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785 lines
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Computer underground Digest Tue June 24, 1997 Volume 9 : Issue 49
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
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CONTENTS, #9.49 (Tue, June 24, 1997)
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File 1--Senate Votes to Block Bomb-Making Info
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File 2--PGP: Breaking the Crypto Barrier
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File 3--ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, June 19, 1997
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File 4--Notes from the Underground: 2 interviews with Se7en
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File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 16:13:32 -0400 (EDT)
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From: Thomas Grant Edwards <tedwards@Glue.umd.edu>
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To: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
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Subject: File 1--Senate Votes to Block Bomb-Making Info
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From WIRED news www.wired.com:
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Senate Votes to Block Bomb-Making Info
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by Rebecca Vesely
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12:09pm 20.Jun.97.PDT The Senate has voted 94-0 to tack onto a
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Defense Department spending bill an amendment that would
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prohibit the distribution of bomb-making instructions in the United
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States.
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Although the word "Internet" is not mentioned in the four-page
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amendment, the legislation would outlaw Web sites, newspapers,
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zines, and books that publish instructions on how to make a
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bomb - such as The Anarchist's Cookbook and The Terrorist
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Handbook. Violators would face fines and prison sentences of
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up to 20 years.
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Sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California), who has
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been trying to get the legislation on the books since 1995, the
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amendment passed Thursday is narrowly written to include only
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the distribution of material that has an "intent to harm."
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...
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[see the rest at www.wired.com]
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 20 Jun 1997 12:53:37 -0800
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From: "--Todd Lappin-->" <telstar@wired.com>
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Subject: File 2--PGP: Breaking the Crypto Barrier
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Source - fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
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An interesting wrinkle to this story...
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Last Wednesday, during the Bernstein hearing here in SF, a debate took
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place between the DoJ's lawyer and Judge Patel regarding the "publication"
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of source code in printed form vs. electronic form. The DoJ lawyer argued
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that the printed code was not considered much of a threat, because it is a
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laborious and time-consuming process to compile the code into software.
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The irony, of course, is that even as he was speaking to Judge Patel, the
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source code to PGP 5.0 was being scanned into computers in Holland.
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--Todd-->
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From Wired News: www.wired.com
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Breaking the Crypto Barrier
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by Chris Oakes
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5:03am 20.Jun.97.PDT
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Amid a striking convergence of events bearing on
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US encryption policy this week, one development underlined what many see
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as the futility of the Clinton administration's continuing effort to
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block the export of strong encryption: The nearly instantaneous movement
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of PGP's 128-bit software from its authorized home on a Web server at
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MIT to at least one unauthorized server in Europe.
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Shortly after Pretty Good Privacy's PGP 5.0 freeware was made available
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at MIT on Monday, the university's network manager, Jeffrey Schiller,
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says he read on Usenet that the software had already been transmitted to
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a foreign FTP server. Ban or no ban, someone on the Net had effected the
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instant export of a very strong piece of code. On Wednesday, Wired News
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FTP'd the software from a Dutch server, just like anyone with a
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connection could have.
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A Commerce Department spokesman said his office was unaware of the
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breach.
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The event neatly coincided with the appearance of a new Senate bill that
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seeks to codify the administration's crypto policy, and an announcement
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Wednesday that an academic/corporate team had succeeded in breaking the
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government's standard 56-bit code.
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The software's quick, unauthorized spread to foreign users might have an
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unexpected effect on US law, legal sources noted.
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"If [Phil] Zimmermann's [original PGP] software hadn't gotten out on the
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Internet and been distributed worldwide, unquestionably we wouldn't have
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strong encryption today," said lawyer Charles Merrill, who chairs his
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firm's computer and high-tech law-practice group. Actions like the PGP
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leak, he speculated, may further the legal flow of such software across
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international borders.
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Said Robert Kohn, PGP vice president and general counsel: "We're
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optimistic that no longer will PGP or companies like us have to do
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anything special to export encryption products."
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The Web release merely sped up a process already taking place using a
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paper copy of the PGP 5.0 source code and a scanner - reflecting the
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fact it is legal to export printed versions of encryption code.
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On Wednesday, the operator of the International PGP Home Page announced
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that he had gotten his hands on the 6,000-plus-page source code, had
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begun scanning it, and that a newly compiled version of the software
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will be available in a few months.
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Norwegian Stale Schumaker, who maintains the site, said several people
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emailed and uploaded copies of the program to an anonymous FTP server he
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maintains. But he said he deleted the files as soon as he was aware of
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them, because he wants to "produce a version that is 100 percent legal"
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by scanning the printed code.
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The paper copy came from a California publisher of technical manuals and
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was printed with the cooperation of PGP Inc. and its founder, Phil
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Zimmermann. Schumaker says he does not know who mailed his copy.
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"The reason why we publish the source code is to encourage peer review,"
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said PGP's Kohn, "so independent cryptographers can tell other people
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that there are no back doors and that it is truly strong encryption."
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Schumaker says his intentions are farther-reaching.
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"We are a handful of activists who would like to see PGP spread to the
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whole world," his site reads, alongside pictures of Schumaker readying
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pages for scanning. "You're not allowed to download the program from
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MIT's Web server because of the archaic laws in the US. That's why we
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exported the source-code books."
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Copyright 1993-97 Wired Ventures, Inc. and affiliated companies.
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All rights reserved.
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 1997 21:33:35 GMT
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From: "ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update Owner"@newmedium.com
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Subject: File 3--ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, June 19, 1997
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Setback in Efforts to Secure Online Privacy
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
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Thursday, June 19, 1997
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WASHINGTON -- A Senate committee today setback legislative efforts to
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secure online privacy, approving legislation that would restrict the right
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of businesses and individuals both to use encryption domestically and to
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export it.
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On a voice vote, the Senate Commerce Committee adopted legislation that
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essentially reflects the Clinton Administration's anti-encryption policies.
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The legislation approved today on a voice vote by the Senate Commerce
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Committee was introduced this week by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
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John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and co-sponsored by Democrats Fritz
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Hollings of South Carolina; Robert Kerry of Nebraska and John Kerry of
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Massachusetts.
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Encryption programs scramble information so that it can only be read
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with a "key" -- a code the recipient uses to unlock the scrambled
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electronic data. Programs that use more than 40 bits of data to encode
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information are considered "strong" encryption. Currently, unless these
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keys are made available to the government, the Clinton Administration bans
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export of hardware or software containing strong encryption, treating
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these products as "munitions."
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Privacy advocates continue to criticize the Administration's
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stance, saying that the anti-cryptography ban has considerably
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weakened U.S. participation in the global marketplace, in addition
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to curtailing freedom of speech by denying users the right to "speak"
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using encryption. The ban also violates the right to privacy by
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limiting the ability to protect sensitive information in the new
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computerized world.
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Today's committee action knocked out of consideration the so-called
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"Pro-CODE" legislation, a pro-encryption bill introduced by Senator
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Conrad Burns, Republican of Montana. Although the Burns legislation
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raised some civil liberties concerns, it would have lifted export
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controls on encryption programs and generally protected individual
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privacy.
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"Privacy, anonymity and security in the digital world depend on
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encryption," said Donald Haines, legislative counsel on privacy and
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cyberspace issues for the ACLU's Washington National Office. "The aim
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of the Pro-CODE bill was to allow U.S. companies to compete with
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industries abroad and lift restrictions on the fundamental right to
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free speech, the hallmark of American democracy."
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"Sadly, no one on the Commerce Committee, not even Senator Burns,
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stood up and defended the pro-privacy, pro-encryption effort," Haines
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added.
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In the House, however, strong encryption legislation that would add
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new privacy protections for millions of Internet users in this country and
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around the world has been approved by two subcommittees.
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The legislation -- H.R. 695, the "Security and Freedom Through
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Encryption Act" or SAFE -- would make stronger encryption products
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available to American citizens and users of the Internet around the
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world. It was introduced by Representative Robert W. Goodlatte, Republican
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of Virginia.
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"We continue to work toward the goal of protecting the privacy of all
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Internet users by overturning the Clinton Administration's unreasonable
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encryption policy," Haines concluded
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update Editor:
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Lisa Kamm (kamml@aclu.org)
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American Civil Liberties Union National Office
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125 Broad Street
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New York, New York 10004
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To subscribe to the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, send a message
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to majordomo@aclu.org with "subscribe Cyber-Liberties" in the
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body of your message. To terminate your subscription, send a
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message to majordomo@aclu.org with "unsubscribe Cyber-Liberties"
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in the body.
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------------------------------
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Date: Sun, 22 Jun 1997 19:30:57
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From: Richard Thieme <rthieme@THIEMEWORKS.COM>
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Subject: File 4--Notes from the Underground: 2 interviews with Se7en
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NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND
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AN INTERVIEW WITH SE7EN BY RICHARD THIEME
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At DefCon IV, the annual hackers' convention in Las Vegas this
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July, they called him "se7en." He's twenty-eight years old, an
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old man of the hacker scene, and he has just "come out" into the
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public eye after seventeen years underground. It's the second day
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of DefCon and Se7en has already given more than a dozen
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interviews to television crews. The attention is wearing him
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down.
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"Don't call me se7en," he said as we entered Spago's, an
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upscale restaurant in Caesar's Palace for dinner. "I don't want
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to be hassled."
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"What should we call you?" I said. "Nine?"
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Before he could answer, a young waiter approached our table.
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"Good evening. Are you all here for a convention?
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Yes, we said, opening our menus.
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The waiter leaned closer and said in a conspiratorial
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whisper, "I understand the elevators at the Tropicana [site of
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DefCon III] still don't stop at the right floor. The blueprints
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for the Monte Carlo [this year's hotel] disappeared two weeks
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ago. The management is in a panic."
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So much for anonymity.
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Waiters, taxi drivers, desk clerks -- everybody in Vegas
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knew DefCon was back in town.
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Why did se7en come out? Why did he leave the hacker
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underground and tunnel up at the age of twenty-eight into the
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bright lights of camera crews, the blank pitiless glare of the
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desert sun?
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"I'd been playing around with the idea of retiring for a long
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time. I wanted to come out before I retired. There are a lot of
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things I want to say, a lot of people I want to know -- I didn't
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have a game plan, exactly, but I wanted to be above ground for
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six months before I dropped out. At DefCon I wanted to meet a lot
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of people whose email addresses I had seen for years."
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? Does it weigh on you, being underground?
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"It does, yes. It's very isolating. You don't quite know what
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else is going on out there, you feel like you're in your own
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little world, and as your world starts to fall apart, as mine did
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-- people going above ground, people retiring -- my world was
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getting a lot smaller. We needed new talent, more than the little
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group we had left, and I was getting older. I wanted to mentor
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some of the younger hackers. Help them the way others helped me."
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[In the world of hacking, a generation lasts about a decade. Many
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hackers go on to work as computer professionals in security,
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intelligence, or business. Participating whole-heartedly in the
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community of hackers, with its rigorous code of ethics, networks
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of mentors, and accumulated expertise, is often the only way to
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learn what no school knows how to teach.]
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"There's a lot to be learned from people, not just in the hacking
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underground, but life in general. In respect to the technology
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and the knowledge I had, it was limiting to relate to so few
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people. There were new things to learn, new perspectives - so
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much to get being out there and I was missing that. It was
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isolating."
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? How old were you when you got into computers?
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"I was eleven when I got my first computer, a TRS-80. Seventeen
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years ago. First thing I did was play games. Remember, this was
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new to the entire world, and all you could do was play games at
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that point. I had no interest in programming then. The computer
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was a fancy expensive toy. It wasn't something to use to balance
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your checkbook or use as a communications device."
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? When did you become aware of communications as a possibility?
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"About 1982, using an Apple IIe. I heard of modems, that you
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could use them to call up other computers and talk to them. That
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was exciting.
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I was into game cracking before bulletin boards. We were messing
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around with Apples with machine language, just screwing around
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with very little knowledge of what we were doing. We cracked our
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first game by accident. We started playing with different call
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registers, and next thing we knew, we had something. Copy
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protection was very simple then so it was not very impressive as
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a technical feat but when you're eleven years old and you cracked
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your first game and it was an accident on top of that ..."
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? It was a power rush, wasn't it?
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"That's what it was. A power rush.
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There was a big apple computer store that opened then in my home
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town. It was mom-and-pop store, not a franchise or a chain. They
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hosted Apple clubs. One group talked about new hardware, another
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about software, arguing about language and coding, then there was
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a little circle of warez kiddies copying games they had cracked.
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We were a precursor to hacking groups, phreaking groups, 2600,
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No one thought of it as crime then. It was a new technology that
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was like a great big toy. The difference between cracking games,
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cracking programs and cracking systems was very little. They were
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all part of a big complex puzzle we wanted to solve. It was just
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a question of how big a chunk of the puzzle did you want to
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tackle? We wanted to break games, that's what was interesting to
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us then, Engineers wanted to break the whole system. They wanted
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to know everything about it. These were people that by every
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definition of the word were hackers. They never called themselves
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that, but they were going to get into that system, no matter
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what.
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The words that are feared today -- crackers, phreakers -- were
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never brought up in the press back then. The TRS-80. the apple
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IIe was still brand new to the world. Very few people had them,.
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It was not like Nintendo today where everybody gets one. They
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were expensive game machines. They were new and people didn't
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know quite what to make of them. The only people who really knew
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them were people who used them at work."
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? When did you become conscious of yourself as a hacker or
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phreaker?
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"Not for many years. I had my own group of friends through
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bulletin boards or school, we were just doing our own thing. We
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never thought of ourselves as hackers or crackers or a conspiracy
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or the underground or trying to be elite. We thought of ourselves
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as friends. We kept to ourselves and didn't cause trouble. We
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never consciously thought of ourselves as hackers or crackers but
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in retrospect we fit the definition. We were our own little mini-
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software piracy ring. No one ever questioned photocopying
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something - obviously not defense secrets or corporate secrets,
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of course. But what we meant by "information wants to be free"
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is, we would email it to ourselves or send a friend a disk. In
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seventeen years of hacking I never made a cent until I made a
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speech this week."
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? What kinds of speaking are you doing?
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"I define the various types and sub-types that the media labels
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hacker, cracker or phreaker. I describe the types of people in
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each group, their motivations, how they differ from one another,
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their ideologies."
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? Do you discuss technique?
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"No, these [his recent talk was for engineers in a space program]
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are UNIX-heads. They know UNIX is inherently weak. One joke I
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heard when I came in was, "UNIX and security are an oxymoron."
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That made me feel good, because I knew I was talking to people
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who knew that you can't fix security in UNIX. The public is
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screaming, "Oh my god, hackers are getting in, they need to fix
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security," but they're clueless! UNIX is insecure, period. End of
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story.
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The engineers' concerns about security were twofold: (1) Their
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approach to security has been to be as obscure as possible. They
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wanted to be invisible. They had very few problems because their
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systems aren't even on the books. At this point, they don't
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exist. Now their program is about to get a lot of press and they
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will no longer enjoy obscurity, so they want to tighten their
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system up as much as possible. They know that some people will
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still get in, but if people are going to get in, it will only be
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people who are talented enough to do it. Not someone who
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accidentally got in or used a simple hole to get in. (2) When
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they do catch a person inside the system, how do they know what
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their intention is? The biggest fear of hackers and crackers
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everywhere is, what is their intention? You find one, you don't
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know what the hell they're doing and that scares the hell out of
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you.
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They felt a lot more comfortable after I told them the basic
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types of hackers. Now, they see someone in their system, they're
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more likely after a few minutes of tracking them to know who they
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are, what they're after, whether to worry about them or not.
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You can usually tell what a hacker's after from what they do when
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they get in. They start to look for directories like "nuke" and
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"secret" that might be a problem. But then again it might not.
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These guys knew the concept of "trophy-grabbing." There might be
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a kid who downloads the plans for a Stealth fighter to his
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computer and puts them on a diskette and throws it up on the
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wall. 'Hey, I got a trophy!' He isn't going to sell it to a spy.
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He wouldn't know who to sell it to if his life depended on it. To
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him, it's just, 'Hey, I got a copy of a stealth fighter sitting
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on my bookshelf!'"
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se7en was a well-known phreaker who knew his way around the
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telephone system. I asked how he got into phreaking.
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"My introduction to phreaking was being taken around by someone a
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few years older than me who said, hey, we're going to go dig in
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the trash of the telephone company. I was like, well what the
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hell for? He goes, 'Trust me. This will blow your mind.' Well, it
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did, it blew my mind for the next ten years.
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We went through the trash, and in my eyes, all we had was a bunch
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of paper. I was not impressed. But he was sorting them and
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saying, OK, these are good, these are bad, these are good. He was
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trying to get me interested in something I saw no interest in. I
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was young,. I was about fifteen years old. To me it was basically
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worthless, looking at a hunch of food and trash, and it wasn't
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until I went over to the guy's house the next night, and he says,
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remember these five or six pieces of paper I grabbed? He fires it
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up and boom! there we are, we're in the phone company. 'We're in
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the phone company?' Yeah, he said. I can do anything I want in
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here. He had found a dialup. He already knew quite a bit about
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the phone system. But he warned me, Don't be one of those punks
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or lusers that makes free phone calls. Learn how it works. Be one
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|
of the people who learns how it works.
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|
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|
That was our goal: to understand how things work.
|
|
|
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The things we did used to be considered normal teenage behavior,
|
|
remember, teenage pranks, Now it's a felony. Now you're part of a
|
|
conspiracy. It's more complex today.
|
|
|
|
Even if they don't send you to jail, they'll confiscate your
|
|
equipment. They like to scare the hell out of you. You become an
|
|
annoyance, they'll take your computers and you'll never get them
|
|
back, no matter what you do. That's pretty good for knocking a
|
|
lot of kids out. But it can have the opposite effect. Some people
|
|
like the Legion of Doom or the other hackers that have gotten
|
|
busted, the government did that to shut them up, but they all
|
|
came back and they came back angry. The last thing the government
|
|
needs is someone they don't understand coming back with an
|
|
agenda.
|
|
|
|
There were a lot of great discoveries through the years, but for
|
|
me, the greatest was how I grew in knowledge and power in my own
|
|
eyes. The giant telephone company and many of the all-knowing
|
|
corporations really had very little clue as to what they were
|
|
doing. The government, the all-powerful government -- starting
|
|
wars, controlling your life -- did not have a clue as to what a
|
|
computer is or what it can do.
|
|
|
|
The realization that all these people that as a kid you're told
|
|
to respect and fear, in a lot of ways you have it more together
|
|
and are a lot smarter than many of these people....
|
|
|
|
It's a power rush, that's what it is. You find out there's
|
|
absolutely nothing special about these people. Here you are, some
|
|
little fifteen or sixteen year old kid, you can do things that
|
|
the phone company can't even do, or the government can't even do.
|
|
The phone company doesn't even know what you're talking about
|
|
when you tell them something you've been doing for years. That's
|
|
the greatest discovery.
|
|
|
|
? Today the real power belongs to people who have knowledge, who
|
|
know how to do things. The others are hiding behind an illusion
|
|
of power? Behind smoke and mirrors?
|
|
|
|
Exactly.
|
|
|
|
(c) Richard Thieme 1997. All Rights reserved
|
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|
|
Se7en: The Sequel
|
|
|
|
Richard Thieme
|
|
|
|
Se7en is out in the light and air now, up from seventeen
|
|
years underground. He's one of the new variety of human being --
|
|
homo sapiens hackii -- who has learned from working with
|
|
computers at every level, from code language to point-and-click,
|
|
to think in ways that fit how computers organize information.
|
|
Se7en is on the road now, delivering seminars to technicians
|
|
about hackers -- how they think, how they behave. He works with
|
|
organizations that are favorite targets of hackers because of
|
|
their work or status.
|
|
He speaks to groups of 30-50 people at a time, cross-
|
|
disciplinary groups consisting of engineers, security personnel,
|
|
administrators -- people who deal with the Internet on a daily
|
|
basis. Naturally, they're concerned about security.
|
|
On his first round of talks, he discussed basic security,
|
|
making his clients aware of what's out there. He helped them
|
|
distinguish hackers in search of trophies from thieves working
|
|
for governments and businesses.
|
|
On his second round of seminars, Se7en is focused on the
|
|
details of security, the technical end. The technicians are set
|
|
up in networks and shown how to scan their own services,
|
|
searching their networks for security holes.
|
|
"Basically we set up our own network of fifteen machines and
|
|
taught them how to break root, showing them how easy it was with
|
|
UNIX. It was important for them to get hands on experience, get
|
|
the feel of it. We showed them how to grab a password file and
|
|
run it through Crack. We introduced them to SYN flooding and
|
|
explained the concept behind it. We showed them some of the
|
|
scripts that are NOT available out there. We didn't launch an
|
|
attack, because that would have been lethal, but we got them to
|
|
the point from which they could launch it."
|
|
They set up encrypted Internet sessions and ran them through
|
|
the whole gamut of hacker behaviors. It was all hands-on,
|
|
technical training.
|
|
|
|
The engineers are learning a lot. They return to work more
|
|
capable of securing their systems and also better equipped to
|
|
talk to the managers who make decisions.
|
|
Se7en believes as a result of his experience on the road
|
|
that the hands-on technical people who work on the front lines of
|
|
the Internet and understand it are seldom promoted into
|
|
management positions where decisions are made. So managers often
|
|
lack experience on the front lines. Because they don't deal with
|
|
the issues on a day to day basis, they often don't understand the
|
|
problems brought to them. Ironically that makes them hesitant to
|
|
promote technical experts into management positions. They would
|
|
leave no one to fix things when they break.
|
|
|
|
Se7en is seeing similar problems at all of the places he
|
|
visits. Most come from outsiders scanning the system, port-
|
|
sniffing, testing for vulnerabilities. It's a big inconvenience.
|
|
The systems operated by multi-national corporations or government
|
|
organizations are immense, incorporating numerous protocols and
|
|
computers. They're too complicated for fledgling hackers to
|
|
penetrate as a rule. Even more experienced ones have trouble
|
|
getting in. That means that the ones who do break through are
|
|
seriously talented hackers. The ones to watch are the ones you
|
|
never hear about.
|
|
|
|
Se7en thinks hackers in the "visible underground" make an
|
|
essential contribution to computing. He laughed at some of the
|
|
conversation among technicians about firewalls, because he knows
|
|
that systems always have holes.
|
|
Hacking organizations such as the LOpht, TNo, and the Guild
|
|
(the current publishers of Phrack Magazine) release UNIX security
|
|
vulnerability scripts to the public all the time. Their research
|
|
into SecurID's (a one-time password hardware product) and most
|
|
recently, the SYN flooder script, have been devastating. Now
|
|
they're looking into Windows NT. They promise results.
|
|
These genuinely "elite" groups have friendly script wars
|
|
with one another. They compete to see who can release the most
|
|
scripts the fastest. The LOpht in particular has promised to put
|
|
out five new vulnerability scripts per week. They accumulate
|
|
scripts, waiting until they have about a dozen, then drop them in
|
|
one big bombshell.
|
|
Companies like Microsoft know, of course, that there are
|
|
numerous holes in their operating systems, but don't know what
|
|
they are. As applications are developed, working versions are
|
|
periodically compiled for testers. The testers try to find as
|
|
many bugs as they can, but the testing environment can never
|
|
reveal the problems that will be found in the real world. A
|
|
million people using Windows NT for a year will turn up bugs that
|
|
a controlled environment will never find.
|
|
Mainstream hackers keep the global network as clean and
|
|
secure as it can be kept. It's a yin yang kind of thing.
|
|
If hackers didn't know that and wanted to keep
|
|
vulnerabilities from the companies themselves, they wouldn't
|
|
release scripts publically through so many different loops.
|
|
When the Guild discovered the SYN flood exploit and wrote
|
|
the corresponding script for it, for example, they published it
|
|
in Phrack, on the Internet, and in other magazines. That's not
|
|
something a hacker would do if he's looking for a way to exploit
|
|
the vulnerability.
|
|
The Network, then, including the Internet, is the REAL
|
|
testing environment, and that's where groups like the LOpht are
|
|
performing a valuable service. Either the holes will be found by
|
|
groups looking for them and making them public or they'll be
|
|
found by more dangerous crackers working behind the scenes.
|
|
Hard core crackers, engaging in serious crime and espionage,
|
|
will not publish articles in 2600 or Phrack. That's why, Se7en
|
|
says, you never hear of the people who do hard crime. When
|
|
someone is forced to the surface, he says, it's always someone
|
|
the underground has never heard of before. After years in the
|
|
business, he knows the rosters as well as anyone.
|
|
|
|
Se7en described an intrusion of a particular server in
|
|
detail, then went on to discuss the organizational response. He
|
|
was not surprised when they responded the way Se7en and his
|
|
friends responded when someone tried to mailbomb their list.
|
|
The organization asked them politely to stop their annoying
|
|
activity, and when they didn't, they cut them off.
|
|
The best way to respond to nuisance intrusions is the
|
|
legitimate way. Try to reason with the intruders, then talk to
|
|
the systems administrators in charge of the computers they're
|
|
using. Most often, the sysadmins don't know what's going on, and
|
|
once they find out, they shut them down.
|
|
|
|
Se7en lived and worked in South Africa when he was younger
|
|
and thinks the "official" (i.e. non-governmental) hacking scene
|
|
is just coming alive.
|
|
South Africans have not generally had wide access to the
|
|
Internet or hacking publications, Now everyone has access to
|
|
hacker web sites, but Se7en thinks most of those are a waste of
|
|
time -- links to other sites, doctrinal positioning, and a lot of
|
|
old warez for "warez puppies" to download and use without
|
|
creativity or insight. Contrary to the image of hackers as anti-
|
|
social, Se7en is keenly aware of the social systems that keep the
|
|
flow of information free and open -- frequent hacking
|
|
conventions, mailing lists, magazines, and the vast informal
|
|
network of contacts.
|
|
Some of the resources on the Net are useful, but the good
|
|
ones are harder and harder to find. Se7en finds five or six
|
|
useful web sites or mailing lists in a year, and he has to wade
|
|
through a lot of garbage to get there.
|
|
But that's no different, he acknowledges, than the hours he
|
|
spent sifting through trash in rubbish bins.
|
|
Persistence! he says, sounding like an experienced
|
|
businessman. "Honestly, that's what it takes: Persistence. Doing
|
|
it weekend after weekend after weekend, every Sunday night, going
|
|
through the trash knowing that if you miss a week, that's the
|
|
week when all the dial-ins for the switches are thrown away.
|
|
Eventually you'll find some gold that you can use. The same thing
|
|
goes for web searches. You have to wade through tons of garbage,
|
|
but if you're persistent and just keep at it and at it and at it,
|
|
eventually you'll find little gold nuggets here and there."
|
|
He has been impressed with the increasing number of South
|
|
Africans interfacing with the mailing lists. They're connecting
|
|
with people who have been hacking ten or fifteen years, he
|
|
cautions. Naturally, with only one or two years experience, they
|
|
have a lot of questions. He understands where they are -- he
|
|
remembers being there himself -- but has some advice for those
|
|
who encounter flames when they ask too many questions or the
|
|
wrong ones.
|
|
Basic netiquette requires that you research thoroughly
|
|
everything you can before you ask questions. RTFM. Read the
|
|
fucking manual. Learn everything you can FIRST, and only when
|
|
you're stuck, ask a question. Do your best to answer it yourself
|
|
before putting it on a mailing list going to fifteen hundred
|
|
people. Don't expect others to do your homework. Tell the list
|
|
you tried to find the answer and couldn't. Don't just go out
|
|
there saying, where can I find this or that? That's a sure way to
|
|
get flamed.
|
|
|
|
In the end, it comes down to people, not technology.
|
|
Ultimately, Se7en says with a laugh, computer security is a
|
|
hopeless pursuit. The Internet is just too big, too complicated,
|
|
too specialized, for every system to be secure. Security is
|
|
inconvenient, and inconvenience makes people uncomfortable. It's
|
|
always a trade off between convenience and security. The moment
|
|
you allow legitimate users onto a site from outside the system,
|
|
you're doomed. All someone has to do is duplicate what that
|
|
legitimate user is allowed to do.
|
|
The weakest link in any chain is and always has been people.
|
|
"You can have the most secure system in the world, and if I
|
|
call up and pretend to be from the help desk and ask for your
|
|
log-in password, and you give it to me, then the best security in
|
|
the world won't help you. "If you don't know anything about
|
|
computers, and don't know that the System Administrator never
|
|
needs to know your password, how can you know if someone's
|
|
conning you?"
|
|
It comes down, Se7en says, to awareness and accountability -
|
|
- managers who understand the real issues and insist on
|
|
accountability throughout the system for knowledge about the
|
|
network and procedures that must be followed. Without that, all
|
|
it takes is a little "social engineering" and the most expensive
|
|
firewall won't mean a thing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Richard Thieme
|
|
|
|
ThiemeWorks ... professional speaking and
|
|
business consulting:
|
|
ThiemeWorks
|
|
P. O. Box 17737 the impact of computer technology
|
|
Milwaukee Wisconsin on people in organizations:
|
|
53217-0737 helping people stay flexible
|
|
voice: 414.351.2321 and effective
|
|
during times of accelerated change.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
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available at no cost electronically.
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|
|
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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|
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Or, to subscribe, send post with this in the "Subject:: line:
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|
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SUBSCRIBE CU-DIGEST
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Send the message to: cu-digest-request@weber.ucsd.edu
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DO NOT SEND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MODERATORS.
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6436), fax (815-753-6302)
|
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CU-DIGEST
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Send it to CU-DIGEST-REQUEST@WEBER.UCSD.EDU
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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violate copyright protections.
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------------------------------
|
|
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|
End of Computer Underground Digest #9.49
|
|
************************************
|
|
|