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27 KiB
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565 lines
27 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Thu, Jan 8, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 01
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Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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CONTENTS, #4.01 ( Jan 8, 1992)
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File 1--Moderators' Corner
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File 2--How The Government Broke The Law And Went Unpunished
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File 3--Federal Seizure of "Hacker" Equipment" (Newsbytes Reprint)
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File 4--Re: FBI vs. Kiddie Porn (CuD 3.44)
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File 5--Re: Whole Earth Review Questions Technology
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File 6--Law Enforcement, the Government & You
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Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
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group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG,
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and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414)
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789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from ftp.cs.widener.edu (147.31.254.132),
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chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au. To use the U. of
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Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the
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quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
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is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should
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be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal
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mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified.
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Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to the
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Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses.
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Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 7 Jan 92 10:44:31 CST
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From: Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
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Subject: File 1--Moderators' Corner
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Issue 4.01 launches the new year. For those asking why there was no
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CuD for the past three weeks (#3.44 was the final issue of '91),
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holidays are less than ideal for sending out mail. Systems, people,
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and mysterious cosmic forces go walk-about, and too much mail bounces
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back. That, coupled with Gordon's two-week jaunt to Utah and Jim's
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trek to Michigan, caused the delay.
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Apologies to those who sent articles that were delayed. We will catch
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up in the next few weeks.
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We encourage longer posts and especially encourage readers to send
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media articles and stories from their local area that might not make
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the national press. Contributors should be sure that, for longer
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articles, no copyright is violated. If there is any question, then
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excerpts should be sent. Shorter new stories of 25-30 lines or less
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are, we are told, generally "fair use."
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1991 13:04:39 -0500
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From: Craig Neidorf <knight@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 2--How The Government Broke The Law And Went Unpunished
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JUSTICE DENIED
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How The Government Broke The Law And Went Unpunished
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by Craig Neidorf
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kl@stormking.com
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BACKGROUND:
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On January 18, 1990, Craig Neidorf, a 20-year-old college junior and
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editor of an electronic newsletter, was visited by Agents Tim Foley
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and Barbara Golden of the United States Secret Service (acting on
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behalf of William Cook, an assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern
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District of Illinois, Eastern Division), and Reed Newlin, an agent of
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Southwestern Bell security of Missouri, acting under color of law in
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conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service. Neidorf was questioned as a
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criminal suspect and eventually charged in a multi-count indictment
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with violations of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, the Interstate
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Transportation of Stolen Property Act, and the Wire Fraud Act, all
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because of his involvement as editor of a newsletter that disseminated
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to the general public from his bedroom at the Zeta Beta Tau fraternity
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house in Columbia, Missouri. All such charges were subsequently
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dismissed by the U.S. Attorney's Office after a week of trial.
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On January 19, 1990, the above named agents returned to Craig
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Neidorf's fraternity house accompanied by a uniformed officer of the
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University of Missouri Police Department. They produced and executed
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a search warrant that empowered them to seize all materials relating
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to Neidorf's newsletter, specifically computer hardware, work product
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of the newsletter, and documentary materials of the newsletter.
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These actions by the various law enforcement authorities constitute an
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actionable offense in violation of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980.
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__________
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TO THE READER:
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During the summer of 1990, I wrote the following review of how the
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Privacy Protection Act of 1980 could have been applied to the above
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described incident. After several months of trying to find a way to
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file a claim, I have finally come to realize that the goal I seek is
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unreachable because I do not possess the financial resources to hire
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legal counsel and no law firm or organization capable of handling the
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case will agree to take it on a contingency basis. Furthermore, as I
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read the law, the statute of limitations on this type of action is two
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years and January 19, 1992 is rapidly approaching. Because of reality
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superceding idealism, I have decided instead to present my case to
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you, the public, in the hopes that perhaps something good results from
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people learning the truth, despite that those truly guilty will not be
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punished.
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I will attempt to lay out and describe the details, ramifications, and
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importance of these events as they relate to the Privacy Protection
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Act of 1980 and as a convenience, I will be referring to myself in the
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third person and narrating from an advocate's point of view.
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I will be citing without quotation directly from the Legislative
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History of the Act and the Act itself as found in P.L. 96-440, pages
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3950-3976 and Title 42, Chapter 21A, Sections 2000aa-2000aa-7.
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__________
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*** What Does The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 Do?
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Part A of S. 1790 provides broad protections against searches for
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documentary materials which are in the possession of those engaged in
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First Amendment activities. When the materials sought consist of work
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product, a general no search rule applies. When the materials sought
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constitute documentary materials other than work product, a
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subpoena-first rule is generally applicable. The title applies to
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state, local, and federal law enforcement officers. Because
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disseminating information regularly affects interstate commerce,
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congressional authority to regulate state and local enforcement in
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this statute is based on the commerce clause <as found in> United
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States Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
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*** What Are The Unlawful Acts?
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Unlawful acts under section 101 involve searches and seizures
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performed only by governmental officials, not private citizens, and
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conducted "in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
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criminal offense."
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It could be argued that Southwestern Bell is also guilty of violating
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the Act because of Reed Newlin, a security person from Southwestern
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Bell, who acted under color of law alongside the law enforcement
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agents in performing the physical search of Neidorf's room. Newlin
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himself did enter Neidorf's room and physically handle his computer
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equipment (ex. going through Neidorf's dresser drawers and pulling out
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an Apple 1200 baud modem).
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*** What Does the Privacy Protection Act Protect?
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The phrase "in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public
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... a form of public communication" reaches not only to materials
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which are to be disseminated to the public or which contain
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information that is to be incorporated in a form of public
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communication, but also materials which are gathered in the course of
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preparing such a publication. For example, a reporter may prepare an
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article which his editor decides should not be published; nonetheless,
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the reporter's interview notes and draft of the article would remain
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protected by the statute. Similarly, all of an author's research
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notes would be protected, although only part of the research was
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ultimately included in the publishing product.
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In order to qualify for the statute's protections, the materials must
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be possessed in connection with a purpose of disseminating some form
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of public communication. The term "form of public communication" is
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designed to have a broad meaning. The fact that a local newspaper,
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for example, has a small circulation does not preclude application of
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the statute to searches of the files on the newspaper.
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*** What Is Work Product?
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In section 107(b), Work Product is defined as to encompass the
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materials whose very creation arises out of a purpose to convey
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information to the public. They may be created by the person in
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possession of the materials, or by another person in anticipation of
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public communication.
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An example of what this means would show that financial records of a
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business which are held by a member of the press are not work product
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inasmuch as they are not created in connection with plans to "to
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communicate to the public." But, a report prepared by a member of the
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press based on those financial records would constitute work product,
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as would such a report prepared by a whistle-blower who intended that
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the contents of the report be made public.
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*** How Can A Law Enforcement Agent Determine What Is Work Product?
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In the interests of allowing for some objective measure for judgment
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by the Office, the Committee (Congress) has provided that the
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work-product must be possessed by someone "reasonably believed" to
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have a purpose to communicate to the public.
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*** Exceptions That Allow Law Enforcement Officers To Use A Search
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Warrant To Seize Work Product Instead Of A Subpoena
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There are two exceptions, but neither exception applies in this
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situation.
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(1). The Suspect Exception allows a search warrant to be used on a
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person who is not an innocent third party, but rather an actual
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suspect. Neidorf was indeed a suspect of a criminal investigation,
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but there is an exception to this exception.
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The suspect exception may not be invoked if the only offense of which
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the possessor is suspected is the receipt, possession, communication,
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or withholding of the materials or the information contained therein.
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The purpose of this provision is to prevent possible abuse by law
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enforcement authorities. For example, without this provision, if a
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reporter had knowingly received a stolen corporate report, the suspect
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exception could be invoked because the reporter might be said to be
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guilty of a crime of receipt of stolen property. To permit a search
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under such circumstances might unduly broaden the suspect exception.
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In other words, law enforcement agents could simply charge the
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journalist with possession or receipt of stolen goods, general very
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broad offenses, and proceed to seize the desired materials because he
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was a suspect in that basically contrived crime. The Department of
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Justice has felt that this is not good law enforcement policy.
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Please Note: The above description very closely resembles the
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scenario that occurred in the Neidorf case if you insert "911
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document" in place of "stolen corporate report."
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The suspect exception is retained in cases where the receipt,
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possession, or communications of materials constitutes an offense
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under the existing language of espionage laws or related statutes
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concerning restricted data.
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Because the suspect exception may not be invoked if the only offense
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of which the possessor is suspected is the receipt, possession,
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communication, or withholding of the materials or the information
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contained therein, this exception is not applicable.
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(2) The second exception allows a lawful search warrant if there is
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reason to believe that the immediate seizure of the materials are
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necessary to prevent death of serious bodily injury. This is clearly
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not applicable to this case.
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*** What Are Documentary Materials?
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Section 107(a) defines documentary materials as to encompass the
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variety of materials upon which information is recorded. Included
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within the definition are not only written and printed materials such
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as reports, records, and interviews, but also films, photographs, tape
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recordings, and videotapes.
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Not included in this definition are contraband or the direct fruits of
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a crime, or the things or property designed or intended for use in the
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offense, or have been used as a means of committing the offense.
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Examples listed include; money, guns, weapons, and narcotics.
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*** Exceptions That Allow Law Enforcement Officers To Use A Search
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Warrant To Seize Work Product Instead Of A Subpoena
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There are four exceptions. The first two are the same as those seen
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above in reference to seizure of work product. Since they have
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already been addressed, I will now focus on the two remaining
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exceptions.
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(3) An otherwise lawful search <is permitted> for non-work product
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documentary materials if there is reason to believe that the notice
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provided by a subpoena duces tecum would result in the destruction,
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alteration, or concealment of the materials.
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Agent Tim Foley's own testimony at the July 1990 criminal trial of
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Craig Neidorf describes the interview and the actions taken by Neidorf
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prior to obtaining the warrant. This same testimony will clearly show
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that there would be no reason to believe that any evidence would have
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been tampered with or destroyed. Indeed, Neidorf cooperated fully
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from the beginning of the investigation, turning over several
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documents and providing information to the agents prior to the search.
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This exception is therefore not applicable.
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(4) If after a proceeding resulting in a court order directing
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compliance with a subpoena duces tecum, the possessor of the materials
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still refuses to produce the materials sought, a search warrant may be
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obtained. This exception is clearly not applicable because a subpoena
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was never sought in the first place.
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__________
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I believe that a careful inspection of the affidavit used to obtain
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the search warrant, the items specified for seizure in the actual
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warrant, and the testimony of Agent Tim Foley of the U.S. Secret
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Service in the criminal trial "United States v. Craig Neidorf" will
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clearly demonstrate that the Secret Service, the U.S. Attorney's
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Office, and potentially others (i.e. University of Missouri Police
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Department and Southwestern Bell) are guilty of violating the Privacy
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Protection Act of 1980 as described above.
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__________
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*** What Are The Remedies?
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Section 106(a) provides a civil cause of action for damages for
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violations of the Act. Such an action may be brought by any person
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aggrieved by a violation of the statute.
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When a government until is liable under this Act for a violation of
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this statute committed by one of its officers of employees, it may not
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assert as a defense to the action brought against it the immunity of
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the officer committing the offense or the good faith belief of the
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officer in the lawfulness of his conduct. The traditional doctrine of
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judicial immunity is preserved and available to the government entity.
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In the past, the good faith defense has often precluded the recovery
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for unlawful searches and seizures. Prohibiting the use of this
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defense when the government unit is the defendant in a suit brought
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under this statute is not only a fair means of assuring compensation
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for damages resulting from unlawful governmental searches, it will
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also enhance the deterrent effect of the statute.
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The good faith defense can be applied only in situations where the
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offender had reason to believe that the immediate seizure of materials
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was necessary to prevent the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a
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human being. This is not applicable.
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*** What Types Of Damages Could Be Collected In A Lawsuit?
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Section 106(e) describes that a plaintiff bringing an action under
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this section on the statute may recover actual damages resulting from
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a violation of the provision of the Act, but that in any event he is
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entitled to recover liquidated damages of not less than $1,000. The
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provision for a minimum amount of liquidated damages is essential
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because it often will be difficult for a plaintiff to show more than
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nominal or actual damages.
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Punitive damages may also be awarded if warranted, as well as
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attorney's fees and litigation costs. It is appropriate that the
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governmental unit be liable for punitive damages.
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OTHER REMARKS TO THE READER:
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In this type of case, the main goal is probably punitive damages. A
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message needs to be sent that violations of privacy and the law must
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be prevented and no one is above the law (least of all those charged
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with the duty of enforcing it).
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My reseach indicates that although there are probably many cases,
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there are only two cases on the books where the Privacy Protection Act
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of 1980 has been used in a civil lawsuit. Neither case is on point.
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The current litigation by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in the
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Steve Jackson Games case also addresses the Act, but its facts are
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different in that the SJG case refers to hardcopy publishing using
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computers whereas a Neidorf case would have addressed electronic
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publications specifically.
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The Neidorf case is supported by strong evidence and the legislative
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history of the Act shows this case to be exactly the type of which the
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Act was designed to combat. A message needs to be sent that the law
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is meant to be obeyed, not just law about computers, but law in
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general.
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Clearly, establishing rights for an electronic publication is another
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step closer to a guaranteed right of free electronic speech. In this
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day and age, WE DARE NOT GIVE UP THAT RIGHT!
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------------------------------
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Date:
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From: mcmullen@well.sf.ca.us
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Subject: File 3--Federal Seizure of "Hacker" Equipment" (Newsbytes Reprint)
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FEDERAL SEIZURE OF "HACKER" EQUIPMENT 12/16/91
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NEW YORK, NEW YORK, U.S.A., 1991 DEC 16 (NB) -- Newsbytes has learned
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that a joint Unites States Secret Service / Federal Bureau of
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Investigation (FBI) team has executed search warrants at the homes of
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so-called "hackers" at various locations across the country and seized
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computer equipment.
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It is Newsbytes information that warrants were executed on Friday,
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February 6th in various places including New York City, Pennsylvania
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and the state of Washington. According to informed sources, the
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warrants were executed pursuant to investigations of violations of
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Title 18 of the federal statutes, sections 1029 & 1030 (Computer Fraud
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and Abuse Act, 1343 (Wire Fraud) and 2511 (Wiretapping).
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Law enforcement officials contacted by Newsbytes, while acknowledging
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the warrant execution, refused to comment on what was called "an
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on-going investigation." One source told Newsbytes that the affidavits
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underlying the search warrants have been sealed due to the on-going
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nature of the investigation."
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He added "There was obviously enough in the affidavits to convince
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judges that there was probable cause that evidence of a crime would be
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found if the search warrants were issued."
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The source also said that he would expect a statement to be issued by
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the Secret Service/FBI team "somewhere after the first of the year."
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(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19911216)
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------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 18 Dec 91 11:47:09 CST
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From: knute!canary!chris@UUNET.UU.NET(Chris Johnson)
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Subject: File 4--Re: FBI vs. Kiddie Porn (CuD 3.44)
|
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Brief comments on: "FBI Investigates Computerized Child Pornography"
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In the referenced article, the following statement was made:
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"The FBI said computer bulletin boards are often used by child
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porno-graphers, but for communication purposes only, not for the
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actual transmission of the illegal material."
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My feeling is that child pornography is probably one of the biggest
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straw men in this day and age. It's bigger than communists in the
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closet, so to speak. Why do I say this? We all probably read enough
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media to see references to child pornography at least several times a
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month. There's certainly a lot of hysteria and what sounds like a lot
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of law enforcement activity in the area.
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Yet I've never seen any, nor do I know anyone who has seen any. Not
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that I'm a collector of pornography by any means. I guess I sort of
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always believed that it must be a Real Big Problem or I wouldn't be
|
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hearing about it so much. Then I report an investigative article.
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The writers actually looked into the reality. Guess what? They
|
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couldn't find any either. In fact, the only so-called purveyors they
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could find were law enforcement sting operations!
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The upshot was this: more child pornography is advertised and
|
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distributed by law enforcement people trying to catch other
|
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pornographers and child molesters than by anyone else, by several
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orders of magnitude it appears.
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A lot of this seems to be a left over from the Meese commission and it
|
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seems the real idea is to censor through intimidation and out-right
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harassment of anything outside Meese's and others puritanical,
|
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up-tight, right wing beliefs. The spectre of "child pornographers" by
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the thousands is a plenty good smoke screen to hide censorship
|
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activities, and* garner lots of public support form concerned parents
|
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at the same time. And even your politicians can jump on the platform
|
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of "doing something good for the American family" by supporting it.
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On the whole, I can't prove there isn't child pornographers using
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BBS's, but I rather doubt it's a pressing problem. I'd rather the FBI
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find a real problem to pursue, like, bribery among government
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officials.
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Dec 91 16:28:58 pst
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From: well!tomwhite@APPLE.COM(Tom White)
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Subject: File 5--Re: Whole Earth Review Questions Technology
|
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|
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For Immediate Release: December 16,1991
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CONTACT: Tom White (415) 332-1716: E-mail:tomwhite@well.sf.ca.us
|
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WHOLE EARTH REVIEW to Readers:
|
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Question Technology (while we still have the chance)
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Sausalito, CA -- The Winter 1991 issue of WHOLE EARTH REVIEW, the
|
||
"Access to Tools" quarterly supplement to the WHOLE EARTH CATALOG,
|
||
questions the political, economic, social and physical effects
|
||
technology has on our lives. WHOLE EARTH REVIEW also questions its
|
||
fundamental assumption that providing
|
||
access to tools is a good and noble enterprise.
|
||
|
||
Is technological innovation invariably beneficial? Do we control
|
||
new technologies or do they control us? Will books and libraries
|
||
become obsolete? These are some of the questions that authors in this
|
||
special issue attempt to answer. Editor-in-Chief Howard Rheingold
|
||
writes in the introduction: "Perhaps our readers will be inspired to
|
||
create new tools for thinking about tools."
|
||
|
||
Among the authors showcased are Jerry Mander, whose book "In
|
||
the Absence of the Sacred" is excerpted at length in the lead article;
|
||
Howard Levine, former director of the National Science Foundation's
|
||
Public Understanding of Science Program; Langdon Winner, a political
|
||
theorist and author; Patricia Glass Schuman, president of the American
|
||
Library Association and of Neal-Schuman Publishers; Linda Garcia, a
|
||
project director and senior analyst at the Office of Technology
|
||
Assessment; Gary T. Marx; Ivan Illich; Amory and Hunter Lovins of the
|
||
Rocky Mountain Institute.
|
||
|
||
For the past two decades WHOLE EARTH REVIEW has provided its
|
||
readers "access to tools" -- practical information about technologies
|
||
ranging from manual post-hole diggers to virtual-computer systems.
|
||
Subscription price is $27 for four issues, add $6 foreign. No advertising
|
||
accepted. On newsstands and bookstore magazine shelves now.
|
||
|
||
Copyright 1991, POINT. Permission granted to redistribute freely.
|
||
Whole Earth Review, PO Box 38, Sausalito, CA 94966
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 92 23:44:19 -0800
|
||
From: Jon Pugh <jpugh@APPLE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 6--Law Enforcement, the Government & You
|
||
|
||
I would like to point out one thing in defense of the "zealous" people
|
||
involved in law enforcement efforts that have been discussed recently.
|
||
These are people who have accepted the job of tracking down criminals,
|
||
and that's what they do. Just as we live computers, or whatever, they
|
||
live law enforcement. It is important for them to remember that not
|
||
everyone is guilty, just as it is important for us to remember that
|
||
they are simply _looking_ for criminals, so they tend to focus on that
|
||
goal. If you were assigned to track down computer criminals and you
|
||
didn't know a bit from a scuzzy disk controller, where would you start
|
||
looking? On bulletin boards and at computer club meetings, of course.
|
||
The citizenry needs to remind the authorities that not everyone is a
|
||
criminal and that we _are_ in America (where the Constitution can be
|
||
construed by some to say that it is better to let a guilty man go than
|
||
to punish an innocent one).
|
||
|
||
On a different subject, I firmly believe in accountability of the
|
||
government. If these allegations connecting the October Surprise to
|
||
the Inslaw software case are even remotely true then the truth
|
||
definitely MUST be known, regardless of whether we have to wake Ron up
|
||
or take the President down. Arguments of the type "We must protect
|
||
the image of the Presidency" are bogus. The President is a man, like
|
||
us. Prone to the same failings as us, only more so because of his
|
||
power. We have already seen how the pressure and power affected
|
||
Richard Nixon. Personally, I do not believe that the president was to
|
||
blame in Ron's case, unless it was simply through negligence. There
|
||
are many career officials assisting the president and others, and it
|
||
may be time for a purge. These people seem to have formed their own
|
||
underground organization, which ostensibly seems to be intended to
|
||
protect and promote a Republican president. Oliver North was willing
|
||
to take the fall for the presidency, but has now recanted. What does
|
||
this say about the way these people treat each other?
|
||
|
||
There is really only one thing I can do though, and I encourage others
|
||
to do the same thing. Ask questions and talk about this. Make sure
|
||
that everyone you talk to knows about the Inslaw case and the the
|
||
October Surprise. Tell them that nothing is proved, but much is
|
||
implied. Tell them to ask questions and tell _their_ friends. All we
|
||
can do is pay attention and make sure that _they_ can't slip one past
|
||
us. Of course I would be very willing to help anyone who _can_ do
|
||
something directly, but I don't really want to end up slashed to death
|
||
in a bathtub. That's what the allegations are in the Inslaw case, and
|
||
if only for that reason we must all obey the song which still rings
|
||
true:
|
||
|
||
Stop, hey, what's that sound? Everybody look what's going down.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.01
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
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