189 lines
9.3 KiB
Plaintext
189 lines
9.3 KiB
Plaintext
July 1991
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MEDICAID FRAUD
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By
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Larry L. Bailey
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Deputy Chief Investigator
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Colorado Attorney General's Office
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Medicaid Fraud Control Unit
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Denver, Colorado
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In 1965, as part of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society,
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legislation was introduced to create the Medicaid Program. The
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program was designed to provide State-administered financing of
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medical services for needy families.
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By 1977, Medicaid was a $19 billion a year program, and it
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was estimated that fraud was costing taxpayers at least $653
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million annually. These losses threatened the integrity of
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Medicaid, and although the Medicaid Program is Federally
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monitored, the original legislation did not specify who would
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investigate and prosecute any suspected cases of fraud.
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Therefore, Congress introduced legislation to form special
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Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU).
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Thirty-eight States currently have MFCUs. Most of the
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units are part of State attorney generals' offices, State bureaus
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of investigation, State police departments, State auditor
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generals' offices, or other similar agencies. Wherever these
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MFCUs are located, it is important that local, State, and
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Federal agencies know of their existence, their authority, and
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their function. Many agencies are unaware that MFCUs exist, and
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as a result, opportunities to refer pertinent information to
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them or to combine investigative efforts with them are often
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overlooked. Therefore, law enforcement agencies should be aware
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of the functions of MFCUs and how these units can help them
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investigate Medicaid cases.
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This article discusses what MFCUs are, how they work in
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conjunction with other law enforcement agencies, and how they
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can assist in local investigations that, were it not for MFCUs,
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might not otherwise be pursued. It also illustrates how
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important it is for other law enforcement agencies to make
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timely referrals of possible crimes to MFCUs.
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PURPOSE
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MFCUs investigate and prosecute Medicaid fraud committed by
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doctors, psychiatrists, pharmacists, laboratories, hospitals,
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nursing homes, and medical equipment and supply companies.
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Personnel in the units also investigate suspected abuse of
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patients in Medicaid-subsidized facilities, ranging from simple
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assaults to sexual assaults or homicides.
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For example, police are often called to nursing homes,
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where unattended deaths may appear to be of either natural or
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accidental causes. If foul play or negligence did occur, it is
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likely that the nursing home personnel would make untrue
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statements to officers and would falsify medical records to
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indicate that the person died of natural causes. To further
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complicate the situation, doctors might sometimes certify the
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cause of death without a thorough examination of the body, much
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less an autopsy. They frequently draw their conclusions on the
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cause of death from statements of personnel at the facility.
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While the local police oftentimes do not have the experience or
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personnel to investigate such cases, MFCUs can investigate the
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possibility of a pattern of abuse or neglect of patients in a
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certain facility and may be able to establish a prosecutable
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case of negligent homicide. However, timely referrals by police
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to MFCUs is crucial, because if a victim is cremated, it is
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virtually impossible to prove that a crime has been committed.
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PERSONNEL
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In most States, MFCU investigators are experienced, sworn
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peace officers who execute search and arrest warrants,
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participate in grand jury investigations, conduct surveillances,
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and operate undercover. For example, investigators in the
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Colorado MFCU have, on the average, over 14 years' experience in
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law enforcement prior to beginning employment with the unit. In
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those States where MFCU investigators are not police officers, a
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sworn officer accompanies investigators whenever it is necessary
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to serve arrest or search warrants.
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MFCU investigators who handle fraud cases that involve
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billing for services not performed, double billings, or
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kickbacks are assisted by auditors in the unit. These auditors
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are usually not sworn officers; however, some MFCUs do have
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police officers who are certified public accountants and also
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serve as unit auditors.
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In addition to investigators and auditors, MFCUs oftentimes
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employ attorneys to prosecute Medicaid cases. Because the
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Federal Government contributes approximately 50 percent of the
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total Medicaid budget, it, as well as the States, is the victim
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of Medicaid fraud. For this reason, some of the lawyers are
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cross-designated as assistant U.S. attorneys. This allows them
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to file charges in Federal court rather than State court, which
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broadens the scope of potential offenses for which the
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defendants can be prosecuted. Federal charges in Medicaid fraud
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cases may include mail fraud, wire fraud, filing false claims,
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and violations of the Federal kickback statute.
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INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION
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In States with large Medicaid programs, such as New York
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and California, single Medicaid fraud cases frequently range in
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the millions of dollars. Prior to the creation of MFCUs, this
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fraud went virtually unchecked. For example, one family used a
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medical clinic to obtain over $30 million illegally from New
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York State. The family purchased a very expensive apartment in
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Manhattan and a mansion in Florida. They were routinely
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chauffeured in a limousine, and they enjoyed all the other
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amenities associated with wealth.
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While the situation is now much improved, in order for
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MFCUs to be truly effective, it is important that other agencies
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notify them when there are possible fraud or patient abuse
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problems within their jurisdictions. The benefit of such
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inter-agency cooperation was clearly illustrated in a recent
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case in Colorado when investigators with the California Attorney
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General's Office advised their counterparts in Colorado that
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suspects from a recent California fraud case had moved to the
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Denver area, possibly to form a new company.
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Investigators in the Colorado MFCU were able to determine
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that the suspects had, in fact, formed a new company in their
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jurisdiction. An MFCU investigator, who joined the company in
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an undercover capacity, quickly identified a pattern of fraud
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within the company, and he also learned that the suspects hoped
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to bribe a government official to obtain confidential
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information.
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At this point, a local police department joined the
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investigation. It provided an additional undercover operative
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and electronic equipment, as well as detectives to operate the
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equipment and assist with the surveillance. This cooperative
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effort resulted in the arrest of five suspects who were charged
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with 24 felony counts of bribery of a public official,
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conspiracy, and fraud, as well as the seizure of computers and
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an automobile. In addition, the company was put out of business
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before it could obtain large amounts of money through fraudulent
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activity. One defendant, who is cooperating with law
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enforcement officials, stated that company officials planned to
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bilk the system out of $30 million during a 10-month period and
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then disappear.
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In another cooperative effort, the Colorado MFCU worked
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with local police and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
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on the investigation of a pharmacist and a pharmacist/dentist
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who wrote prescriptions for controlled drugs and traded them for
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cocaine. They accounted for the controlled drugs by submitting
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false claims to Medicaid that indicated that the prescriptions
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were for Medicaid patients.
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The MFCU assisted the police and DEA by reviewing Medicaid
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claims and other confidential information that is inaccessible
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to police officers who do not work in MFCUs. This joint effort
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resulted in the arrest and successful prosecution of both
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suspects on drug and Medicaid fraud-related charges.
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CONCLUSION
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Medical providers who cheat one program, such as a private
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insurance company, are likely to defraud other programs, such as
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Medicaid or Medicare. Medicaid Fraud Control Units are
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invaluable in the effort to reduce the number of Medicaid fraud
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and abuse cases.
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MFCU personnel can access confidential information not
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available to those outside of their units, and through the use
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of MFCUs, law enforcement agencies can broaden the scope of
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offenses for which certain defendants can be charged.
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Unfortunately, however, because the existence of the units is
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not well-known, law enforcement agencies oftentimes fail to make
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use of this valuable asset. Therefore, it is imperative that
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police departments educate themselves on MFCUs and how they can
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assist law enforcement agencies on the local, State, and Federal
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levels.
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Medicaid Fraud Control Units may well be the key to stem
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the tide of Medicaid fraud and abuse, but it is impossible for
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them to be truly effective until they gain recognition within
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law enforcement agencies. Only then will they begin to make the
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considerable contribution of which they are capable.
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