343 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
343 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
############ ########## Volume 2 Number 8
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############ ########## April 17, 1992
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############# #### #### ########## #### #### ## ## ##
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|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| EFFector
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| | ONline
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| DIGITAL TELEPHONY |
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| The FBI/DOJ Initiative: | eff@eff.org
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| An EFF Editorial |
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| | 155 Second Street
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| ISDN YOU CAN AFFORD | Cambridge, MA 02141
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| A Report from the EFF/ISDN Lab | (617) 864-0665
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| |
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| | 666 Pennsylvania Ave.SE
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| | Washington, DC 20003
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| | (202) 544-9237
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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REACH OUT AND TAP SOMEONE?
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An Editorial
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By Mike Godwin (mnemonic@eff.org)
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You can imagine how difficult the invention of the telephone made law
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enforcement in the late 19th and early 20th century. Prior to the spread
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of telephone networks, criminals had to meet *in person* to conspire.
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If known criminals could be seen meeting at known criminal hangouts,
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law-enforcement agents would often be tipped off that something was up.
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Once the telephone became widespread, however, it became possible for
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criminals to plan crimes without being in the same place--without even
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being in the same town! The advent of telecommunications had made
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detecting and deterring crime a bit harder. Because of this we might
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understand, if not entirely sympathize with, a law-enforcement agent in
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1900 who believed that telephones should be banned altogether.
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By the same token, we can understand the motivations of FBI Director
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William Sessions, who, along with the Department of Justice, wants to
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see a law passed that would prevent advances in telecommunications
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technology from making wiretaps more difficult. But that doesn't mean we
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should be sympathetic to the FBI/DOJ initiative, which would shift the
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burden of making wiretaps feasible from the government to the phone
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companies (and to other electronic communications providers such as
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CompuServe, Prodigy, and small BBSs). Considered as a whole, this
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initiative is based on false technological premises and questionable
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philosophical ones.
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The initiative,called "Digital Telephony," would "require providers of
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electronic communications services and private branch exchanges to
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ensure that the Government's ability to lawfully intercept
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communications is unimpeded by the introduction of advanced digital
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telecommunications technology or any other telecommunications
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technology." The initiative would also require that changes or additions
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in communications software or hardware be paid for through increased
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rates to consumers. All changes and additions to the nation's
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telecommunications system done under the initiative would be
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administered by the Federal Communications Commission (in cooperation
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with the U.S. Attorney General). The initiative also provides that, if
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requested by the Attorney General, "any Commission proceeding concerning
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regulations, standards or registrations issued or to be issued under
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authority of this section shall be closed to the public." In effect, the
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FCC would compel and supervise the incorporation of wiretapping software
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and hardware into the upgraded digital telephone system. And, if the
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Attorney General wished it, this action could take place without public
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review.
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On the technology side, telephone experts question the Justice
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Department's assertion that "the emergence of digital telecommunications
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technology will preclude the FBI and all of law enforcement from being
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able to intercept electronic communications[,] thus all but eliminating
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a statutorily sanctioned, court authorized and extraordinarily
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successful investigative technique." Few of these experts believe that
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digital telephony itself poses the risk of making wiretapping wholly
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impossible; at most, say some experts, wiretapping of digital lines may
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be more difficult. And it should be noted that digital telephone service
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is already in place at many sites, yet Director Sessions told Congress
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just this year that there has not been a single case in which the FBI
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has been unable to implement a wiretap.
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If wiretapping is not about to become obsolete, why are the FBI and the
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Justice Department eager to impose upon communications providers the
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obligation to build in wiretapping capability? One possible explanation
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lies in last year's effort by the Department of Justice (in S. 266) to
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expand government authority to compel phone-companies to "ensure that
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communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text
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contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately
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authorized by law." On its face, this language would have outlawed the
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phone companies' carrying of encrypted communications if the government
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could not decrypt those communications into their "plain text contents."
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Far more than digital telephone service itself, encryption poses the
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risk of making the interception and reading of electronic communications
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immensely difficult if not impossible. Talk to law enforcement personnel
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who've considered the problem, and they'll tell you they're worried
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about the increasing use of commercial encryption, since it would give
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criminals the potential to make their communications, even when
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intercepted, impossible to read. But for the same reason, noncriminal
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uses of encryption are also growing--businesses and individuals have
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valid reasons for wanting to keep their communications private. That's
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why a coalition of industry and civil-liberties groups opposed S. 266
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last year and managed to get it killed.
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That coalition might have had a harder time, however, if the FBI and the
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Justice Department had already passed their Digital Telephony
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initiative. If this initiative had already been in place, the
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government could have urged lawmakers to outlaw encryption in order to
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*protect the phone companies' investment in built-in wiretapping
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capability*. "You've already required the phone companies to build in
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wiretapping," the FBI could tell Congress. "All we're asking now is that
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you ensure that the intercepted communications are readable."
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This hypothetical case underscores the philosophical problems civil
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libertarians have with the Digital Telephony initiative. Historically,
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when advances in communications technology have raised problems for law
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enforcement, the government has coped with those problems by developing
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advances in its own investigatory techniques. For example, when
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telephone systems made it hard to monitor suspects' plans and
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activities, the government didn't outlaw telephones--it learned how to
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implement wiretaps. Until now, U.S. law-enforcement agencies normally
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have responded to new problems in detecting criminal communications by
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developing innovative investigative tools.
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And that's what they should be doing in response to whatever new
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problems are posed by digital telephony and encryption. This is why EFF
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is coordinating a coalition of privacy and civil-liberties groups and
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computer, communications, and telephone companies -- a coalition ranging
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from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the ACLU to
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IBM and U.S. West -- that opposes this initiative. In a free society, we
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believe, the government has no business compelling the phone companies
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to turn our communications networks into surveillance systems.
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-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
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THE SWITCHED CIRCUIT
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Number 1: Reasonable ISDN Rates Available In Massachusetts
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A Report from the EFF's ISDN Lab
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By Christopher Davis <ckd@eff.org> and Helen Rose <hrose@eff.org>
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This is the first in a series of reports from the EFF's new ISDN Lab,
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where we'll be working with the ISDN offerings from New England
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Telephone, along with as many different kinds of ISDN hardware as we can
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get our hands on.
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We recently attended a seminar on ISDN given by New England Telephone
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for the benefit of telecommunications consultants. Though they focused
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primarily on the business aspects of ISDN (no surprise there) they also
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said they were pricing the service for residential lines, "regular"
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single-line business service, and INTELLIPATH Centrex. The apparent
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market focus for offering the residential service is the work-at-home or
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"telecommuting" population, but the residential service is not crippled
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in any way.
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The prices for ISDN services are encouraging. First and foremost, they
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are affordable. This is *not* the gold-plated offering we've seen from
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some of the regional Bells. (Note that these only apply to Massachusetts.)
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Installation charges for ISDN Basic Rate Interface (BRI) which supplies
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2 B channels plus a D channel for call setup and/or low-speed X.25
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packet data) are low (regular installation charges, plus $15 for each
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circuit- switched voice, data, or voice/data B channel) and monthly
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rates are only $8 over the regular rates for that class of service, plus
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$5 for data or voice/data B channels. (Packet switched connections at
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either high or low speed are more expensive, however.)
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One very nice feature is that NET is not charging the usual monthly
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surcharge ($2+) for tone service; this makes the price of an ISDN line
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actually *cheaper* than the two voice lines many people have in order to
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make data calls while leaving their "normal" line free. Though you
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can't order two of the same type of B channel, the voice/data channel
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can be used for either voice or data on a per call basis.This allows you
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to order a voice channel and a voice/data channel to get, in effect, two
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voice lines while also having the ability to do circuit-switched data.
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Voice calls are charged at the usual rate, so if you have unmeasured
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voice service, you're not going to be stuck with measured ISDN voice
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service. Circuit-switched data calls (64kbps) are charged at measured
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rates (until September 25, at business measured rates--currently $.0963
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for the first minute and .016 for each additional minute; after
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September 25, residential customers will pay $.026 for the first
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minute), but are only available (currently) within the same central
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office. NET plans to make interoffice connections available starting
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4th quarter 1992. The ability to do long-distance ISDN will have to
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wait for National ISDN-1, which probably won't happen until 1993 or
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later.
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It may be possible to do 56kbps data over an ISDN "voice" connection,
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since the voice connection is merely a bit-robbed digital end-to-end
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connection. This is one of the first things we'll test; if true, it
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will make an already affordable ISDN tariff even more so.
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As part of the ISDN Lab, we'll be trying ISDN between our home and EFF's
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Cambridge office, allowing us to test both the residential and business
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offerings, and everything from straight 56/64kbps "fast modem" style
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connections to AppleTalk and IP over ISDN.
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As part of this effort, we will be working with several computer and
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telecommunications hardware providers to try out various ISDN terminal
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adapters, routing software, and the like.
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If you have questions about ISDN, or suggestions for the ISDN Lab, send
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electronic mail to isdnlab@eff.org.
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-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
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ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION OFFERS T-SHIRTS
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For a $10 donation, EFF will send you a spiffy 100% cotton white T-shirt
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with the new black and red EFF logo tastefully displayed on front, and
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the following on the back:
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ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
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FOUNDATION
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eff@eff.org
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(50's style graphic with
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large building sitting on world)
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Serving Cyberspace since 1990
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They come in sizes XL and child's S only. Send your $10 check or money
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order to
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation
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ATT: Rita/ T-Shirts
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155 Second Street
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Cambridge MA 02141
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"What a DEAL! People will be hard-pressed to find a shirt of the same
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quality with such fantastic silk-screening for less than $20 in any
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T-shirt store in the country. (You can quote me on that.)"
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-- Brendan Kehoe <brendan@cs.widener.edu> upon receiving his shirt.
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*** Mention that you are an EFFector Online reader, and we will ***
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waive all shipping and handling charges!
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-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
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MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
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In order to continue the work already begun and to expand our efforts
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and activities into other realms of the electronic frontier, we need the
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financial support of individuals and organizations.
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If you support our goals and our work, you can show that support by
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becoming a member now. Members receive our quarterly newsletter,
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EFFECTOR, our bi-weekly electronic newsletter, EFFector Online (if you
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have an electronic address that can be reached through the Net), and
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special releases and other notices on our activities. But because we
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believe that support should be freely given, you can receive these
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things even if you do not elect to become a member.
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Your membership/donation is fully tax deductible.
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Our memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for
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regular members. You may, of course, donate more if you wish.
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Our privacy policy: The Electronic Frontier Foundation will never, under
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any circumstances, sell any part of its membership list. We will, from
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time to time, share this list with other non-profit organizations whose
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work we determine to be in line with our goals. But with us, member
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privacy is the default. This means that you must actively grant us
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permission to share your name with other groups. If you do not grant
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explicit permission, we assume that you do not wish your membership
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disclosed to any group for any reason.
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---------------- EFF MEMBERSHIP FORM ---------------
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Mail to: The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.
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155 Second St. #28
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Cambridge, MA 02141
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I wish to become a member of the EFF I enclose:$__________
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$20.00 (student or low income membership)
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$40.00 (regular membership)
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$100.00(Corporate or company membership.
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This allows any organization to
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become a member of EFF. It allows
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such an organization, if it wishes
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to designate up to five individuals
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within the organization as members.)
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[ ] I enclose an additional donation of $___________
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Name:______________________________________________________
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Organization:______________________________________________
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Address: __________________________________________________
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City or Town: _____________________________________________
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State:_______ Zip:________ Phone:( )_____________(optional)
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FAX:( )____________________(optional)
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Email address: ______________________________
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I enclose a check [ ] .
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Please charge my membership in the amount of $_____________
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to my Mastercard [ ] Visa [ ] American Express [ ]
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Number:____________________________________________________
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Expiration date: ____________
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Signature: ________________________________________________
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Date:______________________
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I hereby grant permission to the EFF to share my name with
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other non-profit groups from time to time as it deems
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appropriate [ ] .
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Initials:___________________________
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-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
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Seen in InformationLeak:
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"We did Windows applications, but we didn't inhale."
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-- Borland CEO Phillipe Kahn, discussing his firm's
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support for OS/2 2.0
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=====================================================================
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EFFector Online is published by
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation
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155 Second Street, Cambridge MA 02141
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Phone:(617)864-0665 FAX:(617)864-0866
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Internet Address: eff@eff.org
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Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged
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To reproduce signed articles individually,
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please contact the authors for their express permission.
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=====================================================================
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