642 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
642 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Mini-biscuit editor: Guy Demau Passant
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CONTENTS, #6.96 (Sun, Nov 5, 1996)
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File 1--Other People's E-mail: TO Read or not to Read?
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File 2--Denning suggests banning non-escrowed crypto
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File 3--Redux: "Does Emiliy really need to read and write?"
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File 4--Book Reviews for FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK
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File 5--DEF CON II Post-Update Announcement
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File 6--Web version of Cu Digest, #6.93, File 1
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File 7--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 23 Oct 1994)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 3 Nov 1994 18:54:51 -0600 (CST)
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From: pkennedy <pkennedy@IO.COM>
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Subject: File *&*--Other People's E-mail: TO Read or not to Read?
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OTHER PEOPLE'S E-MAIL: TO READ OR NOT TO READ?
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There still seems to be a lot of confusion remaining about if
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and when you can properly and legally read another person's
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electronic mail. As the number of people going on-line increases,
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and the situations where e-mail is used proliferate, the landscape
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gets more complicated. Yet, the same basic rule we've always had
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for Postal Service mail applies to electronic mail: if the message
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isn't addressed to you, don't read it unless you have permission.
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If in doubt, don't read other people's mail. Simple enough.
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Predictably, the exceptions complicate this simple rule. All
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e-mail users should learn the important ones, and systems
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administrators should commit them to heart.
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THE ECPA. The principal law protecting the privacy of e-mail
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is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA"
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for short). ECPA is a 1986 federal law that expanded to e-mail the
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protections long afforded telephones conversations. The ECPA
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makes it a serious crime to read, use or disclose another person's
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electronic communications without justification. The ECPA sets the
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basic "don't read without permission" rule, along with some
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exceptions.
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Not only does the ECPA criminalize reading mail without
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permission, it also provides a civil remedy for those whose mail
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has been read or disclosed. So, even if you can't get law
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enforcement interested in prosecuting the person who snooped
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through your e-mail, you can sue the snooper in court. If you win,
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the snooper pays you damages and pays your attorney's fees. (It
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was this civil provision that allowed Steve Jackson Games and its
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BBSs users to sue the Secret Service for reading and deleting their
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e-mail, and allowed them to collect money from the Service and
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force the Service to pay their legal expenses.)
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THE ECPA EXCEPTIONS -- DISCLOSURE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT. The
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ECPA's restrictions have some exceptions. First, systems
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administrators may disclose that mail to law enforcement officials
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in response to a subpoena, search warrant or court order without
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penalty, *if* the administrator has a good faith belief that the
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legal papers are valid. A proper subpoena or search warrant should
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particularly identify the electronic files to be seized, and should
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identify at least the recipient or sender of the messages sought.
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It should not be a broad request for "all electronic mail messages"
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on a particular computer, or simply "all computers," especially
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when the system to be searched or seized runs a BBS.
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THE ECPA EXCEPTIONS -- BUSINESSES. The ECPA does *not*
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protect the privacy of a business' internal e-mail. A common
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misunderstanding among employees is that law protects the privacy
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of internal e-mail. The ECPA does not prevent an employer from
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monitoring its employees' electronic mail, just as it does not
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prevent an employer from listening in on telephone conversations to
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check up on the employee's work.
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On the other hand, each state has laws that protect a person's
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privacy from unwarranted snooping. Generally, a person's "private"
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sphere at work is fairly limited, but an employer who for years
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provides private, secure electronic communications among its
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employees may have allowed a sphere of privacy to develop. A
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sudden, unannounced change to a policy of reading employee e-mail
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might then violate state law. The safer practice for an employer
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would be to have a clear, written policy stating that company
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electronic mail is not private, and that the company retains (or is
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reclaiming) the right to review employee mail. Companies with
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gateways to outside mail services should be especially clear on
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their policy, because, rightly or wrongly, employees will have a
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greater expectation of privacy for personal mail they receive from
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outside the company, similar to personal letters sent to a work
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address.
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THE ECPA EXCEPTIONS -- SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS. The final
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important set of exceptions to the ECPA's "don't read without
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permission" rule is for the system administrators. System
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administrators may "intercept, disclose or use" an electronic
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communication when engaged in any activity which is a "necessary
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incident" (1) "to the rendition of his service" or (2) "to the
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protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
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service."
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There is some debate on the breadth of these exceptions. No
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court case has discussed how they apply to BBSs. I read these
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exceptions narrowly, and believe the prudent systems administrator
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should too. The ECPA says that these exceptions are *not* a
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license to read users' mail at will, or even to spot-check to see
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if users are up to no good. The law says that the systems
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administrator "shall not utilize service observing or random
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monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control
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checks." Any spot-checking must be to monitor the system's
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*functioning,* not the users' *activities.*
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What if a system administrator has specific information that
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a certain user might be using e-mail to discuss or even facilitate
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a crime? Does that justify nosing through the user's e-mail?
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Again, I believe only very narrow circumstances could justify it.
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The systems administrator is no more responsible for criminal plots
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in e-mail than Ma Bell is for telephone conspiracies. For that
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reason, the law need not give the administrator a private-cop badge
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to rifle through e-mail and monitor for any signs of crime. While
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the ECPA does permit a system administrator to disclose to the
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police the contents of an e-mail message that was *inadvertently*
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obtained and which appears to pertain to the commission of a crime,
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this strongly implies that *intentional* sleuthing by systems
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administrators is forbidden.
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*If* a systems administrator has specific information that a
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user is about to damage the system or crash the service, say with
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a virus, the system administrator could justify reviewing that
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user's e-mail as a protection to the system. The harder case is if
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the administrator suspects that a user's actions might be criminal,
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but the only threat to the system is that it might get seized by
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law enforcement on account of the user. (Most BBS crime poses no
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other threat to the system, as it usually depends on the systems'
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continued functioning). Here, the administrator might argue that
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the threat of a seizure of the system (and the resulting loss of
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property) justifies reading the suspected user's e-mail. At
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minimum, however, the ECPA's specific prohibition of random
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monitoring would require the system administrator to have good,
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solid evidence against the user, not just a vague suspicion or
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anonymous claims that something bad is going on.
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A good point of reference: Remember that the same law applies
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to BBSs and telephone companies. Most people want to limit Ma
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Bell's right to monitor phone calls as much as possible. The same
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goes for e-mail.
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TRYING TO AVOID THESE RULES? The ECPA severely restricts a
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systems administrator's access to electronic messages flowing
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through his or her system. Some systems administrators try to
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avoid this limitation on their nosiness by posting disclaimers
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saying "NOTICE: This system does not provide private electronic
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communications" or "WARNING: We read your mail. It is not
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private." With these warnings, some systems administrators think
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they can freely read everyone's e-mail. These warnings are a bad
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idea.
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First, they probably won't do the job. While the facts of the
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particular case will matter, such disclaimers probably will not
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stand up in court. Judges and juries don't like these "take it or
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leave it" ultimatums when it comes to privacy. The disclaimer also
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probably isn't true: the system *does* provide mail that is
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private from all prying eyes except the systems administrator, and
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on any busy system, the administrator *can't* read all the mail,
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which may re-create in practice the very expectation of privacy the
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administrator is trying to deny.
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Second, the disclaimers may make things worse. While trying
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to decrease the chance of a user suing the administrator under the
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ECPA, the disclaimer will increase the systems administrator's
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risks in other areas. An administrator who actually reads his or
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her user's e-mail can be charged with knowing its content, and this
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increases the potential for successful civil suits for libel, as
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well as the danger of criminal prosecution for aiding criminal
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activity on the BBS. The administrator can always claim "I didn't
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read *that* message," but the system's own words say the opposite.
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Worse, if the system is seized by law enforcement, the systems
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administrator may lose very helpful allies: the users. When
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innocent users try to sue the police for violating *their* rights
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under the ECPA, the police will be sure to defend their acts based
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on what the system itself told them: no private e-mail here! The
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ECPA should be a great deterrent against the wholesale seizure of
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BBSs; systems administrators diminish that deterrent by using these
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disclaimers.
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Finally, what possible reason, other than plain rude nosiness,
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justifies reading other people's mail? The law not only imposes no
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responsibility to read or monitor mail flowing through a system, it
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prohibits it. System administrators who fear criminal
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responsibility for what their users are discussing in e-mail are as
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wrong as if Southwestern Bell was worried about being held
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responsible for crimes committed over their phone system.
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A tough question: What about users' personal file directories
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on BBS's? Many BBSs, Internet providers, and other computer
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systems provide their users file storage areas. Some systems call
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and treat these areas as "private." Would it violate the ECPA if
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the system administrator nosed through the files in a user's area?
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It's common for users to write e-mail to a file and store it,
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making them "stored electronic communications" covered by the ECPA.
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If the ECPA protects the privacy of these files from snooping by
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system administrators, doesn't the ECPA clash with the developing
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strict liability for system administrators for copyright
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infringement -- who are now being held liable for infringing files
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whether or not they knew they were on the system? (See Legal
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Bytes, Vol. 2, No. 1, "BBS System Operators' Liability for
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Copyright Infringement: Let the Sysop Beware"). How does a system
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administrator avoid unknowingly harboring infringing computer
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files? The solution *probably* lies in the system administrator
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gaining proper consent from the user, before the fact, to monitor
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these files, but the authors honestly haven't worked through this
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difficult question yet.
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LEGAL BYTES is a (usually) quarterly publication of
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George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
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George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P.
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114 W. Seventh Street, Suite 1000
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Austin, Texas 78701
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(512) 495-1400
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gdf@well.sf.ca.us
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David H. Donaldson, Jr., Editor
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6017080@mcimail.com
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Peter D. Kennedy, Associate Editor
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pkennedy@io.com
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To subscribe:
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Send mail to legal-bytes-Request@io.com with the words
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"subscribe legal-bytes" in the message _body_.
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Online at:
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ftp.eff.org, /pub/Publications/E-Journals/Legal_Bytes/
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gopher.eff.org, 1/Publications/E-Journals/Legal_Bytes
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gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Publications/E-Journals/Legal_Bytes
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http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/E-Journals/Legal_Bytes/
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------------------------------
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Date: 1 Nov 1994 09:01:50 -0500
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From: shabbir@panix.com (Shabbir J. Safdar)
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Subject: File *&*--Denning suggests banning non-escrowed crypto
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Wiretap Watch - post-bill note
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November 1, 1994
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Distribute Widely - (until November 30, 1994)
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Dr. Denning sees restrictions on non-escrowed crypto as an obvious
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possibility if Clipper sinks
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I attended the NYU Law School symposium on "rights in cyberspace" last
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Friday (Oct. 27, 1994) here in New York. There were three panels. On
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the mid afternoon panel, the topic was regulating state access to
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encrypted communications.
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Panelists included Oliver Smoot (attribution forgotten), Dr. Dorothy
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Denning (famous key escrow proponent), Steven Cherry (Voters Telecomm
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Watch spokesperson), and J Beckwith Burr (who was not a rep of the
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EFF, but gave a synopsis of their position).
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Dr. Denning gave a chillingly calm description of key escrow, and then
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the panelists as a whole answered questions. At one point the subject
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arose of just how "voluntary" Clipper really could be, seeing as the
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public and industry had overwhelmingly rejected it. Who will use a
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voluntary standard that nobody likes?
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The consensus of the key-escrow opponents on the panel seemed to be
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"nobody".
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Dr. Denning, speaking for herself and not as a spokesperson for the
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Administration, stated that if alternate non-escrowed encryption
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became prevalent, the next step would be to implement "restrictions"
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on non-escrowed technology.
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I think its safe to assume that Dr. Denning wasn't speaking of secret
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plot to ban private crypto; she was just commenting on the obvious:
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The Administration & Law Enforcement wants access to *all*
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communications. While they'll play "nice" now, they won't be so nice
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if you don't go along with them. It's going to get ugly down the
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road, and HR 5199 could be the panacea.
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What can you do?
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-Get to know your legislator.
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Just as the DT bill was railroaded through, there may not be a big
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chance of stopping 5199, a bill that could put into legislation the
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govt's key escrow program, making it a NIST standard. You must
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convince your legislator that a little privacy is a good thing. Non-
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escrowed crypto will not bring back all the privacy you've lost in the
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last 50 years. It will bring back some. Some is better than none, and
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it maintains the balance between law enforcement interests and privacy
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concerns.
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Learn who your legislators are. Put their phone numbers on a scrap of
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paper and keep them in your wallet or purse. This will encourage you to
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call next session during one of the crucial moments.
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-Save your money.
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There are a lot of organizations around that you can join that will
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represent your interests in Congress. Consider whether you should
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instead save your money and give it directly to a legislator with a
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good record on privacy and cryptography. Several such legislators
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were recently identified in the VTW (Voters Telecomm Watch) 1993/1994
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Report Card.
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-Join the VTW announcements mailing list.
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Send mail to vtw@vtw.org and ask to be subscribed to vtw-announce.
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We will be carefully tracking HR 5199 next session with the same
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frenetic precision we applied to Rep. Maria Cantwell's Cryptography
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Exports bill and the FBI's Wiretap/Digital Telephony bill.
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 3 Nov 1994 02:47:59 -0500
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From: Brandinius@AOL.COM
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Subject: File *&*--Redux: "Does Emiliy really need to read and write?"
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I wanted to respond to, and strongly agree with, Scott Straw's
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comments in CUD 6.92, "Does Emily really need to read and write
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in 2020?" which were actually a response to an earlier invitation
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from Seattle Times reporter Kurt Dahl to send in comments on this
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topic.
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The level of basic English skills on the Internet, and especially
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on local BBSs, is appalling. And adding to the problem is the
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unwritten but sometimes hinted at rule that "flaming someone for
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his or her grammar/spelling is verbotten."
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Perhaps flaming isn't the right approach, but errors and poor
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usage are so prevalent that new net citizens are unlearning what
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has been taught in school. (It could possibly be argued that it
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was never taught in the first place).
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When I see corporate billboards, form letters from companies, and
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personal correspondence from businesses I deal with that are
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loaded with spelling errors, serious grammatical mistakes, and
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other abuses of the language, it's very disturbing to think that
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children learning to read will see these same items and learn
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incorrect usage. But when these same children - - or adults, for
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that matter - - get on the net, the problem becomes much worse. I
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have read, attempted to read, or passed over countless posts,
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some of them quite long and pointed, that suffer from so much
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grammatical misuse and so many spelling/punctuation mistakes that
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they are absolutely unintelligible.
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In fact, being curious about the responses I'd receive, I posted
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a note a year or so ago on a popular local BBS that attempted to
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clear up the differences between commonly misused English words
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such as "there, their, and they're," and "your and you're." It
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wasn't condescending, nor was it flame-style. The responses
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received ranged from "This is helpful" to "Fuck you and the PC
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you rode in on," but they mostly consisted of the latter.
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The headline news servers for AOL, CompuServe, and other online
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services (they seem to all use the same headline service) push
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out articles that are laced with mistakes and misusages. A few
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examples from just one day in January of this year that I saved
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to disk for some reason:
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- - - - - - - - - - - -
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1/18
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Inman withdraws nomination, blasts "New McCarthyism"
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WASHINGTON (JAN. 18) DPA - Bobby Ray Inman, President Bill
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Clinton's choice to become the next U.S. Secretary of
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Defence announced Tuesday that he was withdrawing his
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nomination rather than become a victim of what he called the
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"new McCarthyism."
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~ ~ ~Defense is spelled with an "s" and not a "c."
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- - - - - - - - - - - -
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1/18
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Cold virus to be used to fight disease NEW YORK (JAN. 18)
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XINHUA - U.S. RESEARCHERS ARE TRYING TO REFORM COLD VIRUS'S
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EVIL WAYS TO FIGHT DISEASE . . . THE RESEARCHERS SAID THAT
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THEY HOPE TO USE THE VIRUS TO FERRY HE HUMAN BODY GENERALLY
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INACCESSIBLE TO MODERN MEDICINES.
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~ ~ ~What? This sentence makes no sense whatsoever.
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- - - - - - - - - - - -
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1/18
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California Earthquake could cost LLoyd's around $6 billion
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LONDON (JAN. 18) XINHUA - THE EARTHQUAKE IN LOS ANGELES
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COULD COST LLOYD'S OF LONDON, THE WORLD LARGEST INSURANCE
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MARKET, ABOUT SIX BILLION U.S. DOLLARS, A LLOYD'S SPOKESMAN
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SAID TODAY.
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. . .
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ANALYSTS SAID ONLY 15 TO 20 PERCENT OF BUILDINGS IN
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CALIFORNIA HAD EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE, BECAUSE OF THE HIGH
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COST OF COVER, AND MANY WERE QUAKE-PROOF.
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LLOYD'S IS A SPECIALIST IN DISASTER COVER. IT SCATTERS RISK
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TO INSURERS ELSEWHERE IN A PRECESS KNOWN AS REINSURANCE.
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~ ~ ~It's _coverage_ (both paragraphs), and _process_.
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. . .
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THE EARTHQUAKE, MEASURED 6.6 ON THE RECHTER SCALE AND KILLED
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33, IS THE MOST DEVASTATING SINCE THE 1989 SAN FRANCISCO
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QUAKE THAT KILLED 64 AND COST INSURERS ALMOST ONE BILLION
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U.S. DOLLARS.
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~ ~ ~Should be "The earthquake, _which_ measured" etc.
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~ ~ ~_Richter_, not Rechter_
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Granted, the people typing these in are probably minimum wage workers
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who are being forced to do it so quickly that any checking for
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mistakes would be impossible. But these kinds of mistakes would NEVER
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be tolerated in the printed media; why should the online world be any
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different, especially services that we PAY for?
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And before the flames start, I am not some anal retentive computer
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geek looking to harp on people just to be a pain in the collective
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ass; to understand each other in the online world (or anywhere that
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some form of intellectual communication is necessary to relate to
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others), some basic rules must be agreed upon. If those rules are are
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thrown out the window, the chances for misunderstandings abound and
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the ability to communicate AT ALL is compromised.
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When you add the International aspect of the net to the equation, then
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it gets hairy, and I do not support requiring someone in Iceland to
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write perfect English; but then, if WE OURSELVES can't write even
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decent English, then how can we expect to communicate effectively with
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someone who is just learning the language, or vice versa?
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|
|
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Does Emily need to read and write in the year 2020? Undoubtedly, yes.
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But will she be able to, if the majority of her education in the
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language comes from the net? Unlikely.
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|
|
Brandon Weber
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BWEBER@IGC.APC.ORG
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BRANDINIUS@AOL.COM
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|
|
|
------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 5 Nov 1994 14:50:20 -0500
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From: sross@CRAFT.CAMP.CLARKSON.EDU(SUSAN M. ROSS)
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|
Subject: File *&*--Book Reviews for FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK
|
|
|
|
As Book Review Editor of FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK, I am writing to
|
|
request reviews of books concerning free speech issues related to
|
|
computer-telecommunications networks.
|
|
|
|
FREE SPEECH YEARBOOOK has been sponsored by the Commission on Freedom
|
|
of Expression of the Speech Communication Association since 1961 and
|
|
has been published by Southern Illinois University Press since 1987.
|
|
|
|
Our book reviews traditionally have been 4-7 pages, double spaced.
|
|
Manuscripts should be prepared according to ether the MLA Handbook
|
|
(Modern Language Association) or A Uniform System of Citation. A
|
|
review that evaluates the book rather than merely provides a summary
|
|
of its contents is genrally preferred.
|
|
|
|
Final manuscripts of book reviews are due by January 15, 1995. Please
|
|
mail them to: S. M. Ross, Department of Technical Communications, Box
|
|
5760, Clarkson University, Potsdam, New York 13699-5760
|
|
|
|
E-mail inquiries are welcome. To suggest a book and/or a reviewer,
|
|
please post to: sross@heron.tc.clarkson.edu or
|
|
sross@craft.camp.clarkson.edu
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 1994 18:07:33 -0700 (PDT)
|
|
From: dtangent <dtangent@cyberspace.com>
|
|
Subject: File *&*--DEF CON II Post-Update Announcement
|
|
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
XXXXXXXxxxxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
XXXXXXxxxxxxXXXXXX X X DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
XXXXXxxxxxxxxXXXXXXX X
|
|
XXXXxxxxxxxxxxXXXX XXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXXXX X
|
|
XXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXX XX X Freeside Communications is also home of
|
|
XXXxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXX X XX The DEF CON FTP site and WWW Pages
|
|
XXXXXxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXXXX XX X
|
|
XXXXXXxxxxxxXXXXXXXXX X DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
XXXXXXXxxxxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX DEF CON Mailing List Announcement
|
|
|
|
GREAT! I've got it done finally. After all the mis setp, etc, the
|
|
mailing lists are finally up and running. DEF CON II is over and I am back
|
|
in school and finally getting things in shape. Thanks to everyone who
|
|
helped out!!
|
|
|
|
A couple of announcements:
|
|
|
|
> The con went well, even though more of you showed up than expected! I'll
|
|
be ready next year. We had about 370 people, and only $200 in damage I
|
|
had to pay. Not bad!
|
|
|
|
[> The mailing lists are up! <]
|
|
|
|
[> mail majordomo@fc.net with "subscribe dc-announce" in the body of the
|
|
[> message to join the announcement list. "subscribe dc-stuff" for the
|
|
[> chat list.
|
|
|
|
THE FTP SITE IS MOVING to fc.net in /pub/defcon from cyberspace.com.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU HAVE ANY PICTURES FROM THE CON please mail duplicates to me! I can
|
|
scan them and add them on the ftp and www pages. aleph1 is maintaing the
|
|
DEF CON www site now. If you can't mail them, please try to scan them
|
|
and then send me the scans. If you have old DEF CON I pics, send them too,
|
|
we're tring to rebuild that section too.
|
|
|
|
> I have tapes of the whole convention for sale. They consist of 10(!)
|
|
90 minute tapes, $32.90 for a set. There are taken from the DAT recordings,
|
|
and all by Dead Addicts speech are nice and clear. You'll remember the mess
|
|
up, we re-dubbed DA's speech from a pocket recorder, so he is in mono.. but
|
|
you can understand everything.
|
|
|
|
> I have about 20 long sleeve white shirts left, about 1/2 old style 1/2
|
|
new style. They are three color front, two color back and $22.90 (that
|
|
extra 2.90 is for postage)
|
|
|
|
> If enough demand comes in for the other color shirts I will reprint them.
|
|
|
|
We are starting to plan for next year, and if you would like to get involved,
|
|
please mail dtangent@defcon.org.
|
|
|
|
Mail stuff to:
|
|
|
|
DEF CON
|
|
2709 E. Madison #102
|
|
Seattle, WA, 98112
|
|
|
|
Thanks, and see you on the list! There will be no more mailing by this list.
|
|
If you want to stay up on things, please subscribe to the mailing lists.
|
|
+----------------[cut 'ere]------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
metal=-
|
|
+------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|Metalhead (612) | EFF Member | Support local musicians! | -=NORML=- |
|
|
|Alliance Communications, inc. (ACi) | +1 612 251 8596 | USR HST DS 16800|
|
|
|-=INFORMATION *IS* POWER=-| -=VOTE GRASSROOTS=- | -=QUESTION AUTHORITY=-|
|
|
|An ancient lunatic reigns in the trees of the night... -=Jim Morrison=-|
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Subject: File *&*--Web version of Cu Digest, #6.93, File 1
|
|
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 94 19:12:54 MDT
|
|
From: Mark Atwood <matwood@PERUVIAN.CS.UTAH.EDU>
|
|
|
|
I made a HTML hypertext page out of CUD 6.93 File 1. You can point
|
|
your browser at http://www.cs.utah.edu/~matwood/govt-gophers.html
|
|
for easy access to all the listed gopher servers.
|
|
|
|
Hope this is of use.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
Mark Atwood | My school and employer have too many problems
|
|
matwood@peruvian.cs.utah.edu | without being blamed for mine.
|
|
PGP Fingerprint = BD 97 2A F6 74 C2 F2 CB A7 71 40 BB 4C 9D F9 8B
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1994 22:51:01 CDT
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File *&*--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 23 Oct 1994)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
|
available at no cost electronically.
|
|
|
|
CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
|
|
Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
|
|
Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
|
|
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
|
|
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
|
60115, USA.
|
|
|
|
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
|
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
|
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
|
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
|
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
|
on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
|
|
and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
|
|
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
|
|
1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
|
|
|
|
EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
|
|
In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
|
|
In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: +32.69.45.51.77 (ringdown)
|
|
|
|
UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (192.131.22.8) in /pub/CuD/
|
|
ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/
|
|
aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
|
|
world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
|
uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
|
wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
|
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
|
|
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
|
|
|
|
JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/Publications/CuD
|
|
|
|
The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the NIU Sociology gopher
|
|
at: tk0gphr.corn.cso.niu.edu (navigate to the "acad depts;"
|
|
"liberal arts;" "sociology" menus, and it'll be in CuDs.
|
|
|
|
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
|
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
|
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
|
|
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
|
|
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
|
|
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
|
|
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
|
|
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
|
|
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
|
|
unless absolutely necessary.
|
|
|
|
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
|
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
|
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
|
violate copyright protections.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.96
|
|
************************************
|
|
|