916 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
916 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun Jul 2, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 55
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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la Triviata: Which wine goes best with Unix?
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CONTENTS, #7.55 (Sun, Jul 2, 1995)
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File 1--Another Cinci BBS comment
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File 2--Are We Sheep? - LA Times Op-Ed on online censorship (fwd)
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File 3--Big Brother Covets the Internet (fwd)
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File 4--Legal Bytes 3.01 (part 1)
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File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 30 Jun 95 15:40:00 -0500
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From: JOHN BAILEY <john.bailey@cccbbs.cincinnati.oh.us>
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Subject: File 1--Another Cinci BBS comment
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: We ran several articles on the Cincinnati
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BBS busts in CuD 7.53. Below is another comment from a
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Cincinnatian)).
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Dear CUD,
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I was wondering if you ever did anything in regards to computer
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rights. This is becoming a very big issue lately, especially with the
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Exon bill eeking its way through the government.
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The reason I ask, on Friday, June 16, this became a very critical
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issue for some 5000 users of one BBS here in Cincinnati. A local
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sheriff and his group took it upon themselves to raid 5 local BBSs for
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what he considers "adult material". These BBSs by the way, were not
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all in the sheriff's jurisdiction. The largest BBS (Cincinnati
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Computer Connection, CCC) was a 25 node PCBoard BBS with 5000 users.
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These users used the board for personal mail, conducting business,
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playing games and downloading files. The users are outraged and have
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begun to try and understand what prompted this action and why it was
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executed in the manner it was. The Cincinnati media has provided
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excellent coverage of this situation and the CCC users have already
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held a "town meeting" to try and discover what has actually happened
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and what rights the users really have. Unfortunately, the sheriff and
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his group refused to attend or provide any explanation as to what is
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really happening.
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According to the warrant, "adult material" seemed to be the issue but
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this was very vague and far reaching. If there was offensive material
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on the board, it was unbeknownst to the users. The sheriff apparently
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had a plant on the board for 2 years. This person, in all good
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conscience, would have to have seen that the BBS was a very friendly
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and open "family type" community of users who had nothing to hide.
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Parents and their children (of all ages) used the board. If something
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was wrong, nobody ever bothered to suggest to the Sysop there might be
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a problem, which certainly would have been rectified. Instead, a
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Gestapo type raid was performed (very poorly, I might add), seizing
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some equipment here, some there without full knowledge of how the
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equipment even worked.
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What the CCC users are trying to do is gain some exposure, and
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insight, in to the rapidly growing problems regarding the censorship
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issues the government (and police agencies) seem to have with computer
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on-line networks and the way in which they brutalize computers (and
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their users) instead of trying to remedy the situation through
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discussion and education. If legal action is considered a viable
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alternative, many CCC users have shown support for that type of action
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in order to protect their rights.
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Does your publication offer any kind of editorial facility to not only
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review, but help in the research of these types of on-line network
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problems that seem to be occurring more frequently? Users need to be
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aware of potential seizure of their personal information without their
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knowledge or without a warrant specifically identifying their property
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as part of the seizure. Regardless of the outcome of any type of legal
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proceedings, this incident in Cincinnati could be a far reaching
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landmark case. Your assistance and knowledge would be greatly
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appreciated.
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Sincerely,
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Cincinnati Computer Connection BBS Users
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John M. Bailey (CCC User)
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1570 Citadel Place
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Cincinnati, Oh 45255
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Home: 513-474-9114
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Work: 513-624-8844 ext 239
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Internet: john.bailey@cccbbs.cincinnati.oh.us
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------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 08:11:48 -0500 (CDT)
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From: David Smith <bladex@BGA.COM>
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Subject: File 2--Are We Sheep? - LA Times Op-Ed on online censorship (fwd)
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From--dewelch@earthlink.net (Douglas E. Welch)
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Date--Tue, 27 Jun 1995 14:11:55 -0700
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Previously published in the Los Angeles Times, Tuesday, June 27, 1995. Page
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B11
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Note: Electronic re-posting is ALLOWED but NO PAPER REPRINTS or inclusion in
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online digests without written permission (paper or email) from the
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author. All re-postings must retain this notice.
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The complete article is available on the web site listed below.
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Copyright (c) 1995 Douglas E. Welch
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dewelch@earthlink.net
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dewelch@pop.com
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76625,3301
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http://www.earthlink.net/~dewelch/
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------------------------------------------
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Are We Sheep?
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By Douglas E. Welch
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DOUGLAS E. WELCH, a writer and computer analyst from North
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Hollywood, is concerned about calls for government control
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of electronic media in the guise of protecting children.
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He told The Times:
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The thought of anti-violence and anti-sex technology built into our
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televisions and computers is appalling and unnecessary. The ultimate
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control device is already built into every piece of technology
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manufactured today: the "off" switch.
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We need to use our own best censors, our values and morals, to decide
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what we and our children watch. If we took control and stopped
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watching, advertisers would quickly learn that we expected better
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entertainment.
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Instead, we have become lazy, whining neo-children who want our
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governmental parents to tell us what is right and wrong, what is good
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and bad, so that we don't have to think for ourselves. We want to
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continue grazing peacefully like a herd of sheep while the shepherd
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keeps the wolf at bay. What we don't realize is the shepherd might be
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the wolf in disguise.
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We should not be so willing to give our government the power to
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control what we see and hear. If we give these rights away, they will
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only be bought back at a very high price, if they are to be bought
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back at all.
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 19 Jun 1995 23:21:46 -0500 (CDT)
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From: David Smith <bladex@BGA.COM>
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Subject: File 3--Big Brother Covets the Internet (fwd)
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
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From: nyt@nyxfer.blythe.org (NY Transfer News Collective)
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Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit
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From Flatland, No. 12, May 1995, pp. 44-46.
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Big Brother Covets the Internet
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by Daniel Brandt
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"The Internet offers intelligence agencies an amazing
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potential source for information collection and for monitoring
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the activities of their targets. They not only can plug into
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communications through the names of senders and receivers of
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e-mail, but also through keyword monitoring of messages as
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they have done for many years. If you add e-mail to their
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monitoring of telephone and other credit card transactions,
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they can get a very complete picture of a given person's
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activities.
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"On my long trips to the United States for university
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lecturing and other activities, such monitoring enables them
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to know my every flight, hotel and car rental, and local
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contacts, not to mention my complete itineraries. All this
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prior to my flight from Germany to the U.S. Add to this my
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other calls and bank transactions and you ahve almost every
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imaginable detail. It is a perfect system for spy agencies and
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getting better all the time."
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-- former CIA officer Philip Agee
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What the government giveth, the government can taketh away.
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This message has been received by Internet watchers recently, as
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Big Brother begins to confront the issue of online computer security.
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Internet hacking is at an all-time high, the Pentagon claims, just
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as big business is buying into the Internet in a big way. Something
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has to give.
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"Hackers are even better than communists," says one Washington
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activist who deals with civil rights and electronic privacy issues.
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Several weeks later, on November 22, 1994, NBC News with Tom Brokaw
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underscored his point with an alarmist segment by Robert Hager:
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A Pentagon unit is poised to combat unauthorized
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entries into some of the world's most sensitive computer
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systems. But despite all the safeguards and a computer
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security budget in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
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attempts were made to break into the Pentagon's computers
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on 254 separate occasions in the last twelve months
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alone, almost always through the Internet.... NBC News
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has learned that intrusions into the Defense Department's
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computers go unreported 98 percent of the time -- 98
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percent! -- often because no one is aware information is
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being pirated. Pentagon officials are worried the
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nation's security is being compromised.
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Only Joe McCarthy knows how Robert Hager came up with a figure
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of 98 percent for undetected break-ins, and then pretended it was
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worth repeating. Hager continued with his voice-over and began
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talking about hackers breaking into one nameless hospital's records
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and reversing the results of a dozen pap smears. Patients who may
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have had ovarian cancer, Hager claimed, were told instead that they
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were okay.
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If this were an isolated story, then the Newsgroup subscribers
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on <alt.conspiracy> who reacted to Hager's segment, by speculating
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that something must be behind it, might be dismissed for weaving
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yet another paranoid thread. But here I have to agree that even if
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you're paranoid, they still might be after you. On this story, at
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least, NBC seems to be the mouthpiece for larger forces.
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"Organized Crime Hackers Jeopardize Security of U.S." reads
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the headline in "Defense News" (October 3-9, 1994). This article
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reported on a conference sponsored by the Center for Strategic and
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International Studies, a prestigious Washington think tank with
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close connections to the intelligence community. Dain Gary from the
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Computer Emergency Response Team in Pittsburgh, a hacker-buster
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group funded by the Pentagon, claimed that "there are universities
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in Bulgaria that teach how to create more effective viruses." Mr.
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Gary did not respond to my letter requesting more information.
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The government started the Internet, and then over a period
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of years it lost control. This was partly due to the unique
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architecture of the Internet, which has its roots in a 1964 Rand
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Corporation proposal for a post-Doomsday network. Rand's idea was
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that information packets could contain their own routing
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information, and would not have to rely on centralized switching.
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Anarchy, it seems, is the best antidote to vulnerable
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communications systems.
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Recently the government, due to a combination of tight budgets
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and a trend toward deregulation, has allowed big business to take
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over the main conduits, or "backbone" of the Net. Corporations
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smell a huge potential cybermarket, and are investing money to get
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themselves positioned on the Net. They want to be ready when it
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comes time to harvest the expected profits.
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Today we have a global network with 30 million users.
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No one is in control, and no one can pull the plug. If one
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telecommunications company decided to shut off the segment of the
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Net that they administer, other companies could simply route their
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traffic around them. And if it weren't for password protection and
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the "firewalls" installed by corporations to protect their local
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turf from other computers, each of Internet's users would have
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access to all the other computers on the Net.
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Passwords and firewalls don't always work. A hacker who
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burrows in and obtains the right sort of access can watch the
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passwords of other users fly by, and can capture them for later
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use. In November 1994, General Electric's robust firewalls were
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circumvented by hackers, according to a company spokeswoman, and
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GE had to pull their computers off the Net for a week to revamp
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their security procedures. In two other incidents, a group of
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hackers calling itself the Internet Liberation Front managed to
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break into systems. On one they posted a message warning corporate
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America against turning the Internet into a "cesspool of greed."
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So Big Brother has a problem. But it's not so much a problem
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of national security, except perhaps in the broad sense of economic
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vulnerability. Defense and intelligence systems that are classified
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are not connected to the Internet. When the Pentagon complains to
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NBC about national security, what they really mean is that they
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might have to forego the convenience of Internet contacts with
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their contractors, and use other means instead.
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No, Big Brother in this case is not the Pentagon, it's really
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big business. They're chomping at the Net's information bits, while
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the computer security problem is reining them back. Until this
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problem is solved, the Net cannot be used for serious commercial
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transactions. Big business seems to be feeding scare stories to the
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media, and the Pentagon is helping them out by raising the
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time-tested bugaboo of national security -- the only surefire way
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to scare Congress into repressive legislation. America leads the
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world in information technology, and the Internet is potentially a
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lucrative link in tomorrow's profit chain. If only those pesky
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hackers would go away.
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The hackers that do exist are grist for the system's
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disinformation mill, so if they didn't exist the system would
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probably have to invent them. The bottom line for those whose
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opinions matter is that the Internet has potential to help the rich
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get richer. Hackers belong in jail, of course, but there's also the
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Net surfer who's clogging bandwidth with idle chatter, or even
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swapping copyrighted material with their friends. Frequently this
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unprofitable silliness is subsidized by the universities. All big
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business wants from these folks is consumption -- they may browse
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through online catalogs and debit their credit lines, but forget
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all this virtual community stuff. It's got to go.
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The way to reboot the system is to boot the little guy, and
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the best way to do this has always been to let the government bash
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some heads. The digital equivalent of this is the one-two punch of
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the Clipper chip and the Digital Telephony Bill. Clipper is an
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ongoing government effort to encourage the mass marketing of a
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encryption standard that can be tapped by them. It was developed
|
||
with help from the National Security Agency (NSA), which is worried
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about the emergence of encryption that can't be easily broken by
|
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their supercomputers. The FBI's favorite is the Digital Telephony
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Bill, which was passed without debate by Congress last October.
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It forces telecommunications companies to modify their digital
|
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equipment so that the government has access to wiretapping ports
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when they come calling with a warrant.
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Warrants? When was the last time the intelligence community
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took warrants seriously? Just in case a few of them get nervous
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while breaking the law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
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of 1978 set up a secret court to issue warrants in situations
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||
involving a foreign threat. This court has yet to turn down a
|
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single request put before it -- even rubber stamps don't perform
|
||
this well. All it would take is a vague rumor of a Bulgarian virus
|
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with Russian organized crime lurking close behind, and presto, a
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secret warrant is issued to tap the Internet backbone so that U.S.
|
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spooks can look for nasty digital germs. The judges aren't
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competent to evaluate technical rumors, and with their track
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record, no one pretends that they will call in their own experts.
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Why bother, since the proceedings are secret and there's no
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accountability?
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But then, who needs a warrant? According to reports, the NSA,
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Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and
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Canada's Communications Security Establishment, all practice what
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might be termed the "sister agency gambit." They do this by
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stationing liaison officers in each of the other agencies. When
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they want to tap their own citizens without a warrant, they just
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call over the liaison officer to throw the switch. Now it's called
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"intelligence from a friendly foreign agency" and it's all legal.
|
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|
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|
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Particularly with the Internet, where jurisdictional problems
|
||
involve many nations, this sort of transnational cooperation will
|
||
be the rule rather than the exception. The excuse for monitoring
|
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the Net today might be the security problem. Tomorrow the security
|
||
problem may be solved, one way or another, and the Net will be used
|
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for commercial transactions. Then the excuse for monitoring will be
|
||
the need to detect patterns of commerce indicative of money
|
||
laundering, much like FinCen does today.
|
||
|
||
FinCen, the Financial Crime Enforcement Network, monitors
|
||
Currency Transaction Reports from banks, and other records from
|
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over 35 financial databases, as well as NSA intercepts of wire
|
||
transfers into and out of the U.S. This data is shared with the DEA
|
||
(Drug Enforcement Administration), CIA, DIA (Defense Intelligence
|
||
Agency), IRS, FBI, BATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms),
|
||
and the Secret Service. FinCen, which began in 1990, is an attempt
|
||
to track, cross-reference, and apply artificial-intelligence
|
||
modeling to all the relevant data from government agencies. Now
|
||
they are floating a proposal for a deposit tracking system. When
|
||
the Internet begins carrying financial transactions, FinCen is sure
|
||
to be poking around behind the scenes.
|
||
|
||
One characteristic of the Internet is that surveillance on a
|
||
massive scale is easy to accomplish. With telephone voice or fax
|
||
transmissions, the digital signal is an approximation of the analog
|
||
signal. Massive computing power, relatively speaking, is needed to
|
||
extract the content in the form of words or numbers. This is called
|
||
"speech recognition" for voice, or "optical character recognition"
|
||
for fax. Data on the Internet, on the other hand, is already in the
|
||
form that computers use directly. Moreover, each packet
|
||
conveniently includes the address of the sender and receiver.
|
||
|
||
It's a simple matter to tap an Internet backbone and scan
|
||
every packet in real time for certain keywords. With voice and fax,
|
||
it's only practical to capture specific circuits, and then examine
|
||
them later for content. On the Internet, even encryption doesn't
|
||
solve the privacy problem, because the Net is also ideal for
|
||
message traffic analysis. A stream of encrypted messages between
|
||
two points could be detected by a computer, which then spits out a
|
||
report that's sure to attract attention. Each end of this stream
|
||
is now identified as a target, which means that other types of
|
||
surveillance are now practical. The Internet, in other words,
|
||
increases opportunities for surveillance by many orders of
|
||
magnitude, with or without encryption.
|
||
|
||
Those who have the resources can try to befuddle the spooks
|
||
who monitor them by disguising their transactions. Shell
|
||
corporations, off-shore banks, and cash-intensive businesses will
|
||
still be popular with money launderers. Seemingly innocent
|
||
transactions will slip through the net, and for the most part only
|
||
the little guy without transnational resources will get caught.
|
||
|
||
Which is exactly the point. The little guy on the Net is
|
||
surfing on borrowed time. There are too many pressures at work, too
|
||
many powerful interests to consider. The Net is too important to
|
||
the Suits -- if not now, then soon.
|
||
|
||
|
||
If it were only a case of Us and Them, it would be easier to
|
||
sort it all out. But the self-styled Internet Liberation Front, and
|
||
similar types with hacker nonethics, are part of the problem as
|
||
surely as the greedy capitalists. Nor is it easy to see much hope
|
||
in the way the little guy -- the one who obeys the law -- has used
|
||
the Internet. The entire experiment has left us with 30 million
|
||
connections but very little public-sector content. Apart from the
|
||
sense of community found in Newsgroups, list servers, and e-mail,
|
||
not much is happening in cyberspace. And just how deep is this
|
||
community when the crunch comes? Not nearly as deep as the
|
||
counterculture of the 1960s, and look what happened to them.
|
||
|
||
Rand Corporation, meanwhile, is churning out studies on
|
||
cyberwar, netwar, and information warfare. The Defense Department,
|
||
at the urging of their Advanced Research Projects Agency (which
|
||
started the Internet), recently signed a memorandum of understanding
|
||
with the Justice Department, at the urging of the FBI and the
|
||
National Institute of Justice. This memorandum anticipates a
|
||
coordinated effort on high-tech applications for "Operations Other
|
||
Than War" and "Law Enforcement." The game is on, and the high-tech
|
||
high rollers are getting it together.
|
||
|
||
The neat graphics and sassy prose in "Wired" and "Mondo 2000"
|
||
magazines notwithstanding, the Net-surfing culture is more virtual
|
||
than real. Cyberspace cadets are no match for the real players, and
|
||
it's going to be like taking candy from a baby. Lots of squeals,
|
||
but nothing to raise any eyebrows. It's all so much spectacle
|
||
anyway. Guy Debord (1932-1994) summed it up in "Society of the
|
||
Spectacle" in 1967, when Rand was still tinkering with their
|
||
Doomsday idea:
|
||
|
||
The technology is based on isolation, and the
|
||
technical process isolates in turn. From the automobile
|
||
to television, all the goods selected by the spectacular
|
||
system are also its weapons for a constant reinforcement
|
||
of the conditions of isolation of "lonely crowds." The
|
||
spectacle constantly rediscovers its own assumptions more
|
||
concretely.... In the spectacle, which is the image of
|
||
the ruling economy, the goal is nothing, development
|
||
everything. The spectacle aims at nothing other than
|
||
itself.
|
||
|
||
Then again, the Spectacle does make for excellent Internet
|
||
watching, once silly notions like "information wants to be free"
|
||
are discarded, and the drama can be enjoyed for what it is.
|
||
Basically, it's one more example of something that happens
|
||
frequently in history. The little guy thinks he has created
|
||
something new and powerful. He's so busy congratulating himself,
|
||
that when the Big Dogs begin to notice, the little guy doesn't.
|
||
In the end, it's merely another dog-bites-man nonstory that won't
|
||
be found on NBC News. This just in: "Little guy gets screwed."
|
||
|
||
END END END
|
||
|
||
Flatland can be reached at PO Box 2420,
|
||
Fort Bragg CA 95437-2420, Tel: 707-964-8326.
|
||
Reposting permitted by the author.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 1995 00:31:00 -0500 (CDT)
|
||
From: David Smith <bladex@BGA.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 4--Legal Bytes 3.01 (part 1)
|
||
|
||
---------- Forwarded message ----------
|
||
Date--Fri, 2 Jun 1995 11:40:42 -0500
|
||
From--owner-legal-bytes@io.com
|
||
|
||
By George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P.
|
||
Attorneys at Law
|
||
114 West Seventh Street, Suite 1000
|
||
Austin, Texas 78701
|
||
(512) 495-1400
|
||
(512) 499-0094 (FAX)
|
||
gdf@well.sf.ca.us
|
||
___________________________________
|
||
|
||
Copyright (c) 1995 George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P.
|
||
(Permission is granted freely to redistribute
|
||
this newsletter in its entirety electronically.)
|
||
___________________________________
|
||
|
||
David H. Donaldson, Jr., Publisher <6017080@mcimail.com>
|
||
Peter D. Kennedy, Senior Editor <pkennedy@io.com>
|
||
Jim Hemphill, Contributing Editor <JAHEMPH+aGD&F%GDF@mcimail.com>
|
||
Jeff Kirtner, Law Clerk
|
||
___________________________________
|
||
|
||
IN THIS ISSUE:
|
||
|
||
1. WILL THE SHRINK-WRAP LICENSE DILEMMA PLAGUE ON-LINE SALES?
|
||
|
||
2. SOME LEGAL RISKS POSED BY ON-LINE ADVERTISING
|
||
|
||
3. LOTUS LOSES FIGHT TO PROTECT ITS USER INTERFACE
|
||
|
||
4. COPYRIGHT LAW UPDATE: COPYING BY COMMERCIAL RESEARCHERS IS
|
||
NOT NECESSARILY A FAIR USE
|
||
____________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
1. WILL THE SHRINK-WRAP LICENSE DILEMMA PLAGUE ON-LINE SALES?
|
||
|
||
Can software companies unilaterally decide what terms govern
|
||
the sale of their software? What's the point of those long,
|
||
complicated, one-sided licenses that come with most commercial
|
||
software packages? Are they enforceable?
|
||
|
||
The Purpose of Shrink-wrap Licenses.
|
||
|
||
Everyone has seen these licenses -- they come with commercial
|
||
software and state that opening the package or using the software
|
||
means the buyer is agreeing to abide by their terms. While these
|
||
documents may be slightly aggravating, software companies use them
|
||
for two important reasons -- to protect their copyrights and to
|
||
limit their exposure to lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
Software is terribly easy to copy and distribute; software
|
||
developers understandably want to protect themselves from losing
|
||
revenue from unauthorized copying. Shrink wrap licenses include
|
||
terms restricting the copying of the software in order to help
|
||
insure that the sale of a single copy of the software does not give
|
||
rise to any implied license to make, distribute or use additional
|
||
copies. The licenses might also try add further restrictions, such
|
||
as prohibiting resale or leasing of the software.
|
||
|
||
Shrink-wrap licenses have a second goal: to limit the
|
||
software company's legal liability. This need arises not from
|
||
copyright law, but from the general laws governing contracts and
|
||
the sale of goods -- which in all states (except Louisiana) is the
|
||
Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC.
|
||
|
||
Article 2 of the UCC sets "default" rules that automatically
|
||
become part of just about every sale of goods, unless the buyer and
|
||
seller agree to change the defaults to something else. Despite
|
||
some theoretical questions, most legal authorities agree commercial
|
||
software is a "good" under the UCC.
|
||
|
||
The problem for a software vendor is that the UCC reads into
|
||
every sale implied terms that favor the buyer. Rather than adopt
|
||
the doctrine of "caveat emptor," the UCC assumes that the seller
|
||
has made certain promises or warranties about the quality of the
|
||
product. If the product does not live up to these implied
|
||
warranties, the buyer can sue. Most importantly, the UCC assumes
|
||
that the seller always promises that the product is "merchantable,"
|
||
that is, fit for the customary use that such products are put to.
|
||
Further, the UCC also assumes that the seller has promised that the
|
||
product was fit for the buyer's particular intended use, if the
|
||
seller had reason to know of that use.
|
||
|
||
The seller and buyer can agree to change these terms, such as
|
||
when a used car is sold "as is." The buyer and seller can also
|
||
agree to limit the scope of the seller's liability if the product
|
||
does not live up to the promises that were made. However, when the
|
||
seller tries to make these limitations himself, through terms on an
|
||
invoice or other document, the limitations must be "conspicuous,"
|
||
they must mention "merchantability," and they cannot be "unreason-
|
||
able." Moreover, the buyer has to agree to the limits.
|
||
|
||
Are Shrink-wrap Contracts Enforceable?
|
||
|
||
There is serious question about how effective a typical
|
||
shrink-wrap license is. Various criticisms are made.
|
||
|
||
First, and most obviously, is whether a purchaser has really
|
||
"agreed" to the terms of the shrink wrap license. Typically, the
|
||
buyer does not know what the license says when she buys the
|
||
software; the purchase is made before the terms are revealed. How
|
||
can the buyer "agree" to the terms without knowing what they are?
|
||
After a sale is made, one party cannot add new terms. The federal
|
||
court of appeals sitting in Philadelphia discussed these issues in
|
||
STEP-SAVER DATA SYSTEMS, INC. v. WYSE TECHNOLOGY, 939 F.2d 91 (3rd
|
||
Cir. 1991), and decided that a particular shrink-wrap license was
|
||
not enforceable. See also David Hayes, Shrinkwrap License
|
||
Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 Hastings Comm. Ent.
|
||
L.J. 653 (1993).
|
||
|
||
A second, related objection is one raised to all take-it-or-
|
||
leave it contracts, which are derisively named "contracts of
|
||
adhesion." These tend to get rough treatment by courts, and
|
||
shrink-wrap licenses are a special strain.
|
||
|
||
Other concerns relate to the technical question of contract
|
||
formation -- the sale is usually made between a retailer and the
|
||
consumer, but the shrink-wrap license is between the consumer and
|
||
the software company. Is that a contract at all? What did the
|
||
software company give the consumer that the consumer did not
|
||
already have when she bought the product? There are also some
|
||
concerns about whether particular restrictive terms in these
|
||
licenses (or more accurately, state laws that state that the terms
|
||
are enforceable) violate the federal Copyright Act. See VAULT
|
||
CORP. v. QUAID SOFTWARE, LTD. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
|
||
|
||
Can These Problems be Fixed by On-line Transactions?
|
||
|
||
Do these same objections to shrink-wrap licenses apply to on-
|
||
line transactions? Maybe not.
|
||
|
||
The unique nature of interactive on-line transactions offers
|
||
vendors the ability to get and record the buyer's agreement to
|
||
license terms before a purchase is made. Much of the software that
|
||
is distributed on-line, shareware particularly, comes with a
|
||
license.doc zipped up with the program files. These licenses will
|
||
have the same troubles a shrink-wrap licenses, because they are an
|
||
after-the-fact "surprise".
|
||
|
||
However, most bulletin board systems, and now the World Wide
|
||
Web, can easily be configured to require short interactive sessions
|
||
before a transaction is consummated. The vendor can display the
|
||
license terms, require the buyer's assent before the software is
|
||
made available, and importantly, the buyer's assent can be recorded
|
||
-- written to a log file. While an on-line seller cannot force the
|
||
buyer to read the terms, it surely can record the fact that the
|
||
terms were displayed, and that the buyer gave affirmative responses
|
||
-- "Did you read the terms of the license?" "I did." "Do you agree
|
||
to the terms?" "I do."
|
||
|
||
This type of interaction before the sale makes the transaction
|
||
appear far less one-sided. While take-it-or-leave-it terms might
|
||
still be criticized as "adhesion contracts," the unique give-and-
|
||
take that's possible on-line removes much of the inequitable sting
|
||
that "surprise" shrink-wrap license terms leave on many observers.
|
||
___________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
2. SOME LEGAL RISKS POSED BY ON-LINE ADVERTISING
|
||
|
||
Advertising on the Internet is booming -- not with crass
|
||
"spamming" on Usenet newsgroups, but with flashy, multi-media home
|
||
pages on the World Wide Web that show off pictures, sound and even
|
||
video. Most commercial World Wide Web sites combine a mix of
|
||
advertising, information, and entertainment -- honoring the
|
||
Internet tradition that tasteful, non-intrusive self-promotion is
|
||
acceptable if it comes along with something neat or valuable.
|
||
|
||
Are there legal risks involved in on-line advertising? There
|
||
are, just like any other endeavor. Any business that extends its
|
||
advertising to cyberspace must take the same care as it does with
|
||
print or broadcast advertising. Electronic advertising also
|
||
introduces new questions of jurisdiction -- whose laws apply? On-
|
||
line service providers that accept advertising must consider their
|
||
own potential liability, too. What is their duty concerning the
|
||
content of other companies' ads?
|
||
|
||
Advertisements are "publications."
|
||
|
||
Companies that put their ads on the Internet are "publishers"
|
||
and face the same potential risks of defamation, invasion of
|
||
privacy, etc., from these ads as from print ads. Moreover,
|
||
electronic service providers that accept paid advertisement may be
|
||
"publishers" of those ads as well, and responsible to some degree
|
||
for their content. Absent particular exceptions, advertisements
|
||
carried by a publisher are viewed as that publisher's own speech.
|
||
For example, the landmark 1964 Supreme Court libel case, New York
|
||
Times v. Sullivan, concerned the liability of the New York Times
|
||
for a paid advertisement written by others. The Supreme Court's
|
||
ruling, although favorable to the Times, made no distinction
|
||
between advertisements and other content of the newspaper.
|
||
|
||
Compuserve, in the now-famous Cubby v. Compuserve case,
|
||
successfully defended itself from a libel suit by proving its
|
||
ignorance -- that it knew nothing of the content of a newsletter
|
||
carried on its service, but provided by an outside contractor.
|
||
This defense -- based on the traditional protection granted
|
||
bookstores from libel suits -- is unlikely to be available when it
|
||
comes to paid advertisements. Publishers, whether on-line or in
|
||
print, generally review the content of advertisements before they
|
||
are accepted and published, if only to determine pricing. They
|
||
usually retain the right to refuse an advertisement based on its
|
||
content. (Recall the recent attempts by revisionist "historians"
|
||
to place ads in college papers denying that the Holocaust took
|
||
place).
|
||
|
||
Because of this potential exposure to liability, electronic
|
||
publishers should be guided by two general principles: (1) review
|
||
all proposed advertisements for potential legal problems, and
|
||
(2) obtain an agreement that the advertiser will indemnify the
|
||
publisher for any legal liability that arises from the ad. This
|
||
article reviews several areas of potential concern for electronic
|
||
advertisers.
|
||
|
||
Ads for illegal transactions.
|
||
|
||
You can't legally advertise marijuana for sale. (Or, more
|
||
accurately, the First Amendment does not protect ads for illegal
|
||
transactions.) A publisher can't knowingly carry such ads, even if
|
||
the publisher would not be a party to the illegal transaction.
|
||
|
||
A publisher's liability for carrying ads for illegal
|
||
transactions has been hashed out in an interesting series of
|
||
lawsuits involving the magazine Soldier of Fortune, which
|
||
unintentionally carried several classified advertisements submitted
|
||
by real live hit men offering the services of a "gun for hire."
|
||
The hit men were hired through the magazine ads, and the families
|
||
of those people "hit" sued the magazine.
|
||
|
||
Two federal appeals courts came to entirely opposite
|
||
conclusions about very similar Soldier of Fortune ads. The
|
||
Eleventh Circuit upheld a multi-million dollar damage award against
|
||
the magazine; the Fifth Circuit reversed a finding of liability.
|
||
The legal principles these courts announced were relatively
|
||
consistent, though: if an advertisement poses a "clearly
|
||
identifiable unreasonable risk that it was an offer to commit
|
||
crimes for money" the publisher can be held liable if it was
|
||
negligent in running the ad. BRAUN v. SOLDIER OF FORTUNE MAGAINZE,
|
||
INC., 968 F.2d 1110, 1121 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
|
||
Ct. 1028 (1993). A publisher must make sure that the ad, on its
|
||
face, does not present a "clearly identifiable unreasonable risk"
|
||
that the advertisement is soliciting an illegal transaction. On
|
||
the other hand, the courts are less likely to impose liability for
|
||
ambiguous advertisements that could have an innocent meaning. See
|
||
EIMANN v. SOLDIER OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE, INC., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
|
||
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990). This recognizes courts'
|
||
reluctance to impose a duty on publishers to investigate
|
||
advertisements beyond what the advertisements say.
|
||
|
||
There is no reason to believe that this standard is different
|
||
for advertisements of so-called "victimless" crimes like
|
||
prostitution, although the likelihood of a civil lawsuit might be
|
||
less.
|
||
|
||
Ads for regulated businesses.
|
||
|
||
Many businesses are regulated, and so is the content of their
|
||
advertisements. The First Amendment permits some government
|
||
regulation of commercial speech; for example, lawyer advertising is
|
||
regulated by state bar associations or courts (although lawyers are
|
||
constantly fighting over how far the regulations can go).
|
||
Businesses placing ads should know what rules regulate their
|
||
advertising. Companies accepting ads have two choices: (1) know
|
||
the regulations for all companies for which it accepts ads; or (2)
|
||
require the advertiser to guarantee that its ads comply with
|
||
applicable regulations, and indemnify the publisher for losses if
|
||
they don't.
|
||
|
||
An example of the difficult legal questions raised by local
|
||
regulation in the new borderless world of cyberspace are lottery
|
||
and gambling ads. Some states (and territories) regulate or ban
|
||
advertising lotteries and gambling. Puerto Rico, for instance,
|
||
allows casino gambling. It also allows advertisement of gambling
|
||
aimed at tourists, but prohibits such ads aimed at Puerto Ricans.
|
||
The U.S. Supreme Court says that this odd regulatory scheme is
|
||
constitutional. POSADAS DE PUERTO RICO ASSOCIATES v. TOURISM CO.
|
||
OF PUERTO RICO, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
|
||
|
||
More recently, the Supreme Court also upheld the
|
||
constitutionality of a federal law that forbids radio or television
|
||
stations from broadcasting lottery ads into states that don't have
|
||
a lottery -- even if the broadcasts are primarily heard in a state
|
||
that has a lottery. UNITED STATES v. EDGE BROADCASTING CO., 113
|
||
S. Ct. 2696 (1993). This federal law only regulates airwave
|
||
broadcasts of lottery ads. However, some states have similar
|
||
statutes banning lottery advertising in any medium. For example,
|
||
North Carolina prohibits advertising a lottery "by writing or
|
||
printing or by circular or letter or in any other way." N.C. Stat.
|
||
14-289. Could North Carolina enforce this law against electronic
|
||
publishers who carry lottery ads?
|
||
|
||
Answering that question raises a host of difficult, unanswered
|
||
jurisdictional questions and is beyond the scope of this short
|
||
article. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that North
|
||
Carolina officials would try to prosecute the State of Texas, for
|
||
example, if Texas set up a Web site to advertise its lottery that
|
||
of course could be accessed from North Carolina. On the other
|
||
hand, a local North Carolina service provider that accepted and
|
||
posted ads for the Texas lottery (or even the results of the Texas
|
||
lottery) might have something to worry about: the language of the
|
||
law prohibits it; the service provider is in easy reach of local
|
||
prosecutors; and the U.S. Supreme Court has already looked kindly
|
||
on a similar law.
|
||
|
||
Misleading and deceptive ads.
|
||
|
||
The First Amendment does not protect false advertisement;
|
||
state statutes (and some federal laws) routinely prohibit false,
|
||
misleading and deceptive ads. For example, the broad Texas
|
||
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA")
|
||
prohibits all sorts of deceptive advertising, and gives deceived
|
||
consumers very powerful remedies in court. Such statutes are
|
||
primarily aimed at those who place advertisements, rather than the
|
||
publishers. Where do electronic publishers fit in? As usual, it's
|
||
not clear.
|
||
|
||
Newspapers cannot be sued under the Texas DTPA because that
|
||
law does not apply to "the owner or employees of a regularly
|
||
published newspaper, magazine, or telephone directory, or broadcast
|
||
station, or billboard." Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 17.49(a). Is an
|
||
internet service provider a "magazine" or "broadcast station?"
|
||
Maybe. Is a BBS or a World Wide Web page a "billboard"? Maybe.
|
||
The question has not come up yet. While it would be more logical
|
||
and consistent with the purpose of the statute to exempt electronic
|
||
publishers that perform the same function as a newspaper, courts
|
||
are supposed to apply the DTPA "liberally" to provide consumers
|
||
with as broad a remedy as possible from deceptive ads -- leaving
|
||
the answer in doubt.
|
||
|
||
Some things are clear. An entity distributing information
|
||
regarding its own goods or services cannot claim the "media
|
||
exemption" -- a newspaper or BBS that publishes false information
|
||
about its goods or services can be sued by consumers under the
|
||
DTPA. Also, an entity that has a financial stake in the sale of
|
||
the goods advertised is also subject to DTPA liability. This means
|
||
that internet service providers that accept a percentage of sales
|
||
generated by on-line advertising will be subject to the
|
||
restrictions of the DTPA, and should insure that the ads they place
|
||
are not deceptive, and that the seller has agreed (and can)
|
||
indemnify them for liability. Finally, no publisher -- whether
|
||
earthbound or in cyberspace -- is exempt from DTPA liability if the
|
||
outlet and/or its employees know an ad is false, misleading or
|
||
deceptive.
|
||
|
||
Remember: It's YOUR service.
|
||
|
||
Unless an electronic publication accepts all advertisements,
|
||
regardless of content, and does not review the content of that
|
||
advertising in any way or reserve any right to reject
|
||
advertisements (and can prove this in court), the presumption will
|
||
be that the service "published" the ad and is responsible for its
|
||
content. No one has a First Amendment right to place their
|
||
advertisement with any given Internet service provider or on any
|
||
commercial information service. Despite lots of on-line rhetoric,
|
||
the First Amendment only restricts what the government can do, not
|
||
what businesses (even big ones) can do. Remember that a publisher
|
||
always has the right to reject an ad for any reason at all and can
|
||
require changes before an ad is placed. For ads that are obviously
|
||
illegal, slanderous or misleading, the safest bet is to refuse the
|
||
ad.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 1995 22:51:01 CDT
|
||
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
||
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)
|
||
|
||
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
||
available at no cost electronically.
|
||
|
||
CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
|
||
|
||
Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
|
||
Send it to LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
|
||
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
|
||
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
||
60115, USA.
|
||
|
||
To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CUDIGEST
|
||
Send it to LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
|
||
(NOTE: The address you unsub must correspond to your From: line)
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
||
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
||
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
||
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
||
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
||
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
||
on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
|
||
and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
|
||
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
|
||
1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
|
||
|
||
EUROPE: In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: +32-69-844-019 (ringdown)
|
||
Brussels: STRATOMIC BBS +32-2-5383119 2:291/759@fidonet.org
|
||
In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-464-435189
|
||
In LUXEMBOURG: ComNet BBS: +352-466893
|
||
|
||
UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (192.131.22.8) in /pub/CuD/
|
||
ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/
|
||
aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
|
||
world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
||
wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
||
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
|
||
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
|
||
|
||
JAPAN: ftp://www.rcac.tdi.co.jp/pub/mirror/CuD
|
||
|
||
The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
|
||
Cu Digest WWW site at:
|
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End of Computer Underground Digest #7.55
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