299 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
299 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
November 1990
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WASHINGTON, D.C.'S OPERATION "ON TARGET"
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By
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Eric W. Witzig
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Retired Detective
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Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department
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and
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George R. Wilson
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Firearms Examiner
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Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department
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By March 1989, the mound of evidence in the Firearms
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Reference Collection Room of the Metropolitan Police Department
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in Washington, D.C., was 20 feet long and waist high. This
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hoard of evidence was the result of the upward-spiraling number
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of unexamined homicide cases in the District of Columbia. (1)
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It was obvious that something had to be done to reduce this mass
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of unexamined evidence.
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Unfortunately, a reduction of personnel in the Firearms
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Identification Section exacerbated this backlog. In 1987, the
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unit had three qualified firearms examiners. A year later,
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there were only two. By spring 1989, only one examiner was on
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staff to handle all of the cases. And, even though vacancies
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were advertised, there were no applicants. This article will
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discuss how the Metropolitan Police Department dealt with this
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problem and effectively concluded many of its unexamined
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homicide cases.
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A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
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Acquiring Qualified Examiners
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One long-range answer to the department's lack of examiners
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was to double its efforts to recruit individuals to become
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trained, qualified firearms examiners. To meet this goal, five
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persons were hired and were in training by spring 1989 to become
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qualified examiners; however, none would complete their course of
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study before 1990. In addition, this option would only yield a
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gradual reduction of the backlog, considering the rate at which
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it was growing.
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Another possible solution was to hire several experienced
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examiners. This option was much more viable because if
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experienced examiners could be quickly found, the backlog could
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be reduced or even eliminated. After studying the problem, it was
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determined that 6 qualified examiners handling 30 cases per week
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could examine 360 cases in 12 weeks. But, this would mean that
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each examiner would have to complete examination of one case
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during each working day. Yet, despite the tremendous amount of
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work this would involve, the department decided to proceed with
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hiring experienced examiners.
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First, the Association of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners
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(AFTE) was contacted and asked to provide a list of available,
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qualified members. There were certain stipulations attached,
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however. Each examiner had to be:
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* Qualified as an expert witness in the court system where
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employed;
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* Free of obligations and able to work in residence with
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the program for a period of 90 days; and
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* Willing to return to the District of Columbia for
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court testimony, if necessary.
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From the list provided by the AFTE, the department selected six
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qualified examiners from across the country for the project.
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Laboratory Facilities
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Now, with an available examination staff, additional
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laboratory facilities and equipment were sought. Contact with
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the Forensic Science Research and Training Center at the FBI
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Academy in Quantico, Virginia, proved very helpful. In fact, the
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Academy's microscopic classroom held much of the same equipment
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used by firearms examiners and could be easily converted to a
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firearms laboratory.
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Therefore, arrangements were made with the FBI for the
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examiners to reside at the Academy for the duration of the 90-day
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project. The FBI would be reimbursed on a per diem basis for
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room and board. This allowed the examiners to remain close to
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their workplace, eliminated commuting time, and enhanced
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camaraderie. The net result was an increase in effective working
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time from 8 hours to between 10 and 12 hours per day.
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Funding
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Another hurdle was funding. A proposed budget for the
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project provided:
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* $60,000 for salaries;
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* $3,000 for travel; and
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* $10,000 for room and board.
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The only problem was that the Metropolitan Police
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Department did not have such a significant amount of money
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available. Therefore, another approach was used to fund the
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project--federally forfeited property. This money, seized
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during drug operations in the District of Columbia, was returned
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to the District on an accelerated basis. This creative approach
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solved the budgetary roadblock and paved the way for immediate
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funding of the project.
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However, since the project's examiners were from various
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States, more money would be necessary for transportation and fees
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for expert witness testimony when they were called to testify.
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To solve this problem, the U.S. Attorney for the District of
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Columbia was contacted and subsequently agreed to provide
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transportation and expert witness fees.
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Transporting Evidence
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Arrangements for the program also had to include the
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transportation of evidence. Therefore, a Metropolitan Police
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Department officer was selected to transport all evidence in a
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departmental vehicle and was responsible for maintaining a log
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detailing its chain of custody. The fact that the evidence
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officer was a sworn member of the police department also provided
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a measure of physical security for the evidence transported.
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Information Management
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A final detail of the planning included the use of a
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computer equipped with a word processing program and a data base
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management system in order to provide faster turn-around time
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for paperwork and laboratory reports. A detective from the
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homicide branch operated the computer system. This officer also
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served as a liaison between the project and the homicide branch.
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He provided details about all of the cases under examination and
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was responsible for quickly communicating significant
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examination results to investigating detectives.
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The plan was now complete. A staff of qualified firearms
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examiners had been found, laboratory space and equipment had
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been located, the project had been funded, and transportation of
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evidence and an information management system had been arranged.
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Now, all that was needed was a name for the project. Since the
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project would target a number of drug-related murders, the
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project received the moniker Operation "On-Target."
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IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN
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On June 5, 1989, phase one of the project began at the
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Forensic Science Research and Training Center in Quantico,
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Virginia. Standard laboratory procedures were observed and
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tight security was provided for the hundreds of items of
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evidence.
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Each examiner was equipped with an evidence locker, a work
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bench and hand tools, a low-power microscope, and a comparison
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microscope fitted with photographic equipment that produced
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Polaroid black and white prints. Additional equipment included a
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Unitron MP-6A measuring projector, an electronic balance, and an
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ultrasonic cleaning bath. The laboratory was also furnished with
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natural gas, a hood, and compressed air.
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Standard FBI and AFTE case number nomenclature was followed,
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but with a minor modification. Cases worked in the Metropolitan
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Police Department's Firearms Identification Section (FIS)
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received a case number, such as FIS #89-9999/GRW. This case
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number shows where and when the case was worked, the order in
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which the case was received, and the initials of the examiner.
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For this project, the case number was changed, adding the letter
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"Q" after the letters "FIS" signifying that the case was
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worked at Quantico.
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A data base program tracked the cases. In the beginning of
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the project, 360 cases were entered into the computer by the
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FISQ number and assigned to an examiner. This data base proved
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invaluable because it could automatically provide reports on the
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number of cases assigned and unassigned, to whom they were
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assigned, and when they were completed.
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During the course of the project, the examiners provided
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the following services:
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* Test firing of recovered firearms;
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* Microscopic examination of recovered bullets and
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garments;
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* Microscopic examination and photography of recovered
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cartridge cases;
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* Comparison of test-fired bullets with evidence bullets;
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* Muzzle-to-garment distance determination; and
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* Serial number restorations.
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When the examiners finished a case, they prepared
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hand-written examination reports, which were later typed in the
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Metropolitan Police Department's format. These reports were
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then proofread and corrected within 1 day.
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On August 14, 1989, the last of the assigned cases was
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examined. The frantic pace set by the examiners resulted in the
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examination of 375 firearms cases. The goal of one case per
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examiner per day had been achieved.
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The last 2 weeks of the laboratory phase were used to
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compare all of the test-fired cartridge cases and evidence
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cartridge cases recovered at homicide scenes. To accomplish
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this, black-and-white photographs were taken of the heads of all
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examined cartridge cases, and each photograph was inscribed with
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the FISQ number and grouped according to caliber. The various
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calibers were placed around the walls of the laboratory on large
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pieces of exhibit board.
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Additionally, all of the evidence cartridge cases were
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placed in labeled, clear plastic boxes, and each examiner was
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assigned a certain caliber. For 2 weeks, the examiners
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painstakingly compared all of the cartridge cases. When a
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positive comparison was made, evidence bullets from those cases
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were re-examined and compared. This effort was aided by the
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computer program that tracked the location of various items of
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evidence. For example, cases involving multiple calibers were
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easily accessed through the search feature of the word
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processing program.
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Phase two of operation began on August 28, 1989. This
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phase dealt with handling all of the paperwork for the project.
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The examination reports stored in the computer were printed.
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These reports were then formulated into the project's final
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product, the After Action Report of Operation "On-Target."
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Twenty copies of this 1,000-page report were distributed to the
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U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and to the firearms
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examiners.
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This report summarized the accomplishments of "Operation
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On-Target" as follows:
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"In ninety calendar days... the temporary unit examined
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firearms evidence in a total of three hundred seventy-five
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cases. Three hundred and sixty-two of those cases involved
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the offense of homicide." (2)
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This report also proved invaluable as cases were later prepared
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for prosecution.
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As a result of Operation "On-Target," 3,988 pieces of
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evidence were examined and 7,195 separate examinations were
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performed. And, all of the 375 cases were cross-checked against
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10,640 pieces of test fire evidence.
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CONCLUSION
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Operation "On-Target" proved that by using innovative
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management techniques, seemingly insurmountable problems can be
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solved. "Operation On-Target" also showed that:
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* Federal and local governments can, indeed, work together
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to help solve acute local law enforcement problems;
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* Creative funding through asset forfeiture can cover the
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out-of-budget expenses associated with drug related
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special projects; and
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* Even lack of personnel in critical areas of expertise,
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such as firearms examination, can be solved by hiring on
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a temporary basis, full-time experts in the field.
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Any State or local jurisdiction can replicate this project
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where there exists a backlog of unexamined firearms evidence. In
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an open letter to the participants of Operation "On Target,"
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the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department wrote:
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"Operation 'On Target' is the type of innovative
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program that targeted a specific problem in law
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enforcement, proposed a valid and workable solution,
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and then brought the solution to life. This program
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is a model for all law enforcement agencies...." (3)
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) Two hundred twenty-seven homicides were recorded in
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1987; 372 occurred in 1988. A monthly record of 52 homicides
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were recorded in January 1989; 1989's total was 436.
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(2) The After Action Report of Operation ``On Target,''
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Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., 1989.
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(3) Isaac Fulwood, Jr., Metropolitan Police Department,
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Washington, D.C., October 2, 1989.
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