243 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
243 lines
13 KiB
Plaintext
February 1991
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NYPD'S APPL PROGRAM: A NEW PARTNERSHIP
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By
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Anthony M. Voelker
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Chief of Organized Crime Control
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New York City Police Department
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"A man claiming to represent a reputable delivery service
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appeared at the office of a theater service group and asked
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to collect COD charges for a package addressed to a
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well-known actress. The organization's alert security
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supervisor told the man to come back later for payment, and
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when he returned, the police arrested him for perpetrating
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a delivery scam. (The package contained only an empty
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box.) The Special Frauds Squad of the New York Police
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Department (NYPD) had received 20 complaints of these
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COD cases, with losses averaging from $100 to $500."
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"A security guard observed a scam in progress. The victim
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was shown an envelope containing individually wrapped
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coins. A physician's name, phone number, and address were
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on the envelope. The victim was asked to call the
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"doctor," who said there was a reward for the coins. The
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coins were sold to the victim, who soon discovered that
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they were worthless. The security guard observing this
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scam called local detectives, who arrested the suspect.
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The team had operated in midtown for about 18 months. This
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systematic, ongoing conduct amounted to a "scheme to
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defraud," and a felony charge and conviction followed."
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"In 1985, women were being attacked in elevators and
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staircases of office buildings. In just over a month, the
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suspect raped and robbed nine women. The case generated
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intense media coverage, and as the police attempted to
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identify the suspect, a former NYPD detective, employed as
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a security agent for a large corporation, realized that the
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assailant's modus operandi fit that of a rapist he had
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previously arrested. Local detectives pulled the case file
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to show the suspect's picture to the victims, and the
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`midtown rapist' was positively identified and arrested."
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The common denominator in these incidents was the quick,
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professional action taken by private security personnel who had
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systems in place to notify local police when they observed
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unusual activity. Were it not for their quick actions, these
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cases would probably remain unsolved.
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AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE IS RECOGNIZED
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In the past decade, both law enforcement and private
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security professionals have arrived at the same conclusion: The
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police cannot provide all the protection and enforcement
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necessary to maintain safe and orderly communities. There are
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increasingly fewer police resources to handle an ever-increasing
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demand for services. For example, in New York City in 1989,
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there were 8.3 million calls to the emergency 911 number. The
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Hallcrest Report, (1) which gives the results of a 30-month
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research project on the respective roles of private security and
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public law enforcement, highlighted a growing phenomenon: While
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the private security sector is continually growing in size,
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public law enforcement remains stable, at best, and in some
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areas, is being reduced. The report estimated that in 1990,
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private security expenditures will reach $22 billion (a figure
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recently revised to $26 billion) and will involve almost 700,000
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guards, investigators, and other private security employees. By
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comparison, outlays for local, State, and Federal law
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enforcement will be under $14 billion, with approximately
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600,000 personnel. These facts underscore the tremendous
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importance of a stronger alliance between the New York City
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Police Department (NYPD) and the private security community.
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There have been many long-standing informal relationships
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between public law enforcement officers and private security
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officers, often only on an investigation or incident basis.
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However, only recently have department officials tapped this
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valuable resource.
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THE APPL PROGRAM
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In November 1985, the NYPD commissioner met with four
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former NYPD chiefs, who had become leaders in the private
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security community, to discuss ways of increasing the extent of
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collaboration between the groups. The end result was the
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Police-Private Security Liaison Committee. This committee, in
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turn, formed the Area Police-Private Security Liaison Program
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(APPL). Because APPL operated in Manhattan's central business
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district, the initial operation was aptly named "Midtown APPL."
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The lifeblood of the Midtown APPL program is the close
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working relationship between local police officers and private
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security personnel. The police keep security directors informed
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about local crime trends and patterns, wanted persons, and lost
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or stolen property. This information, often initially received
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from the private security sector, is then passed on by the
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security directors to their corporate networks. In return,
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private security directors inform the police of internal crimes,
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share their knowledge of plant/personnel protection, and advise
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the police of other relevant on-site observations.
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The APPL program encourages personal contact, at each level
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of the chain of command, between the police and private security.
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Police commanders and security directors meet monthly on a formal
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basis, and more frequently on an informal basis, to discuss
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mutual concerns. In addition, police supervisors and officers
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interact on a daily basis with security supervisors and guards.
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By doing this, each gains a better understanding of the others'
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roles, functions, problems, and goals.
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In addition to the monthly meetings, quarterly regional
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meetings are held on a division level (combining several
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precincts) between managers in both public and private security.
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These meetings give managers an opportunity to discuss current
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situations and share their expertise. Presentations by guest
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speakers are made at these quarterly meetings on topics such as
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drugs in the workplace, sexual harassment, emergency medical
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responses, and how to deal with suspicious packages and devices.
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Virtually anything that will enhance performance is deemed an
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appropriate subject for lectures and discussions.
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BRIDGING THE GAP
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Deep-rooted negative feelings can hinder a successful
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merger between police and private security. For years, police
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officers viewed private security officers as little more than
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uneducated, ill-trained guards assigned to watch buildings and
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construction sites. Private security officers, in turn,
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rejected police authority because they resented being treated as
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less than professional law enforcement officers. To bridge this
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credibility gap, the APPL program began as an effort to inform
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the police community about the key role that private security
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plays in our society and the level of professionalism to which
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this industry and its members have risen.
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To illustrate, NYPD Police Academy administrators revised
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its training curriculum to include a private security awareness
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discussion for incoming recruits. Police officers, supervisors,
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and middle managers received the same information through
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regular inservice training, pre-promotion training, and
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workshops. In addition, as part of the executive development
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program (for the rank of captain and above), the department
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arranged for panel discussions with high-level private security
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executives who retired from the department at the chief level.
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With the same objectives in mind--improved understanding
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and respect--groups of police officers and supervisors on patrol
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have been invited to visit private security organizations. They
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meet with security directors and managers to discuss common
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street occurrences and problems and to get a close-up view of
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security facilities, technology, and internal procedures.
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In yet another effort to maintain open lines of
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communication, the department published a registry of private
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security organizations to provide members of both police and
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security units with the means for direct contact. This allowed
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members of the department and private security to exchange
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information, locate experts, or give details of incidents
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observed that would help APPL members perform their duties more
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effectively. This registry also serves as a mailing list to
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disseminate information bulletins and wanted posters to APPL
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members on a regular basis. These bulletins and posters contain
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suspect descriptions, sketches or photos of wanted persons or
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property, and details of methods being employed by local
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criminals. Many of these posters and bulletins have led to the
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arrest of locally active criminals, including the three cited in
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the beginning of this article.
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The APPL program also includes a course taught by
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instructors at the police academy that is specially designed to
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meet the needs of private security first-line supervisors. The
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1-day course features basic police science and social science
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subjects, as well as a description of the legal responsibilities
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of private security. When they complete the course, the private
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security supervisors share the information with their
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subordinates. In the last 3 years, more than 450 security
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supervisors have attended the class, and all have attested to
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the usefulness of the training when they make security
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decisions.
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EXPANSION OF APPL
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When the APPL program was first implemented, it was limited
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to the central business district in Manhattan. The initial
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Midtown APPL program has since grown from a dedicated group of
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30 private security associations in three patrol precincts to
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four programs located throughout the city. The program now
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includes more than 350 private security organizations that
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employ over 12,000 security personnel in more than 500
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buildings. Current plans are to establish an APPL program in
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every part of the city that has private security organizations.
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Until that time, each precinct commander is encouraged to
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establish working relationships with private security personnel
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working within their areas.
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APPL'S KEY INGREDIENTS
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After 4 years, considerable progress has been made in
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bridging the credibility and trust gap between public and
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private policing and in encouraging a spirit of cooperation.
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This could not, however, have been accomplished if it were not
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for a blending of key ingredients.
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First, the enthusiastic support of department officials and
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influential members of the private security community provided a
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substantial foundation upon which to build this program. The
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constant attention, direction, commitment, and unfailing
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involvement of these two factions set a positive tone and
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encouraged both action and change.
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Second, the face-to-face contact between police and
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security personnel forced initial dialogue, and formalized
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networking resulted in a recognition of each other's problems
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and needs. With accurate information came better understanding,
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which led to more productive relationships.
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Finally, there is the requirement that police managers
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submit regular reports to the commissioner on their involvement
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with the private security sector. These reports include current
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cooperative efforts and the results of new initiatives that
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encourage police commanders to interact with private security.
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CONCLUSION
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There is no question that the public benefits when an
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alliance is forged between public law enforcement and private
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security agencies. Initial feedback strongly suggests that the
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APPL program has the NYPD moving in the right direction.
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Distrust seems to be waning, and acceptance of private
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security's place in law enforcement appears improved. The
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efforts of APPL participants have borne the fruits of improved
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understanding and greater tolerance of each other's roles and
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needs within the scope of the law.
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FOOTNOTE
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(1) William C. Cunningham and Todd H. Taylor, Private Security
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and Police in America: The Hallcrest Report (Chancellor Press:
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1985).
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