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40 KiB
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927 lines
40 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Tue, Mar 10, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 11
|
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|
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
|
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Associate Editor: Etaion Shrdlu
|
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|
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CONTENTS, #4.11 (Mar 10, 1992)
|
||
File 1--Net Resources
|
||
File 2--Readers Reply: "Bury Usenet"
|
||
File 3--Readers Reply: Apology to Craig Neidorf (CuD #4.10)
|
||
File 4--F.B.I. and Digital Communications Amendment (NYT synopsis)
|
||
File 5--F.B.I.' Proposed Digital Communications Legislation
|
||
File 6--CPSR Response to FBI Proposal
|
||
File 7--"Real Hackers?" Comparing the old and the new (DFP Reprint)
|
||
File 8--BBSes and Telco Rates
|
||
File 9--HACKING grounds for dismissal
|
||
File 10--Updated Info on 2nd Annual Int'l BBSing & Elec. Comm Conf.
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
|
||
group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG,
|
||
and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414)
|
||
789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from ftp.cs.widener.edu (147.31.254.132),
|
||
chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au. To use the U. of
|
||
Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the
|
||
quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
|
||
European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893.
|
||
|
||
NOTE: THE WIDENER SITE IS TEMPORARILY RE-ORGANIZING AND IS CURRENTLY
|
||
DIFFICULT TO ACCESS. FTP-ERS SHOULD USE THE ALTERNATE FTP SITES UNTIL
|
||
FURTHER NOTICE.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
||
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
||
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
|
||
is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should
|
||
be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal
|
||
mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified.
|
||
Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to the
|
||
Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses.
|
||
Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary.
|
||
|
||
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
||
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
||
violate copyright protections.
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 92 19:58:41 CST
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||
From: Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
||
Subject: File 1--Net Resources
|
||
|
||
Frank Klaess, sysop of ComNet in Luxembourg, is providing CuDs and
|
||
other text files on ComNet Luxembourg BBS. ComNet is a two-line,
|
||
14,400 board and the phone number is: (++352) 466893.
|
||
|
||
ComNet is not yet accessible through internet, but Frank can be
|
||
reached on PC-Exec BBS in Milwaukee (414) 789-4352.
|
||
|
||
+++++++
|
||
|
||
The Well, perhaps the best system in the country, is now accessible
|
||
through ftp (192.132.30.2). The initial sign-up is nominal, and usage
|
||
fees are more than reasonable ($10 a month and $2 an hour). There are
|
||
thousands of discussion topics, conferences on almost every issue
|
||
conceivable, and there are a number of services and features that make
|
||
it a valuable investment. Cybernauts would find the Hacking, EFF
|
||
(Electronic Frontier Foundation) and CPSR (Computer Professionals for
|
||
Social Responsibility) conferences especially interesting.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 8 Mar 92 13:53:33 CST (Sun)
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||
From: peter@TARONGA.COM(Peter da Silva)
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||
Subject: File 2--Readers Reply: "Bury Usenet"
|
||
|
||
Building a new net with a wider bandwidth and tighter controls, as
|
||
Steve seems to want, is a SMOP. Write the software, build your Usenet
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II, and if it's really that far superior then it will supplant Usenet
|
||
I.
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|
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People are always coming up with improvements they'd like to the basic
|
||
Usenet model, but none seem willing to put their money where their
|
||
mouth is. Come on, Steve. You can use the existing transport
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||
mechanism, even. Just a new newsreader or two and you're in business!
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 8 Mar 92 13:55:28 EST
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||
From: The Advocate <unixville@matrix.uunet.uu.net>
|
||
Subject: File 3--Readers Reply: Apology to Craig Neidorf (CuD #4.10)
|
||
|
||
A poster in CuD 4.10 writes:
|
||
|
||
> I never meant to suggest that Craig was in any way "at fault" for the
|
||
> cost of his defense, nor to discourage people from donating money to
|
||
> offset his expenses.
|
||
|
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I was just wondering, did craig ever consider getting a public
|
||
defender? After all, he was above 18, he was an independent student.
|
||
I think he could have qualified, with a little finagling. A lot of
|
||
them are damn good.
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||
|
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I think I had disconnected, during the arrest periods, due to work
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||
loads or i would have suggested it. HAve to admit, it would have been
|
||
nice to put the tab on uncle sam. and federal PDs are 1000 fold
|
||
better then local ones.
|
||
|
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((Moderators' note: Craig's initial attorney seemed unfamiliar with
|
||
the issues his case raised. The Advocate is correct in observing
|
||
that many public defenders are competent, idealistic, and hard
|
||
working. Unfortunately, the issues raised in this case were beyond
|
||
the resources and expertise of most public defenders and required
|
||
some specialized skills.
|
||
|
||
In Chicago, the jurisdiction of Craig's trial, Federal public
|
||
defenders are appointed only if the defendant can demonstrate
|
||
financial need, and Craig, at best, probably would not have qualified.
|
||
Public defense attorneys appointed by the presiding judge from a pro
|
||
bono list, and while, through luck if the draw, it is possible to
|
||
obtain some of the best legal counsel in the country, it is just as
|
||
likely that he would be appointed one who neither was familiar with
|
||
nor willing to take on the line of defense ultimately used.
|
||
Unfortunately, our system of justice requires investment of resources
|
||
before the wheels turn properly.))
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 92 01:32:06 EST
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||
From: Cy Burway <finder@canfield.com>
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||
Subject: File 4--F.B.I. and Digital Communications Amendment (NYT synopsis)
|
||
|
||
As Technology Makes Wiretaps More Difficult, F.B.I. Seeks Help
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||
(From: New York Times, March 8, 1992: p. I-12)
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||
By Anthony Ramirez
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||
|
||
The Department of Justice says that advanced telephone equipment in
|
||
wide use around the nation is making it difficult for law-enforcement
|
||
agencies to wiretap the phone calls of suspected criminals.
|
||
|
||
The Government proposed legislation Friday requiring the nation's
|
||
telephone companies to give law-enforcement agencies technical help
|
||
with their eavesdropping. Privacy advocates criticized the proposal as
|
||
unclear and open to abuse.
|
||
|
||
In the past, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies
|
||
could simply attach alligator clips and a wiretap device to the line
|
||
hanging from a telephone pole. Law-enforcement agents could clearly
|
||
hear the conversations. That is still true of telephone lines carrying
|
||
analog transmissions, the electronic signals used by the first
|
||
telephones in which sounds correspond proportionally to voltage.
|
||
|
||
But such telephone lines are being steadily replaced by high-speed,
|
||
high-capacity lines using digital signals. On a digital line, F.B.I.
|
||
agents would hear only computer code or perhaps nothing at all because
|
||
some digital transmissions are over fiber-optic lines that convert the
|
||
signals to pulses of light.
|
||
|
||
In addition, court-authorized wiretaps are narrowly written. They
|
||
restrict the surveillance to particular parties and particular topics
|
||
of conversation over a limited time on a specific telephone or group
|
||
of telephones. That was relatively easy with analog signals. The
|
||
F.B.I. either intercepted the call or had the phone company re-route
|
||
it to an F.B.I. location, said William A. Bayse, the assistant
|
||
director in the technical services division of the F.B.I.
|
||
|
||
But tapping a high-capacity line could allow access to thousands of
|
||
conversations. Finding the conversation of suspected criminals, for
|
||
example, in a complex "bit stream" would be impossible without the aid
|
||
of phone company technicians.
|
||
|
||
There are at least 140 million telephone lines in the country and more
|
||
than half are served in some way by digital equipment, according to
|
||
the United States Telephone Association, a trade group. The major
|
||
arteries and blood vessels of the telecommunications network are
|
||
already digital. And the greatest part of the system, the capillaries
|
||
of the network linking central telephone offices to residences and
|
||
businesses, will be digital by the mid-1990s.
|
||
|
||
Thousand Wiretaps
|
||
|
||
The F.B.I. said there were 1,083 court-authorized wiretaps--both new
|
||
and continuing--by Federal, state, and local law-enforcement
|
||
authorities in 1990, the latest year for which data are available.
|
||
|
||
Janlori Goldman, director of the privacy and technology project for the
|
||
American Civil Liberties Union, said she had been studying the
|
||
development of the F.B.I. proposal for several months.
|
||
|
||
"We are not saying that this is not a problem that shouldn't be
|
||
fixed," she said, "but we are concerned that the proposal may be
|
||
overbroad and runs the risk that more information than is legally
|
||
authorized will flow to the F.B.I.
|
||
|
||
In a news conference in Washington on Friday, the F.B.I. said it was
|
||
seeking only to "preserve the status quo" with its proposal so that
|
||
it could maintain the surveillance power authorized by a 1968 Federal
|
||
law, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The proposal,
|
||
which is lacking in many details is also designed to benefit state and
|
||
local authorities.
|
||
|
||
Under the proposed law, the Federal Communications Commission would
|
||
issue regulations to telephone companies like the GTE Corporation and
|
||
the regional Bell telephone companies, requiring the "modification" of
|
||
phone systems "if those systems impede the Government's ability to
|
||
conduct lawful electronic surveillance."
|
||
|
||
In particular, the proposal mentions "providers of electronic
|
||
communications services and private branch exchange operators,"
|
||
potentially meaning all residences and all businesses with telephone
|
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equipment.
|
||
|
||
Frocene Adams, a security official with US West in Denver is the
|
||
chairman of Telecommunications Security Association, which served as
|
||
the liaison between the industry and the F.B.I. "We don't know the
|
||
extent of the changes required under the proposal," she said, but
|
||
emphasized that no telephone company would do the actual wiretapping
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||
or other surveillance.
|
||
|
||
Computer software and some hardware might have to be changed, Ms. Adams
|
||
aid, but this could apply to new equipment and mean relatively few
|
||
changes for old equipment.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 92 19:58:41 CST
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||
From: Jim Thomas <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
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||
Subject: File 5--F.B.I.' Proposed Digital Communications Legislation
|
||
|
||
Increasingly sophisticated technology available to the average citizen
|
||
undeniably makes it more difficult for law enforcement to pursue
|
||
legitimate investigations. When technology expands faster than
|
||
society's capacity to examine the social, ethical, or legal
|
||
implications of the changes, two potential problems emgerge: Laws
|
||
that correspond to technological advances do not change, leaving law
|
||
enforcement either handicapped or forced to implement illicit means in
|
||
investigations, or laws change in ways that potentially intrude on
|
||
civil liberties by reducing Constitutional protections. The trick is
|
||
to find a happy medium.
|
||
|
||
The legislation proposed by the U.S. Government reflects an attempt to
|
||
bring current Federal legislation in line with technology. In
|
||
principle, this is wise. In practice, questions arise that should be
|
||
addressed in order to assure that the proposed legislation allows law
|
||
enforcement to pursue its legitimate ends while simultaneously
|
||
protecting the interests of citizens.
|
||
|
||
The proposed legislation has not yet been submitted to Congress, and
|
||
our understanding is that there is as yet no draft of the proposed
|
||
changes. CPSR, EFF, the ACLU, and other groups appear to be actively
|
||
involved in assuring that the language and implications of the final
|
||
document will be carefully examined prior to submission.
|
||
|
||
As we understand the proposed legislation, it would make it easier for
|
||
investigators to conduct *legal* surveillance of digital, broad-band,
|
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communications by implementing technology that targets a specific user
|
||
rather than an entire stream of users. To do this, telecommunications
|
||
systems would require modification that would be implemented by the
|
||
phone companies and would include changes in user devices.
|
||
|
||
Among the questions the proposed legislation raises are:
|
||
|
||
1. Who would bear the costs of the modifications? Should costs be
|
||
passed on to end telecommunications users?
|
||
|
||
2. How would the modifications change the requirements for obtaining
|
||
warrants?
|
||
|
||
3. What potential abuses might arise from the modifications?
|
||
|
||
4. What unanticipated advantages or social benefits might emerge?
|
||
|
||
5. How might the concept of "good faith" be interpreted when
|
||
non-targeted information is obtained?
|
||
|
||
6. How would the proposed legislation dovetail into recent U.S.
|
||
Supreme Court decisions that expand the search powers of law
|
||
enforcement?
|
||
|
||
7. What concepts or definitions of "telecommunications" and other
|
||
terms would be established? How far would the scope of the legislation
|
||
extend? Would it include data lines if it were suspected that the
|
||
target were transferring an unlicensed version of Word Perfect? Among
|
||
the "evidence" used to justify the seizure of Steve Jackson Games, the
|
||
Secret Service claimed that the simple description of Kermit as a
|
||
7-bit protocol used to transfer data between mainframes and PCs was
|
||
evidence of a conspiracy. Would this allow monitoring of all Kermit
|
||
up/downloads by Steve Jackson employees?
|
||
|
||
There are many other questions to be addressed, but the ultimate one
|
||
remains: What is the best language that would protect both law
|
||
enforcements' ability to carry out its function while preserving
|
||
Constitutional rights? The recent history of some law enforcement
|
||
officials, particularly in the Secret Service and a few local
|
||
jurisdictions, indicates that the question is more than a
|
||
philosophical debate. The consequences of ill-considered language for
|
||
all involved require careful consideration of balance.
|
||
|
||
The following is the press release proposing the legislation:
|
||
|
||
+++++
|
||
|
||
U.S. Department of Justice
|
||
Federal Bureau of Investigation
|
||
|
||
Office of the Director Washington, D.C. 20535
|
||
March 6, 1992
|
||
|
||
STATEMENT BY FBI DIRECTOR WILLIAM S. SESSIONS
|
||
CONCERNING PROPOSED DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS LEGISLATION
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement's continued ability to conduct court-authorized
|
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electronic surveillances is one of the most critical issues facing law
|
||
enforcement today. However, recent telecommunications systems
|
||
improvements have outpaced the government's ability to technologically
|
||
continue this highly successful, and lawful technique.
|
||
|
||
Consequently, the U.S. Government has proposed legislation requiring
|
||
the telecommunications industry to ensure that its advanced digital
|
||
telephone systems accommodate the legitimate needs of federal, state,
|
||
and local law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
Specifically, this legislation seeks to preserve the status quo of an
|
||
extraordinarily efficient and effective technique utilized by law
|
||
enforcement to conduct court-authorized electronic surveillances, as
|
||
authorized by Congress in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
|
||
Safe Streets Act of 1968. The approach suggested in the legislation
|
||
represents by far the least costly alternative and is the only certain
|
||
method of addressing the issue.
|
||
|
||
Without an ultimate solution, terrorists, violent criminals,
|
||
kidnappers, drug cartels, and other criminal organizations will be
|
||
able to carry out their illegal activities using the
|
||
telecommunications system without detection. This proposal is critical
|
||
to the safety of the American people and to the law enforcement
|
||
officers who must daily enforce the laws of this country.
|
||
|
||
The Legislative proposal is not solely a law enforcement proposal but
|
||
is a result of a cooperative effort by Administration and Congressional
|
||
leaders, telecommunications industry executives and law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 1992 17:47:59 -0500
|
||
From: dbanisar@washofc.cpsr.org
|
||
Subject: File 6--CPSR Response to FBI Proposal
|
||
|
||
CPSR letter on FBI Proposal
|
||
|
||
CPSR and several other organizations sent the following letter to
|
||
Senator Patrick Leahy regarding the FBI's recent proposal to undertake
|
||
wire surveillance in the digital network.
|
||
|
||
If you also believe that the FBI's proposal requires further study at
|
||
a public hearing, contact Senator Hollings at the Senate Committee on
|
||
Commerce. The phone number is 202/224-9340.
|
||
|
||
Dave Banisar,
|
||
CPSR Washington Office
|
||
====================================================
|
||
|
||
March 9, 1992
|
||
|
||
|
||
Chairman Patrick Leahy
|
||
Senate Subcommittee on Law and Technology
|
||
Committee on the Judiciary
|
||
United States Senate
|
||
Washington, DC 20510
|
||
|
||
Dear Senator Leahy,
|
||
|
||
We are writing to you to express our continuing interest in
|
||
communications privacy and cryptography policy. We are associated
|
||
with leading computer an telecommunication firms, privacy, civil
|
||
liberties, and public interest organizations, as well as research
|
||
institutions and universities. We share common concern that all
|
||
policies regarding communications privacy and cryptography should be
|
||
discussed at a public hearing where interested parties are provided an
|
||
opportunity to comment or to submit testimony.
|
||
|
||
Last year we wrote to you to express our opposition to a Justice
|
||
Department sponsored provision in the Omnibus Crime Bill, S. 266,
|
||
which would have encouraged telecommunications carriers to provide a
|
||
decrypted version of privacy-enhanced communications. This provision
|
||
would have encouraged the creation of "trap doors" in communication
|
||
networks. It was our assessment that such a proposal would have
|
||
undermined the security, reliability, and privacy of computer
|
||
communications.
|
||
|
||
At that time, you had also convened a Task Force on Privacy and
|
||
Technology which looked at a number of communication privacy issues
|
||
including S. 266. The Task Force determined that it was necessary to
|
||
develop a full record on the need for the proposal before the Senate
|
||
acted on the resolution.
|
||
|
||
Thanks to your efforts, the proposal was withdrawn.
|
||
|
||
We also wish to express our appreciation for your decision to
|
||
raise the issue of cryptography policy with Attorney General Barr at
|
||
his confirmation hearing last year. We are pleased that the Attorney
|
||
General agreed that such matters should properly be brought before
|
||
your Subcommittee for consideration.
|
||
|
||
We write to you now to ask that you contact the Attorney General
|
||
and seek assurance that no further action on that provision, or a
|
||
similar proposal, will be undertaken until a public hearing is
|
||
scheduled. We believe that it is important to notify the Attorney
|
||
General at this point because of the current attempt by the
|
||
administration to amend the Federal Communications Commission
|
||
Reauthorization Act with provisions similar to those contained in S.
|
||
266.
|
||
|
||
|
||
We will be pleased to provide assistance to you and your staff.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Sincerely yours,
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg,
|
||
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
||
David Peyton,
|
||
ITAA
|
||
|
||
Ira Rubenstein,
|
||
Microsoft
|
||
|
||
Jerry Berman,
|
||
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||
|
||
Mike Cavanagh
|
||
Electronic Mail Association
|
||
|
||
Martina Bradford,
|
||
AT&T
|
||
|
||
Evan Hendricks,
|
||
US Privacy Council
|
||
|
||
Professor Dorothy Denning,
|
||
Georgetown University
|
||
|
||
Professor Lance Hoffman,
|
||
George Washington University
|
||
|
||
Robert L. Park,
|
||
American Physical Society
|
||
|
||
Janlori Goldman,
|
||
American Civil Liberties Union
|
||
|
||
Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems
|
||
|
||
John Podesta,
|
||
Podesta and Associates
|
||
|
||
Kenneth Wasch,
|
||
Software Publishers Association
|
||
|
||
John Perry Barlow,
|
||
Contributing Editor, Communications of the ACM
|
||
|
||
David Johnson,
|
||
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
|
||
|
||
|
||
cc: Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr
|
||
Senator Hank Brown
|
||
Senator Ernest F. Hollings
|
||
Senator Arlen Specter
|
||
Senator Strom Thurmond
|
||
Representative Don Edwards
|
||
Attorney General Barr
|
||
Chairman Sikes, FCC
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 92 18:52:34 CST
|
||
From: Digital Free Press <max%underg@uunet.uu.net>
|
||
Subject: File 7--"Real Hackers?" Comparing the old and the new (DFP Reprint)
|
||
|
||
((Moderators' note: The following article is reprinted from the
|
||
Digital Free Press. DFP and the Underground Computing Foundation BBS
|
||
are useful sources for material on the Computer Underground. The DFP
|
||
can be contacted at: max%underg@uunet.uu.net))
|
||
|
||
Real Hackers?
|
||
|
||
There is a lot of talk these days about how the word 'hacker' has
|
||
been redefined by the press. The theory is that the old hackers, as
|
||
portrayed in Steven Levy's excellent book _Hackers: Heroes of the
|
||
Computer Revolution_, were good and pure and this breed of hacker
|
||
dramatized in the press is some new evil non-hacker terrorist. This is
|
||
nonsense.
|
||
|
||
According to the book, the hacker ethic(paraphrased) is as
|
||
follows:
|
||
|
||
1. Access to computers should be unlimited and total.
|
||
|
||
2. All information should be free.
|
||
|
||
3. Mistrust Authority - Promote Decentralization.
|
||
|
||
4. Hackers should be judged by their hacking.
|
||
|
||
5. You can create art and beauty on a computer.
|
||
|
||
6. Computers can change your life for the better.
|
||
|
||
In pursuit of the hacker ethic these heroes performed various acts
|
||
that would not be looked upon favorably in today's anti-hacker
|
||
society:
|
||
|
||
Used Equipment Without Authorization (Page 20)
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
"So, without any authorization whatsoever, that is what Peter
|
||
Sampson set out to do, along with a few friends of his from an
|
||
MIT organization with a special interest in model railroading. It
|
||
was a casual, unthinking step into a science-fiction future, but
|
||
that was typical of the way that an odd subculture was pulling
|
||
itself up by its bootstraps and growing to underground
|
||
prominence-to become a culture that would be the impolite,
|
||
unsanctioned soul of computerdom. It was among the first computer
|
||
hacker escapades of the Tech Model Railroad Club, or TMRC."
|
||
|
||
Phone Phreaked (Page 92)
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
"He had programed some appropriate tones to come out of the
|
||
speaker and into the open receiver of the campus phone that sat
|
||
in the Kluge room. These tones made the phone system come to
|
||
attention, so to speak, and dance."
|
||
|
||
Modified Equipment Without Authorization (Page 96)
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
"Nelson thought that adding an 'add to memory' instruction
|
||
would improve the machine. It would take _months_, perhaps, to go
|
||
through channels to do it, and if he did it himself he would
|
||
learn something about the way the world worked. So one night
|
||
Stewart Nelson spontaneously convened the Midnight Computer
|
||
Wiring Society."
|
||
|
||
Circumvented Password Systems (Page 417)
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
"Stallman broke the computer's encryption code and was able to get
|
||
to the protected file which held people's passwords. He started
|
||
sending people messages which would appear on screen when they
|
||
logged onto the system:
|
||
|
||
'I see you chose the password [such and such]. I suggest that
|
||
you switch to the password "carriage return. "It's much
|
||
easier to type, and also it stands up to the principle that
|
||
there should be no passwords.'
|
||
|
||
'Eventually I got to the point where a fifth of all the users on
|
||
the machine had the Empty String password.' RMS later boasted.
|
||
Then the computer science laboratory installed a more
|
||
sophisticated password system on its other computer. This one was
|
||
not so easy for Stallman to crack. But Stallman was able to study
|
||
the encryption program, and as he later said, 'I discovered
|
||
changing one word in that program would cause it to print out
|
||
your password on the system console as part of the message that
|
||
you were logging in.' Since the 'system console' was visible to
|
||
anyone walking by, and its messages could easily be accessed by
|
||
any terminal, or even printed out in hard copy, Stallman's change
|
||
allowed any password to be routinely disseminated by anyone who
|
||
cared to know it. He thought the result 'amusing.'
|
||
|
||
Certainly these hackers were not anarchists who wanted only to
|
||
destroy. They had a personal code of ethics, the hacker ethic to base
|
||
their behavior on. In fact the modern hacker has his/her ethics
|
||
intact. Compare the above hacker ethic with the hacker ethic found in
|
||
_Out of the Inner Circle_ by Bill 'The Cracker' Landreth, a teenager
|
||
arrested by the FBI (Page 18,60):
|
||
|
||
1. Never delete any information you can not easily restore.
|
||
|
||
2. Never leave any names on a computer.
|
||
|
||
3. Always try to obtain your own information.
|
||
|
||
The common denominator to these ethics systems are the respect for
|
||
technology, and the personal growth through free access and freedom of
|
||
information. Certainly the attitude towards private property is the same.
|
||
Accessing and using equipment that you do not own is okay as long as
|
||
you do not prevent those who own it from using it, or damage anything.
|
||
|
||
With respect to the hacker ethic the hackers mentioned in
|
||
_Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier_ by Katie
|
||
Hafner and John Markoff were in fact good hackers. If free access, and
|
||
free information were the law of the land would Kevin Mitnick have
|
||
gone to jail? I do not think so. Sure he got the source code for VMS,
|
||
but is there any evidence that he used this information for personal
|
||
gain, or did he simply use the information to improve his
|
||
understanding of the VMS operating system?
|
||
|
||
Robert T. Morris's worm program was a clever hack. Of course he
|
||
'gronked' it by programming the replication rate much too fast, but
|
||
still there is no evidence that he had any intention of doing harm to
|
||
the system. It was simply a computer experiment. Who owns the
|
||
Internet? Is it some mysterious 'them' or is it our net? If it is out
|
||
net, then we should be able to try some stuff on it, and to heck with
|
||
'them' if they can't take a joke.
|
||
|
||
Of course the German hackers are a different story. What they got
|
||
in trouble for was espionage, and not hacking, which is a breach of
|
||
faith, and is hacking for personal gain. However selling Minix to the
|
||
KGB almost makes it forgivable...
|
||
|
||
It is my contention that hackers did not change. Society changed,
|
||
and it changed for the worse. The environment the early hackers were
|
||
working in correctly viewed these activities as the desire to utilize
|
||
technology in a personal way. By definition hackers believe in the
|
||
free access to computers and to the freedom of information. If you do
|
||
not believe in these principles you are not a hacker, no matter how
|
||
technologically capable you are. You are probable just a tool for the
|
||
greed society. Current bad mouthing of hackers is simply snobbery.
|
||
Rather than cracking down on the modern hacker, we should reinforce
|
||
the hacker ethic, a code of conduct not based upon greed and lust for
|
||
the almighty dollar, but instead for personal growth through the free
|
||
access of computers and information, and a respect for technology.
|
||
|
||
It is the humane thing to do.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 8 Mar 92 03:21 EST
|
||
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@LCC.EDU>
|
||
Subject: File 8--BBSes and Telco Rates
|
||
|
||
GRID News. ISSN 1054-9315. vol 3 nu 5 March 7, 1992.
|
||
World GRID Association, P. O. Box 15061, Lansing, MI 48901 USA
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
(54 lines) Say YES! to Business Rates
|
||
(C) 1992 by Michael E. Marotta
|
||
|
||
BBS sysops in Oregon are fighting a telco policy to charge busi-
|
||
ness rates for any phone with a fax or modem attached. BBS users
|
||
know of similar telco policies from Kansas City, New York,
|
||
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Texas over the last two years.
|
||
Actually, there are at least two ways to view the situation.
|
||
|
||
(1) THE HOME DATA CENTER In an information society, every home
|
||
must be an information center. We have telephones and televisions,
|
||
books, newspapers and magazines, computers, copiers, faxen, cable
|
||
TV, VCRs, camcorders and answering machines. There is a view,
|
||
wrongly held by sysops, that they "provide a service to many
|
||
users." EVERY BBS USER IS A SYSOP. Whether you go to them or they
|
||
go to you, data travels from home to home.
|
||
|
||
(2) THE HOME TREASURY In a commercial society every home
|
||
must be a business. We all buy and sell. Most of us buy and sell
|
||
labor. (Anyone can build a car; most people choose not to.) In
|
||
addition, people everywhere and Americans especially buy and sell
|
||
housewares, nutritional supplements, baseball cards, comic books,
|
||
automobiles and very many other goods. We routinely trade
|
||
childcare, bookkeeping and computer programming services. Your
|
||
checkbook is your general ledger.
|
||
|
||
In 1892, "no one" had an adding machine or typewriter in their
|
||
home. In 1942, dishwashers were found only in restaurants. Should
|
||
your phone rate depend on whether or not you have a dishwasher or
|
||
adding machine in your home? If yours should not, then why should
|
||
General Motors'?
|
||
|
||
Karl Marx's "Communist Manifesto" mandated public schools as a
|
||
prerequisite to socialism. It is no accident that schools
|
||
supported by tax dollars justify many marxist assertions. Among
|
||
these is the myth that "businesses" are "rich" and can afford
|
||
higher phone rates, while "workers" are "poor" and deserve a
|
||
subsidy for the "right" to a phone.
|
||
|
||
Another fallacy of marxism is that telephones are a "public
|
||
utility" that must be regulated or owned by the state.
|
||
|
||
Judging by other markets, if you let anyone become a phone company
|
||
you will find that those who use more service will pay more in
|
||
toto less per call. A user's or provider's race, sex, sources of
|
||
income, height or weight will be equally irrelevant. Those who
|
||
are good at providing information and carrier services will
|
||
prosper and the others will become telco hobbyists.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 1992 19:55:42 GMT
|
||
From: NEELY_MP@DARWIN.NTU.EDU.AU(Mark P. Neely, Northern Territory
|
||
Subject: File 9--HACKING grounds for dismissal
|
||
|
||
A recent article in the _Solicitors Journal_ (Sept. 1991, p.1008-10)
|
||
posed the question as to whether the unauthorised access to a
|
||
Company's computer was grounds for dismissal of an employee. It was
|
||
written by Geoff Holgate, and the following is based on it.
|
||
|
||
The issue came before the court English Employment Appeals Tribunal
|
||
(EAT) and is reported in Denco Ltd. v. Joinson [1991] 1 Weekly Law
|
||
Reports 330.
|
||
|
||
The employee, Michael Joinson, worked as a sheet metal worker for
|
||
Denco Ltd. which manufactured air drying and air conditioning
|
||
equiptment. In 1988 Denco installed a computer which had a number of
|
||
VDU terminals attached to it. The computer was also used by another
|
||
company, Intek, which operated out of the same premises. Denco's
|
||
policy was to encourage its employees to use the terminal even though
|
||
their jobs didn't strictly require it.
|
||
|
||
The computer, via a series of menus, provided information relating to
|
||
the part-icular department within the company.
|
||
|
||
To gain access to a particular menu (or sub-menu) the user was
|
||
required to enter a user identity code and password. The password was
|
||
changed every week. The purpose of the passworded system was that the
|
||
information was provided on a 'need to know' basis, and only those
|
||
authorised to access a particular menu were entitled to use it.
|
||
|
||
The system's history file (which recorded every stroke entered on
|
||
every terminal on the system) revealed an unauthorised access to
|
||
certain of Intek's records on the system. This access was traced to
|
||
Joinson (who admitted the unauthorised access). He had used the
|
||
password of the daughter of a fellow employee who was an Intek
|
||
trainee.
|
||
|
||
Joinson was a member of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. Indeed, he
|
||
was chairperson of a joint committee representing the AEU and other
|
||
unions.
|
||
|
||
Denco alleged that Joinson had used the identity code and password to
|
||
obtain information which would be of use to him in his trade union
|
||
activities, such use being hostile to the company. Joinson claimed
|
||
that his access to the unauthorised information was accidental.
|
||
|
||
He was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct. Joinson complained he
|
||
had been unfairly dismissed.
|
||
|
||
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (hearing an appeal by Denco against an
|
||
industrial tribunal which found in favour of Joinson) held that
|
||
|
||
"if an employee deliberately used an unauthorised password in order
|
||
to enter, or attempt to enter, a computer known to obtain information
|
||
to which he was not entitled, then that of itself was gross misconduct
|
||
which prima facie would attract summary dismissal..."
|
||
|
||
[quote from article, p.1009, not judgement]
|
||
|
||
However the EAT then went on to limit their decision by emphaising that
|
||
|
||
"there may be some exceptional circumstances in which such a response
|
||
might be held ule".
|
||
|
||
[quote from case in article, p.1009]
|
||
|
||
|
||
The tribunal reasoned that as maintenance of the integrity of
|
||
information stored on an employer's computer was important, it was in
|
||
the best interests of management to make it "abundantly clear" that
|
||
interference with its integrity would result in severe penalty.
|
||
|
||
Any comments from the floor?
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 92 02:49:54 MST
|
||
From: mbarry@ISIS.CS.DU.EDU.CS.DU.EDU(Marshall Barry)
|
||
Subject: File 10--Updated Info on 2nd Annual Int'l BBSing & Elec. Comm Conf.
|
||
|
||
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
|
||
|
||
Contact: Terry Travis or Michelle Weisblat
|
||
|
||
IBECC
|
||
A Non-Profit Educational, Literary, and Scientific Society
|
||
|
||
P.O. Box 486
|
||
Louisville, CO 80027-0486
|
||
|
||
Presents
|
||
The 1992 International BBSing and Electronic Communications Conference
|
||
|
||
(303) 426-1847 [VOICE]
|
||
(303) 429-0449 [Fax]
|
||
(303) 426-1866 [DATA/BBS]
|
||
E-Mail: IBECC@f69.n104.z1.FidoNet.Org
|
||
|
||
What is IBECC '92?
|
||
------------------
|
||
|
||
IBECC '92 is the SECOND ANNUAL International BBSing and Electronic
|
||
Communications Conference.
|
||
|
||
It will be held AUGUST 13-16, 1992 in Denver, Colorado. This year's
|
||
theme is "Socially Responsible Computing."
|
||
|
||
--------------
|
||
Special Guests
|
||
--------------
|
||
|
||
DR. JERRY POURNELLE, Ph.D. - Computer Columnist and Editor (Byte),
|
||
Author (Science Fact and Fiction), Lecturer, Consultant on the Impact
|
||
of High Technology on Society, Chairman of the Citizen's Advisory
|
||
Council on National Space Policy, and Outspoken Social Critic -
|
||
Speaking on "Socially Responsible Computing", the future of
|
||
communications and technology in an electronic world, as well as his
|
||
own views on the society of tomorrow.
|
||
|
||
LARRY NIVEN - Futurist, Hugo Award-Winning Author, Designer of Worlds,
|
||
Supporter of Space Conquest - Speaking on the future of networks as
|
||
personal interfaces, reality overtaking fantasy, and living with
|
||
computers when you really don't want to.
|
||
|
||
DAVID HUGHES, SR. - Architect of Big Sky Telegraph (the Montana
|
||
Electronic School House), Consultant, Mover and Shaker, President of
|
||
Old Colorado City Communications, U.S. Military (ret) - Speaking on
|
||
NREN, the SuperComputer Highway, and education through computers and
|
||
networking.
|
||
|
||
Attending IBECC '92
|
||
-------------------
|
||
|
||
IBECC '92 is an intensive THREE-DAY conference. Sessions planned
|
||
include: "Introduction to BBSing" (What is a BBS, and How Do I Use
|
||
It?), "BBSes and the Law" (The Legal Rights and Responsibilities of
|
||
BBS Operators and Users), "Safe Computing" (The Detection and
|
||
Prevention of Computer Infection), "Rumor Control 1992" (Knowing the
|
||
Difference Between Fact and Fiction, and Taking Action Where Needed),
|
||
"Why Kelly CAN Read" (An Exploration into Education and the Computer),
|
||
"NREN" (The National SuperComputer Highway and How it Will Affect Us
|
||
All), "Staying Alive" (BBSing, Electronic Communication and the
|
||
Homebound / Physically Challenged), and "Security? What's That?" (The
|
||
What, Why, and How of Keeping Your Data and Information Safe).
|
||
|
||
Should you attend? If you have an interest in electronic
|
||
communications, bulletin boards, telecommuting, security or safe
|
||
computing, yes. If you would like to understand what a "hacker" is,
|
||
and is not, and what you can do to protect your electronic privacy,
|
||
yes. If your children make more use of your modem or computer than you
|
||
do, yes. In fact, unless you have absolutely no interest in using
|
||
your computer for interacting with the world, you should be there!
|
||
|
||
So that the conference will retain its personal and informal
|
||
atmosphere, attendance at IBECC '92 is strictly limited.
|
||
|
||
What Is IBECC?
|
||
--------------
|
||
|
||
IBECC is a Non-Profit Educational, Scientific, Literary and Charitable
|
||
Society (IRS 501(c)(3) applied for). Incorporated in Colorado,
|
||
IBECC's purposes include the promotion of national and international
|
||
electronic communications, the advancement of telecommunications and
|
||
teleconferencing, the improvement of communications between electronic
|
||
networks, education in the uses, requirements, and security of online
|
||
services, and general support of the electronic community.
|
||
|
||
A non-profit organization, IBECC is much MORE than just another %trade
|
||
show' -- it is a year-round clearing house for ideas, news, and
|
||
relevant information. IBECC represents the interests and concerns of
|
||
not only the professional, but the hobbyist and home user as well.
|
||
|
||
IBECC is primarily Volunteer-Run. Membership (currently $25.00/year
|
||
individual, $100.00/year corporate) pays for the IBECC Newsletter and
|
||
electronic Bulletin Board System (BBS), telephones, support and
|
||
information services, etc. - not salaries. The founders of IBECC, who
|
||
are all handicapped, are extensively involved in computer networks and
|
||
electronic communications, and also run several BBSes in the Denver
|
||
area.
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------------
|
||
IBECC '92 Membership & Hotel Information
|
||
----------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
(All Rates are in U.S. Dollars)
|
||
|
||
VIP (Includes IBECC Membership and VIP Suite)
|
||
|
||
|
||
SPECIAL RATE THROUGH MARCH 8, 1992: $80.00
|
||
March 9, 1992 through June 15, 1992: $125.00
|
||
June 16, 1992 through July 31, 1992: $175.00
|
||
August 1, 1992 and at the door (if available): $200.00
|
||
|
||
Spouse/Significant Other, with VIP Member: $9.69
|
||
Children (Under 14), with VIP Member: FREE
|
||
|
||
Call or Write for Other Rates
|
||
(Conference Only, Handicapped, etc)
|
||
|
||
Conference Location
|
||
-------------------
|
||
|
||
The conference will be held in the SAME HOTEL AS LAST YEAR:
|
||
Sheraton Denver West Hotel & Convention Center
|
||
360 Union Boulevard, Lakewood, CO 80228
|
||
(800) LAKEWOOD or (303) 987-2000
|
||
|
||
Rates
|
||
-----
|
||
|
||
$62.00 (+ tax) Single or Double
|
||
Please Mention IBECC for this DISCOUNTED RATE!
|
||
|
||
Special Rates on Hospitality and Sleeping Suites
|
||
may be Arranged through IBECC
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------
|
||
VENDORS, DEALERS, and DISTRIBUTORS
|
||
----------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Dealer and Vendor Booths and Tables Available
|
||
at VERY Competitive Rates
|
||
|
||
Please Call or Write for Information and Rates
|
||
|
||
IBECC - Now, More than Ever, Your Connection to the WORLD!
|
||
|
||
IBECC BBS: (303) 426-1866 (3/12/24/96/14.4 v.32bis/v.42/HST)
|
||
IBECC VOICE INFORMATION: (303) 426-1847 (Mon-Sat, 9AM-7PM, MST)
|
||
IBECC Mailing Address: P.O. Box 486, Louisville, CO 80027-0486
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.11
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|