475 lines
24 KiB
Plaintext
475 lines
24 KiB
Plaintext
January 1991
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
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WHEN DO POLICE HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROTECT?
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By
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Daniel L. Schofield, S.J.D.
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Special Agent
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Chief, Legal Instruction Unit
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FBI Academy
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Domestic violence is a serious crime problem that presents
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law enforcement officers with difficult and dangerous
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challenges. Victims of domestic violence sometimes file
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lawsuits claiming that the failure of police to make an arrest
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violated their right to police protection. Officers responding
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to a domestic assault call must decide whether an arrest is
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legally justified and whether an arrest is the most effective
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police action to prevent further domestic violence. Some police
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departments allow for officer discretion to diffuse domestic
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disturbances and preserve the family unit by not making an
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arrest. Other departments may limit officer discretion with a
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policy that mandates arrest if there is probable cause to
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believe a crime has been committed during a domestic
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disturbance. The debate over how to use limited police
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resources to best protect citizens against domestic violence
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often includes a discussion of whether police have a legal duty
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to offer a certain level of protection.
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This article discusses the extent to which police have a
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Federal constitutional duty to protect citizens against domestic
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violence and the circumstances under which police can be held
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liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (hereinafter Section 1983)
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for a breach of that duty. Specifically, the article discusses
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Section 1983 claims against the police based on an alleged
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violation of: (1) Substantive due process, (2) equal protection
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of the law, and (3) procedural due process. The potential for
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liability based on these three Federal constitutional claims is
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discussed in the context of recent court decisions involving
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suits against the police. It should be noted that this article
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does not address whether police have a legal duty to protect
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under State law, which depends on the various laws of each
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State. (1)
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
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The 14th amendment's Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o
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state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
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without due process of law." (2) Claims against the police for
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a violation of substantive due process have historically alleged
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that a "special relationship" between police and a victim of
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domestic violence created a constitutional duty to protect that
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person from physical harm. However, the Supreme Court recently
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narrowed the circumstances giving rise to such "special
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relationships" and concluded that the Due Process Clause does
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not legally obligate law enforcement to protect an individual
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absent a custodial relationship.
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GENERAL RULE--NO CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROTECT
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
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Services, (3) a boy, who was beaten and permanently injured by his
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father, claimed a due process violation because local officials
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knew he was being abused but did not act to remove him from his
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father's custody. The Supreme Court concluded that the State
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had no constitutional duty to protect the boy because the Due
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Process Clause is a limitation on the State's power to act, not
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a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.
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Further, according to the Court, the Due Process Clause confers
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no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
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may be necessary to protect an individual against private
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violence. (4) In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that
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a duty to protect arose because of a "special relationship" that
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existed, because the State knew the boy faced a special danger
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of abuse and specifically proclaimed by word and deed its
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intention to protect him against that danger. (5)
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The Court concluded that the Constitution imposes
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affirmative duties of care and protection only to particular
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individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners and involuntarily
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committed mental patients who are restrained against their will
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and rendered unable to care for themselves. (6) "The
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affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's
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knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
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expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which
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it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." (7)
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The Court also noted that while the State may have been aware of
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the dangers the boy faced, it played no part in their creation,
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nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to
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them. And, even though the State once took custody of the boy
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and then returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in
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no worse position than he would have been in had the State not
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acted at all. (8)
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Courts interpreting DeShaney have rejected claims that
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police have a substantive due process duty to protect
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individuals against domestic violence. For example, in
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Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, (9) the U. S. Court
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim by a woman who
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was allegedly beaten and harassed by her estranged husband.
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Despite allegations that the police knew of her plight and
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affirmatively committed to protect her when it issued her a
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restraining order, the court concluded that DeShaney limited the
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circumstances giving rise to a "special relationship" to
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instances of custody, and that no such relationship existed in
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this case imposing a due process duty on the police to protect
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the victim from her husband. (10)
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WHERE POLICE ACTION INCREASES DANGER
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While DeShaney establishes the general rule that police
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have no Federal due process duty to protect citizens from
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private domestic violence, a constitutional duty to protect can
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arise where law enforcement action actually increases an
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individual's danger of, or vulnerability to, domestic violence
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beyond the level it would have been absent the police action.
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(11) For example, in Freeman v. Ferguson, (12) the U. S. Court
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of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that DeShaney
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establishes the possibility that police could be held liable for
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failure to protect an individual against private domestic
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violence if police conduct actually interfered with the
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protective services that would have otherwise been available in
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the community.
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Freeman involved a Section 1983 action against the police
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chief and city for the death of a woman and her daughter at the
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hands of the woman's estranged husband. The plaintiff alleged
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that the police chief failed to perform his duties by reason of
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a close personal relationship with the estranged husband and
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that he interfered with the conduct of other officers by
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directing them not to enforce a restraining order.
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The court found the allegation in Freeman distinguishable
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from DeShaney because it constituted a claim that the violence
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the decedents were subjected to was not solely the result of
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private action, but rather resulted from an affirmative act by
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the police chief to interfere with the protective services that
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would have otherwise been available in the community. The court
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acknowledged that it is not clear under DeShaney how large a
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role the police must play in the creation of danger before
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police assume a corresponding constitutional duty to protect,
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but "...that at some point such actions do create such a duty."
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(13) Courts have also suggested that police can be held liable
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for escorting or removing domestic violence victims to locations
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that actually increase their vulnerability to danger. (14)
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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
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The Supreme Court in DeShaney stated in a footnote that a
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State may not selectively deny its protective services to
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certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal
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Protection Clause. (15) However, an earlier Federal district
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court decision in Thurman v. City of Torrington (16) is
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generally considered the seminal case spawning litigation
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against the police under the Equal Protection Clause.
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In Thurman, a woman and her son were allegedly threatened
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and assaulted numerous times by the woman's estranged husband in
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violation of his probation and a restraining order, despite
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numerous requests to the police department that they protect her
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and arrest her estranged husband. It was also alleged that the
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police department used an administrative classification that
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resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons
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abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic
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relationship, but less protection when the victim is either:
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(1) A woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or (2)
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a child abused by a father or stepfather.
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The Thurman court concluded that police are under an
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affirmative duty to preserve law and order and to protect the
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personal safety of persons in the community. The court further
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noted that police who have notice of the possibility of attacks
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on women in domestic relationships are under a duty to take
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reasonable measures to protect them; failure to perform this
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duty would constitute a denial of equal protection. (17)
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It is important to note that the precedential value of
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Thurman has been substantially undermined by the holding in
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DeShaney that the government has no constitutional duty to
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protect citizens against private domestic violence. In
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addition, more recent Federal court decisions hold that
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extensive evidence of intentional discrimination based on gender
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is required to prove an equal protection claim. These cases
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demonstrate the difficult burdens of proof that plaintiffs must
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meet in order to sustain an equal protection claim against the
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police for a failure to protect a victim of domestic violence.
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POLICE DISCRETION IN ARREST DECISIONS
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As a matter of constitutional law, police have considerable
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discretion in deciding whether and when to make an arrest. In
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McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, (18) the U. S. Court of Appeals
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for the Fifth Circuit interpreted DeShaney as endorsing the
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general principle that choices about the extent of governmental
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obligation to protect private parties from one another have been
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left to the democratic political process. It also held that
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there is no constitutional violation when the most that can be
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said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing when
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suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role. (19)
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In McKee, a woman claimed she was injured as a result of
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the refusal of police officers to make an arrest after a
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domestic assault call and that this non-arrest was the result of
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a city policy that discriminated on the basis of gender in
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Evidence of this
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policy consisted of: (1) An alleged statement by the chief of
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police that his officers did not like to make arrests in
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domestic assault cases because the women involved either
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wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial, and (2)
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statistics that purported to show a lower percentage of arrests
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in domestic violence calls than in non-domestic assault calls.
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The McKee court ruled that the proffered evidence did not
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constitute an equal protection violation and that DeShaney
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should not be circumvented by converting every due process claim
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into an equal protection claim via an allegation that police
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officers exercised their discretion to act in one incident but
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not in another. (20) The court pointed out that police officers
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are not authorized to arrest absent probable cause, and that
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under DeShaney, officers who could have arrested the suspect in
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this case are not under any constitutional duty to do so. (21)
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The court held that DeShaney leaves officers and law enforcement
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agencies with discretionary authority regarding arrest
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decisions, and that officers need not fear that in any close
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case, they must choose between liability for a potential false
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arrest and liability for a potentially actionable non-arrest.
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(22)
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PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
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Is an equal protection violation established by proof that
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the failure of police to protect a victim of domestic violence
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resulted from a police department policy or practice of treating
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domestic assaults differently from non-domestic assaults and
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that women were disproportionately disadvantaged? The answer is
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"No." Courts have ruled that a police department's facially
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neutral policy of treating domestic assaults differently than
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non-domestic assaults only violates the Equal Protection Clause
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if it is proven that the policy disproportionately disadvantages
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women and that it was adopted with an intent to discriminate
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against women. The cases discussed below illustrate the
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significant evidentiary difficulties plaintiffs face in trying
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to prove discriminatory intent.
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For example, the court in McKee ruled that the plaintiff
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failed to prove that an alleged police department policy of
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discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases constituted
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discrimination against women in violation of the Equal
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Protection Clause. The court found the proffered evidence that
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some officers dislike making arrests in domestic cases to be
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different from a policy that is binding on all officers
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regardless of their sentiments. In addition, the court noted
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that the plaintiff's statistical comparison between domestic and
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non-domestic assault arrests was exaggerated by an error and
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failed to correct for the wide variety of factors that might
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influence the likelihood that police would make an arrest.
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These factors include: (1) Whether the assault was in progress
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when police arrived, (2) whether a gun or knife had been used,
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(3) whether the victim had suffered obvious physical injuries
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and required medical attention, and (4) whether the victim
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refused to press charges when the police arrived. (23)
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The plaintiff's statistics also failed to prove
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gender-based discrimination, since they did not indicate how
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many of the victims in the cleared assault cases were women or
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how many of the victims in the domestic violence cases were men.
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The McKee court concluded that the plaintiff was attempting to
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generalize a single incident of police department inaction in
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one case into a general policy or practice. To permit such an
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argument would eviscerate the discretion reserved to police
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officers by DeShaney. (24)
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In Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Department, (25) it was
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alleged that police officers engaged in a practice of failing to
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respond to complaints made by females against males known to
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them and that they specifically failed to consider the complaint
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of a woman who was killed by her former boyfriend as seriously
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as they would consider the complaint of a female against an
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unknown assailant. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third
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Circuit held that to sustain an equal protection claim, "...a
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plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a
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reasonable jury to infer that it is the policy of the police to
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provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than to
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other victims of violence, that discrimination against women was
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a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the
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policy or custom." (26) The court said merely showing that
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categories used by the police in administering the law are
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domestic violence and nondomestic violence is not sufficient
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evidence of gender-based discrimination, absent a showing of an
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intent to discriminate against women. (27)
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
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Do victims of domestic violence ever have a
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constitutionally based right to police protection based on a
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"property interest" created by a State statute or a protective
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order? (28) In Coffman v. Wilson Police Department, (29) a
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spousal abuse victim claimed that her right to due process was
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violated because the police department never arrested or
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restrained her husband, despite the existence of a protective
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order and a contempt finding for violation of the protective
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order and her numerous reports to the police department of
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violations of this order. A Federal district court concluded
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that the State's Protection From Abuse Act did not create an
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enforceable property interest in police protection, but that a
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court order in the form of a protective order issued pursuant to
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that act stating that the appropriate police department shall
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enforce the order does create a constitutionally enforceable
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property right to police protection. (30) The court said
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"...the right is not to immediate and unthinking obedience to
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every request for assistance. Rather, it is the right to
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reasonable police response." (31) The court conceded that there
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is a great deal of discretion in police work and that the
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failure to dispatch a vehicle in response to a domestic violence
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call because other calls had greater importance would not
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necessarily constitute a violation of due process. (32)
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Despite the holding in this one district court decision in
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Coffman, procedural due process claims against police for their
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failure to protect victims of domestic violence are likely to
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fail for the following three reasons. First, other courts
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appear reluctant to adopt the rationale of the Coffman court
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that a State law and protective order creates a constitutionally
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recognized "property interest" to police protection. (33)
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Second, a police officer's negligent deprivation of a "property
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interest" to police protection would clearly not support a
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procedural due process claim, and it is not even clear whether
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an allegation of gross negligence or recklessness would suffice
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or whether intentional conduct must be proved. (34) Third, the
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Supreme Court in a 1990 decision in Zinermon v. Burch (35)
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appears to have precluded Section 1983 liability for a police
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agency if an officer's random and unauthorized intentional
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conduct in not enforcing a protective order is subject to a
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postdeprivation remedy in the form of a State tort action. (36)
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CONCLUSION
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The cases discussed in this article suggest that as a
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general rule, police do not have a constitutionally imposed duty
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to protect citizens against domestic violence. While
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exceptional circumstances may create such a duty and give rise
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to potential liability under Section 1983, lawsuits against the
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police for a failure to protect may have a greater likelihood of
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success in State court under a State-created duty to protect.
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Therefore, law enforcement administrators must decide how to
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most effectively allocate limited police resources to protect
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all the citizens in their communities.
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Any potential exposure to liability under Federal or State
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law for an alleged failure to protect can be reduced if law
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enforcement organizations take the following three initiatives.
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First, law enforcement agencies should promulgate a written
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policy regarding the handling of domestic assault calls that
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includes a clear statement of department policy setting forth
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the extent of officer discretion in making arrest decisions.
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Second, police departments should document the training officers
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receive in handling domestic violence situations and ensure that
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officers also understand what resources are available in the
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community to assist victims of domestic violence. Third, any
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statistical disparity in arrest rates that may exist between
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domestic and non-domestic assaults should be carefully evaluated
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to ensure that such disparity is not caused by any officer bias
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or animus toward female victims of domestic violence and that
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the disparity can be explained in terms of legitimate law
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enforcement interests.
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) See, "Does the Legal System Batter Women? Vindicating
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Battered Women's Constitutional Rights to Adequate Police
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Protection," 21 Ariz. St. L. J. 705, at 711 n. 64 (1989).
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(2) U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Section 1.
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(3) 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989).
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(4) Id. at 1003.
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(5) Id. at 1004.
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(6) Id. at 1005.
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(7) Id. at 1006.
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(8) Id.
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(9) 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
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(10) Id. at 700. In Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d
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1386 (10th Cir. 1990), the court held that the fact police
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surrounded a post office where there was a hostage situation and
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did not attempt to enter the building for more than 1-1/2 hours
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did not create a special situation in which affirmative duties
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of protection arose. A contrary rule would impose
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constitutional duties on the police whenever they respond to
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reports of violence and assemble at the scene contrary to the
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holding in DeShaney.
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(11) In Horton v. Flenory. 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989), the
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court concluded that the holding in DeShaney is limited to
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situations in which the State is not involved in the harm, either
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as a custodian or as an actor.
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(12) 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990).
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(13) Id. at 55.
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(14) See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F.Supp. 1233
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(E.D. Pa. 1989).
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(15) 109 S.Ct. at 1004, n. 3.
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(16) 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
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(17) Id. at 1527.
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(18) 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 727
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(1990).
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(19) Id. at 413.
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(20) Id.
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(21) Id. at 414.
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(22) Id.
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(23) Id. at 415.
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(24) Id. at 416.
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(25) 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).
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(26) Id. at 1031.
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(27) Id. See also, Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas,
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857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); and Howell v. City of Catoosa,
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729 F.Supp. 1308 (N.D. Okla. 1990).
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(28) For a general discussion, see, "Actionable Inaction:
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Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act," 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
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1048 (1986).
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(29) 739 F.Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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(30) Id. at 264.
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(31) Id. at 265.
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(32) Id. at 266.
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(33) See, e.g., Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d
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499 (7th Cir. 1990); and Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F.Supp.
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1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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(34) Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 at 666, n.3 (1986).
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(35) 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990).
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(36) Id. at 984.
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_______________
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Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction
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who are interested in this article should consult their legal
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adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal
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constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law
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or are not permitted at all.
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