299 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
299 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
The recent discussion on email privacy provoked me into trying to formalize the
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employee privacy policy we have here at Digital Research. Currently, there is
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nothing in writing concerning any privacy issues. Here are some references I
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have found which some of you might find interesting. In addition, I've just
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come across some references to Computerworld articles (Jan 14, 1991; Aug 13,
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1990) which I will summarize under separate cover. I've divided case
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sightings into two groups: US Constitutional law, and California law.
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In addition, PLEASE NOTE that I am cross posting this to misc.legal. PLEASE
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EDIT YOUR HEADERS when posting follow ups so that the postings are delivered to
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appropriate news groups.
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====
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I. U.S. Constitution
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"... [S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
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by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
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substance. ... Various guarantees create *zones of privacy*. The right
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of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one
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..."
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[Griswold v Connecticut, US Supreme Court, 1965]
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"The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In
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a line of decisions, however, ... the Court has recognized that a
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*right of personal privacy*, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
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of privacy, does exist under the Constiution. This right of privacy
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... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
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terminate her pregnancy."
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{note: discussion on abortsions to appropriate news groups,
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please}
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[Roe v. Wade, US Supreme Court, 1973]
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"Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
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work or the government instead of a private employer. The operational
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reality of the workplace, however, may make *some* employee's
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expectations of privacy unreasonable ... Public employees' expectations
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of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
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expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by
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virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
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regulation. ... Given the great variety of work environments in the
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public sector, the question of whether an employee has a *reasonable
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expectation of privacy* must be addressed on a case-by-case basis."
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[Majority Opinion, O'Conner v. Ortega, US Supreme
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Court, 1987]
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"... [T]he reality of work in modern time, whether done by public or
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private employees, erveals why a public employee's *expectation of
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privacy* in the workplace *should be carefully safeguarded* and not
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lightly set aside. It is, unfortunately, all too true that the
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workplace has become another home for most working Americans. Many
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employees spend the better part of their days and much of their
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evenings at work. ... Consequently, an employee's private life must
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intersect with the workplace, for example, when the employee takes
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advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal telephone calls, to
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attend to personal business, or to receive personal vistors in the
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office. As a result, th etidy distuctions ... between the workplace
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and professional affairs, on the one hand, and personal possessions and
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private activities, on the other, do not exist in reality."
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[Dissenting Opinion, O'Conner v. Ortega (above)]
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"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
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the passing of urine. most people describe it by euphemisms if they
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talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without
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public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally
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prohibited by law as well as social custom. ... Because it is clear
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that the collection and testion of urine intrudes upon *expectations of
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privacy that society has long recognized* as reasonable, ... we agree
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that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
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Amendment. ...
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The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but
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only those that are unreasonable. ... The expectation of privacy of
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(railroad) employees are diminished by reason of their particiption in
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an industry that is regularted pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
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dependent, in substatial part, on the health oand fitness of employees.
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... We conclude, therefore, that the testing procedures pose only
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limited threats to the *justifiable expectations of privacy* of covered
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employees. By contrast, the government interest in testing ... is
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complelling. Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught
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with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of
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attention can have disastrous consequences."
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[Majority Opinion, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
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Assoc., US Supreme Court, 1989]
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"... [T]he majority today joins those shortsighted courst which have
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allowed basic consitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
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emergencies. ... The majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine
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testing ensures that the first, and worse, casualty of the war on drugs
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will be the precious liberties of our citizens. ... There is no drug
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exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism
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exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of
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domestic unrest. ... The immediate victims of the majority's
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constiutional timorousness will be those railroad workers whose bodily
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fluids the Government may now forcibly collect and analyze. But
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ultimately, totday's decision will reduce the *privacy all citizans
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may enjoy*, for, as Justice Holmes understood, principles of law, once
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bent, do not snap back easily."
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[Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion, Skinner v.
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Railway Laber Executive's Assoc., (above)]
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"Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general,
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employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
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effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much of the same is
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true of employees who are required to carry fireamrs. Because
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successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their
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judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to
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keep from the (Customs) Service personal information that bears
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directly on their fitness. While reasonable tests designed to elicit
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this information doubtless infinge some *privacy expectations*, we do
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not believe these expectations outweigh the Government's compelling
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interest in safety and in the integrity of our borders."
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[Majority Opinion, National Treasury Employees Union v.
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Von Raab, US Supreme Court, 1989]
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"In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of
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*privacy and human dignity* in symbolic opposition to drug use. ...
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What better way to show that the Government is serious about its 'war
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on drugs' than to subject its employees on the front line of that war
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to this invasion of their privacy and affont to their dignity? ...
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Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
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when the Goverment's purposes are beneficent. ... Those who lose
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because of lack of understanding that begot the present exercise in
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symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity is
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thus offended, but all of us -- who suffer a coarsening of our national
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manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content ..."
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[Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion, National Treasury
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Employees Union v. Von Raab (above)]
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"The constitutional right of any citizen not to be searched without a
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reasonable basis of individual suspicion is basic to our freedome.
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Preservaction of this right was crucial to the creation of our form of
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government when we revolted from a system that failed to honor it. If
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a serious problem arises there is often a temptation to solve it by
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relaxing Fourth Amendment protections. Just as a beautiful sand dune
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crumbles if continously eroded by ocean waves, so will *this essential,
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precious right* become a victim if it is modified at times of stress.
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... [T]he requirement compelling all attorneys accepted for employment
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int he (Justice) Department's Antitrus Division to submit to a
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pre-screening urine druge test in absence of any basis for
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individualized suspicion of druge use offends the Fourth Amendment and
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is invalid ..."
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[Willner v. Thornburgh, US District Court for DC, 1990]
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"No matter how carefully tailored, all urinalysis programs implicate
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*serious privacy concerns*. ... We readily agree that pre-employment,
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reasonable suspicion, post-accident, and post-rehabilitation tests ...
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are less intrusive (than random testing) because they are triggered by
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the employee's own acto or conduct, or by a definable event. The
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absence of individualized suspicion increases the intrusiveness of
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testing on an employee's privacy. We conclude, however, that ... the
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privacy interest implicated by random testing in the pipeline industry
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is outweighed by the goverment's interest in detecting and deterring
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drug use."
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[IBEW Local 1234 v. Skinner, Ninth Circuit, 1990]
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II. California Constitution
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"In November 1972, the voters of California specifically amended
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article I, section 1 of our state Constitution to include among the
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various 'inalienable' rights of 'all people' the *right of 'privacy.'*
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Although the general concept of privacy relates, of course, to an
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*enormously broad and diverse* field of personal action and belief, the
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moving force behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused
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privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal
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freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data
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collection activity in contemporary society."
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[White v. Davis, Cal. Supreme Court, 1975]
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"The *breadth of the concept of privacy* ... has been upheld in a
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multitude of fact contexts but as yet remains a concept of as yet
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'undetermined parameters' albeit in process of almost daily growth. ...
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A Person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely mor
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eintimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already
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judicially recognized and protected. ... The state of a person's
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gastointestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized
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public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the
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contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP."
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[From Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, Cal
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Court of Appeal, 1979]
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"The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a
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fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our
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families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our
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personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate
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with the people we choose. This righ tshould be abridged only when
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there is a compelling public need. ... If there is a *quintessential
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zone of human privacy* it is the mind. Our ability to exclude others
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from our mental processes is intrinsic to hte human personality. ... A
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polygraph examination is specifically designed to overcome this privacy
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by compelling communication of thoughts, sentiments and emotions which
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the examinee may have chosen not to communicate."
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[Long Beach City Employees Assoc v. City of Long Beach,
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Cal Supreme Court, 1986]
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"The question of drug testing obviously implicates *important personal
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rights.* To the best of our knowledge, however, no court has held that
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the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be negotiated
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away..."
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[Utility Workers Local 246 v. Souther California Edison
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Co., Ninth Circuit, 1988]
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"Common experience with the increasing use of computers in contemporary
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society confirms that (article I, section 1) was needed and intended
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to *safeguard individuals' privacy* from intrusion by both private and
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governmental action. That common experience makes it only too evident
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that personal privacy is threatened by the information-gathering
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capabilities and activities not just of the government, but of private
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business as well. If the right of privacy is to exist as more than a
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memory or a dream, the power of both public and private insitutions to
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collect and preserve data about individual citizens must be subject to
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constiutional control. ...
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The general concept of privacy can be viewed as encompassing a broad
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range of peronal action and belief. However, that right, much as any
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other constiutional right, is not absolute. A court must engage in a
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balancing of interests rather than a deduction from principle to
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determine its boundaries. ... Stated another way, a court should not
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play the trump card of unconstutionality to protect absolutely every
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assertion of individual privacy."
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[Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., Cal Court of Appeal,
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1989]
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"While an employee sacrifices some privacy rights when he enters the
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workplace, the employee's privacy expecations must be balanced agains
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the employer's interests. ... The *right of privacy* is unquestionably
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*a fundamental interest of our society*. ... We think that thtere is a
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public policy concern in an individual's right to privacy. ... While
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rights are won and lost by the individual actions of people, the
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assertion of the right establishes it and benefits all Californians in
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the same way that an assertion of free speech right benefits all of
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us."
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[Semore v. Pool, Cal Court of Appeal, 1990]
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"... California accords *privacy* the constitutional status of *an
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inalienable right*, on a par with defending life and possessing
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property. ... The constitutional right to privacy does not prohibit
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all incursion into individual privacy, but provides that any such
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intervention must be justified by a compelling interest."
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[Luck v. Souther Pacific Transportation Co., Cal Court
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of Appeal, 1990]
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"(Plaintiff) contends that the California right to privacy is not
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negotiable and cannot be affected by a collective bargaining agreement.
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We have expressly declined to construe *California's privacy guarantee*
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as a non-waiveable right. ... The right to privacy under California
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law is based in major part upon the parties' reasonable expecations and
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these, of necessity, involve the working conditions agreed upon in the
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collective baraining agreement."
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[Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., Ninth Circuit, 1990]
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--
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kral * 408/647-6112 * ...!uunet!drivax!braun * braun@dri.com
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"Talking trash, touching on truth" -- Micheal Hedges "1-900-I-LUV-YOU"
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Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
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