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37 KiB
Plaintext
871 lines
37 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Tue July 21, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 32
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Copy Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Jr.
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Archivist in spirit: Bob Kusumoto
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Shadow-Archivist: Dan Carosone
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CONTENTS, #4.32 (July 21, 1992)
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File 1--The NSA Papers
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File 2--CPSR Challenges Virginia SS
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File 3--EFF hires Cliff Figallo as director of Cambridge office
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File 4--New York Hackers Plead Not Guilty (NEWSBYTES REPRINT)
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File 5--Time Magazine Computer Analyst Arrested for Alleged Faud
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost at tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be
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contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail to:
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Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on Genie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries; from American Online in the PC Telecom forum under
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"computing newsletters;" on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and by
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anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au
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European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
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is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should
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be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal
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mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified.
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Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to
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computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short
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responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely
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necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 24 Jun 92 18:10:02 CDT
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From: Joe.Abernathy@HOUSTON.CHRON.COM(Joe Abernathy)
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Subject: File 1--The NSA Papers
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The following is the written response to my request for an intereview
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with the NSA. To the best of my knowledge, and according to their
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claims, it is the government's first complete answer to the many
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questions and allegations that have been made in regards to the matter
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of cryptography.
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I would like to invite reaction from any qualified readers who care
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to address any of the issues raised herein. Please mail to
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edtjda@chron.com (713) 220-6845.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
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Serial: Q43-11-92 9
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10 June 1992
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Mr. Joe Abernathy
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Houston Chronicle
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P.O. Box 4260
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Houston, TX 77210
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Dear Mr. Abernathy:
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Thank you for your inquiry of 3 June 1992 on the
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subject of cryptography. Attached please find answers
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to the questions that you provided our Agency. If
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any further assistance is needed, please feel free
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to contact me or Mr. Jerry Volker of my staff on (xxx)
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xxx-xxxx.
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Sincerely,
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MICHAEL S.CONN
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Chief
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Information Policy
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ENCL:
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1. Has the NSA ever imposed or attempted to impose
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a weakness on any cryptographic code to see if it
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can thus be broken?
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One of NSA's missions is to provide the means for
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protecting U.S. government and military communications
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and information systems related to national security.
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In fulfilling this mission we design cryptologic codes
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based on an exhaustive evaluation process to ensure
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to the maximum extent possible that information systems
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security products that we endorse are free from any
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weaknesses. Were we to intentionally impose weaknesses
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on cryptologic codes for use by the U.S. government,
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we would not be fulfilling our mission to provide
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the means to protect sensitive U.S. government and
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military communications and our professional integrity
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would be at risk.
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2. Has the NSA ever imposed or attempted
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to impose a weakness on the DES or DSS?
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Regarding the Data Encryption Standard (DES), we
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believe that the public record from the Senate Committee
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for Intelligence's investigation in 1978 into NSA's
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role in the development of the DES is responsive to
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your question. That committee report indicated that
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NSA did not tamper with the design of the algorithm
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in any way and that the security afforded by the
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DES was more than adequate for at least a 5-10 year
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time span for the unclassified data for which it was
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intended. In short, NSA did not impose or attempt
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to impose any weakness on the DES.
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Regarding the draft Digital Signature Standard
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(DSS), NSA never imposed any weakness or attempted
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to impose any weakness on the DSS.
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3. Is the NSA aware of any weaknesses in the
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DES or the DSS? The RSA?
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We are unaware of any weaknesses in the DES or
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the DSS when properly implemented and used for the
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purposes for which they both are designed. We do not
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comment on nongovernment systems.
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Regarding the alleged trapdoor in the DSS. We
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find the term trapdoor somewhat misleading since
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it implies that the messages sent by the DSS are encrypted
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and with access via a trapdoor one could somehow decrypt
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(read) the message without the sender's knowledge.
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The DSS does not encrypt any data. The real issue
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is whether the DSS is susceptible to someone forging
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a signature and therefore discrediting the entire
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system. We state categorically that the chances of
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anyone - including NSA - forging a signature with
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the DSS when it is properly used and implemented is
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infinitesimally small.
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Furthermore, the alleged trapdoor vulnerability
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is true for ANY public key-based authentication system,
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including RSA. To imply somehow that this only affects
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the DSS (a popular argument in the press) is totally
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misleading. The issue is one of implementation and
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how one goes about selecting prime numbers. We call
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your attention to a recent EUROCRYPT conference which
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had a panel discussion on the issue of trapdoors in
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the DSS. Included on the panel was one of the Bellcore
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researchers who initially raised the trapdoor allegation,
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and our understanding is that the panel - including
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the person from Bellcore - concluded that the alleged
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trapdoor was not an issue for the DSS. Furthermore,
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the general consensus appeared to be that the trapdoor
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issue was trivial and had been overblown in the press.
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However, to try to respond to the trapdoor allegation,
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at NIST's request, we have designed a prime generation
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process which will ensure that one can avoid selection
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of the relatively few weak primes which could lead
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to weakness in using the DSS. Additionally, NIST intends
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to allow for larger modulus sizes up to 1024 which
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effectively negates the need to even use the prime
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generation process to avoid weak primes. An additional
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very important point that is often overlooked is that
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with the DSS the primes are PUBLIC and therefore can
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be subject to public examination. Not all public key
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systems provide for this same type of examination.
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The integrity of any information security system
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requires attention to proper implementation. With
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the myriad of vulnerabilities possible given the differences
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among users, NSA has traditionally insisted on centralized
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trusted centers as a way to minimize risk to the system.
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While we have designed technical modifications to
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the DSS to meet NIST's requests for a more decentralized
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approach, we still would emphasize that portion of
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the Federal Register notice for the DSS which states:
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While it is the intent of this standard to specify
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general security requirements for generating digital
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signatures, conformance to this standard does not assure
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that a particular implementation is secure. The responsible
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authority in each agency or department shall assure
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that an overall implementation provides an acceptable
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level of security. NIST will be working with government
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users to ensure appropriate implementations.
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Finally, we have read all the arguments purporting
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insecurities with the DSS, and we remain unconvinced
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of their validity. The DSS has been subjected to intense
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evaluation within NSA which led to its being endorsed
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by our Director of Information Systems Security for
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use in signing unclassified data processed in certain
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intelligence systems and even for signing classified
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data in selected systems. We believe that this approval
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speaks to the lack of any credible attack on the
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integrity provided by the DSS given proper use and
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implementation. Based on the technical and security
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requirements of the U.S. government for digital signatures,
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we believe the DSS is the best choice. In fact, the
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DSS is being used in a pilot project for the Defense
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Message System to assure the authenticity of electronic
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messages of vital command and control information.
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This initial demonstration includes participation from
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services,
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and Defense Agencies and is being done in cooperation
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with NIST.
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4. Has the NSA ever taken advantage of
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any weaknesses in the DES or the DSS?
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We are unaware of any weaknesses in the DSS or
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in the DES when properly implemented and used for the
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purposes for which they both are designed.
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5. Did the NSA play a role in designing the DSS? Why, in the
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NSA's analysis, was it seen as desirable to create
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the DSS when the apparently more robust RSA already
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stood as a de facto standard?
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Under the Computer Security Act of 1987, NIST is
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to draw upon computer systems technical security guidelines
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of NSA where appropriate and to coordinate closely
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with other agencies, including NSA, to assure:
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a. maximum use of all existing and planned programs,
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materials, and reports relating to computer systems
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security and privacy, in order to avoid unnecessary
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and costly duplication of effort; and
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b. that standards developed by NIST are consistent
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and compatible with standards and procedures developed
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for the protection of classified systems.
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Consistent with that law and based on a subsequent
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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between NSA and NIST,
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NSA's role is to be responsive to NIST's requests
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for assistance in developing, evaluating, or researching
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cryptographic algorithms and techniques. (See note
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at end). In 19??, NIST requested that NSA evaluate
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candidate algorithms proposed by NIST for a digital
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signature standard and that NSA provide new algorithms
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when existing algorithms did not meet U.S. government
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requirements. In the two-year process of developing
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a digital signature for U.S. government use, NIST
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and NSA examined various publicly-known algorithms
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and their variants, including RSA. A number of techniques
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were deemed to provide appropriate protection for
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Federal systems. The one selected by NIST as the draft
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Digital Signature Standard was determined to be the
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most suitable for reasons that were set forth in the
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Federal Register announcement. One such reason was
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to avoid issuance of a DSS that would result in users
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outside the government having to pay royalties. Even
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though the DSS is targeted for government use, eliminating
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potential barriers for commercial applications is
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useful to achieve economies of scale. Additionally,
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there are features of the DSS which make it more attractive
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for federal systems that need to have a digital signature
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capability for large numbers of users. Chief mong
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them are the number of trusted operation points and
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system management overhead that are minimized with
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the NIST proposed technique.
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6. What national interests are served by limiting the
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power of cyptographic schemes used by the public?
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We call your attention to the House Judiciary committee
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hearing of 29 April 1992. The Director of the FBI
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expressed his concerns that law enforcement interests
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in meeting responsibilities given to them by Congress
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could be affected unless they had access to communications,
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as was given to them by statute in 1968 (court monitored,
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court sponsored, court reviewed and subject to Congressional
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oversight).
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The National Security Agency has no role in limiting
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the power of cryptographic schemes used by the public
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within the U.S. We have always been in favor of the
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use of information security technologies by U.S. businesses
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to protect their proprietary information, and when
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we had an information security role with private industry
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(prior to the Computer Security Act of 1987), we actively
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advocated use of such technologies.
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7. What national interests are served by limiting the
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export of cryptographic technology?
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Cryptographic technology is deemed vital to national
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security interests. This includes economic, military,
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and foreign policy interests.
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We do not agree with the implications from the
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House Judiciary Committee hearing of 7 May 1992 and
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recent news articles that allege that U.S. export
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laws prevent U.S. firms' manufacture and use of top
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encryption equipment. We are unaware of any case where
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a U.S. firm has been prevented from manufacturing
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and using encryption equipment within this country
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or for use by the U.S. firm or its subsidiaries in
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locations outside the U.S. because of U.S. export restrictions.
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In fact, NSA has always supported the use of encryption
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by U.S. businesses operating domestically and overseas
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to protect sensitive information.
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For export to foreign countries, NSA as a component
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of the Department of Defense (along with the Department
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of State and the Department of Commerce) reviews export
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licenses for information security technologies controlled
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by the Export Administration Regulations or the international
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Traffic in Arms Regulations. Similar export control
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systems are in effect in all the Coordinating Committee
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for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) countries
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as well as many non-CoCom countries as these technologies
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are universally considered as sensitive. Such technologies
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are not banned from export and are reviewed on a case-by-case
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basis. As part of the export review process, licenses
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may be required for these systems and are reviewed
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to determine the effect such export could have on
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national security interests - including economic,
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military, and political security interests. Export
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licenses are approved or denied based upon the type
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of equipment involved, the proposed end-use and the
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end-user.
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Our analysis indicates that the U.S. leads the
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world in the manufacture and export of information
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security technologies. Of those cryptologic products
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referred to NSA by the Department of State for export
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licenses, we consistently approve over 90%. Export
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licenses for information security products under the
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jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce are processed
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and approved without referral to NSA or DoD. This includes
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products using such techniques as the DSS and RSA
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which provide authentication and access control to
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computers or networks. In fact, in the past NSA has
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played a major role in successfully advocating the
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relaxation of export controls on RSA and related technologies
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for authentication purposes. Such techniques are extremely
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valuable against the hacker problem and unauthorized
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use of resources.
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8. What national interests are at
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risk, if any, if secure cryptography is widely available?
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Secure cryptography widely available outside the
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United States clearly has an impact on national security
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interests including economic, military, and political.
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Secure cryptography within the United States may
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impact law enforcement interests.
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9. What does the NSA see as its legitimate interests in
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the area of cryptography? Public cryptography?
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Clearly one of our interests is to protect U.S.
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government and military communications and information systems
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related to national security. As part of that mission,
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we stay abreast of activities in public cryptography.
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10. How did NSA enter into negotiations with the Software
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Publishers Association regarding the export of products
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utilizing cryptographic techniques? How was this group
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chosen, and to what purpose? What statute or elected
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representative authorized the NSA to engage in the
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discussions?
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The Software Publishers Association (SPA) went
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to the National Security Advisor to the President
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to seek help from the Administration to bring predictability,
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clarity, and speed to the process for exporting mass
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market software with encryption. The National Security
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Advisor directed NSA to work wth the mass market software
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representatives on their request.
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ii. What is the status of these negotiations?
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These negotiations are ongoing.
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12. What is the status of export controls on products using
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cryptographic techniques? How would you respond to those who
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point to the fact that the expot of RSA from the U.S. is
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controlled, but that its import into the U.S. is not?
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To the best of our knowledge, most countries who
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manufacture cryptographic products regulate the export
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of such products from their countries by procedures
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similar to those existing within the U.S. Some even
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control the import into their countries. The U.S.
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complies with the guidelines established by CoCom
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for these products.
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Regarding the export of RSA from the U.S., we are
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unaware of any restrictions that have been placed
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on the export of RSA for authentication purposes.
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13. What issues would you like to discuss that I have
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not addressed?
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None.
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14. What question or questions would you
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like to pose of your critics?
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None.
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NOTE: To clarify misunderstandings regarding
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this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); this MOU does
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not provide NSA any veto power over NIST proposals.
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As was discussed publicly in 1989, the MOU provides
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that if there is an issue that can not be resolved
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between the two agencies, then such an issue may be
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referred to the President for resolution. Enclosed
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please find a copy of subject MOU which has been made
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freely available in the past by both NSA and NIST
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to all requestors. At the House Judiciary Committee
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hearings on 7 May 1992, the Director of NIST responded
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||
that he had never referred an issue to the White House
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since his assumption of Directorship in 1990.
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|
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
|
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|
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BETWEEN
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THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
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AND TECHNOLOGY
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AND
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THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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CONCERNING
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 100-235 Recognizing
|
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that:
|
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|
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A. Under Section 2 of the Computer Security Act
|
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of 1987 (Public Law 100-235), (the Act), the National
|
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Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has the
|
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responsibility within the Federal Government for:
|
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|
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1. Developing technical, management, physical,
|
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and administrative standards and guidelines for the
|
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cost-effective security ad privacy of sensitive information
|
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in Federal computer systems as defined in the Act;
|
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and,
|
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|
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2. Drawing on the computer system technical security
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guidelines of the National Security Agency (NSA) in
|
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this regard where appropriate.
|
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|
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B. Under Section 3 of the Act, the NIST is to coordinate
|
||
closely with other agencies and offices, including
|
||
the NSA, to assure:
|
||
|
||
1. Maximum use of all existing and planned programs,
|
||
materials, studies, and reports relating to computer
|
||
systems security and privacy, in order to avoid unnecessary
|
||
and costly duplication of effort; and, - 2. To the
|
||
maximum extent feasible, that standards developed
|
||
by the NIST under the Act are consistent and compatible
|
||
with standards and procedures developed for the protection
|
||
of classified information in Federal computer systems.
|
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|
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C. Under the Act, the Secretary of Commerce has
|
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the responsibility, which he has delegated to the
|
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Director of NIST, for appointing the members of the
|
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Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board,
|
||
at least one of whom shall be from the NSA. Therefore,
|
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in furtherance of the purposes of this MOU, the Director
|
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of the NIST and the Director of the NSA hereby agree
|
||
as follows:
|
||
|
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The NIST will:
|
||
|
||
1. Appoint to the Computer Security and Privacy
|
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Advisory Board at least one representative nominated by
|
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the Director of the NSA.
|
||
|
||
2. Draw upon computer system technical security
|
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guidelines developed by the NSA to the extent that the NIST
|
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determines that such guidelines are consistent with the requirements
|
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tor protecting sensitive information in Federal computer
|
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systems.
|
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|
||
3. Recognize the NSA-certified rating of evaluated
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trusted systems under the Trusted Computer Security Evaluation
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||
Criteria Program without requiring additional evaluation.
|
||
|
||
4. Develop telecommunications security standards
|
||
for protecting sensitive unclassified computer data, drawing
|
||
upon the expertise and products of the National Security
|
||
Agency, to the ratest extent possible, in meeting
|
||
these responsibilities in a timely and cost effective manner
|
||
|
||
5. Avoid duplication where possible in entering
|
||
into mutually agreeable arrangements with the NSA for
|
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the NSA support.
|
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|
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6. Request the NSA's assistance on all matters
|
||
related to cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic techniques
|
||
including but not limited to research, development valuation,
|
||
or endorsement. . - I
|
||
|
||
II. The NSA will:
|
||
|
||
1. Provide the NIST with technical guidelines in
|
||
trusted technology, telecommunications security, and personal
|
||
-identification that may be used in cost-effective
|
||
systems for protecting sensitive computer data.
|
||
|
||
2. Conduct or initiate research and development
|
||
programs in trusted technology, telecommunications security,
|
||
cryptographic techniques and personal identification methods.
|
||
|
||
3. Be responsive to the NIST's requests for assistance
|
||
in respect to all matters related to cryptographic
|
||
algorithms and cryptographic techniques including but not limited
|
||
to research, development, evaluation, or endorsement.
|
||
|
||
4. Establish the standards and endorse products
|
||
for application to secure systems covered in 10 USC
|
||
Section 2315 (the Warner Amendment).
|
||
|
||
5 Upon request by Federal agencies5 their contractors
|
||
and other government-sponsored entities, conduct assessments
|
||
of the hostile intelligence threat to federal information
|
||
systems, and provide technical assistance and recommend endorsed
|
||
products for application to secure systems against that threat.
|
||
|
||
iii. The NIST and the NSA shall:
|
||
|
||
1. Jointly review agency plans for the security and
|
||
-privacy of computer systems submitted to NIST and NSA pursuant
|
||
to section 6(b) of the Act.'
|
||
|
||
2. Exchange technical standards and guidelines
|
||
as necessary to achieve the purposes of the Act.
|
||
|
||
3. Work together to achieve the purposes of this
|
||
memorandum with the greatest efficiency possible, avoiding
|
||
unnecessary duplication of effort.
|
||
|
||
4. Maintain an ongoing, open dialogue to ensure
|
||
that each organization remains abreast of emerging technologies
|
||
and issues effecting automated information system security
|
||
in computer-based systems.
|
||
|
||
5. Establish a Technical Working Group to review
|
||
and analyze issues of mutual interes pertinent to protection
|
||
of systems that process sensitive or other unclassified-information.
|
||
The Group shall be composed of six federal employees, three
|
||
each selected by NIST and NSA and to be augmented as necessary by
|
||
representatives of other agencies. Issues may be referred to the
|
||
group by either the NSA Deputy Director for Information Security
|
||
or the NIST Deputy Director or may be generated -and addressed
|
||
by the group upon approval by the NSA DDI or NIST Deputy Director.
|
||
Within days of the referral of an issue to the Group by
|
||
either the NSA Deputy Director for Information Security or the
|
||
NIST Deputy .Director, the Group will respond with
|
||
a progress report and pan for further analysis, if any.
|
||
|
||
6. Exchange work plans on an annual basis on all
|
||
research and development projects pertinent to protection
|
||
of systems that process sensitive or other unclassified information,
|
||
including trusted technology, technology for protecting the
|
||
integrity and availability of data, telecommunications security
|
||
and personal identification methods. Project updates will be
|
||
exchanged quarterly, and project reviews will be provided
|
||
by either party upon request of he other party.
|
||
|
||
7. Ensure the Technical Working Group reviews prior
|
||
to public disclosure all matters regarding technical_systems
|
||
security techniques to be developed for use in protecting
|
||
sensitive information in federal computer systems to ensure
|
||
they are consistant with the national security of the
|
||
United States. If NIST and NSA are unable to resolve
|
||
such an issue within 60 days, either _ agency may elect
|
||
to raise the issue to the Secretary of Defense and
|
||
the Secretary of Commerce. It is recognized that such
|
||
an issue may be referred to the President through
|
||
the NSC for resolution. No action shall be taken on
|
||
such an issue until it is resolved.
|
||
|
||
8. Specify additional operational agreements in
|
||
annexes to this MOU as they. are agreed to by NSA
|
||
and NIST.
|
||
|
||
IV. Either party may elect to terminate this MOU
|
||
upon six months written notice. This MO& is effective
|
||
upon approval of both signatories.
|
||
|
||
RAYMOND G. KAMMER W. 0. STUDEMAN
|
||
|
||
Acting Director Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy National
|
||
Institut of Director Standards and Technology National
|
||
Security Agency
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
From: David Sobel <dsobel@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
|
||
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 1992 17:29:04 EDT
|
||
Subject: File 2--CPSR Challenges Virginia SS
|
||
|
||
June 30, 1992
|
||
|
||
CPSR Challenges Virginia SSN Practice
|
||
PRESS RELEASE
|
||
|
||
WASHINGTON, DC -- A national public interest organization has filed a
|
||
"friend of the court" brief in the federal court of appeals, calling
|
||
into question the Commonwealth of Virginia's practice of requiring
|
||
citizens to provide their Social Security numbers in order to vote.
|
||
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) alleges that
|
||
Virginia is violating constitutional rights and creating an
|
||
unnecessary privacy risk.
|
||
|
||
The case arose when a Virginia resident refused to provide his Social
|
||
Security number (SSN) to a county registrar and was denied the right
|
||
to register to vote. Virginia is one of a handful of states that
|
||
require voters to provide an SSN as a condition of registration.
|
||
While most states that require the number impose some restrictions on
|
||
its public dissemination, Virginia allows unrestricted public
|
||
inspection of voter registration data -- including the SSN. Marc A.
|
||
Greidinger, the plaintiff in the federal lawsuit, believes that the
|
||
state's registration requirements violate his privacy and impose an
|
||
unconstitutional burden on his exercise of the right to vote.
|
||
|
||
The CPSR brief, filed in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
|
||
Richmond, supports the claims made by Mr. Greidinger. CPSR notes the
|
||
long-standing concern of the computing community to design safe
|
||
information systems, and the particular effort of Congress to control
|
||
the misuse of the SSN. The organization cites federal statistics
|
||
showing that the widespread use of SSNs has led to a proliferation of
|
||
fraud by criminals using the numbers to gain driver's licenses, credit
|
||
and federal benefits. The CPSR brief further describes current
|
||
efforts in other countries to control the misuse of national
|
||
identifiers, like the Social Security number.
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, the Director of the CPSR Washington Office said that
|
||
"This is a privacy issue of constitutional dimension. The SSN
|
||
requirement is not unlike the poll taxes that were struck down as
|
||
unconstitutional in the 1960s. Instead of demanding the payment of
|
||
money, Virginia is requiring citizens to relinquish their privacy
|
||
rights before being allowed in the voting booth."
|
||
|
||
CPSR argues in its brief that the privacy risk created by Virginia's
|
||
collection and disclosure of Social Security numbers is unnecessary.
|
||
The largest states in the nation, such as California, New York and
|
||
Texas, do not require SSNs for voter registration. CPSR points out
|
||
that California, with 14 million registered voters, does not need to
|
||
use the SSN to administer its registration system, while Virginia,
|
||
with less than 3 million voters, insists on its need to demand the
|
||
number.
|
||
|
||
David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel, said "Federal courts have generally
|
||
recognized that there is a substantial privacy interest involved when
|
||
Social Security numbers are disclosed. We are optimistic that the
|
||
court of appeals will require the state to develop a safer method of
|
||
maintaining voting records."
|
||
|
||
CPSR has led a national campaign to control the misuse of the Social
|
||
Security Number. Earlier this year the organization testified at a
|
||
hearing in Congress on the use of the SSN as a National Identifier.
|
||
CPSR urged lawmakers to respect the restriction on the SSN and to
|
||
restrict its use in the private sector. The group also participated
|
||
in a federal court challenge to the Internal Revenue Service's
|
||
practice of displaying taxpayers' SSNs on mailing labels. CPSR is
|
||
also undertaking a campaign to advise individuals not to disclose
|
||
their Social Security numbers unless provided with the legal reason
|
||
for the request.
|
||
|
||
CPSR is a national membership organization, with 2,500 members, based
|
||
in Palo Alto, CA. For membership information contact CPSR, P.O. Box
|
||
717, Palo Alto, CA 94303, (415) 322-3778, cpsr@csli. stanford.edu.
|
||
|
||
|
||
For more information contact:
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, Director
|
||
David Sobel, Legal Counsel
|
||
CPSR Washington Office
|
||
(202) 544-9240
|
||
rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org
|
||
sobel@washofc.cpsr.org
|
||
|
||
Paul Wolfson, attorney for Marc A. Greidinger
|
||
Public Citizen Litigation Group
|
||
(202) 833-3000
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 1992 21:05:54 -0400
|
||
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@EFF.ORG>
|
||
Subject: File 3--EFF hires Cliff Figallo as director of Cambridge office
|
||
|
||
+=========+=================================================+===========+
|
||
| F.Y.I. |Newsnote from the Electronic Frontier Foundation|July 14,1992|
|
||
+=========+=================================================+===========+
|
||
|
||
CLIFF FIGALLO OF THE WELL NAMED DIRECTOR OF EFF's CAMBRIDGE OFFICE
|
||
|
||
Cambridge, Massachusetts July 14,1992
|
||
|
||
Cliff Figallo, former director of the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link (The
|
||
WELL), has accepted the position of Director of the Electronic Frontier
|
||
Foundation's Cambridge office. His duties will include developing that
|
||
office's outreach programs, increasing active EFF membership, and
|
||
expanding overall awareness of EFF's programs in the computer-
|
||
conferencing community and the world at large.
|
||
|
||
In announcing the appointment today, Mitchell Kapor, President of EFF,
|
||
said: "I'm delighted that Cliff Figallo will be joining the EFF to head
|
||
its Cambridge office. Cliff brings 20 years of experience in forming
|
||
both intentional and virtual communities. We know he will put these
|
||
skills to excellent use in helping EFF build its ties to the online
|
||
community.We're all looking forward to working with him closely."
|
||
|
||
Figallo is well-known in computer conferencing circles as the one who
|
||
from 1986 to the present guided the WELL through its formative years.
|
||
Working with a small staff, many volunteers and limited funding, he
|
||
helped develop the WELL into one of the world's most influential
|
||
computer conferencing systems. When EFF was founded it used the WELL as
|
||
its primary means of online communication.
|
||
|
||
Commenting on the appointment of Figallo, Stewart Brand, creator of The
|
||
Whole Earth Catalogue, one of the founders of The WELL and a member of
|
||
the EFF Board of Directors, said: "As an exemplary manager of EFF's
|
||
initial habitat, the WELL, Cliff brings great contextual experience to
|
||
his new job. Best of all for us on the WELL, he won't even be leaving,
|
||
electronically speaking. Cambridge is only several keystrokes from
|
||
Sausalito."
|
||
|
||
Contacted at his home in Mill Valley today, Figallo stated: "I'm very
|
||
thankful for the opportunity to take part one of the critical missions
|
||
of our time -- the opening of new channels of person-to-person
|
||
communication in the world, and the protection of existing channels from
|
||
naive or excessive regulation and restriction.
|
||
|
||
"Pioneers in electronic or telecommunications media are establishing new
|
||
definitions and structures for education, community, and co-operation
|
||
every day. They are developing tools and systems which may prove to be
|
||
vital to the salvation of the planet. This work must go on.
|
||
|
||
"I look forward to helping EFF communicate the importance of events on
|
||
the Electronic Frontier to current and future settlers, and to those who
|
||
would, through unwise use of power, stifle the continued exploration and
|
||
settling of this new realm of the mind and the human spirit."
|
||
|
||
Figallo will assume his duties in September of this year.
|
||
|
||
For more information contact:
|
||
Gerard Van der Leun
|
||
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||
155 Second Street
|
||
Cambridge, MA 02141
|
||
Phone: +1 617 864 0665
|
||
FAX: +1 617 864 0866
|
||
Internet: van@eff.org
|
||
|
||
+=====+===================================================+=============+
|
||
| EFF |155 Second Street, Cambridge MA 02141 (617)864-0665| eff@eff.org |
|
||
+=====+===================================================+=============+
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 18 Jul 92 18:29:39 CDT
|
||
From: mcmullen@well.sf.ca.us
|
||
Subject: File 4--New York Hackers Plead Not Guilty (NEWSBYTES REPRINT)
|
||
|
||
NEW YORK, N.Y., U.S.A., 1992 JULY 17 (NB) --At an arraignment in New
|
||
York Federal Court on Thursday, July 16th, the five New York
|
||
"hackers", recently indicted on charges relating to alleged computer
|
||
intrusion, all entered pleas of not guilty and were released after
|
||
each signed a personal recognizance (PRB) bond of $15,000 to guarantee
|
||
continued appearances in court.
|
||
|
||
The accused, Mark Abene also known as"Phiber Optik"; Julio Fernandez
|
||
a/k/a "Outlaw"; Elias Ladopoulos a/k/a "Acid Phreak"; John Lee a/k/a
|
||
"Corrupt"; and Paul Stira a/k/a "Scorpion", were indicted on July 8th
|
||
on 11 counts alleging various computer and communications related
|
||
crimes --although all five were indicted together, each in not named
|
||
in all eleven counts and the maximum penalties possible under the
|
||
charges vary from 5 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine (Stira) to
|
||
40 years imprisonment and a $2 million fine (Lee).
|
||
|
||
As part of the arraignment process, United States District Judge
|
||
Richard Owen was assigned as the case's presiding judge and a
|
||
pre-trial meeting between the judge and the parties involved.
|
||
|
||
Charles Ross, attorney for John Lee, told Newsbytes "John Lee entered
|
||
a not guilty plea and we intend to energetically and aggressively
|
||
defend against the charges made against him."
|
||
|
||
Ross also explained the procedures that will be in effect in the case,
|
||
saying "We will meet with the judge and he will set a schedule for
|
||
discovery and the filing of motions. The defense will have to review
|
||
the evidence that the government has amassed before it can file
|
||
intelligent motions and the first meeting is simply a scheduling one."
|
||
|
||
Marjorie Peerce, attorney for Stira, told Newsbytes "Mr. Stira has
|
||
pleaded not guilty and will continue to plead not guilty. I am sorry
|
||
to see the government indict a 22 year old college student for acts
|
||
that he allegedly committed as a 19 year old."
|
||
|
||
The terms of the PRB signed by the accused require them to remain
|
||
within the continental United States. In requesting the bond
|
||
arrangement, Assistant United States Attorney Stephen Fishbein
|
||
referred to the allegations as serious and requested the $15,000 bond
|
||
with the stipulation that the accused have their bonds co-signed by
|
||
parents. Abene, Fernandez and Lee, through their attorneys, agreed to
|
||
the bond as stipulated while the attorneys for Ladopoulos and Stira
|
||
requested no bail or bond for their clients, citing the fact that
|
||
their clients have been available, when requested by authorities, for
|
||
over a year. After consideration by the judge, the same $15,000 bond
|
||
was set for Ladopoulos and Stira but no co-signature was required.
|
||
|
||
(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen//19920717)
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 21 Jul 92 19:21:06 EDT
|
||
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 5--Time Magazine Computer Analyst Arrested for Alleged Faud
|
||
|
||
((A little news tidbit to take in consideration next time we hear, a la
|
||
operation SunDevil, of all the 'hackers' that are active in CC fraud)).
|
||
|
||
Time Magazine Computer Analyst Arrested for Alleged Faud
|
||
|
||
A computer analyst, Thomas Ferguson, 44, who worked at Time magazine's
|
||
Tampa, Fla., customer service headquarters has been arrested after
|
||
allegations he sold thousands of subscribers' credit card numbers for
|
||
$1 apiece. Ferguson has been with the magazine for 18 months, faces
|
||
four counts of trafficking in credit cards, authorities said.
|
||
|
||
Police found computer disks containing the credit card numbers of
|
||
about 80,000 subscribers at Ferguson's Clearwater, Fla., home.
|
||
Authorities said they met Ferguson four times to buy about 3,000
|
||
credit card numbers since being tipped off to the scheme in June.
|
||
|
||
Time executives say that all credit card customers should examine
|
||
their credit card bills closely. If unauthorized purchases show up,
|
||
they should call the financial institution that issued the card.
|
||
(Reprinted from STReport 8.29 with permission.)
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.32
|
||
|
||
|
||
|