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891 lines
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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 1, Issue #1.22 (July 14, 1990) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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ARCHIVISTS: Bob Krause / Alex Smith
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REPLY TO: TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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File 1: Moderators' Comments
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File 2: From the Mailbag: More on CU and Free Speech
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File 3: Response to "Problems of Evidence" (Mike Godwin)
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File 4: What to do When the Police come a'knocking (Czar Donic)
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File 5: Observations on the Law (Mike Godwin)
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File 6: Electronic Frontier Fund Press Releases
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.22, File 1 of 6: Moderators' Comments ***
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***************************************************************
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++++++++++
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In this file:
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1) Electronic Frontier Fund formed
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2) CuD's Readership Survey (reminder)
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3) SummerCon '90
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4) Errata
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FUND
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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The Electronic Frontier Fund has been officially announced. The EFF's
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mission statement, press release, "Electronic Bill of Rights," and Legal
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Summary are in File #6 of this issue. The opening day press release and
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other documents have been combined into a single file and is available from
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both archive sites (FTP and Krause). The length of the file is about 950
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lines.
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+++++++++++++++++++
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CuD SURVEY
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+++++++++++++++++++
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Bob Krause has the readership survey about ready. Those who responded
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generally thought the survey to be a good idea. There were no negative
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comments, so it should be going out in a week or two.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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SUMMERCON '90 Week of July 27th St. Louis
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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SummerCon, an annual event where the CU elite gather to party, meet
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friends, and generally have a good time, returns! This years event is
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being hosted by Aristotle and Forest Ranger. CuD wishes them the best and
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welcomes any reports/reviews that attendees wish to contribute.
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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+++++++++++++
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ERRATA (from 1.14)
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+++++++++++++
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In CuD 1.14, we erroneously announced that a PHRACK file to be
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used for evidence announced the beginning of The Phoenix Project
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BBS. In fact, the file made no specific reference to the BBS of the
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same name.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.22, File 2 of 6: Mail--More on Harassment ***
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***************************************************************
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To: tk0jut2%niu.BITNET@cunyvm.cuny.edu
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Subject: Lines of Communication
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Date: 8 Jul 90 22:37:00 PDT (Sun)
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From: john@bovine.ati.com(John Higdon)
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It was most refreshing to see some balanced comment on the subject of
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opinions and viewpoints. Having been outraged by some of the underhanded
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tactics of law enforcement, I have been also a little troubled by the
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inability of some CU types to hear or allow others to hear alternative
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points of view.
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A recent incident comes to mind. Some months ago, there appeared an article
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in Telecom Digest from someone who lamented the advent of CPID. His
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objections were hardly mainstream: with CPID it became risky to "hack"
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authorization codes for long distance carriers. I was annoyed on two
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counts. First was the assumption that CPID would pose any more risk than
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ANI, something that long distance carriers have had available for years,
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and second, that somehow searching for authorization codes was advancing
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the state of hacking in the field of computing or telephony.
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I posted a straight-forward article expressing my opinion. Mind you, my
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background includes healthy amounts of hacking, mainly in the field of
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telephony, with exploits dating back to the sixties. A significant portion
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of my knowledge of the telephone network (a knowledge which now puts food
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on my table) was obtained through what can only be described as
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questionable means. My pointed response rose from the indignations of a
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"real" hacker over the antics of what appeared to be a schlep.
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No sooner did that response appear in the Digest, my e-mailbox filled with
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the most vitriolic, in many cases juvenile, threats one can possibly
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imagine. Most of the hate mail was anonymous, with mighty computer lords
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demonstrating their power over e-mail and threatening unspecified
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retaliation. I answered all that carried a legitimate return address,
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inviting the writer to take me on in the Telecom forum if he (they were all
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from males) thought I was out of line. None did. However, the incident
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confirmed my original premise: the concept of simply stealing authorization
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codes was a product of juvenile minds.
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For a time it appeared that this forum was becoming a strident, whiney,
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self-pitying club. Anything law enforcement did was bad; anything any
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hacker anywhere did was noble and cause-supporting. We're all adults here.
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We all know there are two sides to any situation. As a hacker, my wish
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would be that commercial systems designers put a lot more effort into
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security. If hackers can't get in in the first place, there wouldn't be the
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need for SS raids and the seizure of private computer systems. The age-old
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concept of "security through obscurity" will not suffice any longer.
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Some of the apparent tactics of our law enforcement agencies appear to be
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questionable at the very least. No doubt some innocent bystanders are
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being, to put it mildly, grossly inconvenienced. But let's not as a group
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lapse into self-righteousness, or try to silence those who have an opposing
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point of view.
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**John Higdon | P. O. Box 7648 | +1 408 723 1395
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john@bovine.ati.com | San Jose, CA 95150 | M o o !
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.22, File 3 of 6: Response to "CU Harassment" ***
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***************************************************************
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Date: Sun, 8 Jul 90 16:51:10 -0500
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From: mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu(Mike Godwin)
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To: TK0JUT2%NIU.BITNET@UICVM.uic.edu
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Some responses to Mr. Anonymous:
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RE Point 1 ("misleading" references to punishments):
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It is true that there are a range of punishments available in cases such as
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this one. But it is false to conclude that the judge has either the right
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or necessarily the inclination to sentence leniently. Regarding the
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former: Federal judges' discretion has been greatly limited by the adoption
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of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Increasingly, judges have complained
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that they are not allowed by the Sentencing Guidelines to sentence
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leniently.
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Regarding the latter: Judges may be likely to accept prosecutors'
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characterization of all computer hackers as serious criminals, which means
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the judges won't be likely to use whatever discretion they have to be
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lenient.
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So, how did Robert Morris get such a lenient sentence? Answer: Unless I'm
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mistaken, he was prosecuted for *much less serious crimes* than the LoD
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defendants have been indicted for. Morris was not charged with theft or
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fraud, as I recall. This makes it incredibly misleading for Mr. A to
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compare the Morris case with the Neidorf/Riggs prosecution.
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RE Point 2 (Confiscation of equipment):
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There is no doubt that it's more convenient and more efficient for federal
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law-enforcement agents to seize evidence for inspection. The question is
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not whether there are alternative means for conducting these
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investigations, but whether all the necessary interests have been served.
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One of these interests is every citizen's right not to be deprived of
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property by the government without due process of law, and without just
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compensation.
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Even if Mr. A believes "due process of law" has occurred in, say, the
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seizures at Steve Jackson Games, *where's the "just compensation"*?
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Jackson probably has no remedy at all under federal law, thanks to
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exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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RE Point 3 (What computer criminals will say when caught):
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Mr. A is perfectly correct to note that that suspects, and especially
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guilty ones, will characterize their actions as being comparatively
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innocent.
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But this is true in all federal prosecutions, regardless of whether the
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crimes involve computers, and regardless of whether the defendants are
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truly innocent.
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Mr. A suggests that "it doesn't matter" why the defendants did what they
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did. In this, he demonstrates a basic ignorance of criminal law--it is
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*central* to prosecution of major crimes that the defendants be proved
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beyond a reasonable doubt to have criminal intent. Therefore, what the
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defendants were thinking *does* matter--indeed, for most federal
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prosecutions, the defendant's mental state is the single most important
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issue to be resolved at trial. Except for purely regulatory offenses (which
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typically carry only minor penalties), the criminal law is designed to
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punish (and deter) acts by people with criminal mental states.
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Proving criminal defendants' mental states to a jury's satisfaction has not
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been an insuperable task for federal prosecutors up to now, by the way.
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RE Point 4 (Law enforcement access to the Net):
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Mr. A is also correct to note that relatively few law-enforcement officials
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have Net access, and fewer still understand the relevant electronic
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subculture.
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This is precisely why it is dangerous for them to go forward and
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characterize ALL hackers as serious criminals. Some hackers clearly are
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criminals. But many of them are motivated by the same sense of exploration
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that motivates federal prosecutors to discover new uses for the wire-fraud
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statute. The courts are capable of distinguishing between the merely
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adventurous and the criminal--but misunderstandings on the part of
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prosecutors can make it more difficult for judges and juries to make those
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distinctions. And, of course, willingness to seize lots of property as
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evidence and to prosecute 19-year-old hackers afflicted with braggadocio
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creates ancillary chilling affects the consequences of which none of us
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probably would like.
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The current indictments against Neidorf and Riggs characterize their use of
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BBS "handles" and their erasure of computer logs that recorded their entry
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into computer systems as fraudulent misrepresentations. In effect, the
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federal prosecutors have decided that anyone who uses a BBS "pen name" is
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misrepresenting himself and thereby opening himself up to fraud
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prosecutions. Only persons ignorant of the current American BBS subculture
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can draw such a conclusion.
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**Mike
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.22, File 4 of 6: The Czar's Guide to Law ***
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***************************************************************
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THE CZAR'S GUIDE TO THE YOUNG CRIMINAL ACCUSED OF USING COMPUTERS
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With the hyperactivity of law enforcement officials and the current
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attitudes of the public in general, it is probably time to consider what to
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do in case of a bust. I would guess that just about everybody receiving
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the Computer Underground Digest has violated some sort of law somewhere in
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someone's mind involving computers. This is not to say that all the
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readers of this publication are really criminals -- just that the laws are
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so broadly interpreted so as so make anyone with a modem a criminal. For
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example, if you have ever downloaded shareware and not used it, but didn't
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delete it, and had it for over 15 days, you could be violating copyright
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laws if the author put some sort of announcement to the effect that such
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were the terms of agreement. This means that you could very well be raided
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someday.
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Nothing is more gratuitous than free legal advice given to a defendant
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who has already engaged counsel, especially if the giver of such advice is
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not an attorney. However, as someone close to me was so arrested (and the
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charges later dropped), I thought you might be able to benefit from our
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experience. It does not matter what the computer crime is, how extensive,
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how serious the charges, etc. What matters is how you deal with the system
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when it comes knocking on your door.
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There may be warning signs. You could get a call or a preliminary
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visit from a member of the Secret Service, a call from security from a
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local phone company, a visit from a local policeman, news that someone you
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know has been busted, anything like that. At that point, you are legally
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free to say whatever you want, but it is best if you give the impression
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that you are willing to cooperate. Of course, any specific details you
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give will be noted. They can not be used in evidence against you, but that
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will not stop them from making the attempt in the future. I would indicate
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that I was very willing to help but that, right now, I had a number of
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pressing things to do and that I would like to talk tomorrow when I had
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much more time and could go into more detail. Right now, I'd say, my
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mother was calling. Everyone, to paraphrase Thoreau, should have such a
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mother.
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I would hardly advise anybody to destroy evidence since that is a
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crime itself, but it would seem to me that at this point a lot of material
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you have had around the house has been bringing you bad luck. A lot of
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paper and printouts are a definite fire hazard and should not be left lying
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around. Also, old data never does you any good -- it would be wise to
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format most of your ala disks several times. Better yet, treat yourself to
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some new ones and maybe your luck will change. All those old, dusty disks
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simply clutter things up. It's time to reorganize.
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The search warrant usually takes a while to get, but most judges take
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the path of least resistance and will issue one on fairly flimsy grounds.
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Now you must realize that most police officers are not used to dealing with
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computer people and that they do not like the ones they do have to deal
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with at work. The are used more to searches in the case of narcotics,
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illegal weapons, etc. You can not expect them, then, to be overly polite
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when they do knock on your door. Do not let this frighten you into telling
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them all sorts of things. During the search, however, it helps to have
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someone there crying. Also, act limply, as if you have lost the will to
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live. This will usually placate the more professional ones who should
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realize thereby that you are not going to shoot at them. This behavior is
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simply designed to keep you from being beaten or otherwise abused. It does
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not help your case legally although, if they do beat or otherwise try to
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intimidate you, and you can document it, a prosecutor will feel less
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exuberant about taking the case to court.
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They will probably place you under arrest at this point, reading you
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your rights. Once they do, you are under no obligation to say anything,
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but I would advise you to say "I want an attorney." An alternative is "I
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want a lawyer." You can respond to their "good guy" questions about the
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weather and such, but then when the questions come back to the topic of
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computers you had best repeat the above sentence(s). In fact, the more
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times you say it the better if it ever gets to court, but do not say it
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gratuitously so as to arouse the macho defensiveness that some officers may
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have. Realize that the arresting officer is not a legal scholar and that
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he is no more culpable in this arrest than is the postman for bringing you
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a bill. The real fighting lies ahead. One final point: it is wise to
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become acquainted with an attorney before any of this happens. One thing
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is quite certain: nothing you say to the arresting officers is likely to
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help your case.
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While they are carrying out your computer, your floppies, your
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printouts, your telephones, your answering machine, your radio, your tapes,
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watch them. Remember the irrelevant material they seize. This fact may be
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helpful in court as well and it may well help dissuade the prosecutor from
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doing anything much with the case. In one case, they took copies of the
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Federal Register, a tape of Mozart's 23rd piano concerto (Horowitz), and
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Gordon Meyer's thesis. The constant repetition of "I want my Mozart back"
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irritated the prosecutor no end and lessened enthusiasm for the case.
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(They also picked up pieces of grass the cat had brought in). None of this
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is legally relevant, but then a lot they do is not legally relevant either
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** such as taking the materials in the first place.
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From here on, the case should be in the hands of a competent attorney.
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It is not necessary that he be an expert in computers since the prosecutor
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isn't either and the police even less so. The odds are that you will be
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able to supply more than enough computer expertise. What is important is
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his willingness to fight the case. Most will take that path of least
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resistance, perhaps working toward a plea bargain. The trouble with that
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is you are not in the best position at this point for a plea bargain. One
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of you main strategies should be to make the case so much of a pain in the
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ass for the prosecutor that he tires of it. If the charge is a
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misdemeanor, be advised that prosecutors do not like to prosecute such
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cases in the first place. The charge was made a misdemeanor in the hopes
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that you would simply plead guilty and that would be an end of it. It
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would also be the last you ever saw of your equipment. One last point: a
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defense attorney in one of these cases, after I had complained to him that
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as a taxpayer I resented the enormous expenditure of funds on these cases
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while there were abundant examples of clear and present dangers ripe for
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prosecution, said "Oh, they have absolutely no sense of resource
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management." Hardly encouraging words.
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A pain in the ass: judges do not like to be overturned on appeal,
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usually. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are clearly relevant on your
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behavior before the trial. I would hope that the First and Ninth would be
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applied somewhere in the defense. Everyone knows that the first has to do
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with freedom of expression, but the ninth says, the way I read it, unless
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we specifically give up certain rights to the government, we retain them.
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I do not know, really, how these issues would ultimately be resolved, but
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when constitutional issues are raised during a trial and ruled not
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relevant, the path is set for appeal all the way, as the saying goes, to
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the Supreme Court. No matter that it doesn't help in this case
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specifically -- it may well help in other aspects of the case. The point
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is that once you are in the legal system and have an attorney, you are in a
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fight. They have to prove that you are guilty and you have the right to
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make them prove it legally.
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This does not mean that you examine all aspects of the case and come
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to a rational judgment. The interesting thing is that they try to produce
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any sort of evidence no matter how irrelevant and you try to prevent them
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from presenting any evidence no matter how germane. There is no longer any
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objective truth --simply a fight using words.
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Finally, there is an old maxim to the effect that you should not lie
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to your attorney. It is also true that it helps to have an attorney who
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believes in your case and is willing to fight it at every point, even
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points that seem to you quit irrelevant. When and how much to tell him is
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a tricky issue. Remember, he is good friends with the judge and the
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prosecutor, but he is also quite interested in winning cases for his
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clients. It is also wise to arrange some sort of set fee for the entire
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case so that you feel more comfortable communicating with him. One thing
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you should communicate is the outcome you wish to see from the trial and he
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should also make clear to you what your options are. For example, it is
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more difficult for a prosecutor to convince a jury that you are guilty. He
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doesn't even know that much about computers -- imagine him trying to
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educate others. On the other hand, if he succeeds. and the jury recommends
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jail time, the judge is more likely to impose it. On the other hand, a
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judge might be easier to convince, but he would feel much more free to
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suspend sentence and order "restitution." You have to decide what risks
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you are willing to incur in search of the desired outcome.
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I hope this hasn't sounded too frightening and I hope some of it might
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be helpful to someone out there. All I can say right now is that it is a
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good time for people with computers to make friends with people with law
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degrees. The current climate makes it necessary for the one and profitable
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for the other.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.22, File 5 of 6: Mike Godwin on Federal Law ***
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***************************************************************
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The government's use of the 18 USC 1343 and 18 USC 2314 in this %Craig
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Neidorf's% case, by the way, is similar to its use of 18 USC 641 in the
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Pentagon Papers case. Basically, the government's strategy is to stretch
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the notion of "property" in a way that allows prosecutors to characterize
|
|
defendant's activity as a property crime--theft, that is.
|
|
|
|
There's a very good law-review article on this general subject: Michael E.
|
|
Tigar's "The Right of Property and the Law of Theft," 62 Texas Law Review
|
|
1443 (1984). Here's a relevant passage from that article, addressing the
|
|
government's use of 18 USC 641 (theft of government property) in the
|
|
Ellsberg and Truong cases:
|
|
|
|
When Daniel Ellsberg took the Pentagon Papers, he was prosecuted uner
|
|
section 641 for, among other things, stealing government property
|
|
worth more than one hundred dollars. When David Truong was prosecuted
|
|
for allegedly passing copies of State Department cable traffic to the
|
|
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the government's multicount indictment
|
|
included a theft allegation. Neither theft charge relied directly upon
|
|
the alleged national security character of the information in these
|
|
papers; the government's theory would equally have applied to a
|
|
"whistleblower" in the Environmental Protection Agency who gave a
|
|
newspaper reporter a document outlining a plan to dismantle an agency
|
|
program.
|
|
|
|
The offense of stealing government property does not, in these cases,
|
|
require that the information be sold, simply that it be "worth" more
|
|
than one hundred dollars. The value is established not by the cost of
|
|
the pieces of paper themselves, but by some valuation of the
|
|
information on them. In the Ellsberg and Truong cases, one measure of
|
|
value was supposedly that which a foreign intelligence service would
|
|
attach to the information. In the EPA example, evidence that
|
|
news-paper reporters sometimes pay for "leads" or "leaks" would
|
|
presumably be admissible. But neither Ellsberg, nor Truong, nor the
|
|
hypothetical EPA employee has dispossessed the government of its
|
|
information, even momentarily; the documents were simply copies of
|
|
originals left in the file. Indeed, given the bureaucratic penchant
|
|
for making multiple copies of everything, it is hard to imagine a case
|
|
in which taking a document would so deprive the government.
|
|
|
|
We know why the government wants to prosecute the three leakers, and
|
|
its reason has nothing to do with loss of information: it wants to
|
|
warn those with access to government files that serious consequences
|
|
attend unauthorized use. Yet there is no United States criminal
|
|
statute that expressly proscribes such use. (Page 1462)
|
|
|
|
Tigar is a law professor at the University of Texas.
|
|
|
|
I don't know about you, but it's hard to read that statute without thinking
|
|
1) that AT&T and Bell neither lost any property nor were at risk of losing
|
|
any property in the so-called "thefts" for which Neidorf and Riggs are
|
|
being prosecuted, and 2) the government's valuation of the E911 text file
|
|
as being "worth" $70,000 or so seems designed to be the predicate for a
|
|
major theft prosecution *and for no other purpose.*
|
|
|
|
(Who'd *pay* $70K for that file? It's not offered on any market for that
|
|
price. Valuing it at the number of AT&T employee hours it took to create it
|
|
might make sense if AT&T or Bell were deprived of its use ... but they
|
|
*weren't*. Heck, they weren't even deprived of their *exclusive* use of the
|
|
E911 file, since neither Neidorf nor Riggs was ever able to use the file
|
|
for any purpose other than to prove that someone, somewhere, had had access
|
|
to an AT&T or Bell computer.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
**Mike
|
|
|
|
|
|
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
|
+ END THIS FILE +
|
|
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
|
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
*** CuD #1.22, File 6 of 6: EFF Documents ***
|
|
***************************************************************
|
|
|
|
The following three files are the initial releases and statements issued by
|
|
the ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FUND on July 10, 1990, to announce the founding of
|
|
the group. The files include:
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Mission Statement
|
|
2. Initial Press Release
|
|
3. Legal Overview: The Electronic Frontier and the Bill of Rights
|
|
|
|
The entire packet of six files (about 950 lines) can be obtained from
|
|
either the CuD archives or the FTP site.
|
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
|
|
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
|
|
|
|
Contact: Cathy Cook (415) 759-5578
|
|
|
|
NEW FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED TO ENCOURAGE COMPUTER-BASED COMMUNICATIONS
|
|
POLICIES
|
|
|
|
Washington, D.C., July 10, 1990 -- Mitchell D. Kapor, founder of Lotus
|
|
Development Corporation and ON Technology, today announced that he,
|
|
along with colleague John Perry Barlow, has established a foundation to
|
|
address social and legal issues arising from the impact on society of
|
|
the increasingly pervasive use of computers as a means of communication
|
|
and information distribution. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
|
|
will support and engage in public education on current and future
|
|
developments in computer-based and telecommunications media. In
|
|
addition, it will support litigation in the public interest to preserve,
|
|
protect and extend First Amendment rights within the realm of computing
|
|
and telecommunications technology.
|
|
|
|
Initial funding for the Foundation comes from private contributions by
|
|
Kapor and Steve Wozniak, co-founder of Apple Computer, Inc. The
|
|
Foundation expects to actively raise contributions from a wide
|
|
constituency.
|
|
|
|
As an initial step to foster public education on these issues, the
|
|
Foundation today awarded a grant to the Palo Alto, California-based
|
|
public advocacy group Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
(CPSR). The grant will be used by CPSR to expand the scope of its
|
|
on-going Computing and Civil Liberties Project (see attached).
|
|
|
|
Because its mission is to not only increase public awareness about civil
|
|
liberties issues arising in the area of computer-based communications,
|
|
but also to support litigation in the public interest, the Foundation
|
|
has recently intervened on behalf of two legal cases.
|
|
|
|
The first case concerns Steve Jackson, an Austin-based game manufacturer
|
|
who was the target of the Secret Service's Operation Sun Devil. The EFF
|
|
has pressed for a full disclosure by the government regarding the
|
|
seizure of his company's computer equipment. In the second action, the
|
|
Foundation intends to seek amicus curiae (friend of the court) status
|
|
in the government's case against Craig Neidorf, a 20-year-old University
|
|
of Missouri student who is the editor of the electronic newsletter
|
|
Phrack World News (see attached).
|
|
|
|
"It is becoming increasingly obvious that the rate of technology
|
|
advancement in communications is far outpacing the establishment of
|
|
appropriate cultural, legal and political frameworks to handle the
|
|
issues that are arising," said Kapor. "And the Steve Jackson and Neidorf
|
|
cases dramatically point to the timeliness of the Foundation's mission.
|
|
We intend to be instrumental in helping shape a new framework that
|
|
embraces these powerful new technologies for the public good."
|
|
|
|
The use of new digital media -- in the form of on-line information and
|
|
interactive conferencing services, computer networks and electronic
|
|
bulletin boards -- is becoming widespread in businesses and homes.
|
|
However, the electronic society created by these new forms of digital
|
|
communications does not fit neatly into existing, conventional legal and
|
|
social structures.
|
|
|
|
The question of how electronic communications should be accorded the
|
|
same political freedoms as newspapers, books, journals and other modes
|
|
of discourse is currently the subject of discussion among this country's
|
|
lawmakers and members of the computer industry. The EFF will take an
|
|
active role in these discussions through its continued funding of
|
|
various educational projects and forums.
|
|
|
|
An important facet of the Foundation's mission is to help both the
|
|
public and policy-makers see and understand the opportunities as well as
|
|
the challenges posed by developments in computing and
|
|
telecommunications. Also, the EFF will encourage and support the
|
|
development of new software to enable non-technical users to more easily
|
|
use their computers to access the growing number of digital
|
|
communications services available.
|
|
|
|
The Foundation is located in Cambridge, Mass. Requests for information
|
|
should be sent to Electronic Frontier Foundation, One Cambridge Center,
|
|
Suite 300, Cambridge, MA 02142, 617/577-1385, fax 617/225-2347; or it
|
|
can be reached at the Internet mail address eff@well.sf.ca.us.
|
|
|
|
|
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
|
|
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
|
|
|
|
MISSION STATEMENT
|
|
|
|
|
|
A new world is arising in the vast web of digital, electronic media
|
|
which connect us. Computer-based communication media like electronic
|
|
mail and computer conferencing are becoming the basis of new forms of
|
|
community. These communities without a single, fixed geographical
|
|
location comprise the first settlements on an electronic frontier.
|
|
|
|
While well-established legal principles and cultural norms give
|
|
structure and coherence to uses of conventional media like newspapers,
|
|
books, and telephones, the new digital media do not so easily fit into
|
|
existing frameworks. Conflicts come about as the law struggles to
|
|
define its application in a context where fundamental notions of speech,
|
|
property, and place take profoundly new forms. People sense both the
|
|
promise and the threat inherent in new computer and communications
|
|
technologies, even as they struggle to master or simply cope with them
|
|
in the workplace and the home.
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been established to help civilize
|
|
the electronic frontier; to make it truly useful and beneficial not just
|
|
to a technical elite, but to everyone; and to do this in a way which is
|
|
in keeping with our society's highest traditions of the free and open
|
|
flow of information and communication.
|
|
|
|
To that end, the Electronic Frontier Foundation will:
|
|
|
|
1. Engage in and support educational activities which increase
|
|
popular understanding of the opportunities and challenges posed by
|
|
developments in computing and telecommunications.
|
|
|
|
2. Develop among policy-makers a better understanding of the issues
|
|
underlying free and open telecommunications, and support the creation of
|
|
legal and structural approaches which will ease the assimilation of
|
|
these new technologies by society.
|
|
|
|
3. Raise public awareness about civil liberties issues arising from
|
|
the rapid advancement in the area of new computer-based communications
|
|
media. Support litigation in the public interest to preserve, protect,
|
|
and extend First Amendment rights within the realm of computing and
|
|
telecommunications technology.
|
|
|
|
4. Encourage and support the development of new tools which will
|
|
endow non-technical users with full and easy access to computer-based
|
|
telecommunications.
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
One Cambridge Center
|
|
Cambridge, MA 02142
|
|
(617) 577-1385
|
|
|
|
|
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
|
|
LEGAL OVERVIEW
|
|
|
|
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
|
|
|
|
Advances in computer technology have brought us to a new frontier in
|
|
communications, where the law is largely unsettled and woefully
|
|
inadequate to deal with the problems and challenges posed by electronic
|
|
technology. How the law develops in this area will have a direct impact
|
|
on the electronic communications experiments and innovations being
|
|
devised day in and day out by millions of citizens on both a large and
|
|
small scale from coast to coast. Reasonable balances have to be struck
|
|
among:
|
|
|
|
% traditional civil liberties
|
|
% protection of intellectual property
|
|
% freedom to experiment and innovate
|
|
% protection of the security and integrity of computer
|
|
systems from improper governmental and private
|
|
interference.
|
|
|
|
Striking these balances properly will not be easy, but if they are
|
|
struck too far in one direction or the other, important social and legal
|
|
values surely will be sacrificed.
|
|
|
|
Helping to see to it that this important and difficult task is done
|
|
properly is a major goal of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It is
|
|
critical to assure that these lines are drawn in accordance with the
|
|
fundamental constitutional rights that have protected individuals from
|
|
government excesses since our nation was founded -- freedom of speech,
|
|
press, and association, the right to privacy and protection from
|
|
unwarranted governmental intrusion, as well as the right to procedural
|
|
fairness and due process of law.
|
|
|
|
The First Amendment
|
|
|
|
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
|
|
government from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," and
|
|
guarantees freedom of association as well. It is widely considered to
|
|
be the single most important of the guarantees contained in the Bill of
|
|
Rights, since free speech and association are fundamental in securing
|
|
all other rights.
|
|
|
|
The First Amendment throughout history has been challenged by every
|
|
important technological development. It has enjoyed only a mixed record
|
|
of success. Traditional forms of speech -- the print media and public
|
|
speaking -- have enjoyed a long and rich history of freedom from
|
|
governmental interference. The United States Supreme Court has not
|
|
afforded the same degree of freedom to electronic broadcasting,
|
|
however.
|
|
|
|
Radio and television communications, for example, have been subjected to
|
|
regulation and censorship by the Federal Communications Commission
|
|
(FCC), and by the Congress. The Supreme Court initially justified
|
|
regulation of the broadcast media on technological grounds -- since
|
|
there were assumed to be a finite number of radio and television
|
|
frequencies, the Court believed that regulation was necessary to prevent
|
|
interference among frequencies and to make sure that scarce resources
|
|
were allocated fairly. The multiplicity of cable TV networks has
|
|
demonstrated the falsity of this "scarce resource" rationale, but the
|
|
Court has expressed a reluctance to abandon its outmoded approach
|
|
without some signal from Congress or the FCC.
|
|
|
|
Congress has not seemed overly eager to relinquish even
|
|
counterproductive control over the airwaves. Witness, for example,
|
|
legislation and rule-making in recent years that have kept even
|
|
important literature, such as the poetry of Allen Ginsberg, from being
|
|
broadcast on radio because of language deemed "offensive" to regulators.
|
|
Diversity and experimentation have been sorely hampered by these rules.
|
|
|
|
The development of computer technology provides the perfect opportunity
|
|
for lawmakers and courts to abandon much of the distinction between the
|
|
print and electronic media and to extend First Amendment protections to
|
|
all communications regardless of the medium. Just as the multiplicity
|
|
of cable lines has rendered obsolete the argument that television has to
|
|
be regulated because of a scarcity of airwave frequencies, so has the
|
|
ready availability of virtually unlimited computer communication
|
|
modalities made obsolete a similar argument for harsh controls in this
|
|
area. With the computer taking over the role previously played by the
|
|
typewriter and the printing press, it would be a constitutional disaster
|
|
of major proportions if the treatment of computers were to follow the
|
|
history of regulation of radio and television, rather than the history
|
|
of freedom of the press.
|
|
|
|
To the extent that regulation is seen as necessary and proper, it should
|
|
foster the goal of allowing maximum freedom, innovation and
|
|
experimentation in an atmosphere where no one's efforts are sabotaged by
|
|
either government or private parties. Regulation should be limited by
|
|
the adage that quite aptly describes the line that separates reasonable
|
|
from unreasonable regulation in the First Amendment area: "Your liberty
|
|
ends at the tip of my nose."
|
|
|
|
As usual, the law lags well behind the development of technology. It is
|
|
important to educate lawmakers and judges about new technologies, lest
|
|
fear and ignorance of the new and unfamiliar, create barriers to free
|
|
communication, expression, experimentation, innovation, and other such
|
|
values that help keep a nation both free and vigorous.
|
|
|
|
The Fourth Amendment
|
|
|
|
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "the right of the people to
|
|
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
|
|
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
|
|
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
|
|
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
|
|
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
|
|
|
|
In short, the scope of the search has to be as narrow as
|
|
possible, and there has to be good reason to believe that the
|
|
search will turn up evidence of illegal activity.
|
|
|
|
The meaning of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee has evolved over time in
|
|
response to changing technologies. For example, while the Fourth
|
|
Amendment was first applied to prevent the government from trespassing
|
|
onto private property and seizing tangible objects, the physical
|
|
trespass rationale was made obsolete by the development of electronic
|
|
eavesdropping devices which permitted the government to "seize" an
|
|
individual's words without ever treading onto that person's private
|
|
property. To put the matter more concretely, while the drafters of the
|
|
First Amendment surely knew nothing about electronic databases, surely
|
|
they would have considered one's database to be as sacrosanct as, for
|
|
example, the contents of one's private desk or filing cabinet.
|
|
|
|
The Supreme Court responded decades ago to these types of technological
|
|
challenges by interpreting the Fourth Amendment more broadly to prevent
|
|
governmental violation of an individual's reasonable expectation of
|
|
privacy, a concept that transcended the narrow definition of one's
|
|
private physical space. It is now well established that an individual
|
|
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, not only in his or her home
|
|
and business, but also in private communications. Thus, for example:
|
|
|
|
% Government wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are now limited
|
|
by state and federal statutes enacted to effectuate and even to expand
|
|
upon Fourth Amendment protections.
|
|
|
|
% More recently, the Fourth Amendment has been used, albeit with
|
|
limited success, to protect individuals from undergoing certain random
|
|
mandatory drug testing imposed by governmental authorities.
|
|
|
|
Advancements in technology have also worked in the opposite direction,
|
|
to diminish expectations of privacy that society once considered
|
|
reasonable, and thus have helped limit the scope of Fourth Amendment
|
|
protections. Thus, while one might once have reasonably expected
|
|
privacy in a fenced-in field, the Supreme Court has recently told us
|
|
that such an expectation is not reasonable in an age of surveillance
|
|
facilitated by airplanes and zoom lenses.
|
|
|
|
Applicability of Fourth Amendment to computer media
|
|
|
|
Just as the Fourth Amendment has evolved in response to changing
|
|
technologies, so it must now be interpreted to protect the reasonable
|
|
expectation of privacy of computer users in, for example, their
|
|
electronic mail or electronically stored secrets. The extent to which
|
|
government intrusion into these private areas should be allowed, ought
|
|
to be debated openly, fully, and intelligently, as the Congress seeks to
|
|
legislate in the area, as courts decide cases, and as administrative,
|
|
regulatory, and prosecutorial agencies seek to establish their turf.
|
|
|
|
One point that must be made, but which is commonly misunderstood, is
|
|
that the Bill of Rights seeks to protect citizens from privacy invasions
|
|
committed by the government, but, with very few narrow exceptions, these
|
|
protections do not serve to deter private citizens from doing what the
|
|
government is prohibited from doing. In short, while the Fourth
|
|
Amendment limits the government's ability to invade and spy upon private
|
|
databanks, it does not protect against similar invasions by private
|
|
parties. Protection of citizens from the depredations of other citizens
|
|
requires the passage of privacy legislation.
|
|
|
|
The Fifth Amendment
|
|
|
|
The Fifth Amendment assures citizens that they will not "be deprived of
|
|
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and that private
|
|
property shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation."
|
|
This Amendment thus protects both the sanctity of private property and
|
|
the right of citizens to be proceeded against by fair means before they
|
|
may be punished for alleged infractions of the law.
|
|
|
|
One aspect of due process of law is that citizens not be prosecuted for
|
|
alleged violations of laws that are so vague that persons of reasonable
|
|
intelligence cannot be expected to assume that some prosecutor will
|
|
charge that his or her conduct is criminal. A hypothetical law, for
|
|
example, that makes it a crime to do "that which should not be done",
|
|
would obviously not pass constitutional muster under the Fifth
|
|
Amendment. Yet the application of some existing laws to new situations
|
|
that arise in the electronic age is only slightly less problematic than
|
|
the hypothetical, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation plans to
|
|
monitor the process by which old laws are modified, and new laws are
|
|
crafted, to meet modern situations.
|
|
|
|
One area in which old laws and new technologies have already clashed and
|
|
are bound to continue to clash, is the application of federal criminal
|
|
laws against the interstate transportation of stolen property. The
|
|
placement on an electronic bulletin board of arguably propriety computer
|
|
files, and the "re-publication" of such material by those with access to
|
|
the bulletin board, might well expose the sponsor of the bulletin board
|
|
as well as all participants to federal felony charges, if the U.S.
|
|
Department of Justice can convince the courts to give these federal laws
|
|
a broad enough reading. Similarly, federal laws protecting against
|
|
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping clearly have to be updated to
|
|
take into account electronic bulletin board technology, lest those who
|
|
utilize such means of communication should be assured of reasonable
|
|
privacy from unwanted government surveillance.
|
|
|
|
Summary
|
|
|
|
The problem of melding old but still valid concepts of constitutional
|
|
rights, with new and rapidly evolving technologies, is perhaps best
|
|
summed up by the following observation. Twenty-five years ago there was
|
|
not much question but that the First Amendment prohibited the government
|
|
from seizing a newspaper's printing press, or a writer's typewriter, in
|
|
order to prevent the publication of protected speech. Similarly, the
|
|
government would not have been allowed to search through, and seize,
|
|
one's private papers stored in a filing cabinet, without first
|
|
convincing a judge that probable cause existed to believe that evidence
|
|
of crime would be found.
|
|
|
|
Today, a single computer is in reality a printing press, typewriter, and
|
|
filing cabinet (and more) all wrapped up in one. How the use and output
|
|
of this device is treated in a nation governed by a Constitution that
|
|
protects liberty as well as private property, is a major challenge we
|
|
face. How well we allow this marvelous invention to continue to be
|
|
developed by creative minds, while we seek to prohibit or discourage
|
|
truly abusive practices, will depend upon the degree of wisdom that
|
|
guides our courts, our legislatures, and governmental agencies entrusted
|
|
with authority in this area of our national life.
|
|
|
|
For further information regarding The Bill of Rights please contact:
|
|
|
|
Harvey Silverglate
|
|
Silverglate & Good
|
|
89 Broad Street, 14th Floor
|
|
Boston, MA 02110
|
|
617/542-6663
|
|
|
|
|
|
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
|
+ END THIS FILE +
|
|
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
|
! |