2713 lines
129 KiB
Plaintext
2713 lines
129 KiB
Plaintext
COMSEC LETTER
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Editor: James A. Ross
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Yogo 0
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1984
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COMSEC LETTER
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The ComSec Letter was started in 1984, The Year Of George
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Orwell, by Jim Ross. Initially it was mailed at no charge to
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everyone on his mailing list, and it was later offered by
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subscription. After the founding of the Communication Security
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Association, the letter became its official organ. In 1989 the
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association decided to create a new organ, Comsec Journal; and,
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in order to minimize confusion, the name of this letter was
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changed to Surveillance.
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What follows is an edited version of the contents of one
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year of the letter. (The letter has been edited to remove
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topical, superfluous, and outdated items.)
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Ross Engineering, Inc.
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7906 Hope Valley Court
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Adamstown, MD 21710
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Tel: 301-831-8400; Fax: 301-874-5100January, 1984
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WELCOME!
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This is the first of what we plan to be a monthly letter on
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the subject of communications security. The fact that you have
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received this first letter indicates that your name and address
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somehow found its way into our mailing list. If you do not wish
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to receive future editions, please let us know, and we'll remove
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your name.
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By the way, if our changeover to a computerized system has
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mangled your name or address, please let us know, and we'll
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correct it.
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PURPOSE
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The purpose of this newsletter is to provide accurate
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information on private and commercial (not government)
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communications security.
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SUBJECT MATTER
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Our prime area of interest is communications security. The
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emphasis will be on electronic communications systems and the
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protection of the information that they carry; but, with the
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proliferation of intrusions into computers we'll also be
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addressing the problem of protecting stored information. As a
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matter of fact, our overall interest is in the protection of
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information and privacy protection regardless of the method used
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to collect information.
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CONTENT
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In these letters we plan to include topical information on
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products and techniques, answers to questions submitted,
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announcements of coming events, and reviews of books and
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magazines. In addition to providing this business and technical
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information, we'll also be advising you on services and products
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available from Ross Engineering.
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Feedback from you is encouraged. If there is an area of
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particular interest to you, or any error (heaven forbid!) that
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you want to call to our attention; please write or call. We are
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trying to be a source of accurate, detailed, and unbiased
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information in a technology which has had more than its share of
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misinformation disseminated.
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ADDITIONAL PROJECTS PLANNED
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Naturally, we cannot do everything at once, but we have
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plans to update and correct the reports which the government has
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issued; to write a series of technical essays, and, in general,
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to try to be a clearing house for information on this technology.
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DEFINITION
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Having said that we intend to be a clearing house for
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information on this technology, let's try to define the
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technology that we mean. What exactly is it? Well, for
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starters, it has to do with the collection of information. Some
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people use the term "Industrial Espionage" but that's not good
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for two reasons. First, the word "industrial" seems to limit our
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scope to manufacturing firms, and we are definitely not limited
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in that way. Second, the word espionage refers to the collection
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of information by clandestine means and usually brings up the
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image of government vs. government spying, and our field is
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private and commercial spying. (Governments have such
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unbelievably vast resources available to them, that they exist in
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a different world, in our opinion.) Because the principle
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contributor to this newsletter is a man who has spent over forty
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years working in, studying and teaching communications and
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electronics, this publication will be heavily oriented toward
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communications and electronics.
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The following words, which have been used to describe our
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countermeasures seminar, should give a feel for the technology we
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are addressing: Technical Surveillance; Electronic Eavesdropping;
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Industrial Espionage; Audio Surveillance; Electronic Spying.
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However, we are interested in all means of collecting information
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and we plan to present information which we judge to be of value
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to our readership regardless of whether it relates to electronics
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or not.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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Having just completed a countermeasures seminar here in the
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Washington area, some questions which were asked at the seminar
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are fresh in our minds, so we might as well kick off the
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"content" part of our first newsletter with some answers to
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questions.
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Q. How often do you find something really sophisticated?
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A. If you mean 21st century Buck Rogers equipment, the
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answer is we have not yet found anything in that category. We
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are, of course, aware of some exotic equipment and techniques,
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but we work in the commercial arena and we have not yet faced a
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situation in which the enemy would have conceivably committed
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resources of that magnitude.
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However, as an engineer, I feel that the really elegant
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systems are the very simple ones, such as the speaker of the
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speakerphone being connected to a spare pair leading out of the
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target area to the telephone closet. (That's the one that I
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described to you which was installed in the CEO's office and
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conference room in the company which lost $200,000,000 in
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competitive bids in one year.) Taking advantage of the fact that
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many spare pair are normally available from the target area to
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the telephone closet, in my opinion, makes good sense. Also, the
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Ma Bell equipment is of very high quality, so why not use it?
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And the total cost to the bugger for equipment in the target area
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was zero.
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Q. Don't you think that the best people to find a bug are
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people who have experience in planting them?
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A. It is true that a man who has had experience in planting
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bugs will certainly know some good places to look, but the most
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valuable "looking" is done using sophisticated instruments and
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the most important characteristic of the "looker" is that he
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understand electronic communications and how to use these
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instruments. Saying that a person should have "black bag"
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experience before he works in countermeasures is like saying that
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no surgeon should work on a bullet wound until he has shot a few
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people; or no detective should investigate a rape until he has
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raped a few people!
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Q. Can you provide a checklist to be used to ensure that all
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necessary checks are made during a specific TSCM activity?
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A. No, because we believe that each TSCM activity starts
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with the assessment of the threat and the development of the plan
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for that specific job.
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For example, when checking offices in a multi-tenant
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building, it is usually very important to emphasize the physical
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search, looking for hidden microphone and illegitimate conductors
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leading out of the target areas because it is a simple matter to
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conceal wires under a carpet and run them to a listening post in
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another part of the building. In contrast, we recently did a job
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in which the target area was all of a luxurious home which was
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well isolated from other buildings and located on the waterfront.
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In order to run wires to a listening post the bugger would have
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had to bury them by trenching through a beautifully manicured
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lawn, so, in this case, we did not have to spend time searching
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for extra wires leading out of the target area. Instead, we
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concentrated on looking for irregularities on the connecting
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blocks and checking power lines for carrier current
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transmissions.
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Also, in a multi-tenant building it is usually important to
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perform many audio conduction tests -- are there audio paths
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which conduct target area audio to some place which could be used
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as a listening post? In the case of the home mentioned above,
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there was no possibility of the listening post being located in
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the same building, so we did not perform any audio conduction
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tests.
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However, we do plan to put together some kind of a
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comprehensive outline of the various countermeasures procedures
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and try to develop a matrix to indicate under what circumstances
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each activity is indicated. I used the word "try" advisedly --
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this is a big undertaking and we are not going to put something
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out which is not complete because "a little learning is a
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dangerous thing".
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Q. Can you recommend a good book which will help me get
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started in studying electronics as it relates to eavesdropping?
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A. When this question was asked at the seminar, we thought
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of the textbooks that we used in teaching the electronic
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technician course at Capitol Institute of Technology; but we
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could not recommend this approach because the technician course
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is one year in length with two hours of class and two hours of
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lab each day, four days per week. Someone planning to study the
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subject on a part-time basis while he holds down a full-time job,
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can't possibly go through this much material -- so we were unable
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to provide a good answer at the time.
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Now, however, we think we can name two books which should
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provide a good start. Both of these books have been prepared by
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the Texas Instruments Learning Center, and they are both
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exceptionally well done. In my opinion, you should be able to
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get as much as you want out of them -- that is, if you want to
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skim, you can get the essence; but if you want to dig, full
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technical detail is provided. Further, the books have a lot of
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practical content; and, most important, they are totally free of
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the misconceptions and technical garbage which characterize most
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of the older material.
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The titles are: Understanding Telephone Electronics, and
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Understanding Communications Systems. They are available at $6.95
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each by mail from:
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Texas Instruments Inc., Box 3640, MS 54, Dallas, TX 75285.
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If you can find them, the same books are sold by Radio
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Shack. We paid #3.49 for the telephone book and $2.95 for the
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communications book.
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TI also has many other titles in its "Understanding" series.
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You might find some of the others to be interesting as well.
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Good Luck.
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NEWSPEAK
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Newspaper Headline: Cease Fire Holds Despite Sniper Fire.
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TOO CRITICAL?
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My partner in Pegasus Industries, Inc. says that I'm too
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critical of the material which has been published. He may be
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right, but I believe that when a person holds himself out to be
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an expert, he should be super careful about his pronouncements.
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There is nothing wrong with not knowing everything (most of us
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are in that situation), and there is nothing wrong with making an
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error (the only people who don't make errors are those who don't
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do anything); but there is something wrong when a person, who
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says he is an expert, demonstrates, time and again, a basic lack
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of understanding of the subject matter. Lest I be misunderstood,
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let me amplify my thoughts. I believe that the professor who
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would criticize a student for a lack of knowledge or
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understanding has no place in the teaching profession. I have
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never in my life uttered a critical word to a student (or to a
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colleague) who expressed ignorance regarding some point. Such
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activity, in my opinion, is destructive of the learning process,
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cruel, unfair, stupid, demeaning, diminishing, and a few other
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things.
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My criticisms are reserved for self-styled experts who
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expound on subjects that they do not even understand.
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Specifically, I am referring to whoever first referred to a
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"resonant" ringer instead of a microphonic ringer in a telephone.
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I am referring to the person who first described what he called a
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capacitive tap. I am referring to the first person who explained
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the operation of an ultrasonic motion detector by saying that
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standing waves are set up in the protected area. I am referring
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to the first person who decided that telephone lines have a
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characteristic impedance.
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These people, and others of their ilk, have caused untold
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confusion, because well-meaning folk have studied their errors,
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silly ideas, and idiocies; memorized them and passed them on to
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others who have studied them, memorized them, and passed them on,
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etc.
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(Complete explanations on these things, and more, will be
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coming along in the series of technical essays which are in
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preparation.)
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I have respect for the experience that some of these authors
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have -- they can offer us so much of great value. For instance,
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I just finished reading a book by a man who had ten years
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experience as an investigator, and some of his comments about
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equipment used, procedures, etc. are immensely valuable.
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However, when he attempts to explain the workings of some of the
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electronic equipment that he has used his explanations simply
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don't make sense. Too bad.
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February, 1984
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AH HA!
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Our very first letter proved two points: 1) we're not
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perfect,and 2) some people do read this letter. For all who
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wondered, the address for the Security Journal is Box 15300,
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Washington, DC 20003. Again, when you contact the editor, Robert
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Ellis Smith, tell him Jim Ross sent you.
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RELIABILITY
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During the seminar, one of the discussions which always
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takes place is a survey of what should be the characteristics of
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a countermeasures service firm, and we normally start off with
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adjectives such as ethical, technically competent, properly
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equipped, etc. However, I personally think that reliability
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should be near the top of the list. If your countermeasures
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contractor says he'll be there at 10 AM on Saturday, he should be
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there at 10 AM on Saturday. If he says he has inspected twelve
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telephones, you should have total confidence that he has
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thoroughly inspected all twelve telephones.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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Q. What periodicals do you read?
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A. When this question was asked last year by a retired
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government technician, he gave the impression that he thought
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that all qualified countermeasures practitioners should read
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Telephony. In any event, the question piqued our curiosity so we
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began to note the names of the publications which we normally
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receive and read, and we were really astounded at the result of
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our informal survey.
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Before listing the publications, we must point out that we
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do not read every word in every publication. In fact, we have
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already decided that there are many of these periodicals that we
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will not renew because they are not worth the time to even leaf
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through. Some of the publications listed are paid subscriptions,
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some are qualified subscriptions, and some have been provided to
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us for review.
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Listed alphabetically, the communications-electronics and
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security (non- news, non-business) periodicals which we have been
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reading are:
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ASIS Dynamics, Assets Protection, Computer Decisions,
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Computer Security Alert, Corporate Crime and Security, CQ,
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Cryptologia, Data Communications, Defense Electronics, Electronic
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Design, Electronic Imaging, Electronic News, Electronic Products,
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Electronic Warfare Digest, Electronics, Fraud & Theft Newsletter,
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High Technology, Industrial Communications, Integrated Circuits,
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Investigative Leads, Journal of Security Administration, Law and
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Order, Law Enforcement Communications, Law Enforcement News,
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Microwave Systems News, Microwaves & RF, Monitoring Times,
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National Centurion, PC, PC World, Personal Communications,
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Personal Computing, Photonics Spectra, Police and Security
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Bulletin, Police Newsletter, Popular Communications, Privacy
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Journal, Private Security Case Law Reporter, Professional
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Protection, QST, Radio Communications Report, Radio Electronics,
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Security Dealer, Security Law Newsletter, Security Letter,
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Security Management, Security Systems Administration, Security
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Systems Digest, Security World, 73, Signal, Systems and Software,
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TAP, Technology Review, Technology Today, Telecommunications
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Week, Teleconnect, Telephone Engineer and Management, Telephony,
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The Tortoise Report, and Washington Report.
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All in all, we think that this is quite a list, and rereading it
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reinforces our belief that we did the right thing in ordering a
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rapid reading course!
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To get back to the question which started our research: Yes, we
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do read Telephony, and we also read Telephone Engineer and
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Management which is very, very similar. These magazines both seem
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to be addressing themselves to telephone company decision makers,
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but their classified sections are full of help-wanted ads for
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cable splicers and installers. Regardless of their intended or
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actual readership, we find a lot of interesting material in the
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ads and in the new product announcements. (Most of this material,
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unfortunately, does not relate to countermeasures.)By the way, in
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our opinion Teleconnect is much more fun to read, and more
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informative in many ways.
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INTERESTING NEWSLETTERS
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The Washington Crime News Service publishes several
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interesting newsletters including Security Systems Digest and
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Computer Crime Digest. For a complete list, and maybe some
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samples, contact Betty Bosarge, Washington Crime News Service,
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7620 Little River Turnpike, Annandale, VA 22003. Tell her Jim
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Ross sent you.
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BOOK REVIEW
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This book was recently advertised in a national publication,
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and sounded interesting so we bought it.
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How to Avoid Electronic Eavesdropping and Privacy Invasion
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William W. Turner. Paladin Press. Copyright 1972. Perfect
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Bound. 192 pages. $9.95.
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The back cover of this book says that the author was a
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special agent with the FBI for ten years, graduated from their
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"Sound School", and handled wiretapping and bugging assignments.
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The content of the book demonstrates that the author has much
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experience which could have been the basis for an interesting
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book on the equipment, techniques, and practices with which he
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was familiar. In addition, he probably could have told many
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meaningful and engrossing "war stories" without endangering
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sensitive information; but, sad to say, there are only brief
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references to his experiences and a few revelations as to FBI
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parlance.
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Instead of a book of real, practical information based on
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experience, the publisher has produced a book with two
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outstanding flaws: first, there is a lot of "filler" material,
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and, second, the author tries to explain how some electronic
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systems work without knowing how they work.
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The most blatant filler material is one section of 28 pages
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which is merely a reprint of Title III, PL 90-351, and a full 50
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pages of a verbatim copy of the detailed report of a man who was
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working under cover as a gofer and clerk within a drug company in
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order to collect information on that company. This section
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contains painfully detailed reporting, but little which relates
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to the title of the book, viz,
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"8/18/65 I was ill and didn't work today.
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8/19/65 This was a rather slow day here. We had only one
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shipment come in, containing over-the-counter items and
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cosmetics. Enclosed is the label......"
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To a professional communications-electronics engineer, one
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jarring feature of this book is the author's incorrect use of
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electronic terms which have precise meanings. My feeling is
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that, if you do not have any education in electronics, you'll be
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bamboozled by the technical misinformation; and if you do have an
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education in electronics, you probably don't need this book.
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TRUTH IN ADVERTISING?
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The Washington Post and other prestigious newspapers
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continue to run ads for a tap detector which will not detect a
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simple $15 tap and a bug detector which will not detect a $20
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bug. Can it be after all these years that they still don't know
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that these gimcracks don't work, or is it that they are more
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interested in the ad revenue than they are in the truth?
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March, 1984
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FEEDBACK
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The prize for the first feedback on our letter # 2 goes to
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Doug Kelly, who said that he liked # 1 better than #2. His
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comment caused us to take a critical look at #2, and we found
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that we agreed. Too negative. Like it was written by some old
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sourpuss, mad at the world.
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Thanks for your comment Doug. We're going to make a real
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effort to let the real Jim Ross with his very positive attitudes
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shine through better in the future.
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HITS
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We cannot testify to the accuracy of any of these reports of
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espionage and successful countermeasures activities -- we just
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pass them on as items of interest.
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After our first issue which contained a comment about the
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speaker of a speakerphone being connected across a spare pair, we
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got a call from a fellow in Texas who said he'd been in the
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countermeasures business for six years, and had never seen that
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compromise until the previous month, when he found two!
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We also received a call from Arizona which reported that an FM
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transmitter had been found in a Sheriff's telephone along with a
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hook switch defeat system.
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Last, but not least, a "usually reliable source" reports
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that a compromised telephone instrument was detected in a high
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level office of a petrochemical company which was the target of
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an acquisition effort. He also said that detection of throwaway
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transmitters in hotel rooms which had been selected for
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negotiations resulted in their hiring guards to be sure the rooms
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stayed "clean".
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REBUTTING THE REBUTTAL
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Recently Security Management carried an article by Doug
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Kelly on the subject of debugging in which he set out some
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guidelines relating to "sweeping". In the February issue of the
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magazine is a letter offering a few unsubstantiated opinions to
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correct "errors" in the article.
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There is not enough room here to comment on all of the
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pronouncements in this letter so let's concentrate on one of the
|
||
letter writer's opinions, namely that a spectrum analyzer "lacks
|
||
sensitivity and low frequency coverage" and should be used only
|
||
in conjunction with a countermeasures receiver.
|
||
|
||
First, the Texscan AL51-A can be tuned down to 20 KHz, and
|
||
we really can't imagine anyone building an RF bug to transmit
|
||
through free space at this low a frequency. The antenna would
|
||
need to be a city block or two in length; the final tank, in
|
||
order to get a decent Q, would need a coil as big as a barrel;
|
||
and if the Q were too low, we'd have harmonics which would
|
||
probably lead to accidental discovery of the bug because of
|
||
emissions in a broadcast band. In other words, a bug for
|
||
transmission through free space would be very impractical because
|
||
it would be very large and, therefore, hard to conceal.
|
||
|
||
But how about carrier current, the transmission of RF energy
|
||
over existing lines (power or telephone)? To check for this type
|
||
of threat Doug Kelly uses (and we use) a carrier current detector
|
||
that tunes from about 10 KHz to over 700 KHz, so if the bugger is
|
||
using carrier current we have the means to detect his signal.
|
||
|
||
The letter writer's other criticism of the spectrum analyzer
|
||
is that it is not sensitive enough, so let's look at some real
|
||
numbers and do some simple math. The analyzers that are used in
|
||
countermeasures operations are normally the rugged portable units
|
||
such as the Texscan AL-51A, the Cushman CE-15, and even the
|
||
Motorola Service Monitor R-2200. These units have sensitivities
|
||
ranging from about 0.5 to 1.5 microvolt, depending on frequency,
|
||
type of modulation, bandwidth, signal-to-noise ratio, etc. (This
|
||
sensitivity rivals that of most surveillance receivers.)
|
||
|
||
If any of these units is operated properly in the search for
|
||
an RF bug, it will probably be within a few feet of the bug
|
||
during the spectrum analysis -- let's say, to be very
|
||
conservative, the antenna will be within ten feet of the bug
|
||
while the operator searches the spectrum. The listening post, on
|
||
the other hand, will be well removed from the target area in the
|
||
normal case. Let's say, to make the numbers easy, that it is
|
||
either 100 feet away or, more realistically, 1,000 feet away.
|
||
Maxwell's equations tell us that the far field diminishes as the
|
||
square of the distance from the radiating antenna, so the field
|
||
strength at the two possible listening posts will be 1/100 or
|
||
1/10,000 of its value at the spectrum analyzer. To translate
|
||
these voltage ratios into dB we use the formula: Ratio(dB) = 20
|
||
log V1/V2. This computation tells us that we have either a 40 dB
|
||
(listening post 100 feet away) or an 80 dB advantage (listening
|
||
post 1,000 feet away) over the bugger. With this kind of an
|
||
advantage, it doesn't matter if the bugger's receiver is one or
|
||
two dB more sensitive than our spectrum analyzer; and, of course,
|
||
with a 40 or 80 dB advantage, the TSCM technician doesn't need
|
||
the additional one or two dB gain in sensitivity that he might
|
||
enjoy if he lugged along a surveillance receiver on every job.
|
||
|
||
N.B. These paragraphs have addressed only the letter
|
||
writer's contention that a spectrum analyzer lacks sensitivity
|
||
and low frequency coverage. The many other positive positions
|
||
taken by the letter writer are deserving of similar analyses, but
|
||
they will have to wait.
|
||
|
||
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
|
||
Q. When you are checking for a radio bug with the spectrum
|
||
analyzer, why don't you just use the audio output of the spectrum
|
||
analyzer and look for the audio feedback whistle?
|
||
|
||
A. Quickly tuning through the spectrum with the spectrum
|
||
analyzer demodulating each signal is a possible fast method of RF
|
||
bug detection, but it has a few drawbacks. First, if the bug is
|
||
using modulation on a subcarrier which is modulating the main
|
||
carrier, you will not get any audio feedback because the
|
||
unmodified analyzer is not capable of double demodulation. Next,
|
||
I believe that it is possible to tune through the signal from a
|
||
nearby bug without creating audible feedback. Also, the Texscan
|
||
gives you the option of either narrow band FM or AM detection and
|
||
it is possible to demodulate FM with the switch in the AM
|
||
position; but the converse is not true -- so you would have to be
|
||
continually switching from one detection mode to the other as you
|
||
tuned through the spectrum. Last but not least, the AL-51 has a
|
||
characteristic rattle when the audio gain control is turned up
|
||
too high while in the FM detection mode. This rattle (high
|
||
pitched motorboating) can easily be mistaken for audio feedback
|
||
oscillation. For all of these reasons, I do not use this
|
||
technique when looking for an RF bug.
|
||
|
||
Q. What are the specs on that AIWA TP-M7?
|
||
|
||
A. It's really a good thing that we do not normally accept
|
||
the claims made by salesmen, or we would have answered this
|
||
question incorrectly. By actual measurement, we got 17 minutes
|
||
on one side of an MC-30 microcassette, and exactly 30 minutes on
|
||
one side of an MC-60 with the AIWA operating at 2.4 centimeters
|
||
per second. If you were to operate it at 1.2 cm/s, you should
|
||
get double the above recorded times. (We haven't measured it,
|
||
but we have the feeling that the recorder is slightly more
|
||
sensitive at the higher speed.) Don't forget that if you use the
|
||
SLSS (Sound Level Sensing System), the tape will only be running
|
||
when there is some input above the threshold level that you set;
|
||
and, therefore, you can expect one tape to cover many hours --
|
||
depending on sensitivity setting, level of background noise, etc.
|
||
|
||
Q. How much do you charge for your TSCM services?
|
||
|
||
A. The amount charged for our services depends on a lot of
|
||
things, but a good estimate for an average job would be $300 per
|
||
room and $100 per telephone instrument. After we have computed
|
||
the "ball-park" figure using this simple formula, we modify it
|
||
based on factors such as: is the job a continuing effort or a
|
||
one-time affair; is it a residence or business; an isolated,
|
||
protected building or part of a multi-tenant building; etc. We
|
||
do not charge by the hour -- too much temptation to stretch it
|
||
out, and too much temptation for the client to try to rush us.
|
||
Usually we quote a $500 minimum for a local job, and a $1000
|
||
minimum on a job which requires extended or overnight travel.
|
||
|
||
Q. Our company is considering the purchase of encryption
|
||
equipment to protect data and facsimile transmissions. Can you
|
||
provide a list of vendors?
|
||
|
||
A. This is a field which is changing rapidly, and a full
|
||
answer to your question is not possible in a few words. However,
|
||
there is a good report available which provides copious detail on
|
||
established manufacturers of voice scrambling and encryption
|
||
equipment. This 182-page report, Who. What and Where in
|
||
Communications Security, is available at $75 from us or from the
|
||
publisher, Marketing Consultants International. (If you are a
|
||
consulting client or seminar participant, your special price from
|
||
us is $50.)
|
||
|
||
BOOK REVIEW
|
||
BASIC ELECTRONICS THEORY -- with projects and experiments
|
||
Dalton T. Horn. 532 pages. Hard cover. Copyright 1981. Tab
|
||
Books #1338. Tab Books, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. $19.95.
|
||
|
||
A self-study text on electronics should presume no knowledge
|
||
of the subject matter on the part of the student, and should lead
|
||
the student slowly and carefully along. This book does just
|
||
that. It does not use any complicated mathematics which means
|
||
that some of the explanations are quite simplistic and
|
||
incomplete, but at least the reader does not have to struggle
|
||
through math that he does not understand. (In our opinion there
|
||
is nothing wrong with this approach if the student recognizes
|
||
that, if he wishes to advance to a level higher than technician,
|
||
he'll have to spend time learning the necessary mathematics in
|
||
order to be able to profit from the more advanced books in the
|
||
field.)
|
||
In looking through this book, we found no real errors. --
|
||
That may sound like a left-handed compliment, but it wasn't meant
|
||
to be; some of the technician-level books currently in print are
|
||
loaded with errors!
|
||
|
||
The only criticisms that we have are that the author used
|
||
the word "bridge" the way telephone company people use it rather
|
||
than the way it is used in electronics (see our glossary); and,
|
||
for some reason, the electret microphone is not listed in the
|
||
section on microphones.
|
||
|
||
Other than those two minor items, we found the book to be
|
||
excellent for its intended purpose. It provides a nice blend of
|
||
practical content (pictures of components, simple projects and
|
||
experiments) with fairly complete technical explanations of how
|
||
things work. The author covers all standard components including
|
||
vacuum tubes and solid state devices, and even briefly goes into
|
||
how stereophonic sound is transmitted and received, TV, and even
|
||
a short section on digital computers.
|
||
If you are just getting started in electronics, we recommend
|
||
this book.
|
||
|
||
SECURITY LETTER
|
||
Robert McCrie is the editor of Security Letter, an excellent
|
||
publication which is currently offering (until March 31) a
|
||
special rate to new subscribers. Address: 166 East 96th St., New
|
||
York, NY 10128.
|
||
|
||
TELEPHONY
|
||
Something striking happened in 1983. For the first time
|
||
since this seminar program started in 1977, phone companies began
|
||
to send people to our seminar -- where we discuss, among other
|
||
things, tapping telephones, how it's done, and how to protect
|
||
yourself.
|
||
In an effort to reach more phone company people we began
|
||
sending news releases to Telephony magazine, but they never ran a
|
||
single word about our activities. (Ours, by the way, is the only
|
||
seminar on this subject which is a seminar, and not a pitch to
|
||
sell equipment.) So we asked the editor why his magazine had
|
||
never run any information on our seminar, and he responded that
|
||
the magazine is telephone company specific and tapping telephones
|
||
is something which relates to industry as a whole!
|
||
Considering the number of telco security people who have
|
||
attended our seminar, we wonder if his subscribers feel as he
|
||
does. Oh well.
|
||
|
||
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
|
||
The main purpose of this letter is to shed some light on an
|
||
area of communications technology which has suffered too long
|
||
from the lack of light, and your comments and questions will help
|
||
shape its content.
|
||
April, 1984
|
||
|
||
OBJECTION!
|
||
Recently Security Management ran a series of articles on the
|
||
computer crime problem. Unfortunately, many of the articles were
|
||
written by lawyers -- and you can easily guess what their
|
||
proposed solution to the problem was. That's right: they are
|
||
proposing to enact some additional laws!
|
||
We object to this approach on principle, in general, and in
|
||
detail.
|
||
We object on principle because, in our lifetime, we have
|
||
watched our federal government legislators, time after time, try
|
||
to legislate the solution to a problem; and usually in the
|
||
process they create problems many times worse than the one they
|
||
were trying to solve. We give it as our fixed opinion that there
|
||
is a sickness in this land, the virulence of which increases with
|
||
proximity to the Capitol; and that that sickness is the ingrained
|
||
belief that the federal government can legislate a solution to
|
||
any problem.
|
||
In general we object to the tenor of those articles because
|
||
they did not even attempt to define the problem before they
|
||
proposed methods of combatting it. (There seemed to be an
|
||
assumption that the computer crime problem consists solely of
|
||
hackers gaining access to computers by telephone, and the authors
|
||
seemed to be unaware of any other facet of computer crime.)
|
||
In detail, we object because so many uninformed opinions
|
||
were offered as facts. Two of those unsupported conclusions are:
|
||
"....all indicators point to a bright future for the computer
|
||
criminal." and: "Law enforcement sources are quick to point out
|
||
that professional criminals can, in time, learn to circumvent
|
||
even the best computer security measures." We disagree. It is
|
||
our professional opinion that the indicators point to
|
||
technological developments (equipment, procedures, and
|
||
techniques) which will diminish the overall chances of success
|
||
for computer criminals. For instance, currently available
|
||
hardware includes telephone access control systems featuring
|
||
call-back to the authorized telephone number and cryptographic
|
||
systems that would take thousands of years of computer time to
|
||
break. More important, however, the computer itself is a
|
||
fantastic tool to use in innovative new audit procedures to catch
|
||
the main culprit -- the trusted company employee who has figured
|
||
out how to rip off his employer. More on this (much more) later.
|
||
Please note that we are not taking the position that no
|
||
legislation is needed. Our point here is that the computer crime
|
||
problems cannot be cured by legislation. Laws prohibiting
|
||
trespassing, theft, vandalism, conversion after trust, etc. may
|
||
well need to be broadened to include data being stored or
|
||
transmitted electronically or optically.
|
||
|
||
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
|
||
Q. How can you claim that your seminar is "the only seminar
|
||
on this subject which is a seminar, and not a pitch to sell
|
||
equipment"?
|
||
A. We make that claim because, to the best of our knowledge,
|
||
it is completely true.
|
||
First, our seminar is a seminar. It is not a lecture. It
|
||
is not a training session. It is not a workshop. It is a
|
||
seminar in every sense of the word. Look in a good dictionary;
|
||
or, better yet, ask some educators to list the characteristics of
|
||
a seminar. They'll tell you that it is an informal meeting of a
|
||
small group of advanced students with their professor,
|
||
characterized by a lot of "give and take" between all of the
|
||
participants.
|
||
Our seminar participants are not specialists in electronics
|
||
or communications (in eight years we've had only two people with
|
||
EE degrees); but they are senior security people -- they are
|
||
directors of security, government and private investigators,
|
||
businessmen, managers, etc. They are people with a lot of
|
||
experience, and they are advanced students in our view. The size
|
||
of our seminar group is deliberately kept to a small number, and
|
||
this old professor tries his best to keep the atmosphere informal
|
||
so as to encourage two-way communication, the key to learning.
|
||
Yes, this company does sell equipment. However, we do not
|
||
sell for any one manufacturer; in fact, we do not even endorse
|
||
the entire line from any one manufacturer. During the seminar we
|
||
make recommendations in response to specific questions, but no
|
||
effort is made to sell equipment and we sometimes have the
|
||
situation that a seminar participant will take our recommendation
|
||
and go directly to the manufacturer to order.
|
||
It is possible that one or two of the one-week and two-week
|
||
technician training courses are not pitches to sell equipment,
|
||
but that would not invalidate our statement because a hands-on
|
||
technician training course is not in any way a seminar,
|
||
regardless of what it is called by its promoters.
|
||
Do the sponsors of these other "seminars" try to sell
|
||
equipment to attendees? The literature that one of them sends to
|
||
prospective distributors says, "Remember, seminar attendees are
|
||
customers." The literature describing a Monday-through-Thursday
|
||
workshop explains that attendees who have purchased equipment may
|
||
stay over for an intensive hands-on day of training on Friday!
|
||
Yes, these companies are trying to sell equipment at their
|
||
sessions, and we do not criticize them for that. However, we are
|
||
not aware of any true seminars, other than ours, which are not
|
||
heavily oriented toward the sale of the sponsor's equipment.
|
||
|
||
Q. Why have you been reviewing books about basic electronic
|
||
theory in the COMSEC LETTER?
|
||
A. Those reviews have been included for two reasons.
|
||
First, some young folks (Have you ever noticed that some old
|
||
folks don't want to even be exposed to anything new?) have asked
|
||
for just this information.
|
||
Second, Jim Ross thinks that many people now working in the
|
||
field of countermeasures should begin to learn electronics
|
||
because they will soon face a vital life decision. Either they
|
||
are going to have to learn some electronics theory so that they
|
||
can work on new systems, or they'll have to join the charlatans
|
||
and put on a good act, or they'll have to get out of the
|
||
business. In the past it might have been sufficient to memorize
|
||
the normal connections on the network in standard telephones like
|
||
the 500, the 565, and the 1500; but we're here to tell you, in
|
||
case you hadn't noticed, things are changing! New instruments
|
||
with new features are being introduced daily. Even the AT&T
|
||
Phone store now offers equipment with new features like automatic
|
||
redialing of a busy number. (For more detail on the proliferation
|
||
of new instruments, features and systems, see the next segment,
|
||
"What's Happening?".)
|
||
|
||
WHAT'S HAPPENING?
|
||
In case you haven't looked recently, we're in the midst of a
|
||
telecommunications revolution. Divestiture, Ma Bell, Baby Bells,
|
||
LATAs, RBOCs, and so on.
|
||
Something else is happening which is, we think, of major
|
||
import to all who claim to be professionals in the
|
||
countermeasures business -- and that something is an astounding
|
||
increase in new telephone equipment and features, with more being
|
||
introduced every day. To back up that observation with some
|
||
facts, we offer the following: The February 1984 issue of Today's
|
||
Office magazine contained a buyer's guide detailing the features
|
||
of the PBXs currently available. Included were 91 different PBXs
|
||
from 26 different manufacturers!
|
||
However, it appears that the Today's Office researchers
|
||
missed a few because the March issue of Teleconnect had a much
|
||
shorter review of PBXs, which contained 9 that were not listed in
|
||
the other feature.
|
||
To further reinforce the same point, a quick survey of the
|
||
March issue of Teleconnect reveals that that one issue, in ads
|
||
and text, showed or mentioned 27 different PBXs and 56 different
|
||
telephone instruments from 36 different manufacturers.
|
||
Things are changing, and the wise will plan ahead.
|
||
|
||
HELP!
|
||
When we published a list of periodicals that we read, we had
|
||
no idea that it would generate so much response. We've had so
|
||
many requests for addresses of magazines that we can no longer
|
||
answer all of them individually, and still have time to get
|
||
anything else done. Therefore, we are mailing, with this letter,
|
||
an updated version of the flier which lists the security
|
||
publications that we offer for sale. In this flier you'll find
|
||
address lists for periodicals, membership organizations,
|
||
manufacturers, etc. If you buy the periodicals address list, and
|
||
find that we missed any that you are interested in, let us know
|
||
and we'll revise the list again and send you a no-charge copy of
|
||
the new one.
|
||
|
||
NEWSLETTER
|
||
If you work in security in an organization which has many
|
||
employees, significant assets, or the appearance thereof, Private
|
||
Security Case Law Reporter is a publication you should take a
|
||
serious look at. It is exactly what its name says, and it could
|
||
save your company a bundle by advising you of law precedents.
|
||
Contact the publisher, Richard M. Ossoff, at 1375 Peachtree
|
||
Street NE, Atlanta, GA 30309.
|
||
|
||
TIMM-2
|
||
While counselling a TSCM practitioner recently, we advised
|
||
him to look in his TIMM-2. He countered with, "I don't have one.
|
||
Where can I get it?"
|
||
We're stumped. Do you know of a source? If so, please let
|
||
us know. LEA used to sell them, but the last time I tried to
|
||
order they were out. Maybe we'll have to have some copies made
|
||
of ours and add it to the publications list.
|
||
(If you've never heard of it, TIMM-2 is a telephone
|
||
installation and maintenance manual which is extremely helpful in
|
||
the TSCM business if you are working on one of the standard
|
||
telephones.)
|
||
|
||
FEEDBACK
|
||
Your comments are solicited. Ideas for technical essays,
|
||
critical comments, questions, rebuttals, whatever. Send them
|
||
along.
|
||
Also, we'd like to hear any ideas that you may have
|
||
regarding the format (layout etc.), or anything else to make it
|
||
better.
|
||
|
||
CHALLENGE
|
||
Can you write a good definition for "tap"? No, not a water
|
||
tap; tap as we use it in our business of privacy protection.
|
||
We'll offer ours in an upcoming COMSEC LETTER, but we'd like to
|
||
hear yours -- might even publish it and give you credit in print.
|
||
|
||
May, 1984
|
||
|
||
WHY ARE WE DOING THIS?
|
||
This interesting question has been asked a few times, and
|
||
deserves an answer in print.
|
||
As we have mentioned before, the very sensitive information
|
||
will not be revealed in a general distribution newsletter -- not
|
||
because we're trying to prejudge how it will be used by our
|
||
readers. Not at all. We don't reveal everything because some of
|
||
our earnings come from consultation, and if we gave everything
|
||
away free, we'd starve. Purely practical.
|
||
But as to why we've embarked on a mission of educating
|
||
anyone interested in a field that many consider very sensitive,
|
||
let's go on record. We believe that strength comes through
|
||
education and communication is the route to education. To those
|
||
who cry, "You'll teach all those bad guys how to tap telephones
|
||
and plant bugs!", we say, "Hogwash! The bad guys already know
|
||
those things. The bad guys are totally goal-oriented, and they
|
||
have a communication system which is nearly perfect."
|
||
The level of education and training necessary to build and
|
||
use electronic equipment capable of doing a good job of bugging
|
||
or tapping is 9th grade hobbyist. If we, the good guys, are to
|
||
have any chance at all to protect ourselves, we must know what
|
||
the threats are and what the appropriate countermeasures are.
|
||
Our objective is to provide accurate, usable technical
|
||
information to anyone who wants it because we believe in strength
|
||
through knowledge. We believe that the entire ethical community
|
||
will be better off when more people understand what is really
|
||
possible in the field of technical surveillance and technical
|
||
surveillance countermeasures.
|
||
|
||
TECHNICIAN TRAINING COURSES
|
||
We have had some inquiries regarding sources of training for
|
||
countermeasures technicians so we'll relate what we are aware of,
|
||
and ask anyone with pertinent information to send it along.
|
||
First, a general comment. A person does not learn how to be
|
||
a competent countermeasures technician with a few hours of
|
||
training. In our view, education, training, and experience are
|
||
all required, and the amount of each is dependent on each
|
||
person's background. Someone with a lot of good experience in
|
||
investigations, a ham radio experimenter, some telephone people,
|
||
some military communicators, and some electronic security people
|
||
will easily learn the TSCM trade. However, we all know that some
|
||
people learn more in one year on the job than others learn in
|
||
ten, and we've all met the theoretician with a string of degrees
|
||
and no practical sense. So there are no set rules, and no
|
||
absolutes as to how much training it takes.
|
||
To try to put it into perspective, the technician course at
|
||
Capitol Institute of Technology consists of two hours of class
|
||
and two hours of lab four days each week for one full year, and
|
||
this course is not quite enough to ensure passing the test for
|
||
the FCC Commercial Radiotelephone License.
|
||
Now let's consider the training courses which are offered.
|
||
Dektor, the last we heard, offers a one-week and a two-week
|
||
course for countermeasures technicians. I have seen their
|
||
classroom and I sat in on one of the lectures. Each table seats
|
||
two students, and it looks like each table has one tool kit and
|
||
one telephone for hands-on training. Their instructional
|
||
material gives the impression that they try to start at zero and
|
||
cover all analog electronic communication theory assuming no
|
||
prior knowledge on the part of the student. My feeling,
|
||
therefore, is that they may be trying to do too much in a short
|
||
period. Dektor is located in Savannah, Georgia, and if you are
|
||
interested, contact Bill Ford or Allan Bell.
|
||
Down in Texas there is a course which looks very similar to
|
||
the Dektor course except that they take their students into the
|
||
field and show them how to enter telephone company pedestals,
|
||
etc. Our information on this training program is sketchy and
|
||
mostly derived from an article by Ted Swift who works for DEA and
|
||
moonlights in countermeasures. (See: Training Countermeasures
|
||
Specialists in the November/December 1983 Data Processing and
|
||
Communications Security magazine.) Ted's article says the
|
||
teacher is Charles Taylor, and you can reach him at Texas A & M
|
||
University.
|
||
ISA (Information Security Associates) has just announced a
|
||
four-day workshop which, again, sounds very similar to the Dektor
|
||
course. This course has not been presented yet so we have no
|
||
feedback from any attendees. ISA is located in Stamford,
|
||
Connecticut, and your contact would be Dick Heffernan or Sam
|
||
Daskam.
|
||
Jarvis International Intelligence Inc., located in Tulsa,
|
||
OK, offers an interesting array of training courses such as:
|
||
Technical Surveillance, Eavesdropping Countermeasures, Technical
|
||
Intercept, Methods of Entry, and Computer and Data Security, .
|
||
Your contact here would be the president of the company, Ray
|
||
Jarvis.
|
||
|
||
|
||
BOOK REVIEW
|
||
How To Get ANYTHING ON ANYBODY. Lee Lapin. Copyright 1983.
|
||
Auburn Wolfe Publishing, 584 Castro St. #351, San Francisco, CA
|
||
94114. $29.95 plus $4.00 P & H. Toll free order # 800-345-8112.
|
||
This perfect bound, 264 page, 81/2 x 11" book is a good
|
||
source of information. It is written in a flippant and
|
||
irreverent style, but it contains a tremendous amount of
|
||
information which can be of great value in two different ways.
|
||
First, if you want to "get" something on somebody, it might tell
|
||
you how; and, second, if you think you have to protect yourself,
|
||
this book might give you an idea of how someone might attack your
|
||
privacy.
|
||
Don't believe all of the promotional material (including
|
||
some in reviews). The "undetectable" bugs are not undetectable,
|
||
etc. In fact, don't believe everything in the book. Some of the
|
||
equipment touted is pure junk; the analysis of lie detection
|
||
methods and equipment varies from insightful to simple
|
||
recitations of some extremely shallow and unscientific "studies";
|
||
some of the conclusions stated as facts are questionable, and so
|
||
on.
|
||
Regardless of its shortcomings, however, we like its style,
|
||
and are really impressed with its content. Those portions
|
||
dealing with our specialty, even with the obvious errors in
|
||
theory and equipment evaluations, are probably of more value than
|
||
the government reports which cost us taxpayers millions of
|
||
dollars.
|
||
It's worth the price.
|
||
|
||
KUDOS
|
||
A couple of times we've been critical of the content of some
|
||
material published in Security Management so it's only fair that
|
||
we also sound off when they do something worthy of praise.
|
||
'Tis time.
|
||
Several months ago they carried an article pointing out that
|
||
optical fiber would be a great way to carry the alarm and
|
||
supervisory signals for intrusion detection systems because an
|
||
optical fiber link is next to impossible to tap as contrasted
|
||
with wire lines. The author's point was that a bad guy could tap
|
||
into a wire line and figure out the coding used to pass
|
||
information back and forth and then use this knowledge to fool
|
||
the central station by sending normal responses to it while he is
|
||
breaking in.
|
||
We don't have all of the details, but heard last month that
|
||
this scenario had actually occurred in NYC. A high level
|
||
protection system was tapped by the bad guys, and they figured
|
||
out how the intrusion detection system reported "All OK" so they
|
||
substituted their equipment which kept telling the central
|
||
station that all was OK while they broke into a bank and made off
|
||
with a bundle.
|
||
|
||
WAY TO GO, AT&T!
|
||
We just received six AT&T credit cards.
|
||
Surprise #1: they were mailed to us bulk rate. We're
|
||
surprised because they were probably trying to save postage, but
|
||
our experience with bulk rate has been that many pieces get lost
|
||
..... and we wonder what happens to lost credit cards.
|
||
The other reason that we were surprised is that they mailed
|
||
these six cards in six different envelopes -- which means that
|
||
they paid six times as much postage as they had to! (Up to three
|
||
ounces bulk rate costs the same as one featherweight piece.)
|
||
Welcome to the competitive world, AT&T.
|
||
|
||
TIMM-2
|
||
Last month we asked for a source of TIMM-2, and so far we
|
||
have received replies from Jeffrey Larson and Charles Augustine
|
||
which confirm that the TIMM-2 is out of print, and giving us the
|
||
information on its replacement. Thanks guys.
|
||
If you need wiring diagrams, parts ordering information,
|
||
wire pair standard assignments, etc. for standard telephones (Ma
|
||
Bell types only, we presume), you can order the ITT Telephone
|
||
Apparatus Practices Manual, PN 820870-101, from ITT
|
||
Telecommunications Corp., Box 831, Corinth, MS 38834. It sells
|
||
for $50.00 paid-in-advance, and will be shipped via UPS about 30
|
||
days ARO.
|
||
In addition, GTE and REA (Rural Electrification
|
||
Administration not Ross Engineering Associates) have various
|
||
publications. We're trying to find our copies of their catalogs
|
||
so we can add their addresses, etc. to our lists of sources of
|
||
information.
|
||
While we're on the subject of the TIMM-2, has anyone ever
|
||
found a standard telephone which needs all four wires which run
|
||
between the handset and the instrument? All of the schematics
|
||
that we have checked show two of these four conductors connected
|
||
together inside the instrument which means, of course, that one
|
||
of them is superfluous. A connection inside the handset would do
|
||
the job.
|
||
|
||
YOUR COMMENTS, PLEASE
|
||
In the March 26 issue of Telephony in the section entitled
|
||
"Plant Man's Notebook" there was an item which raises some
|
||
questions. This news item said that the Barnes Hospital in St.
|
||
Louis had saved a fortune on new wiring for its new telephone
|
||
system by buying the old wiring from Southwestern Bell for
|
||
$600,000.
|
||
That's interesting because, in our experience, old wiring is
|
||
normally abandoned by the Bell companies. When we work on
|
||
countermeasures in buildings which have had many tenants we find
|
||
layer on layer of old wiring which has been abandoned. In fact,
|
||
we've often joked about starting a new side business in which we
|
||
charge clients for removing old wiring as a communications
|
||
security measure, and then selling it. We are certainly not all
|
||
wise and all knowing when it comes to all of the phone companies
|
||
everywhere, but we thought that all of the Bell companies used to
|
||
operate the same way.
|
||
So then, the questions are: Do all Bell companies abandon
|
||
old wiring? If so, does that mean that Barnes Hospital paid
|
||
$600,000 for something that they could have had for nothing? If
|
||
they don't abandon old wiring, what is all this stuff we've been
|
||
working around and taking pictures of? Do some companies
|
||
sometimes recover old wiring? If so, which companies? And how
|
||
do they decide what to leave behind and what to recover?
|
||
Your comments, please.
|
||
|
||
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
|
||
Q. Why are you opposed to the LEIU?
|
||
A. Primarily because we believe that the LEIU is an attempt
|
||
to thwart the law by people who are sworn to uphold the law.
|
||
(For anyone who is not familiar with the initials, LEIU stands
|
||
for Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. The best reference that
|
||
we have seen regarding this extra-legal activity by law
|
||
enforcement organizations is the book, The Private Sector, by
|
||
George O'Toole. In his book O'Toole in a calm and totally
|
||
unsensational manner provides details on this
|
||
activity/organization.)
|
||
Now it's always possible that our information is incorrect,
|
||
and therefore, our conclusions are all wet; but we see the LEIU
|
||
as an effort on the part of participating police departments to
|
||
collect "dossiers" on people in this country without running the
|
||
risk of having to reveal the contents of these dossiers under the
|
||
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. If this is its
|
||
purpose, we are opposed.
|
||
It's not that we are not sympathetic to the plight that law
|
||
enforcement people find themselves in when some kook takes a shot
|
||
at a public figure. We don't like to see anyone taken advantage
|
||
of, and the media hue and cry following such an event certainly
|
||
is good for ratings and sales of newspapers, but it is not at all
|
||
fair. What we refer to is the accusation that the Secret
|
||
Service, the FBI, or whoever should have known that that man (or
|
||
woman) was "after" the president or the senator, should have had
|
||
him/her under observation, should have locked him/her up long
|
||
ago, etc.
|
||
We're sympathetic, but we're still opposed to the LEIU. No
|
||
one who has any depth of knowledge about Jim Ross will ever
|
||
accuse him of having a soft spot in his heart for politicians,
|
||
especially legislators; but dear friend and fellow voter, we put
|
||
those legislators in their powerful positions and they represent
|
||
us. If the laws that they pass are lame-brained, then we should
|
||
replace the legislators, not concoct ways to violate the laws.
|
||
It is especially distressing to consider that the people who
|
||
operate LEIU are the people who have sworn to uphold the law.
|
||
|
||
NEWSPEAK
|
||
In the May 1984 edition of the magazine, Inc., there is a
|
||
full-page ad by IH (the International truck maker) which
|
||
proclaims, "When idling, our 6.9 liter medium diesel burns about
|
||
300% less fuel than a comparable gasoline powered engine."
|
||
Now let's see -- if the gasoline powered engine burns one
|
||
gallon per hour, 300% less would be 3 gallons per hour less, or a
|
||
net increase of 2 gallons per hour.
|
||
Better not let that diesel idle too long, or you'll be
|
||
pumping diesel fuel all over the street as the fuel tank
|
||
overflows!
|
||
|
||
|
||
CORDLESS TELEPHONES
|
||
Recently the Washington Post newspaper ran a feature article
|
||
on the privacy problems people face when using cordless
|
||
telephones. The article seemed to imply that some expensive
|
||
equipment or special knowledge is required to listen to these
|
||
calls.
|
||
'Taint so.
|
||
If you want to alert your management to the ease with which
|
||
these calls (and possible others) can be overheard, here's what
|
||
you do. Buy a low cost scanner (We like the J.I.L. SX-100 @
|
||
$129.95) and scan the five transmit frequencies used by the
|
||
hand-held units (49.830, 49.845, 49.860, 49.875, and 49.890 MHz).
|
||
Once you are certain that there are cordless telephones operating
|
||
near your office, call a meeting and let your execs hear some
|
||
calls live. They'll be astounded at the things people will say
|
||
on the air just because they're talking on a telephone and they
|
||
know that it is a private conversation. (By the way, listening
|
||
to what is on the radio is legal, but revealing what you hear,
|
||
acting on information received, recording, and a few other things
|
||
are illegal under federal law. Consult a communications lawyer
|
||
for details.)
|
||
|
||
|
||
June, 1984
|
||
|
||
EDITORIAL
|
||
Now that we've completed one half of our first year of
|
||
publishing this newsletter, it's about time to advise you of our
|
||
intentions.
|
||
From the outset, the objective of all of our educational
|
||
efforts has been to shed some light on the technology variously
|
||
know as ECM, TSCM, countermeasures, countermeasures surveys,
|
||
sweeps, etc. and the full field of protection of privacy. This
|
||
newsletter is called COMSEC LETTER because we believe that
|
||
communications security deserves top billing in this field.
|
||
Our education and experience dictate that we emphasize
|
||
electronics; however, because of the interest that your editor
|
||
has in good communication (in the generic sense), the letter will
|
||
contain material which addresses good communication overall --
|
||
not just electronic communication. Further, because the
|
||
telephone companies play such a large part in communications, the
|
||
letter will contain a good deal of information which relates to
|
||
the phone companies.
|
||
With regard to communications in general, in this letter
|
||
you'll find criticisms of the creeping degeneration of our
|
||
language due to the ever-more-popular habit of using a euphemism
|
||
in place of the correct word.
|
||
You'll also find that this engineer, as do most engineers,
|
||
usually prefers accurate, precise words, rather than some of the
|
||
ambivalent words which change meaning depending on what the
|
||
speaker (or listener) wants them to mean.
|
||
Further, we really believe that 1984 is here. Our
|
||
government is not yet as far along as the government in the book;
|
||
but, with a lot of help from media, industry, PR flacks, and
|
||
super-addlepated bureaucrats, NEWSPEAK is here, and we'll serve
|
||
up small doses of outstanding examples from time to time.
|
||
Meantime, back at the ranch, there is still an urgent need
|
||
for full, complete and accurate information on the threats to
|
||
privacy through the use of electronic equipment and techniques to
|
||
intercept communications and to alter or steal stored
|
||
information. COMSEC LETTER is our first effort to begin to
|
||
address that need. We also have plans for a series of technical
|
||
essays and a book, but while those things are in the making, this
|
||
letter and the "Electronic Spying and Countermeasures" seminar
|
||
are the principal media for an exchange of ideas on this
|
||
technology.
|
||
Also, we'll describe electronic technician training courses
|
||
from time to time.
|
||
Last but not least, we try in each issue of the newsletter
|
||
to provide some information on sources of information such as
|
||
books, newsletters, magazines, etc.
|
||
To sum up, even though the title is COMSEC LETTER, this
|
||
newsletter relates to good communication overall, and to the
|
||
protection of privacy overall.
|
||
|
||
YOUR EDITOR'S MAIN BIAS
|
||
Let's face it. everybody with a functioning brain and
|
||
experience in this world has some bias. Some are strong. Some
|
||
are weak. Some are dangerous, and some are innocuous.
|
||
Edward R. Murrow is quoted as saying, "Everyone is a
|
||
prisoner of his own experiences. No one can eliminate prejudices
|
||
-- just recognize them."
|
||
I have a natural dislike of people/organizations which take
|
||
advantage of others -- sometimes I even feel sympathy for a
|
||
politician who's getting unfair treatment by our fourth estate!
|
||
However, my principal prejudice is that I hate a cheater,
|
||
especially one which is clearly dominant in its field.
|
||
My experience has been that the dominant organization in any
|
||
particular field tends to try to take advantage of people in ways
|
||
that would probably get a "Mom and Pop" organization in trouble.
|
||
Example #1: Hertz ran a full page ad in the Washington Post
|
||
to deliver the message that it is better than its competition
|
||
because "you never pay a mileage charge at Hertz". The day the
|
||
ad appeared I received the bill from Hertz for a car that I had
|
||
rented in the Washington suburb of Frederick with -- you guessed
|
||
it -- a mileage charge. (The Frederick Hertz manager has since
|
||
confirmed that he still charges for mileage even though Hertz has
|
||
signs in airports proclaiming "From here to eternity, there's
|
||
never a mileage charge at Hertz.") (Is Frederick on the other
|
||
side of eternity?)
|
||
Example #2: Bell Atlantic is trying to sell its cellular
|
||
mobile phone service called Alex, so they run a full page ad in
|
||
the Washington Post business section which shows a smiling,
|
||
handsome young man holding his Alex telephone in his automobile
|
||
and saying "The first call I made with Alex paid for this car."
|
||
(Now, we all know that a telephone call does not pay for a car,
|
||
but it's reasonable to assume that the ad-writer was trying to
|
||
imply that some business deal was consummated during the call,
|
||
and that business deal earned a profit which was great enough to
|
||
pay for the car.) I think that if an ordinary (non-dominant)
|
||
business had run that ad, it would have been forced to produce
|
||
hard evidence that the picture was of a real customer and that
|
||
his first call had actually earned enough to pay for the car; or
|
||
that company would have had to face some kind of sanctions from
|
||
government or consumer protection organizations. However, the
|
||
Washington Post is certainly dominant as is Bell Atlantic, so
|
||
that's the end of that.
|
||
Yes, your editor is biased -- primarily against dominant
|
||
businesses which try to take advantage of others. He also has a
|
||
problem with people who cheat whether by taking a parking place
|
||
reserved for the handicapped or by not living up to agreements
|
||
like finders fees, etc. However, his principal prejudice relates
|
||
to the giants and shortly you'll see comments on some businesses
|
||
which are super-dominant, namely utilities (especially the phone
|
||
companies).
|
||
|
||
|
||
SP
|
||
Tony Anastasio points out that IH may have trouble with
|
||
math, but, at least they know how to spell "diesel".
|
||
(Confidentially, we know how to speel it also; we just put
|
||
in errors like that to see if anybody reads these letters.)
|
||
(And if you believe that, send us your name and address
|
||
--there's a bridge we'd like to sell to you!) Thanks Tony.
|
||
|
||
BUYERS' DIRECTORY
|
||
Data Processing and Communications Security magazine has
|
||
just published a directory of suppliers of products and services
|
||
for computer and communications security. The directory lists
|
||
over 900 vendors classified into 22 categories and 165
|
||
subcategories. The book seems to be reasonably complete (some of
|
||
the "interesting" companies do not appear, by choice or by
|
||
accident, we do not know). It is now available, and the price is
|
||
$10.00. Contact Paul Shaw, Data Processing and Communications
|
||
Security, Box 5323, Madison, WI 53705. Phone (608) 231-3817.
|
||
|
||
NEW CORDLESS FREQUENCIES
|
||
Starting on October 1, 1984, there will be twice as many
|
||
frequencies authorized for cordless telephones and the base
|
||
stations will no longer transmit at about 1.7 MHz using power
|
||
lines as antennas. Both base and handset will transmit through
|
||
conventional antennas with the base frequencies starting at 46.61
|
||
MHz and the handset frequencies starting at 49.67 MHz.
|
||
It's reasonable to assume that the market for the old
|
||
equipment will dry up, and prices should drop drastically as the
|
||
starting date for the new channel pairs approaches.
|
||
The new frequencies (in MHz) are:
|
||
Channel # Base Frequency Handset Frequency
|
||
1 46.61 49.67
|
||
2 46.63 49.845
|
||
3 46.67 49.86
|
||
4 46.71 49.77
|
||
5 46.73 49.875
|
||
6 46.77 49.83
|
||
7 46.83 49.89
|
||
8 46.87 49.93
|
||
9 46.93 49.99
|
||
10 46.97 49.97
|
||
|
||
COME NOW!
|
||
Telephone Engineer and Management in its April 15 issue
|
||
reports that the US Air Force, because of divestiture, now pays
|
||
$800 for service that formerly cost $75, and $445 for a plug that
|
||
used to cost $7.50! We wonder if both parties to these
|
||
transactions don't think that they are dealing with play money.
|
||
Somebody wake them!
|
||
However, their fiscal irresponsibility seems almost sane
|
||
when compared to the article's final fillip which said, ""While
|
||
the Air Force said it will search out new suppliers in an attempt
|
||
to lower costs, it was doubted that an adequate competitor can be
|
||
found because of the sensitivity of services."
|
||
Can you believe that the editor of a responsible publication
|
||
would swallow such an inanity, and then lend credence to it by
|
||
publishing it without comment?!?! Can you believe that the US
|
||
Air Force takes the position that only AT&T, among the qualified
|
||
vendors, can be trusted?!?! (The way AT&T is taking them to the
|
||
cleaners financially, we wonder why the USAF thinks they can be
|
||
trusted with "sensitive" information.)
|
||
Come on, Air Force. Try calling GEEIA, or the Signal Corps.
|
||
Or if you must hire a civilian firm, we'll help you find many
|
||
which are qualified, cleared, and can be trusted to refrain from
|
||
stealing government secrets OR taxpayers' money.
|
||
|
||
|
||
MAXWELL'S EQUATIONS REVISITED
|
||
Maxwell's Equations tell us that the far field diminishes as
|
||
the square of the distance from the radiating antenna. To look
|
||
at it the other way, if you want to double the range of a
|
||
transmitter you must increase its output power by a factor of 2
|
||
squared or four; a 10 times increase in range would require an
|
||
increase in power of 10 squared or 100; and so on. Other things
|
||
being equal, this is a simple mathematical relationship which
|
||
holds up.
|
||
Now comes an advertiser in security magazines who says his 1
|
||
watt transmitter has a range of 1-2 miles, and his 5 watt
|
||
transmitter has a range of 8 to 10 miles. To increase the range
|
||
from 1 mile to 8 miles would require a power increase to 64
|
||
watts, but somehow he does it with an increase to 5 watts. He
|
||
should share his technical secret with the world -- or send his
|
||
copy writer back to doing ads for soap which is "new and improved
|
||
and lemon flavored."
|
||
|
||
CORDLESS PHONES, AGAIN
|
||
Not only are cordless phones a threat to your privacy, they
|
||
may even damage your hearing. According to The Harvard Medical
|
||
School Letter of April '84, if you happen to have one of the
|
||
cordless phones which transmits its ring signal through the
|
||
speaker (earpiece), and have it next to your ear when a ring
|
||
signal is received; the sound transmitted out of the speaker can
|
||
be of sufficient intensity to cause "instant and permanent
|
||
destruction of nerve cells responsible for detecting sound."
|
||
|
||
PUBLICATIONS FOR SECURITY MANAGERS
|
||
"International Terrorist Attacks" and "Political Risk
|
||
Letter" are two publications that might be of interest to our
|
||
Security Manager readers. For a sample, contact Victor Hertz,
|
||
Frost and Sullivan, Inc., 106 Fulton Street, New York, NY 10038.
|
||
(212) 233-1080.
|
||
|
||
|
||
July, 1984
|
||
|
||
QUOTE OF THE MONTH
|
||
"There's plenty of precedent for a trade press that has no
|
||
original thinking. God knows." Teleconnect, July '84.
|
||
|
||
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
|
||
Q. Is equipment available to identify the telephone number
|
||
of the calling party?
|
||
A. The answer to this question is a qualified "Yes." We
|
||
know, for instance, that many emergency (911) boards have the
|
||
ability to freeze a call so that the caller stays connected to
|
||
the emergency board no matter what the caller does. We've been
|
||
told that some of these boards have the ability to display the
|
||
identity of the calling number (and probably the name and address
|
||
of the subscriber). However, we're quite certain that such a
|
||
capability will not be universal any time soon because it would
|
||
require a tremendous expenditure to implement in the older
|
||
exchanges.
|
||
|
||
We have been advised that Bell has said that it will be
|
||
totally equipped with the 56 Kb/s CCIS #7 (called CCITT # 7 in
|
||
one article) before the end of 1985. (Considering the actual
|
||
state of affairs, including the fact that Manhattan is not yet
|
||
even fully converted to ESS, we wonder about the credibility of
|
||
this schedule.) This version of the ESS switch will provide
|
||
calling party identification in binary decimal coded form to each
|
||
telephone switching center between the calling party and the
|
||
called party's exchange. Therefore, the phone company will be
|
||
able to identify the calling number of all calls routinely and
|
||
instantaneously. This identifying tag, however, will not be
|
||
attached to the call when the call is connected to the called
|
||
telephone. (Seems like this would be easy enough to do, but
|
||
apparently Ma thought we wouldn't need it or want it -- or maybe
|
||
she's just protecting us from ourselves.)
|
||
|
||
As we understand it after the new system is installed,
|
||
subscribers will have the following options available for an
|
||
additional monthly fee.
|
||
1) Calling number restriction. Subscriber will be able to
|
||
instruct the computer to intercept calls from numbers which he
|
||
specifies -- therefore, he can refuse to take calls from those
|
||
pesky bill collectors, etc. (It may also be possible for the
|
||
subscriber to provide a list of numbers from which he will accept
|
||
calls, and all others will be intercepted.)
|
||
|
||
2) Call trace. If the subscriber wants to learn the calling
|
||
number after the call is terminated, he can dial a code within a
|
||
prescribed period of time and learn the calling number. Note
|
||
that this can be done only after the call is over.
|
||
|
||
During the recent seminar in New York, there was a
|
||
discussion on this subject and we were left with the question of
|
||
the availability of calling number identification at the called
|
||
number while the phone is ringing before the call is answered.
|
||
After checking with our consultants and talking to one of the
|
||
manufacturers, this is what we come up with: Such a feature is
|
||
currently available from several manufacturers, but the only
|
||
callers which can be identified are those which are served by the
|
||
same electronic PBX. That means that you would be able to see
|
||
the identity of the caller only if the caller was another
|
||
extension served by the same PBX. You will not have the ability
|
||
to see who is calling from the other side of the PBX.
|
||
Q. Who makes high quality scramblers?
|
||
|
||
A. For a complete answer to that question I refer you to the
|
||
publication, "Who, What and Where in Communications Security."
|
||
There are many reputable companies in the field, but I'm not
|
||
going to try to name any because I can't do the question justice
|
||
in a few words -- so I recommend this 182 page book to anyone
|
||
seriously looking at the possible purchase of speech scrambling
|
||
or data encryption equipment. The book is a real "bible" with
|
||
detailed information on the technology and the established
|
||
manufacturers and their products. We offer it for sale at the
|
||
publishers list price of $75, and we discount it to consulting
|
||
and seminar clients at $50. If you want to know more about this
|
||
report, drop us a line or give us a call, and we'll mail you some
|
||
descriptive material.
|
||
|
||
Q. What do you know about this Britton organization in
|
||
Hawaii? Do any of their designs work?
|
||
|
||
A. About seven years ago I bought a lifetime subscription
|
||
from Don Britton Enterprises. It was supposed to guarantee me a
|
||
copy of every new plan that they introduce for the rest of my
|
||
life. To date, I have written to them twice; but I have never
|
||
received a single plan since the first packet arrived. I don't
|
||
know whether they are a con outfit, or whether there have been no
|
||
new plans since I subscribed. I know they have my address
|
||
because they keep soliciting my business.
|
||
|
||
We have never built one of their designs, but they look
|
||
reasonable, but be careful; when you try to build from someone
|
||
else's plans, you find that most circuits have glitches in them.
|
||
|
||
Q. Where does the stuff you put into your newsletters come
|
||
from?
|
||
|
||
A. The opinions are strictly my own. I hope they are based
|
||
on real factual information, and I hope that they are helpful. If
|
||
I am not really certain of the facts, I qualify the opinion.
|
||
|
||
Many ideas come from questions asked by phone and during the
|
||
seminar. Also, I have copies of most of the material that has
|
||
been published, and most of it is so bad that it will provide
|
||
ideas for many, many technical essays.
|
||
|
||
The factual information that appears in this letter comes
|
||
from many sources. Some, of course, is based on my education and
|
||
experience. In addition, we subscribe to an unholy number of
|
||
periodicals and also many people provide ideas and information.
|
||
|
||
Stuff, indeed!
|
||
|
||
Q. How do you rate the Dektor equipment versus the ISA
|
||
equipment?
|
||
|
||
A. Both companies sell high quality equipment. However, we
|
||
do not endorse any manufacturer's line across the board, but in
|
||
response to questions during the seminar we discuss specific
|
||
items and cover the tradeoffs. (For more information, come to
|
||
the seminar!)
|
||
|
||
DATA COMMUNICATIONS PRIMER
|
||
If you are involved with data communications in any way, we
|
||
have a booklet to recommend to you. It is short, full of
|
||
explanatory line drawings, full of good information in layman's
|
||
language, and it's FREE. The title is Making It Through The Maze
|
||
Of Data Communications and it's available from Infotron Systems
|
||
Corp., 9 N. Olney Ave, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003. 609-424-9400.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER CRIME
|
||
The current issue of Security Letter contains the results of
|
||
a poll on computer crime. Much food for thought. Security
|
||
Letter, 166 East 96th St., New York, NY 10128.
|
||
|
||
POINT OF VIEW
|
||
We were admonished (gently and courteously) recently because
|
||
the site of our last seminar was advertised as New York City, but
|
||
it actually took place in a suburb on Long Island. To all who
|
||
thought that was deceptive, we offer our sincere apology. Our
|
||
objective in naming a city is only to give folks coming from afar
|
||
an idea of the locale. If we had said Uniondale, NY, even most
|
||
natives would have had to look at a map to see where to book a
|
||
flight to.
|
||
|
||
There was no intent to deceive, but we've been thinking a
|
||
lot about it and offer the following observations.
|
||
|
||
This is the eighth year of our seminar. Most of those have
|
||
been held in the Washington, DC area and our promotional
|
||
materials all say "Washington, DC." All of these seminars have
|
||
been held in a Maryland suburb and we have yet to hear a comment
|
||
on this. Yet the first time we advertise New York City, and hold
|
||
the seminar in a suburb, we're told that we are misleading. Why
|
||
is this? Are New Yorkers that parochial? (If you'd care to
|
||
comment, anyone, we'd be glad to hear from you. We'd be
|
||
especially glad to hear from you Dick, because you were the first
|
||
to bring it to our attention.)
|
||
|
||
Another thought. We've heard West Point referred to as "in
|
||
upstate New York." Now I lived at West Point for six years and I
|
||
never for a moment considered that it was upstate. Maybe that's
|
||
because most of my family resides in the Schenectady area. Of
|
||
course, we have a daughter in Plattsburgh, and there's no doubt
|
||
that that is upstate!
|
||
|
||
It's all in your point of view.
|
||
|
||
Again. Sincere apologies if anyone was deceived.
|
||
|
||
By the way, we're now looking for a site in Manhattan for a
|
||
seminar late this year. Any ideas?
|
||
|
||
OUR STRANGE LANGUAGE
|
||
Tender, as a noun, means "offer"; yet it is always used in
|
||
the financial pages as an adjective modifying the word "offer",
|
||
viz, tender offer.
|
||
|
||
Excise, as a noun, means "a tax"; yet it is always used by
|
||
lawyers as an adjective modifying the word "tax", viz, excise
|
||
tax.
|
||
|
||
Strange, no?
|
||
|
||
LITERATURE
|
||
Telephony magazine reports that the Bell System Catalog of
|
||
Publications, PUB 10000 is now available. Contact Bell
|
||
Communications Research Information Exchange, 30 Vreeland Rd. Rm.
|
||
S103, Box 915, Florham Park, NJ 07932.
|
||
|
||
INTERESTING CONTRACT
|
||
We were asked recently if we could tap a telephone line for
|
||
a private investigator with an unusual contract. It seems that
|
||
he had been hired by a company to demonstrate that the records
|
||
which are stored in their computer were vulnerable.
|
||
|
||
Security managers: Good idea or no, in your opinion?
|
||
|
||
By the way, we told the inquirer, "Yes, we can tap the
|
||
phone. If you like, we can also provide the man to break into
|
||
the computer and copy some files."
|
||
|
||
NEW SCANNER
|
||
Lee Greathouse of Personal Communications magazine sent us a
|
||
product data sheet on the new Regency MX7000 scanner. Looks
|
||
great. Synthesized (no crystals), 20 channels, 25 MHz - 512 MHz
|
||
and 800 MHz - 1.2 GHz. Includes the new cordless frequencies and
|
||
the cellular frequencies. However, we have heard that cellular
|
||
will hop from one channel to another on each transmission --
|
||
which means that eavesdropping on one call will not be simple,
|
||
even with a scanner like this one.
|
||
|
||
AT&T (BUT A NICE COMMENT THIS TIME)
|
||
At first we didn't think it was so nice. As a matter of
|
||
fact, when we saw the charges on our bill for long distance
|
||
information, we thought it was stupid and counterproductive of
|
||
AT&T to charge for this service. However, after a little
|
||
reflection ol' JAR decided that he was the one who was stupid.
|
||
Why should AT&T give me free information so I can dial the call
|
||
on MCI?!?!
|
||
|
||
Wonder when we'll be able to get free information from MCI?
|
||
|
||
|
||
August, 1984
|
||
|
||
SOME OF MY BEST FRIENDS ARE.........
|
||
Telco employees. Seriously. It's true. I even have a
|
||
cousin who works for Ma Bell. (Actually, she works for a Baby
|
||
Bell.)
|
||
|
||
The reason that this particular item is appearing at this
|
||
time is that one of those friends, who is also a respected
|
||
colleague in the countermeasures business, recently said, "Jim, I
|
||
detect a hint of a bite in your words when you are writing about
|
||
a telco.
|
||
|
||
Very perceptive. If he had been less gentle, he would have
|
||
said "a hint of acrimony", or "a great deal of antipathy".
|
||
|
||
In any event, his comment triggers us to present this
|
||
segment, so that you may better understand our bias with regard
|
||
to telcos.
|
||
|
||
Jim Ross may be good friends with some telco people, but no
|
||
one who knows him will ever accuse him of being a friend of any
|
||
telco -- at least not any telco with which he has had dealings.
|
||
(There may be one which he could like, but he hasn't seen it
|
||
yet.)
|
||
|
||
So what's the problem? Why the antipathy?
|
||
|
||
There are three main reasons for my dislike of telcos, and a
|
||
mixed bag of other reasons -- some significant, and some quite
|
||
insignificant.
|
||
|
||
The first main reason is your editor's bias against dominant
|
||
entities as explained in an earlier issue.
|
||
|
||
The next main reason applies to any government controlled
|
||
utility, and I'm sure that every other independent businessman
|
||
shares some of my feelings. Every businessman has to stand on
|
||
his own two feet and make a profit to survive. If he hires too
|
||
much help, he loses his profit and maybe his business. If he
|
||
makes a mistake, he has to pay for it. If it's a big mistake, it
|
||
can put him out of business. (Can you imagine spending six
|
||
million dollars to publicize a name, a la American Bell, before
|
||
you find out that you cannot use the name?!?) I think it is
|
||
natural for those of us who must survive in a competitive
|
||
environment to resent a business which is guaranteed a profit by
|
||
the government. If a utility hires too much help, it only has to
|
||
get authority for a rate increase to cover the additional expense
|
||
plus some additional profit. If a utility makes a mistake, it
|
||
just arranges to raise rates so the captive customer ends up
|
||
paying for it. The government regulated utilities are probably
|
||
the only businesses in the world in which all of the players are
|
||
profitable.
|
||
|
||
The final principal reason for my antipathy cannot be as
|
||
easily pinned down. It has to do with attitudes and
|
||
characteristics which have been acquired over the years, and a
|
||
lot of policies and practices which relate to how management and
|
||
individual employees of the companies see their company.
|
||
|
||
We'll try to outline some ideas from our experience.
|
||
|
||
"Hubris." Is the company really a part of the government --
|
||
or slightly superior to it?
|
||
|
||
"Greed." According to Teleconnect, telcos' profit, as a
|
||
percentage of sales, ranges from about 30% to more than 50%.
|
||
Wow!
|
||
|
||
"Green-eyeshade school of management." Have the computers
|
||
crank out how long on average it takes to answer an information
|
||
('scuze me: "directory assistance") call. Demand that the
|
||
average time decrease. Measure the performance of each operator.
|
||
Pressure everyone whose time per transaction is above the norm.
|
||
(Do the same with service calls, etc.) (Since this was written,
|
||
a local phone company made headlines by firing an information
|
||
operator of sixteen years experience for falling below the norm.)
|
||
|
||
"Hubris." Start with a company which has always been a
|
||
monopoly, and which demonstrates continually that it knows
|
||
nothing about making it in a competitive environment. Spend
|
||
millions of dollars on national TV ads to deliver the message
|
||
that the telco will teach your company how to do "telemarketing".
|
||
Then allow the advertised "800" number to stay busy for days on
|
||
end. Or have the given telemarketing department number answered
|
||
with a recording that says, "All of our sales people are in a
|
||
meeting until 11:30. Please call back after that time." Can you
|
||
conceive of a competitive business spending a fortune to
|
||
advertise, and then not be prepared to answer the phone?!?!!!
|
||
And what they were advertising is the service of teaching you how
|
||
to sell by phone!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
|
||
|
||
"Combination." Ingrain into the minds of all business
|
||
office people who speak with customers that the only thing that
|
||
is important is the telco employee's time. The customer's time
|
||
is worth nothing; keep him on hold interminably. Never offer to
|
||
call back after you have found the necessary information.
|
||
|
||
NOW WAIT JUST A MINUTE.
|
||
The normal rejoinder when someone speaks ill of Ma Bell is,
|
||
"We have the world's best telephone system. How can you knock
|
||
that?
|
||
|
||
Nowhere have I said that we don't have the best system in
|
||
the world. I'm not qualified to make that judgment because I
|
||
don't know all about all systems. However, ours is really good,
|
||
maybe the best. (Although we had DDD available to us when I was
|
||
stationed in Germany in the early fifties.) Doesn't matter. I
|
||
am critical of the company, not the system, and not the people.
|
||
|
||
When I telephone telco repair and tell the young lady that I
|
||
have 60 Hertz hum on the line, it is not her fault that she
|
||
doesn't know what I mean. (It is her fault that she says,
|
||
"You'll have to speak English if you want me to help you.")
|
||
|
||
When I talk to the telco repair people and describe a
|
||
problem which obviously exists in an exchange about 30 miles
|
||
away, and they dispatch a repairman to my house; it's not that
|
||
repairman's fault that the company is wasting his time and mine.
|
||
The company policy appears to be that all problems are assumed to
|
||
be the customer's fault until proven otherwise.
|
||
|
||
After I have many problems with call forwarding and ask to
|
||
speak to someone knowledgeable, and get a man who starts reading
|
||
from the instructions, "It says here that you dial 72, and when
|
||
you hear another dial tone ... etc." His lack of familiarity is
|
||
not his fault.
|
||
|
||
All of these problems, in my opinion, are due to severe
|
||
comparmentilization in the "old" telco. Know your job, but don't
|
||
ever look beyond its limits. Don't think; you have a procedure
|
||
to tell you what to do.
|
||
|
||
My feeling is that the "new" telcos will be different. I
|
||
see it. I feel it. I think they must encourage capable people
|
||
to expand beyond the old boundaries. Time will tell.
|
||
|
||
Just don't let anyone tell you that Jim Ross doesn't respect
|
||
the telco. Just because he is critical of some things doesn't
|
||
mean that he doesn't appreciate the high quality equipment, and
|
||
procedures, the excellent overall quality of service and the fact
|
||
that Bell Labs knows more about communications theory than the
|
||
rest of the world put together.
|
||
|
||
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ASSOCIATION
|
||
All of the details are not firm, but this membership
|
||
association is currently being organized. Anyone interested in
|
||
the overall subject of security of communications -- oral,
|
||
telephone, radio, data, and every conceivable kind of
|
||
communications -- is invited to join. Charter members will be
|
||
those joining before the end of 1984, and the regular annual dues
|
||
of $50 will provide paid-up membership through 1985.
|
||
|
||
The most important benefit of membership will be the
|
||
ability, through newsletters and meetings, to exchange
|
||
information with others in the field -- either people who have
|
||
similar problems or people who are professionals at solving
|
||
COMSEC problems.
|
||
|
||
Other benefits of membership will be a subscription to the
|
||
COMSEC LETTER, reduced rates for attendance at local and national
|
||
workshops, conferences, panels, exhibits and functions such as
|
||
COMSEC '85.
|
||
|
||
Some folks who heard about these plans by word of mouth have
|
||
already sent in their first year's dues and we thank them. We
|
||
hope to have a membership solicitation packet put together in
|
||
about one month.
|
||
|
||
Let us hear from you if you can help. We all need to work
|
||
together if we want an organization which serves its members.from September
|
||
|
||
|
||
September, 1984
|
||
|
||
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ASSOCIATION
|
||
|
||
A few hardy souls have committed themselves to the
|
||
establishment of a national membership organization for
|
||
individuals and businesses interested in communications security.
|
||
|
||
The principal objective of the association will be to
|
||
collect and disseminate information on COMSEC.
|
||
The primary vehicle for exchange of information will be a
|
||
members-only newsletter. Members are encouraged to submit
|
||
articles, anecdotes, news items, new techniques/equipment
|
||
descriptions, gripes, etc. Anything which could be of interest
|
||
to CSA members is wanted. The COMSEC LETTER will be sent to all
|
||
members as one of the benefits of membership. This publication
|
||
will be slightly different in content and make-up than the one
|
||
which you have been receiving without charge. The editor will
|
||
still be Jim Ross, but COMSEC LETTER itself will become
|
||
non-proprietary and non-commercial. CSA will also provide its
|
||
members with opportunities to exchange information through local
|
||
and national meetings. When we're able, we'll install a computer
|
||
bulletin board so that members can have instant access to the
|
||
association's data bases, and be able to exchange messages with
|
||
other members. Also, we'll be offering some new educational
|
||
programs -- seminars, workshops, video tapes, etc. Let us know
|
||
if you are interested in participating.
|
||
|
||
Members will be offered discounts on training programs,
|
||
educational activities, advertisements, products, publications,
|
||
etc. so that annual dues will be recouped easily for any member
|
||
who participates in even a few activities.
|
||
|
||
Once each year we're planning a national meeting with
|
||
panels, exhibits, etc. The first of these, COMSEC '85 is
|
||
tentatively scheduled for Washington, DC in the fall of '85.
|
||
|
||
Many details have yet to be considered. If you would be
|
||
interested in participating in the organization process, let us
|
||
know. At the time that this is written we have made no decision
|
||
on the various categories of membership -- student, foreign,
|
||
corporate, etc. All we have determined is that, to start, dues
|
||
for individuals will be $50 per year. Everyone who joins during
|
||
1984 will be listed as a charter member, and his dues will cover
|
||
membership through December 1985.
|
||
ACCESS CHARGES
|
||
Lessee now. Access charges. That's what C&P Telephone just
|
||
started charging its customers in order to give them access to
|
||
what they've always had access to.
|
||
|
||
No. Some of the trade press uses the term in referring to
|
||
the money that AT&T Long Lines paid back to local telcos
|
||
(kickback?).
|
||
|
||
But, no. There all of these stories about how we all have
|
||
some right to equal access to any LD company. Maybe access
|
||
charges mean we have to pay to use MCI or Sprint or whoever.
|
||
|
||
Oh well.
|
||
|
||
POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS
|
||
We have been throwing rocks at our phone companies (which
|
||
usually provide excellent communication, admittedly) quite
|
||
regularly in this letter, and we keep thinking that we should
|
||
offer some positive suggestions rather than just criticizing.
|
||
Therefore, we have started to list (in the computer) some serious
|
||
ideas for making the companies better -- or, at least, less
|
||
irritating. We'll run some of these in a later issue. If you
|
||
would like to put in your two cents worth, let us know.
|
||
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER CRIME
|
||
This topic seems to have caught the attention of the press,
|
||
the legal professionals, the legislators, and the man on the
|
||
street. However, most of the material which has appeared in
|
||
print has not attempted to define the problem, but focused
|
||
instead on the exploits of hackers such as the Milwaukee
|
||
youngsters who called themselves the "414s" after their area
|
||
code. (One recent story said that they derived their name from
|
||
the fact that they were all members of Boy Scout Troop 414.
|
||
Anything to sell more papers!)
|
||
|
||
In our opinion, most of the material which has appeared,
|
||
even in the trade press, is shallow and self-serving in the
|
||
extreme. The authors seem to be assuming that unauthorized entry
|
||
into computers via modems and telephone is computer crime.
|
||
|
||
We take a quite different approach. Although we agree that
|
||
unauthorized access via telephone is some sort of trespass, and
|
||
some theft or vandalism might occur making this crime more
|
||
serious than walking on a neighbor's lawn; we do not agree that
|
||
this is all there is to computer crime. In fact, this aspect
|
||
might even represent the least significant part of the problem.
|
||
|
||
Let's see if we can get a start toward defining the problem;
|
||
and, maybe, convince you to look at it from a slightly different
|
||
perspective.
|
||
|
||
First, what is computer crime?
|
||
|
||
To us, computer crime means:
|
||
1) using one's special knowledge of digital
|
||
computer hardware and software to commit a crime that you could
|
||
not commit without that knowledge, and
|
||
2) in an environment in which digital computer
|
||
hardware and software is essential.
|
||
|
||
Note that this definition excludes all of those "computer
|
||
crimes" in which the computer is used in place of the old paper
|
||
and pencil record keeping systems. That is, if the bookkeeper
|
||
figures out a way to get checks sent to bogus addresses which the
|
||
bookkeeper controls, it is not a computer crime even though a
|
||
computer was involved in the bookkeeping and check writing
|
||
process. This crime is as old as the hills, and the fact that a
|
||
computer is involved is immaterial. Something has been stolen by
|
||
subterfuge, and the computer is incidental, not central, to the
|
||
process. The thief is a clerk, without special knowledge of
|
||
computer hardware or software. He could just as well have been
|
||
using a pencil or punching keys on a typewriter as on a computer
|
||
keyboard.
|
||
|
||
On the other hand, if he uses his special knowledge of
|
||
software to circumvent automatic checks and balances or audit
|
||
trails, then he has truly committed a computer crime -- one which
|
||
he could not have committed without knowledge of hardware and
|
||
software.
|
||
|
||
Yes, this definition flies in the face of most of what has
|
||
been printed. We'd like to hear your opinion. Let's get some
|
||
ideas, and maybe, working together, we can develop some good
|
||
definitions.
|
||
|
||
Back on the question of breaking into data bases via modems
|
||
and telephone connections: We'd like to strongly suggest that
|
||
this is an example of what the lawyers call an "attractive
|
||
nuisance", and the keepers of these nuisances should face
|
||
punishment. (If you put a swimming pool in an unfenced yard, and
|
||
an infant falls in and drowns, the law does not punish the
|
||
infant. The law punishes the irresponsible person who created
|
||
the attractive nuisance.)
|
||
|
||
What do you think?
|
||
|
||
|
||
YOGO CONTEST
|
||
Earlier this year we introduced the YOGO element in our
|
||
masthead, and to date only the proofreader (our everlovin' of 25
|
||
years) has asked what it means. We doubt that every reader has
|
||
figured it out -- in fact, we wonder if anyone has figured it
|
||
out. So, just for kicks, here's a contest: the first person who
|
||
calls with the correct answer will get his name in print in this
|
||
letter, and have his subscription extended for one year at no
|
||
charge. (Ross family members are not eligible. This means you,
|
||
Marilyn and Jim!)
|
||
|
||
|
||
ASK AND YE SHALL RECEIVE
|
||
In our July letter we commented on AT&T's new charges for LD
|
||
directory assistance, and wondered when MCI would offer reduced
|
||
rate service. Sure enough! MCI dropped its announcement on us
|
||
shortly thereafter. They allow two free inquiries per month, as
|
||
does AT&T, but they charge 45 cents per call vs. AT&T's 50 cents.
|
||
|
||
|
||
KANSAS SUPREME COURT
|
||
According to Telephony magazine, "The Supreme Court of
|
||
Kansas has ruled that police may legally monitor and record
|
||
conversations conducted over cordless telephones and use the
|
||
recordings as evidence in court. The court determined that such
|
||
conversations, which were heard over an ordinary FM radio set,
|
||
were equivalent to oral communications and not subject to wiretap
|
||
laws."
|
||
If the court really made that ruling, it should be ashamed
|
||
-- for several reasons.
|
||
|
||
Anyone who wants to know what the law really says is
|
||
referred to 18 USC 2511 which makes it a felony to record oral
|
||
communications without the consent of one of the parties. The
|
||
communication in question, however, was a radio communication at
|
||
the point of interception, not an oral communication; and,
|
||
therefore, the law relating to interception of radio
|
||
communication applies.
|
||
|
||
What we see from here is that, in addition to its lack of
|
||
understanding of 18 USC 2511 (contained in the latest law, "PL
|
||
90-351, The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968"),
|
||
the court apparently has not been referred to the Communications
|
||
Act of 1934. In it, 47 USC 605 defines the rules for handling
|
||
intercepted radio communication. (We have an essay in
|
||
preparation on this. It should be ready soon.)
|
||
|
||
CNA
|
||
Here we are taking on another supreme court (or this time
|
||
maybe it's only the editor of a trade publication), but we
|
||
honestly believe in strength through knowledge, and that
|
||
knowledge comes through free and open communication. In any
|
||
event, Telephony magazine reported: "The California Supreme Court
|
||
ruled that police officers acting without a search warrant can no
|
||
longer obtain the names and addresses of people with unlisted
|
||
numbers from telephone companies."
|
||
|
||
That statement is factually incorrect. It's true only if
|
||
the court meant the only official way to get the information is
|
||
with a search warrant. During our seminar, however, we explain
|
||
how the CNA system works, and how anyone can use it to get
|
||
Customer Name and Address for any telephone number, listed or
|
||
unlisted.
|
||
|
||
(Consulting clients and seminar participants: call us if you
|
||
want the latest information on CNA.)
|
||
|
||
LIE DETECTION
|
||
During our recent seminar in New York, we got into a
|
||
spirited discussion on the subject of lie detection which was
|
||
exceptionally valuable because we had some experienced, and
|
||
intelligent, examiners in the group. The consensus was that
|
||
there are some technological aids which will help an examiner to
|
||
detect stress, but the person giving the test must use his own
|
||
mind to evaluate all bits of information before he can hope to
|
||
come to a conclusion on which to stake his reputation.
|
||
|
||
Specifically, some of our participants pointed out that, if
|
||
the subject does not understand the words that are used, the
|
||
equipment will detect no stress, because there will be no stress
|
||
because the examinee does not understand the question.
|
||
|
||
That may sound like a fatuous statement, but one of the
|
||
experienced examiners emphasized that there is a whole class of
|
||
people with whom you don't use certain words such as "steal". As
|
||
he pointed out, you ask, "Did you take the watch?" and the
|
||
subject will understand; and you'll get a stress reaction if
|
||
he/she was involved in the theft. If you say, "Did you steal the
|
||
watch?", you'll get no stress response because the individual
|
||
doesn't understand the concept of "steal."
|
||
|
||
The subject of lie detection is one that we believe needs to
|
||
be aired, and we have an essay in preparation which will present
|
||
our views on the subject. Your contribution is welcome, anytime.
|
||
|
||
TSCM, BASIC EQUIPMENT NEEDS
|
||
The question of what basic equipment is needed in order to
|
||
be able to work in the TSCM field has been asked more than once
|
||
and really deserves an answer.
|
||
|
||
We have an answer in the works, but it will not be a simple
|
||
list of equipment, sources and prices. It will be a full
|
||
treatment of the problem, with emphasis on threat assessment,
|
||
etc.
|
||
|
||
Your comments are solicited.
|
||
|
||
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
|
||
Q. What are the standard "bug" frequencies?
|
||
|
||
A. Wow! What dynamite is packed into that question!
|
||
|
||
For reasons which may be valid or may not be valid, we're
|
||
not going to list any frequencies which are authorized for use by
|
||
law enforcement. That leaves illegal bug frequencies, and they
|
||
can be anywhere; but let's use some reason and try to limit the
|
||
field.
|
||
|
||
First, to go extremely high in frequency requires special
|
||
effort which is beyond the means of most buggers. Second, very
|
||
low frequencies require large components making a bug hard to
|
||
hide. Third, if you were planting an illegal bug, you'd want to
|
||
set the frequency to minimize the chance of accidental detection,
|
||
so you'd stay outside of bands in common use. However, to build
|
||
a good receiver from scratch is quite a project, so you'd
|
||
probably pick an operating frequency just outside a standard band
|
||
so you could modify a commercial receiver.
|
||
|
||
Ron (and anybody else who's interested), there is no set
|
||
answer to your question, but I hope this gives you enough
|
||
information to get you started.
|
||
|
||
You might also check on equipment from Japan which was
|
||
originally intended for their own domestic use. (Broadcast bands
|
||
are different in Japan.) I have heard that there are stores in
|
||
the Canal St. area in NYC which carry this stuff.
|
||
|
||
BS DEGREE BY MAIL?
|
||
It is possible to earn an accredited BS degree in
|
||
electronics engineering technology by mail. We have no
|
||
reservations in recommending this program because some years ago
|
||
your editor was retained by the Accrediting Commission of the
|
||
National Home Study Council to evaluate the program, and he found
|
||
it to be very good.
|
||
This is a bona fide college and any degree awarded has been
|
||
earned. You will have to take courses, study, and demonstrate
|
||
that you have learned the course material before you get a
|
||
passing grade in any course. This is not one of those "funny"
|
||
degrees that you get for "life experience" after you have sent a
|
||
check for the right amount.
|
||
|
||
Contact Grantham College of Engineering, 2500 South La
|
||
Cienega Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90035.
|
||
|
||
IDEA FOR THE INVESTIGATOR
|
||
We have long had a plan to develop a tailing system which we
|
||
would make available on rental to those who might have a need for
|
||
such a capability, and just this week received a flier in the
|
||
mail which strikes us as something similar which might be of
|
||
interest to our government and private investigator readers.
|
||
Thrifty Rent-a-Car is offering to rent '73 through '84 models for
|
||
surveillance purposes. They offer vans, trucks, station wagons,
|
||
etc. which don't look like "cops cars." Seems like a good idea
|
||
to us non-investigator types.
|
||
|
||
|
||
TECHNICIAN TRAINING COURSES
|
||
Received since we last published information on such
|
||
courses: First, the address for the course in Texas is: Texas
|
||
A&M University System, College Station, Texas. 409-845-6391.
|
||
|
||
Also, Dick Heffernan pointed out that the extra day at the
|
||
end of the ISA course is for people who already own equipment and
|
||
want additional training.
|
||
|
||
ANI
|
||
Automatic Number Identification. As explained to us, this
|
||
is a method whereby it is possible to contact a telco facility
|
||
and hear voice identification of the telephone number of the pair
|
||
being used. It was designed to be an aid to telco installers,
|
||
but it sure could be helpful to a lot of other folks -- now that
|
||
it is OK for us to work on our own inside wiring.
|
||
|
||
To use the system it is only necessary to dial a three digit
|
||
code, and a synthesized female voice will speak the number
|
||
assigned to the pair that you are connected to. In parts of New
|
||
York City and Long Island the code is "958". Dial that number
|
||
and you'll be told the number that you are calling from.
|
||
|
||
Who knows the codes for other areas? Call us.
|
||
|
||
WHOOPS!
|
||
Since the segment above (on ANI) was written, we read in
|
||
Telephone Engineer and Management that ANI is a part of the Bell
|
||
system which provides billing information to the telco. Now, we
|
||
know that what we said about New York is true, but we wonder if
|
||
what TE&M said is also true. (It doesn't seem likely that the
|
||
same system would simultaneously provide analog voice information
|
||
and digital computer information.)
|
||
|
||
Who knows? Is it one, or the other, or both??? Call us.
|
||
|
||
PUBLICATIONS
|
||
If you are interested in telephone communications security,
|
||
you should be reading TAP. This publication has recently been
|
||
undergoing some major changes (redirection?), but the content is
|
||
worth much more than the ten dollars asked for a one year (six
|
||
issue) subscription. TAP, 147 W 42nd St. #603, New York, NY
|
||
10036.
|
||
|
||
(If you order a subscription, have patience. The office was
|
||
recently broken into and torn up. The new editor has rescued
|
||
what he could; has everything in cardboard boxes in a new
|
||
location, and hasn't published a new issue since Jan/Feb '84.
|
||
Hang on! He'll catch up soon, we're confident.)
|
||
If you have an interest in radio communications, you should
|
||
be reading Monitoring Times. It is an excellent source of
|
||
information on the hobby of radio monitoring and the equipment
|
||
used -- receivers, scanners, antennas, etc. (The July issue had
|
||
a feature on what are the radio listening laws in all of the
|
||
individual states.) Also, MT provides a lot of detail on secret
|
||
and underground transmissions. Send them $10.50 for a one year
|
||
(12 issue) subscription or contact Bob Grove for a sample. MT,
|
||
Grove Enterprises, Inc., 140 Dog Branch Rd., Brasstown, NC 28902.
|
||
|
||
|
||
NEWS NOTES
|
||
We have been informed that Col. C.R. (Mac) McQuiston
|
||
recently demonstrated his Veremetric L-1000 digital voice stress
|
||
analyzer. We'd like to hear from him or from anyone with
|
||
details.
|
||
|
||
Also, we're told that the following took place recently.
|
||
|
||
Scene: large metropolitan area on east coast of USA.
|
||
Players: attorneys for the defendant in a large class action
|
||
suit. Activity: TSCM in offices of law firm. Finding: one
|
||
telephone, in critical area, has been modified with a hook switch
|
||
bypass. Action: modified instrument replaced. No identification
|
||
of bugger, and no investigative effort contemplated because suit
|
||
was settled out of court shortly thereafter.
|
||
|
||
BUYING PHONES?
|
||
If you are thinking about buying a multiline phone system,
|
||
we recommend that you get a copy of a booklet called "THE HOW TO
|
||
BUY A PHONE BOOK." It's not about buying a phone book; it's a
|
||
book about how to approach buying a phone system. Self-serving,
|
||
but after all the people who offer it for free want you to buy
|
||
their phones. Really good anyway. Contact Walker Communications
|
||
Corp., 200 Oser Ave, Happauge, NY 11788. 516-435-1100. (We like
|
||
the way they write their phone number also, and we're going to
|
||
eliminate the brackets around our area code in the future.)
|
||
(Think we'll start a national trend?)
|
||
|
||
MODERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY & DISCOUNT LD CARRIERS
|
||
Big hassle. The different discount LD services have
|
||
different policies for when they begin timing a LD call for
|
||
billing purposes. The reason for the confusion is that they
|
||
don't get the supervisory signal which indicates that the called
|
||
number has answered. AT&T gets this signal but MCI, Sprint, etc.
|
||
don't. Two questions:
|
||
1. Why does AT&T get the supervisory signal and the others
|
||
don't?
|
||
2. If, for some valid technical reason, this signal cannot be
|
||
provided to non-AT&T carriers, why don't these carriers use some
|
||
of the available technology to sense the status of the call?
|
||
There are ICs available off the shelf which can sense (and
|
||
report) ringing, busy circuit, busy line, and complex waveforms
|
||
such as speech. Why don't they use this technology?
|
||
|
||
OUR INTERESTING LANGUAGE
|
||
Heard: "Makes a sneer." Actually sung: "Makes us near."
|
||
|
||
October, 1984
|
||
|
||
NEW ON OUR MAILING LIST
|
||
Effective this issue we're adding some names to our mailing
|
||
list, and we're making this introductory comment to try to catch
|
||
the attention of each individual who has been added. (Unless you
|
||
tell us to desist, you'll get three issues without charge.)
|
||
|
||
First, we're adding Art Sundry, GM of Motorola
|
||
Communications and Electronics Inc., and the young lady who said
|
||
she is the boss of their telemarketing operation, Mary Adelaide
|
||
Burns. Our astounding communication with this operation is
|
||
recounted in this issue, and we repeat the offer that we made by
|
||
phone to Mary Burns: if Motorola wishes to respond, we'll carry
|
||
the response in this newsletter (unless they expect us to publish
|
||
a book and distribute it at no charge).
|
||
|
||
Next, and we have also added the members of the Society of
|
||
Telecommunications Consultants. Again, if you get this letter
|
||
unbidden, and have no interest in COMSEC, please let us know and
|
||
we'll stop sending it.
|
||
|
||
Last, bnl, we're adding all of the people who stopped at our
|
||
booth at the ASIS show in Chicago in September. Welcome.
|
||
|
||
CSA
|
||
The Communications Security Association is a non-profit
|
||
memebership organization of people and companies interested in
|
||
the field of communications, especially communications security.
|
||
|
||
At this time, Jim Ross is the CSA unpaid, "volunteer"
|
||
administrator, working part time to try to do the things
|
||
necessary to get a new organization started. If you have
|
||
requested a membership packet, please be patient. Information is
|
||
being assembled, created, and word-processed; and something will
|
||
be forthcoming in the next week or two. Preliminary packets will
|
||
be prepared and copied on the same equipment used to create the
|
||
COMSEC LETTER, namely the IBM PC and XEROX 1035. A fancier
|
||
package will be typeset and printed after the organization can
|
||
afford it.
|
||
|
||
If you wish to become a charter member, and don't need more
|
||
information before making a decision, send $50.00. Annual dues
|
||
are $50.00 for individuals in the USA, and dues received before
|
||
the end of 1984 qualifies you as a charter member with dues paid
|
||
up through 1985. If you're not sure, or want more information,
|
||
send your inquiry to CSA. Please be patient.
|
||
|
||
To all who have already sent their dues: "Thanks. You will
|
||
be receiving a packet of information including a blank form
|
||
asking you how you can help to get the new association
|
||
functioning."
|
||
|
||
COMSEC '85
|
||
The founders of CSA have tentatively planned the first
|
||
annual meeting for Washington, DC during the fall of 1985 and
|
||
have named this meeting "COMSEC 85". Presentations, panel
|
||
discussions, exhibits, and other activities are planned. YOUR
|
||
input is invited.
|
||
|
||
COMSEC LETTER
|
||
This letter will normally be four pages and will be mailed
|
||
bulk rate early each month. As a CSA organ it will be
|
||
non-proprietary and non-commercial.
|
||
|
||
QUOTE OF THE MONTH
|
||
Plant Man's Notebook, Telephony magazine: "Life is half over
|
||
before you realize that it's one of those do-it-yourself deals."
|
||
|
||
ITT & FBI VS. LONG DISTANCE STEALERS
|
||
A recent issue of Telephone Engineer & Management notes that
|
||
ITT Communications Service and the FBI have collaborated to crack
|
||
down on those who steal long distance service by using someone
|
||
else's identification. More power to them! Maybe there should
|
||
be a system set up to reward those who provide information on
|
||
such thieves.
|
||
|
||
We don't condone stealing, but, we predict that the system
|
||
of coding used will be very simple to break and the phreaks will
|
||
be passing along the formula very soon. With all of their money
|
||
and all of their brains AT&T really should be able to come up
|
||
with something with at least a tad of security.
|
||
|
||
AIWA TP-M7
|
||
This microcassette recorder is our favorite. It is slightly
|
||
larger than the Olympus Pearlcorder S-910, but our AIWA is much
|
||
more sensitive than our Pearlcorder. We have heard that AIWA is
|
||
no longer making the 7, opting instead to manufacture the 9 which
|
||
has fewer features and a higher price (shades of Detroit!).
|
||
|
||
NAME THAT SEMINAR
|
||
Our seminar started out with the name "Electronic Security"
|
||
and evolved into "Electronic Spying and Countermeasures" because
|
||
most of the information on access control, intrusion detection,
|
||
etc. was available elsewhere, but everybody was interested in
|
||
bugs and taps. During the two-day affair, though, we discuss
|
||
much more than just electronic spying. We cover the laws
|
||
relating to surreptitious interception of communication, other
|
||
methods of collecting information, any modern electronics systems
|
||
or techniques which relate to security and investigations, etc.
|
||
So what should we call the seminar?
|
||
|
||
After a conversation with Jack Dyer in California, we're
|
||
inclined toward "Industrial Espionage Countermeasures". What do
|
||
you think?
|
||
|
||
PRIVACY, WHAT IS IT?
|
||
Our recent experience with Motorola began when we saw an ad
|
||
which implied that Motorola is offering a line of mobile radios
|
||
which provided secure radio communications. That ad is long
|
||
since gone, but the one running in the current issue of SIGNAL
|
||
magazine is headlined, "PRIVACY-PLUS RADIO GIVES YOU RELIABLE
|
||
COMMUNICATIONS. AND LETS YOU KEEP THE CONVERSATION TO YOURSELF."
|
||
One of the brochures we received in response to our request is
|
||
entitled "PRIVACY PLUS PERFORMANCE..."
|
||
|
||
Those three words contain the essence of the problem. To me
|
||
they conveyed the idea that Motorola was offering a two-way radio
|
||
system which provides private communication to the users plus the
|
||
kind of reliable performance that we have come to expect from
|
||
Motorola products. What do those words convey to you?
|
||
|
||
Looking for some detail for the readers of the COMSEC
|
||
LETTER, we called the Motorola telemarketing number to get the
|
||
full story. During the conversation, we explained to the sales
|
||
rep that we are not a potential customer, but rather producing a
|
||
newsletter on communications security. Pricing information was
|
||
easy to get, but how security is achieved was another story. At
|
||
one point she told me that I should study up on radio
|
||
communication theory so that I could understand her. When I
|
||
asked her if they were using some modulation type other than a
|
||
standard such as FM or ACSB, she told me that she would only talk
|
||
to me if I learned how to speak to her nicely, and hung up on me.
|
||
|
||
When I called back and asked to speak to the boss, Mary
|
||
Burns tried to explain the privacy feature by using an analogy.
|
||
She said that in the old days people had party line telephones,
|
||
but now most people have private lines, and asked me, "Don't you
|
||
agree that this conversation that we're having is a private
|
||
conversation?" That certainly was the wrong question to ask a
|
||
guy who spends a large part of his life writing and speaking in
|
||
an effort to get the message across that telephones are not
|
||
secure means of communication! (Even TIME magazine agrees with
|
||
me; see page 38 of the October 29 issue.)
|
||
In any event, after a careful reading of their literature, I
|
||
now appreciate what the Motorola system does and what it doesn't
|
||
do. It does not, as the heading says, provide private
|
||
communications. All it does is prevent other users of the same
|
||
repeater from hearing your communications on their two-way
|
||
radios. Anyone in your area with the appropriate receiving
|
||
equipment can listen with no trouble.
|
||
|
||
Now, it may be that the users of repeaters will appreciate
|
||
that this system will only keep other users of the same repeater
|
||
from hearing on their two-way, fixed-frequency radios, but does
|
||
that mean that Motorola is selling a product which provides
|
||
"privacy"?
|
||
|
||
Is this another case of a dominant entity getting away with
|
||
something that would land a small company in hot water?
|
||
|
||
What do you think?
|
||
|
||
YOGO CONTEST WINNER
|
||
Dennis Steinauer of the National Bureau of Standards is our
|
||
winner. In a later issue of COMSEC LETTER we'll explain YOGO,
|
||
and give some samples of some very imaginative contest entries.
|
||
|
||
November, 1984
|
||
|
||
SOME IDEAS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ASSOCIATION
|
||
What do you think about establishing a panel of experts to
|
||
answer members questions? Computer bulletin board? How about
|
||
providing expert witness referral service? Speakers bureau?
|
||
|
||
THANKS
|
||
Our thanks to Jack Dyer who arranged for us to speak to the
|
||
San Fernando Valley ASIS Chapter February 5, and to Joe Rodrigues
|
||
who has offered us the use of his offices as our headquarters
|
||
while we are visiting in the Los Angeles area during that week.
|
||
We look forward to in-person meetings with many of our Los
|
||
Angeles area correspondents.
|
||
|
||
ANOTHER COURT (SMART ONE THIS TIME)
|
||
In Alexandria (VA) Circuit Court the judge instructed the
|
||
jury that "interception of an oral communication" is defined as
|
||
the "aural acquisition" or hearing of an oral conversation that
|
||
had been recorded. Great.
|
||
|
||
What it means is that simply recording a conversation is not
|
||
intercepting the conversation. If no person has ever listened to
|
||
what has been recorded, then no interception has taken place.
|
||
|
||
Simple. Logical. Accurate. Great!
|
||
|
||
Next, of course, the court will have to extend its
|
||
definition because there are computer-driven transcription
|
||
systems which can prepare a written record of the recorded
|
||
conversation with no human listening. In that case no
|
||
interception takes place until a human reads the transcript, in
|
||
our opinion.
|
||
|
||
(Sam. This is a point that I was yammering about when first we
|
||
met --- and the judge agrees with the engineer!)
|
||
|
||
STRANGE, NO?
|
||
We recently received an inquiry from Continental Telephone
|
||
of the West, and their business letterhead has no phone number on
|
||
it!
|
||
|
||
Q & A
|
||
From Ted Genese, several questions.
|
||
|
||
Q. Kindly send the latest information on CNA.
|
||
A. Ted, in your area the CNA number is 518-471-8111. CNA is
|
||
a service of your friendly telco -- which has heretofore been
|
||
intended for the use of other telcos. (Now available in some
|
||
places for anyone to use -- details in a future letter.)
|
||
|
||
Here's how it works. Suppose you check your phone bill and
|
||
find a call to East Waubeek that you know you didn't make. You
|
||
call your telco business office and the telco person reads from
|
||
script 47, and assures you that he/she will check into it. That
|
||
person then calls the CNA (Customer Name and Address) number for
|
||
the exchange for East Waubeek, saying to the telco person who
|
||
answers something like: "This is Joe Gahockus in the Golden
|
||
Westchester Telephone Company and we have a #%$&@#$ subscriber
|
||
here who is trying to beat us out of some money by claiming he
|
||
never called this number so I need customer name and address for
|
||
YYY-XXX-ZZZZ." The telco person at the other end yawns, keys in
|
||
the number, and reads the CNA information off the screen.
|
||
|
||
That's how the phone company uses the system. Of course,
|
||
they try to hold the CNA numbers, and the very fact that the
|
||
service exists, close to the vest; but keeping a goodie like that
|
||
a secret is impossible. Changing the numbers and coding the
|
||
numbers add an unbelievable administrative burden and make the
|
||
system cumbersome, so the numbers tend to stay the same for some
|
||
time. (One caller from NYC told me that they change every few
|
||
months, but that 518 number has been valid for years.) So the
|
||
service exists, and is known to the wily investigator. Don't you
|
||
suppose that a private investigator who needs to know the name of
|
||
the person/business to whom a phone number is assigned might be
|
||
tempted to pretend to be a telco employee, and call CNA for
|
||
information?
|
||
|
||
Q. Canal Street is a long street. Is it possible to narrow
|
||
it down a little, such as the name or address?
|
||
|
||
A. (This question refers to a comment we made about
|
||
equipment available from merchants on Canal Street in NYC.)
|
||
Sorry, Ted. It's been about 40 years since we visited Canal
|
||
Street, and all we remember is that there are many sources of
|
||
almost anything electronic. Can anyone help? Tony, Harold,
|
||
John, ... anyone?
|
||
|
||
Q. Where is Thrifty Rent-a-Car?
|
||
|
||
A. The man who wrote to us is Bob Rish, Thrifty, 6461 Edsall
|
||
Rd., Alexandria, VA 22312. 703-354-5939. However, I'm sure that
|
||
they must have outlets in the NYC area.
|
||
|
||
Q. Any more information available on ANI?
|
||
|
||
A. More will be forthcoming in later issues of the COMSEC
|
||
LETTER, and in the CSA members-only letter.
|
||
|
||
NEWSLETTER
|
||
Paul Estev is the editor of a newsletter called 2600. (Bet
|
||
you can't guess where that name came from!) For a sample copy
|
||
contact him at 2600 Enterprises, Box 752, Middle Island, NY
|
||
11953-0752.
|
||
|
||
RF SCREEN ROOMS
|
||
Excellent reference: Shielded Enclosures. Electronic
|
||
Construction Service, 17256 Napa St., Northridge, CA 91325.
|
||
818-885-5188
|
||
|
||
FEEDBACK
|
||
Here's the text of a letter which we recently received, and
|
||
our open letter response:
|
||
|
||
From Al Smith, The Windsource Co., Wamsutter, Wyoming.
|
||
|
||
"Dear Sir: I'm interested in Communications Security
|
||
Association, but I'm wondering what is in store there. I've
|
||
enjoyed reading COMSEC LETTER but its information has been mostly
|
||
'old hat' to this reader. A higher level of information is
|
||
needed to warrant $25 or $50, specifically in the areas of radio,
|
||
telephone, and digital techniques. Topics I'd like to read about
|
||
include spread spectrum/frequency hopping, digital encoding,
|
||
decoding, digital television bugging, microwave bugging, Shamrock
|
||
and Baby Bells, Soviet comsec, TEXTA highlights, digital code
|
||
decryption theory.
|
||
Would you please advise whether this sort of writing is in
|
||
the command of the staff you've assembled. If so, you'll have the
|
||
proscribed [sic] cash!
|
||
|
||
Another concern of mine is whether advertising will be
|
||
available, and its cost. Would really appreciate a sample of the
|
||
first CSA newsletter if that's possible."
|
||
|
||
Open letter from Jim Ross to Al Smith, The Windsource:
|
||
|
||
"Dear Al:
|
||
|
||
Your letter is certainly interesting, but I'm sure that I
|
||
alone cannot give you an adequate answer, so, with this comment,
|
||
I'm asking others in my readership to help out.
|
||
|
||
As for what's ahead for CSA -- I don't know. I am merely an
|
||
unpaid, volunteer editor trying to act as a catalyst to get a
|
||
meaningful membership organization started. As I told a recent
|
||
caller, I cannot dictate what the organization should do. I'll
|
||
make some suggestions, but it is a membership organization, and
|
||
it is going to do what the membership decides. If you join,
|
||
you'll have a say in what takes place. With your wide variety of
|
||
interests and advanced education, I'm sure you could contribute
|
||
many articles to the CSA organ.
|
||
|
||
Now, with regard to your specific questions, the technical
|
||
staff is severely limited in its education and experience and
|
||
cannot address all of the items you list. In fact, the staff (me)
|
||
hasn't even heard of some of the things you mention -- for
|
||
instance, to us Shamrock is an oil company, and TEXTA rings no
|
||
bells at all. Further, we have no knowledge of Soviet comsec,
|
||
and, if we did, we certainly would not expound on it in a general
|
||
circulation letter.
|
||
|
||
We will be discoursing on frequency hopping and other spread
|
||
spectrum types, and encryption/decryption will be a favorite
|
||
topic. You confuse us somewhat with the way that you use the
|
||
words relating to codes and ciphers. It is our understanding
|
||
that the words mean entirely different things, and we will be
|
||
explaining our understanding of the differences for those in our
|
||
readership who might be interested.
|
||
|
||
For decryption theory, we recommend Cryptologia; that topic
|
||
is far too specialized for our audience.
|
||
|
||
From this vantage point, advertising in the CSA organ would
|
||
seem to be a good idea. More revenue could mean a decrease in
|
||
dues; or, more likely, an increase in services.
|
||
|
||
So there you have it, Al. I hope you will decide to join the
|
||
new organization and help it get started.
|
||
|
||
As for your request for a free sample of the new
|
||
publication, please try to understand that I've been creating and
|
||
mailing a newsletter each month for a year without charge, while
|
||
trying to keep a business going, run seminars all over the
|
||
country, testify as an expert in federal and state courts, design
|
||
TSCM equipment, start a manufacturing business, start a new
|
||
association, and keep up with the work associated with a house in
|
||
the country with two acres to maintain, etc. My answer to you
|
||
must be the same as the madam gave the pentagon colonel who
|
||
thought "fly before buy" was an accepted way of doing business.
|
||
I'm sure you know what she told him, and I hope you're not
|
||
offended by my refusal of your request to sample the merchandise
|
||
before you make a $50 decision.
|
||
|
||
Sincerely,
|
||
Jim Ross"
|
||
|
||
|
||
December, 1984
|
||
|
||
OUR THANKS
|
||
Because this is the last COMSEC LETTER that will go to the
|
||
full mailing list, we think this is the best place to give credit
|
||
to our proofreader, and our stuffer and mailer -- there wouldn't
|
||
have been a COMSEC LETTER without you. From Jim Ross (the elder)
|
||
to Lynne Ross and Marilyn Roseberry: Thanks.
|
||
|
||
SEASON'S GREETINGS
|
||
No time for cards this year, so we send our greetings via
|
||
this letter. To all of our nice readers (and the mean ones too):
|
||
a late but sincere, "Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!"
|
||
|
||
.... LAST ISSUE .... UNLESS ....
|
||
This is your last issue of COMSEC LETTER unless you have
|
||
joined CSA, or we receive your subscription order. Membership
|
||
packets for CSA will go out during January, but if you're already
|
||
convinced, send $50 (to CSA c/o Ross Engineering) for your
|
||
individual dues for 1985. (Dues for corporations and other
|
||
special categories have not yet been set.)
|
||
|
||
RATES
|
||
We recognize that this letter has been going to many, many
|
||
people who probably have only a passing interest in the subject
|
||
matter, and we hope that it has been of value. However, there is
|
||
an old engineering design (and business!) principle which says:
|
||
"There ain't no such thing as a free lunch." ... We must derive
|
||
some revenue from the time spent in this effort, and therefore,
|
||
in the future it will only be available by subscription.
|
||
|
||
This letter is aimed at an audience which consists primarily
|
||
of security practitioners and investigators who are involved in
|
||
protection of information -- data, telephone, teletype, whatever.
|
||
We believe that the people we are thinking about could realize a
|
||
return of hundreds or thousands of times the annual subscription
|
||
cost of $25 if one idea, one product, one technique or one caveat
|
||
rings a bell and proves useful. It has happened before.
|
||
|
||
MORE ON KANSAS SUPREME COURT DECISION
|
||
Open letter to the Kansas Supreme Court Jurists:
|
||
|
||
"Apparently you assumed that because some of the sellers of
|
||
cordless telephones have privacy warnings in their user's
|
||
manuals, all users of all cordless telephones have no expectation
|
||
of privacy (18 USC 2510) because they have been warned.
|
||
|
||
"We just read all the way through a user's manual from
|
||
General Electric and it doesn't mention anything about privacy.
|
||
|
||
"Further, we wonder about your understanding of the real, as
|
||
opposed to theoretical, world. Would that you had at some time
|
||
in your experience tried your hands at teaching! Your assumption
|
||
that what is printed is read, and that what is read is
|
||
understood, and that what is understood is retained, and that
|
||
what is retained is used in making conscious decisions relating
|
||
to everyday occurrences, is patently absurd. Even in the
|
||
classroom, where both professor and student are desirous of
|
||
transferring as much information as possible, experience teaches
|
||
that what you have assumed just is not real.
|
||
"How can you, in good conscience, hold a person responsible
|
||
for understanding, and abiding by, the contents of an instruction
|
||
book which he may never have seen, when you yourselves, with
|
||
research staff and practically unlimited time to make a decision
|
||
in the quiet of chambers with no distractions, didn't even bother
|
||
to determine the meaning of the simple, but key, word, "oral"?!
|
||
|
||
"For a practical lesson in whether cordless phone users
|
||
think that they have an expectation of privacy, we urge you to
|
||
get a scanner and tune to cordless telephone frequencies. -- Sad
|
||
but true: people think that telephone communications are secure.
|
||
The stuff they say will convince you that they think that their
|
||
conversation is private. The fact that their expectation of
|
||
privacy is due to abject ignorance does not alter the fact that
|
||
they are conducting themselves as though they were having a
|
||
private conversation.
|
||
|
||
"When you walk down the street, do you think your
|
||
conversation is private? When you lean over the table in a
|
||
restaurant to impart a juicy tidbit, do you think your
|
||
conversation is private? Most people talking on the telephone
|
||
think that their conversation is private. They have an
|
||
expectation of privacy. That expectation may be erroneous, but
|
||
they have it nevertheless."
|
||
|
||
FEEDBACK
|
||
Steve U. (he doesn't want us to reveal his name) writes:
|
||
"Your newsletter is marginally interesting; occasionally useful.
|
||
Do you intend the thing to be a gossip column for the
|
||
intelligence clique in the know? I usually have the feeling that
|
||
I am missing a phantom page each month as some things are non
|
||
sequitur."
|
||
Very Interesting. Let's consider some different thoughts
|
||
triggered by Steve's comments.
|
||
First, why does he say, "Do NOT ever (NEVER!) release my
|
||
name outside your firm for any reason without my express
|
||
permission."?
|
||
Second, thanks for saying that we are sometimes useful. We
|
||
try.
|
||
Third. Do you think that our stories about IH, Motorola,
|
||
Hertz, etc. are gossip? If so, we urge you to look back in early
|
||
letters where the editor revealed his biases relating to how
|
||
stupid use of the language imperils good communications, and also
|
||
his dislike of the fraud and near-fraud committed through lies in
|
||
some claims.
|
||
Fourth. Implying that we are some part of an intelligence
|
||
community clique is really wild. Your editor has done some work
|
||
for some of these organizations, but he has never been a part of
|
||
the intelligence community, and never been a part of any clique.
|
||
However, we know what it feels like to be on the outside of
|
||
a closed club. The Washington DC ASIS Chapter has refused to
|
||
carry any of our seminar announcements, or even to let their
|
||
members know that they could have had a no-charge trial
|
||
subscription to this letter in 1984. We first joined in 1978 so
|
||
it's not that we're new. We're in our second year of advertising
|
||
in their newsletter, so we're not unknown to them. They do carry
|
||
releases for other folks, so it's not a blanket policy to keep
|
||
the membership in the dark. (They even ran one that was phoned
|
||
in announcing demonstrations of a manufacturer's product!) Tell
|
||
us about cliques -- but don't accuse us of being a part of one!
|
||
Now, as to phantom pages and non sequiturs, we are really at
|
||
a loss to figure out what you mean. Our most dangerous
|
||
assumption might be that we see the letter as a continuum, and
|
||
assume that previous issues have been read. Other than that, we
|
||
assume little knowledge of electronic communications theory, but
|
||
we do assume some reasonable level of intelligence and
|
||
experience. Also, there are times when we address a comment to
|
||
an individual -- there is nothing sinister in that; it's merely
|
||
an old professor's ploy to try to keep everyone awake and
|
||
listening. However, as for any non sequitur: you find it, and
|
||
we'll eat it.
|
||
|
||
A GOOD QUESTION FROM A MYSTERY MAN
|
||
His business doesn't have a phone and he doesn't have a
|
||
phone, but he sent us a good question. He asked us to explain the
|
||
difference between COMSEC LETTER and the CSA.
|
||
OK Al (or whoever you are), here goes.
|
||
The COMSEC LETTER is a newsletter regarding information, its
|
||
storage and its transmission; and the protection thereof. It
|
||
relates to all types of information and communication -- voice,
|
||
data, teletype, facsimile, television, radio, microwave, or
|
||
whatever. Even data in storage is of interest.
|
||
The Communications Security Association is a non-profit
|
||
membership association incorporated in the District of Columbia
|
||
for which COMSEC LETTER is a benefit of membership.
|
||
|
||
|
||
COMING IN 1985:
|
||
|
||
STRESS DETECTION
|
||
At least one person misunderstood one of our points in our
|
||
segment on lie detection, so we'll try again in a future issue.
|
||
|
||
Q & A
|
||
To all who have written and called with questions and
|
||
comments: your letters are appreciated and you will be answered.
|
||
|
||
YOGO
|
||
We got some great answers in our YOGO contest. Details in
|
||
'85.
|
||
|
||
CN/A
|
||
For John Nakic and others who have inquired: We are
|
||
preparing a short report on the CN/A system. It will explain the
|
||
system, and include the latest numbers that we have. Price will
|
||
be nominal.
|
||
|
||
CONTENT
|
||
|
||
Starting in January, 1985 the COMSEC LETTER will become an
|
||
organ of the Communications Security Association. It will no
|
||
longer be a no-charge publication, prepared and distributed by
|
||
Jim Ross at his expense. Therefore, in addition to watching the
|
||
calendar, your editor will have to be careful to be totally
|
||
even-handed in announcing things like training sessions,
|
||
products, etc.
|
||
|