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Computer underground Digest Sun Nov 9, 1997 Volume 9 : Issue 82
ISSN 1004-042X
Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
CONTENTS, #9.82 (Sun, Nov 9, 1997)
File 1--Fwd: study of women hackers
File 2--Re: Governance in Cyberspace
File 3--Re: CuD, #9.77, - Digital Copyright Controversy
File 4--The Internet as scab
File 5--Police forsee 'scary' electronic crimes
File 6--Invitation to try cyberjournal list
File 7--Re: "HATE SPEECH" / 5th HORSEMAN OF THE APOCALYPSE?
File 8--Warren Coucilman Wants Library Porn Surfers Names Made Public
File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 97 17:45:59 -0800
From: "Gordon R. Meyer" <grmeyer@RICOCHET.NET>
Subject: File 1--Fwd: study of women hackers
---------------- Begin Forwarded Message ----------------
Date-- 10/31 5:47 PM
Received-- 11/04 11:33 AM
From-- Phil Agre, pagre@weber.ucsd.edu
[Paul Edwards is an interesting and nice guy who wrote a good book on
the early history of AI entitled "The Closed World". His new project
concerns women hackers, and he's looking for relevant information and
potential interviewees. I'd much appreciate if you could forward this
to anyone who might be able to help him.]
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE).
Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below.
You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use
the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions
for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help@weber.ucsd.edu
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Date--Fri, 31 Oct 1997 12:38:37 -0500
From--"Paul N. Edwards" <pedwards@pcd.stanford.edu>
Subject--Pre-1985 Women Hackers?
I'm a historian of technology. Most of my work concerns the political,
social, and cultural history of computers and their uses. Members of this
list may know my book The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of
Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). More
information about me is available on WWW at the URL below.
I'm now working on a historical article about women hackers, based largely
on email and telephone interviews. The purpose of the article is to
investigate myths and realities surrounding the role of women in
computing,
especially during the 1960s and 1970s, when most authors have argued that
hacking was more or less exclusively male. As I've met more and more women
recently who describe themselves as hackers, I've become interested in the
particular experiences of the small minority of hackers who were female.
(NB: I am purposely leaving the definition of the term up to respondents.)
I'd like to hear from women who fit any of the following categories:
1) self-identified hackers;
2) women who have had extensive involvement with hacker communities in
some
way, while not necessarily identifying as hackers; and
3) women computer professionals who have done serious thinking about the
gender roles of hackers.
I'm especially (but not exclusively) interested in women whose experience
dates from the period prior to 1985. I would like to interview as many of
you as possible, either by telephone, or by email. I've prepared a short
(but broad) questionnaire that can be the basis for either oral or written
responses. Interviews can be confidential, if desired.
I'm also looking for:
4) documents relating to women hackers. These might include, for example,
old email, other correspondence, newsgroup postings, or published
literature. Again, I'm primarily but not exclusively interested in the
period before 1985.
Hope you'll be interested. I will be happy to send you a copy of the
questionnaire or to interview you by phone. It would also be helpful to
have names/emails of other women who might be willing to participate.
Paul
---------------------------------------------------------
Paul N. Edwards
Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer
Program in Science, Technology, and Society, Stanford University
http://www.stanford.edu/group/STS/edwards.html
Director, Information Technology & Society Project
http://www.stanford.edu/group/itsp/
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 1997 11:08:40 +0100
From: Felipe Rodriquez <felipe@xs4all.nl>
Subject: File 2--Re: Governance in Cyberspace
Governance in Cyberspace (or what the EU calls the Information Society)
does not adapt to traditional power structures. These structures,
that we usually refer to as authorities, are in essence almost
always regionally bound; their authority and influence stops at
the regions- or countries border. One of the unique, and
unchangeable, properties of Cyberspace is that it moves over those
borders, and thus in many ways rejects the concept of local
authority.
Information in Cyberspace is distributed, and thus power is
distributed. There is no single entity that can change the way
things work on the Internet. But if there's a consensus about
something, change happens.
An example; The technical fundament of the Internet, the Request
For Comment (RFC) series, that form the underlying structure of
protocol standards, have been created mostly in a consensus
process. The people that created these standards where mostly
volunteers and scientists, although initially some where
commissioned by the US Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
These's RFC's today are basically created by Internet Engineering
Task force working groups, which are made up by people interested
in the topic; anyone can join an IETF working-group and
participate in the creation of a new Internet standard. There is
some loose coordination of these developments by the Internet
Architecture Board, connected to the Internet Society, but no-one
can pretend to control the course of events; in other words no-one
can pretend to govern the Internet. It is governed by broad
consensus.
Restriction of information in Cyberspace has proved to be
impossible, and assuming that power and information are
interconnected we could say that restriction of power in
Cyberspace to a government is impossible.
There's numerous examples that show how information flows in
unrestricted ways; the German government wants to prevent the
circulation of a certain document, called Radikal. The document is
published on a web site in the Netherlands, where it is not
considered to be illegal. The German Prosecutor General ordered
German providers to block this page. Immediately afterwards the
banned document is copied to 50 places on the Internet, all over
the world. A year after the German attempt to censor the document,
Germans can still easily access it on the Internet unrestricted by
censorship. This example demonstrates the limits that are imposed
on the power of the German government; they could not prevent
their citizens from accessing a document the government did not
want them to read. The power in this case was distributed, at the
expense of the power of government; it was given to the German
citizens who can now decide themselves if they want to access and
read this document or not.
Another example; the government in Singapore is very anxious to
control the information it's citizens access on the Internet. To
obtain a level of control they've installed several gateways that
are under the influence of the government. There's also a number
of mandatory proxies that filter certain addresses. People inside
Singapore have demonstrated that despite the attempt to control
access to certain information, this information is easy to obtain;
it proves to be impossible for the Singapore government to control
al the content on the Internet. There's now an estimated 1 billion
pages on the World Wide Web. It impossible to know the content of
all these pages and selectively filter them at the national proxy.
Even if this level of control would be possible for Singapore,
there's a famous phrase used by many on the Net; Internet routes
around censorship. If Singapore would accomplish a 'total-control'
system, it would still be possible to route around the
control-mechanisms by using second-level proxy servers outside
Singapore, or so-called anonimizers. Not to mention remailers and
other technology. The Singapore example shows a government that
tries to maintain power in the traditional way; by restricting
information. And reality shows that it does not work, only the
illusion of control is maintained.
The last example of free flow of information concerns PGP. PGP
stands for Pretty Good Privacy, this is encryption software one
can use to protect email and other documents. The encryption used
in this program is so strong, that it cannot be exported from the
USA to other countries (export of strong crypto is illegal in the
US). But since the first version of PGP, version 1.0, it has been
available all over the world. People simply downloaded the
software from the US, and distributed it around the world.
Version 2.0 was created in Europe to avoid US export restrictions;
this version has also been distributed around the world. The
latest version of PGP, version 5.0, was created in the US by the
company PGP Inc. In a matter of days after publication of this
software it was available in Europe, despite US export
restrictions. Later on people scanned in the source-code, to
create a legal' copy of the program (export of source code is not
illegal in the US, it is considered free-speech). Just a few days
ago version 5.5 of PGP was published in the US, and it is already
available outside the US. PGP has demonstrated that export
restrictions of data and software are impossible to maintain. Even
the US government cannot control the free flow of information, and
the distribution of power that is a consequence of this free flow.
Governments are easily tempted to create systems of control on the
Internet, or to try and sanction policy. These attempts are taking
place in various shapes and forms, like self-regulation by the
market, and content-labelling initiatives.
In the EU a lot of effort is invested in self-regulation by the
market. The market, and the companies in the marketplace, are
easier to control than the chaotic mess of individuals, because
economic instruments can be used to force the players in the
market into a certain direction. By self regulation the
authorities shift part of power to the marketplace in an attempt
to maintain order and stability in Cyberspace. When self
regulation is closely watched one sees that it comes down to
companies governing their customers. Self regulation in practice
means that an internetprovider has to prevent the questionable
expressions of his customers. Self regulation could also be called
the privatization of authority. The concept of self regulation of
Internet by the marketplace shows the decline of state-authority,
and may, in an extreme situation, lead to its downfall. Self
regulation is dangerous; the market will always try to avoid
obvious risks. A customer that expresses dubious statements is a
risk; a company prefers to 'selfregulate' and prevent the
expression of this customer, rather than risk a legal procedure.
The company may be held liable in some way, and liability costs
precious money. Self regulation can easily lead to restriction of
established rights, like the right on freedom of expression. This
may sound extreme, but it is not. Reality proves this argument;
when the German providers where asked to prevent the publication
of 1 document originating in the Netherlands, they did not have
the technical means to single out this document. Thus they
obstructed an entire web server, with more than 10.000 other
resources on-line. They did this because they where afraid of
prosecution; that would harm their image and cost a lot of money
in legal fees. Thus it was preferred to 'self-regulate' and
prevent the document, and 10.000 other resources, to be accessed
by German citizens. Not only did this act of 'self-regulation'
infringe the right of free-expression, it also obstructed the free
flow of goods and information within the European Union. Similar
examples exist all over the world; providers prefer to disconnect
their customers before allowing them their right of free
expression. Freedom of expression is in many cases regarded as
risk instead of a universal right.
Another attempt to establish more control on the Internet is the
technology of labelling and filtering. Content labelling and
filtering techniques are propagated to protect children, and to
achieve 'downstream' filtering of content (filtering by the user).
Many question if such technology would achieve a safer Internet
for children; the Internet is basically an adult zone, and very
difficult to turn into a safe haven for children. But if labelling
and filtering technology is implemented, it could easily be used
for 'upstream' filtering; by the provider, government or other
organizations. A country like Singapore would of course consider
such technology to be a gift from heaven, because it allows better
control of what information the citizen accesses. It establishes
the traditional way of government control; restriction of
information, and is thus an attempt to keep things the way they
where in the industrial era. Earlier in this message I stated
that on the Internet things are achieved by consensus, and not by
authority; thus content-labelling and filtering technology will
not be implemented. Only a fraction of people want this
technology, most people do not. Most likely labelling will not
happen because the consensus is absent.
Traditional structures of authority increasingly lose their value
in a worldwide networked environment, no single regional authority
can establish total control in Cyberspace. Control is distributed
to its citizens. In many ways this is beneficial for the citizen.
In some ways it may not be. But at this moment it is not clear
where problems may arise, and where action should be taken to
avoid these problems. We are in a transition phase, where only few
things are clear. Only time can tell where this development will
bring us, but it will profoundly change the way governance works.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 1997 19:10:00 -0800 (PST)
From: "Bruce J. Bell" <bruce@ugcs.caltech.edu>
Subject: File 3--Re: CuD, #9.77, - Digital Copyright Controversy
I'm sure this CuD has stirred up a lot of controversy; here I am to
add my $.02 to the fray....
Permission granted to edit for size and publish in CuD.
>Date--Sun, 26 Oct 1997 13:46:48 -0600 (CST)
>From--Wade Riddick <riddick@MAIL.LA.UTEXAS.EDU>
>Subject--Telerights II - Current Digital Copyright Controversy
>
> Open Letter to Chairman Tauzin Concerning
> the Current Digital Copyright Controversy
>
> (c) 1997 By Wade Riddick
> All rights reserved
> Circulate freely without alteration
[from the introductory section of the letter]
> My research goal has been to discover and then advocate such
>methods in the hopes that we can return to more of an open market in
>intellectual property. I believe that if someone buys a book in
>hardback, they ought tobe able to buy, 'own' and resell its digital
>'copy' in exactly the same fashion they can with the physical
>document. Decisions like 'renting' software are most efficiently
>left to free enterprise and not mandated in the law. Once
>intellectual property is open to rental, lease, outright purchase
>and even bundling like financial options-just as any other form of
>property-then its market will expand as fruitfully as other capital
>markets have in the last decade. The more flexible the law is in
>rewarding entrepreneurs, the more complex, developed and profitable
>the marketplace will become.
First off, this doesn't sound like a "research goal" per se. It
sounds like Mr. Riddick has an idea what he would *like* to be true,
whether or not research actually indicates it to be feasible. This
is reflected in the content of his letter, where he consistently ignores
the question of whether the prerequisites necessary for his proposals
can (or should) be met.
Since this prerequisite is, effectively, "design all computers to
refuse to duplicate data with a copyright notice", one might
reasonably ask how this will be accomplished.
As wonderful as Mr. Riddick's vision for the future of
intellectual property may be, I expect that even if it were
possible, the negative consequences of enforcing this requirement
would dwarf the possible positive consequences of the resulting
commerce.
The idea of adding a "copyright chip" to all computers, and all
its ancillary requirements of implementation and enforcement is by
no means new. I can't think of any specific references, but the
idea is certainly old-hat to me; the reason it isn't discussed
much is mainly that it's such a dumb idea on its face. It sounds
like an exerpt from the paranoid speculations of Richard Stallman,
though if it is ever implemented, it would of course mean that
those speculations were in fact justified...
Certainly, it's much more invasive than the "Clipper Chip"
proposal was, so it fails for the same reason that initiative did:
why would anybody buy crippled computers when un-crippled ones are
available? And how can you possibly reduce the availability of
un-crippled computers without banning their sale and manufacture?
Although I'm sure this kind of proposal is a wet-dream to people
in the recording industry, the movie industry, and the FBI, I
doubt it will receive any kind of welcome from the computer
industry, or from ISP's, or from the lowly consumer. I
particularly note the implication that "liability" be used as a
stick to drive consumers into cooperation with this scheme, as
well as ISP's, and (presumably) the computer industry in general.
At the consumer level, aside from questions of overall
desirability, the proposal that digital signatures and watermarks
be used to track down and punish the owner of the "original copy"
of a work that is distributed outside this proposed copyright
system seems doubtful.
Consider that deliberate "pirates" could take the simple expedient
of finding multiple copies of the original work. Any elements in
the plaintext that are identical between all instances could not
be used to identify the original purchaser; while elements that
differ are those that may contain purchaser information, and can
be scrambled, deleted, or even ignored if the "pirates" themselves
are untracable.
Digital watermarking is an interesting concept, and it may be
useful for some things, but it is not useful as a copy-protection
scheme.
Aside from this, the proposal relies on the copy-protected data
being distributed in digitally-signed encrypted form, and somehow
deleted after being viewed. Consider that any software for
displaying or manipulating such copyrighted data in an "approved"
manner will necessarily have to deal with the data in a plaintext
format.
No matter what auxiliary "tamper-resistant" hardware is installed
on the computer, once the data is in a form suitible for display
and manipulation by the software, there is no practical way this
hardware can keep the software from saving the plaintext data.
Unless, that is, all software permitted to run on computers must
be pre-approved by some agency as secure in this respect, and
digitally signed so that the computer will recognize and execute
it. Note that for practical purposes, this will prohibit private
individuals from writing and executing their own programs to run
on the computer. Note also the difficulty of producing programs
that are bug-free, much less "secure"...
Another possibility is that an entirely new, highly secure OS be
designed that prevents programs permitted access to copyrighted
information from storing any data in a generally-accessible
format. Again, assuming such an OS is designed with no bugs or
security holes, all other OS's must necessarily be forbidden, and
no modified, unapproved versions can be tolerated. It will also
be inconvenient to use, since many possible features of programs
will be prohibited. (e.g., copyright-enabled programs will be
unable to store anything...)
A question that Mr. Riddick asks, but does not effectively answer,
is: who will pay for developing this software? He suggests that
"It can be bundled into the general expense of developing the
'information superhighway.'" The above problems suggest that that
this cost is enormously greater than he has considered.
Also, there is no "information superhighway" general expense
account. (the mere fact that Mr. Riddick would mention such a
cockeyed concept as a putative source of funding is astounding)
The question of who would pay the costs for such a program is not
trivial. I submit that no software developer would accept the
requirements and limitations necessary for this proposal, even if
they could sell it in a market where software without these
limitations is available. Perhaps they, too, must be made liable
for all users of their product...
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 1997 13:58:51 -0500
From: Andy Oram <andyo@ORA.COM>
Subject: File 4--The Internet as scab
An interesting article appeared in the October 28 Boston Globe about
striking teachers in the province of Ottawa. The strike is over
typical work rules ("class size, length of the school day, and number
of hours of teaching time"). But one paragraph in particular caught my
eye:
If the strike continues, provincial authorities said,
they will urge parents to educate their children at home
using assignments and learning aids provided on the
Internet.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Andy Oram O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. email: andyo@oreilly.com
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 1997 23:51:17 -0500 (EST)
From: Stunt Pope <markjr@shmooze.net>
Subject: File 5--Police forsee 'scary' electronic crimes
In the Nov/3/97 Toronto Star, staff writer Cal Millar penned an
article headlined "Police forsee 'scary' electronic crimes". This
sentiment came out of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police conference last week where the chiefs of the 50 largest
cities in North America were given "confidential briefings".
Toronto police chief David Boothby said in an interview "Expect to
find frauds we never imagined". Alas, he could not reveal "details
of confidential meetings", but he further elucidated the situation
as "pretty scary".
Boothby went on to say that organized criminals will be able to
electronically steal from accounts and use scrambled
communications to plan crimes.
Mission accomplished in convincing my town's top cop of the evils
of secure crypto, from the sounds of it. The rest of the attendees
seem to concur, as they asked the telecommunications industry "to
provide technology to let police intercept scrambled communication
from criminals who use high-tech cellular and other transmission
systems to thwart law enforcement efforts and avoid detection."
All this makes perfect sense from the point of view of federal law
enforcement officials, politicians and lobbyists who oppose secure
crypto and are slugging it out to have it banned: get all the
chiefs together in a room, scare them sh*tless with tales of child
porn rings and a-bomb schematics being transmitted heavily
encrypted all over the place and then send them home to spread the
word.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 1997 11:32:36 GMT
From: "Richard K. Moore" <rkmoore@iol.ie>
Subject: File 6--Invitation to try cyberjournal list
I'd like to an extend an invitation to join the cyberjournal list, at least
on a trial basis - the traffic is not heavy. Cj was featured as TipWorld's
Mailing List of the Day for 10/23/97. They described the list as follows:
CYBERJOURNAL
CJ for short, this is one of many lists sponsored by the Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility. A moderated forum to talk
about anything you want, recent posts include juicy conspiracy
theories about Princess Diana's death, the increasing emergence
of global monopolies, and international corruption. Perspectives
from around the world, specially written articles, quotes, and
cross-postings of other newsletters are common.
In fact cj is more like a "journal" than a "talk forum", and the focus is
on globalization, the changing architecture of world systems, political
realism, propaganda and mind control, democracy, and the opportunities and
challenges for progressive activism.
Coming up on cj will be a new series of articles/essays which will make up
the first-draft of a book aimed at comprehensively exposing the true nature
of globalization: "Globalization and the New World Order - democracy at a
crossroads". Interspersed with this series will be items of special
interest and responses/contributions from subscribers.
To join cyberjournal, simply send:
To--listserv@cpsr.org
Subject--(ignored)
---
sub cyberjournal John Doe <-- your name there
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 1997 14:00:36 -0700 (MST)
From: Ken Arromdee <karromde@nyx.net
Subject: File 7--Re: "HATE SPEECH" / 5th HORSEMAN OF THE APOCALYPSE?
> ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
>
> MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law
> to get after the Devil?
>
> ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
>
> MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
> round on you--where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
> This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--man's
> laws, not God's--and if you cut them down--and you're just the man to
> do it--d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
> would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
> safety's sake.
>
> --Robert Bolt "A Man For All Seasons"
The above quote that tallpall used to head his message is rather
ironic in context. Fascism is certainly a devil. And yes, I'd
give the devil benefit of law, for my own sake. This quote
expresses _exactly_ why fascists should be allowed free speech,
and should not be forced off the net in any shape or form. It's
not because I particularly like fascists, it's because if you
restrict free speech in order to get rid of the fascists, you
pave the road towards restricting free speech for anyone.
And contrary to his claim that people who arguing for the rights
of fascists are not potential victims, I am Jewish.
It's also interesting to actually check out the list of FBI cases
and compare to how he describes it--the cemetery defacement case
was at the top of the page, but nothing suggests that the cases
on the page are listed in order from most to least important.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 03 Nov 97 05:36:19 EST
From: steenburger@hotmail.com
Subject: File 8--Warren Coucilman Wants Library Porn Surfers Names Made Public
Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 03 Nov 97 Volume 11 : Issue: 017
<snip>
Council Vice-President Chuck Busse offered an alternative to filtering:
making the names of people who access porn via city libraries public.
According to an article in the Detroit News: "under Busse's proposal,
which was not acted on, pornography viewers' names could be published
in newspapers, on the city Web site or made available to anyone who
files a Freedom of Information request through the city attorney's
office. The names would be gathered from city computer records and made
available to the public. Only people who call up sex sites on library
screens would be identified." I guess then the mob would know where to
gather and whose house to burn down. A couple of (other) problems come
to mind. One is that a login system would have to be set up so that
files accessed could could be matched to the patron viewing them. Woe
to the person who forgets to log off! Especially if the next person to
use the terminal is one of the city's porn addicts or a neo-nazi. I
hear the city has plenty of both. Of course all the sites accessed
would show up in a log file, not just the porn sites (as if it would be
easy to tell which were which), thus creating some of the biggest
privacy violations in the history of the United States.
Well, Warren city attorneys are used to being on the losing side of
costly litigation. Was this a serious suggestion? Did he think a lot
about this before hand or did he just blurt it out in haste so that
Gloria Sankuer would not be the only one to get credit for saving our
culture from decay? It looks as if Busse knows even less about the
internet and libraries than Sankuer. That's probably why he wasn't one
of the two council members appointed to work with the library board in
search of an internet filter. That honor went to St. Pierre, and the
council's internet expert Sankuer.
http://members.aol.com/neofrant/index.html
http://www.detnews.com/1997/macomb/9710/15/10150169.htm
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
Subject: File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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End of Computer Underground Digest #9.82
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