576 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
576 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
March 1991
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EMERGENCY SEARCHES OF EFFECTS
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By
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John Gales Sauls
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Special Agent and Legal Instructor
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FBI Academy
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Quantico, Virginia
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A police department receives an anonymous tip that a bomb
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is concealed in a package addressed to a foreign embassy located
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in its jurisdiction. The package has been sent via a package
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delivery service. The police contact the delivery service,
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which has five packages addressed to the embassy. The police
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converge on the delivery service, immediately subject each
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package to X-ray examination, and seize one package that appears
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to contain explosives. This package is then taken to a safe
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disposal area, where it is opened, and the explosive device is
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disarmed. No warrant is obtained for the X-ray examination, the
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seizure, or the search performed when the package is opened.
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Other officers of the department receive a tip that a
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package arriving by bus contains a large quantity of cocaine.
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The tipster provides a description of the package, including the
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name of the addressee. Officers locate the package at the bus
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station and detain it for several minutes until a trained drug
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detection dog is able to sniff it. (1) The dog alerts, and the
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police maintain a surveillance until a man comes to claim the
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package. The man is held while the police open the package,
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discovering the cocaine. The man is then arrested. No warrant
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was obtained for the search of the package or the man's arrest.
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In each of these situations, officers have made on-the-spot
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decisions to conduct searches and seizures without warrants. In
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the prosecutions that follow, the defendants will likely
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challenge the admissibility of the seized evidence, claiming it
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was obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.
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Because the searches and seizures were performed without
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warrants, the burden of establishing their legality will rest
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upon the government. (2)
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What emergency circumstances justify an officer searching
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or seizing, without a warrant, items of personal property
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effects? (3) This article seeks to answer that crucial question
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through an exploration of the "emergency" or "exigent
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circumstances" exception to the fourth amendment warrant
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requirement. (4)
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Courts commonly recognize three threats as providing
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justification for emergency warrantless action--danger to life,
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danger of escape, and danger of destruction or removal of
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evidence. The presence of any one of these threats may provide
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justification for a warrantless search or seizure of personal
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property. There are different legal standards for emergency
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action based upon danger to life and that involving the danger
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of escape or destruction of evidence. Awareness of the type of
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emergency present in a particular situation is the key to
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correct on-the-spot decisions.
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This article will first examine U.S. Supreme Court and
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lower court decisions considering the legality of warrantless
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searches of effects based upon suspected threats to life. It
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will focus on the legal standard for such emergency searches and
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the circumstances courts commonly deem sufficient for
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establishing a threat to life and the allowable scope of action
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for dealing with that threat. The article will then examine
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cases involving warrantless searches of effects based upon
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emergency threats of destruction or removal of evidence.
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THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DEFINED
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The fourth amendment protects persons in the United States
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from "unreasonable" searches or seizures of their effects. (5)
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in determining what government
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intrusions are reasonable under the fourth amendment, has
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expressed an emphatic preference for searches and seizures made
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pursuant to judicially issued warrants. (6) As the Court has
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stated, the "Constitution requires that the deliberate,
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impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between
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the citizen and the police... [and] searches conducted outside
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the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
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magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
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subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated
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exceptions." (7)
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In most situations then, a "reasonable" search or seizure
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is one performed with a valid warrant. Consequently, for fourth
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amendment purposes, "reasonable" is a legal term with a
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meaning different from that attached to the word as it is
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commonly used. There are exceptions to the warrant
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requirement--"reasonable" warrantless searches and seizures--
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but these exceptions are created not by what a police officer
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might believe to be reasonable but by a court's assessment of
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necessity. The "exceptions are `jealously and carefully
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drawn,' and there must be `a showing by those who seek exemption
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[from the warrant requirement]...that the exigencies of the
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situation made that course imperative' "(citations omitted).
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(8) The Court has recognized the need to provide for emergency
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situations "...where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant,
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such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or
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destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse
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to a neutral magistrate," (9) but the government bears the
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burden of showing the warrantless action was necessary. (10)
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DANGER TO LIFE EMERGENCY
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Because of the high value our society places on life, a
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circumstance that has a profound impact on the reasonableness of
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a warrantless search or seizure is whether such action is taken
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to neutralize a suspected threat to human life. The U.S.
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Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
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require police officers to delay in the course of an
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investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or
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the lives of others." (11) In fact, the Court has approved a
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lower standard of proof--reasonable suspicion--for justifying
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warrantless searches based upon a perceived danger to life, so
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long as the action taken is no greater than necessary to
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eliminate the danger. (12) Therefore, where a warrantless search
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or seizure is made in response to a perceived threat to life,
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the government must be prepared to show that at the time of the
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action: 1) Facts were known that would cause a reasonable
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person to suspect that prompt action was necessary to protect
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human life; and 2) that the action taken was no more intrusive
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than necessary to eliminate the suspected threat.
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Suspected Presence of Dangerous Instrumentalities
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In Michigan v. Long, (13) two officers patrolling a country
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road late at night saw a car being driven erratically and at
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excessive speed. Before they could stop the car, it turned onto
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a side road and swerved into a ditch. (14) Mr. Long, the sole
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occupant of the car, met the officers at its rear. The driver's
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door was left open. After two requests, Long produced his
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driver's license, and after a second request for the vehicle's
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registration, he started walking toward the open driver's door.
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The officers followed, and before Long could enter the car, they
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saw a large hunting knife on the car's floorboard. Now
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suspecting that Long might have weapons on his person, the
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officers stopped him and performed a patdown search. (15) This
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search revealed no weapons. Suspecting that there might be
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other weapons in the car, one officer shined his flashlight into
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the interior, saw a pouch protruding from beneath the center
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armrest, and entered the car and raised the armrest to examine
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it. The pouch was open and contained marijuana. This discovery
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prompted Long's arrest.
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In assessing the reasonableness of this warrantless entry
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and limited search of Long's car, the Supreme Court approved the
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officers' actions, noting both the factual justification for
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suspecting the presence of weapons and the circumscribed nature
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of their search. (16) The Court held that where officers
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reasonably suspect the presence of readily accessible deadly
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weapons in a lawfully stopped vehicle, they may make a limited
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search of the vehicle's interior for the purpose of locating and
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controlling the weapons. (17) In performing such a search,
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officers must restrict their examination to those places where
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readily accessible weapons might be concealed. (18)
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The officers in Long were able to protect themselves and
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the public with a cursory search of the car's interior.
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Different facts will support a search with a broader scope. For
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example, in Cady v. Dombrowski, (19) the Supreme Court assessed
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the legality of a search of the trunk of an arrestee's car that
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had been impounded and stored at an unsecured private lot. The
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car's owner was arrested for murder, and after the car had been
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towed from the arrest scene, the police learned facts causing
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them to suspect that a handgun might be in the car. Officers
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went to the private lot where the car was located and found a
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revolver (which was later determined to be the murder weapon) in
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the car's trunk. In approving the reasonableness of this
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warrantless search, the Court cited its "...concern for the
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safety of the general public who might be endangered if an
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intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the [unsecured,
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unattended] vehicle." (20)
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The interior of a suitcase, (21) briefcase, (22) handbag,
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(23) or package suspected to contain a dangerous instrumentality
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may also be searched without a warrant where necessary to
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protect persons. For example, in United States v. Sarkissian,
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(24) officers had reason to believe that explosives were
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concealed in luggage arriving on a commercial airline flight.
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Suitcases unloaded from the plane were sniffed by a dog trained
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in detecting explosives and examined by X-ray. A suitcase,
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appearing on X-ray to contain explosives, was opened and
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searched. These warrantless actions were held reasonable based
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upon the peril posed by unsecured explosives.
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In United States v. Miller, (25) a limited search of the
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interior of a purse was approved as a reasonable protective
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measure. On a day Miller's husband was to be arraigned for a
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felony, she entered the courtroom with a coat draped over her
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arm concealing a large handbag. She sat near the rear of the
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courtroom along the center aisle, where her husband, who was in
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custody, would soon be walking. She rested her hand upon her
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partly opened bag. A marshall, aware of these facts and having
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been informed that a report had been received that Miller's
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husband might attempt an escape, opened Miller's bag further,
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locating a firearm. In holding the marshall's actions
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reasonable under the fourth amendment, the court noted that,
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coupled with the report that an escape might occur,
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"...Miller's concealment of her handbag upon entry, the
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strategic seat she selected, and the convenient placement of her
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open bag made reasonable the belief that she might be armed." (26)
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Suspected Presence of Information Crucial to Preserving Life
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Officers occasionally are confronted with facts that cause
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them to reasonably suspect that information necessary to
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preserve the life of a person is contained in an effect. For
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example, in United States v. Dunavan, (27) officers responded to
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a report of a disabled car that had set the grass beneath it on
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fire. In the driver's seat, they found Dunavan, who was
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"foaming at the mouth and unable to talk." (28) Dunavan was
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rushed to the hospital, and the officers then sought to
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determine the cause of his malady in the hope of providing
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information that would aid in his treatment. In the course of
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this effort, they opened two briefcases belonging to Dunavan,
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revealing evidence of crime. This action was held to be a
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reasonably limited search responsive to the emergency at hand.
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DANGER OF DESTRUCTION OR REMOVAL OF EVIDENCE EMERGENCY
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In addition to danger to life, the U.S. Supreme Court has
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also recognized the danger of destruction or removal of evidence
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as embodying exigent circumstances sufficient to justify
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warrantless action. (29) In regard to effects, the action
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permissible to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence is
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substantially less than that allowed to protect life.
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Generally, only a warrantless seizure of an effect will be
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allowed to preserve evidence, not a warrantless search of the
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effect's contents.
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The factual justification required to support a warrantless
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seizure of an effect to prevent the destruction or removal of
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evidence depends on the extent of control exercised by the
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government over the item. The Supreme Court has recognized two
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distinct types of seizures of effects: 1) Temporary detention,
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which requires a showing of reasonable suspicion to believe the
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item contains evidence or contraband; and 2) a more absolute
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seizure, which must be justified through a showing of probable
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cause to search the interior of the item for evidence or
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contraband.
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Temporary Detention of Effects
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In United States v. Place, (30) the Supreme Court approved
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temporary detention by the police of luggage reasonably
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suspected (31) to contain illegal drugs. Place was an airline
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traveler who aroused the suspicion of police based upon his
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appearance, travel itinerary, and conduct. Officers took
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Place's two suitcases from him, stating that they would seek a
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search warrant for the bags. They then transported the
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suitcases from New York's La Guardia Airport to Kennedy Airport,
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where they were sniffed by a trained drug detection dog 90
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minutes after the seizure. Although the Court approved the
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initial seizure of Place's suitcases, it held the seizure
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ultimately involved too great an interference in Place's
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possessory interest in his property to be reasonable. Citing
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the length of time of the seizure as unnecessarily long, the
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Court also noted "...the failure of the agents to accurately
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inform [Place] of the place to which they were transporting his
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luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of
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what arrangements would be made for the return of the luggage if
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the investigation dispelled the suspicion." (32) This holding
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is premised, in part, on the fact that luggage frequently
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contains necessities to which travelers need ready access. Less
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lengthy temporary seizures of luggage have been upheld as
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reasonable. (33)
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Other types of effects may be detained for greater periods
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of time without the seizure becoming unreasonable. For example,
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in United States v. Van Leeuwen, (34) the Supreme Court upheld as
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reasonable a detention of a mailed package that lasted several
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hours. In United States v. LaFrance, (35) a 4-hour detention of a
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package shipped via Federal Express was approved. These
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decisions are founded on the premise that the sender or
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addressee of a package shipped or mailed has a substantially
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reduced expectation of ready access to that item. (36)
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Probable Cause Seizures
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The goal of a temporary detention of an effect is the
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development of facts amounting to probable cause to search that
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item. This is accomplished through investigation performed
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during the period of temporary detention, and in drug cases,
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frequently includes the use of drug detection dogs. Once
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probable cause to search has been established, a more absolute
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seizure becomes reasonable. (37) Officers may take control of
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the effect to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence for
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a reasonable period while application is made for a search
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warrant. (38) This allows them to protect the evidence until
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judicial authorization may be obtained to open the item and
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examine its contents.
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SUMMARY
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Returning to the hypothetical situations presented at the
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beginning of this article, in each case, the officers were
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confronted with circumstances they believed required an
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immediate search. The officers who reasonably suspected that a
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bomb was present in a package bound for an embassy needed to
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verify or dispel the suspicion as quickly as possible to prevent
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unnecessary danger to life. The warrantless actions they
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performed--the X-ray examinations followed by the opening of the
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package that appeared to contain explosives--were appropriate
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based upon reasonable suspicion and were reasonably limited to
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accomplish their purpose, that is, eliminating the threat posed
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by the explosives.
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The officers investigating the suspected drug activity were
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also justified in performing certain prompt warrantless actions.
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Their initial seizure was lawful, based upon their reasonable
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suspicion that the package contained illegal drugs. The canine
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sniff was also lawful, since it was promptly accomplished.
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However, once probable cause to search was established, the
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emergency threat of removal or destruction of evidence could
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have been eliminated merely by taking control of the package
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pending issuance of a search warrant. Consequently, the
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examination of the contents of the package without a warrant was
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not a valid emergency search. (39)
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CONCLUSION
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This article has set out requirements for emergency
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searches and seizures of effects based upon: (1) Threats to
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life; and (2) threats of destruction of evidence. Because the
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scope of warrantless action allowed under the fourth amendment
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differs depending upon the category of emergency threat
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involved, it is essential that officers considering the
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lawfulness of a proposed emergency search evaluate the type of
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threat presented. Once that determination is made, the
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appropriate legal standard may be applied to the facts known.
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Where warrantless searches and seizures are necessary, clear
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awareness of the type and nature of the threat involved will
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also facilitate limitation of the scope of the warrantless
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action to only that which is necessary to eliminate the threat.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) For an excellent discussion of the legal issues
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associated with the use of drug detection dogs, see Kingston,
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"Hounding Drug Traffickers: The Use of Drug Detection Dogs,"
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FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, August 1989, pp. 26-32.
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(2) McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Katz v.
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United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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(3) The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
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"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
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papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
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shall not be violated...." Effects include such personal
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property as packages, suitcases, handbags, etc., as well as
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vehicles.
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(4) For a discussion of emergency searches of premises, see
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Sauls, "Emergency Searches of Premises," FBI Law Enforcement
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Bulletin, Part I, March 1987, pp. 23-30, Conclusion, April 1987,
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pp. 24-30. For a discussion of emergency searches of persons,
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see Sauls, "Emergency Searches of Persons," FBI Law Enforcement
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Bulletin, January 1988, pp. 24-30.
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(5) See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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(6) See Katz v. United States, supra note 2.
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(7) Id. at 357.
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(8) Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971).
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(9) Supra note 5, at 759.
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(10) Supra note 2.
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(11) Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
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(12) Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990); Michigan v.
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Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide whether reasonable
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suspicion is the standard by which the reasonableness of all
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danger to life emergency searches should be measured. The Court
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has stated, however, that probable cause is not always the
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standard by which the legality of a search should be measured,
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even where the search constitutes a substantial intrusion into a
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person's privacy. See New Jersey v. T. L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
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340-41 (1984).
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(13) 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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(14) For a discussion of the legal issues associated with
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vehicle stops, see Sauls, "Traffic Stops: Police Powers Under
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the Fourth Amendment," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Part I,
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September 1989, pp. 26-31; Conclusion, October 1989, pp. 27-32.
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(15) For an excellent discussion of investigative detention
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and frisk searches, see Hall, "Investigative Detention: An
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Intermediate Response," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Part I,
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November 1985, pp. 25-31; Part II, December 1985, pp. 18-23;
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Conclusion, January 1986, pp. 23-29.
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(16) Supra note 13, at 1051.
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(17) Id.
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(18) Id. The scope of such a search includes the interior of
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unlocked containers that might conceal deadly weapons. See
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United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
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denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980) (purse in suspected bank robber's
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car that was suspected to contain a bomb); United States v.
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Glenna, 878 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1989) (suitcase in van suspected
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to contain a bomb); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411 (7th
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Cir. 1985) (purse in car suspected to contain deadly weapons);
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United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
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(tactile examination of exterior of paper bag in car suspected to
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contain deadly weapons).
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(19) 413 U.S. 433 (1972).
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(20) Id. at 447.
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(21) United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
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See also, United States v. Pulido-Baguerizo, 800 F.2d 899 (9th
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Cir. 1986).
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(22) United States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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McClinnhan is noteworthy for its discussion of the dilemma faced
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by an officer who has reasonable suspicion that a dangerous
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instrumentality is contained in an effect, but who has no way of
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verifying or dispelling his suspicions other than an examination
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of the interior of the effect. Seizing the effect will not
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neutralize the dangerous instrumentality, and no warrant can be
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obtained since the suspicions do not rise to the level of
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probable cause to search. Consequently, a prompt examination of
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the effect's interior is the least intrusive measure to
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neutralize the threat.
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(23) United States v. Miller, 468 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1972),
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cert. denied, 410 U.S. 935 (1972).
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(24) Supra note 21.
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(25) Supra note 23.
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(26) Id. at 1045.
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(27) 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973).
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(28) Id. at 202.
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(29) See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Vale v.
|
||
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
|
||
|
||
(30) 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
|
||
|
||
(31) For examples of facts held to constitute reasonable
|
||
suspicion that contraband is present, see United States v.
|
||
Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989); United States v. Sharpe, 105
|
||
S.Ct. 1568 (1985).
|
||
|
||
(32) Supra note 30, at 710.
|
||
|
||
(33) See, e.g., United States v. Pantazis, 816 F.2d 361 (8th
|
||
Cir. 1987); United States v. Alpert, 816 F.2d 958 (4th Cir.
|
||
1987).
|
||
|
||
(34) 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
|
||
|
||
(35) 879 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
|
||
|
||
(36) See also, United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692 (9th
|
||
Cir. 1984), approving a 9-hour warrantless seizure of a mailed
|
||
package.
|
||
|
||
(37) United States v. Place, supra note 30.
|
||
|
||
(38) Although considerable latitude is generally allowed, at
|
||
least some diligence in promptly applying for a search warrant is
|
||
required. See United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d. 414 (9th Cir.
|
||
1988).
|
||
|
||
(39) Since the officers have acted without a warrant, as a
|
||
practical matter, the officers and their prosecutor should
|
||
consider the potential application of other exceptions to the
|
||
warrant requirement, such as Search Incident to Arrest. These
|
||
considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
|
||
|
||
|
||
_______________
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction
|
||
who are interested in this article should consult their legal
|
||
adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal
|
||
constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law
|
||
or are not permitted at all.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
LEGAL BRIEF
|
||
MINNICK V. MISSISSIPPI
|
||
U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION
|
||
|
||
On December 3, 1990, in Minnick v. Mississippi, the Supreme
|
||
Court established a new rule concerning the interview of
|
||
in-custody suspects who have asserted the right to consult with
|
||
counsel. In a 6-2 ruling (Justice Souter not participating), the
|
||
Court held that "when counsel is requested, interrogation must
|
||
cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without
|
||
counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with
|
||
his attorney."
|
||
|
||
Minnick and a companion escaped from a county jail in
|
||
Mississippi and committed a house burglary looking for weapons.
|
||
They were surprised by the arrival of the occupants of the house
|
||
and murdered two of them. Minnick fled and was ultimately
|
||
apprehended in California 4 months after the murders. FBI Agents
|
||
sought to interview Minnick in jail in California. Minnick was
|
||
advised of his Miranda rights, and though he refused to sign a
|
||
written waiver, agreed to answer some questions. During the
|
||
interview, Minnick told the Agents he would make a full
|
||
statement in a few days when his lawyer was present. The Agents
|
||
then terminated the interview. Three days later, an investigator
|
||
for the State of Mississippi sought to interview Minnick in
|
||
California. Again, Minnick declined to sign a written waiver of
|
||
his Miranda rights, but agreed to talk with the investigator.
|
||
Statements given to the investigator led to Minnick's prosecution
|
||
and conviction for murder.
|
||
|
||
Minnick challenged the admissibility of his statements,
|
||
claiming that his invocation of his right to counsel to the FBI
|
||
Agents precluded his subsequent waiver of rights given to the
|
||
Mississippi investigator, even though he had consulted with his
|
||
court-appointed counsel on two or three occasions in the
|
||
interim. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Minnick ruled that
|
||
once a suspect has consulted with his attorney, the suspect may
|
||
thereafter be contacted, waive his rights, and be interviewed by
|
||
the police.
|
||
|
||
In reversing the Mississippi Supreme Court, the U.S.
|
||
Supreme Court established a bright-line rule barring
|
||
police-initiated interviews following an invocation of the right
|
||
to counsel by an in-custody suspect. The Court ruled the actual
|
||
presence of counsel is necessary before police-initiated
|
||
interrogation may resume and that a bright-line rule prohibiting
|
||
reinterrogation of a suspect who has requested counsel without
|
||
the presence of his attorney would best protect the fifth
|
||
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, a
|
||
bright-line rule approach saves judicial resources otherwise
|
||
expended in making determinations of voluntariness and provides
|
||
specificity for police, prosecutors, and suspects as to
|
||
acceptable police practice.
|
||
|
||
The Court's rule announced in Minnick does not disturb the
|
||
previous holding that if a suspect initiates the dialogue with
|
||
the police, a valid waiver and confession may follow. Minnick
|
||
specifically recognizes that courts may still find a "a waiver
|
||
of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested,
|
||
provided the accused has initiated the conversation or
|
||
discussions with the authorities."
|
||
|
||
Minnick is a significant change in the law of confessions
|
||
and interrogations. Police officers should be aware of this
|
||
expansion of the right to counsel in custodial interrogations
|
||
and the need to ensure the presence of an attorney if
|
||
police-initiated reinterrogation is desired after an initial
|
||
invocation of the right.
|
||
|
||
_______________
|
||
|
||
This legal brief was written by Special Agent Jeffrey
|
||
Higginbotham, a legal instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico,
|
||
Virginia.
|
||
|