265 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
265 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
August 1990
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THE TACTICAL INCIDENT:
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A TOTAL POLICE RESPONSE
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By
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Nicholas F. Kaiser, M.A.
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Assistant Chief, Chief of Patrol
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Troy, New York, Police Department
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With the advent of police tactical units, police managers
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needed to consider new organizational structures within their
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departments. Accordingly, the development and testing of
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policies and procedures, along with opening new lines of
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authority and communications, became necessary. In fact,
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individual units adopted policies written especially for them.
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These individualized policies outlined how each unit would and
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could function. Specialization became the case in point.
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Today, tactical units remain vital to any department's
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response to a critical situation. However, they cannot operate
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within a vacuum and depend on the support of other units. The
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critical situation requires all police units to work as one, not
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as individual entities.
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Attaining this teamwork is essential to successfully contain
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a crisis situation. One way is to implement Standard Operating
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Procedures (SOPs) and policies that foster teamwork through a
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properly guided training program, briefings, and a sensitivity to
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feedback.
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Initiating these policies and SOPs alleviates or eliminates
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many of the problems managers encounter. For example, when an
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SOP clearly defines who has authority over the scene of an
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incident, and this is reinforced during training, authority
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probably will not be questioned during an actual crisis
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situation. (1) In the same way, establishing a team concept helps
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to minimize jealousy on the part of nontactical officers. (2)
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This article will discuss the importance of a coordinated
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response to crisis situations and the importance of each
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participating department in the incident. It will also discuss
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how training, initiating appropriate policies and procedures,
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feedback, and briefings can improve a police department's total
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response to crisis situations.
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TEAM RESPONSE TO A CRISIS
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Communications Officers
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The communications department is the initial point of
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contact in most crisis situations. In fact, the typical response
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begins with informing communications personnel, who then relay
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the facts to responding patrol units, investigators, tactical
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unit members, negotiators, and any other necessary personnel.
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The importance of clear, effective communication throughout the
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incident cannot be stressed enough. And, since most
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communication between units reacting to a critical incident is
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conducted through the communications officers, the role of this
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position in a crisis is essential to the team concept. In fact,
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most communication between units reacting to a critical incident
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is conducted through the communications officer.
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Patrol Units
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A responding patrol unit can resolve many calls before they
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escalate into a crisis situation. But, subsequent intelligence
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information and the use of proper containment procedures are
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essential should such a crisis emerge. An improper response by a
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responding unit could jeopardize the entire operation.
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The most crucial moment of any critical situation is in the
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hands of the first officer on the scene. (3) The objective of this
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officer is to isolate, analyze and contain the incident, request
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the tactical team if needed, and gather available intelligence.
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By initially assessing the scene with a concern for safety of
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citizens and officers, containing the subject(s) by establishing
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a preliminary inner perimeter, and gathering and relaying
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pertinent information, the first responding officer provides a
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vital link in the total police response to a critical situation.
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Investigators
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Usually, by the time the investigators arrive on the scene,
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the first responding officers have already gathered the
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intelligence and have contained the incident. This information
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often deals with the types of weapons involved, the location of
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suspect(s), and whether there are hostages. Investigators,
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therefore, must receive this information from these officers and
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then interview possible witnesses to update the intelligence.
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This information must then be made available to the other units
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involved, particularly the tactical unit whose mission and plan
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may be extremely dependent upon such information. Tactical units
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should not be their own intelligence arm and, as such, should
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rely upon others charged with this responsibility. (4)
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Tactical and Negotiation Personnel
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Certainly, the tactical unit and the hostage negotiation
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team are integral parts of any police department's response to a
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crisis. The tactical unit's role is essential should an
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incident escalate to a point wherein an organized assault may be
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needed. The same holds true for the hostage negotiation team.
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At this point in the crisis situation, all other units become
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dependent upon an organized assault unit working with an
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experienced negotiation team.
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Of course, every police manager would prefer to resolve
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these situations through skilled negotiation leading to a
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surrender of all offenders, but many times this is not the case
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and a tactical assault becomes the only alternative. In such
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instances, the tactical unit's mission is to protect all involved
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and to arrest or neutralize the suspect(s). Even so, other
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members of the department should be familiar with how tactical
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units operate and of their limitations when implementing a
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coordinated assault.
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K-9 Teams
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K-9 teams have also proven themselves to be useful in
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tactical situations. (5) They can be used to locate barricaded
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suspects, as part of entry and arrest teams, as diversions, and
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as psychological threats. (6) As with tactical units, other units
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must also be familiar with the use of K-9 teams so that the
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total police response can be effectively coordinated.
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METHODS FOR IMPROVING TEAM RESPONSE
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Training
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Proper training provides the foundation upon which to build
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a formidable response to critical situations. In most
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departments, the tactical unit trains on a regular basis,
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sometimes with hostage negotiators, K-9 and other specialized
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units. Unfortunately, most departments do not involve patrol
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officers or investigators in this type of training. For tactical
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unit members, while the need for training with special tactical
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weapons and tools must not be underemphasized, training with
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other units that respond to crisis situations should also be on a
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regular basis. By involving these other units in the training
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program, proper responses can be ensured.
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During training, the tactical unit should also demonstrate
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the use of various devices, such as diversionary devices, machine
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guns, and door-breaching, so that others may understand the
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benefits and limitations of each. As a result, the confidence of
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other officers in the tactical unit and in their equipment will
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be reinforced.
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Inservice training, with a block of instruction on crisis
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situations, can also be useful. Departments should consider
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involving all units in true-to-life scenario training at least
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twice a year. However, care should be taken to ensure that all
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officers understand the nature of their roles and how their
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performance relates to the others. Video tapes of these training
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sessions can be especially helpful.
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Policies and Procedures
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Many departments lack comprehensive policies for the
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coordination of tactical operations. Therefore, departments
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should specify policies, SOPs, and procedures for tactical
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situations, such as the division of labor between each unit and
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how individual units fit into the entire plan. In addition,
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since lines of authority may change at the scene of a critical
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incident, a written policy covering this area would effectively
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coordinate the operation and avoid confusion as to who is in
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command. These principles regarding command should be clearly
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stated in the department's SOPs and reinforced in training and
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debriefings.
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Outside Feedback
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Being sensitive to constructive criticism from sources
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outside the department can be useful in formulating an objective
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plan for improvement. For example, almost without exception,
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crises capture the media's attention. In fact, the media often
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will initiate a series of editorials as to how the incident might
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have been handled better. In this case, it is important to not
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become defensive and to remain as objective as possible in order
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to respond carefully to each commentary. Many times, useful
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information can be obtained from such editorials and can be used
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in future training.
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Briefings and Debriefings
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Each critical incident must be viewed as an opportunity to
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learn and to prepare for the next event. Briefings and
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debriefings, in particular, can be very effective in this regard
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and can also help to solidify cooperation among various units.
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Even though incidents occur without warning, thereby eliminating
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a complete, formal briefing, all officers should be briefed
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whenever possible in order to reduce the possibility of
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misunderstandings. For example, perimeter personnel should be
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advised of the tactical unit's intention to use diversionary
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devices so that their use would not be misinterpreted as
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unfriendly fire.
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Accordingly, not only must the tactical unit debrief after
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each encounter, but everyone involved, such as patrol officers,
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investigators, K-9, and communications officers, should also
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participate in debriefings. When these debriefings take place,
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officers should discuss what went wrong and, equally as
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important, what went right during a critical incident. Even
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though strong emotions may arise, such as anger or fear, the end
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result will ultimately be objective learning.
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The normal course of events at a debriefing usually includes
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recognizing problems and successes, admitting any problems
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internally, admitting the problem to others, and developing a
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solution. This can be difficult, because the tendency to blame
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others or oneself is hard to resist. But, objectivity and an
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emphasis on learning will result in a successful debriefing in
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most cases. Then, the various units should examine the overall
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plan and each officer involved must identify any mistakes.
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Finally, all the involved units should determine how to better
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handle the problems that arose during this particular critical
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incident should they reoccur.
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CONCLUSION
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Increased specialization in police departments across the
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country enables them to respond to unusual situations with more
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expertise. However, there are still instances where cooperation
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erodes at the scene of a crisis situation. But, with a specific
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departmental plan that includes established policies and SOPs,
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police departments can avoid disadvantages of this nature and can
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develop and use their various skills to the fullest.
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As time passes, the introduction of new technologies will
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bring even more increased specialization to law enforcement.
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Therefore, it has become more important that each specialty work
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cooperatively with others in the pursuit of law enforcement
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goals. Only through teamwork and close cooperation between all
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law enforcement specialties can law enforcement agencies
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successfully conclude crisis situations.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) James W. Stevens and David W. MacKenna, ``Assignment and
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Coordination of Tactical Units,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
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vol. 58, No. 3, March 1989, pp. 2-9.
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(2) Ibid.
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(3) John T. Dolan and G. Dwayne Fuselier, ``A Guide for First
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Responders to Hostage Situations,'' FBI Law Enforcement
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Bulletin, vol. 58, No.4, April 1989, pp. 9-13.
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(4) Captain Wade Y. Ishimoto, ``Intelligence Support of SWAT
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Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp.
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7-11.
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(5) VanNess H. Bogardus, III, ``The Application of K-9's to
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SWAT Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 1983,
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pp. 19-22.
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(6) Donn Kraemer, ``The Application of Police Canines to
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Tactical Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 5, No. 1, Winter
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1987, pp. 39-41.
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