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813 lines
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Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 31, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 54
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth / Ralph Sims
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Copy Editor: Etaion Shrdleaux, Sr.
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CONTENTS, #4.54 (Oct 31, 1992)
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File 1--Two New Shadows
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File 2--Some comments on NBC Dateline's "Hacker" Segment
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File 3--Transcript of DATELINE NBC: ARE YOUR SECRETS SAFE
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File 4--Somebody gets access to freeway callbox codes, runs up bill
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be
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contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at:
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Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on Genie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under
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"computing newsletters;" on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; in
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Europe from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893; and using
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anonymous FTP on the Internet from ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in
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/pub/cud, red.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.91) in /cud, halcyon.com
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(192.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2)
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in /pub/text/CuD. Back issues also may be obtained from the mail
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server at mailserv@batpad.lgb.ca.us.
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European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 20 Oct 1992 18:20:24 -0400
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From: Brendan Kehoe <brendan@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 1--Two New Shadows
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I'm pleased to announce the availability of two additional mirrors of
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the Computer Underground Digest archives. The main archive at
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ftp.eff.org is now replicated by:
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IN THE US:
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red.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.91) in /cud(Michigan)
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halcyon.com (192.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud(Washington)
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IN AUSTRALIA:
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ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD
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All three are exact copies of the archives stored on the EFF's machine.
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Please save the bandwidth and visit the site closest to you.
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A shadow in Europe or Scandinavia would also help (there's a lot of
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interest from people in Finland, Sweden, Great Britain, and Germany
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particularly).
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Brendan Kehoe
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cudarch@eff.org
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 31 Oct 92 16:11:58 CST
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From: Jim Thomas <well@sf.ca.us>
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Subject: File 2--Some comments on NBC Dateline's "Hacker" Segment
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About a month ago, Susan Adams, producer of NBC's Dateline called me.
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She indicated that Dateline was going to do a story on hackers, and
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she wanted to know how many "hacker busts" had gone to court. She
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limited the term "hacker" to teenaged computer intruders, and did not
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seem interested in the more serious crimes of professional
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criminals who ply their trade with computers or with computer abusers
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who prey on their employers. Suspecting a pre-defined slant to the
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story, I attempted to make it clear that, despite increased visibility
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of attention to computer abuse, there have been relatively few
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indictments. Operation Sun Devil, I explained, was mostly smoke and
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served more to dramatize "hacker activity" far more than its success
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in apprehending them. I provided some basic background in the Sun
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Devil, Len Rose, and Phrack cases, some of which she seemed to know.
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I emphasized the civil rights issues, the complexity of the "hacker
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phenomenon," and the hyperbole of law enforcement and media that
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distorts the nature of the problem and thereby obstructs solutions.
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At some length I attempted to explain the problem of media
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sensationalism, the problems of balancing Constitutional rights with
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legitimate law enforcement interests and the potential for abuse that
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created by an imbalance, and the need for responsible and incisive
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reporting by the media. Ms. Adams indicated that she had talked to
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Mike Godwin of the EFF, who I presumed would have told her the same
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thing, and others who claimed to have been contacted by Dateline staff
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indicated that they, too, cautioned against sensationalism. Believing
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that NBC would like to think that its quality of programming exceeds
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that of Geraldo's "Now it can be Told" (See CuD #3.37 special issue on
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"Mad Hacker's Key Party"), I anticipated a balanced, accurate, and
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non-sensationalized depiction of "hackers." To paraphrase H.L.
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Mencken, nobody ever went broke underestimating the accuracy of tv
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tabloid journalism. The program that aired on Tuesday, October 27,
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1992, could have been worse, but that's hardly a sound way to evaluate
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a program.
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The teaser to the "Are Your Secrets Safe" segment framed the story
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around the potential dangers that "hackers" pose: They can wipe-out
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your bank account, crash the E911 system, and destroy the nation's
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telephone networks. In case we missed the point, footage from
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Sneaker's linked Ben Kingsly's scene, in which he discussed his mad
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scheme of "bringing down the whole damn system" with the activities of
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"hackers." The opening shot of a silhouetted young hacker identified
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only under the pseudonym "Quintin" bragging about his exploits
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reinforced the shadowy activities. Quintin demonstrated no skills,
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and other than simply assert that he had previously engaged in vague
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activities, his primary function on the show seemed to be little more
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than as a dramatic prop that enabled the producers to shape the mood
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of their recreation. Quintin may or may not be an arch-fiend, but he
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neither did nor said anything that established credibility. Even the
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screen shot of nic.ddn.mil and UFO information has a piscine
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smell--there was no evidence that it was anything more than a file
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readily obtained either by ftp or even (shades of Cliff Stoll) a file
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inserted in a computer system to trap intruders. Either way, the
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mystery of Quintin's identity seemed the message, and he provided
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nothing of any substance not known to anybody who roams the Internet.
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Brief interviews with Kent Alexander, the prosecutor in the "Atlanta
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3" case, and with Scott Ticer of BellSouth, elicited the
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corporate/law-enforcement view of hackers as dangerous criminals who
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should be prosecuted. For them, the issues are black and white,
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simple, and unequivocal. The solutions to the problem are clear, as
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the Atlanta Legion of Doom cases indicated: Put 'em in prison.
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The moderator, Jon Scott, then informed the audience that, to learn
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more about the hacker world, he went "underground." Dramatic
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terminology, but grossly inaccurate. To go "underground" presumably
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would mean hooking up with people surreptitiously involved in on-going
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intrusion who could clearly demonstrate how one might break into
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military computers, access and re-program the E911 system, or shift
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money from one bank account to another. Scott did none of this.
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Instead, he interviewed two former LoD participants, both of whom are
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visible and quite "above ground," and neither of whom demonstrated
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much of value, let alone anything that could be considered dangerous.
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Adam Grant, sentenced to a brief stint in Federal prison in the
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"Atlanta 3" case, and Scott Chasin, a former LoD participant who, with
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some LoD friends, were partners in ComSec, a short-lived computer
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security consulting firm, demonstrated a few "hacker tricks," but
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nothing that could even remotely be considered dangerous.
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Grant explained "trashing"--rummaging through trash to find useful
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information--to Scott. Grant took Scott to a BellSouth trashbin to
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illustrate how he used to trash. Although BellSouth presumably
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implemented policies requiring locks on trashbins, on one side of the
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bin the lock was unlocked and there was no lock on the other side. One
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presumes nothing of interest was found, or it would have become another
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prop in the show. In Hacker Crackdown, Bruce Sterling provides an
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account of his own trashing experience during a moment of boredom at a
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law enforcement computer security conference (pp. 197-202) that was
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far more interesting and produced far more detailed information.
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The interview with Scott Chasin was equally misleading. Chasin typed
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what appeared to by a simple "whois" command that lists the Internet
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addresses of the target. For example, typing "whois jthomas" would
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produce the following addresses on military computers:
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whois jthomas
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Thomas, James (JT276)jthomas@TECNET1.JCTE.JCS.MIL
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(703) 695-1565 225-1565
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Thomas, James (JT5)jthomas@WSMR-EMH82.ARMY.MIL
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(505) 678-5048 (DSN) 258-5048
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Thomas, Jeffery (JT21)jthomas@TACHOST.AF.MIL
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(804) 764-6610 (DSN)574-6610
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Thomas, Jeffrey K. (JKT9)jthomas@WSMR-EMH02.ARMY.MIL
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(505) 678-4597 (DSN) 258-4597
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Thomas, Jennifer L. (JLT9)jthomas@APG-EMH5.APG.ARMY.MIL
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(301) 671-2619 (DSN) 584-2619
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Thomas, Joseph, Jr. (JT168)jthomas@REDSTONE-EMH2.ARMY.MIL
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(205) 876-7407 (DSN) 746-7407
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Thomasovich, John L. (JLT5)jthomas@PICA.ARMY.MIL
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(201) 724-3760 (DSN) 880-3760
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Or, "whois 162.45.0.0" would give:
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Central Intelligence Agency (NET-CIA)
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Central Intelligence Agency
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OIT/ESG/DSED
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Washington, DC 20505
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Netname: CIA
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Netnumber: 162.45.0.0
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Coordinator:
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703-281-8087
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Record last updated on 22-Jul-92.
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Or, "ftp nic.ddn.mil" would connect us to the Network Information
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Center, which was shown on Quintin's screen, a military system that
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allows anonymous ftp privileges, where the command "cd /pub ; ls"
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would produce a list of the documents that one could (legally) rummage
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through. One could "grep" or "find" "UFO" or any other key word
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quite legitimately. Dateline did a major disservice to viewers by not
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explaining at least minimal basics of computer technology and the
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workings of Internet. Nothing portrayed by Chasin or Scott or on the
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screen necessarily indicated wrong doing, and in fact it seemed
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nothing more than a routine use of commands available to anyone with a
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Unix system and Internet access. In fact, we learned nothing that
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isn't explained in Krohl's "The Whole Internet" or Kehoe's "Zen and
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the Art of the Internet." Dateline took basic information and made it
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appear arcane, dangerous, and of special significance.
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Chasin next demonstrated "social engineering," in which a telephone
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caller attempts to con useful information from somebody through
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deception. Chasin was given a week to access any point of a system
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belonging to a corporation identified only as one of the "Fortune
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500." Posing as a company computer operator, it took only a few calls
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and 90 minutes (collapsed for dramatic effect into about a minute on
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the program) to con a receptionist out of her password. Whether this
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access would allow deeper penetration into the computers or simply
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allow the intruder to read the secretary's private mail remains
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unknown. Although a convincing demonstration of social engineering, it
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also emphasizes a point that Dateline glossed over, which hackers and
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security personnel have been saying for years: The greatest threat to
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computer security is the individual user.
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Computer crime is serious. It is unacceptable. Computer predations are
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wrong. But, the Dateline description did little to illustrate its
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nature and complexity and did much to re-inforce public technophobia
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and fears of computer literate teenagers. The issue here isn't
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whether the term "hacker" is again abused, whether "hackers" receive
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good or bad press, or whether a program develops a slant that is
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merely not to one's liking. Dateline's error was far more serious than
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any of these trivial cavils. At root, Dateline presented
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misinformation, seemed to have a story carved out in advance and
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merely sought detail for it, and depicted little of substance in
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contriving a fear-mongering story organized around assertion rather
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than evidence. It only confused the nature of computer crime, and
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confused perceptions lead to bad laws, bad law enforcement, and no
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solutions.
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As Adam Grant pointed out, the fact that people have the ability to
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intrude upon a system or to shoot somebody does not mean they are
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necessarily social threats. To exaggerate a "hacker threat" feeds the
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folly of excessive punishment for computer delinquents, and it
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suggests that the answer to the "hacker problem" is to apprehend the
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hacker rather than address the broader questions of computer
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responsibility, computer security, and computer literacy. Even with
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its hyperbole, Dateline could have salvaged some respectability if it
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had concluded by informing users that computer systems generally are
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intended to be open, that *trust* is a crucial element of computer
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use, and that users themselves can take significant steps to increase
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security little effort.
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Dateline seemed uninterested in its responsibility to the public. It
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seemed more interested in presenting a sexy story. When Geraldo
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presented "Mad Hacker's Key Party," the producer had the class to
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engage in a dialogue with critics and seemed genuinely interested in
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learning from criticism. I wonder if Susan Adams, producer of this
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Dateline segment, will do the same?
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------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 28 Oct 92 10:00:55 MST
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From: ahawks@NYX.CS.DU.EDU(we're tiny we're toony)
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Subject: File 3--Transcript of DATELINE NBC: ARE YOUR SECRETS SAFE
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From the same guy that brought you a transcript of Geraldo's NOW IT
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CAN BE TOLD, here's a transcript of last night's DATELINE NBC episode
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which featured a segment called ARE YOUR SECRETS SAFE that dealt with
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hackers:
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Transcript of ARE YOUR SECRETS SAFE segment of
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DATELINE NBC airing October 27, 1992
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PRODUCER: SUSAN ADAMS
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EDITOR: MARY ANN MARTIN
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Announcer: Well, when we come back, how computer hackers can make you
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and me their victims. The computer underground can potentially shut
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down our high-tech society. Our financial records, medical data,
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communications systems, it's all at their finger tips. Jon Scott
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reports. Next.
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<Commercials>
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Announcer: <first few words garbled: Paraphrased, "In the old
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days when you faced breaking and entering">...you knew it. Today, it's
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not that simple. In our high tech society, we can be targets of crime
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and never suspect a thing. It's crime by computer hackers. They've
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been glamorized by Hollywood most recently in the hit film "Sneakers."
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But, how do real hackers operate, and just what kind of damage can
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they do? Tonight, Jon Scott goes into their world to see how they
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access ours.
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[shot of computer screen, keys being pressed is the sound heard.
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<Text on the screen reads: We don't want to scare you, but ...>
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[FADE to silhouette of shadowed hacker, voice altered electronically]
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"QUINTIN": I have accessed - you name it, really: credit card
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companies, telephone companies, government installations, military
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installations, political organizations, senators' computer systems.
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JON SCOTT [reporter]<voice-over>: His voice is altered. His face
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hidden. His name - an alias.
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[fade to A HACKER %white male, approx. 14-18, wearing blue Yankess
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hat backwards, t-shirt and jeans% sitting at small desk in front of a
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laptop]
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SCOTT: In fact we don't even know his real name. That's the only
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way "Quintin" would agree to talk to us. Because "Quintin" is a
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hacker: a computer genius who illegally breaks into computers for
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fun.
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[fade back to silhouette shot, camera shot alters between SCOTT
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%reporter% and QUINTIN]
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SCOTT: Have you ever shared information, say, about a company with
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one of their competitors?
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QUINTIN: That I have not done.
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SCOTT: Have you ever been tempted to?
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QUINTIN: Umm, there's always kind of the lurking temptation.
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[fade to shot of QUINTIN's hands at keyboard]
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SCOTT<voice-over>: It's a frightening thought: someone breaking
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into your computer and roaming around in it with the potential to
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share, sell, even alter what they see. That's what hackers can do.
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Quintin told us he's read the private mail of a US Senator,
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[close-up shot of laptop screen showing info from nic.ddn.mil
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concerning UFO info at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio]
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browsed through secret government files on UFOs, and gone snooping in
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our nation's military computers.
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[fade back to silhouette shot again]
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SCOTT: Do you recognize that what you do is illegal?
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QUINTIN: <pause> Yeah, Yeah I do.
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SCOTT: Is it immoral?
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QUINTIN: To me, no.
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[fade to shot standing in the midst of a room filled with computers]
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SCOTT: More and more hackers like "Quintin" are out there, illegally
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breaking into systems that could contain information about you.
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Think about how much of your life is on a computer: your credit
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rating, financial records, your paycheck at work - computers run your
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telephone, your electricity, and your gas. In corporate America, it
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seems, they run everything.
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[fade to shot from the movie SNEAKERS - Ben Kingsley and Robert
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Redford sitting and talking]
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REDFORD: Stock market?
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KINGSLEY: Yes.
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REDFORD: Currency market?
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KINGSLEY: Yes.
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REDOFRD: Commodities market?
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KINGSLEY: Yes?
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REDFORD: Small countries?
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KINGSLEY: <pause> I might even be able to crash the whole damn
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system.
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SCOTT<voice-over>: In the movie SNEAKERS, Ben Kingsley dreamed of
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using a computer to dismantle the world's financial system. To some
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it's not so far-fetched.
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[fade to shot of Kent Alexander in empty courtroom]
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KENT ALEXANDER: Most people think of this movie as science-fiction.
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After prosecuting this case, I think of it as reality.
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SCOTT: Former computer prosecuter Kent Alexander was one of the
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first to win a conviction against computer hackers.
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ALEXANDER: I've seen hackers who've tapped into phone systems and
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litterally tapped into phone lines to listen in on telephone
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conversations. Hackers have broken into credit bureaus to get
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people's credit histories, hackers have broken into credit card
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records to have money wired to themselves.
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[shot of newspaper clippings related to the Atlanta 3 LoD case]
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SCOTT<voice-over>: In a highly-publicized trial in 1990, Alexander
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sent three Atlanta hackers to jail, among them - Adam Grant.
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[fade to shot of Grant and Scott walking to BellSouth building at
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night.]
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SCOTT: So how often would you come over here?
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GRANT: In the beginning as maybe as much as a couple times a week.
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SCOTT<voice-over>: Adam belonged to an elite hacker club called the
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Legion of Doom. One of the methods he used to obtain secret computer
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codes was to rummage through the trash at BellSouth - the regional
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phone company in Atlanta.
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[they stop in front of a BFI trash dumpster and examine it]
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GRANT: Back a few years ago they weren't locked. You could just
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slide the doors open, reach in, grab a bag, leave. This one's not
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even locked.
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SCOTT<voice-over>: Using the information he found here Adam was able
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to sit in front of his home computer and hack into the heart of
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BellSouth.
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SCOTT: They didn't learn something on this side [pointing to
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unlocked dumpster - slides it open, it contains a bunch of folded up
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cardboard boxes].
|
||
|
||
GRANT<voice-over>: At BellSouth we were able to get into all manner
|
||
of computers.
|
||
|
||
[fade to shot of Grant sitting and talking]
|
||
|
||
uh, the phone switches themselves.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: In essence you got to the point where you could've turned off
|
||
everybody's phones in Georgia.
|
||
|
||
GRANT: About any one of a couple dozen of us could've done that.
|
||
|
||
[fade to shot of interior of BellSouth command center]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: for more than a year, Adam and his friends had
|
||
free access to the inner workings of 12 BellSouth computer systems.
|
||
|
||
[back to previous shot]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: They say you could've crashed or broken the 911 system.
|
||
|
||
GRANT: Mmm-hmm <nods>. The operative word for me is *could have*.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: You could have done that?
|
||
|
||
GRANT: Yes. I could go out and shoot people. You can.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: BellSouth cracked down hard on Adam and the others, even
|
||
though it acknowledges they never disrupted phone service or changed
|
||
any customer accounts.
|
||
|
||
[shot of US phone network display]
|
||
|
||
[fade to shot of BellSouth spokesman Scott Ticer]
|
||
|
||
TICER: We don't care what the motive may or may not be.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Scott Ticer is a corporate spokesman for
|
||
BellSouth.
|
||
|
||
TICER: We are not talking about Wally and the Beav, much less Eddie
|
||
Haskel. We're not dealing with a bunch of mischievous pranksters
|
||
playing in some high-tech toyland [possibly toilet, not clear]. This
|
||
is a crime.
|
||
|
||
[shot of skyscraper]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: BellSouth is just one example of a company
|
||
stalked by hackers. In a recent New York case, members of a club
|
||
known as the Masters of Deception
|
||
|
||
[shots of MoD-related newspaper articles]
|
||
|
||
were indicted, accused of hacking into institutions like:
|
||
|
||
[corporate logos appear on computer monitor]
|
||
|
||
the Bank of America, Martin Marietta, PacificBell, SouthwesternBell,
|
||
New York Telephone, TRW, Information America, and New York
|
||
University. So how does a hacker get into these systems? To find
|
||
out, Dateline went underground into the hacker's world.
|
||
|
||
[fade to shot of Scott Chasin]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Power and ego have a lot to do with hacking.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: 21 year-old Scott Chasin spent 9 years as a hacker. He says
|
||
his hacker days are behind him now, but he still keeps tabs on the
|
||
hacker underground.
|
||
|
||
[shot of monitor with a bunch of Account: and Password: 's]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Basically these are passwords for a university that somebody
|
||
has cracked.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: Scott showed as a hacker's secret meeting place - a private
|
||
electronic bulletin board.
|
||
|
||
[shot of login to board called TCH]
|
||
|
||
individual hacker clubs set up these boards so members may swap
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
<reads message on screen>"I need some help figuring out how to crash
|
||
my school's computer system"? Is he serious?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Sure. Why wouldn't he be?
|
||
|
||
[varying shots of crack screens from pirated software and hacking
|
||
utilities <password hackers, wardialers%]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Hacker clubs, some of whose logos you see here,
|
||
are very competitive. Sometimes its club v. club, sometimes its
|
||
member v. member.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Grant]
|
||
|
||
GRANT: You want to make yourself unique. And one of the best ways
|
||
of doing that is being forceful - being obnoxious.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Grant typing]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: For many like Adam, the underground is the first place they
|
||
found where they felt like they had power.
|
||
|
||
GRANT: You think about: "I can do something that's really
|
||
different. I can do nothing that none of my friends can. I can do
|
||
something that most people anywhere can't. And that makes you stand
|
||
out - makes you want to do it." It's like a criminal olympics.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Chasin typing]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Hackers might break into a computer with your
|
||
name in it by accessing one of the computer networks which link
|
||
millions of computers world-wide. Scott showed us what he could
|
||
reach from his living room. We went looking for the top-secret
|
||
National Security Agency. We found it.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Chasin typing "NSA" on monitor, then:
|
||
|
||
National Security Agency (NSA)
|
||
Network Services Agency (NET-NSA)
|
||
Whois: _
|
||
]
|
||
|
||
Same with the Pentagon.
|
||
|
||
[shot of monitor:
|
||
|
||
PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL
|
||
26
|
||
]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Let's do a search for NASA.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: It's like searching the phonebook for someone's street
|
||
address and learning where they live.
|
||
|
||
[screen shows 'whois' output of NASA matches]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Found over 247 of 'em.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: 247 NASA computers?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Computers and networks, that are on the Internet. Correct.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: But each of these NASA computers has a lock on it, and only
|
||
authorized users like NASA employees are allowed to have th keys. To
|
||
"unlock" most computer systems, authorized employess type in their
|
||
username and then their password. Passwords and user names are
|
||
supposed to be kept secret, but hackers have ways of getting them.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Quintin]
|
||
|
||
QUINTIN: Sometimes it's as simple as a phone-call to the company and
|
||
portraying myself as another employee, to pulling telephone records,
|
||
to actually entering the building and places where I physically
|
||
should not be.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: So on the one-hand you break into the building and then you
|
||
break into the computers?
|
||
|
||
QUINTIN: Yes.
|
||
|
||
[shot of Scott]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: Most hackers don't resort to burglary - they can get the
|
||
information they need over the phone. They call it social
|
||
engineering - basically, it's a con job. We asked Scott, the former
|
||
hacker, to show us how it's done. Dateline obtained permission from
|
||
a Fortune 500 company to have Scott try and hack in. The company
|
||
gave him 1 week to land anywhere inside its computer system. Posing
|
||
as a fellow staff member, Scott began by making random calls to
|
||
unsuspecting employees.
|
||
|
||
[Chasin on phone, ringing]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Hi. My name's Scott Chasin and I'm calling from Business
|
||
Affairs. I'm at home right now and I'm wondering if there's a way I
|
||
could get into the network - I just bought a PC.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE1: You have Crosstalk?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Yes I do.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Hist first call was to the computer department.
|
||
He's looking for the 800 number he needs to dial to have his computer
|
||
connect to the company's system.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: What is the number it has to dial?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE1: Your best bet is to dial the 800 number.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Right. But, I don't show that on my screen.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE1: What do you show?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: It just says xxx-xxx-xxxx, I think, yeah.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE1: Oh, it's 800-***-****.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: With the phone-numbers, he's at the company's
|
||
front door. Now he needs the "keys": a username and password, to
|
||
get inside.
|
||
|
||
[phone rings]
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Hi, *****, this is Scott Chasin calling from the computer
|
||
center.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE2: Hi.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: How ya doin'?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE2: Ok!
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Is everything up and runnin' down there?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE2: Uhhh, why? 'we sposed to be down?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Yeah we're having some problems, we've been having some
|
||
reoccuring problems since last night.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE2: Believe me, I'm not a computer maven person. hahaha.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Hahah. That's all right, I'll help ya out! If you log out
|
||
and log back in, we'll go through the whole scenario so I can see if
|
||
everything's ok on my end. Can you do that for me?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE2: I think so...hold on...
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Bare in mind he [Chasin] still can't see anything
|
||
on his end - it's a ruse. All he wants is a username and a password.
|
||
Even if he only gets a username from someone, a hacker can make an
|
||
educated guess at a password.
|
||
|
||
[cut to interview of Chasin]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: What are some common passwords that people use?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: money, sex, love, secret, password. Mostly first names,
|
||
husband names, wife names, pet's names, social security numbers,
|
||
parts of their telephone....
|
||
|
||
[cut back]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: But as we saw, most of the time a hacker doesn't
|
||
even have to guess.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN [on phone]: Why don't you tell me what your login id is cuz
|
||
I'm gonna watch you come across the network so I can see where the
|
||
problem's arising from.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: What my login is?
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Yeah.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: ******
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: What password do you enter to get into the BIOS, [BIOC,
|
||
BIAC %unintelligible%]?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: shy.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: s-h-y is your password?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: Yep.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: s-h-y.
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: shy.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Ok, I'll tell ya what I'm gonna do, I'll go in there and see
|
||
if you have any stuck processes and I'll call ya back and tell ya
|
||
when it's all right.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: Remember, he'd been given a week to break into
|
||
the system. It took him an hour-and-a-half.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN[on phone still]: Alright?
|
||
|
||
EMPLOYEE3: Thanx.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Ok, bye-bye.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: I'm in.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: So the receptionist, who simply hands you a password, might
|
||
be giving you access to the CEO's office.
|
||
|
||
CHASIN: Might be giving me the ability to shut down the company.
|
||
|
||
[cut to Quintin again]
|
||
|
||
SCOTT<voice-over>: The moral to computer users: don't give out your
|
||
password, and change it often. Hackers like Quintin are out there,
|
||
and to them it's a game - a challenge - to break into your system.
|
||
|
||
[cut to Grant again]
|
||
|
||
Just listen to Adam Grant, the guy who spent 7 months in jail for
|
||
Breaking into BellSouth's computers.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: What's the lesson, in your story, for other hackers?
|
||
|
||
GRANT: Don't get caught.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: Not "don't do it".
|
||
|
||
GRANT: People are going to do what they're going to do.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: How do think it plays to people at home when you tell others,
|
||
simply, "don't get caught"?
|
||
|
||
GRANT: That's their own business. I don't think it's right for
|
||
other people to tell me how to live my life. So, I shouldn't tell
|
||
other people how to live their life.
|
||
|
||
SCOTT: And yet you acknowledge that hacking is wrong.
|
||
|
||
GRANT: Smoking is wrong. Taking drugs is wrong. People do it all
|
||
the time.
|
||
|
||
[FADE to computer monitor, showing:
|
||
|
||
Goodnight.
|
||
|
||
<Female announcer: If you're wondering about your home computer, you
|
||
don't really have much to worry about. If you don't use a modem, if
|
||
you aren't hooked up to a phone line, you have nothing to fear. And,
|
||
even if you are, hackers are not as interested in you as they are in,
|
||
say, your bank, or your credit union, or maybe the phone company.>
|
||
<end>
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 92 16:45:16 PDT
|
||
From: clarinews@CLARINET.COM(UPI)
|
||
Subject: File 4--Somebody gets access to freeway callbox codes, runs up bill
|
||
|
||
GARDEN GROVE, Calif. (UPI) -- Somebody apparently got hold of the
|
||
serial number and telephone number of a Southern California freeway
|
||
callbox, and used them to rack up nearly $2,000 in phone bills.
|
||
|
||
The Orange County Transportation Authority is trying to determine just
|
||
how the phone thief used the electronic serial number and telephone
|
||
number of the freeway emergency callbox to make 11,733 calls totaling
|
||
25,875 minutes, and who will foot the bill.
|
||
|
||
OCTA Executive Director Stan Oftelie said they got suspicious because
|
||
calls charged to the callboxes' supposedly secret numbers average
|
||
fewer than 100 a month.
|
||
|
||
Oftelie said OCTA officials also are trying to determine how the
|
||
freeway box could be used for in-state and out-of-state calls since
|
||
the boxes connect directly to California Highway Patrol dispatch
|
||
headquarters.
|
||
|
||
"We're concerned about it," Oftelie said. "They shouldn't be able to
|
||
call anywhere but Highway Patrol headquarters." OCTA said it has
|
||
tightened security measures, and is talking with GTE Cellular and L.A.
|
||
Cellular to determine who will pay the bill. The callbox is one of
|
||
1,100 solar cellular phone boxes in the county. Most average 10 to
|
||
100 calls per month from motorists in trouble.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.54
|
||
************************************
|
||
! |