below.
|
||
|
||
1) Make the PKUNZIP.BAT file from DOS, by typing in this:
|
||
copy con pkunzip.bat
|
||
command
|
||
^Z
|
||
2) Then go and zip the file up, call it something that sounds catchy,
|
||
but not too suspicious.
|
||
Ok, if you have the file ready to upload, you are ready to begin to
|
||
hack the board. Logon to the board, then go to the file area. Once you have
|
||
done this, upload the file to a directory that you can retrieve the file from.
|
||
After you have up'ed the file, go to the archive menu and extract the file,
|
||
usually the sysop will have the extract command under 'X'. Well if you did
|
||
everything right, you should be in the sysop's DoS, if not you probably have
|
||
done something wrong. Well if you have dome something wrong tough shit!
|
||
Once you are in DoS, delete this file, 'x:\bbs\logs\sysop', where 'x'
|
||
is the sysop's drive that he runs Renegade/Teleguard off of. Also delete any
|
||
files in the temp. directories. To run Reneagde/Teleguard in local mode, type
|
||
1) TTY COM# <- where # is the sysop's com port
|
||
2) Renegade -k
|
||
That will let you basically anything you want to his bbs system w/o him even
|
||
seeing what you are doing to his machine. Well this is King Pin signing out,
|
||
and saying "Hack 'em for your personal use!".
|
||
|
||
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
Hacking Renegade/TeleGuard is made possible by the loans and grants
|
||
by, me and some lame sysops running the software. But not all of the
|
||
Renegade/TeleGuard boards are lame!
|
||
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> King Pin
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> The <20>lack Death
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> 7o3.892.0015
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=- The Empire Times -=-
|
||
Volume 1, Issue 3, File 10 of 10
|
||
Media Fax Numbers
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Here is a Listing of FAX machine Numbers of Press organizations
|
||
around the country and in a city/town near you...
|
||
|
||
|
||
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
||
|
||
CNN - Atlanta Atlanta, GA 404.827.3015
|
||
LA Times Los Angeles, CA 213.237.7190
|
||
KCBS Los Angeles, CA 213.460.3733
|
||
KNX Los Angeles, CA 213.460.3733
|
||
CNN Los Angeles, CA 213.460.5081
|
||
KTLA TV 5 Los Angeles, CA 213.460.5952
|
||
KHJ TV 9 Los Angeles, CA 213.460.6265
|
||
City News Los Angeles, CA 213.465.7236
|
||
ABC TV Los Angeles, CA 213.557.5210
|
||
UPI Los Angeles, CA 213.620.1237
|
||
Reuters Los Angeles, CA 213.622.0056
|
||
CBS TV Los Angeles, CA 213.651.0321
|
||
KABL Los Angeles, CA 213.660.9258
|
||
AP Los Angeles, CA 213.748.9836
|
||
KFWB Los Angeles, CA 213.871.4670
|
||
Orange Co Reg Los Angeles, CA 714.543.3904
|
||
Riverside Press Los Angeles, CA 714.782.7572
|
||
Daily News Los Angeles, CA 818.713.0058
|
||
LA Daily News Los Angeles, CA 818.731.0058
|
||
KNBC Los Angeles, CA 818.840.3535
|
||
NBC TV Los Angeles, CA 818.840.4275
|
||
MacNeil/Lehrer New York 212.581.7553
|
||
ABC Prime Time New York, NY 212.580.2427
|
||
ABC Am Agenda New York, NY 212.751.0479
|
||
NBC Nightly New York, NY 212.765.8447
|
||
ABC World New York, NY 212.887.2795
|
||
ABC 20/20 New York, NY 212.887.2969
|
||
Good Mng NY New York, NY 212.887.4724
|
||
CBS New York, NY 212.975.1519
|
||
CBS Eve News New York, NY 212.975.2115
|
||
Oakland Trib Oakland, CA 415.645.2285
|
||
CC Times Oakland, CA 415.943.8362
|
||
Sac'to Bee Sacramento, CA 916.321.1109
|
||
Sac'to Union Sacramento, CA 916.440.0664
|
||
KCRA TV Sacramento, CA 916.441.4050
|
||
Gannett Sacramento, CA 916.446.7326
|
||
AP San Diego San Diego, CA 619.291.2098
|
||
San Diego Union San Diego, CA 619.299.3131
|
||
San Diego Trib San Diego, CA 619.299.7520
|
||
KPOO San Francisco, CA 415.346.5173 Chris Jones
|
||
CBS TV San Francisco, CA 415.362.7417
|
||
Wall St. Journal San Francisco, CA 415.391.4534
|
||
KSFO Radio San Francisco, CA 415.391.5464
|
||
CNN TV San Francisco, CA 415.398.4049
|
||
NY Times San Francisco, CA 415.421.2684
|
||
NBC TV San Francisco, CA 415.441.2823
|
||
KTVU TV (2) San Francisco, CA 415.451.2610
|
||
SF Chronicle San Francisco, CA 415.512.8196
|
||
KQED Radio San Francisco, CA 415.552.2241
|
||
LA Times San Francisco, CA 415.552.2776
|
||
UPI San Francisco, CA 415.552.3585
|
||
Bay City News San Francisco, CA 415.552.8912
|
||
AP San Francisco, CA 415.552.9430
|
||
NPR Radio San Francisco, CA 415.553.2241
|
||
KQED San Francisco, CA 415.553.2241 Carole Pierson
|
||
KOFY TV San Francisco, CA 415.641.1163
|
||
KALX San Francisco, CA 415.642.9715 Theo Davis
|
||
KCBS Radio San Francisco, CA 415.765.4080
|
||
KRON TV (4) San Francisco, CA 415.765.8136
|
||
KPIX TV (5) San Francisco, CA 415.765.8916
|
||
KJZZ San Francisco, CA 415.769.4849 Tim Hodges
|
||
SF Examiner San Francisco, CA 415.777.2525
|
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