354 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
354 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
January 1990
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TOMORROW'S AMERICA:
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LAW ENFORCEMENT'S COMING CHALLENGE
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By
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Rob McCord
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and
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Elaine Wicker
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Powerful economic and social indicators point to stiff
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challenges for law enforcement policymakers. During the next
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decade, law enforcement officials will be forced to wrestle with
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disruptive social, demographic, and technological changes. And
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struggles to confront many of the troublesome trends facing the
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Nation will be played out against a backdrop of financial
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cutbacks from Federal, State, and local governments.
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Many analysts point to difficult issues and conflicting
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trends: While cost-cutting throughout government is forcing
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cutbacks in services, public pressure for more effective service
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is growing. Jobs increasingly require skilled personnel; yet, the
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pool of qualified young workers is shrinking, especially the pool
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supplying law enforcement's traditional recruits young, white
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males. Information about economic and demographic trends is
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available, but useful interpretation is complicated by the widely
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varying ways national trends play out in diverse geographic
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areas.
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Looming challenges and expected cutbacks are certain to
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force more reliance on information and information technologies.
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The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reports
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that information technologies will reshape virtually every
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product, service, and job in the United States during the next
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decade. Effective law enforcement may hinge, to a large degree,
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on effective use of information technologies, and successful law
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enforcement will certainly demand accurate anticipation of local
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and national emerging trends and issues.
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With the challenge of foresight in mind, this article
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briefly outlines a number of significant demographic and economic
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trends and their probable implications for law enforcement.
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TRENDS
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The U.S. population is aging. In 1996 the first wave of
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``baby boomers'' will turn 50, marking the start of a ``senior
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boom'' in the United States. By 2010 one in every four Americans
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will be 55 or older. (1)
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The age difference in population composition is especially
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evident when comparing 1950 to the year 2000. In 1950 there were
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12.3 million people aged 65 and older, or 8.2 percent of a
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population of 150.7 million. By the year 2000, an estimated 34.9
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million elderly will constitute 13 percent of the population, and
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by the year 2015, Americans aged over 65 will make up fully 20
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percent of the U.S. population. (2)
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Over the next decade, more than 90 percent of new entrants
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into the workforce will be women, minorities, and immigrants, but
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almost two-thirds will be women. In 1960 only 11 percent of
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women with children under the age of 6 were employed; today, 52
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percent work outside the home. (3)
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The minority population is increasing rapidly, and by 1990,
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20 percent of American children will be black or Asian. By the
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year 2000, this figure will grow to 21 percent and then increase
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to 23 percent by 2010. When projections for white Hispanic
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children are added, the figures increase dramatically to 31
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percent, 34 percent, and 38 percent, respectively. By 2010, 25
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percent of the children in 19 States will be black, Hispanic,
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Asian, or some other minority. In the District of Columbia and
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six States, more than 50 percent of children will be minority
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group members. Minorities will constitute the majority of
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children in New Mexico (77 percent), California (57 percent),
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Texas (57 percent), New York (53 percent), Florida (53 percent),
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and Louisiana (50 percent). (4)
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Immigrants account for an ever-increasing share of the U.S.
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population and workforce. Legal immigration during the 1980s has
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accounted for an average of 570,000 people per year, which is 30
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percent higher than the average for the 1970s and significantly
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more than in any year from 1924 to 1978. (5)
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The 10 metropolitan areas with the highest number of
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immigrants in rank order are New York, Los Angeles-Long Beach,
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Chicago, Miami-Hialeah, San Francisco, Washington, DC (including
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the Maryland and Virginia suburbs), Anaheim-Santa Ana, San Jose,
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Oakland, and San Diego. These cities and 28 others all receive
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approximately 2,000 immigrants each year from 16 or more
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different countries.
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In 1980 there were somewhere between 2.5 and 3.5 million
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illegal aliens in the United States. One estimate holds that
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illegal aliens are growing in number at a rate of 100,000 to
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300,000 a year, while several hundred aliens with nonimmigrant
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status also live illegally in the United States. (6)
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The labor force growth is slowing, and the number of
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``entry-level'' workers is decreasing. Between 1986 and the year
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2000, the overall growth of the labor force is projected to be
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1.2 percentthe slowest rate since the 1930s and about one-half
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the rate of U.S. labor force growth experienced between 1972 and
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1986. And in the 1990s the number of traditional entry-level
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workers--those aged 16-34 will actually shrink. (7)
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The number of single parent households is likely to
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increase. More than 25 million women head their own households,
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or 28 percent of the Nation's 91 million households. Seven
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percent of these are female-headed, single-parent families with
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children under the age of 18. Women who live alone account for
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52 percent of female-headed households; over one-half of these
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women are 65 years of age or older. (8)
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In terms of race and ethnic origin, dramatic differences
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emerge. Two-thirds of black and Hispanic households are headed
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by women, as compared with 36 percent of white households headed
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by females. By the year 2000, women will head 29 percent of
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households. (9) And if present trends continue, one-half of the
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marriages that take place today will end in divorce a decade
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from now.
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Jobs that are declining in number are those that could be
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filled by those with fewer skills. The fastest-growing jobs are
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those that require more language, math, and reasoning skills. For
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the next decade, 9 out of 10 new jobs will be in the service
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sector, in fields that generally require high levels of education
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and skill. Ten years ago, 77 percent of jobs required some type
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of generating, processing, retrieving, or distributing
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information. By the year 2000, heavily computerized information
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processing will encompass 95 percent of the jobs. (10) Some
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projections about employment trends suggest that by the 1990s,
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anyone who reads below a 12th-grade level will be excluded from
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employment possibilities.
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Statistics indicate the United States is becoming a
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bifurcated society with more wealth, more poverty, and a
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shrinking middle class. The gap between the ``haves'' and the
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``have nots'' is widening. The percentage of the population
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earning middle-class wages, between $15,000 and $49,000 per year,
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has dropped over the past decade. (11) More than 32 million of the
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Nation's approximately 240 million citizens have incomes below
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the poverty level. At the same time, the number of households
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headed by persons in the 35-50 age group with incomes of $50,000
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or more is expected to almost triple by 2000. (12)
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An underclass of Americans those who are chronically poor
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and live outside society's rules is growing. Data of the Urban
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Institute show that between 1970 and 1980, the underclass
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tripled. In 1980, 29 million Americans lived in poverty and about
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1.1 million of them lived as members of the underclass. The Urban
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Institute identified 880 underclass neighborhoods in the United
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States in 1980, and those neighborhoods tended to be
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disproportionately populated by minorities. (13)
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IMPLICATIONS
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For most law enforcement officials, troublesome trends and
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economic constraints are all too familiar. Throughout the next
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decade, law enforcement officials will continue to face
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conservative policies that translate into ``cutback management''
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and continued attempts to do more with less. Public demands for
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effectiveness and accountability appear likely to force law
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enforcement leaders to try innovative solutions to long-existing
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problems.
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Successful policing may well depend on efficient and
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effective use of information. An obviously effective use of
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demographic data in efforts to conserve operating expenses lies
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in the task of assigning patrol officers. A geographic area with
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residents who are pre-dominately middle income, high-rise
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condominium dwellers, aged 65 and older, can be policed in a
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different fashion and with fewer officers than an area with a
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large number of residents aged 10 to 18 years old.
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In the future, law enforcement forces will almost certainly
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reflect changes in America's demographic profile and in its
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social and cultural values. Dramatic changes in labor force
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composition will force equally dramatic responses in hiring and
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administration for law enforcement, a traditionally young, white,
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male-dominated profession. Shifts toward older workers, fewer
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entry-level workers, and more women, minorities and immigrants in
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the population will lead law enforcement and private industry to
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become more flexible in order to compete for qualified
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applicants. Law enforcement agencies must devise new strategies
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to attract 21-35 year olds. This age group will be at a premium
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over the next 10 years, and the trend will continue well into the
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middle of the next century.
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By the year 2000, an estimated 75 percent of all workers
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currently in the workforce will need retraining, and population
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shifts away from dominance by white males of European heritage to
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racial and ethnic diversity will bring changes in training as
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well as hiring practices. Law enforcement agencies will have to
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train existing personnel, both sworn and nonsworn, and a major
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thrust will likely be toward communication with
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non-English-speaking communities, perhaps with incentives for
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bilingualism.
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If law enforcement fails to look beyond high school
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graduates as a principal source of candidates, police departments
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will likely face worker shortages. Law enforcement agencies will
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also face fierce competition from the private sector and from the
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military for entry-level employees, such as carpenters,
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electricians, plumbers, masons, construction workers, and others
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in the trade industries who have historically employed marginally
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educated young males. A severe disadvantage facing law
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enforcement recruiters will be wage packages; law enforcement
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will most likely never be competitive with most youth-oriented
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private sector employees. Historically, the view that public
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service is a privilege helped to offset the disparity between
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public and private sector pay. Yet, this perspective seems to be
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in decline.
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Family and lifestyle concerns are increasingly affecting the
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law enforcement workplace. America has become a society in which
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women with young children have become an important part of the
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workforce. The high divorce rate and increase in female-headed
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households contribute to the emphasis on family issues. If law
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enforcement is to attract and keep qualified workers, benefits
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and workplace accommodations, such as daycare, flexible hours,
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and paid maternity leave, must become a part of law enforcement's
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benefits package. The private sector has been moving in this
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direction with incentives and fringe benefit packages for over a
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decade.
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In an era of budget constraints, adapting new policies and
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practices to hold competent workers becomes critical. As
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occupational mobility increases, not only will law enforcement's
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pool of ``home grown'' candidates shrink, but also the erosion of
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traditional social and psychological dependence on ``place'' will
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make it easier for employees to move to other jobs and locations.
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Costs of training will continue to escalate. Some estimates hold
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that it takes 3 to 5 years for a police officer to move from raw
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recruit to novice investigator. Many law enforcement agencies
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already find themselves in the position of constantly training
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personnel to replace those who take other jobs.
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A rapidly changing economy will create instability for many
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workers and set the stage for an upsurge in crime. Prospects for
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unskilled workers are bleak. Analysts warn that opportunities
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for workers with limited education and training will diminish
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considerably in the next two decades. The number of jobs
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typically filled by people who have not finished high school
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declined by 40 percent. This changing workplace has been a major
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factor in the growth of the underclass, since about two-thirds of
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the residents of underclass areas lack even basic workplace
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skills. The Urban Institute contends that the underclass has to
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be understood, in part, as a response to economic realities.
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Crime is an important source of income for the underclass, and
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financial incentives seem to be rising as a result of a
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flourishing drug trade.
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AN EXPLOSIVE MIX
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A wide variety of polls suggest an increasing number of
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Americans believe drug abuse is out of control. According to a
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recent World Peace Foundation Conference report on drugs, ``The
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cocaine problem has become an object of near hysteria in the
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United States.'' Closely linked to that contention is the growing
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notion that the drug epidemic is essentially a black urban
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problem. Blacks constitute only 12 percent of the Nation's
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population, but they account for 50 percent of the heroin, 55
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percent of the cocaine, and 60 percent of PCP hospital emergency
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care. (14) Yet, evidence shows that the $110 billion per year that
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is lining the pockets of drug lords is not being generated only
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by poor, inner-city blacks. The vast majority of that money is
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coming from the 76 percent of the illegal drug users white
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yuppies. (15)
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The Urban Institute warns that increasing public concern
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about the most visible elements of the underclass threatens to
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exacerbate racial tensions and strengthen prejudices. The
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perceived lack of equity for the disenfranchised casts government
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as the ``bad guy,'' and many of the underclass see police as the
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ultimate symbol of oppression.
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A compelling number of experts support the contention that
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urban unrest and civil disorder are likely possibilities. The
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potential for massive urban unrest and civil disturbances
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reminiscent of the riots of the mid-1960s and 1970s clearly
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exists.
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CONCLUSION
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Economic and demographic trends portray a Nation and its
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institutions struggling to respond to rapid social and economic
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evolution. Throughout the next decade, a complex array of
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interdependent and competing demographic and economic forces
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will prompt policymakers to seek innovative, nontraditional
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approaches to hiring, training, and administration.
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In large part, effective policing in the future is closely
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tied to strategic policy choices made by today's law enforcement
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officials. The long-term risks of ignoring critical shifts in
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the population and the economy pose a serious threat to the
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internal security of the Nation. To reduce that threat, voters
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and politicians alike may need to recalculate America's
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traditional national security equation shifting scarce public
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dollars from defense spending to domestic law enforcement.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) Anita Manning and David Proctor, ``Senior Boom: The
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Future's New Wrinkle,''USA Today, January 31, 1989, 1D.
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(2) Ibid.
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(3) The Future World of Work: Looking Toward the Year 2000,
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The United Way, 1988, p. 19.
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(4) Joe Schwartz and Thomas Exter, ``All Our Children,''
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American Demographics, May 1988, pp. 42-43.
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(5) James P. Allen and Eugene J. Turner, ``Where to Find the
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New Immigrants,'' American Demographics, September 1988, pp.
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22-27.
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(6) James C. Raymondo, ``How to Count Illegals, State by
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States,'' American Demographics, September 1988, pp. 42-43.
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(7) Martha F. Richie, "America's New Workers," American
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Demographics, February 1988, pp. 34-41.
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(8) Diane Crispell, ``Women in Charge,'' American
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Demographics, September 1989, pp. 26-29.
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(9) Ibid.
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(10) Marvin J. Cetron, ``Class of 2000: The Good News and the
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Bad News,'' The Futurist, November-December, 1988, pp. 9-15.
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(11) What Lies Ahead: Looking Toward the '90s, The United
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Way, 1987, p. 41.
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(12) Isabel V. Sawhill, ``The Underclass: An Overview,'' The
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Public Interest, Summer 1988, pp. 3-15.
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(13) Ibid.
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(14) David R. Gergen, ``Drugs in White America,'' U.S. News and
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World Report, September 19, 1989.
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(15) Ibid.
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About the authors:
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Executive Director Rob McCord and Elaine Wicker are with the
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Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future, U.S. Congress,
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Washington, D.C. |