176 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
176 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
February 1991
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PERSPECTIVE:
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THE PATROL FUNCTION
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By
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Patrick V. Murphy
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Former Police Commissioner of New York City
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Current Director of the Police Policy Board
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The United States Conference of Mayors
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Washington, DC
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American policing has improved substantially since a
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Presidential crime commission in 1967 identified a number of
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fundamental weaknesses. Officers today are better educated,
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departments are more representative of the populations they
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serve, and there is more restraint in the use of force. Yet,
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serious flaws remain.
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Specifically, there is much room for improvement in most
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departments with regard to organization, management, planning,
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policy, and effectiveness. The courage and dedication of
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hundreds of thousands of officers, as well as the
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professionalism of police administrators, cannot overcome the
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organizational flaws that weaken the police, especially with
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regard to their contribution to crime control and order
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maintenance.
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CRIME CONTROL
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In a democratic society, the responsibility for peace
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keeping and law observance rests with the community, not with
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the police. Well-trained police are required, but their role is
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to supplement and aid community efforts, not to supplant them.
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Unfortunately, urban police departments consistently have
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accepted a disproportionate share of the responsibility for
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maintaining social control. And, relying on police wisdom, the
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people have reacted by "not getting involved." However, it is
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officer-citizen teamwork that is the basic building block of
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crime control.
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Prevention is, by far, the largest component of crime
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control, and most crime prevention should be done by the people.
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Therefore, the efforts of the people need to be coordinated,
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planned, and well-directed. The challenge for the police
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administrator, then, is to structure a police department, with
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all of its responsibilities and complexities, to assist the
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people in exercising social control and protecting themselves.
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LESSONS LEARNED
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British research found more than 30 years ago that crime
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rates were lowest in villages with a single constable. When one
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officer had exclusive responsibility for protecting fewer than
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1,000 people, the essential partnership of people and police was
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ideally formed. Police responsibility was clearly fixed in one
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individual rather than shared among many. The constable, who
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had full authority and discretion, became a respected leader.
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Results of initiatives taken by the police were easily observed
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and appreciated by a grateful community. In turn, the constable
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could enjoy the satisfaction of a job well done.
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Unfortunately, most U.S. police departments have drifted
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away from the organizational structure that allows patrol
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officers time for community interaction. Instead, the patrol
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car, radio, telephone, computerized dispatch, and unrealistic
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expectations for rapid response have made responding to calls
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for service the major component of patrol work, not managing
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crime prevention as it should be.
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A high-ranking official of a large city police department
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recently revealed that 90% of patrol officers' time is devoted
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to calls for service. And research findings indicate that a
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small percentage of such calls involve life-threatening
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situations or crimes in progress. What results is insufficient
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time on the part of the patrol officer to assist the people to
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protect themselves. Therefore, police administrators need to
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organize patrol personnel so that they can mobilize citizens
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into a force that controls crime and enforces established
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community values.
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REORGANIZING PATROL
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No aspect of reorganization is more important than properly
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structuring the patrol function. This should begin with a clear
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understanding of the purpose of patrol personnel, which is to
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provide the leadership to help people protect themselves, their
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homes, and their neighborhoods. For the most part, citizens
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should be the workers that the police depend on to get the job
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done. And, nothing less than the involvement of every
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generalist patrol officer (GPO) can generate sufficient
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participation of the people.
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In addition, a state-of-the-art program of "differential
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police response"(DPR) to calls, according to pre-established
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priorities, should recapture a large portion of the valuable
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time of officers to devote to their fundamental purpose.
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Differential police response involves screening calls by
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carefully trained operators. Few of these calls require an
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immediate dispatch. Most can be satisfactorily resolved by
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telephone, delayed dispatch, written information mailed to a
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citizen, or a written report mailed from a citizen. A
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comprehensive public education program is necessary to assure
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the people that the change will not diminish response to actual
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emergencies.
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THE GENERALIST PATROL OFFICER
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The most important position in a police department is the
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generalist patrol officer. GPOs manage the contributions of
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residents to crime prevention and social control and are the
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catalysts that generate citizen volunteer hours for every hour
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of officer duty time. They should be information processors,
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coordinators, planners, and leaders, because they can make a
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critical difference in reducing the anonymity of urban life that
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facilitates the success of criminals.
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Every rank, specialization, and position within a
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department should exist to support the GPO. In the past, law
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enforcement's efforts to specialize police functions reduced the
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number of patrol officers, which detracted from crime prevention
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and helped criminals take control of neighborhoods. Instead,
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the move should be for GPOs to get to know their communities.
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This can be accomplished by dividing a city into as many
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sub-beats as there are generalist patrol officers. In doing so,
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the protection of a small population (in the range of 1,000
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residents per GPO depending upon crime rate) can be made the
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individual responsibility of each. It obviously is easier for
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residents to interact with one rather than five officers. Close
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officer-citizen teamwork is then facilitated, and maximum
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participation of the people working together with their "own"
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officer strengthens social control. For urgent matters, when
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their "own" officer is not on duty, a beat team colleague can
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assist residents.
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BEAT TEAMS
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Officers assigned to a beat should be members of a team
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headed by a sergeant, the "neighborhood chief of police." This
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sergeant should have maximum flexibility in directing and
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scheduling personnel within the constraints of providing
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continuous patrol car service as required by department, area,
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or precinct policy. Ideally, the beat team will include a
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civilian collator/assistant to receive, evaluate, and
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disseminate, information--the lifeblood of police work.
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Since citizens are dependent on the police to exchange
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information with them about crime patterns, drug pushers, and
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known criminals, officers should have the responsibility to
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obtain reports of crime, suspicious activity, and the behavior
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of parolees/probationers and other intelligence from citizens on
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their beats. That information must be analyzed and disseminated
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to the people. A well-informed neighborhood community will be
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better prepared to protect itself and feed back useful
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intelligence to the beat team.
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CONCLUSION
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Most police work is performed by patrol officers, who are
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critical to law enforcement's role in ensuring a free society.
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Patrolling is a complex, truly professional level of work.
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Properly organizing it within a large department, especially in
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areas with high rates of poverty, unemployment, school dropout,
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teenage parents, racial discrimination and the other root causes
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of crime, is challenging even for the most capable
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administrators.
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Mobilizing and assisting the people is the key to crime
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control, and prevention is the first priority. Law enforcement
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should be a fail-safe, but rarely used, device that kicks into
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effect only after prevention has failed.
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