342 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
342 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
December 1990
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CRIMINAL INFORMANTS:
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AN ADMISTRATOR'S DREAM OR NIGHTMARE?
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By
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Harry A. Mount, Jr.
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Special Agent
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FBI's Newark, New Jersey, Field Office
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Informants expose crimes that otherwise may go undetected.
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When properly used and controlled, they provide information that
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improves police efficiency, assists in the apprehension and
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prosecution of criminals, and sometimes even prevents crimes from
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taking place.
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However, to use informants effectively, agencies must
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establish and maintain strict, written departmental policies on
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handling informants. Even when operating under tight controls,
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informants can go bad quickly. When they do, they create
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significant legal and public relations problems.
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Law enforcement agencies that intend to use informants
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extensively must also be willing to defend publicly this
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decision. Fortunately, this is not difficult because the use of
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informants to solve or prevent crime is on solid legal ground.
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Judge Learned Hand, one of America's most famous jurists,
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observed:
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"Courts have countenanced the use of informants from time
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immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when
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the crime consists of preparing for another crime, it is
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usually necessary to rely on them or upon accomplices because
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the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly." (1)
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As early as 1650, British Chief Justice Hale encouraged
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criminals to cooperate with the law by rewarding them for giving
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evidence against their accomplices. Hale established an
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arrangement that he called a "Plea of Approvement," which
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offered arrested criminals immunity from prosecution, or at least
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a reduced sentence, if they provided information on crimes that
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they knew about. (2)
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More than 300 years later, law enforcement's use of
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informants is accepted by Americans, who have become familiar
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with the practice. The media constantly run stories about sting
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operations, protected witnesses, and paid sources. They know
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that the mystery associated with these individuals ensures
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audience interest and widespread attention.
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In fact, Americans are sensitized to informant use by the
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entertainment media. Covert meeting sites, the danger, and the
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air of anonymity portrayed on television and in movies all add
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an element of suspense that engenders public understanding and
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acceptance of informant use by both fictional and real
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detectives.
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JUSTIFYING AN INFORMANT PROGRAM
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Yet, how does a law enforcement agency justify paying for
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information? Don't taxpayers already pay for police protection?
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Legislators and ordinary citizens frequently pose these
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questions, and there is but one answer. Simply stated, using
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informants is cost-effective. Informants provide intelligence,
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insight, and information that lead to arrests and convictions.
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Informants allow a law enforcement agency to expend its
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personnel on activities that have a high likelihood of success.
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For example, because of information provided by informants,
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arrest teams can determine where suspects can be found, how
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heavily armed they are, and who they are with. Some informants
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help investigators to obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
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or through the use of informants, investigators can record
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actual criminal conspiracies on tape through court-ordered
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electronic surveillance.
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Good informants keep people from being harmed, evidence
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from being destroyed, and potentially explosive and dangerous
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crimes from taking place. As an important byproduct, proactive
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investigations often increase the efficiency and morale of sworn
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investigative personnel.
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ESTABLISHING AN INFORMANT PROGRAM
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A law enforcement agency that wants to have an effective,
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controlled informant program must encourage its sworn personnel
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to develop and maintain a professional attitude toward
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informants. One of the first steps that an agency must take in
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establishing a professional informant program is to convince its
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investigators that informants are not of questionable character,
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unworthy of respect. In reality, many informants who provide
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assistance to law enforcement are not criminals. Many hold
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responsible positions in public agencies and private businesses.
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Many are citizens motivated by personal antipathy to criminal
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conduct that they see around them. A few cooperate because they
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enjoy the cops-and-robbers excitement that goes along with
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solving crimes. Some are seeking revenge for professional or
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personal affronts, while others just trade information for money.
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Citizens have an obligation to report crime. However, no
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officer seriously expects citizens to live up to that obligation
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on a routine basis. (3) Fear of being killed, embarrassed,
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badgered, losing time from work, or of being inconvenienced work
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against citizens volunteering information about a crime.
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Therefore, law enforcement agencies must use informants to take
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the place of ordinary citizens who refuse to get involved.
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In fiction, as in real life, investigators often refer to
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informants in less than polite terms. Officers must understand
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that the attitude behind such terminology stands in the way of a
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healthy relationship between an investigator and a source. These
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personal feelings alienate people who could provide positive
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information that would solve crimes. Use of derogatory terms
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even turns off the "professional" paid informant.
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Consequently, departments should consciously discourage the
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practice of using derogatory terms, both on and off the job.
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A professional attitude toward informants does not just
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evolve. Law enforcement officers must be trained to cultivate a
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nonjudgmental frame of mind. Agencies must design both basic
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and advanced schooling that helps each officer to overcome the
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simple, but deeply ingrained, prejudice that is associated with
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informing.
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There is no doubt that Americans believe that telling tales
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on others is wrong. From childhood, they are taught not to
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tattle on brothers and sisters, classmates, or friends. Parents,
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teachers and clergymen constantly reenforce the concept. Even
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some law enforcement professionals believe that it is wrong to
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"tell on" another person, although they realize they need the
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information provided by informants to develop cases and
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apprehend criminals. Frequently, they even admire those who
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refuse to talk.
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Consequently, when law enforcement personnel work to
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develop informants, they are going against ingrained habits.
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The only way around the conflict is to train personnel, formally
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and informally, to view the use of informants as a critically
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important law enforcement technique.
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Once investigators overcome their reluctance to nurture
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this kind of confidential alliance, they find that developing
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informants is not too difficult and soon realize that using
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informants means controlling informants. However, the alert
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agency must recognize that administrative controls are necessary
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to run an effective informant program.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
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Law enforcement administrators must establish and maintain
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several areas of strict control. Generally, they must:
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1) Protect an informant's identity
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2) Ensure information is recorded in files
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3) Disseminate information to appropriate personnel, while
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simultaneously guarding the information from general
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perusal
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4) Involve mid-level managers as overseers of informant
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operations
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5) Employ alternate informant handlers
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6) Develop a payment system that calls for accurate
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accounting of all monies paid to informants.
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Protect the Informant's Identity
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Only those with a need to know should be advised of an
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informant's identity. In practical terms, this means
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investigators and their alternates who work closely with the
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source. The squad supervisor or first-line manager should be
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encouraged to meet the informant so that the source knows that
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there are people in authority who support the program and so
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that the manager has a general "feel" for the informant. The
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person who controls the informant file room must also know the
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identity of an informant in order to handle the filing and
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other paperwork. These employees should be the only people who
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routinely handle informant information and who need to know the
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informant's identity.
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To ensure secrecy, informants should have code numbers and
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code names assigned to them. These take the place of the
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source's real name on all documents and reports, and also in
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personal conversations. Any information provided by the source
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must be documented and recorded using code numbers and code
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names.
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The files created must be maintained in secure rooms and
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access to them must be strictly controlled by an employee
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specifically assigned to control access. Only the informant's
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handler or alternate handler and the immediate supervisor should
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be allowed to examine those files routinely. Top management
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should have access to them, but only when necessary. A daily
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record that lists everyone who enters the secure file room
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should also be maintained. This control is not implemented to
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create a bureaucratic roadblock, but to protect sources by
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limiting the number of people who know their identities.
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Institutionally, it also reenforces the importance of protecting
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informants' identities.
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Record Information
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Ultimately, the intent of every investigation is
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prosecution, which requires maintaining records and files.
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Information may be the informant's stock-in-trade, but that is
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only the starting point for law enforcement officers. Paperwork
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allows prosecutors to obtain warrants or to put together cases
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that will be tried in court.
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Refusing to identify sources except by their code names
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frequently causes resentment, both inside and outside the
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department. Regardless, unless sources are scheduled to testify
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in open court, there is no reason for anyone to know informant
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identities. (4) Agencies should try to establish how reliable
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its sources are, while at the same time legally resisting any
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exposure of the their identities.
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Disseminate Information
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Dissemination is the key to making informant operations
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successful. Files full of facts are worthless unless someone
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uses them to focus an investigation on specific people, obtain
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search and arrest warrants, or support an affidavit for
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electronic surveillance. Informant handlers must be taught to
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believe that information without action is worthless. Too often,
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informant handlers believe that they have done their jobs by
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developing knowledgeable sources who keep them individually
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abreast of the latest inside criminal information.
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Unfortunately, handlers may become afraid of revealing their
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sources, and so, they keep the information to themselves.
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Computers with megabytes of criminal data sit in many squad
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rooms. However, these computer systems are equally useless
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unless someone takes the information and uses it, drawing the
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equations that link person to person, incident to incident, and
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crime to crime. Facts must be shared and opinions solicited.
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Only then does an informant program pay off.
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Therefore, the agency that uses informants productively
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develops standard report forms and disseminates information to
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those authorized to use it. Specific paperwork and
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dissemination procedures must be adopted, and officers must
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understand that information cannot be shared outside standard
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channels. The department must depend on the code names of the
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sources to shield informant identities from the casual or
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uninitiated reader. A good informant handler uses judgment and
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discretion to disseminate only those facts that will advance an
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investigation without identifying the source.
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Involve Mid-Level Managers
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Each department or agency should have mid-level managers
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directly overseeing informant operations. This is necessary
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because all too often, a close, symbiotic relationship develops
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between an informant and informant handler. This type of
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relationship leads to a corresponding loss of objectivity on the
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part of the informant handler. A mid-level manager who has no
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immediate personal stake in the operation can step in to enforce
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departmental procedures impartially, when necessary.
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Employ Alternate Informant Handlers
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To assist in maintaining objectivity, each department or
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agency also should assign two investigators to each informant.
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One is the primary informant handler, while the second acts as
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an alternate. The alternate handler should witness every
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payment for services and expenses, attend most debriefing
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sessions, and contact the source any time the primary contact is
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unavailable.
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Often, there is resistance to this policy because
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investigators object to another person being involved. Many
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believe the alternate causes friction and depersonalizes the
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affiliation. However, the alternate can both sympathize with the
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informant and remain objective and slightly detached. This
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relationship helps to maintain a balance and perspective that
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fosters control.
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Develop Strict Payment Procedures
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In the past, investigators paid informants nominal amounts
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of money. This is no longer the case. Many police agencies
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disburse substantial amounts of money to sources, and
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consequently, expect to be able to direct their activities. This
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requires accountability. Payments must be witnessed, receipts
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obtained, and cumulative records maintained.
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Generally, informants should be paid on a C.O.D. basis, not
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on a regular schedule. Also, only when informants provide
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valuable information should they be paid. There should be no
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standard pay scale for information. The informant handler must
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consider the value of each item and then recommend a specific
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payment.
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Many factors affect the amount of a payment. What kind of
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information is provided? Is the source placed in any real
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danger? What is the status of the case? How long has the source
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provided information? How reliable is the source? Normally,
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the informant's handler should suggest an appropriate payment
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and an immediate supervisor should authorize it.
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CONCLUSION
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Working informants is fulfilling. Investigators who use
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informants effectively can be reasonably sure that they are
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going to develop cases against key criminals. Having someone
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report on the daily successes and frustrations of criminals
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helps investigators to gather and maintain evidence that leads
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to apprehensions and prosecutions.
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U.S. District Court Judge Stephen Trott once addressed U.S.
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Government prosecutors on using informants to try cases. In a
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supplement to that lecture, he noted, "Notwithstanding all the
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problems that accompany using criminals as witnesses...the fact
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of the matter is that police and prosecutors cannot do without
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them period."
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
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(2) E. Cherry and C. Molton, "Police and the Criminal
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Informant," unpublished dissertation for the Advanced Course
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3/80 Project, Metropolitan Police Detective Training School.
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(3) James Reese, "Motivations of Criminal Informants," FBI
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Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 1980, p. 24.
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(4) There may be occasional exceptions to this rule. For
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example, a judge may require an "ex parte, in camera" hearing
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to determine the source's reliability and accuracy of the
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information provided. Prosecutors may want to talk to a source
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before they seek warrants or subpoenas.
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