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Computer underground Digest Sun June 06 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 41
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senrio
CONTENTS, #5.41 (June 06 1993)
File 1-- LODCOM@ Mail Bounces Fixed --
File 2-- CuD (and other stuff) for Non-Internet readers
File 3-- A New public CU BBS in Southern Italy
File 4-- Sending E-Mail to Clinton and Gore
File 5-- Electronic fingerprinting of welfare recipients in CA
File 6-- Email "Etiquette"
File 7-- Microstate: Old Empires and New (New Repub. Reprint)
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
60115.
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
nodes and points welcome.
EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
unless absolutely necessary.
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
violate copyright protections.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 04 June 1993 22:51:01 EDT
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
Subject: File 1--LODCOM@ Mail Bounces Fixed --
CuD 5.39 ran a special issue describing the LOD's ambitious project of
"hacker" BBSes in the 1980s. We received a number of inquiries about
bounced mail back from lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com. Mindvox upgrade of
mail services created a temporary snag. We're informed that mail that
seemed to bounce in fact arrived, so those inquiring about LOD's "BBS
History Project" should have received a response by now.
For more information on the LOD project, including what files are
currently available and the price list for each, contact them directly
at lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 02 Jun 1993 19:32:57 -0600
From: af814@FREENET.HSC.COLORADO.EDU(ERIC PAUL)
Subject: File 2--CuD (and other stuff) for Non-Internet readers
My name is Eric Paul. I have received your fine publication
since midway through volume 4. I have decided to give
something back to the "Underground" community for all the
service that you have given me. I run The SpellBook BBS here
in Plainville, Mass. We run at 14.4 v.32b v.42b. I have all of
Volume 5 available for download in a no-ratio area. I also
support FREQ in Fidonet, Chateaunet, and Maxnet. Anonymous/
unlisted systems are welcome. Please feel free to add my
information to your list of sources to try and take the load off
of some of the backbone FTP sites. Thanks again for such a fine
publication.
Eric Paul
BBS: 508/695-9656
Fido: 1:333/596
Chateau: 100:6100/101
Maxnet: 90:171/301
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 04 Jun 93 10:16:52 GMT
From: luc pac <LPACCAG@ITNCISTI.BITNET>
Subject: File 3--A New public CU BBS in Southern Italy
(MODERATORS' NOTE: Luciano has been working on setting up his system
in Southern Italy for the past few months, and it's just about set to
roll. As he reminded us, Italy is a relatively under-devopled country
and lacks the access to Internet, BBS, and other resources that many
of us take for granted. We wish him well in providing a public site
for information in his part of the world)).
I'm glad to let you know: I have set up a public BBS exclusively
dedicated to the computer underground and counter-cultural issues. You
can connect and download stuff such as CuD, Phrack, EFF's bulletins,
'zines, academy papers, SPUNK Press writings, and the like.
Furthermore, there are a few echo conferences about cyberpunk and
libertarian/anarchistic issues.
It is NOT a H/P BBS. Its archive is meant to be used by any kind of
people: H/P community as well as scholars and researchers. I myself
am writing my final dissertation on CMC and the building of virtual
communities.
BITs Against The Empire BBS is cybernet and *fidonet* node
(2:333/412), and stuff can be downloaded via File/Request open to
everyone (points and unlisted nodes included). Because of my lack of
money/time, the system is *NOT* 24h. It is only open 23.00 to 7.15
local time -- that is GMT - 1 (NY should be six hours late, LA nine
hours).
I just thought it is interesting to you knowing that CuD can be found
outside the Internet in South Europe.
The BBS number is: +39-461-980493
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 04 June 1993 22:51:01 EDT
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
Subject: File 4--Sending E-Mail to Clinton and Gore
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of Presidential Correspondence
++++++++++++++++++
For Immediate Release June 1, 1993
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
IN ANNOUNCEMENT OF WHITE HOUSE ELECTRONIC MAIL ACCESS
Dear Friends:
Part of our commitment to change is to keep the White House in
step with today's changing technology. As we move ahead into the
twenty-first century, we must have a government that can show the way
and lead by example. Today, we are pleased to announce that for the
first time in history, the White House will be connected to you via
electronic mail. Electronic mail will bring the Presidency and this
Administration closer and make it more accessible to the people.
The White House will be connected to the Internet as well as
several on-line commercial vendors, thus making us more accessible and
more in touch with people across this country. We will not be alone
in this venture. Congress is also getting involved, and an exciting
announcement regarding electronic mail is expected to come from the
House of Representatives tomorrow.
Various government agencies also will be taking part in the near
future. Americans Communicating Electronically is a project developed
by several government agencies to coordinate and improve access to the
nation's educational and information assets and resources. This will
be done through interactive communications such as electronic mail,
and brought to people who do not have ready access to a computer.
However, we must be realistic about the limitations and
expectations of the White House electronic mail system. This
experiment is the first-ever e-mail project done on such a large
scale. As we work to reinvent government and streamline our
processes, the e-mail project can help to put us on the leading edge
of progress.
Initially, your e-mail message will be read and receipt
immediately acknowledged. A careful count will be taken on the number
received as well as the subject of each message. However, the White
House is not yet capable of sending back a tailored response via
electronic mail. We are hoping this will happen by the end of the
year.
A number of response-based programs which allow technology to
help us read your message more effectively, and, eventually respond to
you electronically in a timely fashion will be tried out as well.
These programs will change periodically as we experiment with the best
way to handle electronic mail from the public. Since this has never
been tried before, it is important to allow for some flexibility in
the system in these first stages. We welcome your suggestions.
This is an historic moment in the White House and we look forward
to your participation and enthusiasm for this milestone event. We
eagerly anticipate the day when electronic mail from the public is an
integral and normal part of the White House communications system.
President Clinton Vice President Gore
PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV VICE.PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 23 May 1993 11:33:44 -0700
From: "James I. Davis" <jdav@WELL.SF.CA.US>
Subject: File 5--Electronic fingerprinting of welfare recipients in CA
I spoke on Thursday (5/13) at a hearing before the San Francisco
Social Services Commission regarding their plan to begin requiring
that welfare recipients submit to electronic fingerprinting as a
condition of receiving public assistance. I am sending out a copy
of my remarks (it's a rather long posting) under "separate cover."
Here is some background information on the issue:
I collected most of the data contained in my remarks from
interviews with various people, and some memos and press releases
from various agencies. I understand that there is a small piece in
a recent _Mother Jones_ about the experience in LA, which supports
the points I made in my remarks. I have a more pointed piece in
the CPSR/Berkeley newsletter if you are interested.
In June of 1991, Los Angeles County began requiring electronic
fingerprints as a condition of receiving General Assistance (GA).
GA is a state-mandated, county administered program for indigent
adults. The system is ostensibly designed to deter people from
receiving benefits under multiple names, although their are many
aspects of the system that could bear more serious scrutiny than
it has received to date.
LA is spending some $9.4 million over five years on the Automated
Fingerprint Image Reporting and Match System (AFIRM), AFIRM was
developed by computer services giant Electronic Data Systems. In
February of this year, Alameda County started using the system, at
an estimated cost of $1.3 million. San Francisco is currently
considering adopting the system. The Department of Social Services
says it will cost $1 million to implement, but I think that is
low. The AFIRM proposal was approved by the SF Social Services
Commission on May 13, and the matter now goes to the SF Board of
Supervisors, who must approve a change in the ordinance governing
GA, to include the fingerprinting requirement. The next step will
be a hearing before one or more committees (perhaps Willie
Kennedy's on social policy, and/or the finance committee), most
likely in early June.
Any suggestions for questions about the system will be very
helpful, especially questions about technical, privacy and
security issues. It is clear that SF plans to link the system up
with other counties and share data with them regularly. Also if
you have any expertise on fingerprinting and law enforcement, I
need some info on that.
The AFIRM system only makes sense if it is installed on as wide a
basis, and for as many public assistance programs as possible. On
the other hand, the more counties that refuse to participate, the
less likely it will be to take root. I think that there is an
opportunity to stop it at the SF Board of Supervisors...
Jim D.
++++++++++++++++++++++=
STATEMENT BEFORE THE SAN FRANCISCO SOCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION
REGARDING THE AFIRM SYSTEM
My name is Jim Davis, and I live at 414 Chestnut Street in San
Francisco. I am here in two capacities, first, as a San Francisco
resident and taxpayer, and second, as the western regional
director for Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
(CPSR). Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a
national public-interest alliance of computer scientists,
engineers, users and others interested in the impact of computer
technology on society. We work to influence decisions regarding
the development and use of computers because those decisions have
far-reaching consequences and reflect basic values and priorities.
CPSR has 500 members in the Bay Area.
Fingerprinting of people as a requirement for receiving General
Assistance (GA) benefits is a bad idea, for several reasons:
* the proposed system is unnecessary;
* its use cannot be justified for the reasons put forward by the
Department of Social Services;
* it shifts resources from providing benefits to expanding the
welfare bureaucracy;
* the costs of the system have most likely been understated, and
the benefits overstated;
* it is fraught with risks for people who receive welfare;
* it is an affront to anyone who must rely on welfare;
* it sets a dangerous precedent for everyone who receives any kind
of government assistance;
* it sends a false message to San Franciscans about welfare.
Please allow me to elaborate.
THE SYSTEM IS UNNECESSARY.
The proposed Automated Fingerprint Image Reporting and Match
System (AFIRM) is unnecessary. AFIRM is intended to deter fraud by
preventing GA recipients from signing up under more than one name.
However, current policy requires people to provide a state ID card
or driver's license to DSS before they can receive GA. According
to Bill Madison, an information officer with the Department of
Motor Vehicles, it is extremely difficult to obtain identification
under more than one name. DMV personnel are trained to identify
false documentation. Suspicious requests for ID are passed along
to their security unit, which can utilize their database of
digital fingerprints and photographs to determine if a duplicate
request has been made. That is, the checks against maintaining
more than one identity are already in place. The AFIRM system is
redundant, and duplicates government resources. As such, it is a
waste of our money.
AFIRM'S USE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED FOR THE REASONS GIVEN BY DSS.
AFIRM's use cannot be justified for the reasons put forward by the
Department of Social Services. The rationale for installing AFIRM
is not to detect fraud per se. In fact, Alameda County, which
began using the AFIRM system in early February, is about 80% done
with fingerprinting of existing GA clients. With approximately
9,000 GA cases processed, only six matches have been found, and
none of those matches were cases of fraudulent behavior. The
stated purpose of AFIRM, rather, is to deter alleged fraud by
driving away people who would "double-dip" in the GA program.
From Alameda County's experience, in fact the caseload has dropped
by 147 cases since the system was implemented. But without any
data as to why the caseload dropped, it is spurious logic at best
to assert that fraud has been rooted out. Much more likely reasons
for the caseload drop are missed appointments, perhaps because of
lost or missed mail; fears about being fingerprinted; concerns
about privacy; or the inevitable problems of processing 11,000
cases. A 98.5% rate of success in processing would be admirable in
most quality assurance managers' book; but the other 1.5% that are
failures could still account for all of the dropped cases.
In fact any substantial change in case-handling could result in a
drop in cases, of people who are entitled to receive benefits. I
have yet to see any data to substantiate the claim that AFIRM has
deterred fraud. All that can be said is that AFIRM is an
expensive, additional obstacle to receiving GA, and that its use
coincides with a reduction in caseloads. However, the purpose of
AFIRM is not to reduce caseloads, and any other goals of using the
system cannot be proven with currently available data. That makes
AFIRM an expensive, long-term "maybe."
AFIRM SHIFTS RESOURCES FROM SERVICES TO BUREAUCRACY.
AFIRM represents additional costs in GA administration, with no
rise in the benefits pool. As such, it means that the ratio of
administration-to-benefits has gone up; that is, new
inefficiencies are built into the welfare system. Computers are
not a magic solution, and additional infrastructure is required to
install and maintain hardware and software, and train users and
adjust office procedure. Inflating bureaucracy at the expense of
services-provided is not a wise use of taxpayer money.
THE COSTS OF THE SYSTEM HAVE MOST LIKELY BEEN UNDERSTATED, AND THE
BENEFITS OVERSTATED.
In his letter to Mayor Frank Jordan, DSS General Manager Brian
Cahill wrote that the system "would cost in the neighborhood of $1
million over a 5 year period. Our costs would be based on hardware
and the number of cases on GA." Yet Alameda County estimates that
the same system there will cost $1.3 million over a five year
period. San Francisco's case load is 50% higher that Alameda's,
meaning that the anticipated cost to San Francisco could be twice
Cahill's estimate. In addition, adopting new systems mean many
hidden costs: inefficiencies while adopting a new system, staff
frustration on the learning curve, lost time due to re-processing
cases that were erroneously closed, etc. Such costs could further
inflate the $2 million price tag. Furthermore, if data-sharing
begins with other counties, additional administrative resources
will be required. The dollar costs need to be examined very
carefully.
Likewise, the alleged savings from using the system could bear
more serious scrutiny. For example, Cahill asserts that Alameda
County saved $360,000 in four months by discontinuing 35 cases.
Cahill is claiming savings that would be realized over a three
year period in the first few months. It's dubious accounting to
claim all of the benefits before they are actually realized. A
more honest accounting using Cahill's figures would be to say that
the $21,000 per month system saved $11,000 a month. Using the
latest Alameda figure of 147 cases dropped, the system appears to
begin to pay for itself. But one must ask, how many of those
dropped cases will be reopened, torpedoing the inflated benefits
of the AFIRM system? In addition, the largest drop in cases will
most likely happen during the changeover period, so projections
should not be based on an initial rate of dropping caseloads. To
reassert, the claimed savings should not be taken at face value.
AFIRM IS FRAUGHT WITH RISKS TO GA RECIPIENTS.
DSS has assured the Mayor's office that AFIRM fingerprint
information will not be shared with police agencies. The AFIRM and
police computer systems are distinct, and department policy
forbids sharing of information. However, such assurances are not,
and cannot be enough. First, the line between social services and
law enforcement is becoming increasingly blurred. The stated
rationale for the fingerprinting system is in fact a law
enforcement one -- to prevent criminal activity. DSS already works
closely with the District Attorney's office in investigating
alleged fraud. Information is shared between the agencies; and
whether it is the fingerprint itself or information derived from
fingerprint searches, the protestations that data sharing will not
take place are seriously weakened.
"Unofficial" use of the data poses additional problems. Data
stored on a computer is much more prone to unauthorized
duplication, modification, and transmission than its low-tech
counterparts. And such problems are even more likely in the
absence of a thought-out policy regarding the security of computer
records. Does DSS have a computer security policy? Who will have
access to the fingerprint information? What audit trail will be
maintained regarding changes to data on the system? Is DSS taking
into account where technology will be five years from now, as
equipment costs will most assuredly drop, and computing search
power will grow. Access issues will continue to grow in
complexity.
Furthermore, I have been told of cases in recent history where
zealous DSS employees have shared information with police, against
stated department policy. Local newspapers have reported on police
officers keeping duplicate sets of police data on their home
computers, against policy. And I'm sure that you are all aware of
the current case of former police inspector Tom Gerard, who is
charged with stealing confidential police files and suspected of
selling the information to other agencies and even to other
governments. The point is that once data assumes a digital format,
it tends to persist in computer systems, and to leak about. One
must carefully weigh the questionable benefits of AFIRM against
the potential abuse of the system, and the loss of privacy for GA
recipients. The simplest solution in this case is not to collect
the information in the first place.
AFIRM IS AN AFFRONT TO ANYONE ON WELFARE.
The AFIRM system is based on a presumption of guilt. That is,
unless you confirm your innocence of not double-dipping, you are
assumed to be guilty of it. This contravenes a basic
constitutional principle.
AFIRM SETS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR ANYONE RECEIVING GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE.
If AFIRM takes root in San Francisco, it will continue to spread
to other counties, and to other government programs. Social
service administrators have made it clear that they intend to
extend the reach of the AFIRM system. Other counties in the Bay
Area have considered adopting it for their GA programs. More
ominous, Los Angeles will begin in June a $21 million pilot
program to quadruple the reach of the program to include people
receiving assistance from the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. Alameda County is rumored to be exploring
the same thing, and who knows, it may be under discussion in San
Francisco. But why stop the program there? Anyone receiving any
kind of government support, from social security to veterans
benefits to income tax deductions could be equally culpable of
defrauding the government. Why not fingerprint them before
providing support. Who knows where it would end? This is a bad
precedent being tested on a vulnerable group of San Franciscans.
AFIRM SENDS A FALSE MESSAGE ABOUT WELFARE.
It shouldn't need to bear repeating, but being poor is not a
crime. Yet the law enforcement aura surrounding fingerprinting is
inescapable. Last year, for example, the Wall Street Journal
reported that airport officials, looking for a way to speed people
through immigration at Kennedy Airport, decided not to use
fingerprinting technology to match people with their passports.
"We didn't want to get into fingerprints because of law
enforcement connotations," said Richard Norton, the Air Transport
Association's senior director of facilitation. Requiring
fingerprinting for receiving benefits reinforces an all-too-common
perception of criminality. This is a divisive message to send to
San Franciscans about General Assistance.
For the reasons just stated, I repeat that the AFIRM system is a
bad idea, and I urge you to decide against its implementation.
Thank you for your patience.
Jim Davis
414 Chestnut Street
San Francisco, CA 94133
(415) 398-2818
May 13, 1993
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 16:07:27 EDT
From: Jerry Leichter <leichter@LRW.COM>
Subject: File 6--Email "Etiquette"
I thought you might find the following interesting for historical
value. Some things haven't changed much since 1984, but some have.
In particular, while the general ideas in this posting area as much
part of the net gestalt now as they were 9 years ago, what I find
striking is the change in tone. There's no feeling of a flame war
ready to break out at any moment, and in fact there is only a single
reference to "flames", and that in a context somewhat different form
contemporary usage. For me, it was a bit of a walk down memory lane;
the style and tone were very familiar, but hearing them again made
clear how the world has changed.
-- Jerry
Date--Mon, 17 May 93 10:47:44 -0400
From--John Robinson <jr@ksr.com>
Sender--jr@ksr.com
To--silent-tristero@Think.COM
Subject--an impressive show
+------- Start of forwarded message -------
From--cmb
Subject--[deg@wise1.tau.ac.il--Re--Email "Etiquette"]
Date--Mon, 17 May 93 10:01:48 EDT
I hope enough of this 1984 Lisp-based humor is still funny in a 1993
Unix-centered world. Note that the mail reading and composing
software was much more complex than today and that users often used
multiple fonts (some of their own creation) in messages. Bug reports
automatically included a stack backtrace and the values of all
arguments and local variables along with the version and patch level
of all software.
From--David Goldfarb <deg@wise1.tau.ac.il>
To--Tom McMahon <tlm@triple-i.com>
Cc--The-Usual-Suspects@triple-i.com
Subject--Re--Email "Etiquette"
Date--Fri 14-May-93 14:37:49 IST
Years and years ago there was a rather facetious Email "etiquette" file
floating around. CWR seems to remember it having possibly been
authored by BSG. If anyone knows its whereabouts could you please send
me a copy?
I knew my old "humor.mai" file would come in useful some day :-)
I've decided that this is such an important message for our time that
it should be forwarded to the whole list. Enjoy!
Please note the following line from Bernie's message:
"Inclusion of very old messages from others makes for an impressive show."
David
Date--Friday, 13 April 1984, 16:16-EST
From--Bernard S. Greenberg <BSG at SCRC-TENEX>
Subject--Mail Style
To--fun at SCRC-TENEX
(For those of of you who have read this already, MLB has just made
a substantial contribution of the highest quality to this file,
and you should read it again from the string "MLB" on.)
Based upon recent discussions of proper etiquette and style in
electronic mail, I have prepared a [satiric] document on the subject.
SCRC:<BSG>MAIL-STYLE.TEXT
============= S:>BSG>Mail-Style.text inserted 10/16/85 ==============
Proposed Symbolics guidelines for mail messages
BSG 4/11/84
It is impermissible to use the term "EMAIL".
Mail should be at least a mixture of upper and lower case. Devising
your own font (Devanagari, pinhead graphics, etc.) and using it in the
mail is a good entertainment tactic, as is finding some way to use
existing obscure fonts.
Sending the mail from Unix is frowned upon (although this has gotten
much better).
It is customary to attack the someone by including his or her message,
indented (unless you are using MM), and replying point by point, as
someone debating someone they are watching on TV, or hearing on the
radio.
It is considered artful to append many messages on a subject, leaving
only the most inflammatory lines from each, and reply to all in one
swift blow. The choice of lines to support your argument can make or
break your case.
Replying to one's own message is a rarely-exposed technique for
switching positions once you have thought about something only after
sending mail.
State opinions in the syntax of fact: "...as well as the bug in LMFS
where you have to expunge directories to get rid of files....."
If you have nothing to say on a subject, replying with a line such as
"I agree with this." puts you in the TO:'s for all future messages,
and establishes you as "one who really cares", if not an actual
expert, on the topic at hand.
Inclusion of very old messages from others makes for an impressive
show.
The choice of a subject line is of supreme importance. It should be
concise and witty. The subject line has to survive once the discussion
has diverged far past the original subject. Remember "Hewitt AP0"?
Oblique allusion to past famous subject lines is one of the best
techniques for generating subjects. So is any reference to drawings of
B. Kliban.
People can be set wondering by loading obscure personal patchable
systems, and sending bug reports. Who would not stop and wonder upon
seeing "Experimental TD80-TAPE 1.17, MegaDeath 2.5..."? The same
for provocatively-named functions and variables in stack traces.
Know the list of "large, chronic problems". If there is any problem
with the window system, blame it on the activity system. Any lack of
user functionality should be attributed to the lack of a command
processor. A surprisingly large number of people will believe that you
have thought in depth about the issue to which you are alluding when
you do.
Know how to blow any problem up into insolubility. Know how to use
the phrase "The new %A system" to insult its argument, e.g., "I guess
this destructuring LET thing is fixed in the new Lisp system", or
better yet, PROLOG.
Never hit someone head on, always sideswipe. Never say, "Foo's last
patch was brain-damaged", but rather, "While fixing the miscellaneous
bugs in 243.xyz [foo's patch], I found...."
You get 3 opportunities to advertise your Rock band, no more.
Idiosyncratic indentations, double-spacing, capitalization, etc.,
while stamps of individuality, leave one an easy target for parody.
Strong language gets results. "The reloader is completely broken
in 242" will open a lot more eyes than "The reloader doesn't
load files with intermixed spaces, asterisks, and <'s in their names
that are bigger than 64K". You can always say the latter in a later
paragraph.
The entire life, times, collected works, expressions, and modalities
of Zippy the Pinhead are a common ground for much of the metaphor,
rhetoric, and invective which pass daily through the mail. An occasional
parenthetical "yow" CORRECTLY USED will endear one to the senior
systems staff. So will puns and other remarks addressed directly
to the point.
+------------------------------------------------------------
MLB volunteered the following, 4/13/84
Including a destination in the CC list that will cause the recipients'
mailer to blow out is a good way to stifle dissent.
When replying, it is often possible to cleverly edit the original
message in such a way as to subtly alter its meaning or tone to your
advantage while appearing that you are taking pains to preserve the
author's intent. As a bonus, it will seem that your superior
intellect is cutting through all the excess verbiage to the very heart
of the matter.
Referring to undocumented private communications allows one to claim
virtually anything: "we discussed this idea in our working group last
year, and concluded that it was totally brain-damaged".
Points are awarded for getting the last word in. Drawing the
conversation out so long that the original message disappears due to
being indented off the right hand edge of the screen is one way to do
this. Another is to imply that anyone replying further is a hopeless
cretin and is wasting everyone's valuable time.
Keeping a secret "Hall Of Flame" file of people's mail indiscretions,
or copying messages to private mailing lists for subsequent derision,
is good fun and also a worthwhile investment in case you need to
blackmail the senders later.
Users should cultivate an ability to make the simplest molehill into a
mountain by finding controversial interpretations of innocuous
sounding statements that the sender never intended or imagined.
Obversely, a lot of verbal mileage can also be gotten by sending out
incomprehensible, cryptic, confusing or unintelligible messages, and
then iteratively "correcting" the "mistaken interpretations" in the
replys.
Electronic mail is an indispensable component of the automated office.
Besides providing entertainment, it gives one the appearance of
engaging in industrious and technically sophisticated activity. By
flaming constantly on numerous mailing lists, one can be assured of a
ready supply of makework as well as an opportunity to establish one's
reputation amongst the "literati".
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1993 20:42 CDT
From: <BOEHLEFELD@WISCSSC.BITNET>
Subject: File 7--Microstate: Old Empires and New (New Repub. Reprint)
((MODERATORS' NOTE: In the year 2250, some enterprising social
scientist might compare the political systems of constitutional
democracy and Gatesean democratic technocracy and come up with the
following typology):
| > "MicroState: Old Empires and New" by Douglas Coupland, in
| > _The New Republic_, June 7, 1993.
| >
| > ==============================================================
| > Constitutional Democracy | Microsoft
| > ===================================+==========================
| > born in 18th c. France | born in
| > and the United States | 1970s Seattle
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > People of a common culture | People of a common culture
| > ruling a common territory | ruling a common industry
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > constitutions | MS-DOS
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > self-determination | compelling applications
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > freedom | Windows
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > obsolete monarchies and empires | IBM
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > tricoteuses | the media
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > "Let them eat cake" | "The PC will never catch on"
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > Protestant individualism | loner nerds
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > enlightenment | microprocessors
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > secularism | no wardrobe restrictions
| > | at the office
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > the rise of science | software upgrades
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > rationalism | Mr. Spock worship
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > Boston Tea Party | Starbuck's coffee addiction
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > radicals | cyberpunks
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > civil liberties pioneers | hackers
| > -----------------------------------|-----------------------------------
| > preceded industrialism | precedes post-industrialism
| > ==============================================================
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.41
************************************

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