923 lines
44 KiB
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923 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun Apr 5, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue .16
|
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|
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
|
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Associate Editor: Etaion Shrdlu
|
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Arcmeisters: Brendan Kehoe and Bob Kusumoto
|
||
|
||
CONTENTS, #4.16 (Apr 5, 1992)
|
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File 1--Article on Software Patents
|
||
File 2--Why form is as important as content
|
||
File 3--The FBI Needs Industry's Help--OpEd in NYT
|
||
File 4--ACLU's Janlori Goldman's Reply to FBI Proposal (Risks Reprint)
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
|
||
group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG,
|
||
and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414)
|
||
789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4),
|
||
chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au. To use the U. of
|
||
Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the
|
||
quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
|
||
European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
||
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
||
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
|
||
is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should
|
||
be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal
|
||
mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified.
|
||
Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to
|
||
computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short
|
||
responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely
|
||
necessary.
|
||
|
||
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
||
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
||
violate copyright protections.
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 28 Mar 92 17:35:31 CST
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From: Net Wrider <nwrider@uanonymous.uunet.uu.net>
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Subject: File 1--Article on Software Patents
|
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|
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The following is available by anonymous FTP from prep.ai.mit.edu
|
||
in the pub/lpf directory.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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This article by Brian Kahin appears in the April 1990 issue of
|
||
Technology Review (Building W59, MIT, Cambridge MA 02139,
|
||
(617)253-8250). It may be copied for noncommercial purposes
|
||
provided that it is copied, along with this statement and the bio
|
||
at the end of the article, without any modification whatsoever.
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||
(Copyright (C) 1990 by Brian Kahin)
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|
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The Software Patent Crisis
|
||
|
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An explosion of patents on software processes may radically
|
||
change the programming industry--and our concept of human
|
||
expression in the computer age.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Last August, Refac International, Ltd., sued six major spreadsheet
|
||
publishers, including Lotus, Microsoft, and Ashton-Tate, claiming they
|
||
had infringed on U.S. Patent No. 4,398,249. The patent deals with a
|
||
technique called "natural order recalc," a common feature of
|
||
spreadsheet programs that allows a change in one calculation to
|
||
reverberate throughout a document. Refac itself does not have a
|
||
spreadsheet program and is not even in the software industry. Its
|
||
business is acquiring, licensing, and litigating patents.
|
||
|
||
Within the last few years, software developers have been surprised to
|
||
learn that hundreds, even thousands, of patents have been awarded for
|
||
programming processes ranging from sequences of machine instructions
|
||
to features of the user interface. Many of the patents cover
|
||
processes that seem conventional or obvious, and developers now fear
|
||
that any of the thousands of individual processes in their programs
|
||
may be subject to patent-infringement claims.
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||
|
||
The Refac suit demonstrates the vulnerability of the industry to such
|
||
claims. Patent no. 4,398,249 was applied for in 1970, granted in
|
||
1983, and only recently acquired by Refac. In the meantime, software
|
||
developers have been busily creating spreadsheets and other new
|
||
products unmindful of patents. The industry accepted copyright and
|
||
trade secret as adequate protection for its products, and most
|
||
programmers assumed that patents were not generally available for
|
||
software.
|
||
|
||
Never before has an industry in which copyright was widely established
|
||
suddenly been subjected to patenting. As it is, only a few companies
|
||
that create microcomputer software have the resources to try to defend
|
||
against patent infringement claims. Most small firms will be forced
|
||
to pay license fees rather than contest the claims, even though many
|
||
software patents may not stand up in court.
|
||
|
||
In the long run, the costs of doing business in a patent environment
|
||
will radically restructure the industry. Many small companies will
|
||
fold under the costs of licensing, avoiding patent infringement, and
|
||
pursuing patents defensively. The individual software entrepreneur
|
||
and inventor may all but disappear. There will be fewer publishers
|
||
and fewer products, and the price of software will rise to reflect the
|
||
costs.
|
||
|
||
Especially disturbing is that the broad claims of many recent software
|
||
patents appear to establish monopolies on the automation of such
|
||
common functions as generating footnotes and comparing documents.
|
||
Some claims even cover processes for presenting and communicating
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||
information, raising troubling questions about the effect of patents
|
||
on the future of computer-mediated expression.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Patent vs. Copyright
|
||
|
||
Software patents, like all patents, give an inventor the right to
|
||
exclude all others from making, selling, or using an invention for 17
|
||
years. In return, the patentee discloses his or her "best method" of
|
||
implementing the invention, thereby relinquishing trade secrets that
|
||
might otherwise be enforced forever (like the formula for Coca-Cola).
|
||
|
||
To obtain a patent, an applicant must convince Patent Office examiners
|
||
that the invention would not be obvious to a "person of ordinary skill
|
||
in the art" who is familiar with all the "prior art," which includes
|
||
previous patents and publications. In contrast, copyright inheres in
|
||
books, poems, music, and other works of authorship, including computer
|
||
programs, from the moment they are created. Registering one's work
|
||
with the Copyright Office is a simple, inexpensive procedure that has
|
||
important benefits (it is a precondition for filing suit, for
|
||
example), but the copyright itself is automatic when the work is fixed
|
||
on paper or on disk.
|
||
|
||
Copyright and patent protect different things. Copyright
|
||
protects expression but not underlying ideas. Patents protect
|
||
useful processes, machines, and compositions of matter.
|
||
Traditionally "processes" have included methods of physically
|
||
transforming materials but not business methods or mental steps.
|
||
Thus, computer programs fall somewhere between the traditional
|
||
territories of copyright and patent.
|
||
|
||
>From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the Patent Office and the
|
||
courts grappled with the question of whether algorithms--the
|
||
elemental processes on which computer programs are built--are
|
||
patentable as either processes or machines. Early on, the
|
||
Patent Office granted some patents for processes built into
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||
computer hardware that today would be contained in software, but
|
||
it was reluctant to grant patents for programs per se. As the
|
||
1966 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System
|
||
pointed out, the Patent Office had no system for classifying
|
||
programs. The report also noted that even if this were remedied,
|
||
the volume of programs being created was so enormous that
|
||
reliable searches of "prior art" would not be feasible or
|
||
economical.
|
||
|
||
However, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
|
||
maintained that computer programs were patentable and overturned
|
||
numerous Patent Office decisions denying patentability. The
|
||
Supreme Court vindicated the Patent Office in two decisions,
|
||
Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) and Parker v. Flook (1978), holding
|
||
that mathematical algorithms were not patentable subject matter.
|
||
Still, the CCPA continued to uphold patentability in other cases.
|
||
Finally, in Diamond v. Diehr (1981), a sharply divided Supreme
|
||
Court upheld the patentability of a process for curing rubber
|
||
that included a computer program. The majority concluded that
|
||
programs that did not preempt all uses of a computer algorithm
|
||
could be patented--at least when used in a traditional process
|
||
for physically transforming materials.
|
||
|
||
That case has been the Supreme Court's last word on the subject.
|
||
But despite the narrowness of the ruling, the Patent Office
|
||
underwent a radical change of heart. Until very recently, there
|
||
were no reported appeals of adverse Patent Office decisions,
|
||
leading observers to conclude that the office was eventually
|
||
granting almost all applications for software patents. Although
|
||
articles began appearing in legal periodicals a few years ago
|
||
noting that patents were being routinely granted for many
|
||
software processes, not until 1988 did the industry realize that
|
||
the rulBY':. +)c{asp|3oz5&%bhqXG=Rz86JAUWdVR*`3Irdle of
|
||
the game. By the spring of 1989, the patents that entered the
|
||
pipeline after Diamond v. Diehr were starting to flow out in
|
||
significant numbers--by one count, nearly 200 in the first four
|
||
months of that year.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Processing Problems
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, the Patent Office classification system remains
|
||
unchanged, and the volume of software being created has grown
|
||
exponentially. This makes searching for prior art--processes
|
||
already in public use--time-consuming and expensive.
|
||
|
||
The search is extraordinarily difficult because the field's
|
||
printed literature is thin and unorganized. Software documents
|
||
its own design, in contrast to physical processes, which require
|
||
written documentation. Also, software is usually distributed
|
||
without source code under licenses that forbid reverse
|
||
engineering. This may amount to suppressing or concealing the
|
||
invention and therefore prevent the program from qualifying as
|
||
prior art. The search for prior art may require securing oral
|
||
testimony from people who developed software at universities many
|
||
years ago, an expensive proposition.
|
||
|
||
Many programmers suspect that patent examiners lack knowledge of
|
||
the field, especially since the Patent Office does not accept
|
||
computer science as a qualifying degree for patent practice (it
|
||
accepts degrees in electrical engineering). Moreover, attracting
|
||
and holding individuals with expertise in a field like software,
|
||
where industry demand is high, is not easy for a government
|
||
agency. Less qualified examiners create problems because they
|
||
naturally have a lower standard in determining the hypothetical
|
||
"person having ordinary skill in the art," and are thus more apt
|
||
to grant patents for obvious processes. Since the examination
|
||
process is conducted ex parte (as a private matter between the
|
||
Patent Office and the applicant), less qualified personnel are
|
||
also more likely to be influenced by sophisticated patent
|
||
attorneys and the apparent expertise of the applicant.
|
||
|
||
The quality of software patents being awarded has aroused
|
||
concern even among patent lawyers and other advocates of the new
|
||
regime. But it will be left to firms being sued for infringement
|
||
to prove that a process should not have been patented because it
|
||
was obvious in view of the prior art. Meanwhile, software
|
||
patents stand as intimidating weapons for those who hold them.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Restructuring the Industry
|
||
|
||
Perhaps because of some of these problems, applications for
|
||
software patents take an average of 32 months to be approved and
|
||
published. That's significantly longer than the overall average
|
||
of 20 months, and a very long time given the short product cycles
|
||
of the software business.
|
||
|
||
Unlike copyright, independent creation is irrelevant to patent
|
||
infringement. Every developer is charged with knowledge of all
|
||
patents. Even if someone is not aware of a patent, he or she can
|
||
still infringe against it. Furthermore, patent applications and
|
||
the examination process are confidential, so there are ordinarily
|
||
several years of patents in the pipeline that no search will
|
||
reveal. Although no infringement occurs until the patent issues,
|
||
an inventor may find that a newly awarded patent covers a feature
|
||
he or she has already incorporated and marketed in a finished
|
||
product. While this is a problem for the patent system as a
|
||
whole, it is intolerable for software developers because of the
|
||
industry's rapid pace of innovation and long patent-processing
|
||
period.
|
||
|
||
The problem is compounded by the fact that a modern software
|
||
package may contain thousands of separately patentable processes,
|
||
each of which adds to the risk of infringing patents that are
|
||
already in the pipeline. Since software functions are
|
||
interdependent and must be carefully integrated, developers can
|
||
find it difficult to excise a process built into the original
|
||
program.
|
||
|
||
The patent system exacts a high penalty in an industry as
|
||
decentralized as software. Programming requires no special
|
||
materials, facilities, or tools: to design software is to build
|
||
it. Because barriers to entry are low, the industry attracts
|
||
many small players, including hundreds of thousands of
|
||
individuals who work as consultants or short-term employees.
|
||
Rather than a handful of competitors working on the same problem,
|
||
there are likely to be dozens, hundreds, even thousands. Since
|
||
under the patent system one winner takes all, many
|
||
others--including developers without lawyers--are deprived of
|
||
the fruits of their independent labor and investments.
|
||
|
||
Patent proponents argue that this uninhibited duplication of
|
||
effort wastes resources. But the "waste" could be cut only by
|
||
reducing the number of players and slowing the pace of
|
||
development to fit the cycles of the patent system. The result
|
||
would be a handful of giants competing on a global scale, bidding
|
||
for the ideas and loyalty of inventive individuals.
|
||
|
||
However, many programmers believe that there are diseconomies of
|
||
scale in software development--that the best programs are
|
||
authored rather than assembled. The success of Visicalc, Lotus
|
||
1-2-3, WordPerfect, and other classic programs testifies to the
|
||
genius of individuals and small teams. Certainly there has been
|
||
no evidence that they need more incentives. Quite the contrary,
|
||
the freewheeling U.S. software industry has been a model of
|
||
creative enterprise.
|
||
|
||
|
||
A Costly System
|
||
|
||
Even software developers and publishers who do not wish to patent
|
||
their products must bear the costs of operating under a patent
|
||
system. While these costs may initially come out of the software
|
||
industry's operating margins, in the long run, they will be borne
|
||
by users.
|
||
|
||
At the first level is the expense of analyzing prior art to avoid
|
||
patent infringement. A precautionary search and report by
|
||
outside patent counsel can run about $2,000--that's per process,
|
||
not per program.
|
||
|
||
Next are the direct costs of the patent monopoly--the license
|
||
fees that must be paid to patent holders. If the patent holder
|
||
refuses to license at a reasonable fee, developers must design
|
||
around the patent, if that is possible. Otherwise, they must
|
||
reconceive or even abandon the product.
|
||
|
||
The third set of costs are those incurred in filing for patents.
|
||
Searching for prior art, plus preparing, filing, negotiating, and
|
||
maintaining a patent, can total $10,000 to $25,000, not including
|
||
internal staff time. Seeking foreign patents can make the bill
|
||
substantially higher.
|
||
|
||
The notoriously high costs of patent litigation must be borne by
|
||
both sides. Just the discovery phase of a lawsuit is likely to
|
||
cost each side a minimum of $150,000, and a full trial can cost
|
||
each from $250,000 to millions. Again, these figures do not
|
||
include internal staff time, which could easily double the real
|
||
cost. While a small patent holder may be able to secure a law
|
||
firm on a contingency basis or sell an interest in the patent to
|
||
speculators, the defendant has no such options.
|
||
|
||
Litigation also involves the possibility and further expense of
|
||
an appeal. All appealed patent cases now go directly to the
|
||
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, successor to the
|
||
CCPA), where panels in patent cases are usually led by patent
|
||
lawyers turned judges. Whereas patents once fared poorly on
|
||
appeal, the CAFC has found patents to be both valid and infringed
|
||
in over 60 percent of the cases that have come before it. The
|
||
CAFC has greatly strengthened the presumption of patent validity
|
||
and upheld royalties ranging from 5 to 33 percent.
|
||
|
||
While a large software company may be able to absorb these costs,
|
||
they will disproportionately burden smaller companies. The first
|
||
to suffer will be independent developers who cannot afford to
|
||
market their own products. These developers typically receive
|
||
royalties of 10 to 15 percent from publishers who serve as their
|
||
distributors. Such modest margins, out of which developers must
|
||
recoup their own costs, would be wiped out by the need to pay
|
||
royalties to a few patent holders.
|
||
|
||
The high costs of a patent environment give patentees
|
||
considerable leverage over small firms who will, as a practical
|
||
necessity, pay a license fee rather than contest a dubious claim.
|
||
To establish credibility, the patentee will settle for small fees
|
||
from the initial licensees. The patent holder can then move on
|
||
to confront other small firms, pointing to such licensings as
|
||
acknowledgments of the patent's validity and power. This tactic
|
||
has a snowballing effect that can give the patent holder the
|
||
momentum and resources to take on larger companies.
|
||
|
||
Cross-licensing--where firms secure patents to trade for the
|
||
right to other patents--seems to work reasonably well in many
|
||
industries and has been touted as the answer to these problems.
|
||
However, cross-licensing is of little value to smaller companies,
|
||
which have little to bring to the table. And cross-licensing may
|
||
prove of limited value even to large companies, since it does not
|
||
protect against companies like Refac that have no interest in
|
||
producing software and therefore no need to cross-license.
|
||
|
||
Of course, the power that software patents afford may induce some
|
||
venture capitalists to invest in them. But investing in software
|
||
patents is one thing; investing in robust, complex products for a
|
||
mass market is another.
|
||
|
||
In fact, software publishers hold very few patents. The vast
|
||
majority are held by large hardware companies, computer
|
||
manufacturers that have in-house patent counsel and considerable
|
||
experience in patenting and cross-licensing. Nearly 40 percent
|
||
of the software patents that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
|
||
now issues go to Japanese hardware companies. It is quite
|
||
possible that the separate software publishing industry may cease
|
||
to exist as companies find that they need the patent portfolios
|
||
and legal resources that the hardware giants can provide. The
|
||
result will be a loss of diversity in software products, reduced
|
||
competition, and, many believe, a less productive software
|
||
industry.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Protecting Ideas and Information
|
||
|
||
A deeper, more disturbing problem in patenting programs was
|
||
barely evident before computers became ubiquitous personal tools
|
||
and software became infinitely versatile. More than a
|
||
"universal machine," the computer has developed into a medium for
|
||
human expression and a mediator of human experience. Software is
|
||
designed to satisfy specific needs for shaping and delivering
|
||
information. Thus, what is increasingly at stake in software
|
||
patents is the generation and flow of information. This becomes
|
||
more threatening when the claims in a patent extend far beyond
|
||
the disclosed means of implementation to cover general ideas.
|
||
|
||
Broad patent claims covering abstract processes are not limited
|
||
to software, or even to computer hardware. Consider patent no.
|
||
4,170,832, granted in 1979 for an "interactive teaching machine."
|
||
The patent discloses a clumsy-looking combined videotape deck and
|
||
television with a set of push buttons.
|
||
|
||
The patent includes a process claim for a procedure commonly used
|
||
in interactive video: showing an introductory video segment,
|
||
presenting the viewer with a limited number of choices,
|
||
registering the viewer's decision, and then revealing the likely
|
||
outcome of that decision. The disclosed machine, which was never
|
||
marketed, contributes nothing to the public domain: it simply
|
||
reveals one person's way of implementing a basic instructional
|
||
technique.
|
||
|
||
In a notorious 1983 case, a federal district court upheld the
|
||
patentability of Merrill Lynch's Cash Management Account system,
|
||
a procedure for moving investment funds among different types of
|
||
accounts. Acknowledging that the system--essentially a method of
|
||
doing business--would not be patentable if executed with pencil
|
||
and paper, the court nevertheless upheld the patent because it
|
||
made use of a computer.
|
||
|
||
The Patent Office has taken this principle one step further.
|
||
Besides granting monopolies on new procedures such as the Cash
|
||
Management Account system, the office is also awarding patents
|
||
merely for automating familiar processes such as generating
|
||
footnotes (patent no. 4,648,067) and comparing documents (patent
|
||
no. 4,807,182). But software developers have been routinely
|
||
automating such common office functions, bookkeeping procedures,
|
||
learning strategies, and modes of human interaction for years.
|
||
The principle that patents are granted to induce inventors to
|
||
disclose trade secrets has no relevance here. These processes
|
||
are part of everyday life, and can and should be computerized in
|
||
a number of ways.
|
||
|
||
What's more, information per se is traditionally the substance
|
||
and territory of copyright. The intelligent ordering of
|
||
information is the very heart of grammar, rhetoric, and graphic
|
||
design.
|
||
|
||
Why should information be subject to the pervasive restraints of
|
||
patent simply because it is interactive rather than linear?
|
||
Should human expression that is assembled, communicated, or
|
||
assimilated with the aid of a computer be restrained by patents?
|
||
If the computer is seen as an extension of the human mind rather
|
||
than vice versa, the answer is no.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Changing Patent Policy
|
||
|
||
Software developers who understand the impact of patents are
|
||
demoralized. Lawyers assure them that patents are here to stay,
|
||
and that programmers must seek new patents to protect against
|
||
other patents. These lawyers point to the growing torrent of
|
||
software patents, the presumption of patent validity, and the
|
||
fervidly pro-patent record of the Court of Appeals for the
|
||
Federal Circuit. Smaller companies that cannot afford this
|
||
advice can only hope that companies with deeper pockets will
|
||
afford more visible and attractive targets for patent holders
|
||
bringing suit.
|
||
|
||
But the narrowness of the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v.
|
||
Diehr remains. The Court never explicitly rejected the
|
||
traditional doctrines against the patentability of mental steps
|
||
and business methods, doctrines that may yet defeat many of the
|
||
patents that have issued. If the hue and cry grows, Congress
|
||
could amend the Patent Act to make it clear that the scope of
|
||
patenting is still limited to physical processes.
|
||
|
||
The software industry was not broke, but it is in the process of
|
||
being "fixed." The question is whether the fixing will be done
|
||
by the gush of awards from private proceedings in the Patent
|
||
Office--or by a public decision about whether software patents
|
||
serve "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," as
|
||
the Constitution requires.
|
||
|
||
+++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
Brian Kahin is an attorney specializing in information technology
|
||
and policy. An adjunct research fellow in the Science,
|
||
Technology and Public Policy Program at Harvard University's
|
||
Kennedy School of Government, he was formerly affiliated with the
|
||
MIT Research Program on Communications Policy and the MIT
|
||
Communications Forum. He is a graduate of Harvard College and
|
||
Harvard Law School.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 92 11:20:08 EST
|
||
From: ulowell!p30.f30.n231.z1.fidonet.org!Dave.Appel%harvard@HARVUNXW.BITNET
|
||
Subject: File 2--Why form is as important as content
|
||
|
||
I'd like to pass a message on to authors who write for electronic
|
||
newsletters: If you make your article easy to read, you will get
|
||
more people to read it.
|
||
|
||
I've been reading electronic news in the form of computer
|
||
bulletin boards and electronic newsletters since 1986. At first
|
||
I mainly saw technical and hobbyist communication, but BBS and
|
||
Usenet readership has changed. Your communications can no longer
|
||
be directed solely to tech-weenies and computer-nerds. You must
|
||
include a wide cross section of non-technical society as well.
|
||
|
||
Your audience is wider than you think. For example, I get CUD
|
||
from a BBS with a Usenet feed, and then distribute it to 4 other
|
||
bulletin boards in town. When I see something very important,
|
||
I'll post a message in the city-wide echo conference (25 BBSs)
|
||
referring people to an article in CUD###.ZIP on such-an-such BBS.
|
||
And, I know other folks in other cities do this too.
|
||
|
||
QUESTION:
|
||
What can you do to get more people to read what you write?
|
||
|
||
ANSWER:
|
||
****----> MAKE IT EASIER TO READ <----****
|
||
|
||
QUESTION:
|
||
How do you make it easier to read?
|
||
|
||
ANSWER:
|
||
Form, format (pretty-printing and line length), good
|
||
sentence structure, short well-constructed paragraphs,
|
||
correct grammar, correct spelling, syntax ... all those
|
||
things that made you hate your high school sophomore
|
||
English teacher.
|
||
|
||
Yes, this stuff does make an article easier to read. And, an
|
||
article that is easy to read has a better chance of being read.
|
||
|
||
One key segment of your audience consists of people, such as
|
||
executives or other non-technicals, who won't read "news" on a
|
||
monitor or VDT. (Believe it or not, there are a lot of people
|
||
who don't work in front of a computer screen.) These people need
|
||
to see a hard copy.
|
||
|
||
Therefore, your article not only has to look good on the screen,
|
||
it also has to look good on *PAPER* without reformatting. (You
|
||
might come back and say "research has shown that X percent
|
||
of readers read it online." But 100 minus X percent don't. And
|
||
VIPs, the ones you want to convince and motivate the most, don't.
|
||
To those people hard copy is not only easier but carries more
|
||
impact than the ethereal electronic version.)
|
||
|
||
Additionally, those who read the hardcopy version probably don't
|
||
have access to e-mail to easily respond to surveys about how and
|
||
where they read it. There is a vast silent readership out there.
|
||
And the better your article looks on paper, the larger that
|
||
readership will be.
|
||
|
||
Here we go.
|
||
|
||
LINE LENGTH:
|
||
|
||
Long lines are harder to read than short lines. Just because you
|
||
have 80 columns on the screen doesn't mean that line length has
|
||
to extend that far. Printed magazines usually have three columns
|
||
per page, sometimes more, always at least two.
|
||
|
||
I suggest a maximum of 65 characters for line length. It's
|
||
easier to read on the screen, and will give a print-out big 1"
|
||
margins when printed on standard 8.5" x 11" paper in a standard
|
||
pica (10 pitch, 12 point) font. BIG margins make it easier to
|
||
read.
|
||
|
||
Magazine editors have a formula for determining the optimum line
|
||
length:
|
||
O = lca x 1.5
|
||
Mn = O - 25%
|
||
Mx = O + 50%
|
||
Where O= optimum line length and lca = lower case alphabet length.
|
||
|
||
In essence, this formula says that a the best length for a line
|
||
is one and one half times the length of all of the lower case
|
||
letters printed next to each other, give 50% or take 25%.
|
||
|
||
Example:
|
||
I see your article online. I like it, believe it, and want to
|
||
act on it. You've convinced me. But I'm staff, not management.
|
||
I have to make a hard copy of your article, or the whole
|
||
newsletter, and present it to management. Anyone who has
|
||
presented reports to management knows that looks count.
|
||
|
||
But I can't just shoot it out to the printer in a nice 11 or 12
|
||
point font and maintain decent margins. I have to remove the
|
||
hard carriage returns, but not all of them, to reformat
|
||
paragraphs. Headers, quotes, tables, outlines, and indented
|
||
paragraphs need the hard returns left in. So neither standard
|
||
search-and-replace nor conversion programs will work 100%. It's
|
||
a hand job. Now it's going to take me 15 to 20 minutes in a
|
||
word-processor before I can print it out and hand it to my boss.
|
||
Multiply that by the 100 or 1000 people around the world who
|
||
might want to show your important article to their boss.
|
||
|
||
SENTENCE LENGTH:
|
||
|
||
Sentence length needs to be varied similar to how a story-teller
|
||
or a comedian varies the pace. This keeps the audience or reader
|
||
from getting bored. If all the sentences are of equal length it
|
||
gets rhythmic and monotonous. Very long sentences are hard to
|
||
understand.
|
||
|
||
PARAGRAPH LENGTH:
|
||
|
||
Long paragraphs make a page look gray, and make it harder to
|
||
read. Long paragraphs are visually unpleasant. White space is
|
||
needed to break it up.
|
||
|
||
A paragraph should contain just one thought and be small enough
|
||
to be easily understood. If your thought takes too long to
|
||
explain, break it up into smaller pieces. More complex material
|
||
needs shorter elements to be easily understood. Paragraph length
|
||
affects the eye-strain, attention span and fatigue level of your
|
||
reader, which in turn affects whether he will finish reading it.
|
||
|
||
ORGANIZATION:
|
||
|
||
Good organization can be summarized in three easy steps:
|
||
1) Thesis
|
||
2) Body
|
||
3) Conclusion
|
||
|
||
Tell the reader what you're going to tell him. Expound upon it
|
||
and make your points. Then recap what you said. The reader
|
||
should not have to read three or four paragraphs down to find out
|
||
what you are writing about. Most people just read the first
|
||
paragraph to find out if they want to read the rest of article.
|
||
If you don't hook them in the first paragraph, you've lost them.
|
||
|
||
SPELLING, GRAMMAR, ETC:
|
||
|
||
Just between us, I don't care if you make typos. You don't care
|
||
if I make typos. However, errors stick out like a sore thumb to
|
||
scholars, businessmen and management types.
|
||
|
||
Spelling and obvious grammar or usage errors give the
|
||
impression that you aren't serious about what you are writing.
|
||
Such errors indicate that you didn't take the time to give your
|
||
piece a professional appearance. These errors give people who
|
||
don't know you the impression that you aren't as intelligent as
|
||
you really are.
|
||
|
||
Besides, a four star restaurant does not serve haute cuisine on
|
||
paper plates. You don't package a diamond ring in an old cigar
|
||
box. If your piece is important, you need to make it look
|
||
important.
|
||
|
||
HOW TO DO IT:
|
||
|
||
First, check your work yourself, keeping in mind the above
|
||
suggested guidelines. Proof it two or three times, then run it
|
||
through spelling and grammar checkers if possible.
|
||
|
||
If your piece is very important, ask a friend to look it over.
|
||
If your piece is of the utmost importance, ask someone with
|
||
professional editing or proofreading experience to look it over.
|
||
Even professional writers admit that proofing and final editing
|
||
one's work is best done by someone else. Other people can point
|
||
out things in your writing that you don't see.
|
||
|
||
Most spelling and grammar checkers don't point out such usage
|
||
errors as "there" instead of "their" or "they're." It takes
|
||
careful proofreading two or three times.
|
||
|
||
An occasional comma splice or run-on sentence will not bother
|
||
most readers. But complicated, poorly constructed, or hard to
|
||
understand sentences will have the reader shaking his head
|
||
wondering what you meant.
|
||
|
||
If you don't have friends or associates who are good at
|
||
proofreading and editing, you can try professional services.
|
||
Many editors, proofreaders, typesetters, etc. have started their
|
||
own desktop publishing businesses. Even if all you need is
|
||
electronic editing, not hardcopy output, those people can help
|
||
you polish your work. This will help you get your points across,
|
||
and even increase the number of people who read your article.
|
||
|
||
One such business in Indianapolis is The Electronic Editor BBS at
|
||
(317)293-8395, 293-1863 voice. They allow you to upload your raw
|
||
copy in practically any format and from any word processor.
|
||
Making files "sysop only" insures privacy. Encryption with
|
||
PKZIP's password facility prior to upload can guarantee privacy.
|
||
Their editors make the edited version of your file available in
|
||
encrypted format for download or mail the file back to you on
|
||
diskette. Hardcopy laser printer output is optional.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION:
|
||
|
||
I think that many of the issues discussed in electronic
|
||
newsletters such as CUD are important. I'd like to see those
|
||
issues taken to the power holders, the movers and shakers, the
|
||
corporate executives and the middle managers who run the
|
||
institutions in our society.
|
||
|
||
I see many articles that might be described as diamonds in the
|
||
rough. Polishing your articles and formatting them nicely will
|
||
go a long way towards:
|
||
|
||
- increasing your readership
|
||
- reaching the important people
|
||
- assisting your current readership in re-distributing your
|
||
work beyond the electronic community.
|
||
|
||
You may send comments, questions, flames, to:
|
||
Fidonet: Dave Appel @ 1:231/30
|
||
RIME: Dave Appel -> IBMNET
|
||
Internet: Dave.Appel@f30.n231.z1.fidonet.org
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 92 8:01:39 EST
|
||
From: Lance J. Hoffman <hoffman@seas.gwu.edu>
|
||
Subject: File 3--FBI OpEd in NYT (Risks Digest Reprint, #3.31)
|
||
|
||
The debate on (son of) S. 266 and on whether and how to "dumb down"
|
||
computer technology to satisfy law enforcement needs is joined in The
|
||
New York Times of Friday, March 27, 1992 with articles by William
|
||
Sessions, FBI director, and Janlori Goldman, director of the privacy
|
||
and technology project of the American
|
||
|
||
Civil Liberties Union. RISKS readers with an interest (or stake)
|
||
should read these articles carefully, and consider responding with
|
||
letters to the editor of the New York Times of their own if they have
|
||
anything to add. If the technical community wishes to be heard, it
|
||
should speak up now. (Letters to their congressional representatives
|
||
may not hurt either ;-) ).
|
||
Pance Hoffman
|
||
|
||
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The George
|
||
Washington University, Washington, D. C. 20052 (202) 994-4955
|
||
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
>Date: Fri, 27 Mar 92 07:54:31 CST
|
||
>From: ks@stat.tamu.edu (Kurt F. Sauer)
|
||
>Subject: The FBI Needs Industry's Help--OpEd in NYT
|
||
|
||
FBI Director William Sessions wrote an interesting op-ed piece in
|
||
today's New York Times (Vol. CXLI, No. 48,918, Fri., Mar. 27, 1992, p.
|
||
A15) dealing with the problems which federal law enforcement expects
|
||
to encounter when placing court-ordered wiretaps on data circuits.
|
||
When I read between the lines, it sounds as if Mr. Sessions doesn't
|
||
want us to use data security which employs end-to-end encryption;
|
||
perhaps other RISKS-DIGEST readers will draw different conclusions.
|
||
|
||
[Under the rubric "Dialogue/High-Tech Wiretaps"]
|
||
|
||
Keeping an Ear on Crime: The F.B.I. Needs Industry's Help
|
||
|
||
By William S. Sessions
|
||
|
||
Advances in telecommunications technology promise to deprive
|
||
Federal, state and local law enforcement officers and the public of
|
||
the incalculable benefits that can be obtained only by
|
||
court-authorized wire-tapping.
|
||
|
||
Wiretapping is one of the most effective means of combating drug
|
||
trafficking, organized crime, kidnapping and corruption in government.
|
||
The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not want the new digital
|
||
technology that is spreading across America to impair this crucial
|
||
law-enforcement technique. Thus, after consulting with the
|
||
telecommunications industry, members of Congress and executive branch
|
||
agencies, the Justice Department has proposed legislation that is
|
||
intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officers to
|
||
intercept conversations of people engaged in serious crimes.
|
||
|
||
This bill is consistent with legislation passed in 1968 after
|
||
Congress debated the constitutional problem posed by the Government's
|
||
need to address both serious criminal conduct and the individual's
|
||
right to privacy. Congress struck a balance by passing the Omnibus
|
||
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
|
||
|
||
That law and later amendments created the meticulous procedure by
|
||
which law enforcement officers obtain judicial authorization for
|
||
electronic surveillance. Wiretaps can be used to address only the
|
||
most serious criminal, sometimes violent, threats facing society.
|
||
Only when a judge is satisfied that all statutory safeguards have been
|
||
met and all other reasonable investigative steps have failed or will
|
||
likely fail, are taps permitted.
|
||
|
||
Digital technology makes possible the simultaneous transmission
|
||
of multiple conversations and other data over the same lines. The
|
||
problem is that voice transmission will soon be replaced by an
|
||
endless, inseparable stream of electronic emissions, making it
|
||
virtually impossible to capture criminal conversations.
|
||
|
||
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not complaining. As the
|
||
telecommunications industry develops digital technology, new services
|
||
such as Caller ID are becoming available to business and private
|
||
customers. The new technology already has provided benefits for the
|
||
F.B.I.--for example, it helped solve the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
|
||
|
||
But if digital technology is fully introduced with insufficient
|
||
attention to public safety, the effectiveness of law enforcement
|
||
officers will be greatly impaired.
|
||
|
||
As society and technology evolve, so do government's needs and
|
||
responsibilities. And, yes, the burden of helping to safeguard the
|
||
public often falls on those who make profits from regulated goods and
|
||
services. It is reasonable for the telecommunications industry to
|
||
come to the aid of law enforcement. The proposed legislation relies
|
||
on it to find technical solutions that are cost effective while
|
||
permitting the development of its technology. Surely it can do both
|
||
in a way that insures its competitiveness.
|
||
|
||
Indisputably, there will be financial costs associated with
|
||
whatever technical solutions the private sector might develop. These
|
||
costs cannot be measured only in dollars; consider the price society
|
||
would pay if the ability to solve complex crimes were thwarted by an
|
||
end to wiretapping. In a recent large-scale military-procurement
|
||
fraud case-- which was successful because of wiretaps--the fines,
|
||
restitutions, forfeitures and savings to taxpayers exceeded $500
|
||
million.
|
||
|
||
The cost to telecommunications companies would not be so
|
||
substantial as to outweigh the consequences of an inability of law
|
||
enforcement to act. But if nothing is done soon, as technology
|
||
advances and the digital systems become more widespread, the cost of
|
||
addressing the issue down the road will undoubtedly increase
|
||
dramatically.
|
||
The proposed legislation does not expand the authority of the
|
||
F.B.I. or any other criminal justice agency. It simply preserves
|
||
what Congress authorized in 1968--nothing more.
|
||
|
||
In recent years, Congress has expanded the Federal criminal
|
||
activities for which wiretapping may be obtained. As in 1968, it must
|
||
decide if law enforcement should have this invaluable tool available.
|
||
I am confident that congress will again support law enforcement by
|
||
approving the necessary legislation.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 92 18:23:41 PST
|
||
From: central office <9958@service.com
|
||
Subject: File 4--ACLU's Janlori Goldman's Reply to FBI Proposal (Risks Reprint)
|
||
|
||
>Date: Mon, 30 Mar 92 20:40:26 EST
|
||
>From: "Daniel B. Dobkin" <dbd@ans.net>
|
||
>Subject: Dumbing down the FBI
|
||
|
||
Lance Hoffman's posting on Friday mentioned the New York Times Op-Ed
|
||
dialogue between FBI Director William Sessions and Janlori Goldman,
|
||
director of the ACLU Privacy and Technology Project. Kurt Sauer
|
||
posted Director Session's article; at the risk of preaching to the
|
||
choir, herewith is Ms. Goldman's reply.
|
||
|
||
Keeping an Ear on Crime: Why Cater To Luddites?
|
||
|
||
By Janlori Goldman
|
||
|
||
The Federal Bureau of Investigation says advances in the
|
||
telecommunications industry are likely to make it difficult to use its
|
||
old-fashioned wiretapping techniques to listen in on telephone
|
||
conversations. The F.B.I.'s solution, in legislation the Justice
|
||
Department is asking Congress to pass, is to force the
|
||
telecommunications and computer industries to redesign their
|
||
modernized systems to accommodate the bureau's needs. Unfairly, the
|
||
F.B.I. wants consumers to pay for it through rate increases and higher
|
||
equipment costs. The telecommunications and computer industries both
|
||
oppose a bill that would mandate such sweeping regulations.
|
||
|
||
The proposal makes the bureau look like Luddites, the 19th century
|
||
English weavers who smashed new machines that they claimed put them
|
||
out of work. Instead of keeping up with new developments, the F.B.I.
|
||
wants to freeze progress.
|
||
|
||
It is wrongheaded and dangerous to require the industry to put
|
||
surveillance first by slowing innovation and retarding efficiency. How
|
||
can the F.B.I. justify this policy at home while the White House is
|
||
wringing its hands over U.S. competitiveness in the international
|
||
market?
|
||
|
||
The F.B.I. fears that new digital technology will make it difficult,
|
||
even impossible, to listen in on conversations by using traditional
|
||
wiretapping equipment. The new technology converts voices and data
|
||
into electronic blips and reconverts the blips into voices and data
|
||
near the receiving end on high-speed fiberoptic lines.
|
||
|
||
The bureau overstates its concern. The telecommunications industry
|
||
says it is not aware of a single instance in which the F.B.I. has been
|
||
unable to tap a line because of the widespread new technology. Even
|
||
the Director, William S. Sessions, admitted in a Congressional
|
||
hearing last week that no warrant has been issued that could not be
|
||
executed.
|
||
|
||
At issue is the F.B.I.'s ability to wiretap in the future. But the
|
||
answer is not a legislative fix that freezes technology. The F.B.I. is
|
||
not only asking the industry to dumb down existing software, it wants
|
||
to prohibit it from developing new technologies that might interfere
|
||
with the Government's ability to intercept various oral and electronic
|
||
communications. The proposed restrictions not only cover phone
|
||
companies but also on-line computer services (such as as Prodigy and
|
||
Compuserve), electronic mail systems and bulletin boards, and
|
||
switchboards.
|
||
|
||
The F.B.I. says its proposal only seeks to preserve its legal
|
||
authority to wiretap. Actually, it wants to expand the power of the
|
||
Federal Communications Commission, which regulates the
|
||
telecommunications industry, to make the F.B.I.'s needs a priority in
|
||
designing new technologies. In its legislation, the Government
|
||
threatens to impose a $10,000-a-day fine on companies that develop
|
||
technologies that exceed the F.B.I.'s technical competence. The
|
||
F.B.I. has it backward. If the Government wants to engage in
|
||
surveillance, it must bear the burden of keeping pace with new
|
||
developments. Last year, Congress appropriated $80 million for a
|
||
five-year F.B.I. research effort focused on telecommunications
|
||
advances.
|
||
|
||
There is a serious risk that rollbacks in advances may make
|
||
telecommunications networks more vulnerable to unauthorized intrusion.
|
||
One of the industry's main goals is to design secure systems that
|
||
thwart illegal interception of electronic funds transfers, proprietary
|
||
information and other sensitive data.
|
||
|
||
The F.B.I. is not the only agency trying to block progress. The
|
||
National Security Agency has tried to put a cap on the private
|
||
development of technology in encryption, the electronic encoding of
|
||
data to guard against unauthorized use.
|
||
|
||
As the private sector develops more effective encryption codes to
|
||
protect information in its data bases, the N.S.A. worries that it may
|
||
have trouble breaking such codes in its intelligence gathering
|
||
overseas. The agency is denying export licenses for certain encryption
|
||
codes, thus inhibiting the private sector's development and use of the
|
||
technology. Congress should defeat the proposal. Otherwise, we may be
|
||
prohibited from erecting sturdy buildings if the thick walls prevent
|
||
an F.B.I. agent from eavesdropping on a conversation through a cup
|
||
pressed to a wall.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.16
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|