textfiles/law/hostaker.txt

                                                                  
            CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST HOSTAGE TAKER                           
   
                              By

                      G. Dwayne Fuselier
     Special Agent, Special Operations and Research Unit
                         FBI Academy
                              and
                        Gary W. Noesner                         
   Special Agent, FBI, Washington Metropolitan Field Office

                                                    
    ``For the foreseeable future, terrorism, both domestic and 
international, will continue to be a major concern to U.S. 
Government and law enforcement agencies.'' (1)  Concern over 
terrorism is consistently voiced by officers attending the FBI 
National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.  Some officers have the 
impression that in a terrorist hostage incident, the crisis 
management approach would (or should) be substantially different 
from that in a criminal hostage incident.  This is not the case.  

     Since the mid-1970s, the FBI has grouped hostage taking 
incidents into four broad categories--the terrorist, the prison 
situation, the criminal, and the mentally disturbed.  State and 
local law enforcement officers at the FBI Academy have indicated 
that these four major categories are still commonly used by law 
enforcement agencies. (2)  Further, there is also the consensus 
that the current set of negotiation strategies and tactics 
available to law enforcement provides viable alternatives from 
which to choose, whatever the motivation for the taking of 
hostages. (3)                                                        

     Unfortunately, much of what is believed about terrorist 
conduct and behavior is derived from the media and the 
entertainment industry.  Both the general population and the law 
enforcement community have come to accept the terrorist 
stereotype as accurately depicting personality traits, 
dedication, sophistication, commitment, and modus operandi.       

     All too often, the dramatic events surrounding a terrorist 
incident are misrepresented in fictional accounts or in media
efforts aimed at recreating actual situations that have
occurred.  Further, a brief news flash, broadcasted during an
ongoing terrorist siege, does not draw an accurate picture of a
terrorist's total range of conduct and personality traits.
Therefore, many of the expressed ideas regarding terrorists
appear to be based upon incorrect perceptions.

The Terrorist Hostage Taker                                       
                                                                              
     The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social goals. (4)  One major
difficulty in discussing the terrorist hostage taker is that the
words ``terrorist'' and ``terrorism'' have been used by the
media to such an extent that they are virtually useless as valid
descriptive terms.  They have become political terms with almost
as many definitions as speakers.
                     
     From the viewpoint of the crisis manager (i.e., the on-scene 
commander), does it help to distinguish a hostage taking as a 
terrorist act, separate from a criminal act?  No, it does not. 
The label given the behavior does not change the act.  In fact, 
the FBI now refers to such acts as ``terrorist crimes'' to 
underscore the fact that the motivation for the behavior does not 
change the criminality of such behavior.  The emphasis here is 
not meant to imply a lesser risk but to stress that the act is, 
first and foremost, a violent crime in progress, regardless of 
the stated motivation of the hostage taker.                       

     Too often, those who are quick to point out that an act is a 
``terrorist incident'' (or any other kind, for that matter) 
mistakenly confuse the labeling with understanding.  In this 
case, the label is one that is so subjective that it is 
meaningless.  To describe an incident as only a ``terrorist'' 
event implies that all such events are similar.  Even additional 
adjectives, such as ``Palestinian'' terrorists, fail to identify, 
for example, significant differences in motives, methods, and 
goals of the various Palestinian factions, and of course, 
individual differences among the members themselves.              

     The use of a label is helpful only if the term is associated 
with essential elements that differentiate one set of behaviors 
from another.  Perhaps a more-descriptive term would be ``planned 
political/ religious'' hostage taking, since this term does not 
have the emotional overtones currently attached to the word 
``terrorist.'' Such a term avoids the automatic, and potentially 
misleading, assumptions made when the word ``terrorist'' is 
used.                                                             

     The essential question is:  In confronting such an incident, 
will law enforcement agencies employ crisis management techniques 
that have been used successfully in a wide variety of 
hostage/barricade situations, or will those procedures be 
discarded as a result of faulty assumptions of how terrorists are 
supposed to behave?  Popular perceptions regarding terrorists 
would lead us to believe that they comprise a unique and specific 
personality type, and that terrorists are to be differentiated 
from the wide range of criminal and mentally disturbed 
personalities more frequently observed by law enforcement crisis 
managers.  To our knowledge, no scientific studies or analytical 
surveys exist that might serve to provide the basis for such a 
belief.  In order to examine the validity of current crisis 
management/negotiation techniques in confronting such incidents, 
it is essential to separate common myth from factual knowledge. 

The Terrorist Mystique                                            

     In a planned political/religious incident, the subjects 
typically take hostages with the intent of getting publicity for 
their cause, and in some cases, to demand the release of 
imprisoned group members.  The fact that these are planned rather 
than spontaneous hostage takings indicates an increased 
likelihood of outside moral and/or operational support and 
creates a virtual certainty of extensive media coverage.          

     It appears that some political and religious extremists, 
particularly in the Middle East, have been successful in one very 
basic way--they have generated an extreme interest and concern 
for their activities among Western law enforcement officers. 
Former Chinese Communist party leader Mao Tse Tung maintained 
that terrorists should kill one to influence a thousand, and some 
radical Palestinian groups and extremist Lebanese Shia (e.g., 
Hizballah) seem to have accomplished this.                        

     However, in an article reviewing the terrorist psychosocial 
profile, Strentz concludes that terrorist groups (particularly 
those of Middle Eastern origin) have changed dramatically. (5)  
Contrasting left-wing Middle Eastern groups of the 1980s to those 
groups active a decade earlier, he found the more recent Middle 
Eastern groups to be poorly educated, unskilled, unemployed, 
illiterate, undisciplined, and ill-trained.  Does this mean that 
a planned political/religious hostage incident is not dangerous? 
Obviously not.  As Strentz notes, ``While one should never 
consciously underestimate adversaries, neither should one make 
them into supermen.  They are a force to be reckoned with, but 
must be viewed within the perspective of reality.'' (6)              

     Beginning in 1985, the FBI began investigating violations of 
the Hostage Taking Statute (Title 18, USC, Section 1203) and in 
1986, the Overseas Homicide/Attempted Homicide Statute (Title 18, 
USC, Section 2331).  These statutes provided for the first time 
the investigative vehicle through which FBI Special Agents could 
actively and aggressively respond to major terrorist incidents 
abroad wherein American citizens and property were the victims.   

     Starting with the June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 
847, FBI Special Agents came into direct contact with a number of 
American victims.  Through detailed debriefings in pursuit of 
criminal prosecution, they collected a large volume of data 
concerning observed terrorist behavior.  Subsequent FBI victim 
debriefings and interviews of incarcerated terrorists involved in 
almost all of the planned political/religious incidents that  
have occurred during the second half of the 1980s expanded this 
database significantly. (7)                                          

     Understandably, the information-gathering process during 
this investigative activity was not designed as an orderly 
scientific examination that would provide the basis for 
personality assessments.  Rather, it aimed at developing 
evidentiary material.  Nonetheless, relying on these interviews, 
and on the experience and observation of FBI Agents, a clearer 
and more accurate picture of terrorist behavior can be drawn. 
This picture should serve to demystify the terrorist, to separate 
fact from fiction, and to support the position that decades of 
significant crisis management experience in a variety of  
circumstances has prepared American law enforcement to deal with 
a political/religious hostage incident.                           

     It appears that the average terrorist is not as 
sophisticated as is commonly believed.  Terrorist interviews and 
victim debriefings show that most of the terrorists of the 1980s 
received very marginal training prior to deployment for an 
operation.  They were provided with only a minimal set of 
instructions as to how to conduct themselves during an operation. 
And while these terrorists may have been given a list of demands, 
for the most part, they were not trained to negotiate with 
authorities to achieve those demands.                             

     In the course of the FBI's investigations, it became evident 
that these subjects are seldom prepared to deal with the unknown 
variables and unforeseen changes that routinely play an integral 
part in such sieges.  As a general rule (and more specifically 
applicable to Middle Eastern subjects), the terrorists are young 
males with little or no formal education.  These individuals come 
from deprived economic conditions and are without any significant 
positive work experience.  Contrary to popular notion, they do 
not employ sophisticated false documentation or disguises and 
most certainly do not fit the ``jet set'' multilingual, worldly, 
and savvy profile so often projected in popular literature.       

     For example, before going to Italy to initiate the October 
1985, Achille Lauro incident, the four young terrorists involved 
never traveled outside of Lebanon. Only one spoke a second 
language.  They received little training, were afforded only 
minimal instructions regarding their mission, and traveled on 
Scandinavian passports.  These terrorists stood out as four young 
Arab males aboard a ship populated almost entirely by elderly 
American and European tourists.  Once the operation began, they 
were confronted with unexpected responses from government 
officials.  This put them in a panic, since they failed to 
prepare contingency plans and could not adapt to the 
circumstances.                                                    

     During the September 1986, hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in 
Karachi, the four terrorists who boarded the Boeing 747 
immediately rushed to the front of the aircraft looking for the 
cockpit in order to gain control of the crew.  They were 
dumbfounded when they discovered the cockpit was not located at 
the nose of the aircraft, as anticipated. They did not know that 
a Boeing 747's cockpit could only be reached by ascending a 
stairway located at the rear of the first class cabin.  This 
delay allowed the cockpit crew to escape.                         

     The April 1988, hijacking of Kuwaiti Flight 422 has been 
cited as demonstrating terrorist sophistication.  However, during 
this incident, when Beirut International Airport controllers 
denied landing clearance and blocked the runway, one terrorist 
demanded the pilot land in the ocean and taxi from there onto the 
land.  When the pilot argued that such a maneuver was impossible, 
the terrorist displayed the plastic safety card found in the back 
of all passenger seats and pointed to a drawing depicting a 
floating aircraft with passengers exiting and gathering on 
flotation equipment.  The terrorist firmly believed that this 
picture proved that the aircraft could land in the water, float, 
and then be driven onto land.                                     

     Such incidents clearly do not support the popular belief 
that all terrorists undergo extensive and detailed aircraft 
hijack training at so-called ``desert terrorist academies.'' 
However, these examples should not suggest that 
political/religious hostage takers are harmless or incompetent. 
These subjects, like all hostage takers, should be treated with 
the utmost caution and respect.  These unsophisticated, 
uneducated, and ill-trained young men have killed many innocent 
victims.  Indeed, they probably should be considered even more 
dangerous because of their inadequate preparation and the acts of 
violence they tend to commit when their plans do not materialize.  

The Law Enforcement Response                                      

     One question frequently asked by police officers during 
training sessions is, ``How would you negotiate differently 
during a terrorist incident?''  Once the distinction is made 
between kidnapping (where the location of subject and victim are 
typically unknown) and hostage taking (where the subject and 
victim are contained within a police perimeter), officers are 
surprised (or perhaps disappointed) to hear the answer. 
Basically, negotiation strategies and tactics for terrorist  
incidents are identical to those that would be used during any  
hostage or barricade incident, regardless of the political or  
religious backgrounds of the subjects.                            

     Simply stated, there are a finite number of strategies (and 
particular tactics to support each of those strategies) to choose 
from when negotiating with hostage takers that are contained and 
isolated.  The fact that a particular group of subjects puts 
forth political or religious reasons for taking hostages does not 
call into play a conceptually different set of strategies.  The 
negotiation team assesses the motives, demands, and behaviors of 
these hostage takers and makes recommendations to the on-scene 
commander as to the most appropriate strategy, drawn from the 
same set of possibilities as in any other hostage incident.       

     However, the specific factors the team considers crucial to 
a particular incident, in all cases, depends on the
circumstances of the hostage taking.  For example, suppose a
person, claiming harassment and persecution by Federal
authorities who are stealing thoughts from his mind, took
hostages in a public office building and threatened to kill the
hostages unless the FBI stopped the persecution.  The
negotiation team would logically focus on the subject's medical
history, seeking records of past treatment for mental
disturbance, interviewing any mental health professional (MHP)
who may have treated the subject, and perhaps using the MHP as a
consultant.  On the other hand, if a group of subjects took the
same hostages in the same building, but claimed to represent the
``People's Holy Liberation Forces,'' the team would certainly
value any information on the origins, composition, and any
previous actions by this group.  Knowledgeable sources on both
the political and religious dogma of the group, as well as
language experts, would be consulted and perhaps incorporated
into the negotiation team.  As one can see, the process of
assessment and recommendation remains the same, but clearly the
specific factors or issues that the team considers critical vary
with each incident.

     This is not to say that when a politically motivated 
incident occurs in the United States, there is not a greater 
amount of involvement by the higher levels of the U.S. 
Government, because there is.  In fact, ``The desire of
terrorists, both international and domestic, to focus media
attention on their causes by staging attacks at locations or
events of international interest has made it necessary for
governmental and law enforcement authorities to closely
coordinate their preparations for special events.'' (8)  That
involvement, however, does not call into play ``better,'' or
even different, negotiation strategies or principles.  The
negotiation recommendations are simply reviewed by a longer
chain of command.

     Even as long as 12 years ago, Stratton stated that social,
political or religious terrorists are the most difficult to deal
with because of their commitment. (9)  However, he also pointed out
that negotiation with political/religious hostage takers has
been successful.

     When hostage takers plan to be surrounded, as in the 
takeover of a public building, the probability of a prolonged 
incident increases and the risk to the hostages is considered to 
be very high.  However, notwithstanding the fact that such an 
incident was deliberately planned, the commitment of the hostage 
takers may not be a ``total'' commitment.  Post-incident review 
of the behavior of some of the hostage takers in planned 
political incidents indicates that there may be a difference in 
being ``willing'' to die for a cause and in ``wanting'' to die 
for a cause.  Once the subject has been away from a support 
system for days or weeks and emotional and physical exhaustion 
sets in, that person may be more willing to accept the rationale 
presented by the negotiator.                                      

     Political hostage takers have been negotiated with 
effectively by stressing that their point has been made, their 
demands have been heard, their cause has been ``aired'' to the 
world, and therefore, killing hostages would only serve to 
discredit them and their cause in the eyes of the public.  One 
author concludes that police negotiating tactics are most likely 
to succeed in planned, political/religious situations if the 
subjects are primarily interested in making a symbolic statement 
and obtaining publicity. (10)  These negotiation tactics have, in 
fact, been successful in resolving a number of planned 
political/religious hostage incidents in the United States and  
elsewhere. (11)  Even incidents that required a tactical 
resolution, such as the siege at the Iranian Embassy in London in 
April 1981, confirmed the appropriateness of these negotiating 
techniques.                                                 

Conclusion                                                        

     The dangers posed by planned political/religious hostage 
taking incidents should in no way be minimized.  Rather, law 
enforcement should respond to these incidents in a manner that 
is consistent with the crisis management procedures that have 
been developed and validated through thousands of 
hostage/barricade situations worldwide.                           

     If political/religious situations are accorded special  
status or are the cause for law enforcement to ignore effective  
crisis management strategies, then law enforcement falls victim 
to the ``terrorist mystique'' that has allowed terrorism to 
become a potent weapon in recent years.  However, if a planned 
political/religious incident is not treated as a special case, 
and  hostage takers instead are dealt with as any other high-risk 
subject would be, then law enforcement will be better able to 
employ the professional skills learned through the lessons of the 
past years.                                                       

FOOTNOTES                                                         

(1)   Oliver B. Revell, Terrorism:  A Law Enforcement Perspective 
(Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1988).                                             
     
(2)   Statements received from officers attending negotiation 
classes conducted by the Special Operations and Research Unit at 
the FBI Academy.                                                  
     
(3)   Participants from major U.S. cities, England, Germany, and 
Hong Kong during an advanced hostage negotiation seminar held at 
the FBI Academy in February 1989.                                 
     
(4)   FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 
1986, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Terrorist Research and 
Analytical Center, Washington, D.C., 1986.                        

(5)   Thomas Strentz, ``A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile:  Past 
and Present,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1987, pp. 
13-19.                                                            

(6)   Ibid.                                                       
     
(7)   Incidents included the Achille Lauro hijacking, the 
EgyptAir hijacking in Malta, the Rome and Vienna airport attacks, 
the bombing of TWA Flight 840, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 
in Karachi, Pakistan, The Royal Jordanian Airline hijacking, the 
hijacking of Kuwaiti Flights 221 and 422, and dozens of attacks 
directed against American diplomats and citizens worldwide.       
     
(8)   Supra note 1.                                               
     
(9)   John Stratton, ``The Terrorist Act of Hostage Taking:  A 
View of Violence and the Perpetrators,'' Police Science and 
Administration, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-9.                           
     
(10)  A.H. Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Boulder, 
Colorado:  Westview Press, 1980).                                 
     
(11)  Incidents included the seizure of a train by South 
Moluccans in the Netherlands in December 1975; the Balcombe 
Street siege by IRA members in London in December 1975; the
hijacking of TWA Flight 355 by Croatians in September 1976,
finally resolved in Paris; the Hanafi Muslim siege of three
buildings in Washington, D.C., in March 1977; the hostage taking
by Croatians at the West German Consulate in Chicago, Illinois,
in August 1978; the takeover of the Turkish Embassy by Armenians
in Ottawa, Canada, in March 1985; and the Oakdale, Louisiana,
and Atlanta, Georgia, prison sieges by Cuban inmates in
November/December 1987.