571 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
571 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
Path: uuwest!spies!apple!decwrl!fernwood!geoff
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From: geoff@fernwood.mpk.ca.us (Geoff Goodfellow)
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Newsgroups: comp.misc,misc.legal,alt.bbs,alt.cosuard
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Subject: LEGAL OVERVIEW - THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
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Message-ID: <5123@fernwood.mpk.ca.us>
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Date: 10 Jul 90 14:58:58 GMT
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Followup-To: eff@well.sf.ca.us
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Organization: Anterior Technology, Menlo Park, CA USA
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Lines: 560
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LEGAL OVERVIEW
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THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
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Advances in computer technology have brought us to a new frontier in
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communications, where the law is largely unsettled and woefully
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inadequate to deal with the problems and challenges posed by electronic
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technology. How the law develops in this area will have a direct impact
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on the electronic communications experiments and innovations being
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devised day in and day out by millions of citizens on both a large and
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small scale from coast to coast. Reasonable balances have to be struck
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among:
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% traditional civil liberties
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% protection of intellectual property
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% freedom to experiment and innovate
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% protection of the security and integrity of computer
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systems from improper governmental and private
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interference.
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Striking these balances properly will not be easy, but if they are
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struck too far in one direction or the other, important social and legal
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values surely will be sacrificed.
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Helping to see to it that this important and difficult task is done
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properly is a major goal of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It is
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critical to assure that these lines are drawn in accordance with the
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fundamental constitutional rights that have protected individuals from
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government excesses since our nation was founded -- freedom of speech,
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press, and association, the right to privacy and protection from
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unwarranted governmental intrusion, as well as the right to procedural
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fairness and due process of law.
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The First Amendment
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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
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government from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," and
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guarantees freedom of association as well. It is widely considered to
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be the single most important of the guarantees contained in the Bill of
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Rights, since free speech and association are fundamental in securing
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all other rights.
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The First Amendment throughout history has been challenged by every
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important technological development. It has enjoyed only a mixed record
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of success. Traditional forms of speech -- the print media and public
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speaking -- have enjoyed a long and rich history of freedom from
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governmental interference. The United States Supreme Court has not
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afforded the same degree of freedom to electronic broadcasting,
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however.
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Radio and television communications, for example, have been subjected to
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regulation and censorship by the Federal Communications Commission
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(FCC), and by the Congress. The Supreme Court initially justified
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regulation of the broadcast media on technological grounds -- since
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there were assumed to be a finite number of radio and television
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frequencies, the Court believed that regulation was necessary to prevent
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interference among frequencies and to make sure that scarce resources
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were allocated fairly. The multiplicity of cable TV networks has
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demonstrated the falsity of this "scarce resource" rationale, but the
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Court has expressed a reluctance to abandon its outmoded approach
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without some signal from Congress or the FCC.
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Congress has not seemed overly eager to relinquish even
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counterproductive control over the airwaves. Witness, for example,
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legislation and rule-making in recent years that have kept even
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important literature, such as the poetry of Allen Ginsberg, from being
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broadcast on radio because of language deemed "offensive" to regulators.
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Diversity and experimentation have been sorely hampered by these rules.
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The development of computer technology provides the perfect opportunity
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for lawmakers and courts to abandon much of the distinction between the
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print and electronic media and to extend First Amendment protections to
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all communications regardless of the medium. Just as the multiplicity
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of cable lines has rendered obsolete the argument that television has to
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be regulated because of a scarcity of airwave frequencies, so has the
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ready availability of virtually unlimited computer communication
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modalities made obsolete a similar argument for harsh controls in this
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area. With the computer taking over the role previously played by the
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typewriter and the printing press, it would be a constitutional disaster
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of major proportions if the treatment of computers were to follow the
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history of regulation of radio and television, rather than the history
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of freedom of the press.
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To the extent that regulation is seen as necessary and proper, it should
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foster the goal of allowing maximum freedom, innovation and
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experimentation in an atmosphere where no one's efforts are sabotaged by
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either government or private parties. Regulation should be limited by
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the adage that quite aptly describes the line that separates reasonable
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from unreasonable regulation in the First Amendment area: "Your liberty
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ends at the tip of my nose."
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As usual, the law lags well behind the development of technology. It is
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important to educate lawmakers and judges about new technologies, lest
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fear and ignorance of the new and unfamiliar, create barriers to free
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communication, expression, experimentation, innovation, and other such
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values that help keep a nation both free and vigorous.
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The Fourth Amendment
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects, agaihe warrant
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demonstrates the existen Oath or
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
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zed." In short, the scope of the search
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has to be as narrow as possible, and there has to be good reason to
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believe that the search will turn up evidence of illegal activity.
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The meaning of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee has evolved over time in
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response to changing technologies. For example, while the Fourth
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Amendment was first applied to prevent the government from trespassing
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onto private property and seizing tangible objects, the physical
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trespass rationale was made obsolete by the development of electronic
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eavesdropping devices which permitted the government to "seize" an
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individual's words without ever treading onto that person's private
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property. To put the matter more concretely, while the drafters of the
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First Amendment surely knew nothing about electronic databases, surely
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they would have considered one's database to be as sacrosanct as, for
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example, the contents of one's private desk or filing cabinet.
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The Supreme Court responded decades ago to these types of technological
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challenges by interpreting the Fourth Amendment more broadly to prevent
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governmental violation of an individual's reasonable expectation of
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privacy, a concept that transcended the narrow definition of one's
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private physical space. It is now well established that an individual
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has a reasonable expectation of privacy, not only in his or her home
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and business, but also in private communications. Thus, for example:
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% Government wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are now limited
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by state and federal statutes enacted to effectuate and even to expand
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upon Fourth Amendment protections.
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% More recently, the Fourth Amendment has been used, albeit with
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limited success, to protect individuals from undergoing certain random
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mandatory drug testing imposed by governmental authorities.
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Advancements in technology have also worked in the opposite direction,
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to diminish expectations of privacy that society once considered
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reasonable, and thus have helped limit the scope of Fourth Amendment
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protections. Thus, while one might once have reasonably expected
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privacy in a fenced-in field, the Supreme Court has recently told us
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that such an expectation is not reasonable in an age of surveillance
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facilitated by airplanes and zoom lenses.
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Applicability of Fourth Amendment to computer media
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Just as the Fourth Amendment has evolved in response to changing
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technologies, so it must now be interpreted to protect the reasonable
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expectation of privacy of computer users in, for example, their
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electronic mail or electronically stored secrets. The extent to which
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government intrusion into these private areas should be allowed, ought
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to be debated openly, fully, and intelligently, as the Congress seeks to
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legislate in the area, as courts decide cases, and as administrative,
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regulatory, and prosecutorial agencies seek to establish their turf.
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One point that must be made, but which is commonly misunderstood, is
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that the Bill of Rights seeks to protect citizens from privacy invasions
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committed by the government, but, with very few narrow exceptions, these
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protections do not serve to deter private citizens from doing what the
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government is prohibited from doing. In short, while the Fourth
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Amendment limits the government's ability to invade and spy upon private
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databanks, it does not protect against similar invasions by private
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parties. Protection of citizens from the depredations of other citizens
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requires the passage of privacy legislation.
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The Fifth Amendment
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The Fifth Amendment assures citizens that they will not "be deprived of
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and that private
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property shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation."
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This Amendment thus protects both the sanctity of private property and
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the right of citizens to be proceeded against by fair means before they
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may be punished for alleged infractions of the law.
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One aspect of due process of law is that citizens not be prosecuted for
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alleged violations of laws that are so vague that persons of reasonable
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intelligence cannot be expected to assume that some prosecutor will
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charge that his or her conduct is criminal. A hypothetical law, for
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example, that makes it a crime to do "that which should not be done",
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would obviously not pass constitutional muster under the Fifth
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Amendment. Yet the application of some existing laws to new situations
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that arise in the electronic age is only slightly less problematic than
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the hypothetical, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation plans to
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monitor the process by which old laws are modified, and new laws are
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crafted, to meet modern situations.
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One area in which old laws and new technologies have already clashed and
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are bound to continue to clash, is the application of federal criminal
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laws against the interstate transportation of stolen property. The
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placement on an electronic bulletin board of arguably propriety computer
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files, and the "re-publication" of such material by those with access to
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the bulletin board, might well expose the sponsor of the bulletin board
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as well as all participants to federal felony charges, if the U.S.
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Department of Justice can convince the courts to give these federal laws
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a broad enough reading. Similarly, federal laws protecting against
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wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping clearly have to be updated to
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take into account electronic bulletin board technology, lest those who
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utilize such means of communication should be assured of reasonable
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privacy from unwanted government surveillance.
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Summary
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The problem of melding old but still valid concepts of constitutional
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rights, with new and rapidly evolving technologies, is perhaps best
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summed up by the following observation. Twenty-five years ago there was
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not much question but that the First Amendment prohibited the government
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from seizing a newspaper's printing press, or a writer's typewriter, in
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order to prevent the publication of protected speech. Similarly, the
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government would not have been allowed to search through, and seize,
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one's private papers stored in a filing cabinet, without first
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convincing a judge that probable cause existed to believe that evidence
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of crime would be found.
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Today, a single computer is in reality a printing press, typewriter, and
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filing cabinet (and more) all wrapped up in one. How the use and output
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of this device is treated in a nation governed by a Constitution that
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protects liberty as well as private property, is a major challenge we
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face. How well we allow this marvelous invention to continue to be
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developed by creative minds, while we seek to prohibit or discourage
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truly abusive practices, will depend upon the degree of wisdom that
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guides our courts, our legislatures, and governmental agencies entrusted
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with authority in this area of our national life.
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For further information regarding The Bill of Rights please contact:
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Harvey Silverglate
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Silverglate & Good
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89 Broad Street, 14th Floor
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Boston, MA 02110
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617/542-6663
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ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
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LEGAL CASE SUMMARY
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July 10, 1990
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation is currently providing litigation
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support in two cases in which it perceived there to be substantial civil
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liberties concerns which are likely to prove important in the overall
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legal scheme by which electronic communications will, now and in the
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future, be governed, regulated, encouraged, and protected.
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Steve Jackson Games
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Steve Jackson Games is a small, privately owned adventure game
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manufacturer located in Austin, Texas. Like most businesses today,
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Steve Jackson Games uses computers for word processing and bookkeeping.
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In addition, like many other manufacturers, the company operates an
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electronic bulletin board to advertise and to obtain feedback on its
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product ideas and lines.
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One of the company's most recent products is GURPS CYBERPUNK, a science
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fiction role-playing game set in a high-tech futuristic world. The
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rules of the game are set out in a game book. Playing of the game is
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not performed on computers and does not make use of computers in any
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way. This game was to be the company's most important first quarter
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release, the keystone of its line.
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On March 1, 1990, just weeks before GURPS CYBERPUNK was due to be
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released, agents of the United States Secret Service raided the premises
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of Steve Jackson Games. The Secret Service:
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% seized three of the company's computers which were used in the
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drafting and designing of GURPS CYBERPUNK, including the computer used
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to run the electronic bulletin board,
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% took all of the company software in the neighborhood of the computers
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taken,
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% took with them company business records which were located on the
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computers seized, and
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% destructively ransacked the company's warehouse, leaving many items
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in disarray.
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In addition, all working drafts of the soon-to-be-published GURPS
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CYBERPUNK game book -- on disk and in hard-copy manuscript form -- were
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confiscated by the authorities. One of the Secret Service agents told
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Steve Jackson that the GURPS CYBERPUNK science fiction fantasy game book
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was a, "handbook for computer crime."
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Steve Jackson Games was temporarily shut down. The company was forced
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to lay-off half of its employees and, ever since the raid, has operated
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on relatively precarious ground.
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Steve Jackson Games, which has not been involved in any illegal activity
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insofar as the Foundation's inquiries have been able to determine, tried
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in vain for over three months to find out why its property had been
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seized, why the property was being retained by the Secret Service long
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after it should have become apparent to the agents that GURPS CYBERPUNK
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and everything else in the company's repertoire were entirely lawful and
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innocuous, and when the company's vital materials would be returned. In
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late June of this year, after attorneys for the Electronic Frontier
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Foundation became involved in the case, the Secret Service finally
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returned most of the property, but retained a number of documents,
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including the seized drafts of GURPS CYBERPUNKS.
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The Foundation is presently seeking to find out the basis for the search
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warrant that led to the raid on Steve Jackson Games. Unfortunately, the
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application for that warrant remains sealed by order of the court. The
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Foundation is making efforts to unseal those papers in order to find out
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what it was that the Secret Service told a judicial officer that
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prompted that officer to issue the search warrant.
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Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a search
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warrant may be lawfully issued only if the information presented to the
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court by the government agents demonstrates "probable cause" to believe
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that evidence of criminal conduct would be found on the premises to be
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searched. Unsealing the search warrant application should enable the
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Foundation's lawyers, representing Steve Jackson Games, to determine the
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theory by which Secret Service Agents concluded or hypothesized that
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either the GURPS CYBERPUNK game or any of the company's computerized
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business records constituted criminal activity or contained evidence of
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criminal activity.
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Whatever the professed basis of the search, its scope clearly seems to
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have been unreasonably broad. The wholesale seizure of computer
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software, and subsequent rummaging through its contents, is precisely
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the sort of general search that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
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prohibit.
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If it is unlawful for government agents to indiscriminately seize all of
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the hard-copy filing cabinets on a business premises -- which it surely
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is -- that the same degree of protection should apply to businesses
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that store information electronically.
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The Steve Jackson Games situation appears to involve First Amendment
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violations as well. The First Amendment to the United States
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Constitution prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of
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speech, or of the press". The government's apparent attempt to prevent
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the publication of the GURPS CYBERPUNK game book by seizing all copies
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of all drafts in all media prior to publication, violated the First
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Amendment. The particular type of First Amendment violation here is the
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single most serious type, since the government, by seizing the very
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material sought to be published, effectuated what is known in the law as
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a "prior restraint" on speech. This means that rather than allow the
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material to be published and then seek to punish it, the government
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sought instead to prevent publication in the first place. (This is not
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to say, of course, that anything published by Steve Jackson Games could
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successfully have been punished. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the
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case, since SJG's business seems to be entirely lawful.) In any effort
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to restrain publication, the government bears an extremely heavy burden
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of proof before a court is permitted to authorize a prior restraint.
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Indeed, in its 200-year history, the Supreme Court has never upheld a
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prior restraint on the publication of material protected by the First
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Amendment, warning that such efforts to restrain publication are
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presumptively unconstitutional. For example, the Department of Justice
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was unsuccessful in 1971 in obtaining the permission of the Supreme
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Court to enjoin The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston
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Globe from publishing the so-called Pentagon Papers, which the
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government strenuously argued should be enjoined because of a perceived
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threat to national security. (In 1979, however, the government sought
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to prevent The Progressive magazine from publishing an article
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purporting to instruct the reader as to how to manufacture an atomic
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bomb. A lower federal court actually imposed an order for a temporary
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prior restraint that lasted six months. The Supreme Court never had an
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opportunity to issue a full ruling on the constitutionality of that
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restraint, however, because the case was mooted when another newspaper
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published the article.)
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Governmental efforts to restrain publication thus have been met by
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vigorous opposition in the courts. A major problem posed by the
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government's resort to the expedient of obtaining a search warrant,
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therefore, is that it allows the government to effectively prevent or
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delay publication without giving the citizen a ready opportunity to
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oppose that effort in court.
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The Secret Service managed to delay, and almost to prevent, the
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publication of an innocuous game book by a legitimate company -- not by
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asking a court for a prior restraint order that it surely could not have
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obtained, but by asking instead for a search warrant, which it obtained
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all too readily.
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The seizure of the company's computer hardware is also problematic, for
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it prevented the company not only from publishing GURPS CYBERPUNK, but
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also from operating its electronic bulletin board. The government's
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action in shutting down such an electronic bulletin board is the
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functional equivalent of shutting down printing presses of The New York
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Times or The Washington Post in order to prevent publication of The
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Pentagon Papers. Had the government sought a court order closing down
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the electronic bulletin board, such an order effecting a prior restraint
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almost certainly would have been refused. Yet by obtaining the search
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warrant, the government effected the same result.
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This is a stark example of how electronic media suffer under a less
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stringent standard of constitutional protection than applies to the
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print media -- for no apparent reason, it would appear, other than the
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fact that government agents and courts do not seem to readily equate
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computers with printing presses and typewriters. It is difficult to
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understand a difference between these media that should matter for
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constitutional protection purposes. This is one of the challenges
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facing the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation will continue to press for return of
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the remaining property of Steve Jackson Games and will take formal
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steps, if necessary, to determine the factual basis for the search.
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The purpose of these efforts is to establish law applying the First and
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Fourth Amendments to electronic media, so as to protect in the future
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Steve Jackson Games as well as other individuals and businesses from
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the devastating effects of unlawful and unconstitutional government
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intrusion upon and interference with protected property and speech
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rights.
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United States v. Craig Neidorf
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Craig Neidorf is a 20-year-old student at the University of Missouri who
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has been indicted by the United States on several counts of interstate
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wire fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property in
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connection with his activities as editor and publisher of the
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electronic magazine, Phrack.
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The indictment charges Neidorf with: (1) wire fraud and interstate
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transportation of stolen property for the republication in Phrack of
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information which was allegedly illegally obtained through the accessing
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of a computer system without authorization, though it was obtained not
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by Neidorf but by a third party; and (2) wire fraud for the publication
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of an announcement of a computer conference and for the publication of
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articles which allegedly provide some suggestions on how to bypass
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security in some computer systems.
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The information obtained without authorization is a file relating to the
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provision of 911 emergency telephone services that was allegedly removed
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from the BellSouth computer system without authorization. It is
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important to note that neither the indictment, nor any briefs filed in
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this case by the government, contain any factual allegation or
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contention that Neidorf was involved in or participated in the removal
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of the 911 file.
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These indictments raise substantial constitutional issues which have
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significant impact on the uses of new computer communications
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technologies. The prosecution of an editor or publisher, under
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generalized statutes like wire fraud and interstate transportation of
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stolen property, for the publication of information received lawfully,
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which later turns out to be have been "stolen," presents an
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unprecedented threat to the freedom of the press. The person who should
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be prosecuted is the thief, and not a publisher who subsequently
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receives and publishes information of public interest. To draw an
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analogy to the print media, this would be the equivalent of prosecuting
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The New York Times and The Washington Post for publishing the Pentagon
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Papers when those papers were dropped off at the doorsteps of those
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newspapers.
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Similarly, the prosecution of a publisher for wire fraud arising out of
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the publication of articles that allegedly suggested methods of
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unlawful activity is also unprecedented. Even assuming that the
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|
articles here did advocate unlawful activity, advocacy of unlawful
|
|
activity cannot constitutionally be the basis for a criminal
|
|
prosecution, except where such advocacy is directed at producing
|
|
imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite such action. The
|
|
articles here simply do not fit within this limited category. The
|
|
Supreme Court has often reiterated that in order for advocacy to be
|
|
criminalized, the speech must be such that the words trigger an
|
|
immediate action. Criminal prosecutions such as this pose an extreme
|
|
hazard for First Amendment rights in all media of communication, as it
|
|
has a chilling effect on writers and publishers who wish to discuss the
|
|
ramifications of illegal activity, such as information describing
|
|
illegal activity or describing how a crime might be committed.
|
|
|
|
In addition, since the statutes under which Neidorf is charged clearly
|
|
do not envision computer communications, applying them to situations
|
|
such as that found in the Neidorf case raises fundamental questions of
|
|
fair notice -- that is to say, the publisher or computer user has no
|
|
way of knowing that his actions may in fact be a violation of criminal
|
|
law. The judge in the case has already conceded that "no court has
|
|
ever held that the electronic transfer of confidential, proprietary
|
|
business information from one computer to another across state lines
|
|
constitutes a violation of [the wire fraud statute]." The Due Process
|
|
Clause prohibits the criminal prosecution of one who has not had fair
|
|
notice of the illegality of his action. Strict adherence to the
|
|
requirements of the Due Process Clause also minimizes the risk of
|
|
selective or arbitrary enforcement, where prosecutors decide what
|
|
conduct they do not like and then seek some statute that can be
|
|
stretched by some theory to cover that conduct.
|
|
|
|
Government seizure and liability of bulletin board systems
|
|
|
|
During the recent government crackdown on computer crime, the government
|
|
has on many occasions seized the computers which operate bulletin board
|
|
systems ("BBSs"), even though the operator of the bulletin board is not
|
|
suspected of any complicity in any alleged criminal activity. The
|
|
government seizures go far beyond a "prior restraint" on the publication
|
|
of any specific article, as the seizure of the computer equipment of a
|
|
BBS prevents the BBS from publishing at all on any subject. This akin
|
|
to seizing the word processing and computerized typesetting equipment
|
|
of The New York Times for publishing the Pentagon Papers, simply because
|
|
the government contends that there may be information relating to the
|
|
commission of a crime on the system. Thus, the government does not
|
|
simply restrain the publication of the "offending" document, but it
|
|
seizes the means of production of the First Amendment activity so that
|
|
no more stories of any type can be published.
|
|
|
|
The government is allowed to seize "instrumentalities of crime," and a
|
|
bulletin board and its associated computer system could arguably be
|
|
called an instrumentality of crime if individuals used its private
|
|
e-mail system to send messages in furtherance of criminal activity.
|
|
However, even if the government has a compelling interest in interfering
|
|
with First Amendment protected speech, it can only do so by the least
|
|
restrictive means. Clearly, the wholesale seizure and retention of a
|
|
publication's means of production, i.e., its computer system, is not the
|
|
least restrictive alternative. The government obviously could seize
|
|
the equipment long enough to make a copy of the information stored on
|
|
the hard disk and to copy any other disks and documents, and then
|
|
promptly return the computer system to the operator.
|
|
|
|
Another unconstitutional aspect of the government seizures of the
|
|
computers of bulletin board systems is the government infringement on
|
|
the privacy of the electronic mail in the systems. It appears that the
|
|
government, in seeking warrants for the seizures, has not forthrightly
|
|
informed the court that private mail of third parties is on the
|
|
computers, and has also read some of this private mail after the systems
|
|
have been seized.
|
|
|
|
The Neidorf case also raises issues of great significance to bulletin
|
|
board systems. As Neidorf was a publisher of information he received,
|
|
BBSs could be considered publishers of information that its users post
|
|
on the boards. BBS operators have a great deal of concern as to the
|
|
liability they might face for the dissemination of information on their
|
|
boards which may turn out to have been obtained originally without
|
|
authorization, or which discuss activity which may be considered
|
|
illegal. This uncertainty as to the law has already caused a decrease
|
|
in the free flow of information, as some BBS operators have removed
|
|
information solely because of the fear of liability.
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation stands firmly against the
|
|
unauthorized access of computer systems, computer trespass and computer
|
|
theft, and strongly supports the security and sanctity of private
|
|
computer systems and networks. One of the goals of the Foundation,
|
|
however, is to ensure that, as the legal framework is established to
|
|
protect the security of these computer systems, the unfettered
|
|
communication and exchange of ideas is not hindered. The Foundation is
|
|
concerned that the Government has cast its net too broadly, ensnaring
|
|
the innocent and chilling or indeed supressing the free flow of
|
|
information. The Foundation fears not only that protected speech will
|
|
be curtailed, but also that the citizen's reasonable expectation in the
|
|
privacy and sanctity of electronic communications systems will be
|
|
thwarted, and people will be hesitant to communicate via these networks.
|
|
Such a lack of confidence in electronic communication modes will
|
|
substantially set back the kind of experimentation by and communication
|
|
among fertile minds that are essential to our nation's development. The
|
|
Foundation has therefore applied for amicus curiae (friend of the
|
|
court) status in the Neidorf case and has filed legal briefs in support
|
|
of the First Amendment issues there, and is prepared to assist in
|
|
protecting the free flow of information over bulletin board systems and
|
|
other computer technologies.
|
|
|
|
For further information regarding Steve Jackson Games please contact:
|
|
|
|
Harvey Silverglate or Sharon Beckman
|
|
Silverglate & Good
|
|
89 Broad Street, 14th Floor
|
|
Boston, MA 02110
|
|
617/542-6663
|
|
|
|
For further information regarding Craig Neidorf please contact:
|
|
|
|
Terry Gross or Eric Lieberman
|
|
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky and Lieberman
|
|
740 Broadway, 5th Floor
|
|
New York, NY 10003
|
|
212/254-1111
|