955 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
955 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
Computer underground Digest Sun Feb 17, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 17
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe (Improving each day)
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Acting Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Whacker Editor: Tonya Harding
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CONTENTS, #6.17 (Feb 17, 1994)
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File 1--Photography, Computer Underground, and Images
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File 2--Update on Canadian BBS "Licensing" (Re: CuD 6.15)
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File 3--AP Article on Clipper
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File 4--Congress Online
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File 5--Public access to *Inaccurate(?)* Public Records?
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File 6--Clipper Questions and Answers in a Nutshell
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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To subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
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and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: ftp.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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UNITED STATES:
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
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etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD
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ftp.halcyon.com (192.135.191.2) in mirror2/cud
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KOREA: ftp: cair.kaist.ac.kr in /doc/eff/cud
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 19 Feb 1994 11:13:52 -0800
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From: Rika Kasahara <rika@WELL.SF.CA.US>
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Subject: File 1--Photography, Computer Underground, and Images
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: In CuD 6.16, we reported a solicitation for
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"freaks" for the cover story on computer culture in a Japanese
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magazine. A bit of a language barrier resulted in the solicitation
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being misunderstood by ourselves and others. We are quite happy to
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acknowledge that the intent of the cover is the exact opposite from
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what it appeared to be. We apologize to Rika Kasahara, the original
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poster, for the misunderstanding.
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In a series of private and quasi-public posts, Rika has explained the
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differences between the Japanese and U.S. images of the computer
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culture. The intent of the story and the proposed cover was, in fact,
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an attempt to do precisely what we suggested the media to, which is to
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break down stereotypes. One reader suggested that Rika's proposal
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would be identical to the cover on Scientific American a few years ago
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depicting four "computer nerds" from Legion of Doom as virile,
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well-dressed and exceptionally photogenic businessmen as a way of
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challenging stereotypes. I agree.
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Rika's private communications to me in the past week have been
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valuable in adding to my own understanding of another culture. One
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reader suggested that CuD itself promotes cultural misunderstanding by
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focusing almost exclusively on North America, even though a
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substantial portion of readers are from virtually all other continents
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and about 40 countries. They're right. We STRONGLY ENCOURAGE READERS
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IN OTHER COUNTRIES, especially in South America and Asia, to submit
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articles describing their experiences. Another suggested that I was
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attempting to distance myself from computer folk who looked different.
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Because, depending on mood and season, I would qualify as an
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appropriate grunge candidate for the cover, the poster's observation
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is off-target. But, his point might be reframed as simply his way of
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emphasizing our own position that it's important to appreciate
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difference rather than use differences to create damaging stereotypes
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that lead to bad laws, bad polices, and bad enforcement.
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In her post below, Rika explains how she would challenge stereotypes.
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In doing so, she also gives us some insight into her own culture. We
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admire her patience and grace in successfully contributing to our own
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understanding)).
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Let me post another note to make my point clearer. I hope my English is
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better in this one. I got a friend to help me to write it.
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I guess I was misunderstood (in the previous post).
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In Japan, where there is not a mature computer culture, overground or
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underground, the hacker's image is on a par with that of rapists and
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murderers - except that the hackers are seen as being a little
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smarter. However, they aren't seen as anything more than common,
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lowlife criminals.
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The stereotypical hacker in Japan is usually seen as either as a
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balding, overweight, myopic individual lurking behind a monitor
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throughout his life, with little purpose to his existence other than
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using his computer to cause trouble for the society outside his door
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-- or -- as an evil, scheming figure, waiting in the darkness, with
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secret plans, sharp fangs, and a plot to steal your software.
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The hacker's image is that of an overgifted antagonist who runs in the
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same circles as the common footpad and heroin junkie. They aren't
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viewed as having any redeemable features whatsoever, but their
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intelligence makes them a grave threat to legitimate members of
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society, so their very existence is feared. The meaning of their lives
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is composed of almost nothing more than invading protected systems and
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selling data for personal gain. Friendless, angry, and ready to
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inflict damage onto the electronic world, this mythical villain hides
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just beyond your senses, waiting to strike whenever he sees you are
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vulnerable.
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For the most part, "hackers," (is there a good encompassing, concise
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definition for a hacker?) aren't this way at all. HoHoCon, for some
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reason, had a surprising lack of dark, cloaked, shadowy figures in
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attendance. Most hackers appear and act like ordinary people except
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they are usually intrinsically curious about the machinations of their
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reality, and will stop at no end in order to figure out how the world
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actually works.
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In order to fix this bad image and show that a hacker is indeed a real
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person and not a thief or murderer, the magazine has been reporting
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real hackers' stories, including mine. And this time, I wanted to get
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some photos of some real hackers or anybody from the computer
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underground culture for the story, and for the cover page- to show
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that, contrary to popular opinion, hackers aren't all myopic,
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overweight bald guys, and shadowy vampires. I was kind of joking when
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I said "don't be an ordinary computer nerd" and the things about long
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hair or a nose ring. I was not trying to find computer freaks, but
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photogenic, interesting-looking people who wouldn't mind being
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photographed and put in a magazine. The magazine cannot pay for people
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being in these photographs - they do not have enough of a budget to
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model rates, so this is an appeal to get some good pictures of actual
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hackers who wouldn't mind having their pictures appear publicly.
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Although after this there may not be any people that want to show up,
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I still would like to take pictures of actual hackers. I don't want to
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get pictures that damage the image of hackers, but pictures that
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improve it - pictures that show that hackers are real people that have
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interesting lives, not shadowy thieves, like the current hacker image
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is in Japan. If anyone wouldn't mind showing up for this, I will be
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taking pictures tomorrow ((Feb. 19)) at Buena Vista Park, on the
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corner of Buena Vista West, and Haight at 1 pm. If you want to show
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up, please do so.
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This isn't a cattle call for a freak show, but I just want pictures of
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some interesting people to use in the magazine. I'm sorry if what I
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said before was understood as something different. I didn't mean to
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offend anybody.
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 02:51:13 EST
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From: John_Stevenson@MAGIC-BBS.CORP.APPLE.COM
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Subject: File 2--Update on Canadian BBS "Licensing" (Re: CuD 6.15)
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I wrote this messge in response to many rumours that have been
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floating around Onenet and MAGIC recently.
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Don't Panic
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I've been following the thread started when I forwarded LORD QORTHON's
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copied post to the CyberForum. At first I was alarmed, but when I gave
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the matter some thought, I realized that it is highly unlikely that
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the CRTC has any interest in regulating BBSes right now. It may be
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that government policy may effect BBS operation in future, but I just
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don't see that happening any time soon.
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Before I go on, I want to make it clear that I know the CRTC fairly
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well from nearly a decade of work in the community radio sector.
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> The Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is
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>currently in the process of setting itself up to regulate Public
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>bulletin boards. They want to make it an offense to run a BBS without a
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>CRTC license. If licensing comes into effect, the BBS scene will quite
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>literally shrivel up and die.
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Bruce McIntosh telephoned the CRTC in Ottawa last week, and was told that
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there are no plans to regulate bullten boards in the works. He spoke with a
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public info officer and was told nothing was being worked on. To me, that
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makes perfect sense - the CRTC has suffered from budget cuts in the past
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few years and is understaffed. They would rather see more self-regulation,
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like the cable industry's recent standards council. I am sure that if this
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ever became something real, a group of BBSers getting together and drafting
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some very basic standards would nip it in the bud.
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> Consider the example of radio in the 40's and 50's. Before the
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>CRTC was formed, anyone could broadcast radio signals legally from their
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>home on any bandwidth. Fearing obscenity and extreme access to
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>information, the CRTC was formed to sell licenses to broadcasters.
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>Without such a license, you could be prosecuted for broadcasting. The
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>result of this action can be seen today: the only radio stations we see
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>are totally mainstream and are hell-bent on making profit, not pleasing
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>listeners or informing the public.
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When I see this kind of history thrown out as "reality", it bothers me a
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great deal. Government regulation of broadcasting existed from nearly the
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beginning of the sector in Canada. The CBC and CRTC were formed not to stop
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"obscenity and extreme access to information" but American commercial radio
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control of Canadian airwaves. It was not the case that "anyone could
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broadcast radio signals legally from their home on any bandwidth (sic)" -
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even in the 1920s, the Fisheries Dept. was giving put licences.
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> If licensing comes into affect, we will LOSE this access. Not only
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>will the pirate boards be hunted down and exterminated, but all
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>currently LEGAL PUBLIC DOMAIN BBS's will also be made illegal unless
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>they can afford a license. And who do you think will get licenses?
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>Only those willing to follow the CRTC guidelines for radio and
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>television. Corporations and rich executives. The BBS world, our
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>underground paradise (if you will) is in great danger of becoming a
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>commercial hell like the rest of today's media.
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This seems like a likely scenario if (a) the CRTC had some desire to
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control BBSes as you describe and (b) they could afford to do it. I am not
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sure about the first and doubt the second very much.
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> We don't yet know what the proposed licensing fee will be, but it
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>could anywhere in the area of $300-$5,000. This could also depend on
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>the size of the BBS. However, most BBS's will simply close up shop if
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>the government wants a license. The government will simply weed out all
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>the little guys and support the big guys.
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Licence fee for a non-profit radio station is $25 dollars a year.
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Commercial stations pay a very small percent of their profit as the fee.
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I'm not in favour of licencing, but $25? In the US, all DJs (commercial or
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non-commercial, it doesn't matter) need an FCC licence to be on the air.
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Now that is restrictive.
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> Before I go into my plan of action, I want to tell you that if
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>licensing comes into effect, if will be basically impossible to beat the
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>system. All pirate radio stations in North America have been crushed by
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>the government in a matter of months. Imagine how easy it will be to
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>crush pirate bulletin board systems (and by that I simply mean BBS's
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>without a license) with traceable phone numbers. Bell Canada would be
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>sure to help the CRTC bust those boards. And the RCMP would have a real
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>easy time busting any boards with illegal software, because those boards
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>would not have licenses. The CRTC finds the board through Bell, arrests
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>the sysop for running a board without a license, then informs the RCMP
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>that this sysop was allowing copyrighted material to be transferred
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>through his/her bbs. That sysop, for the first time in his/her life, is
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>suddenly looking at a possible jail term.
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It's hard for me to argue that folks running pirate boards shouldn't get
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busted. While I don't agree with many aspects of our wonderful econimic
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system, I don't think the way to reform it is through establishing pirate
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bulliten boards. The software business is tough enough.
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Actually, it isn't all that easy to find a pirate radio station, especially
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outside Ontario. The Department of Communications has only a couple of
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testing vans for the whole of Canada. Fact is, there are unlicenced radio
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stations which have been in existance for years which the CRTC either can't
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or doesn't want to bust. The last time they went after someone that I can
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remember was for pirate television - a group of religious boradcasters out
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west wanted to start a Christian TV station, even though that's contrary to
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regulation. They ended up allowing them to apply for licences. Isn't the
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CRTC mean?
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I have never heard of anyone going to jail or receiving fines for breaking
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broadcast regulations in Canada. Maybe it happened in the past, but in the
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most recent ten years, it hasn't. Sure, broadcasters have been punished,
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but it has never involved criminal prosecution. Yes, in the US this happens
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a lot - but not in Canada.
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Anyway, how easy will it really be to track down an "illegal" BBS? Radio
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and television have a limited range of frequencies they can use - in many
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parts of Canada, interferance from a new broadcaster will lead to
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complaints. But a BBS isn't as noticable. What is the CRTC going to do -
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wardial every city and town in Canada? Nope, they'll have to wait for
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complaints, or pay someone to hang out in the hacker scene and track down
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"pirate" boards.
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>She would be willing to confront the CRTC on legal grounds if we have
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>enough support from YOU. I have to hear from you. In order to force
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>the CRTC to at least seriously listen to our argument, we need a lot of
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>names, and a lot of letters to your local MP and to the CRTC.
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God, I am sick of people thinking of the CRTC as some sort of FCC-style
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scary monolith. They've bee watching Pump Up the Volume too many times.
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The fact is that the Commission is pretty supportive of non-commercial
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radio. Maby people in the CRTC just want to be responsive to what
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broadcasters and the public want. They don't fine you and for the most part
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there is very little ass-kicking going on.
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>OUR GOAL: To stop the CRTC from requiring the licensing of bulletin
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>board systems and get it written into the law books that private, home
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>run bbs's are totally legal and should never be regulated, in the
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>interests of free information.
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I know we've argued about this for awhile, but whether the CRTC or anyone
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else regulates BBSes will be determined by a bunch of circumstances. First,
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is the public somehow served by this kind of regualtion? Maybe. In the
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past, even newspapers have been subject to public policy. However, I don't
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see a pressing need for regulation. Second, if there is a desire to
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regulate, who is going to pay for it? Regulation means staff, research, and
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time. Can the CRTC spare that when they have to deal with such issues as
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new cable services and long distance services? I don't think so.
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> KEEP PRIVATE BBS's LEGAL!
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>
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> LORD QORTHON
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I guess the sourse of this post was a hacker, probably a warezwolf.
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As I said at the beginning of this post, don't panic. Even if there is
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a desire to regulate (and I am drafting a letter to Keith Spicer, the
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chair of the CRTC to find out), we will have plenty of notice and can
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deal with it.
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 13:27:36 -0500
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From: Dave Banisar <Banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
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Subject: File 3--AP Article on Clipper
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++++ fwd ++++
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Subject--Computer Users Blast Chip Plan
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From--The Associated Press, clarinews@clarinet.com
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Date--Thu, 17 Feb 94 22:30:07 PST
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Computer enthusiasts worried about electronic privacy are
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attacking the Clinton administration's proposed new computer
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privacy standard -- and they're putting their feelings on-line.
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"For an administration that's concerned with the information
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highway, they really are putting potholes in the highway before it
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gets built," said Jerry Berman, executive director of the
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Electronic Frontier Foundation in Washington.
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The government's new standard, Key Escrow Encryption, was
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announced this month and is supposed to assure privacy during the
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current explosion in electronic communications.
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But computer users and the industry have bridled at a provision
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that guarantees that law enforcement and national security agencies
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would still be able to intercept all messages, including electronic
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mail and telephone signals, for lawfully authorized wiretaps.
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"John Q. Public is worried about other things, but when they
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learn that the government is proposing to design the locks for your
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electronic data messages, business transactions -- and then also
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keep the keys in a quote, safe, place of their choosing ... I don't
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think the public is going to accept it," Berman said in an
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interview.
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The system uses a microcircuit called the clipper chip to
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scramble messages on computers and other digital equipment.
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Manufacturers would not be forced to use the chips, but would be
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forbidden from exporting other encryption technology, to keep it
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from terrorists, drug dealers and others.
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The administration has said encryption is a law-and-order issue
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because it can be used by criminals to defeat wiretaps and avoid
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prosecution. It has strategic value in international affairs as
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well, officials say.
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Opponents of the plan, including the Business Software Alliance,
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maintain that U.S. companies will lose sales to overseas customers
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seeking the best security available, and that criminals will simply
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find other sources for the products.
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Computer Professionals
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for Social Responsibility have begun electronic petition drives on
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the Internet, the worldwide on-line network of computers.
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The foundation said this week it has received 3,000 messages
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from computer users supporting a bill by Rep. Maria Cantwell,
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D-Wash., that would loosen export controls on scrambling
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technology, effectively removing the clipper chip's advantage to
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manufacturers.
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"Much of this is ordinary, shrink-wrapped software, the kind
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millions of people buy every day for their home and business
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computers at regular retail outlets," Cantwell said in offering
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her bill.
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The computer professionals group has received 13,000 messages
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urging President Clinton to withdraw the clipper proposal and will
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deliver them to the White House, said Marc Rotenberg, the
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organization's Washington director.
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Talk about the proposal spread to computer networks outside the
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Internet as well.
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"Like they say, the devil is in the details," one man wrote on
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a computer bulletin board in central Indiana. "First, Clipper is
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voluntary. Then guess how long it will be until the use of any
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`non-approved' encryption is outlawed?"
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Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., chairman of the Judiciary Committee's
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subcommittee on technology, said this week that he strongly opposes
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the clipper proposal because of privacy and civil liberties
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concerns. Other opponents are expecting him to convene hearings on
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the plan.
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The dispute threatened to smudge the administration's image
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among the computer literati. Signs of high-tech's increased stature
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at the White House have included the presence of then-Apple
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Computer chairman John Sculley at Clinton's first address to
|
|
Congress and Vice President Al Gore's support for an "information
|
|
superhighway." The White House even set up an E-mail address for
|
|
Clinton shortly after he took office.
|
|
Jim Thomas, editor of Computer Underground Digest on the
|
|
Internet, has watched the anti-clipper campaign building since
|
|
Attorney General Janet Reno announced the proposal Feb. 4.
|
|
"It's like fighting a juggernaut," said Thomas, a professor of
|
|
sociology and criminology at the University of Northern Illinois.
|
|
"Some people think it's a done deal. But I'm highly optimistic
|
|
that we'll beat it. I think the momentum is growing."
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
From: dbatterson@ATTMAIL.COM(David Batterson)
|
|
Date: 18 Feb 94 20:12:19 GMT
|
|
Subject: File 4--Congress Online
|
|
|
|
Congress Is Lagging Behind In Getting Online
|
|
by David Batterson
|
|
|
|
|
|
While the White House is now online and able to receive
|
|
e-mail from citizens, Congress has languished behind--somewhat unsure
|
|
of how fast to implement this new technology. Meanwhile, those of us
|
|
who strongly favor e-mail access to government officials think that
|
|
Congress is moving entirely too sluggardly. Who's right?
|
|
|
|
Many would argue that e-mail is unnecessary, since we can already
|
|
mail letters to members of Congress, as well as phone or fax them.
|
|
However, fax machines were once as rare as sincerity on Capitol Hill,
|
|
but now proliferate. The same is true with cellular phones; their
|
|
usage has exploded. Likewise, it's fast becoming the same situation
|
|
with e-mail. You cannot stop progress; e-mail is the next big wave of
|
|
communications.
|
|
|
|
While most Senators are not online, one prominent member of the
|
|
U.S. Senate is: Ted Kennedy. According to staffer Chris Casey, "our
|
|
office has been posting info to a small network of Massachusetts
|
|
computer BBSs (bulletin board systems) and into two USENET news groups
|
|
since early last year." [USENET is part of the huge Internet computer
|
|
network that links up millions of computer users.]
|
|
|
|
Casey also e-mailed me that "we're in the process now of
|
|
implementing direct constituent e-mail access to our office. More
|
|
people up here need to wake up to the importance of this type of
|
|
access." I couldn't agree more.
|
|
|
|
In a previously published interview, Kennedy said "constituent e-
|
|
mail and electronic distribution of information are likely to become
|
|
routine on Capitol Hill in the near future." He's right.
|
|
|
|
The leadership and members of both the House and Senate should
|
|
stop oozing along like molasses flowing uphill in Vermont. The time's
|
|
are-a-changin' fast. If they refuse to provide constituent e-mail and
|
|
online access, those elected officials should resign from public
|
|
office.
|
|
|
|
Oregon Rep. Elizabeth Furse, District 1, totally agrees with
|
|
Kennedy, and has implemented constituent e-mail and a USENET news
|
|
group for her office. Mary Fetsch, Furse's press secretary, said it's
|
|
important for the representative's constituents to reach her online,
|
|
since "it's a high-tech district, including the 'Silicon Forest' where
|
|
we have Intel, Nike and other firms that are highly computerized."
|
|
|
|
I tested Rep. Furse's system, and here's part of the form letter
|
|
reply: "Thank you for contacting me through the House of
|
|
Representatives' Constituent Electronic Mail System (CEMS). I am
|
|
pleased to be a part of this effort to offer citizens a quick,
|
|
efficient and environmentally sound way to communicate with their
|
|
representatives in Congress."
|
|
|
|
Online access to Congress is part of the Clinton administration's
|
|
overall plans to develop a National Information Infrastructure. For a
|
|
perfect example, the public has responded favorably to having text of
|
|
the President's health care plan and NAFTA available online. When
|
|
Ross Perot was running for president, online services, BBBs and e-mail
|
|
systems were abuzz with blizzards of messages and information.
|
|
|
|
Another strong proponent for public electronic access is
|
|
curmudgeon and activist Jim Warren, who lives in the San Francisco Bay
|
|
area. Warren was the organizer of the first Conference on Computers,
|
|
Freedom and Privacy, and the founder of InfoWorld, a major computer
|
|
industry trade paper.
|
|
|
|
Warren not only wants to be able to e-mail members of Congress.
|
|
In addition, he's pushing hard to "computerize the filing of and
|
|
public access to state and local campaign-finance disclosures,
|
|
officials' statements of economic interests, and state lobbyists'
|
|
disclosures."
|
|
|
|
Warren sees access to public records as one component of a
|
|
broader issue, of computerization that allows online feedback to
|
|
city/town, county/parish, state and federal officials/agencies,
|
|
personal use, nonprofit-organization use, commercial/tax-paying use,
|
|
public dissemination, and community discussions (town-sized to Village
|
|
Earth)."
|
|
|
|
In an e-mail message from Rep. Charlie Rose (D-NC), Chairman,
|
|
Committee on House Administration, Rose said that "the results of the
|
|
six month public mail pilot have been very encouraging. The nature
|
|
and character of the incoming electronic mail has demonstrated that
|
|
this capability will be an invaluable source of information on
|
|
constituent opinion. We are now in the process of expanding the
|
|
project to other members of Congress, as technical, budgetary and
|
|
staffing constraints allow."
|
|
|
|
In other words, it will take a long time for anything significant
|
|
to happen. Unless constituents scream for online access, it will be
|
|
slow in coming to their districts.
|
|
|
|
In spite of the pressure, at present only eleven members of the
|
|
U.S. House of Representatives have public electronic mailboxes that
|
|
may be accessed by their constituents. The ten are: Sam Coopersmith
|
|
(D-AZ), Jay Dickey (R-AR), Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), Newton Gingrich (R-
|
|
GA), Dennis Hastert (R-IL), George Miller (D-CA), Karen Shepherd (D-
|
|
UT), Fortney "Pete" Stark (D-CA), Mel Watt (D-NC), plus Rose and
|
|
Furse.
|
|
|
|
There are a few hopeful signs on the Senate side, according to
|
|
Casey. "The Senate recently set up an 'FTP server' that will allow
|
|
any Senator or Senate Committee to post information on the Internet."
|
|
|
|
Sen. Charles Robb (D-VA) also posts information and receives e-
|
|
mail. Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) "has or is near to begin posting info
|
|
to a network in New Mexico," Casey e-mailed me.
|
|
|
|
As Sen. Kennedy has emphasized, e-mail doesn't replace
|
|
"traditional means of communication." That's true, since all replies
|
|
to e-mailed letters will be sent by USPS until some distant point in
|
|
the future.
|
|
|
|
Getting a paper reply to an electronic message really defeats the
|
|
purpose of e-mail--giving you only half a loaf. But for the stodgy
|
|
House and Senate to even get that far is practically a miracle, so
|
|
it's worth something.
|
|
|
|
To e-mail Rep. Elizabeth Furse, use: furseor1@hr.house.gov. For
|
|
more information on the House of Representatives e-mail system, e-mail
|
|
congress@hr.house.gov. Rep. Furse's news releases and other
|
|
information can be found in the USENET news group titled OR.POLITICS.
|
|
|
|
For information on Sen. Kennedy's online developments, e-mail
|
|
chris_casey@kennedy.senate.gov.
|
|
|
|
###
|
|
|
|
David Batterson covers computers & telecommunications for WIRED,
|
|
ComputorEdge, Computer Underground Digest, VICTORY! and other
|
|
publications. His e-mail addresses are: dbatterson@attmail.com,
|
|
dbatterson@aol.com, evfw91a@prodigy.com, and
|
|
david.batterson@f290.n105.z1.fidonet.org.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 1994 17:19:15 -0800
|
|
From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
|
|
Subject: File 5--Public access to *Inaccurate(?)* Public Records?
|
|
|
|
Feb.17, 1994
|
|
|
|
"It is error alone which needs the support of government.
|
|
Truth can stand by itself." -- Thomas Jefferson
|
|
[from John Dilley <jad@nsa.hp.com> ]
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|
PUBLIC ACCESS TO *INACCURATE(?)* PUBLIC RECORDS
|
|
|
|
I don't know if you followed or are interested in the flap over
|
|
"Altered White House documents" but thought I would brazenly bring it to
|
|
your attention.
|
|
|
|
It is certainly germane to the question of public access to *reliable*
|
|
government information. I objected on alt.internet.services on Feb 5 to
|
|
having found a version of a story on the ftp site whitehouse.gov which
|
|
did not match facts widely reported in the media.
|
|
|
|
The Internet flap which ensued finally caught the attention of the
|
|
White House and I received a denial from Jock Gill of the Office of
|
|
Media Affairs that the WH altered or edited any documents - despite the
|
|
fact that I had evidence to the contrary.
|
|
|
|
The story hit the AP wires and the on-line community has been extremely
|
|
interested - and supportive of the need to protect the accuracy and
|
|
reliability of what we receive on-line from the government!
|
|
|
|
I prepared an approximately 11k synopsis of the gist of the story,
|
|
including the AP version which appeared on-line, if you are interested. I
|
|
think much of it is still contained on alt.internet.services though it
|
|
went everywhere and bits and pieces are scattered all over.
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|
ABOUT THE NEXT ITEM HEREIN: EXPLICIT EXAMPLE OF A NET-BASED POLITICAL PUSH
|
|
This GovAccess list began as online support for an effort to mandate that
|
|
California's *state*-level legislative information available via the nets.
|
|
Because of (1) its public/popular support and (2) the net-ability of
|
|
*timely* mass-communications among geographically-disbursed supporters, it
|
|
was politically irresistable.
|
|
GovAccess.015 and the following message both concern a net-based *federal*
|
|
political push regarding a *national* net-related issue. GovAccess.015
|
|
concerned a national petition addressed to the President - the Executive
|
|
Branch. It has already drawn OVER TEN-THOUSAND CO-SIGNATORS.
|
|
The following item concerns direct advocacy to representatives in the
|
|
Legislative Branch - supporting Congressional action to redress the grievance.
|
|
Although I am personally a furious and flaming advocate on this issue, I
|
|
am weaseling the information in, here, under the [legitimate] excuse that it
|
|
is clearly an example of a net-based populist political push - this time, at
|
|
a federal level.
|
|
|
|
The "just-cause" and "public-interest" aspects are merely icing on the cake:
|
|
* Shall the Clinton/Gore administration continue to supress national and
|
|
global adoption of the best possible personal-communications privacy-
|
|
protection technology - that can be most-easily deployed and least expensive?
|
|
* Shall the administration continue to force U.S. high-tech companies into
|
|
non-competitive positions, by prohibiting their foreign sale of the best
|
|
secure-communications technology - even though it is already known world-
|
|
wide, published in the open technical literature more than a decade ago,
|
|
and gleefully sold by foreign competitors?
|
|
* Shall the administration continue to pretend that this globally-known
|
|
security technology is a "dangerous munition," the export of which must be
|
|
mostly-prohibited by the Secretary of State, when it is sold on diskettes
|
|
throughout the U.S., is readily available throughout the world, and can be
|
|
downloaded in a few minutes from many thousands of Internet sites, globally?
|
|
* Shall the administration continue its efforts to deploy and install
|
|
costly new communications systems that are exclusively *designed* to aid its
|
|
covert surveillance of personal, financial and business communications -
|
|
electronic-snooping so-often abused by politicians and officials in the
|
|
positions to exercise it?
|
|
* Does the administration *really* think that alleged wrongdoers will
|
|
actually use communications systems that are *designed* to facilitate
|
|
government eves-dropping - especially when provably-secure technology is
|
|
available to everyone, worldwide, at little or no cost?
|
|
* Should the government develop and deploy ever-greater citizen-surveillance
|
|
technology for ever-increasingly-convenient, undetectable peeping-anywhere at
|
|
the touch of a Washington keyboard, while citizens are offered only a
|
|
guaranteed-insecure secret system to protect against corporate and personal
|
|
snooping while facilitating government peepers?
|
|
|
|
Thus - the next item concerns net-based political action by those who have
|
|
the technical competency to understand the issues and their ramifications -
|
|
to address this bizarre lunacy. While opposition-action is still permitted.
|
|
--jim
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION SEEKS NET-WIDE SUPPORT (INCLUDING YOU! :-)
|
|
From ssteele@eff.org Tue Feb 15 12:11:15 1994 * DISTRIBUTE WIDELY *
|
|
subject: EFF Wants You (to add your voice to the crypto fight)
|
|
Monday, February 7th, 1994 [reformatted for GovAccess. --jim]
|
|
From: Jerry Berman, Executive Director of EFF. jberman@eff.org
|
|
---
|
|
Dear Friends on the Electronic Frontier,
|
|
I'm writing a personal letter to you because the time has now come for
|
|
action. On Friday, February 4, 1994, the Administration announced that it
|
|
plans to proceed on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme
|
|
a national standard, and to discourage the development and sale of
|
|
alternative powerful encryption technologies. If the government succeeds
|
|
in this effort, the resulting blow to individual freedom and privacy could
|
|
be immeasurable.
|
|
As you know, over the last three years, we at EFF have worked to ensure
|
|
freedom and privacy on the Net. Now I'm writing to let you know about
|
|
something *you* can do to support freedom and privacy. *Please take a
|
|
moment to send e-mail to U.S. Rep. Maria Cantwell (cantwell@eff.org) to
|
|
show your support of H.R. 3627, her bill to liberalize export controls on
|
|
encryption software.* I believe this bill is critical to empowering
|
|
ordinary citizens to use strong encryption, as well as to ensuring that
|
|
the U.S. software industry remains competitive in world markets.
|
|
Here are some facts about the bill:
|
|
Rep. Cantwell introduced H.R. 3627 in the House of Representatives on
|
|
November 22, 1993. H.R. 3627 would amend the Export Control Act to move
|
|
authority over the export of nonmilitary software with encryption
|
|
capabilities from the Secretary of State (where the intelligence community
|
|
traditionally has stalled such exports) to the Secretary of Commerce. The
|
|
bill would also invalidate the current license requirements for
|
|
nonmilitary software containing encryption capablities, unless there is
|
|
substantial evidence that the software will be diverted, modified or
|
|
re-exported to a military or terroristic end-use.
|
|
If this bill is passed, it will greatly increase the availability of
|
|
secure software for ordinary citizens. Currently, software developers do
|
|
not include strong encryption capabilities in their products, because the
|
|
State Department refuses to license for export any encryption technology
|
|
that the NSA can't decipher. Developing two products, one with less secure
|
|
exportable encryption, would lead to costly duplication of effort, so even
|
|
software developed for sale in this country doesn't offer maximum
|
|
security. There is also a legitimate concern that software companies will
|
|
simply set up branches outside of this country to avoid the export
|
|
restrictions, costing American jobs.
|
|
The lack of widespread commercial encryption products means that it will
|
|
be very easy for the federal government to set its own standard--the
|
|
Clipper Chip standard. As you may know, the government's Clipper Chip
|
|
initiative is designed to set an encryption standard where the government
|
|
holds the keys to our private conversations. Together with the Digital
|
|
Telephony bill, which is aimed at making our telephone and computer
|
|
networks "wiretap-friendly," the Clipper Chip marks a dramatic new effort
|
|
on the part of the government to prevent us from being able to engage in
|
|
truly private conversations.
|
|
We've been fighting Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony in the policy arena
|
|
and will continue to do so. But there's another way to fight those
|
|
initiatives, and that's to make sure that powerful alternative encryption
|
|
technologies are in the hands of any citizen who wants to use them. The
|
|
government hopes that, by pushing the Clipper Chip in every way short of
|
|
explicitly banning alternative technologies, it can limit your choices for
|
|
secure communications.
|
|
---
|
|
Here's what you can do:
|
|
I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
|
|
Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
|
|
your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
|
|
deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
|
|
of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
|
|
on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
|
|
a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
|
|
Subject header.*
|
|
This is the first step in a larger campaign to counter the efforts of
|
|
those who would restrict our ability to speak freely and with privacy.
|
|
Please stay tuned--we'll continue to inform you of things you can do to
|
|
promote the removal of restrictions on encryption.
|
|
In the meantime, you can make your voice heard--it's as easy as e-mail.
|
|
Write to cantwell@eff.org today.
|
|
---
|
|
If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
|
|
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
|
|
The text of the Cantwell bill can be found with the any of the following
|
|
URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
|
|
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
|
|
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
|
|
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
|
|
---
|
|
[The Electronic Frontier Foundation is one of the most-effective spokes-
|
|
groups for online civil-liberties that I know of in Washingtoontown, and
|
|
Berman is one of the most effective DC advocates for such issues. --jim]
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|
ONLY IN AMERIKA: CRYPTOIDS' COMIC RELIEF IN THE FED-SNOOP AND GOV-PEEP GAME
|
|
From washofc!banisar@uu5.psi.com Wed Feb 16 12:08:21 1994
|
|
Organization: CPSR Washington Office
|
|
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
|
|
To: CPSR Civil Liberties Group <cpsr-civilliberties@Pa.dec.com>
|
|
Big Brother Inside Logo
|
|
A parody of the Intel's Logo modified for the Clipper Chip is now available
|
|
for use for stickers, posters, brochures etc. The Big Brother Inside
|
|
graphic files are now available at the CPSR Internet Archive -
|
|
ftp/gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/crypto/clipper
|
|
big_brother_inside_sticker.ps (postscript-scale to fit your project)
|
|
big_brother_inside_logo.gif (Color GIF - good startup/background screen)
|
|
big_brother_inside_picts_info.txt (Info on the files)
|
|
The files have also been uploaded to America Online in the Mac Telecom and
|
|
Graphic Arts folders.
|
|
big_brother_inside_sticker.ps is a generic postscript file, created in
|
|
CorelDraw. The postscript image lies landscape on the page, and consists
|
|
of the intel-logo's ``swoosh'' and crayon-like lettering on the inside.
|
|
This design was originally created for the sticker project: the image was
|
|
screened onto transparent stickers 1" square for the purpose of applying
|
|
them to future clipper-chip products. (cdodhner@indirect.com was in charge
|
|
of that project; as far as I know he's still distributing them for a small
|
|
donation to cover printing & mailing costs).
|
|
The design was created by Matt Thomlinson <phantom@u.washington.edu>
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: 18 Feb 94 15:23:33 EST
|
|
From: Mark Lloyd <73670.57@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
|
Subject: File 6--Clipper Questions and Answers in a Nutshell
|
|
|
|
Clipper Q and A
|
|
By W. Mark Lloyd
|
|
|
|
WHAT IS THE CLIPPER CHIP?
|
|
|
|
The Clipper chip is an encryption chip using an algorithm called
|
|
Skipjack. The Skipjack algorithm was developed by the National
|
|
Security Agency (NSA) for the National Institute of Standards and
|
|
Technology (NIST). Data encrypted using the Skipjack algorithm can be
|
|
decrypted using a secret process that requires two separate keys.
|
|
These keys would be escrowed separately by NIST and the Department of
|
|
Treasury. Under the plan, a law enforcement agency would require a
|
|
court order to get the two keys that would have to be combined to
|
|
decrypt a transmission generated with a Clipper chip.
|
|
|
|
HOW DOES THE SKIPJACK ALGORITHM DO THIS?
|
|
|
|
Encryption algorithms use numbers called keys that are like
|
|
combinations to a lock. Messages are encrypted and decrypted much the
|
|
same as locks are locked and unlocked. The key to any Clipper encoded
|
|
message is itself encrypted using a key derived from two other keys
|
|
that are stored separately. The encrypted key and a number that
|
|
identifies the chip that sent the message are then encrypted with
|
|
another key that is common to many other chips. All of this is sent
|
|
along with the encrypted original message. This is done so if a law
|
|
enforcement agency wants to decrypt a message the process can be
|
|
reversed: The outer portion of the encrypted key is decrypted to get
|
|
the number that identifies the unit that sent the message. This is
|
|
used to obtain the two separate escrowed keys that are then combined
|
|
to decrypt the session key that allows the original message to be
|
|
decrypted.
|
|
|
|
Let s look at another way. You have the session key S, the key E
|
|
derived from the two escrowed keys, the family key F, the message M
|
|
and the chip identification number C. It s all put together like
|
|
this: (M encrypted with key S)+(((S encrypted with key E) C
|
|
)encrypted with F)
|
|
|
|
IS THE SYSTEM SECURE?
|
|
|
|
If everything goes right, according to the a panel of five
|
|
cryptography experts who have reviewed it.
|
|
|
|
WHAT ALGORITHM DOES THE ACTUAL ENCRYPTION?
|
|
|
|
That is classified information.
|
|
|
|
BUT AREN'T GOOD ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS SECURE, EVEN WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS
|
|
WHAT THEY ARE, LIKE DES?
|
|
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
THEN WHY NOT JUST PUBLISH THE ALGORITHM?
|
|
|
|
The reasons cited are that compromising the algorithm would be
|
|
detrimental to national security. This means that secret techniques
|
|
are used in the algorithm.
|
|
|
|
SO A GOVERNMENT SECRET IS GOING TO BE IN THOUSANDS OF THESE CLIPPER
|
|
CHIPS SHIPPED ALL OVER THE WORLD?
|
|
|
|
That's the plan.
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SO IF SOMEONE FIGURES OUT HOW TO GET THE ALGORITHM FROM THE CLIPPER
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CHIPS, OUR NATIONAL SECURITY COULD BE COMPROMISED?
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If you follow the NSA's logic, yes.
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Law enforcement officials are going to be using the algorithm and the
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family key many time to get unit identification numbers. Let s say
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that the algorithm is leaked. Or one of the black boxes that will be
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used to decrypt the chips is compromised and the algorithm and family
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keys are generally known? What will happens then?
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The algorithm could be subject to tampering. From our explanation in
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question two we would go from this: (M encrypted with key S)+(((S
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encrypted with key E) C )encrypted with F) to this (M encrypted with
|
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key S)+(S encrypted with key E) C. This would leave the chip number
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|
open to tampering. Also in theory it would allow a steady attack on
|
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the key E, that would compromise the unit. This attack is
|
|
theoretically better than attacking a message without the law
|
|
enforment field, but even if the key S is known (by getting someone
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with a chip with to send you a message with a key you have negotiated)
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|
it would still be difficult with today s computer power. In any case
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|
anyone with anything to hide wouldn t use a Clipper chip for
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|
transmissions they wanted to keep secret from law enforcement
|
|
authorities.
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|
MOST ENCRYPTION IS DONE WITH SOFTWARE. CAN THE SKIPJACK ALGORITHM BE
|
|
USED IN SOFTWARE ENCRYPTING SYSTEMS?
|
|
|
|
No. The nature of the Skipjack algorithm makes it only useful if it
|
|
is released in a special tamper proof chip.
|
|
|
|
SO THE ALGORITHM IS ONLY USEFUL FOR APPLICATIONS THAT CAN USE HARDWARE
|
|
ENCRYPTION?
|
|
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
WHAT IF I WANT TO ENCRYPT A MESSAGE WITH A REALLY SECURE ALGORITHM
|
|
BEFORE IT IS ENCRYPTED BY A CLIPPER CHIP?
|
|
|
|
That would be a simple and obvious way to get around the Clipper chip.
|
|
|
|
BUT ISN'T MOST ENCRYPTION CURRENTLY DONE USING SOFTWARE ON GENERAL
|
|
PURPOSE MICROPROCESSORS?
|
|
|
|
Yes.
|
|
|
|
IS CLIPPER GOING TO BE EASIER TO EXPORT THAN DES?
|
|
|
|
According to the Clinton administration, yes.
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|
|
|
IS THERE A FOREIGN MARKET FOR CLIPPER ENCRYPTION DEVICES?
|
|
|
|
For there to be a market there needs to be a reason for foreign
|
|
purchasers to prefer Skipjack or Clipper technology to currently
|
|
available algorithms. This has not been shown to be true. There a
|
|
report in the British press that the NSA has a representative in
|
|
London that is lobbying European governments to adopt the Clipper
|
|
chip.
|
|
|
|
WHAT IF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SPY ON THEIR OWN CITIZENS, WILL
|
|
WE GIVE THEM THE KEYS TO DO THIS?
|
|
|
|
Good question.
|
|
|
|
What if a foreign government allows the importation of Clipper chips,
|
|
but only if they get the keys first? Would we be responsible for
|
|
their abuse?
|
|
|
|
That question has not been answered yet.
|
|
|
|
If we only give them the key when they ask, what if we suspect the
|
|
keys they want are to spy on a political adversay. What if a foreign
|
|
government decides to make an issue of us not giving them the keys to
|
|
a Clipper chip we sold them? How will we deal with this?
|
|
|
|
We would be in a no win situation.
|
|
|
|
WILL THE NSA GET THE KEYS TO SKIPJACK UNITS THAT ARE EXPORTED?
|
|
|
|
Government officials have said to some people that the NSA will not
|
|
get these keys. NSA has not yet said this on the record.
|
|
|
|
HAVE ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT THE COMPUTER HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
|
|
INDUSTRIES ASKED FOR A NEW ALGORITHM TO EXPORT?
|
|
|
|
No. Both the Software Publishing Association and the American
|
|
Electronics Association, along with other industry groups, have asked
|
|
that the DES algorithm be made available for easy export. The DES
|
|
algorithm is already available all over the world. DES is classified
|
|
as a munition by the US government and cannot be exported easily.
|
|
|
|
THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ON FEBRUARY 4 SPOKE ABOUT THE
|
|
PROBLEM OF "TERRORISTS, DRUG DEALERS, AND OTHER CRIMINALS" USING
|
|
ENCRYPTION. WILL THE CLIPPER CHIP DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT THESE PEOPLE
|
|
FROM USING NON-ESCROWED ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES?
|
|
|
|
No. These prople will be able to encrypt with whatever algorithm they
|
|
want.
|
|
|
|
ARE THERE OTHER WAYS OF ESCROWING KEYS VOLUNTARILY, FOR GOVERNMENTAL
|
|
AND BANKING NEEDS THAT REQUIRE BOTH CONFIDENTIALITY AND
|
|
ACCOUNTABILITY?
|
|
|
|
Yes. There is work being done now on techniques that allow much more
|
|
flexible ways of voluntarily escrowing keys.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
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End of Computer Underground Digest #6.17
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************************************
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