1019 lines
48 KiB
Plaintext
1019 lines
48 KiB
Plaintext
FREEDOM FROM WAR
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THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM
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FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE
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DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL
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WORLD
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277
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Disarmament Series 5
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Released September 1961
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Office of Public Services
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BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
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INTRODUCTION
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The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided
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by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human
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history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting
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mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General
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Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete
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Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
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This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the
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war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of
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international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It
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sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be
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taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom
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from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles
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deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the
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disarmament field:
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First, there must be immediate disarmament action:
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A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of
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general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that
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specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.
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Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective
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international controls:
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The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and
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effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as
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agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained
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forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the
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disarmament process.
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Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:
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There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of
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national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international
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peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are
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unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of
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alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only
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be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international
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institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations
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Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.
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---------
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There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States
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Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The
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full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.
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FREEDOM FROM WAR
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THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR
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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARM-
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AMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD
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SUMMARY
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DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
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The over-all goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful
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world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and
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international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of
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law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under
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effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to
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change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United
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Nations.
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In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets
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forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should
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direct their efforts:
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The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their
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reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to
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preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace
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Force;
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The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all
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weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than
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those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining
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internal order;
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The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international
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agreements, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the
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principles of the United Nations;
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The establishment and effective operation of an International
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Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to
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insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.
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TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES
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The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a
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detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their
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efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved.
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To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at
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the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to
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progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those
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immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of
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nations and that could facilitate and form port of the total program.
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GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
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The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the
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negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:
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As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be
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progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure
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international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
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Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed,
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in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
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Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of
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time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon
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as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and
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verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the
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next stage have been made;
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Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out
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scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed
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forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the
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disarmament process; and
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Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely
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the security of any state.
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DISARMAMENT STAGES
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The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in
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three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international
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institution.
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FIRST STAGE
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The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the
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capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this
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stage would mean that:
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The nuclear threat would be reduced:
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All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the
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testing of nuclear weapons.
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The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be
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stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be
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converted to non-weapons uses.
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States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such
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weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such
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nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.
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States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt
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to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.
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A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the
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feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual
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elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
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Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:
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Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and
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weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed
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levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be
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discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.
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Arms and armed forces would be reduced:
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The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be
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limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding
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that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of
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armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be
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limited.
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An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the
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feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual
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elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.
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Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:
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The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons of mass
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destruction would be prohibited.
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States would give advance notification of space vehicle and military
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launchings.
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U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:
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Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations
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arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law,
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and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.
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An International Disarmament Organization would be established for
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effective verification of the disarmament program:
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Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.
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It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place
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and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.
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It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.
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States would be committed to measures to reduce international tension
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and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or
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surprise attack:
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States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type
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of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to
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refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
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A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any
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situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
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States would be committed to give advance notice of major military
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movements which might cause alarm, observation posts would be
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established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.
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SECOND STAGE
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The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within
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sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation
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of all measures in the second stage would mean:
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Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and
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military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons
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delivery vehicles and countering weapons;
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Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes
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under the United Nations;
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Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United
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Nations;
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Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the
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production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a
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reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
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On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of
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stocks of nuclear weapons;
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The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military
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bases and facilities wherever located; and
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The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament
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Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to
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determine the transition to Stage III.
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THIRD STAGE
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During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building
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on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the
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measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal
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of a world in which:
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States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and
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establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order;
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they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace
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Force.
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The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of
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armaments, would be fully functioning.
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The peace keeping capabilities of the United nations would be
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sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such
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arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just
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settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
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APPENDIX
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DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT
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THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR
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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA-
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MENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD
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The nations of the world,
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Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary
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development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious
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ideological differences;
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Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge
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of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create
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conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to
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fulfill their basic aspirations;
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Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of
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independent states adhering to common standards of justice and
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international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of
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law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with
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the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a
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permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective
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international control and where the resources of nations shall be
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devoted of man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;
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Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete
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disarmament in a peaceful world:
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(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of
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their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required
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of preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations
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Peace Force;
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(b) the elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including
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all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other
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than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining
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internal order;
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(c) The establishment and effective operation within the framework of
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the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all
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disarmament obligations;
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(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of
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international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the
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maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United
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Nations.
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Call on the negotiating states:
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(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan
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for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts
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without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;
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(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement
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at the earliest possible date;
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(c) Also to seek - without prejudice to progress on the disarmament
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program - agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to
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the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part
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of that program.
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Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following
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principles:
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(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is
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completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safe-guarded
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measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed
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period of time.
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(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively
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verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be
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instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that
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agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed
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forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.
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(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect
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adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an
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international agreement or treaty.
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(d) As stated relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be
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progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure
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international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as
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will as to facilitate the development of international cooperation an
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common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
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(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take
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place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been
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carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the
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arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage
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have been instituted.
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Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and
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complete disarmament:
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STAGE I
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A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:
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(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established
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within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the
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agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for
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the effective verification of the disarmament program.
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(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2)
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a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as
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permanent members as permanent members and certain other states on a
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rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the
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Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will
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have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective
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impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.
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(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken
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by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the
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states in developing the details of agreed further verification and
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disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies
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as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures
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provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as
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may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament;
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(4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification
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arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.
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B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:
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(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and
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U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for
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all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels
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will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.
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(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by
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equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by
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transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at
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specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party
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to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at
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prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or
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converted to peaceful uses.
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(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.
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(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall
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be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting
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on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction
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and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of
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their production.
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C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:
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(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the
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testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.
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(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be
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stopped.
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(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in
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weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past
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production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.
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(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful
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uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be
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developed in agreement with the IAEA.
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(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such
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weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such
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nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States
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not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt
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to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or
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receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.
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(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the
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nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of
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examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing
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the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons
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stockpiles.
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D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:
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(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories
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and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be
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reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction
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shall be accomplished in each step by transfer to depots supervised by
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the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each
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step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the
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vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be
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destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
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(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons
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delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such
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vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.
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(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery
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vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles
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shall be limited or halted.
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E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:
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(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons
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capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.
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(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and
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to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with
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the track of the vehicle.
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F. To reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise
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Attack:
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(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states
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and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as
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may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm
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and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the
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geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the
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event.
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(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as
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major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on
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concentrations and movements of military forces.
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(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection
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arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.
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(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within
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the IDO to examine and make recommendations of the possibility of
|
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further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident,
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miscalculation, or failure of communication.
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G. To Keep the Peace:
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(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to
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refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force - including
|
||
nuclear, conventional, or CBR - contrary to the principles of the U.N.
|
||
Charter.
|
||
|
||
(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and
|
||
subversion against any country.
|
||
|
||
(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful
|
||
settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further
|
||
arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and
|
||
for the codification and progressive development of international law.
|
||
|
||
(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment
|
||
in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.
|
||
|
||
(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing
|
||
cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate any situation
|
||
which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
|
||
|
||
STAGE III
|
||
|
||
A. International Disarmament Organization:
|
||
|
||
The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively
|
||
enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures
|
||
undertaken in Stage II.
|
||
|
||
B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:
|
||
|
||
(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily
|
||
significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to
|
||
agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.
|
||
|
||
(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by
|
||
equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by
|
||
transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at
|
||
specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties
|
||
have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed
|
||
levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to
|
||
peaceful uses.
|
||
|
||
(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of
|
||
armaments.
|
||
|
||
(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall
|
||
be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.
|
||
|
||
(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR
|
||
weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks
|
||
progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or
|
||
converted to peaceful uses.
|
||
|
||
C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:
|
||
|
||
Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum
|
||
levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the
|
||
nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material
|
||
shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.
|
||
|
||
D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:
|
||
|
||
Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery
|
||
vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles
|
||
shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage
|
||
I.
|
||
|
||
E. To Keep the Peace:
|
||
|
||
During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping
|
||
processes of the united Nations, to the end that the United Nations can
|
||
effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in
|
||
violation of the purposes and principles of the united Nations:
|
||
|
||
(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and
|
||
operation of the united Nations so as to assure that the United Nations
|
||
will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or
|
||
breaches of the peace.
|
||
|
||
(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively
|
||
strengthened.
|
||
|
||
(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments
|
||
in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful
|
||
settlement of disputes and differences.
|
||
|
||
STAGE III
|
||
|
||
By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through
|
||
a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful
|
||
international behavior, and the development of strengthened
|
||
international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N.
|
||
should have reached a point where the states of the world can move
|
||
forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament
|
||
and continuously developing principles and procedures of international
|
||
law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military
|
||
power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force
|
||
(emphasis added) and all international disputes would be settled
|
||
according to the agreed principles of international conduct.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the
|
||
disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world
|
||
in which:
|
||
|
||
(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and
|
||
establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order;
|
||
they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace
|
||
Force.
|
||
|
||
(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of
|
||
armaments, would be fully functioning.
|
||
|
||
(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of
|
||
agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those
|
||
required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be
|
||
destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
|
||
|
||
(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be
|
||
sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such
|
||
arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just
|
||
settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
|
||
|
||
The end of Publication 7277.
|
||
|
||
THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY BULLETIN
|
||
|
||
Less Government, More Responsibility, And - With God's Help -
|
||
A Better World
|
||
|
||
No. 383 April 1991
|
||
|
||
|
||
WHOSE SIDE ARE THEY ON?
|
||
by
|
||
John F. McManus
|
||
|
||
|
||
In the interest of peace, many Americans have been persuaded to support
|
||
disarmament programs and to create as a substitute for each nation's
|
||
military a United Nations Peace Force. Most feel certain that their own
|
||
rights and the independence of their nation would in no way be placed in
|
||
jeopardy. But there is a vital question few seem willing or able to ask:
|
||
Who would be left to restrain the all-powerful United Nations?
|
||
|
||
For his Secretaries of State and Defense, President John F. Kennedy
|
||
selected Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara. Each was a member of the New
|
||
York-based Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization formed
|
||
in 1921 for the purpose of bringing about a one-world government.
|
||
|
||
Only nine months into his administration - on September 25, 1961, to be
|
||
precise - Mr. Kennedy travelled to UN headquarters in New York to
|
||
present a proposal entitled Freedom From War: The United States Program
|
||
For General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The work of
|
||
the Rusk-led State Department, with the willing acquiescence of the
|
||
McNamara-led Defense Department, the proposal was published as
|
||
"Department of State Publication 7277."
|
||
|
||
In his remarks before the UN, President Kennedy asked for a commitment
|
||
from all nations "not to an arms race, but to a peace race - to advance
|
||
together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete
|
||
disarmament has been achieved." He did not get any such commitment, yet
|
||
the United States embarked on the Kennedy-launched program.
|
||
|
||
Freedom From War (or "7277," as it is frequently called) proposes three
|
||
stages of disarmament ending with the transfer of the armed forces of
|
||
our nation to the United Nations. As Senator Joseph Clark of
|
||
Pennsylvania approvingly reminded his colleagues in a Senate speech on
|
||
March 1, 1962, this program is "the fixed, determined and approved
|
||
policy of the government of the United States."
|
||
|
||
A reading of the document itself confirms that disarmament "would
|
||
proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to
|
||
challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force...." In other
|
||
words, the only significant military power left in the world would be
|
||
the United Nations.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The provisions of the treacherous proposal would actually leave our
|
||
nation defenseless before the UN, and before any other nation that
|
||
didn't similarly disarm. And it would place the UN's superior military
|
||
power in the hands of the UN's Undersecretary for Political and Security
|
||
Council Affairs, the overseer of all UN military activity. This post, by
|
||
virtue of a secret agreement concluded at the founding of the UN (an
|
||
arrangement later confirmed by an astonished former UN Secretary General
|
||
named Trygve Lie), has always been held by a communist. The man who
|
||
holds it today, is Vasiliy S. Safronchuk of the Soviet Union. Unless our
|
||
leaders are stopped, they will succeed in turning over our military
|
||
forces to the United Nations where they will be controlled by a
|
||
communist.
|
||
|
||
********************************************
|
||
|
||
Since the UN was created, there have been 14 Undersecretaries for
|
||
Political and Security Council Affairs. All have been communists, and
|
||
all but one have come from the Soviet Union.
|
||
|
||
|
||
1946-1949 Arkady Sobolev 1963-1965 V.P. Suslov
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
1949-1953 Konstantin Zinchenko 1965-1968 Alexei E. Nesterenko
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
1953-1954 Ilya Tchernychev 1968-1973 Leonid N. Kutakov
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
1954-1957 Dragoslav Protitch 1973-1978 Arkady N. Shevchenko
|
||
(Yugoslavia) (USSR)
|
||
1958-1960 Anatoly Dobrynin 1978-1981 Mikhail D. Styenko
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
1960-1962 Georgy Arkadev 1981-1986 Viacheslav A. Ustinov
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
1962-1963 E.D. Kiselev 1987- Vasiliy S. Safronchuk
|
||
(USSR) (USSR)
|
||
|
||
********************************************
|
||
|
||
Subverting Our Sovereignty
|
||
|
||
Are our leaders really implementing this plan? Yes, they are! The
|
||
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is part of it; the treaty banning the use of
|
||
outer space for nuclear weapons is part of it; the Nuclear
|
||
Non-Proliferation Treaty is part of it; and so is the Intermediate
|
||
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, signed by President Reagan and Soviet
|
||
leader Gorbachev and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1988.
|
||
|
||
When Freedom From War was first made public, many startled Americans
|
||
tried to obtain a copy. It was quickly declared "out of print" by
|
||
federal authorities. Then, it was superseded in April 1962 by a "more
|
||
precise" statement of the U.S. disarmament policy in a document entitled
|
||
Blueprint For the Peace Race: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on
|
||
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Presented formally to an 18-nation UN Committee on Disarmament meeting
|
||
in Geneva, the foreword to the Blueprint states that it doesn't cancel
|
||
the plans given in Freedom From War. It merely "elaborates and extends
|
||
the proposals of September 25," the date that Freedom From War was
|
||
unveiled at UN headquarters by President Kennedy. In complete accord
|
||
with Freedom From War, the Blueprint spells out its overall goal in the
|
||
third of its three stages: "The Parties to the Treaty would
|
||
progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in
|
||
Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no
|
||
state could challenge it."
|
||
|
||
When questioned about the commitment of the United States to the
|
||
Blueprint, A. Richard Richstein, General Council of the U.S. Arms
|
||
Control and Disarmament Agency, stated in a May 11, 1982 letter that
|
||
"the United States has never formally withdrawn this proposal." In
|
||
January 1991, William Nary, the official; historian of the Arms Control
|
||
and Disarmament Agency, confirmed again that "the proposal has not been
|
||
withdrawn." Mr. Nary also confirmed that "certain features of it have
|
||
been incorporated into subsequent disarmament agreements."
|
||
|
||
In summary, the plan to disarm the United States in favor of an
|
||
all-powerful United Nations Peace Force is unfolding. It calls for
|
||
relinquishing virtually all of our nation's military forces to a UN
|
||
command whose leader, by agreement between the U.S. and the USSR during
|
||
the founding sessions leading to the creation of the UN, will always be
|
||
a communist. In the end, "no state could challenge" the communist-led
|
||
military power of the United Nations.
|
||
|
||
This supposed "disarmament" program, therefore, is not as much about
|
||
weapons elimination as it is about weapons distribution and control. If
|
||
the program succeeds, only the UN and those nations skirting UN weapons
|
||
prohibitions will be armed. It is remarkably similar to the drive that
|
||
would outlaw private ownership of firearms. (emphasis added) If that
|
||
drive should ever succeed, only the government and those who are outlaws
|
||
would possess guns. Law-abiding citizens would be at their mercy in the
|
||
latter case; law-abiding nations would be at the mercy of the UN and
|
||
outlaw nations in the other.
|
||
|
||
Background To This Situation
|
||
|
||
How did we get into such a situation? Who are the individuals promoting
|
||
such a suicidal proposal? Why is Congress going along instead of
|
||
repudiating this dangerous program? How do we get out of it before it's
|
||
too late?
|
||
|
||
At the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the delegation from the
|
||
United States included a young State Department official named Alger
|
||
Hiss. Widely acclaimed for both his ability and his enthusiasm for the
|
||
world organization, he rose to become the acting secretary general of
|
||
the founding UN conference. As a member of the steering and executive
|
||
committees of the conference, he played a major role in drafting the UN
|
||
Charter. He also helped to staff the U.S. delegation and was chosen by
|
||
his peers for the prestigious task of personally transporting the
|
||
Charter to the President and to the Senate for ratification.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Alger Hiss, however, was later found to have been a secret communist,
|
||
more loyal to a foreign power than to the nation of his birth. A 1950
|
||
State department document named 15 other key U.S. government officials
|
||
who were responsible for planning the creation of the UN. They, too,
|
||
were subsequently named as secret communists by official agencies.
|
||
|
||
************************************************
|
||
|
||
Five years after the 1945 founding of the United nations, official
|
||
records released by the State Department# identified the individuals
|
||
listed below as key U.S. contributors to the planning for the world
|
||
organization. Each of the 16 was subsequently identified in sworn
|
||
testimony before U.S. government agencies as a secret communist.
|
||
|
||
Alger Hiss Nathan Gregory Silvermaster
|
||
Harry Dexter White Harold Glasser
|
||
Virginius Frank Coe Victor Perlo
|
||
Noel Field Irving Kaplan
|
||
Laurence Duggan Solomon Adler
|
||
Henry Julian Wadleigh Abraham George Silverman
|
||
John Carter Vincent William K. Ullman
|
||
David Weintraub William H. Taylor
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, U.S. State Department
|
||
|
||
************************************************
|
||
|
||
Not only was the U.S. represented by a sizable number of communists, our
|
||
nation's delegation also contained 43 individuals who were then or soon
|
||
would be members of America's leading Establishment organization, the
|
||
privately-run Council on Foreign Relations. Alger Hiss himself was both
|
||
a communist and a CFR member as was another U.S. member of the UN
|
||
planning team, Lauchlin Currie. As communists, and as CFR members, they
|
||
worked diligently to bring the world government into existence, and they
|
||
labored just as hard to have the United States a part of it.
|
||
|
||
There were, of course, delegations from the USSR and the other founding
|
||
nations. These were made up of communists, socialists, one-worlders, and
|
||
easily manipulated starry-eyed dreamers. All were committed to world
|
||
government at the expense of national sovereignty. All wanted the United
|
||
Nations to be supreme. There was to be no more war as soon as the United
|
||
Nations was given sufficient power, especially unchallenged military
|
||
power, to keep the peace.
|
||
|
||
For the past 45 years, intense pro-UN propaganda has convinced many
|
||
Americans (and many others as well) that the words "peace" and "United
|
||
Nations" are virtually interchangeable. Anyone who opposes the UN risks
|
||
being labelled a warmonger. Those who support the UN customarily find
|
||
themselves showered with accolades.
|
||
|
||
Peace is so universally desired that almost anything seems reasonable to
|
||
achieve it. Proposals to empower the UN with the world's dominant
|
||
military capability have received widespread support. At first glance,
|
||
the idea may seem to have some merit. A world police force formed to
|
||
keep the peace. Wouldn't it be wonderful!
|
||
|
||
Suppose, however, that the unchallengeable power of the United Nations
|
||
fill into the wrong hands? Suppose it ended up at the disposal of Alger
|
||
Hiss and his comrades? Couldn't it be used to impose a tyranny on the
|
||
rest of mankind? Wouldn't any would-be tyrant gravitate to the
|
||
organization?
|
||
|
||
Even if the UN wire not run by communists, socialists, and one-worlders
|
||
who despise nationhood, wouldn't the awesome power we are talking about
|
||
be sufficient to corrupt anyone? Who would be able to bridle any UN
|
||
leaders who had been given greater power than anyone else on earth?
|
||
|
||
Don't Discard Americanism
|
||
|
||
It can't be said too often that America is unique. Our nation began with
|
||
the thunderous assertion in the Declaration of Independence that
|
||
"men...are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights."
|
||
According to the founding premise of this nation, rights come from God,
|
||
not from government. And the declaration then declared that governments
|
||
are formed solely "to secure those rights." That's all! Secure God-given
|
||
rights, not provide for wants, redistribute the wealth, or make
|
||
dependent serfs out of the people.
|
||
|
||
With the marvelous foundation laid in the Declaration, the men who
|
||
formed this unique and wonderful nation the wrote a Constitution whose
|
||
sole purpose was to govern the government, not the people. America was
|
||
expected to be a nation where the government was limited by law and the
|
||
people were limited by freely accepted moral codes such as those found
|
||
in the Ten Commandments.
|
||
|
||
Nothing like America had ever existed in all history. And did this
|
||
nation prosper! Millions left the old world to come here penniless - not
|
||
to be cared for but to enjoy freedom and opportunity. America became the
|
||
hope of the world - even for these who were not fortunate enough to live
|
||
within our borders.
|
||
|
||
The United Nations, on the other hand, has no place for God. If rights
|
||
don't come from God, the presumption is that they are granted by
|
||
government. The UN actually fosters such a presumption, as can be
|
||
discovered in its International Covenants on Human Rights.
|
||
|
||
What must be understood is that a government that presumes to grant
|
||
fundamental rights - which is what the UN does - is a government that
|
||
can suspend them at will. If the "self evident " truths in the
|
||
Declaration of Independence are canceled or forgotten in favor of the
|
||
UN's ways, all rights given us by our Creator will exist only at the
|
||
extremely dubious pleasure of the United Nations.
|
||
|
||
The reality here is that the UN turns the entire American system on its
|
||
head. To consider submitting our nation to the dictates of the
|
||
anti-American, pro-communist and Godless United Nations is suicidal.
|
||
Yet, this is exactly what our leaders have been working towards for
|
||
several decades. Sad to say, it is perfectly obvious that this is
|
||
precisely what President Bush is talking about when he repeatedly
|
||
expresses his desire to create a "new world order."
|
||
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, the desire for peace has clouded the vision of many
|
||
otherwise clear-thinking Americans. Many have been persuaded to think
|
||
only of the concept of "peace," but not what kind of peace. No one
|
||
should ever forget that there is the peace of the grave, the peace of
|
||
submission, and the communist peace that consists of no opposition to
|
||
communism. Peace with justice, the goal of anyone possessing good will,
|
||
is as likely under United Nations domination as is the chance that water
|
||
will flow uphill.
|
||
|
||
Whenever thoughts such as these are brought to the attention of sensible
|
||
Americans, enthusiasm for UN-style peace diminishes rapidly. "Let's keep
|
||
our independence!" is a common response. "Why should we trust others to
|
||
look after our well-being?" is another. But too few are aware of the
|
||
dangers inherent in an all-powerful world government. And too few,
|
||
therefore, have been guarding against transferring U.S. military forces
|
||
and U.S. sovereignty to the United Nations.
|
||
|
||
The "New World Order"
|
||
|
||
In an exclusive interview published in the December 31, 1990/January 7,
|
||
1991 issue of U.S. News and World Report, President Bush called for "a
|
||
reinvigorated United Nations" that he hoped would bring about the "new
|
||
world order." What should be reinvigorated instead are the U.S.
|
||
Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
|
||
|
||
During a January 9, 1991 press conference, Mr. Bush said that the crisis
|
||
in the Middle East "has to do with a new world order [that] is only
|
||
going to be enhanced if this newly activated peacekeeping function of
|
||
the United Nations proves to be effective." Obviously, he considers our
|
||
forces in the Middle East to have been under the UN's peacekeeping
|
||
jurisdiction. And isn't it curious that this supposed "peace"
|
||
organization's authority was used in starting the war in the Middle East?
|
||
|
||
Then, in his January 19, 1991 speech to the nation, the President again
|
||
touted the "new world order," describing it as "an order in which a
|
||
credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the
|
||
promise and vision of the UN's founders." He didn't remind anyone that
|
||
the UN's founders were communists, socialists, one-worlders, and
|
||
starry-eyed dreamers who would happily tear down the unique foundations
|
||
of the United States and replace them with the UN Charter.
|
||
|
||
What To Do To Save America
|
||
|
||
Answers to some of the questions we have already raised, and to others
|
||
that anyone reading this pamphlet must have, begin with an understanding
|
||
of the grip on America held by the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr.
|
||
Bush, a member of the CFR's Board of Directors as recently as 1979, can
|
||
point to more than 350 CFR members currently serving as U.S. Government
|
||
officials. A similar CFR dominance prevailed during the Reagan years and
|
||
in several previous administrations.
|
||
|
||
Current U.S. Officials holding membership in the CFR include Secretary
|
||
of Defense Cheney, National Security Advisor Scowcroft, Joint Chiefs
|
||
Chairman Powell, CIA Director Webster, and Deputy Secretary of State
|
||
Eagleburger. Don't expect any to block further entanglement of the
|
||
United States in the UN.
|
||
|
||
There are also 16 U.S. senators and a like number of U.S.
|
||
representatives who hold membership in this organization. Don't expect
|
||
them to protect our nation from UN domination.
|
||
|
||
Realize too, that practically nationally important organ of the news
|
||
media is led by a CFR member. Any senator or representative who wishes
|
||
to receive favor from the media goes along with subverting America to
|
||
internationalist goals. Any senator or representative who tries to keep
|
||
our nation independent runs the risk of having the media make him seem
|
||
like a lunatic.
|
||
|
||
The great majority of the American people who value their freedom and
|
||
their nation's independence have to become informed and alarmed about
|
||
the path down which we are being taken. There will be no change without
|
||
a rising tide of indignation. And there will be no rising tide of
|
||
indignation until the frightening details about the ongoing subversion
|
||
of this nation have been placed in the hands of many more Americans.
|
||
|
||
Happily, there are reliable sources of information both about President
|
||
George Bush's commitment to his "new world order" and about the Council
|
||
on Foreign Relations itself. We highly recommend two books:
|
||
|
||
1. The Establishment's Man, by James J. Drummey, a tastefully written
|
||
yet devastating expose' of the political career of George Bush;
|
||
|
||
2. The Shadows of Power, by James Perloff, a history of the Council on
|
||
Foreign Relations taken from its own papers and publications.
|
||
|
||
The enemy is within the gates of our great land. Those who would deliver
|
||
out nation to a UN-controlled "new world order" have achieved great
|
||
power and influence. Whether they are stopped in time is up to
|
||
individuals who will read a pamphlet like this one, books like those
|
||
recommended above, and a great deal more information that is available
|
||
to anyone. Once informed, an American worthy of the name will work with
|
||
others to throw the rascals out of office, and, in the words of George
|
||
Washington, "put none but Americans" in charge of guarding this nation. |