756 lines
34 KiB
Plaintext
756 lines
34 KiB
Plaintext
From <@vm42.cso.uiuc.edu:owner-cudigest@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU> Wed Jul 13 01:32:24 1994
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Date: Wed, 13 Jul 1994 00:03:00 CDT
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Reply-To: TK0JUT2@MVS.CSO.NIU.EDU
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Sender: CU-DIGEST list <CUDIGEST%UIUCVMD.bitnet@vm42.cso.uiuc.edu>
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Subject: Cu Digest, #6.63
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To: Multiple recipients of list CUDIGEST <CUDIGEST%UIUCVMD.bitnet@vm42.cso.uiuc.edu>
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Computer underground Digest Tue July 12, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 63
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copper Ionizer: Ephram Shrustleau
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CONTENTS, #6.63 (Tue, July 12, 1994)
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File 1--2600 FOIA Decision
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File 2--Draft Motion in response to Am. Action BBS Judge
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File 3--Steve Jackson Games case - comments/update
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File 4--White House Pays off in potential patent infringement
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115, USA.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
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and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
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world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
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JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 11 Jul 1994 15:12:15 EST
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From: David Sobel <dsobel@WASHOFC.EPIC.ORG>
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Subject: File 1--2600 FOIA Decision
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2600 FOIA Decision
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A federal judge in Washington, DC has ordered the release of
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Secret Service documents concerning the November 1992 raid on a
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meeting of 2600 Magazine readers at a shopping mall in Virginia.
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The documents were the subject of a Freedom of Information Act
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lawsuit filed by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
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(CPSR). The case is being litigated by the Electronic Privacy
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Information Center (EPIC), a joint project of CPSR and the Fund
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for Constitutional Government.
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The FOIA case has confirmed the involvement of the Secret Service
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in the incident, in which numerous individuals were detained,
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searched and ordered to identify themselves even though no search
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warrant was presented. The detentions and searches were conducted
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by Arlington County Police and mall security officers. Meeting
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participants believe that these actions were undertaken at the
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behest of the Secret Service, which has never publicly explained
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its role in the incident.
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Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer's decision and order are re-printed
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below.
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David L. Sobel
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Legal Counsel
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Electronic Privacy Information Center
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<dsobel@epic.org>
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================================================================
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR )
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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, )
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)
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Plaintiff, )
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)
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v. ) Civil Action No. 93-0231-LFO
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)
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UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, )
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)
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Defendant. )
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_________________________________)
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MEMORANDUM
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Plaintiff brought this action under the Freedom of
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Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 et seq., to obtain any
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documents in defendant's possession relating to the breakup of a
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meeting of computer enthusiasts that took place on November 6,
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1992 at the Pentagon City mall in Arlington, Virginia. The
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attendees, apparently affiliated with a computer magazine called
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2600 and referred to in media accounts of the incident as computer
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"hackers," were dispersed shortly after their arrival by Arlington
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County Police and mall security officers.[1] According to
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plaintiff, the officers took names of attendees and confiscated
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some of their personal property before ordering them to leave the
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mall. Plaintiff also avers that an agent or agents of defendant
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participated in the incident.
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Plaintiff submitted its FOIA request to defendant on November
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10, 1992. Several months later, defendant released to plaintiff
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------------------------
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[1] See "Hackers Allege Harassment at Mall," Wash. Post ,
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Nov. 12, 1992, at A9.
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several newspaper articles about the incident. Defendant informed
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plaintiff that it was withholding two additional responsive
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documents pursuant to FOIA exemptions 7 (A), (C), and (D). The
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parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. During the
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pendency of these motions, defendant discovered six additional
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responsive documents in its Washington, D.C. field office.
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Defendant submitted a supplementary declaration and memorandum in
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which it stated that it would withhold the six new documents under
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the same three FOIA exemptions claimed for the two earlier
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documents. Defendant subsequently filed an additional declaration
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_in camera_. Plaintiff has moved to strike defendant's _in
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camera_ submission.
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I.
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Plaintiff objects to defendant's _in camera_ submission on
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the ground that permitting such submissions in FOIA actions
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undermines the adversarial structure of Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
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820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), by
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preventing the plaintiff from expressing its views as to the
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government's reasons for withholding documents. See Yeager v.
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DEA, 678 F.2d 315, 324-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982). As plaintiff
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contends, _in camera_ submissions should only be permitted in
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those instances where they are "absolutely necessary" to resolve
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the case. Id. This is such an instance. Defendant has made a
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thorough effort to explain as much of its case as possible in its
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public filings. However, the confidential nature of the criminal
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investigation underlying
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(2)
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defendant's withholding of documents makes _in camera_ review the
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exclusive means of weighing specific aspects of defendant's
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claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's _in
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camera_ submission will be denied, and that submission will be
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considered in ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary
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judgment.
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II.
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FOIA exemption 7 permits the withholding of several
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categories of "records or information compiled for law enforcement
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purposes." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7). Initially, plaintiff argues
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that defendant has categorically failed to satisfy the threshold
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requirement for invoking exemption 7 because defendant has failed
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to demonstrate that the information at issue relates to a criminal
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investigation.
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Defendant's public declarations specify the nature of the
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underlying criminal investigation, and its _in camera_ submission
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discusses that investigation with even greater specificity. This
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is a case to which exemption 7 might properly be applied.
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Defendant has withheld documents based on three provisions of that
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exemption.
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A.
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FOIA exemption 7(C) permits the withholding of information
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that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
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invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (b)(7)(C).
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Defendant argues that exemption 7(C) applies in this case because
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of "the 'strong interest' of individuals, whether they be
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suspects, witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated
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unwarrantedly
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(3)
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with alleged criminal activity.'" Dunkelberger v. Department of
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Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
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The cases defendant cites in support its exemption 7(C) claim
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generally involve persons whose connection with a criminal file
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could embarrass or endanger them -- for example, persons
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investigated but not charged in criminal matters. See, e.g., Fund
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for Constitutional Government v. National Archives and Records
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Service, 656 F.2d 856, 861-66 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Defendant has not
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suggested that the meeting at issue here is the object of any
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criminal investigation. The incident occurred in plain view of
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the patrons of a busy shopping mall. The mere fact that defendant
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has maintained materials relating to the incident in connection
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with a criminal investigation does not mark participants in the
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meeting with the "stigma" of being associated with a criminal
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investigation, which defendant identifies as the gravamen of its
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7(C) claim. Indeed, several participants in the meeting have
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executed privacy waivers in connection with a later FOIA request
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from defendant, which suggests that they do not perceive release
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of the material defendant is withholding as a threat to their
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privacy interests. Exemption 7(C) is not an appropriate basis for
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withholding responsive documents in this case.
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B.
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Defendant next invokes FOIA exemption 7(D), which permits the
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withholding of documents that "could reasonably be expected to
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disclose the identity of a confidential source ... and ...
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information furnished by a confidential source." 5 U.S.C. Sec.
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(4)
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552(b)(7)(D). To support its claim of this exemption, defendant
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initially cited the law of this Circuit that "in the absence of
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evidence to the contrary, promises of confidentiality are
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'inherently implicit' when the FBI solicits information." Keys v.
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Department of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
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(citations omitted). However, during the pendency of this motion,
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the Supreme Court in Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S.Ct.
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2014 (1993), eliminated the Keys presumption. The Court held that
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exemption 7(D) only applies where there is an actual promise of
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confidentiality, or circumstances from which such a promise may be
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inferred -- for example, a type of crime that makes recriminations
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against sources likely. Id. at 2023. After Landano, which
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defendant concedes governs the exemption 7(D) claim in this case,
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defendant's sole basis for applying exemption 7(D) is a statement
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in its supplemental memorandum that defendant "recently contacted"
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the source, which told defendant that the source understood the
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information to have been provided on a confidential basis.
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Supplemental Declaration of Melvin E. Laska (June 18, 1993) at
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para. 49. Such a post hoc rationalization is inadequate. At no
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time has defendant offered any evidence of an express or implied
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promise of confidentiality at the time the source provided the
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information. Thus, defendant's exemption 7(D) claim does not
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survive Landano.
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C.
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Defendant's strongest claim for withholding certain responsive
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documents is based on FOIA exemption 7(A) That exemption permits
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(5)
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an agency to withhold responsive documents that "could reasonably
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be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings." 5
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U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(A). Defendant has represented that it is
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maintaining the withheld documents as part of a particular,
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ongoing criminal investigation. It has elaborated on this
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representation in its _in camera_ submission. Withholding of
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documents is appropriate under exemption 7(A) if release of the
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documents would interfere with the ongoing investigation in any of
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the ways defendant enumerates: by alerting individuals that they
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are under investigation, thus allowing them to alter their
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behavior; by exposing or chilling the participation of informants
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or witnesses; or by providing premature access to the government's
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strategy or the nature, focus, and limits of its case. See
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generally NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-241
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(1978).
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Defendant, however, has failed to demonstrate that the
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release of each of the documents it has withheld would interfere
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with the ongoing investigation in any of these ways. Defendant's
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public filings state that the investigation involves allegations
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made by, a private corporation of telephone fraud. See
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Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
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Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (June 25, 1993)
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at 3. Thus, defendant cannot fear the possibility that release of
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the withheld documents might reveal defendant's involvement in
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this type of investigation. Similarly, the fact that the
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documents at issue are responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request
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indicates that those documents concern the breakup of the November
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6, 1992 meeting
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(6)
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at Pentagon City. Thus, defendant cannot claim exemption 7(A) to
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withhold documents based on the possibility that the documents
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would reveal that investigators were interested in that meeting.
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The only documents at issue that defendant might properly withhold
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under exemption 7(A) would fall into one of the following three
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categories: information identifying the individual(s) under
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investigation and stating that they are under investigation;
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information identifying any witness(es) or informant(s) of the
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activity under criminal investigation and stating that they are
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witnesses or informants; and information revealing the particular
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strategy or parameters of the criminal investigation, such as the
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name of the corporation complaining of telephone fraud, the dates
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of the suspected criminal activity, or any conclusions defendant's
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agents have drawn in connection with the investigation. Beyond
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information in these specific categories, defendant has failed to
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explain how release of any withheld documents would interfere with
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any ongoing criminal investigation. Accordingly, the accompanying
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Order instructs defendant to redact from the withheld documents
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information that falls into the three specific categories
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described in this paragraph and to release the redacted documents
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to plaintiff.
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Date: July 1, 1994 /sig/
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Louis F. Oberdorfer
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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(7)
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR )
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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, )
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)
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Plaintiff, )
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)
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v. ) Civil Action No. 93-0231-LFO
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)
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UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, )
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)
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Defendant. )
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_________________________________)
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ORDER
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For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is
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this 1st day of July 1994, hereby
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ORDERED: that plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's _in
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camera_ submission should be, and is hereby, DENIED; and it is
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further
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ORDERED: that defendant's motion for summary judgment should
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be, and is hereby, GRANTED in part with respect to FOIA exemption
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7(A); and it is further
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ORDERED: that plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment
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should be, and is hereby, GRANTED with respect to FOIA exemptions
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7(C) and (D) and is GRANTED in part with respect to FOIA exemption
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7(A); and it is further
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ORDERED: that defendant shall redact from the withheld
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documents information that falls into the three specific
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categories described in the accompanying Memorandum and shall
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release the redacted documents to plaintiff.
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/sig/
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Louis F. Oberdorfer
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 9 Jul 94 22:53:05 PDT
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From: hkhenson@CUP.PORTAL.COM
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Subject: File 2--Draft Motion in response to Am. Action BBS Judge
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DRAFT MOTION
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(Note this is not a motion, but an early draft by a non-lawyer --
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-me- about one aspect of the AA BBS case. I have been very
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concerned with what I have found about the performance of the
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courts. It has turned out to be a lot worse than I thought.
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Keith Henson)
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On July 8, 1994 Judge Julia Smith-Gibbons, United States District
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Court for the Western District of Tennessee in Memphis TN,
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verbally ruled that defendant's motion to dismiss (improper venue
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based on the North American Free Trade Agreement and others) was
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denied. Her words were that her order denying the motion was "in
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the typewriter." Defendants and defendant's attorney expect (on
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the basis of her previous judicial conduct) to be handed the
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written order at the time of trial, precluding any interlocutory
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appellate remedies.
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Defendants Robert and Carleen Thomas are therefore forced to
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appeal Judge Gibbon's ruling without an order reduced to writing
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and signed by the court. However, her verbal ruling is "final"
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with respect to this issue.
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If this interlocutory appeal were delayed until after trial the
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Thomases' would be irreparably harmed, even if acquitted. Not
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only would they lose the cost of trial, which could not be
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recovered civilly, but they would have to shutdown their business
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as it requires part time physical presence. (Trial in this area
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would not be as onerous in that the business could continue to be
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operated with a few hours attention each night.)
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These motions are being filed in both the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
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cuits because the underlying case involves an *assault* on the
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authority of the Circuit Courts, and therefore upon the entire
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court system. When the Courts lose their capacity to function
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normally it is termed insurrection. The case at hand may be
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close to this state.
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As is made clear by attached documents, a *district* court in the
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Sixth Circuit is attempting to enforce authority over persons and
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property in the Ninth Circuit on the basis of a manufactured
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"crime".
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The gross inequity performed by law enforcement agents in
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manufacturing the child pornography charge could be proved at
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trial, but the *law* on which the "crime" is based (Title 18,
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Section 2252 of the Federal Code) has been ruled "unconstitutio-
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nal on its face" in the Ninth Circuit (US vs X-citement Video,
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Inc., 982 Federal Reporter Second Edition, page 1285, Dec. 16,
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1992). At the time of the search of the Thomas's home and
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business, (January 10, 1994) this statute *could not* be used to
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prosecute *any* person in the Ninth Circuit because it is an
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unconstitutional law, and unenforceable. (Judge Gibbons was
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notified on June 22, 1994 of these facts.)
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On January 26, 1994 a Federal Grand Jury in Memphis Tennessee
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returned an indictment against Robert Thomas citing section 2252,
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a section which *could not be applied* by any Ninth Circuit
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District Court to a citizen in that circuit or any other Circuit.
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(There were other sections cited including section xxx calling
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for forfeiture of their home, bank accounts, cars, and tens of
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thousands of dollars of computer hardware to the Tennessee
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authorities.)
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The effect--if a district court in one section of the country is
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allowed to charge citizens on laws ruled unconstitutional in the
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Circuit where they live--is to completely undermine the authority
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of all the Circuit courts in the country. This case is about
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liberty and property, but taken to the extreme, a person could be
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removed from his home by a District Court operating in another
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part of the country and executed.
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This appeal is about nothing less than the authority of *any*
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Federal court to protect the life, liberty and property of any
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|
citizen of the United States.
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|
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If this appeal is not granted, it will show that the Circuit
|
|
courts can ignore another Circuit's laws and do anything they
|
|
want with a citizen's life, liberty and property. It will show
|
|
that the Circuit courts do not have the authority to protect
|
|
life, liberty, or property for the people within their circuit,
|
|
and ultimately will undermine the courts ability to protect any
|
|
inhabitant of the United States.
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(Net.folks--please comment!)
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1994 22:50:18 PDT
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From: George, Donaldson & Ford <gdf@well.sf.ca.us>
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Subject: File 3--Steve Jackson Games case - comments/update
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Source: LEGAL BYTES, Spring 1994, Volume 2, Number 1
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gdf@well.sf.ca.us
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___________________________________
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Copyright (c) 1994 George, Donaldson & Ford, L.L.P.
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(Permission is granted freely to redistribute
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this newsletter in its entirety electronically.)
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======================================================================
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STEVE JACKSON GAMES v. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE:
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GOVERNMENT DROPS ITS APPEAL; PLAINTIFFS PRESS FORWARD ON
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"INTERCEPTION" ISSUE
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Earlier issues of LEGAL BYTES reported on the lawsuit brought by
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the Austin, Texas role-playing game publisher, Steve Jackson Games,
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|
against the U.S. Secret Service for violating the company's civil
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|
rights and the privacy rights of its electronic bulletin board
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|
system's users. Armed with bare suspicion and a search warrant based
|
|
on largely inaccurate information, the Secret Service on March 1, 1990
|
|
raided the company's offices, seizing its BBS and two other computers,
|
|
hundreds of floppies, drafts of a soon-to-be released game book, and
|
|
volumes of other computer records and documents. No one was ever
|
|
arrested or charged, but the Secret Service kept the BBS and other
|
|
materials for almost four months.
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|
|
Three years later, the Secret Service found itself in federal
|
|
court, not prosecuting anyone at Steve Jackson Games, but instead
|
|
trying to defend its raid against a civil lawsuit brought by the
|
|
company, its owner Steve Jackson, and three outside users of the
|
|
company's BBS (represented by the lawfirm publishing this newsletter).
|
|
After a three-day trial, Judge Sam Sparks held that the Secret
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|
Service's seizure of the draft game books and the BBS violated the
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|
Privacy Protection Act of 1980, and that its seizure, without probable
|
|
cause, of the BBS e-mail violated a provision of the Electronic
|
|
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. Section 2703. The
|
|
Secret Service was ordered to pay $1,000 to each of the users of the
|
|
BBS, and over $50,000 to Steve Jackson Games to compensate for damaged
|
|
equipment and lost sales. The government also agreed to reimburse
|
|
over $250,000 in costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the company in
|
|
bringing the lawsuit.
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|
|
The Secret Service initially gave notice of its intent to appeal
|
|
the judgment, but by January, 1994, had changed its mind. The appeal
|
|
was dismissed, and the government has now paid a total of over
|
|
$300,000 to the Plaintiffs. This is the first and only known recovery
|
|
of money from the federal government for violating the civil liberties
|
|
and privacy of computer users.
|
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|
|
The Plaintiffs' victory was not complete, however. Judge Sparks
|
|
rejected their argument that the Secret Service had violated yet
|
|
*another* law when it seized the BBS -- the Wiretap Act, as amended by
|
|
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA").
|
|
Congress expanded the Wiretap Act in 1986 to include protection for
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|
all types of electronic communications, including electronic mail and
|
|
private bulletin board communications. The Wiretap Act prohibits
|
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interception of electronic communications without a court order, a
|
|
greater burden than obtaining a simple search warrant from a federal
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or local magistrate or judge.
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When the Secret Service seized the Steve Jackson Games BBS, it
|
|
contained undelivered electronic mail -- that is, mail written by a
|
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user and addressed to another user, but not yet read by the intended
|
|
recipient. When the Secret Service seized the BBS, and then later
|
|
read and deleted all the e-mail on that BBS, this mail lost its
|
|
privacy, and was prevented from being delivered.
|
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|
|
The government argued that the seizure of mail in transit was not
|
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an "interception" under the Wiretap Act because the e-mail was
|
|
temporarily stored on the hard drive of the computer. Judge Sparks
|
|
agreed, although the Plaintiffs argued that walking off with mail in
|
|
transit and preventing it from being delivered sure *seems* like an
|
|
interception. Judge Sparks' decision has in effect added an
|
|
additional requirement to the definition of interception -- that an
|
|
"interception" must be *contemporaneous* to its transmission, and
|
|
therefore the seizure of a storage device can never qualify as an
|
|
interception.
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|
The word "contemporaneous" does not appear in the Wiretap Act and
|
|
the Plaintiffs have argued that the legislative history of the
|
|
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, as well as the language and
|
|
logic of the act, indicates that seizures of BBSs that include
|
|
undelivered e-mail are "interceptions" of such communications
|
|
requiring court orders.
|
|
|
|
The government has responded by arguing that the ECPA establishes
|
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two separate, airtight compartments -- one for "stored" electronic
|
|
communications resident on hard drives, no matter how temporarily, and
|
|
communications that are in-transit, that is, where the electrons are
|
|
moving from computer to computer. Under the government's theory, BBS
|
|
or Internet e-mail changes legal status, and therefore the level of
|
|
protection, as it moves from computer to computer on its way to its
|
|
destination.
|
|
|
|
This issue remains important despite Judge Sparks' other ruling
|
|
that the Secret Service's seizure of *all* the e-mail violated another
|
|
provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. At least some
|
|
law enforcement agencies appear to be interpreting Judge Sparks'
|
|
decision as a "go ahead and seize, but don't read or delete, and try
|
|
to return promptly" rule; that is, that the law permits them to seize
|
|
electronic mail without probable cause, as long as they do not read or
|
|
delete it. Although this is not an accurate reading of Judge Sparks's
|
|
ruling, a clear decision that the seizure of in-transit e-mail would
|
|
unambiguously protect not just the *privacy* of e-mail, but would
|
|
protect the *delivery* of the mail as well. Other methods, including
|
|
subpoenas and making on-site duplicates, can preserve the government's
|
|
need for information when legitimate and supported by probable cause.
|
|
|
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Further, the ruling exhibits a static application of the statute
|
|
to technology, not intended by Congress when the ECPA was enacted.
|
|
The Plaintiffs have pressed forward with their appeal in order to
|
|
establish better protection for electronic communication privacy. The
|
|
government and law must come to grips with the proliferation of
|
|
privately owned and operated communications systems. While
|
|
single-line dial-up BBSs are now relatively primitive, there are
|
|
countless thousands of them. The large commercial services such as
|
|
CompuServe and America Online are growing at fantastic rates; Steve
|
|
Jackson Games' own BBS has become a commercial Internet machine with a
|
|
T-1 line and over a dozen dial-up connections, providing ftp, telnet,
|
|
newsgroup and e-mail services. It is not unreasonable to ask the
|
|
government to give new means of communications the same respect as it
|
|
has long granted telephone calls. With the much-vaunted information
|
|
superhighway coming, the government will face these problems anyway.
|
|
Private communications increasingly will travel over privately owned,
|
|
small, decentralized service providers, and the government cannot
|
|
continue to argue that the difference in technology (or size) warrants
|
|
lower protection under the law.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
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|
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Date: Mon, 11 Jul 1994 14:53:56 -0700
|
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From: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock@well.sf.ca.us
|
|
Subject: File 4--White House Pays off in potential patent infringement
|
|
|
|
CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1994 // July 11 //
|
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|
|
Jacking in from the "Blank Check" Port:
|
|
|
|
Washington, DC -- The Administration will today announce it has
|
|
sidestepped the threat of patent infringement lawsuit involving its
|
|
Escrow Encryption System, commonly known as Clipper. The solution:
|
|
Toss the original patent holder a blank check and buy him off.
|
|
|
|
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the agency
|
|
walking point for the White House on its proposed encryption Clipper
|
|
encryption standard, has agreed in principle to license two key
|
|
patents relating to the technical workings of the key escrow system
|
|
from patent holder Silvio Macali, an MIT professor.
|
|
|
|
The government's key escrow system depends on the capturing of digital
|
|
"keys" that allow authorized law enforcement officials to unscramble
|
|
Clipper encoded speech or Capstone encoded data, including electronic
|
|
mail. Macali, as it now turns out, thought up the idea and had the
|
|
moxy to patent his scheme. Macali's inventions detail the process
|
|
whereby a digital key is divided into pieces. Those pieces are then
|
|
held by separate "key escrow agents" which now turn out to be hand
|
|
picked government agencies; one is NIST the other a division of the
|
|
Treasury Department. Those keys must be combined to successfully
|
|
unlock the code that allows law enforcement officials to listen in.
|
|
|
|
The license agreement effectively eliminates "concerns Macali raised
|
|
about possible infringement of his patents," said NIST spokeswoman,
|
|
Anne Enright Shepherd. It also sidesteps a potentially ugly lawsuit
|
|
in which Macali lawyers could have uncovered all sorts of currently
|
|
unknown information about the Clipper program.
|
|
|
|
According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the government's
|
|
agreement with Macali grants the Administration a nonexclusive license
|
|
to the patents for use in current implementations of Clipper and
|
|
Capstone and for future implementations, Shepherd said.
|
|
|
|
It's not known whether the government will make a single payment to
|
|
Macali or pay royalties. "The procurement phase of the agreement is
|
|
still continuing," Shepherd said. Disclosure of the amount paid to
|
|
Macali and details of the license agreement are expected to be made
|
|
public sometime early next month, she said. That agreement, however,
|
|
wont result in any user fees, Shepherd said.
|
|
|
|
Questions Raised
|
|
================
|
|
|
|
Although the government's action today nullifies a pesky problem, it
|
|
also continues to raise serious questions about the Administration's
|
|
-- and more pointedly -- about the National Security Agency's ability
|
|
to ramrod an encryption policy that has been elevated to the status of
|
|
a national security issue.
|
|
|
|
Surely the NSA or NIST can dial up the U.S. Patent Office and query
|
|
its database, looking for patent conflicts. Apparently the clock and
|
|
dagger crowd was too busy with other matters. Arrogance or oversight?
|
|
|
|
"Macali made the existence of his patents known during the public comment
|
|
period," Shepherd said. "He let the government know he had some patents
|
|
that he felt were similar to some technology used by the key escrow system.
|
|
So the discussions kind of began at that point," she said.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, the "public comment" period was launched only after the
|
|
White House trotted out its Clipper policy as set in stone. Nobody
|
|
expected Macali to piss the parade.
|
|
|
|
Privacy and civil liberties groups have roundly criticized the
|
|
government for developing Clipper in secrecy, not allowing public
|
|
debate on the issue. If that debate had taken place, Macali would
|
|
have come forward years ago.
|
|
|
|
Despite the Administration's continued efforts to push Clipper into
|
|
the deep waters of the mass market, there are rumblings that it may
|
|
not be christened after all. At very least, it may not be the only
|
|
encryption standard blessed by the government.
|
|
|
|
Several groups are now floating their own alternatives to the Clipper
|
|
program. And although the National Security Agency is working behind
|
|
the scenes to sink such efforts, NIST, at least, is making the
|
|
appearance of listening.
|
|
|
|
Earlier this year, NIST put out a call for the Cooperative Research
|
|
and Development Agreement (CREDA), which was an effort to draw
|
|
publicly interested parties into a cooperative venture to develop a
|
|
key escrow alternative.
|
|
|
|
Those that came forward have now thrown off working formally with
|
|
CREDA, but have instead formed their own working group, government
|
|
sources said. Those efforts are being heard and taken seriously,
|
|
according to several government sources familiar with the discussions.
|
|
"Encryption isn't a front page issue, but those [inside the
|
|
Administration] working on this issue are tired of being beat up over
|
|
it," said a White House official.
|
|
|
|
Discussions on Clipper alternatives "are continuing," Shepherd said.
|
|
"And we're still open to other alternative ideas and we're working
|
|
with the people who have presented their own ideas at this point."
|
|
|
|
Meeks out...
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.63
|
|
************************************
|
|
|