832 lines
39 KiB
Plaintext
832 lines
39 KiB
Plaintext
|
|
Computer underground Digest Sun Mar 1, 1998 Volume 10 : Issue 15
|
|
ISSN 1004-042X
|
|
|
|
Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
|
|
News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
|
|
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
|
|
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
|
|
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
|
|
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
|
|
Ian Dickinson
|
|
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
|
|
Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
|
|
|
|
CONTENTS, #10.15 (Sun, Mar 1, 1998)
|
|
|
|
File 1--Privacy groups tell FCC to deep-six wiretap law
|
|
File 2--SLAC Bulletin, February 14, 1998
|
|
File 3--Thoughts on the Coaltion of ISPs and the Usenet Blockade
|
|
File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
|
|
|
|
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
|
|
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 17:33:17 -0800 (PST)
|
|
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
|
|
Subject: File 1--Privacy groups tell FCC to deep-six wiretap law
|
|
|
|
Seems as though even the folks (not the undersigned) who lauded the virtues
|
|
of the Digital Telephony wiretapping law and cut a deal to ensure its
|
|
passage are now claiming it's gone astray. Attached below are comments
|
|
filed (I believe today) with the FCC on the law.
|
|
|
|
Even if you don't care about wiretapping, consider this: the Digital
|
|
Telephony law requires technology firms to make communications readily
|
|
snoopable by law enforcement agents. Think of this as a precedent for
|
|
requiring technology firms to make //encrypted// communciations readily
|
|
snoopable by law enforcement agents.
|
|
|
|
Trust me, even if you haven't thought about that precedent and its value
|
|
when lobbying members of Congress, Louis Freeh has.
|
|
|
|
-Declan
|
|
|
|
******
|
|
|
|
Before the
|
|
|
|
Federal Communications Commission
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20554
|
|
|
|
In the Matter of )
|
|
) CC Docket No. 97-213
|
|
Communications Assistance for )
|
|
Law Enforcement Act )
|
|
|
|
|
|
Surreply Comments of
|
|
|
|
The American Civil Liberties Union
|
|
The Electronic Privacy Information Center
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
|
|
|
|
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Electronic Privacy
|
|
Information Center (EPIC), Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) respectfully
|
|
submit these surreply comments in the above referenced proceeding. Our
|
|
organizations represent a broad perspective of public interest, privacy and
|
|
civil liberties interests.
|
|
|
|
ACLU, EPIC and EFF jointly filed comments with the Federal
|
|
Communications Commission in response to the Notice of Proposed
|
|
Rulemaking (NPRM) on implementation of the Communications Assistance
|
|
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) on December 12, 1997. In our
|
|
previous comments, we urged the Commission to exercise its statutorily
|
|
conferred authority to delay compliance with the Act until October, 2000.
|
|
|
|
However, after reviewing the comments filed by the Federal Bureau
|
|
of Investigation (FBI), public interest groups, and industry; and in light of
|
|
the FBI's four year delay in releasing to the public the statutorily required
|
|
Notice of Capacity; and the FBI's obstruction of the adoption of industry
|
|
compliance standards that are feasible and technically possible, we are
|
|
convinced that the Commission must indefinitely delay the implementation
|
|
of CALEA. We call on the Commission to report to Congress on the
|
|
serious legal, technical, and policy obstacles that have thwarted CALEA's
|
|
implementation. Our organizations also request that the Commission
|
|
require the FBI to provide comment-- on the public record-- explaining their
|
|
failure to meet the statutory Notice of Capacity Requirement imposed by
|
|
Congress nearly four years ago.
|
|
|
|
Our requests in this proceeding are based on several provisions for
|
|
government accountability and privacy protection incorporated in CALEA
|
|
and its legislative history, which has thus far been largely ignored.
|
|
Section
|
|
107 of CALEA provides that any person(s), including public interest
|
|
groups, concluding that any standard issued on the implementation of the
|
|
Act is deficient, may petition the Commission for review. This section
|
|
provides that one factor for judging the acceptability of standards is whether
|
|
they protect the privacy of communications that are not permitted to be
|
|
intercepted under the law.
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, the legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the
|
|
Commission's authority over this implementation process is designed to
|
|
ensure that the following goals are realized: (1) Costs to consumers are kept
|
|
low, so that 'gold-plating' by the industry is kept in check; (2) the
|
|
legitimate
|
|
needs of law enforcement are met, but that law enforcement does not engage
|
|
in gold-plating of its demands; (3) privacy interests of all Americans are
|
|
protected; (4) the goal of encouraged competition in all forms of
|
|
telecommunications is not undermined, and the fact of wiretap compliance is
|
|
not used as either a sword or a shield in realization of that goal.
|
|
|
|
Because our organizations have concluded that these statutory goals
|
|
have not been satisfied, we believe it is incumbent on the Commission to
|
|
take action with regards to our requests. In these surreply comments we
|
|
will also address several issues raised in submissions of other interested
|
|
parties that call for an expansion of the CALEA's mandate and that run
|
|
counter to Congress' stated goals.
|
|
|
|
I. The FBI has Disregarded the Congressional Limitations and
|
|
Statutory Obligations Imposed on Law Enforcement by CALEA:
|
|
|
|
CALEA explicitly called on law enforcement to issue a technical
|
|
capacity notice by October 25, 1995, one year after the law's enactment.
|
|
Carriers were given three years after the notification to install capacity
|
|
meeting the notification requirements. Thus, under the statutory timetable,
|
|
industry's deadline for compliance was to have been October 1998.
|
|
|
|
Section 104(a)(2) requires that the technical capacity notice
|
|
provide a
|
|
numerical estimate of law enforcement's anticipated use of electronic
|
|
surveillance for 1998. The notice is required to establish the maximum
|
|
interceptions that a particular switch or system must be capable of
|
|
implementing simultaneously.
|
|
|
|
By mandating the publication of numerical estimates of law
|
|
enforcement surveillance activity, Congress intended CALEA's notice
|
|
requirements to serve as accountability "mechanisms that will allow for
|
|
Congressional and public oversight. The bill requires the government to
|
|
estimate its capacity needs and publish them in the Federal Register."
|
|
|
|
In addition to the concerns of privacy advocates, the Public Notice
|
|
requirement was based on industry concerns that the cost of providing
|
|
intercepts was becoming an undue burden on companies and that the
|
|
number of intercepts was growing too rapidly for industry to respond. In
|
|
1994, AT&T testified that such law enforcement notice was necessary for
|
|
industry to accomplish the following:
|
|
|
|
-require law enforcement to focus on what it actually requires to accomplish
|
|
its legitimate needs thereby freeing resources they do not actually require
|
|
for
|
|
other purposes;
|
|
|
|
-provide an essential mechanism for Congress to control both the costs and
|
|
level of law enforcement involvement in the development of new services;
|
|
|
|
-ensure that the fewest taxpayer dollars are spent to address law
|
|
enforcement concerns.
|
|
|
|
As documented in detail in our prior comments, the FBI has yet to
|
|
provide the mandated Notice of Capacity. The Bureau has thus far released
|
|
two initial notices that were both withdrawn after sharp public criticism over
|
|
the FBI's failure to meet the statutory requirements.
|
|
|
|
The FBI comments also do not explain why the public and Congress
|
|
should ignore their failure to meet this statutory obligation. Instead, the
|
|
FBI
|
|
asserts that public safety should override any technical problems industry
|
|
groups may face in complying with CALEA's statutory deadline.
|
|
However, we believe that this assertion has also not been justified by the
|
|
FBI to date.
|
|
|
|
According to statistics released by the Administrative Office of the
|
|
U.S. Courts and the Department of Justice, the actual number of
|
|
interceptions has risen dramatically each year and in 1996 alone 2.2 million
|
|
conversations were captured by law enforcement. A total of 1.7 million of
|
|
these intercepted conversations were deemed not "incriminating" by
|
|
prosecutors. Our organizations believe that these numbers do little to
|
|
support the FBI contentions that CALEA should be given broad
|
|
interpretation.
|
|
|
|
Moreover, the FBI comments state that a blanket extension on the
|
|
compliance with CALEA should not be granted despite the impasse
|
|
between industry and law enforcement because of the potential threat to
|
|
public security. While we recognize the importance of protecting the
|
|
public, Congress required that there be a balancing of the interests of law
|
|
enforcement with the need to protect privacy and develop new technologies.
|
|
Specifically, Congress had the following objectives:
|
|
|
|
(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies
|
|
to carry out properly authorized intercepts;
|
|
|
|
(2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally
|
|
revealing technologies; and
|
|
|
|
(3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and
|
|
technologies.
|
|
|
|
Hence, we are not persuaded by the FBI's conclusion that there
|
|
should not be a blanket extension for compliance with CALEA. Until it is
|
|
clear that each of the Congressional objectives is met and there is a public
|
|
release by the FBI of its statutorily mandated Notice on Capacity, the
|
|
technical compliance with the Act should be postponed.
|
|
|
|
II. The FBI Has Not Maintained Narrowly Focused Capability for
|
|
Law Enforcement Agencies to Carry Out Authorized Intercepts
|
|
|
|
The FBI's bad faith in the implementation process has prevented the
|
|
development of acceptable technical standards that are feasible by industry.
|
|
As our prior comments document and industry comments support, the FBI
|
|
has repeatedly endeavored to require that industry meet a FBI wish-list of
|
|
surveillance capability needs never contemplated by Congress. Indeed,
|
|
avoiding such an impasse was precisely why Congress explicitly redrafted
|
|
the statute in 1994 to eliminate law enforcement control over industry
|
|
standard-setting.
|
|
|
|
Instead of preserving a narrow focus on surveillance capability, the
|
|
FBI has sought an expanded capability by interpreting CALEA to apply to
|
|
entities and user services specifically exempt by Congress. The comments
|
|
submitted by the FBI underscore the validity of our concerns by presenting
|
|
a wish-list of items that go far beyond the authorized electronic surveillance
|
|
under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
|
|
Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
|
|
and CALEA.. For example, the FBI comments call for CALEA compliance
|
|
by carriers providing access to information services, private
|
|
communications services, and paging services -- an expansion of
|
|
surveillance capabilities never contemplated by Congress.
|
|
|
|
(a) Information services
|
|
|
|
In paragraph 29 of its submission, the FBI states that it agrees that
|
|
providers of "exclusively information services are excluded from CALEA"
|
|
but that "any portion of a telecommunications service provided by a
|
|
common carrier that is used to provide transport access to information
|
|
services is subject to CALEA."
|
|
|
|
Such services are explicitly exempt under the statute. Section 103
|
|
(4)(b) provides limitations on what services are required to meet assistance
|
|
capability requirements under CALEA. It states:
|
|
|
|
(b) Limitations:
|
|
(2)Information services; private networks and interconnection services and
|
|
facilities. The requirements of subsection (a) do not apply to--
|
|
|
|
(A) information services; or
|
|
|
|
(B) equipment, facilities, or services that support transport or switching of
|
|
communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of
|
|
interconnecting telecommunications carriers.
|
|
|
|
Congress explicitly rejected any application of CALEA to
|
|
information services including electronic mail and on-line services
|
|
recognizing that interception of those communications is the equivalent of
|
|
"call content" and is therefore, subject to a much higher degree of protection
|
|
under the Constitution. The FBI, and the Commission NPRM, incorrectly
|
|
assume there is a distinction between carriers that exclusively provide
|
|
information services and common carriers that provide access for
|
|
information services. The FBI is simply attempting to gain back-door
|
|
access to information services contrary to Congress' intent.
|
|
|
|
(b) Carriers Providing Private Services:
|
|
|
|
Paragraph 22 of the FBI comment states that "there may exist
|
|
telecommunications companies that do not hold themselves out to serve the
|
|
public indiscriminately that should also be treated as 'telecommunications
|
|
carriers' by the Commission. Otherwise, companies that hold themselves
|
|
out to serve particular groups may, intentionally or inadvertently, undermine
|
|
CALEA."
|
|
|
|
Thus, the FBI's conclusion that private services that do not
|
|
indiscriminately provide services to the public fall within CALEA's ambit is
|
|
unwarranted. Indeed as the legislative history states:
|
|
"...telecommunications services that support or transport switching of
|
|
communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of
|
|
interconnecting telecommunications carriers...need not meet any wiretap
|
|
standards...Earlier digital telephony proposals covered all providers of
|
|
electronic communications services, which meant every business and
|
|
institution in the country. That broad approach was not practical. Nor was
|
|
it justified to meet any law enforcement need."
|
|
|
|
Indeed the explicit exclusion of private networks was also based on
|
|
the potential threats to personal privacy that such could be incurred by
|
|
requiring private networks to meet the CALEA configuration requirements.
|
|
CALEA's legislative history states that private networks are not the usual
|
|
focus of court authorized electronic surveillance and that these networks,
|
|
although excluded by CALEA's requirements, may be required to provide
|
|
law enforcement with access to information after receiving a court order.
|
|
|
|
(c) Paging services:
|
|
|
|
Paragraph 25 of the FBI comments state: "Law enforcement
|
|
contends that paging systems should be included in the definition of
|
|
"telecommunications carrier" for the purposes of interpreting CALEA
|
|
because paging systems generally fall within the definition of common
|
|
carrier or, at minimum, rely on common carriers to be activated."
|
|
|
|
Paging service's reliance on common carriers for activation does not
|
|
automatically compel their compliance with CALEA.
|
|
|
|
III. The FBI Has Ignored Privacy Protection Requirements
|
|
|
|
The Congress specifically required privacy safeguards to assure that
|
|
communications not be made vulnerable to hackers and rogue wiretaps as a
|
|
result of CALEA. Section 105 of CALEA, Systems Security and Integrity,
|
|
mandates that "telecommunications carriers shall ensure that any
|
|
interception of communications or access to call-identifying information
|
|
effected within its switching premises can activated only in accordance with
|
|
a court order or other lawful authorization...". However, the FBI comments
|
|
and FCC NPRM merely reduce privacy concerns to questions of
|
|
telecommunication carrier recordkeeping and employee screening measures.
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, Section V of the FBI comments, which addresses the
|
|
carrier security procedures, attempts to undermine the protections against
|
|
unlawful government surveillance guaranteed in the Electronic
|
|
Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 18 U.S.C. 2510, et. seq. This section
|
|
asserts that there is "anecdotal evidence" that carriers have refused to
|
|
comply with law enforcement requests for wiretapping where there is
|
|
confusion as to the validity of court orders. As a result, the FBI has called
|
|
on the Commission to limit the ability of carriers to question the lawfulness
|
|
of requests for interception by various law enforcement entities. Similarly,
|
|
paragraph 47 states that "[c]arriers are the implementers, not the enforcers,
|
|
of lawful intercept orders or certifications under the electronic surveillance
|
|
laws."
|
|
|
|
We strongly disagree with that conclusion. Carriers have an
|
|
affirmative obligation under ECPA to ensure that they are not wrongfully
|
|
disclosing information to the government or third parties. The failure of
|
|
carriers to exercise good faith judgment and carefully scrutinize such
|
|
requests for information may expose them to criminal and civil liability
|
|
under ECPA. 18 U.S.C. 2520 (d). We believe that a Commission ruling
|
|
providing that carrier's lack the ability to scrutinize the validity of
|
|
warrants
|
|
would require them to abrogate their statutory good faith obligations. In
|
|
addition, the Commission lacks authority to limit the rights of carriers to
|
|
review such orders and such a requirement would not comport with other
|
|
federal and state requirements.
|
|
|
|
Paragraph 46 of the FBI comments broadly states that carriers may
|
|
not question law enforcement authority to conduct wiretapping
|
|
investigations where one party has consented to interception. The FBI
|
|
broadly states that "[i]n such cases, the electronic surveillance statutes
|
|
clearly indicate that no court order is required."
|
|
|
|
We similarly disagree with this conclusion. Currently, at least 12
|
|
states do not permit "one party consent" to interceptions of communications.
|
|
Thus, we believe that a Commission rule limiting carrier discretion would
|
|
certainly create pre-emption questions where there is no Congressional basis
|
|
and where the request comes from state law enforcement.
|
|
|
|
Conclusion
|
|
|
|
Congress envisioned CALEA's implementation as an open process
|
|
that would ensure accountability and prevent the development of
|
|
unprecedented surveillance capabilities. The expanded capabilities sought by
|
|
the FBI, along with their non-compliance with CALEA's Public Notice of
|
|
Capacity Requirements warrant serious Commission and Congressional
|
|
response.
|
|
|
|
Our organizations believe that given the FBI's failure to meet public
|
|
accountability provisions, the Commission must indefinitely delay the
|
|
implementation of CALEA and report to the Congress on the serious
|
|
obstacles that have thwarted its implementation to date. We also ask that the
|
|
Commission require the FBI provide comment on the public record
|
|
explaining its failure to meet it unambiguous statutory obligations under
|
|
CALEA.
|
|
|
|
Respectfully Submitted,
|
|
|
|
|
|
_____________________________________
|
|
Laura W. Murphy, Director
|
|
Greg Nojeim, Legislative Counsel
|
|
A. Cassidy Sehgal, William J. Brennan Fellow
|
|
American Civil Liberties Union
|
|
Washington National Office
|
|
122 Maryland Ave, NE
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20002
|
|
(202) 544-1681
|
|
|
|
Marc Rotenberg, Director Barry Steinhardt, President
|
|
David L. Sobel, Legal Counsel Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
David Banisar, Staff Counsel 1550 Bryant Street, Suite 725
|
|
|
|
Electronic Privacy Information Center San Francisco CA 94103
|
|
666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301 (415) 436-9333
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20003
|
|
(202) 544-9240
|
|
|
|
Computer Professionals for
|
|
Social Responsibility
|
|
CPSR, P.O. Box 717,
|
|
Palo Alto, CA 94302
|
|
(650) 322-3778
|
|
|
|
cc:
|
|
Rep. Bob Barr
|
|
Sen. Orrin Hatch
|
|
Sen. Patrick Leahy
|
|
Rep. Henry Hyde
|
|
Sen. Ashcroft
|
|
Sen. Edward McCain
|
|
Sen. Arlen Spector
|
|
Rep. Billy Tauzin
|
|
Rep. McCollum
|
|
Rep. Charles Schumer
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No.
|
|
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994)
|
|
(codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.)
|
|
|
|
Statement of the AT&T Corporation Before the House Subcommittee on Civil
|
|
and Constitutional Rights
|
|
and Senate Subcommittee on Technology and Law, reprinted, in Schneier and
|
|
Banisar: The Electronic
|
|
Privacy Papers, Wiley and Sons, 1997.
|
|
|
|
See generally, EPIC letter to The Telecommunications Industry Liason
|
|
Unit, November 13, 1995,
|
|
reprinted in 1996 Electronic Privacy and Information Center, Cryptography
|
|
and Privacy Sourcebook, 1996,
|
|
discussing the failure of the Initial FBI Notification of Law Enforcement
|
|
Capacity Requirements to meet
|
|
CALEA's obligations.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------
|
|
POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology
|
|
To subscribe: send a message to majordomo@vorlon.mit.edu with this text:
|
|
subscribe politech
|
|
More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 1998 13:09:56 -0500 (EST)
|
|
From: jw@bway.net
|
|
Subject: File 2--SLAC Bulletin, February 14, 1998
|
|
|
|
SLAC Bulletin, February 14, 1998
|
|
---------------------------------
|
|
|
|
The SLAC Bulletin is a low-volume mailer (1-5 messages per month)
|
|
on Internet freedom of speech issues from Jonathan Wallace,
|
|
co-author of Sex, Laws and Cyberspace (Henry Holt 1996) and
|
|
publisher of The Ethical Spectacle (http://www.spectacle.org). To
|
|
add or delete yourself:
|
|
http://www.greenspun.com/spam/home.tcl?domain=SLAC
|
|
|
|
NO GATEKEEPERS
|
|
|
|
Jonathan Wallace jw@bway.net
|
|
|
|
Our president's latest scandal was broken by Internet columnist
|
|
Matt Drudge, who reported that Newsweek had spiked a story about
|
|
Monica Lewinsky.
|
|
|
|
Some people see that as a black eye for the print media and a
|
|
victory for the Internet. Not First Lady Hilary Clinton, who was
|
|
asked about the Net's role in dissemination of news at a press
|
|
conference on February 11.
|
|
|
|
"As exciting as these new developments are.... there are a number
|
|
of serious issues without any kind of editing function or
|
|
gate-keeping function. What does it mean to have the right to
|
|
defend your reputation, or to respond to what someone says?
|
|
|
|
"There used to be this old saying that the lie can be
|
|
halfway around the world before the truth gets its boots on.
|
|
Well, today, the lie can be twice around the world before the
|
|
truth gets out of bed to find its boots. I mean, it is just
|
|
beyond imagination what can be disseminated."
|
|
|
|
Clinton was asked whether she favored regulation of the Net. She
|
|
said she didn't yet know, but commented:
|
|
|
|
"Anytime an individual or an institution or an invention leaps
|
|
so far out ahead of that balance [contemplated by the Founders]
|
|
and throws a system, whatever it might be --political, economic,
|
|
technological --out of balance, you've got a problem, because
|
|
then it can lead to the oppression of people's rights, it can
|
|
lead to the manipulation of information, it can lead to all kinds
|
|
of bad outcomes which we have seen historically. So we're going
|
|
to have to deal with that."
|
|
|
|
These are among the most scary words ever said about Net
|
|
regulation. Contrast them to the rhetoric we're used to, about
|
|
the Net as a hydra-headed pornmonger reaching into your child's
|
|
bedroom. Censorship advocates like former Senator Exon at least
|
|
have the decency to pretend that all they care about is
|
|
"decency." Mrs. Clinton goes a huge step further: she's worried
|
|
about information. Not just falsehood. Information. Obviously,
|
|
for her the right result was Newsweek's decision to spike the
|
|
story, not Drudge's to run it.
|
|
|
|
We're already far enough along in the Lewinsky scandal to know
|
|
something happened. The President and Mrs. Clinton have endured a
|
|
lot of falsehood on the Net. I don't remember either of them
|
|
calling for Net regulation because of Usenet postings or Web
|
|
pages claiming that the military shot down flight 800, or that
|
|
Ron Brown or Vincent Foster were assassinated. It took the truth,
|
|
not a lie, to make Hilary Clinton say the Net is dangerous.
|
|
|
|
This recalls the early days of the republic, when laws banning
|
|
"seditious libel" were in force. Back then, there were greater
|
|
penalties for telling the truth than for lying. People might
|
|
disbelieve a lie. The truth was more damaging.
|
|
|
|
Preserve us from gatekeepers. Their function is highly
|
|
overrated. Yes, they filter out some falsehoods, but they also
|
|
print some, while blocking some truths. Their sense of what
|
|
interests the public is notoriously faulty and unrepresentative.
|
|
Most of the time, if I really want to drill down into an issue
|
|
and get to to the truth, I get my information from the Net.
|
|
|
|
I didn't see Hilary Clinton's comments above reported in the
|
|
print media; I got them from a posting by Declan McCullagh to his
|
|
fight-censorship list. For three years, I've written whatever I
|
|
wanted, whenever I felt like, in The Ethical Spectacle and to my
|
|
mailing lists. A gatekeeper of any kind would have spiked most of
|
|
of the stories I wrote about. An editor might have made some
|
|
little contribution to my grammar or, on occasion, my spelling.
|
|
In the balance, I've done much better without gatekeepers than I
|
|
have with them.
|
|
|
|
Contrast the experience I've had writing for others. In the past
|
|
three years, I've had articles killed by print media, or edited
|
|
beyond recognition. Language I never wrote expressing ideas that
|
|
aren't mine has been introduced. I even saw scores of
|
|
typographical errors crop up in the hardcover of Sex, Laws and
|
|
Cyberspace during the editing process. More people read The
|
|
Ethical Spectacle in a month than have read that book in the two
|
|
years it has been out.
|
|
|
|
People like Hilary Clinton want gatekeepers for the Net not to
|
|
screen for falsehood but to keep the truth within acceptable
|
|
parameters. Government censorship isn't necessary when the media
|
|
censors itself. Mrs. Clinton appears to hold the "Don't make me
|
|
come over there" theory of government.
|
|
|
|
A much better opinion of the value of a medium without
|
|
gatekeepers was expressed by Judge Stewart Dalzell in his opinion
|
|
in ACLU v. Reno, invalidating the Communications Decency Act.
|
|
Judge Dalzell appreciated the Net's "low barriers to entry",
|
|
"astoundingly diverse content" and "relative parity among
|
|
speakers." His fascinating conclusion was that the Net is
|
|
superior to print media as a "speech-enhancing medium" precisely
|
|
because of the lack of gatekeepers:
|
|
|
|
"It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has
|
|
achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
|
|
marketplace of mass speech that this country -- and indeed the
|
|
world -- has yet seen.... Indeed, the Government's asserted
|
|
'failure' of the Internet rests on the implicit premise that too
|
|
much speech occurs in that medium, and that speech there is too
|
|
available to the participants."
|
|
|
|
He noted that, if the government were permitted to impose
|
|
gatekeepers on the Net, the "Internet would ultimately come to
|
|
mirror broadcasting and print, with messages tailored to a
|
|
mainstream society" where "economic power has become relatively
|
|
coterminous with influence."
|
|
|
|
Judge Dalzell praised "the autonomy" that the Net "confers to
|
|
ordinary people as well as media magnates." This autonomy is
|
|
precisely what frightens Hilary Clinton.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 09:20:53 -0600
|
|
From: Richard MacKinnon <spartan@actlab.utexas.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 3--Thoughts on the Coaltion of ISPs and the Usenet Blockade
|
|
|
|
The Usenet Blockade
|
|
The Usenet Death Penalty (UDP) is a misnomer because it is not a form of
|
|
virtual capital punishment--at least not in the short-term. It is more akin
|
|
to a blockade or a seige. A Usenet Blockade may be an effective means of
|
|
coercing the Netcom leadership to better address the antisocial activities
|
|
originating from the base camp of spammers located within its borders.
|
|
Primarily an economic attack, blockades have been used throughout history to
|
|
help meatspace governments align their priorities with their neighbors.
|
|
Since Usenet consists of several sovereignties, it can be useful to apply
|
|
much of what we know about international relations, that is, the theories
|
|
relating to national actors interacting in an ungoverned space. As an
|
|
ungoverned space, Usenet is learning how to self-govern by way of coalitions
|
|
which is the primary way actors move out of the state of nature into
|
|
relative civilization.
|
|
|
|
Competing Illiberalisms
|
|
There is no doubt that spam is a major annoyance for the Usenet world, and
|
|
for some there is a real economic cost. As a result, users have turned to
|
|
their leaders for solutions. These solutions range from personal defense
|
|
systems (filtering software), to isolationism (closed systems), to blockades
|
|
(the Usenet death penality). Unfortunately, all three categories of
|
|
solutions pose serious challenges to the concept of free speech and the free
|
|
movement of information--arguably an ideology foundational to Usenet. The
|
|
challenge is to determine which solution is less illiberal and to determine
|
|
who ought to make this determination.
|
|
|
|
Analysis of the Competition: Defense systems may be end-user based,
|
|
ISP-based, or network-based.
|
|
|
|
End-User based
|
|
|
|
1. In the event of bombing (Usenet "spamming" in this example), end-users
|
|
may purchase among the many competing brands of poor, mediocre, and barely
|
|
satisfactory personal filtering systems on the open market. A functioning,
|
|
Reaganesque "Star Wars Defense" system has not yet appeared in the
|
|
state-of-the-art efforts--not only do the defense systems screen out
|
|
incoming missiles, they often screen out rain, sunlight, and other useful
|
|
things causing the otherwise vivacious virtual environment to wilt, dry up,
|
|
and become dull.
|
|
|
|
2. Frustratingly, they also fail in their primary mission and let a lot of
|
|
missiles through with varying degrees of casualties reputedly ranging from
|
|
exposing children to naked adults and exposing adults to naked children.
|
|
This is something that software may never be able to dress/address.
|
|
|
|
3. There is a lot of political controversy over these inadequacies. Leaders
|
|
of various end-user communities have met with representatives of the
|
|
moral-military-industrial complex in an attempt to either make better
|
|
personal defense systems or eliminate their use altogether. As Bruce
|
|
Sterling in Austin observed at last week's Conference on Computers, Freedom
|
|
and Privacy, the resolution seemingly lies beyond the grasp of even the
|
|
White House Office of Science and Technology which finds it simpler to
|
|
tackle the problems posed by theoretical physics and space exploration.
|
|
Needless to say, the resolution is out there--way, way, out there--creating
|
|
a vacuum of indecision and an opportunity for ad hocractic power.
|
|
|
|
ISP-based
|
|
|
|
4. Some ISPs in the past have attempted to close their borders and restrict
|
|
the flow of traffic in and out. This has also been frowned upon by many of
|
|
the same leaders of end-user communities. Fundamentally, isolationism is an
|
|
ostrich approach to making "foreign policy" among CISPs. The Usenet world
|
|
continues to spin and the people with their heads in holes just end up
|
|
missing out on lots of interesting events.
|
|
|
|
5. As a result, lots of disgruntled netizens flee from closed systems to
|
|
freer systems. Geo-economics has forced many "virtual countries" to loosen
|
|
up their border controls. Naturally, this makes them susceptible to bombing
|
|
attacks.
|
|
|
|
Network-based
|
|
|
|
6. Virtual countries which are loathe to close their borders because that
|
|
policy is inherently illiberal are forced to choose between establishing
|
|
network-level blockades or placing the burden of defense on the end-users by
|
|
way of personal filtering systems--most of which have also been considered
|
|
illiberal.
|
|
|
|
7. Blockading, fundamentally an ad hoc economic attack, has been identified
|
|
as a means of coercing a virtual country into policing the activities within
|
|
its borders so that its national digital output (NDO) falls within the
|
|
bounds of systemically acceptable end-user behavior. The Leviathan rears
|
|
its ugly head.
|
|
|
|
Who decides?
|
|
Should Usenet "global" policy be set by individuals, their virtual
|
|
communities, isolated ISPs, coalitions of ISPs (CISP), or national
|
|
governments? The logic of collective action in Usenet is governed by a set
|
|
of social laws which are elusive but as reliable as many physical laws when
|
|
properly understood. As a board member of Electronic Frontiers-Texas
|
|
(formerly EFF-Austin), I have been participating in the drafting our
|
|
position statement on the Usenet Death Penalty and Netcom. My understanding
|
|
of the social laws of ungoverned interaction is that any policy
|
|
recommendation to the coalition of ISPs requires as strong an element of
|
|
coercion if it is going to get their attention. Otherwise, the ad hoc UDP
|
|
CISP will continue to pursue its interest and what it perceives is the
|
|
interest of its constituents. The coalition wielding the most coercive
|
|
power has the most influence over the ungoverned decisionmaking process.
|
|
|
|
Who decides?
|
|
Should Usenet "global" policy be set by individuals, their virtual
|
|
communities, isolated ISPs, coalitions of ISPs (CISP), or national
|
|
governments? The logic of collective action in Usenet is governed by a set
|
|
of social laws which are elusive but as reliable as many physical laws when
|
|
properly understood. As a board member of Electronic Frontiers-Texas
|
|
(formerly EFF-Austin), I have been participating in the drafting our
|
|
position statement on the Usenet Death Penalty and Netcom. My understanding
|
|
of the social laws of ungoverned interaction is that any policy
|
|
recommendation to the coalition of ISPs requires as strong an element of
|
|
coercion if it is going to get their attention. Otherwise, the ad hoc UDP
|
|
CISP will continue to pursue its interest and what it perceives is the
|
|
interest of its constituents. The coalition wielding the most coercive
|
|
power has the most influence over the ungoverned decisionmaking process.
|
|
|
|
1. The weakest statement:
|
|
|
|
"We the people of <insert your organization here> deplore the use of the
|
|
Usenet Death Penalty" on Netcom because it infringes on the liberties of
|
|
Netcom's end-users--liberties and rights which we hold dear and inalienable.
|
|
What happens to Netcom today could happen to us tomorrow."
|
|
|
|
I like and support this statement, but my understanding of the social
|
|
physics is that it is anemic and although it may get some media play, it
|
|
will have little actual influence on the play of events. It's an example of
|
|
critique without action.
|
|
|
|
2. One might write a statement as follows:
|
|
|
|
"We the people of <insert your organization here> deplore the use of the
|
|
Usenet Death Penalty" on Netcom because it infringes on the liberties of the
|
|
Netcom end-users--liberties and rights which we hold dear and inalienable.
|
|
What happens to Netcom today could happen to us tomorrow." Therefore, we
|
|
are calling for a general strike against all ISPs which intend to
|
|
participate in this egregious and illiberal curtailment of free speech. On
|
|
February XX, we are encouraging everyone to close their accounts on these
|
|
systems and move to ISPs who refuse to participate in the UDP."
|
|
|
|
I like this statement better because it uses the logic of the blockade
|
|
(economic coercion) against the CISP and it carries the satisfaction of
|
|
praxis--theory plus action.
|
|
|
|
3. Or one could write a statement like this:
|
|
|
|
"We the people of <insert your organization here> deplore the use of the
|
|
Usenet Death Penalty" on Netcom because it infringes on the liberties of the
|
|
Netcom end-users--liberties and rights which we hold dear and inalienable.
|
|
What happens to Netcom today could happen to us tomorrow." Therefore, we
|
|
are calling for a general strike against all ISPs which intend to
|
|
participate in this egregious and illiberal curtailment of free speech. On
|
|
February XX, we are encouraging everyone to close their accounts on these
|
|
systems and move to Netcom in an act of solidarity."
|
|
|
|
This is the strongest statement because it shows conviction. While most of
|
|
us have privately condemned Netcom for permitting the spamming, this
|
|
statement underlies our belief that the classification of what is spam and
|
|
what it isn't is a dangerous and suspect activity. Further, it shows that
|
|
we are willing to give up our own access to Usenet in the fight to guarantee
|
|
access to everyone. A long roll-call of voluntary conversions would get the
|
|
attention and action need to have an effect. In other words, the statement
|
|
should be accompanied with a list that looks something like this:
|
|
|
|
user@netcom.com, formerly user@MAIN.Org
|
|
user@netcom.com, formerly user@unforgettable.com
|
|
user@netcom.com, formerly user@mail.utexas.edu
|
|
user@netcom.com, formerly user@actlab.utexas.edu
|
|
...and thousands of others formerly from everywhere.anywhere
|
|
|
|
This third statement accompanied by such a list, when presented to the CISP
|
|
will carry the political and moral weight necessary to work with the laws of
|
|
social physics, not against them.
|
|
|
|
--Richard MacKinnon (http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/~spartan), author of
|
|
"Searching for the Leviathan in Usenet" and "Punishing the Persona:
|
|
Correctional Strategies for the Virtual Offender." His views are not
|
|
necessarily the views of Electronic Frontiers-Texas or the Advanced
|
|
Communication Technologies Laboratory.
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Richard MacKinnon http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/~spartan
|
|
Government Department mailto:spartan@gov.utexas.edu
|
|
Advanced Communication Technologies Laboratory (ACTLAB)
|
|
The University of Texas at Austin
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
|
available at no cost electronically.
|
|
|
|
CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
|
|
Or, to subscribe, send post with this in the "Subject:: line:
|
|
|
|
SUBSCRIBE CU-DIGEST
|
|
Send the message to: cu-digest-request@weber.ucsd.edu
|
|
|
|
DO NOT SEND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MODERATORS.
|
|
|
|
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6436), fax (815-753-6302)
|
|
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
|
60115, USA.
|
|
|
|
To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CU-DIGEST
|
|
Send it to CU-DIGEST-REQUEST@WEBER.UCSD.EDU
|
|
(NOTE: The address you unsub must correspond to your From: line)
|
|
|
|
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
|
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
|
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
|
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
|
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
|
on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
|
|
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
|
|
1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
|
|
|
|
In ITALY: ZERO! BBS: +39-11-6507540
|
|
|
|
UNITED STATES: ftp.etext.org (206.252.8.100) in /pub/CuD/CuD
|
|
Web-accessible from: http://www.etext.org/CuD/CuD/
|
|
ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/
|
|
aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
|
|
world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
|
wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
|
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/CuD/CuD/ (Finland)
|
|
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
|
|
|
|
|
|
The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
|
|
Cu Digest WWW site at:
|
|
URL: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest/
|
|
|
|
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
|
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
|
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
|
|
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
|
|
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
|
|
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
|
|
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
|
|
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
|
|
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
|
|
unless absolutely necessary.
|
|
|
|
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
|
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
|
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
|
violate copyright protections.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #10.15
|
|
************************************
|
|
|