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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
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>D I G E S T<
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*** Volume 1, Issue #1.21 (July 8, 1990) **
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****************************************************************************
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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ARCHIVISTS: Bob Krause / Alex Smith
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REPLY TO: TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
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views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
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for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
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protections.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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File 1: Moderators' Comments
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File 2: From the Mailbag
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File 3: On the Problems of Evidence in Computer Investigation
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File 4: Response to Mitch Kapors Critics (E. Goldstein)
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File 5: The CU in the News: Excerpts from Computerworld article
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.21, File 1 of 5: Moderators' Comments ***
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***************************************************************
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----------
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In this file:
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1) The CU and Freedom of Speech
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2) CuD's readership (and survey request)
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3) New archive policy
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-----------------------------
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE CU
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-----------------------------
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The moderators and most contributors have consistently criticized federal
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agents' investigation and prosecution of the computer underground because
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of its chilling effect on free speech and what we see as dangerous and
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unacceptable encroachments on the First Amendment. We find any constraints
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on the freedom to express ideas (including art, information sharing, or
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political views) improper. It is not without some irony that we sense
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another barrier to free exchange of ideas.
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The author a file below (File 3) requested anonymity because s/he has
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experienced harassment in the past from those who object to the content of
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those ideas. In this case, the harassment included disruptive early morning
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phone calls and other breaches that exceeded the bounds of even prankish
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incivility. If the author's experiences were isolated, they would require
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little comment. Unfortunately, those of us who identify with the CU can be
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an aggressive and self-righteous lot, and we receive a number of complaints
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by CU critics of a variety of intrusions on their life that, if the
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positions were reversed, we would enrage us.
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The climate of fear that limits exchange of information and ideas seems to
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be a two-edged sword. Both critics and advocates seem unwilling to express
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themselves openly for fear of retaliation. When a single voice is silenced
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through fear, we all suffer. Most CU types recognize this, but, if lines
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between "them" and "us" (whoever constitutes each side) become sharper, if
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passions increase without a productive outlet, and as we come to feel more
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threatened by each other, we begin to re-create the conditions that most of
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us are struggling to eliminate. Freedom of speech simply cannot exist in a
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climate of distrust.
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We recognize the bulk of the readers of CuD are professionals and would
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not themselves intentionally stifle the right of another to speak. But,
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perhaps we are not doing enough to remove the barriers that seem to exist
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between various groups. As young computerists enter the modem/CU culture,
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the more experienced among us can continually remind users through message
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logs, hotline communiques, papers, articles, and other forums, that
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retaliation for simply voicing unpopular ideas is wrong. Flamez are one
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thing, but accessing accounts, phone threats, actions that disrupt family
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life, and similar reactions cannot be tolerated. We find it sad that we
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feel it necessary to take a position on this, but the comments of would-be
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contributors indicate that there is a problem, and we should be sure our
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own house is in order if we intend to maintain credibility.
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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-------------------------------
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WHO READS CuD? (IMPORTANT: PLEASE READ)
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-------------------------------
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Some readers indicate that one reason they do not submit articles to us is
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because of the impression that CuD's readers are hackers, young, and
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perhaps irresponsible, and the message would be lost. These people are
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surprised when we give them a sense of the demographics. We do not keep
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records (other than the mailing list and back issues), but over the months
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we have gather a rough profile of subscribers from mailing addresses and
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responses. We assume here that the characteristics of those who do not
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respond or others give no cue of who they are or what they think are
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randomly distributed.
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**NOW--HERE'S THE IMPORTANT PART**:
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Bob Krause, who helps with many of the CuD duties, would like to do a
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survey of the readership. But, before sending out a survey to the readers,
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we would like some feedback. If people find e-mail surveys offensive, they
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can simply delete them. We are more concerned with what people think of the
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propriety of it. It would be short (3 minutes to complete), and we agree
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with Bob that the information could be helpful. Bob is a computer
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applications programmer in upstate New York, and is also a graduate student
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interested in computer security.
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We feel bob has several good reasons that justify his project.
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1. His primary reason is to establish some floor-base figures, from CuD and
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other sources, to examine the demographics of the "computer underground."
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It would be useful to show the readers who "they" are on the list and also
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display that those on the list are not all criminally insane teenagers lead
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by a dangerous 60's-type moderator.
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2. A survey limited to CuD readers would give us a better sense of the
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readership so we can assure ambivalent readers that they are in the
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majority.
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3. Bob's goal is to eventually gather sufficient data for a paper on the
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composition of the CU that would be appropriate for the National Computer
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Security Conference in 1991.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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-------------
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ARCHIVES
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-------------
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With regret, we are NO LONGER ABLE to send archives from the TK0JUT2@NIU
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site, and we request that readers obtain them FTP or from Bob Krause. We
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are under no pressure of any kind to stop, nor is our decision the result
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of the "chilling effect." The problem is time: JT is getting nasty "why
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isn't your book" finished notes from the publisher, and GM's commute
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between Chicago and the suburbs leaves little spare time.
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.21, File 2 of 5: From the Mailbag ***
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***************************************************************
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In this file: 1) Dorothy Denning's paper on hackers
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2) Legal info on the ECPA from Mike Godwin
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: 25 Jun 1990 1021-PDT (Monday)
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To: tk0jut2%niu.bitnet@uicvm.uic.edu
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Cc: denning, 72307.1502@compuserve.com
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Subject: Paper on Hackers
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The following is the title and abstract of a paper that I will be
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presenting at the 13th National Computer Security Conference in Washington,
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D.C., Oct. 1-4, 1990. A copy of the full paper can be obtained from me or
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the CuD archives.
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Concerning Hackers Who Break into Computer Systems
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A diffuse group of people often called %%hackers'' has been
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characterized as unethical, irresponsible, and a serious danger to
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society for actions related to breaking into computer systems. This
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paper attempts to construct a picture of hackers, their concerns, and
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the discourse in which hacking takes place. My initial findings suggest
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that hackers are learners and explorers who want to help rather than
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cause damage, and who often have very high standards of behavior. My
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findings also suggest that the discourse surrounding hacking belongs at
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the very least to the gray areas between larger conflicts that we are
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experiencing at every level of society and business in an information
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age where many are not computer literate. These conflicts are between
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the idea that information cannot be owned and the idea that it can, and
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between law enforcement and the First and Fourth Amendments. Hackers
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have raised serious issues about values and practices in an information
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society. Based on my findings, I recommend that we work closely with
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hackers, and suggest several actions that might be taken.
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Dorothy Denning, Digital Equipment Corp., denning@src.dec.com
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Date: Fri, 6 Jul 90 15:09:33 -0500
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From: mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu(Mike Godwin)
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Subject: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
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John, you asked whether 18 USC 1343 comprised all or part of the Electronic
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Communications Privacy Act. I've already sent you one reply, but I meant to
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add that the Act you're asking about is set out in 18 USC 2701 et seq.
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The first thing I noticed (which is to say, the first thing I looked for)
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was the penalties subsection, which lists penalties that are generally much
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less than those available under the wire-fraud statute, 18 USC 1343.
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So, one wonders, why isn't the government prosecuting the Legion of Doom
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under Secs. 2701 et seq. rather than under 1343? I have some speculations
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on this issue:
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a) The ECPA protects explicitly protects "communications," which probably
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excludes source code and which arguably excludes the E911 "help file"
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(since it wasn't written to be communicated via e-mail). So, the feds have
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a colorable argument that these statutes weren't intended to deal with
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"hacking" at all.
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b) By characterizing the LoD activities as theft and fraud rather than
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merely as invasion of privacy, the government gets to threaten far more
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serious penalties, making the whole sting operation more media-worthy. The
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more media coverage of a major show trial, the more deterrent effect on
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hackers, the feds may think.
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c) Prosecution for more serious crimes is politically necessary for the
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government to justify the resources it devoted to the Legion of Doom sting
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and other investigations/prosecutions. Only four arrests as of John
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Schwartz's last NEWSWEEK article.
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FYI, the first-offense penalties for unauthorized access to "stored
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communications" under 18 USC 2701 are a maximum of one year in prison and
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$250,000 in fines if the access was sought for commercial or destructive
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purposes, and a maximum of six months in prison and $5000 in fines "in any
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other case."
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--Mike
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=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
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+ END THIS FILE +
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+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
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***************************************************************
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*** CuD #1.21, File 3 of 5: On the Problems of Evidence ***
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***************************************************************
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Please post this without attribution to me (anonymously). I've gotten
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too much hate mail and nuisance phone calls from hackers to want more,
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and from the postings I've seen here, that type of person may be the
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majority of your audience.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Following are various random thoughts and reactions of a retired
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semi-hacker to things that have appeared in the digest of late:
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1) Quoting the maximum possible penalty for various crimes is not "fair" in
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the sense that those maximum sentences are seldom imposed. Saying that the
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LoD folks, with no prior record, and (apparently) minimal or no damage
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caused, are going to face 50 years in prison, is an attempt to incite the
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reader. Most of those laws specify a range of penalties that reflect the
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severity of the crime. For instance, Robert Morris (who did more damage
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than the LoD folks, as near as I can tell) only got a token fine and a
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probated sentence. If the LoD folks even get convicted (doubtful, I would
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guess), then their sentence cannot possibly be the maximum. Federal
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sentencing guidelines would not allow it, and no judicial review would
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uphold it.
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The extreme penalties are in place for extreme crimes. If someone mucked
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about with a computer and caused multiple deaths, or crashed the FedWire
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computers for a half day -- that would be more deserving of a major
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sentence.
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The law is written to cover a range. Let's try to be more realistic about
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this aspect of things, okay?
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2) Confiscation of equipment during search warrants. Well, how would YOU
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do it? Pretend you are a Federal agent. Figure that you have to search for
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evidence of wrong-doing on the computer system of someone who you (rightly
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or wrongly) suspect has been involved in illegal computer activity.
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Let's leave behind the question of whether the search warrants of late are
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justified or not, or whether the agents involved have been overzealous. It
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doesn't matter for this little exercise. Instead, put yourself in the role
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of the person who has sufficient reason so suspect someone of a crime that
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it is your duty to investigate. You need to be thorough, and find the
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evidence if it is there. You are a Fed with a valid, fair search warrant.
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Consider some of the problems:
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* There may be gigabytes of information on disks, tapes, and optical
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media that has to be searched, file by file.
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* You also have to search the "free list" where files may have been
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deleted, because sometimes evidence is found there. You need to do this on
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every disk, using something like Norton Utilities.
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* You may have to try to decrypt some files, or figure out what
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format they use.
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* Some evidence may be hidden in other ways on the machine (use your
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imagination a little here -- I'm sure you can think of some ways to do it).
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You have to search it out.
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You've only got one or two people to search the machine, but those persons
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are also assigned to a dozen other cases. Could you do a comprehensive
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search in a few days? A week? To do an effective search of that much
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material would probably take many, many weeks. And remember, the person
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whose equipment you are searching is somewhat (or very) knowledgeable, and
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has probably tried to hide the information in some way, so you have to work
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extra hard to search. Sure they're bitching and moaning about how they
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can't continue their business without their equipment, but what can *you*
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do about it if you are going to do your job right?
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Then there are other problems:
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* The machine you are searching may have non-standard hardware and
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software. You can't just transfer the disks to another machine and read
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them. If nothing else, the heads may be out of alignment on the suspect's
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machine, making the disks unreadable anywhere else.
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* The machines you are searching may require special peripherals to
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print/run/read data. Your system doesn't have an optical disk, or 8mm tape
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unit, or maybe even a 3.25 disk drive.
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* You have a small budget for equipment and don't have anything big
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enough or fast enough to search the data created by complex machines being
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searched.
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* You don't have the budget or time to make copies of all the data and
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take the data with you (even in bulk quantities and high speed, how much
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would it take for you to copy 500Mb onto floppies?)
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* Because of chain of custody requirements for the search, you have to
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be able to certify that the evidence was under the control of responsible
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people the whole time from the execution of the warrant up until the
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introduction of trial. That means you can't go home for the night, then
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come back the next day.
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* You can't ask the suspect to help -- he may have function keys,
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booby-traps, or other things in place to erase or alter the evidence you're
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after. You can't let him near the system, or even near anything that might
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signal to the system.
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How do you address these issues? By taking the whole set of equipment
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involved in the search and using it to do the searching and printing. You
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know it is compatible with the data you are searching, and it probably has
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sufficient capacity to do the search.
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Suppose you find incriminating evidence, or at least material that needs to
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be presented as evidence. What do you do? Well, you can't just print it
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out or make a floppy copy and then hand the machine back. There is a
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concept of "best evidence" involved that means you probably need the
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original form. Plus, naive jurors have a hard time relating the data, the
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original computer, and copies of the data; defense lawyers like to
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capitalize on that. Take a copy into court, and an ignorant judge might
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rule that it can't be used in evidence.
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How to address the problem? Keep the machine and storage until after the
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trial.
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It is very easy for people to criticize the law enforcement personnel for
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their searches. Perhaps they *should* be criticized for their selection of
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suspects and their flair for dramatics, in some (many?) cases. But if you
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are going to criticize, then come up with a *reasonable* alternative that
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can be used.
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I originally thought that seizure of the equipment was too extreme, but the
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more I thought about the problem, the more I realized that in many cases
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the authorities have no choice if they are to do a thorough and useful
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search. I know that if someone wanted to search my systems, it would take
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them weeks. Heck, I have so much stuff on disk and tape, it sometimes
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takes me more than a day to find what I want, and I'm the one who organized
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it all!
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3) Prosecution, etc.
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Suppose you have evidence that someone had broken into the computers at
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Bank XYZ and made copies of a few harmless files. What do you do?
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Well, one thing is for certain. You don't believe them if they say they
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were only looking around. If you did, then *everyone* caught trespassing
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or committing larceny would use the same line. Everybody "casing" the
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system for a later. major theft would make the same claim -- they were just
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looking. How do you prove otherwise?
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So, do you wait for them to get back on and steal something important or
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cause major damage?
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No, that has obvious drawbacks, too. If you have the evidence that a crime
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has been committed, then you prosecute it before a larger crime is
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committed. It may look petty, but you don't take chances with other
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people's property or lives.
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I'm not going to start a debate on whether or not charges in a certain case
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are too extreme, or whether the law provides too harsh a penalty for some
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transgressions. Besides, we might all agree on that. :-) However, from a
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standpoint of security, you never want to allow unauthorized people to
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snoop on your system, whether they are causing harm or not; from a law
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enforcement view, you don't wait for people to commit repeated major
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felonies if you can nail them on what they've already done.
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Because people steal and lie, it makes it impossible to give the benefit of
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the doubt to the majority who really don't mean much harm. My machine has
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been broken into and sabotaged; as such, I will never again believe anyone
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who claims they were "just looking" and I will prosecute trespassers if I
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can. That's too bad for the harmless hacker, but the harmless hacker had
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better realize that assholes have spoiled the environment we all once
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enjoyed. The more people keep breaking into systems, or worse, the more
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the lawmakers and law enforcement types are going to press back and make
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noise about the problems. Think it's bad now? Then just keep hacking
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into systems and provide ammunition to the know-nothings who may start
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suggesting laws like registration of modems or licensing people to have
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PCs.
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4) Definitions, the law, etc.
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First of all, I'm not surprised that you have so little comment in this
|
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list from law enforcement types and others of their mind-set. Part of that
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may be due to the fact that they don't have network access. Believe it or
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not, there are only a few dozen Fed agents with the computer expertise to
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know how to access the net. And the US Govt has not allocated much in the
|
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way of funds to build up computers and technology for law enforcement.
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Just because they're the govt doesn't mean they have lots of equipment,
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personnel, or training. Believe me, I speak from first-hand experience on
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this.
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There's another reason, too, and it's related to my request to post this
|
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anonymously. I believe myself to be fairly middle of the road on many of
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these legal issues, and what I've read so far in this digest is very
|
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extreme (and sometimes insulting) to people in law enforcement. I wonder
|
||
if people on this list can be objective enough to try to see the other side
|
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of the issue -- is it worth my while to try to suggest even so much as
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balance here?
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Again, it is very easy to criticize, but I don't see anyone trying to think
|
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objectively about the underlying problems and try to suggest better
|
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solutions. The base problem isn't that there are "evil" law enforcement
|
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people out there trying to bash computer users. It's because there are
|
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irresponsible people breaking the law, and the law enforcement folks are
|
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unsophisticated and uneducated about what they're trying to stop.
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|
||
Yes, there is no question that there are abuses of the law and the system.
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Yes, there is no question that there are some problems with the system.
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Yes, there is no question that there are some stuck-up people in the legal
|
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system who enjoy bullying others.
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BUT
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There are also people breaking into systems they have no right to
|
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access...and it doesn't matter why they do it or whether they harm
|
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anything, it is wrong and illegal. There are people committing fraud
|
||
against banks, credit card companies, and telecommunications companies --
|
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against all of us. There are instances of industrial and political
|
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espionage going on. There are computer-run racist hate groups, kiddie porn
|
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rings, and conspiracies to commit all kinds of awful things.
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How would you write the laws so that illegal activity could be prosecuted
|
||
appropriately without endangering the rights of the innocent? Instead of
|
||
being critical, let's see some of you "authorities" apply your expertise to
|
||
something constructive! Suggest how we can write good laws that work but
|
||
can't be abused. This would be a good forum for that. If we come up with
|
||
some good suggestions, I suspect we could even get them into more
|
||
appropriate forums. But we have to have reasonable ideas, first, not
|
||
simply cries of "foul" that fail to acknowledge that there are real
|
||
criminals out there amongst the rest of us.
|
||
|
||
|
||
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
||
+ END THIS FILE +
|
||
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
||
|
||
|
||
***************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #1.21, File 4 of 5: On Mitch Kapor's Critics ***
|
||
***************************************************************
|
||
|
||
--------------
|
||
The following originally appeared in TELECOM Digest, #467.
|
||
--------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 90 23:04:32 CDT
|
||
From: TELECOM Moderator <telecom@eecs.nwu.edu>
|
||
Subject: TELECOM Digest V10 #467
|
||
|
||
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 90 00:00:00 gmt
|
||
From: dunike!isis!well!emmanuel (Emmanuel Goldstein)
|
||
Subject: Mitch Kapor and "Sun Devil"
|
||
|
||
|
||
It's real disturbing to read the comments that have been posted recently on
|
||
TELECOM Digest concerning Operation Sun Devil and Mitch Kapor's
|
||
involvement. While I think the moderator has been chastised sufficiently,
|
||
there are still a few remarks I want to make.
|
||
|
||
First of all, I understand the point he was trying to get across. But I
|
||
think he shot from the hip without rationalizing his point first, thereby
|
||
leaving many of us in a kind of stunned silence. If I understand it
|
||
correctly, the argument is: Kapor says he wants to help people that the
|
||
Moderator believes are thieves. Therefore, using that logic, it's okay to
|
||
steal from Kapor.
|
||
|
||
Well, I don't agree. Obviously, Kapor DOESN'T believe these people are
|
||
criminals. Even if one or two of them ARE criminals, he is concerned with
|
||
all of the innocent bystanders that are being victimized here. And make no
|
||
mistake about that - there are many innocent bystanders here. I've spoken
|
||
to quite a few of them. Steve Jackson, Craig Neidorf, the friends and
|
||
families of people who've had armed agents of the federal government storm
|
||
into their homes and offices. It's a very frightening scenario - one that
|
||
I've been through myself. And when it happens there are permanent scars
|
||
and a fear that never quite leaves. For drug dealers, murderers, hardened
|
||
criminals, it's an acceptable price in my view. But a 14 year old kid who
|
||
doesn't know when to stop exploring a computer system? Let's get real. Do
|
||
we really want to mess up someone's life just to send a message?
|
||
|
||
I've been a hacker for a good part of my life. Years ago, I was what you
|
||
would call an "active" hacker, that is, I wandered about on computer
|
||
systems and explored. Throughout it all, I knew it would be wrong to mess
|
||
up data or do something that would cause harm to a system. I was taught to
|
||
respect tangible objects; extending that to encompass intangible objects
|
||
was not very hard to do. And most, if not all, of the people I explored
|
||
with felt the same way. Nobody sold their knowledge. The only profit we got
|
||
was an education that far surpassed any computer class or manual.
|
||
|
||
Eventually, though, I was caught. But fortunately for me, the witch-hunt
|
||
mentality hadn't caught on yet. I cooperated with the authorities,
|
||
explained how the systems I used were flawed, and proved that there was no
|
||
harm done. I had to pay for the computer time I used and if I stayed out of
|
||
trouble, I would have no criminal record. They didn't crush my spirit. And
|
||
the computers I used became more secure. Except for the fear and
|
||
intimidation that occurred during my series of raids, I think I was dealt
|
||
with fairly.
|
||
|
||
Now I publish a hacker magazine. And in a way, it's an extension of that
|
||
experience. The hackers are able to learn all about many different computer
|
||
and phone systems. And those running the systems, IF THEY ARE SMART, listen
|
||
to what is being said and learn valuable lessons before it's too late.
|
||
Because sooner or later, someone will figure out a way to get in. And you'd
|
||
better hope it's a hacker who can help you figure out ways to improve the
|
||
system and not an ex-employee with a monumental grudge.
|
||
|
||
In all fairness, I've been hacked myself. Someone figured out a way to
|
||
break the code for my answering machine once. Sure, I was angry -- at the
|
||
company. They had no conception of what security was. I bought a new
|
||
machine from a different company, but not before letting a lot of people
|
||
know EXACTLY what happened. And I've had people figure out my calling card
|
||
numbers. This gave me firsthand knowledge of the ineptitude of the phone
|
||
companies. And I used to think they understood their own field! My point
|
||
is: you're only a victim if you refuse to learn. If I do something stupid
|
||
like empty my china cabinet on the front lawn and leave it there for three
|
||
weeks, I don't think many people will feel sympathetic if it doesn't quite
|
||
work out. And I don't think we should be sympathetic towards companies and
|
||
organizations that obviously don't know the first thing about security and
|
||
very often are entrusted with important data.
|
||
|
||
The oldest hacker analogy is the
|
||
walking-in-through-the-front-door-and-rummaging-through-my-personal-belongings
|
||
one. I believe the Moderator recently asked a critic if he would leave his
|
||
door unlocked so he could drop in and rummage. The one fact that always
|
||
seems to be missed with this analogy is that an individual's belongings are
|
||
just not interesting to someone who simply wants to learn. But they ARE
|
||
interesting to someone who wants to steal. A big corporation's computer
|
||
system is not interesting to someone who wants to steal, UNLESS they have
|
||
very specific knowledge as to how to do this (which eliminates the hacker
|
||
aspect). But that system is a treasure trove for those interested in
|
||
LEARNING. To those that insist on using this old analogy, I say at least be
|
||
consistent. You wouldn't threaten somebody with 30 years in jail for taking
|
||
something from a house. What's especially ironic is that your personal
|
||
belongings are probably much more secure than the data in the nation's
|
||
largest computer systems!
|
||
|
||
When you refer to hacking as "burglary and theft", as the Moderator
|
||
frequently does, it becomes easy to think of these people as hardened
|
||
criminals. But it's just not the case. I don't know any burglars or
|
||
thieves, yet I hang out with an awful lot of hackers. It serves a definite
|
||
purpose to blur the distinction, just as pro-democracy demonstrators are
|
||
referred to as rioters by nervous leaders. Those who have staked a claim in
|
||
the industry fear that the hackers will reveal vulnerabilities in their
|
||
systems that they would just as soon forget about. It would have been very
|
||
easy for Mitch Kapor to join the bandwagon on this. The fact that he didn't
|
||
tells me something about his character. And he's not the only one.
|
||
|
||
Since we published what was, to the best of my knowledge, the first
|
||
pro-hacker article on all of these raids, we've been startled by the
|
||
intensity of the feedback we've gotten. A lot of people are angry, upset,
|
||
and frightened by what the Secret Service is doing. They're speaking out
|
||
and communicating their outrage to other people who we could never have
|
||
reached. And they've apparently had these feelings for some time. Is this
|
||
the anti-government bias our Moderator accused another writer of harboring?
|
||
Hardly. This is America at its finest.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Emmanuel Goldstein
|
||
Editor, 2600 Magazine - The Hacker Quarterly
|
||
|
||
emmanuel@well.sf.ca.us po box 752, middle island, ny 11953
|
||
|
||
|
||
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
||
+ END THIS FILE +
|
||
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
||
|
||
|
||
***************************************************************
|
||
*** CuD #1.21, File 5 of 5: Excerpts from Computerworld ***
|
||
***************************************************************
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 01 Jul 90 15:59:43 EDT
|
||
From: Michael Rosen <CM193C@GWUVM>
|
||
Subject: Re: articles
|
||
To: Computer Underground Digest <TK0JUT2>
|
||
|
||
|
||
---------------
|
||
%The following was excerpted from: Computerworld, 6/25/90 (pp. 1,6). The
|
||
author is Michael Alexander (CW Staff).%
|
||
---------------
|
||
|
||
"...civil libertarians asserted last week that authorities have crossed the
|
||
bounds of the Constitution in carrying out searches..
|
||
|
||
...Mitch Kapor, founder of Lotus Development Corp. and On Technology, Inc.,
|
||
and John Barlow an author and lyricist for the Grateful Dead, will announce
|
||
the official launch of a computer hacker defense team "within a few weeks,"
|
||
as a result of the government's crackdown on computer crime, Kapor said
|
||
last week.
|
||
|
||
Two Law firms, Rabinowitz Boudin Standard Krinsky & Lieberman in New York
|
||
and Silverglate Gertner Fine & Good in Boston, are the other members of the
|
||
planned hacker defense team.
|
||
|
||
...Government agents have intimidated some hackers who sought legal counsel
|
||
and stampeded over their constitutional rights to free speech by illegally
|
||
seizing computers used to operate bulletin-board systems, said Terry Gross,
|
||
an attorney at Rabinowitz Boudin Standard Krinsky & Lieberman. The firm is
|
||
noted for its expertise in handling cases that it believes are deliberate
|
||
attacks on constitutional rights. For example, it defended Daniel Ellsberg
|
||
in the celebrated Pentagon Papers case.
|
||
|
||
Computerworld learned last week that Rabinowitz Boudin Standard Krinsky &
|
||
Lieberman is already providing legal assistance in the defence of Craig
|
||
Neidorf, a 20-year-old hacker and newsletter editor who has been indicted
|
||
in Chicago in a scheme to steal Bellsouth Corp. documentation for an
|
||
enhanced 911 emergency telephone system.
|
||
|
||
"I personally asked the attorneys to provide some informal advice in these
|
||
matters, and that is obviously a logical precursor to more formal
|
||
involvment," Kapor said in an interview.
|
||
|
||
The defense team is in the midst of setting up a formal structure and
|
||
strategy for the organization, Kapor said. Asked if the group will provide
|
||
funds to pay legal fees for computer hackers, Kapor replied: "I contemplate
|
||
doing that very strongly, but none of these decisions are final or public."
|
||
|
||
..."The government is overreacting," said Sheldon Zenner, Neidorf's
|
||
attorney and a member of the katten Muchin & Zavis law firm in Chicago.
|
||
"They are grappling with legitimate concerns of computer crime but are
|
||
trampling constitutional rights at the same time."
|
||
|
||
Zenner said that he will file First Amendment motions this week on his
|
||
client's behalf. Neidorf was slated to go to trial in federal district
|
||
court in Chicago last week, but the trial was rescheduled for next month to
|
||
allow the defense to file new motions.
|
||
|
||
"Craig is a 20-year-old nebish, so they don't mind going after him," Zenner
|
||
said. "They didn't think that it would raise the same issues as if they
|
||
went after _The New York Times_ or _The Wall Street Journal_."
|
||
|
||
Neidorf, who recently completed his junior year at the University of
|
||
Missouri, is a co-editor of "Phrack," a newsletter for computer hackers.
|
||
He has admitted to publishing an edited version of 911 documentation but
|
||
contended that he did not know the information had been stolen.
|
||
|
||
Federal and state law enforcers have maintained that it is necessary to
|
||
seize a computer to evaluate its contents for evidence of a crime, not to
|
||
block publication of any information on a bulletin board.
|
||
|
||
"I don't see this as a First Amendment issue," said Kirk Tabbey, a Michigan
|
||
assistant prosecuting attorney and coordinating legal counsel to the
|
||
Michigan Computer Crime Task Force.
|
||
|
||
"It is an intrusion only as far as we need to prove the crime," Tabbey
|
||
said. "You try to take only what you need because you have to comply with
|
||
the Fourth Amendment, which limits illegal searches and seizures."
|
||
|
||
Steve Jackson, founder of Steve Jackson Games in Austin, Texas, said he
|
||
thinks otherwise. In March, the Secret Service raided his office and the
|
||
home of an employee and seized computers that it said contained a "handbok
|
||
on computer crime," Jackson said. The handbook was in fact a game, he
|
||
said."
|
||
|
||
|
||
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
|
||
+ END CuD, 1.21 +
|
||
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+===+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=
|
||
|
||
|