369 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
369 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
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PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT/PRIVATE SECURITY:
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A NEW PARTNERSHIP?
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By
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Terrence J. Mangan
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and
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Michael G. Shanahan
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As the industrialized nations of the modern world move
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deeper into a cultural/technological metamorphosis that has come
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to be known as ``the information society,'' institutions are
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being inevitably and significantly affected by the
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transformation. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field
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of law enforcement.
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Since the late 1960s, American law enforcement has passed
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through major changes that are not only healthy but also
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irreversible. Changes over the past two decades, besides leading
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to dramatically higher salaries and benefits for law enforcement
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personnel, have produced law enforcement agency accreditation
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standards, the use of highly sophisticated technology, and
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probably most important of all, an air of professionalism. This
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professionalism is especially visible in the area of policy
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setting.
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Gone is the stereotype that police are the guarantors of the
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socioeconomic status quo. Today, the police are recognized as
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being artful practitioners on the leading edge of major social
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issues. As such, police are in the front-line delivery of public
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services associated with the mentally ill, the homeless, abused
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children, battered spouses, and victims of racial and religious
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intolerance.
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EVOLVING ISSUES
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Through this law enforcement metamorphosis, it is important
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to remember a basic premise of organizational ecology:
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Organizations are dependent upon and affected by changes and
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evolutions in other organizations in their immediate environment
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or sphere of influence. This is the case with law enforcement
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where private security has emerged as a major player in the
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safeguarding of Americans and their property.
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In the area of resources alone, the growth of private
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security has expanded from what was estimated in 1969 as less
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than 300,000 employees in an industry whose national product in
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the United States was calculated at $2.5 million (1) to an industry
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which has grown to an estimated $18 billion employing close to 2
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million people. This is twice the size of public law
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enforcement. Moreover, according to a 1984 survey of the
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National Institute of Justice, public law enforcement resources
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have remained relatively flat, with a significant percentage of
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law enforcement agencies showing an effective decline in
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personnel, despite growth rates in population and crime. (2)
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A number of complex and evolving related trends may be
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contributing factors in the explanation for the phenomenal growth
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of private security at a time when public law enforcement growth
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has stagnated. Such trends as taxpayer revolts, automation,
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transferral of functions, stagnant economic growth, terrorism,
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inner-city problems, financing of local services, and
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immigration/emigration readily come to mind. Regardless of the
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possible reasons, the fact remains that private security will
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continue to have an impact upon and implications for society, in
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general, and public law enforcement, in particular.
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Ironically, the emergence of the private security industry
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that now numerically and financially far exceeds its public
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counterpart occurred without much influence from or interaction
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with public police. In fact, until recently, there was a mixture
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of disdain and concern that the emergence of private security was
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threatening the professionalism of policing. Many officials
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complained that the absence of adequate private security
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standards was allowing the proponents of private security to
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confuse the citizenry that ``rent-a-cops'' were a better bargain
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than protective services provided through public law enforcement.
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Police have traditionally viewed private security employees
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as inadequately trained and ill-paid individuals who could not
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find other work but were nevertheless allowed to carry a gun.
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Furthermore, because these individuals looked and acted like
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police, there was alarm that the private security industry might
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even usurp important aspects of public law enforcement and erode
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key citizen contacts that bond police officer and citizen in a
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common alliance. Those fears have not been realized; however,
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this unfortunately widespread view, early on, did much to stifle
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potentially mutual and beneficial relationships between law
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enforcement and private security.
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While the 1960s were characterized as a period of
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indifference toward private security, and the 1970s as one of
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changing perceptions and some mistrust of the industry, the 1980s
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and 1990s will most likely be regarded as the era of
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collaboration and joint ventures between public law enforcement
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and private security. This is necessitated by the fact that
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individual and corporate citizens who are policed by public law
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enforcement are also increasingly becoming the clients of private
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security.
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SCOPE OF PRIVATE SECURITY DUTIES
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As pointed out in the 1984 results of a 30-month
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descriptive and exploratory research project of the private
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security industry, the scope of private security is constantly
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changing and goes far beyond the more traditional areas of
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``turf'' of local law enforcement agencies. (3) Proprietary or
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corporate security encompasses such sophisticated and diverse
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concerns as assets protection, loss prevention, countermeasures
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for industrial espionage, drug testing in the work environment,
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extortion, product tampering, dignitary and facility protection,
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and communications security, to name a few examples.
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Contract or private security companies also provide guard
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and patrol services to business, industry and residential areas;
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develop, sell, lease, and monitor simple to sophisticated
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communications and alarms systems; provide investigative,
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intelligence, and bodyguard equipment and services among other
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services. Additionally, a significant amount of the
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investigations involving credit card theft and fraud, check
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cases, shoplifting, embezzlement, employee theft, computer
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hacking, and other criminal enterprises are carried out by
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private security. This ``de-policing'' trend has necessitated
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new efforts in cooperation between public and private entities,
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as well as the growth of new respect and understanding on the
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part of both.
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COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
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Evidence of this collaboration and cooperation between
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public law enforcement and private security is increasingly
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evident. On two occasions, public law enforcement/private
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security ``summits'' have been held in the northwestern United
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States, where the Boards of the American Society for Industrial
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Security (ASIS), the State Associations of Chiefs of Police
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(SACOP), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and heads of
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Federal, State, and local agencies met on a common agenda with
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legislators, academics, and other key players. Moreover, joint
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committees have been formed by IACP and ASIS to address common
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law enforcement protocols and guidelines. In many of these
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endeavors, leadership and coordination have been offered through
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation because these law enforcement
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and corporate concerns are both national and international in
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scope.
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Another cooperative effort is occurring in Washington State
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where an organization constituted of law enforcement and
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corporate executives, including key executives from both
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proprietary and contract security organizations, has been
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successful in a number of joint endeavors. The organization
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known as the Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum is
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alternately chaired by executives from public law enforcement and
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private security. It has successfully introduced and fostered
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enactment of key legislation; established its own strategic
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planning annex, ethical protocols, and executive strategies
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projects; and has been generally a model for successful
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public-private sector efforts. Similar organizations modeled
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after this organization have been started in other States.
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Through efforts such as these, the stereotype of private
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security guards as underpaid, poorly educated, and untrained is
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joining that same, but outmoded, stereotype of police in the dust
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bin of history. Hopefully, both will be replaced by the vision
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of a growing partnership between police professionals and private
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security specialists in a highly technical and changing
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environment where the collaborative effort of both benefit the
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common good.
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A CHANGING OUTLOOK
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The progression toward a rapprochement between public law
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enforcement and private security will require work, trust,
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compromise, and resource investment of both parties before true
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partnerships materialize. Several areas involving thorny and
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fundamental value issues remain to be discussed and, hopefully,
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resolved. Paramount among these is whether the growth and
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expanding influence of private security constitute the emergence
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of a ``shadow'' criminal justice system. In other words, will
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the profit motive and loyalty to a company replace public service
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and accountability to a system of basic principles of law and
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fairness?
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Several studies have reported that the dynamics of the
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burgeoning private security system and how it interacts with and
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disposes of criminal activity have never been systematically
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explored or documented. (4) In fact, as Albert J. Reiss, Jr., of
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Yale University pointed out:
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``The large majority of private security agencies do not
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have full legal power of arrest, yet they exercise enormous
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discretion over criminal matters that occur on private property.
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Despite this, almost nothing is known from systematic inquiry
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about how these private police exercise discretion over criminal
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matters.'' (5)
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As an illustration, employee theft prosecuted in public
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court might result in a conviction and concomitant sanctions. But
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handled in a corporate venue, the theft might warrant dismissal
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and debarment from future employment within that industry, all
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without benefit of the extensive due process safeguards of the
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criminal justice system. In other instances, it might serve the
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corporate image of the ``damaged'' institution to allow quiet
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resignation and nonreporting of a crime, or conversely, criminal
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prosecution if this option is believed to be in the best business
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interests of the company.
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It remains to be seen how arbitrary decisions such as these
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will impact long-term concepts and values of the traditional
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criminal justice system. As more areas of responsibilities are
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assumed by or transferred over to the area of private security
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through a combination of realpolitik, limited public resources,
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impatience with traditional systems, and growing corporate
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influence, the demand for more examination and discussion of
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these matters will grow.
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INFORMATION EXCHANGE
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Nonetheless, cooperation between public law enforcement and
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private security must continue and, if there is one area where
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public law enforcement and private security have worked
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cooperatively for joint advantage, it has been in the area of
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collection and dissemination of records. The ability of both
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public law enforcement and private security to amass large
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amounts of personal data about people's personal histories,
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employment records, etc., poses serious liability problems during
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an era that has seen severe restrictions placed on the use and
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release of such data.
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Recently, Illinois joined a number of States that now have
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statutes authorizing the release of criminal conviction data on a
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job-related basis to corporations. Although much more work needs
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to be done in this area, having defensible model legislation
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gives impetus to other States to aggressively pursue this course
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of action. Alternatively, in many States, thanks to cooperative
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law enforcement/private security initiatives, corporations are
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simply obtaining a release from applicants, submitting a
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fingerprint card, paying an established fee, and subsequently
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receiving a criminal history from the desired police agency.
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There has been no evidence of problems with these arrangements,
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and corporations that operate in multiple States have been
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willing to adjust their procedures to conform to applicable State
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laws.
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TARGETED AREAS FOR COOPERATION
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Reassuring signs that joint efforts are possible are
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appearing with broader scope and greater frequency. As an
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example, one of the more significant protocols that has been
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developed in recent years has been joint management of
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product-tampering threat cases. The public is not well served
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when valuable time and evidence are lost because jurisdictions
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and corporations do not know their specific roles relative to
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these violations. To address this, an initiative was launched by
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the Southland Corporation, in conjunction with the IACP Private
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Sector Liaison Committee, to draft a model protocol that could be
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distributed to every State, county, and local law enforcement
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agency in America.
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For the first time, private corporations, Federal agencies
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such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the U.S.
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Department of Agriculture, and the FBI, and State and local
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agencies cooperated not only in the review of the draft protocols
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but also cooperated in adopting written directives relative to
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this issue. Since 1986, over 100,000 copies of this protocol
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have been circulated throughout the United States. They are in
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place in State police agencies, sheriffs' offices, police
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departments, as well as Federal and State law enforcement groups.
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Affected corporations are aware of the protocols, and a number of
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corporate security directors have carefully built appropriate
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procedures into their own internal operating procedures.
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Another example of emerging cooperation is in the area of
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drugs. Through the efforts of the State of Maryland and the
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chief of police for Baltimore County, a model protocol addressing
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the issue of drugs in the workplace has been circulated to law
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enforcement agencies and State chiefs associations. The purpose
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of the document is to make available to corporations, and
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especially the small business community, a straightforward
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pamphlet that has been reviewed by the Justice Department, the
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FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This initiative,
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which began in the fall of 1989, promises to be similar to the
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effort which produced the product-tampering threat protocol and
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is an instrument through which companies and units of government
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can devise a ``Drugs in the Workplace'' procedure.
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Furthermore, there are hundreds of community-based programs
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that are directly benefiting community law enforcement efforts.
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Namely, Pizza Hut spends as much as $136 million a year
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encouraging young people to improve their reading skills through
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its ``Book It Program'' organized to reduce illiteracy.
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``Operation Home Free,'' started by Trailways Bus Lines and
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continued by the Greyhound Corporation, allows juvenile runaways
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to return home at no cost. While efforts such as these are only
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tangentially associated with the public law enforcement and
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private security rapprochement, they are a harbinger of the
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commitment corporations are increasingly willing to make to help
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law enforcement and they will serve to strengthen developing
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public law enforcement and private security relationships.
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The commitment has even led to ``role reversals'' where
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public law enforcement is now learning from its private security
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counterparts. Effective business trends such as customer
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satisfaction, service orientation, subcontracting for services,
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specialization, joint ventures, and even advertising and public
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relations are being embraced by and changing the shape of public
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law enforcement in the United States. As an example of these
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role reversals, over 60 Fortune 500 companies make available
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their training programs to supervisors at the rank of sergeant
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through sheriff, chief, or superintendent. The program began
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modestly with such corporations as Unisys, General Telephone of
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California, and AT&T. Today, in 45 States, over 1,200 police
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managers annually receive tuition-free corporate training that
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would not otherwise be available through police academy budgets.
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CONCLUSION
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It is mutually incumbent upon both public law enforcement
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and private security to continue to establish and improve
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mechanisms at every level which will not only allow but
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encourage dialogue on common law enforcement concerns and
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challenges. As so aptly stated a few years ago:
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``The exchanges between the policing institution and its
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societal surroundings help assure both its change and its
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stability for the functioning of the police organizations
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must be kept somewhat in tune with the environment in
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which it operates.'' (6)
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It is hoped that the growing mutual respect and cooperation,
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as evidenced by the initiatives outlined, are laying the
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groundwork for a future of effective law enforcement in a world
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that is growing increasingly complex and more demanding. Through
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these efforts the continuing public law enforcement/private
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security rapprochement will undoubtedly succeed.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) Rand Report, 1972.
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(2) William C. Cunningham and Todd Taylor, ``A Preview of the
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Hallcrest Report: Security-Police Relationships,'' Security
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Management, June 1983.
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(3) William C. Cunningham and Todd Taylor, The Hallcrest
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Report: Private Security and Police in America (Portland:
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Chancellor Press, 1984).
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(4) Supra note 2.
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(5) Albert J. Reiss, Jr., ``Discretionary Justice,'' Handbook
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of Criminology, 1984, p. 681.
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(6) John P. Clarke and Richard Sykes, ``Determinants of Police
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Organization and Practice in a Modern Industrial Society,''
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Handbook of Criminology, 1984, p. 456.
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About the authors:
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Terrence J. Mangan is Chief of Police of the Spokane, WA
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Police Department. Co-author, Michael G. Shanahan, is
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Chief of Police, University of Washington Police Depart-
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ment, Seattle, WA.
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