13112 lines
698 KiB
Plaintext
13112 lines
698 KiB
Plaintext
(Quick Tutorial below - please read)
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C R I M E F I G H T E R S
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Chap 0 Table of Contents and Quick Tutorial (2 pages)
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Chap 1 FloppyBooks info, Copyright/Trademarks (2 pgs)
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Chap 2 Why Police Can't Cope, and The Need for CrimeFighters (8 pgs)
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Chap 3 Crime Stoppers and We-Tip's Formula for Rewards (6)
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Chap 4 Catch-all Reward Law: $25,000 - All Felonies, All States (3)
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Chap 5 Fines & Forfeiture Laws: 50% Paid to CrimeFighters! (7)
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Chap 6 Misdemeanors and Do-It-Yourself Lawsuits (11)
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Chap 7 Qui Tam Law: Be the Prosecutor - Control Plea Bargaining (6)
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Chap 8 Civil & Criminal RICO Laws (8)
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Chap 9 Drunk Driver Terminators (D.D.T.) Patrols - to Get Started (10)
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Chap 10 Drug Laws & Drug Wars - Unlimited Business Opportunities (10)
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Chap 11 Polluter Tooters: Anti-Pollution laws, MEGABUCK Rewards (16)
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Chap 12 Terrorists, Assassins, and Police Corruption (6)
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Chap 13 Bounty Hunters, Bail Bond Agents and Skip Tracers (6)
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Chap 14 U.S. Customs/Coast Guard Laws, Mechanics' Laws (11)
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Chap 15 Post Office Rewards, Scams, Cons, Frauds (10)
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Chap 16 Wildlife Protection/Poaching, Conservationists Laws (12)
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Chap 17 National Forests (Vandalism, Pot Growing, other laws) (11)
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Chap 18 Wiretap and Blackmail Laws & Rewards for CrimeFighters (10)
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Chap 19 Misc Rewards for This and That (Dozens of them) (10)
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Chap 20 State Reward Laws (3)
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Chap 21 Crime Information, Your Right to Withhold for Rewards (5)
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Chap 22 Citizen Arrests - What you Need to Know (15)
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Chap 23 High Speed Pursuits - Unlike Smokey and the Bandit! (7)
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Chap 24 Rules of Evidence - Entrapment Explained (6)
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Chap 25 Where to Get CrimeFighter Training (5)
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Chap 26 High Tech Tools of the Trade - Where to Get Them (7)
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Chap 27 Problems with Prosecutors and Plea Bargaining (8)
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Chap 28 How to Calculate Rewards, Proposed CrimeFighters Reward Law (7)
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Chap 29 CrimeFighters International, Inc. Membership info. (5)
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Chap 30 Membership Application (3)
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There are about 240 pages in this book.
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Quick Tutorial - Floppy and Hard Disk Operation
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F1 pops up a Help File that's available at all times. The HELP file is in
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two parts.
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Part 1 is available when reading text. It contains a full explanation of
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all standard features plus a few things you need to know before you begin.
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Scroll through it for general information on the various Function
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keys and short-cut keys. But first, please read the following notes.
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Part 2 is when you're in the program and need HELP on a particular feature
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you want to use that's HIGHLIGHTED. Use F1 to get information on that
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particular feature in more detail. (Context sensitive Help.)
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When you use F10 to activate the main menu at the top left of the screen,
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use the left/right arrows to make a selection. When you do, the selection
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should be highlighted to indicate where you are. If you can't see the
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highlight, it may be because you have entered the wrong information about
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your computer config. or made a typo. Exit the program and type START.
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This page (table of contents) stays in memory at all times.
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F6 displays this info at any time. Hit F6 again and it removes it.
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Note: Function Keys aren't active when you're in the HELP or other windows.
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Use ESC to "back up" or remove Help windows and (F*) Function windows.
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The Windows feature in the Turbo Pascal software used in the development
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of this program also provides Zoom and Resize Window features. These may
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be useful in other programs (or FloppyBooks by other authors) but have no
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real use in this book. I suggest you ignore these two features, even though
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they are available and explained in the HELP file.
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A minor program bug that seems to be beyond the skill of our programmer
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can be easily overcome by an extra keystroke. Instead of waiting 3 to 6
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months for the programmer to fix it, I decided to release the books now.
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F7 opens a window to select a chapter. When the window is opened, use the
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TAB key to move the invisible cursor into the prompt box where it will
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start blinking, waiting for input. Enter the chapter number and <enter>.
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(Using the TAB key to activate the blinking cursor is the extra keystroke.
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This minor but baffling program bug should be corrected in Version 2.0.)
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FLOPPY-BASED Operation Only
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Disk # 1 has the book reader software and HLP file. Both files MUST be in
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drive A at all times. Disk # 1 has a few chapters on it, but other chapters
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may be on disk 2 or 3.
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To minimize floppy swapping, make sure all the chapters AVAILABLE on each
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disk are in numerical sequence. (The numbers on the disk directory don't
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have to be in sequence, but there should be no missing chapter numbers for
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that group of files.) A missing file, not available anywhere, will prevent
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loading of other chapters. That shouldn't happen, but it might because of a
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bad modem transmission or faulty floppy. Use F7 to select the next chapter
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available to bypass that problem until you get another copy of the book.
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Disk 2 and 3 (etc) are put in drive B in numerical sequence. When you
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start, your computer will read drive A and can read the first few text
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files on that disk. Eventually, you'll try to access a file that's on
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drive B, and the computer can't find it on A. You'll get an error message.
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ERROR MESSAGE: "Chapter can't be found" means:
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The next chapter is not on drive A. If the next chapter is on drive B, tell
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the computer to read drive B from then on, and insert disks in sequence in
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drive B until the end of the book. Here's how to do it:
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(1) Use ESC to exit error message.
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(2) Use CTL-F7 to get a window to let you change DIRECTORY (first box)
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(type B: and <enter>. (Directory Paths aren't usually needed for floppies.)
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(3) Change disks as needed for the next chapter in sequence. Use F9 to read
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the next file - or,
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(4) You are reading files on drive B but have read the last one on the
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floppy in drive B. Insert the next floppy if you want to continue reading
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in sequence. Use ESC to exit error message, F9 for next chapter - or,
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(5) You can also read files in random order. F7 opens a window to select
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a chapter to read or print. When the window is opened, USE THE TAB KEY to
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move the cursor to the prompt box and enter the number you want. Make sure
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the disk with that chapter is in the current read drive and <enter>.
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If the random chapter you want to read is not on the current read drive),
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change drives first (Ctl-F7), then F7 to type the chapter number.
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Once you're reading files on drive B you won't have to change drives back
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to A unless you want to start all over, or random read files that are on
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drive A. In that case, reset the directory (Ctl-F7) to read from A:
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(Remember, F6 will toggle you to and from this tutorial if you need it.
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Or use F1 for additional help.)
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NOW, hit F1 to read the general information on part 1 of the Help File.
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Or,
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F9 for Next Chapter
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Copyrights & Trademarks,
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and Program/Book Copying Restrictions
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* * * Copyright Notice * * *
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FloppyBooks software by Wm. B. McGhee, 1400 Colorado Street, Boulder City,
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NV 89005.
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FLOPPYBOOKS COPYRIGHT 1991 WILLIAM B. MCGHEE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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Book text by Wm. B. McGhee. 1400 Colorado Street, Boulder City, NV 89005.
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CRIMEFIGHTERS COPYRIGHT 1993 WILLIAM B. MCGHEE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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This complete FloppyBooks unit, including FloppyBooks' software and name
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||
related book text, may be freely copied on floppies, uploaded to BBSs and
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||
downloaded by the public to attain unlimited distribution.
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||
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||
This book's text may not be reproduced in any other form or manner except
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||
for book reviews without the written permission of the author.
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||
|
||
Addition, deletion or modification of this book's text without the author's
|
||
permission is strictly prohibited and a copyright violation.
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||
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||
Trademark Notices
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||
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||
FloppyBooks (TM) is a unique name belonging to William B. McGhee. Please
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||
note is is one word (not two) and the capital "B" in Books. When writing
|
||
about FloppyBooks, please use the correct spelling.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters (TM) is a unique name belonging to William B. McGhee. Please
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||
note it is one word (not two) and the capital "F" in Fighters. When writing
|
||
about CrimeFighters, please use the correct spelling.
|
||
|
||
FloppyBooks' Software Restrictions
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||
|
||
FloppyBooks' software and name-related text files are not interchangeable
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||
with other FloppyBooks. The book's name is embedded in the program and the
|
||
accompanying text files must have the same name. The software and name-
|
||
related text and *.BAT files are programmed to be used for one specific
|
||
book. (Some books have a PRINT option, some don't.)
|
||
|
||
FloppyBooks' software is not intended for use as a general purpose text-
|
||
file reader program. Changing the book-reader program to match users' text
|
||
files or naming a text file to fit into someone's licensed FloppyBook is
|
||
prohibited and a copyright violation. Copyright violation is a felony!
|
||
|
||
Feedback
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||
|
||
Reader's comments, suggestions, corrections, and book contributions (text)
|
||
are welcomed by authors and appreciated by future readers. Your feedback
|
||
helps to improve technical books and software. Please contact the book
|
||
author if you would like to provide additional material or corrections.
|
||
|
||
If you find errors, please do NOT make the corrections yourself. Instead,
|
||
ask the author to make the changes so the original text will not lose its
|
||
copyright protection.
|
||
What's a FloppyBook?
|
||
|
||
FloppyBooks are electronic books on a floppy disk. Like Shareware, they are
|
||
distributed freely on computer bulletin boards. Unlike Shareware, there is
|
||
no charge or obligation to read FloppyBooks. Instead of collecting book
|
||
royalties, the author may sell related products or services.
|
||
|
||
When copying FloppyBooks to diskettes or downloading via modems, ALL the
|
||
software and their name-related text and *.BAT files must be kept together
|
||
as ONE UNIT. Text files from one FloppyBook cannot be read or printed by
|
||
other FloppyBook software because their respective names won't match. When
|
||
storing a FloppyBook on a hard drive, keep each FloppyBook UNIT in a
|
||
separate directory.
|
||
Read/Print FloppyBooks
|
||
|
||
FloppyBooks, Inc. invites and encourages copying of FloppyBooks and passing
|
||
them on for everyone's education and enjoyment. A print option on the TOP
|
||
BAR of the screen means anyone may print the text for personal use. Print
|
||
privileges does not include commercial printing for sale and profit unless
|
||
the author specifically grants that privilege in writing or in his book.
|
||
|
||
Allowing printing of a FloppyBook does not mean the book author gives up
|
||
the copyright. Only the author may make changes, additions or deletions to
|
||
the text. The author reserves the right to rescind printing authorization
|
||
at any time. Page numbering is automatic, but resets to page 1 when the
|
||
printing operation is interrupted and restarted.
|
||
|
||
Read/Only FloppyBooks
|
||
|
||
If a Print option is not available, it's because the author may want to
|
||
sell printed versions. Updated, printed versions of FloppyBooks may be sold
|
||
at lower prices on BBSs than in book stores, as a pre-publication offer.
|
||
|
||
To get a professionally printed copy of a FloppyBook, contact the author
|
||
whose name appears in the author's copyright section above. If there are
|
||
sufficient requests the author may make printed copies available.
|
||
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||
F9 for next Chapter
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||
Why CrimeFighters are Needed
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(Police Can't Cope With Crime!)
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||
"CrimeFighters" is a word coined by the author to give a name to citizen
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||
crime fighters participating in law enforcement and paid on commission for
|
||
their time, effort, and personal risk. A job description of a CrimeFighter
|
||
is a bounty hunter, working unofficially for law enforcement agents to
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||
collect rewards, plus 50% of fines and forfeitures when available.
|
||
|
||
Everyone knows the crime rate and violent crimes are on the increase. But,
|
||
it's impossible for police to be at the scene when crimes are committed
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||
unless it's by accident or advance notice by informants. Fact is, police
|
||
really can't do anything to reduce the increasing crime rate. It's like
|
||
trying to bail out a sinking ship when the water is coming in faster then
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||
the crew can bail. They need help. CrimeFighters can provide that help.
|
||
|
||
Chief Justice Richard Neeley, of the West Virginia Supreme Court, mentions
|
||
in his book, "Take Back Your Neighborhood," that doubling or tripling the
|
||
number of police patrols is NOT a viable solution to crime prevention and
|
||
detection. The main reason is that police on patrols only spend about 2 to
|
||
5 percent of their time actually preventing "crime"! That may sound like
|
||
neglect of duty, but it's not.
|
||
|
||
Police patrols are used to discourage crime by their uniforms and easily
|
||
identified patrol cars (police presence). Most of the time, they respond to
|
||
radio calls to maintain law and order. "Law and order" covers a wide range
|
||
of services that have little to do with making felony arrests.
|
||
|
||
Police stop fights and family disputes, quiet noisy neighbors, catch wild
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||
animals or rescue pets, attend the dead until a medical examiner arrives,
|
||
check out "suspicious noises" and (usually false) burglar alarms, issue
|
||
parking or speeding tickets, go to the scene of traffic accidents and write
|
||
accident reports, maintain the peace (law and order) at rock concerts and
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||
sporting events, pick up drunks and derelicts, deliver babies, escort
|
||
ambulances, control traffic at fires and accidents or during emergencies,
|
||
qualify at target practice, attend police lectures, lead parades and
|
||
funerals, chauffeur high-ranking officials, give lectures to kids at public
|
||
schools, spend countless hours in court as witnesses in civil and criminal
|
||
suits, wait for and talk to prosecutors concerning arrests made, take
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||
coffee breaks, make personal phone calls and do personal errands, and spend
|
||
almost as much time on paperwork filling in reports on everything they do.
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||
|
||
In addition to the above, sick leave, holidays, and 3 to 4 weeks vacation
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per year reduce time on the job. Altogether, Justice Neeley estimates that
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||
out of every $100 spent on a patrol police wages, only $2 or $3 is actually
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||
spent on felony-related law enforcement!
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||
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||
It's not the polices' fault that they spend so little time on actual crime
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||
prevention and apprehension of criminals. We expect (and demand) them to
|
||
take care of society's problems - whether they are crime-related or not.
|
||
Supreme Court decisions have also hindered field police work. The ever-
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||
present threat of lawsuits have increased paperwork requirements, and
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||
reports must be filled every time the officer does something out of the
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||
ordinary, and that takes a few more hours.
|
||
|
||
Patrol officers are usually not involved in follow-up work after a crime
|
||
has been committed and the perpetrators (perps) have disappeared. That's
|
||
the work of more experienced officers who have been promoted to detective
|
||
rank. Plainclothes officers are assigned to various details relevant to
|
||
such crimes, as homicide, rape, vice, robbery, bunco, organized crime, drug
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||
enforcement, etc. Many of these crimes require elaborate "sting operations"
|
||
and undercover work.
|
||
|
||
However, in a study for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
|
||
involving 153 police jurisdictions and covering a 2-year period, the Rand
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||
Corporation found that even police assigned to detective work spend little
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||
more than half their average time on actual casework.
|
||
|
||
A year-long controlled experiment in Kansas City in the 1970s studied
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||
whether doubling or tripling the number of police patrols had any effect in
|
||
reducing crime. The Police Foundation found that the extra police presence
|
||
neither had an effect on the number of crimes committed, nor on the
|
||
public's feeling of insecurity. While high visibility of clearly marked
|
||
police cruisers and the distinctive uniform tend to suppress unlawful
|
||
activity momentarily, they don't permanently prevent criminal activity.
|
||
Criminals just wait until the police aren't around.
|
||
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||
The report concluded, "Primary responsibility rests with families, the
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||
community and its individual members. The police can only facilitate and
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assist members of the community in the maintenance of law and order, and no
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more."
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||
|
||
Robert diGrazia, the Police Chief of Montgomery County, Maryland, who was
|
||
also the former Police Chief of Boston and St.Louis, said to a group of
|
||
fellow Chiefs, "We are not letting the public in on our era's dirty little
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||
secret -- that there is little the police can do about crime."
|
||
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||
When you think about it, you realize that's the truth!
|
||
|
||
Most police work is reactive. That is, crimes aren't committed when police
|
||
are in the area. Police seldom are lucky enough to catch lawbreakers at the
|
||
scene of the crime. Most of the time they are responding to crimes that
|
||
have already taken place, and the perps have fled the scene and are
|
||
unknown. That's where police need help.
|
||
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Help Wanted - With Restrictions
|
||
|
||
A few Police Chiefs have openly admitted they need help. Police
|
||
Commissioner Lee P. Brown, said, "We (the public) just can't continue to
|
||
rely on the police." Others, with a John Wayne complex, will never admit
|
||
they need help. But whether they admit it or not, they do need help. Crime
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||
statistics prove it. However, police don't want vigilantes or trigger-happy
|
||
yahoos who could hinder them and threaten law and order.
|
||
|
||
Police discourage civilian volunteers on the firing line, except in
|
||
emergencies where they may ask for help. At all other times, it's best to
|
||
stay out of the way. There's a good reason for their attitude and official
|
||
policy.
|
||
|
||
Training and experience are the two most important ingredients in police
|
||
work. Cops are (usually, but not always) trained at Police Academies, and
|
||
even after this basic training, rookies do not perform hazardous duty right
|
||
away. Rookies are assigned to training units and/or to a Training Officer
|
||
for further on-the-job training. Many veteran cops are reluctant to have a
|
||
rookie as a partner instead of a fully trained officer when working on
|
||
dangerous assignments or patrols.
|
||
|
||
Ordinary citizen have no basic police training, may not be qualified with
|
||
firearms, don't know police procedure in making arrests, and are liable to
|
||
go bonkers when and if they come under fire.
|
||
|
||
If you were a police officer, would you want untrained, unpredictable,
|
||
unproven, and unreliable, rank amateurs for partners? Of course not.
|
||
|
||
What You CAN Do
|
||
|
||
Be on the alert to spot criminal activity. Learn to be observant. Look for
|
||
things that don't look right or people who are out of place in their
|
||
surroundings or acting suspicious. (Think like a cop!) Try to infiltrate
|
||
street gangs if you're in that age bracket and can blend in, or find and
|
||
make "friends" in criminal circles. But NEVER become involved in criminal
|
||
activity yourself -- unless you have specific written authority from a law
|
||
enforcement agent and are part of an official undercover operation.
|
||
|
||
Work undercover: Learn who is involved in criminal activity, where they
|
||
operate, and what they've done. Get evidence when you can. Feed the
|
||
information to your local FBI agents and let them decide which appropriate
|
||
law enforcement agency will be involved. Your information may provide
|
||
probable cause to get search warrants. Let the authorities do the follow up
|
||
and make the arrests. You'll still be eligible for rewards without having
|
||
to risk your neck making arrests or appearing in court.
|
||
|
||
Citizens work in a variety of positions (accountants, lawyers, secretaries,
|
||
clerks, factory workers, truck drivers, etc.) in which criminal activity
|
||
occurs. They may obtain sufficient evidence of a crime (probable cause) to
|
||
lead to a formal investigation or an arrest.
|
||
|
||
Undercover CrimeFighters should try to record information or criminal
|
||
evidence on audiotape, videotape or film. When they have sufficient infor-
|
||
mation they should contact an FBI agent to negotiate a reward. At that
|
||
point, CrimeFighters usually drop out of the action.
|
||
|
||
Bring the FBI into a case as soon as possible and let their undercover
|
||
agent take over. Then the agent will be the witness who testifies in court.
|
||
If the CrimeFighter testifies, anonymity will be lost. Revealing a Crime-
|
||
Fighters' identity might also result in unpleasant retaliation, including
|
||
physical violence.
|
||
FBI vs. Police Departments
|
||
|
||
Why work with the FBI instead of local police? Because almost all of the
|
||
significant rewards in this book are based on federal laws. Crimefighters
|
||
need to negotiate with the FBI, not local police. If the FBI isn't
|
||
interested in making arrests, they'll turn it over to the local police
|
||
department, but the Crimefighter will, if it's negotiated first, still
|
||
collect federal rewards.
|
||
|
||
The FBI uses experienced, well-qualified federal prosecutors. That's
|
||
another reason to work with federal agents, federal courts and federal
|
||
prosecutors. State prosecutors are too often inexperienced and overworked.
|
||
Most will allow plea bargaining to lesser offenses to get an easy
|
||
conviction. When they lose the felony conviction, you lose the reward!
|
||
|
||
Few serious rewards are offered by state governments or cities. Local
|
||
police aren't authorized to negotiate or pay federal rewards. Perhaps
|
||
that's why CrimeStoppers and We-Tip evolved.
|
||
|
||
After reading this book you'll realize that CrimeStoppers, We-Tip and other
|
||
privately-funded reward organizations are for amateurs! If you want to
|
||
collect the big rewards and be considered a professional, you have to
|
||
move up the ladder to the federal level.
|
||
|
||
Where the BIG Bucks Are
|
||
|
||
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law was created for
|
||
mobsters like Al Capone. Recent court decisions indicate that felons who
|
||
profit from their crimes comes under the scope of RICO laws - even bribery!
|
||
(Chapter 8 provides full details of RICO law.)
|
||
|
||
Successful career criminals often accumulate small fortunes from a lifetime
|
||
of criminal activity. Anything of value purchased from the "fruits of
|
||
criminal activity" may be seized by the courts. Multi-million dollar
|
||
businesses have been forfeited under RICO. (A few of them are mentioned
|
||
in Chapter 5.)
|
||
|
||
It doesn't matter when the assets were purchased or whether they relate to
|
||
the crime being prosecuted. Anything of value owned by a lawbreaker that
|
||
can't be proven by him to have been purchased with "honest money" (and the
|
||
burden of proof is on the defendant) can be seized by the court under RICO
|
||
laws -- and the CrimeFighter can get a share of the fines and forfeitures!
|
||
|
||
RICO law now applies to virtually every felony except those committed for
|
||
other than profit such as joyriding in a stolen automobile or murder in
|
||
crimes of passion, for example. That leaves a wide range of criminal
|
||
activity subject to RICO and opens up more possibilities for fines and
|
||
forfeitures -- to take away the profit from successful criminals.
|
||
|
||
Police are required to face danger as part of their job. Crimefighters
|
||
don't have to go all the way regardless of personal risk. Crimefighters can
|
||
back off, at any time, and give the information and evidence to the FBI.
|
||
Let them do the dangerous work. They'll thank you for it, too!
|
||
|
||
In addition to RICO and sharing in huge fines and forfeitures, dozens of
|
||
federal laws pay generous rewards - a couple of them up to $250,000!
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter Candidates
|
||
|
||
All ex-law officers, licensed private investigators, security guards,
|
||
military veterans, and bail recovery agents, are ideal CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters are self-employed. No license is required. And there are no
|
||
age limits, sexual or physical requirements.
|
||
|
||
Chapter 25 tells you where to get law enforcement training, hand-to-hand
|
||
combat, and handgun practice that's better than those at Police Academies.
|
||
There are hundreds of specialized books and videos in the CrimeFighter
|
||
Catalog (CRIMCAT). Look for it on your local BBSs. If you don't have the
|
||
training, you can get it! If you've been looking for an action career, one
|
||
that pays $100,000 or more a year, in proportion to the risks taken, this
|
||
is it.
|
||
Part II
|
||
|
||
Self-Help in Law Enforcement
|
||
|
||
The history of law enforcement shows that before the early 1900s there were
|
||
very few "public" police. Most police were watchmen or guards employed by
|
||
merchants to protect their merchandise. In towns and villages everyone
|
||
looked out for one another. When a known criminal or crime in progress was
|
||
spotted, a hue and cry was sounded. All able-bodied men and women would
|
||
rally to catch and punish the culprit.
|
||
|
||
At frontiers, almost everyone had a gun. When a crime was spotted the
|
||
criminal was either captured or shot by irate citizens. The only bleeding
|
||
hearts in those days were in dead culprits! People knew what to do and what
|
||
was expected of them. This self-help approach went out of fashion with the
|
||
horse and buggy. In the 1900's police forces as we know them today were
|
||
gradually established in cities, and for a while the crime rate was low
|
||
enough for local police to handle crimes without any help. Times have
|
||
changed. The self-help concept needs to be seriously reconsidered today.
|
||
|
||
During the last century the public has been led to believe law enforcement
|
||
is strictly up to city, state, and federal authorities. Some police still
|
||
insist law enforcement should be reserved only for those who are trained
|
||
for it. It isn't. There is no legal monopoly on law enforcement. Anyone can
|
||
and should get involved in law enforcement -- up to their capabilities.
|
||
It's every citizen's obligation and duty to help enforcement personnel
|
||
maintain law and order and to catch criminals or give evidence when they
|
||
see someone committing a crime.
|
||
|
||
Remember the Kansas City report, "Primary responsibility rests with
|
||
families, the community and its individual members. The police can only
|
||
facilitate and assist members of the community in the maintenance of law
|
||
and order, and no more."
|
||
|
||
When some citizens see a crime being committed, they pretend they don't see
|
||
it. They turn away because, even if they wanted to do something, they
|
||
simply don't know WHAT to do or HOW to do it. They feel vulnerable, scared,
|
||
helpless, and embarrassed! That's the problem.
|
||
|
||
Solution: Training for CrimeFighters is available. Chapter 25 provides full
|
||
details. More than 400 books and videos listed in CrimeFighters' Catalog
|
||
(CRIMCAT) can provide insider information on all areas of law enforcement
|
||
and related subjects.
|
||
Costs of Law Enforcement
|
||
|
||
A cop's pay for 20 years, fringe benefits, equipment, and administrative
|
||
support costs, is about $1 million ($50,000 a year for 20 years). And, if
|
||
the officer is promoted to sergeant before retirement, the pension for
|
||
about 35 years will cost another $1 million. And, not all cops are in the
|
||
firing line. There's a large percentage of sworn officers in administrative
|
||
and other support services. The total cost of each full time career officer
|
||
on the streets cost taxpayers close to THREE million dollars!
|
||
|
||
That's something to remember when you ask for more police protection and
|
||
want a cop on every street corner. Police services aren't free!
|
||
|
||
If, as a taxpayer, you don't mind paying $3 million for a career police
|
||
officer who spends about 5% of the time fighting crime, you shouldn't mind
|
||
a full-time CrimeFighter being paid $1 million on a commission-only basis.
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
|
||
Citizens can be unofficial undercover agents to find out about criminal
|
||
activity and give this information to the FBI to make arrests, or make the
|
||
arrests themselves when there is no time to call the FBI.
|
||
|
||
The incentive to put yourself in a potentially hazardous situations is that
|
||
you can be paid handsomely for it from generous rewards. Large rewards are
|
||
available and mentioned in detail in this book. Your share of fines and
|
||
forfeitures, sometimes in the millions of dollars, are bonuses!
|
||
|
||
Being a Crimefighter isn't for timid people. It's for those who want
|
||
adventure, physical action, large sums of money, and who are not afraid to
|
||
get involved in the war on crime.
|
||
|
||
If you've thought of being a police officer, but weren't eligible, you can
|
||
be a CrimeFighter instead and do (almost) the same job.
|
||
|
||
Crimefighters are independent, and their hours are flexible. Unlike police,
|
||
they can take the jobs they like and leave the ones they don't like; work
|
||
with partners of their own choosing; take time off when they want; wear
|
||
clothes they like to wear; and as an unofficial bounty hunter, make about
|
||
$100,000 a year, or more.
|
||
|
||
Volunteers are needed. Your Crimefighter application is in this FloppyBook.
|
||
Be the first CrimeFighter in your neighborhood and recruit your own group.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Privately Funded Rewards - How Much do they Pay?
|
||
|
||
There are a few privately funded organizations who offer rewards for
|
||
information leading to the conviction of felony crimes and some
|
||
misdemeanors. Two of the most popular are We-Tip and Crime Stoppers.
|
||
|
||
We-Tip was founded in 1972 by Bill Brownell, a retired Los Angeles County
|
||
Sheriff's Deputy, and Miriam Eckert, an Ontario (California) business
|
||
owner. Initially, the program was a California citizen's self-help program
|
||
against drugs. In 1982, We-Tip went nationwide and expanded to include all
|
||
major crimes. We-Tip now covers all 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
|
||
Islands, Canada, and Mexico. Because We-Tip was the first, it's recognized
|
||
as the originator of anonymous tip programs.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers was founded in 1976 by Greg MacAleese, a New Mexico
|
||
policeman. Like We-Tip, it provides financial incentives to encourage
|
||
citizens to report criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
As a result of We-Tip and Crime Stoppers' programs, the number of tips sent
|
||
to police departments has increased substantially. Both have the same idea,
|
||
concepts, and get similar results. The difference is in their method of
|
||
sales promotion and fund-raising to pay rewards. Another difference is that
|
||
Crime Stoppers has been organized into Chapters (called "Programs"),
|
||
whereas We-Tip is not. As a result Crime Stoppers quickly grew to about
|
||
1,000 local Chapters by 1990, in the United States, Canada, Africa,
|
||
Australia, England, and the Netherlands. In 1989, 193 Crime Stoppers
|
||
programs operated in Texas alone!
|
||
|
||
There are three levels of Crime Stoppers: municipal, state-wide,and Crime
|
||
Stoppers International, Inc. All are non-profit. CrimeStoppers' goal is to
|
||
promote programs throughout the world and help coordinate and exchange
|
||
information among state and local groups.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers charges no franchise fee to start a local program but there
|
||
is a $25,000 minimum funding required for payment of rewards, and specific
|
||
operating requirements to protect the name and concept of Crime Stoppers.
|
||
|
||
The address of Crime Stoppers International, Inc. is 3736 Eubank Blvd.,
|
||
N.E., Suite B-4, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87111, (505)294-2300 or (800)
|
||
245-0009.
|
||
|
||
We-Tip's mailing address is: We-Tip Inc., P.O. Box 1296, Rancho Cucamonga,
|
||
California 91730. We-Tip operates out of a single location via "800"
|
||
numbers: In California (800-78-CRIME), outside California (800) 73-CRIME,
|
||
or FAX: (714) 987-2477. These hotlines are operated 24 hours a day, 7 days
|
||
a week.
|
||
Both are Needed
|
||
|
||
We-Tip pays rewards for information on criminal activity "anywhere,
|
||
anytime" in the United States. That includes rural areas, interstate
|
||
highways, and National Forests. We-Tip's wanted posters on marijuana
|
||
growers and free bumper stickers are found in National Forests' Ranger
|
||
Stations, for example.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers obtains funding from local businesses and from individuals
|
||
living in their area. Local groups are authorized by their board of
|
||
directors to pay rewards only for information concerning crimes in their
|
||
community. That's because there is a limit on local donations and fund-
|
||
raising drives from residents and merchants. Local programs can't afford to
|
||
pay rewards for information on crimes committed outside their community.
|
||
|
||
Each organization has strengths and weaknesses. We-Tip fills in the gaps in
|
||
areas where Crime Stoppers does not pay rewards. Together, they cover the
|
||
entire country.
|
||
|
||
If a community is too small to financially support a local Crime Stoppers
|
||
program, but wants to do something about the crime rate, they can
|
||
distribute We-Tip's brochures in their area to obtain We-Tip's coverage.
|
||
|
||
We-Tip is like a Federal Marshall who covers all counties throughout the
|
||
United States plus other areas. Crime Stoppers groups are like city police
|
||
who cover only their respective cities. By coincidence, Bill Brownell is a
|
||
retired county deputy sheriff, whereas Greg MacAleese is a city policeman.
|
||
|
||
Fund Raising
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers Chapters have about 10,000 key people throughout the United
|
||
States who actively promote their fund-raising and reward-paying programs.
|
||
They advertise heavily in local newspapers, radio, T.V., and billboards.
|
||
That's the major advantage of the franchise concept.
|
||
|
||
Another advantage is political clout created by thousands of motivated
|
||
people (committee members) of local Chapters in all 50 states. Because
|
||
Chapters are non-profit, they usually get free advertising on radio, T.V.
|
||
and outdoor advertising. News articles and press releases are also used to
|
||
get maximum coverage.
|
||
|
||
We-Tip isn't as well known as Crime Stoppers outside of California and
|
||
adjoining states because their advertising is mainly in the Western states.
|
||
We-Tip concentrates the advertising of their reward program via
|
||
professionally designed brochures.
|
||
|
||
We-Tip's brochures, one for every serious crime, are sold at low cost to
|
||
anyone who wants to distribute them in their community. The small box on
|
||
the back of the brochure provides the name and address of the person or
|
||
business making them available. The cost of brochures is tax-deductible as
|
||
advertising costs for companies. We-Tip has them printed in large
|
||
quantities and sells them at a small profit. The profits from the sale of
|
||
brochures, plus donations, are used to fund their reward money.
|
||
|
||
Misdemeanors
|
||
|
||
We-Tip pays rewards for information on all felonies anywhere in the United
|
||
States. And, according to one of their brochures, they pay rewards for
|
||
information concerning vandalism and graffiti misdemeanors.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers may or may not pay rewards for information on serious
|
||
misdemeanors. Nationwide, millions of misdemeanors are committed every
|
||
year. Crime Stoppers and We-Tip would be quickly out of funds if they paid
|
||
rewards for all misdemeanors. When in doubt, call them.
|
||
|
||
Rewards - How much can you get?
|
||
|
||
Most privately funded organizations, such as Crime Stoppers, Crime Solvers,
|
||
Secret Witness, Crime Line, We-Tip and others, pay rewards "up to $1,000."
|
||
But, very few tipsters are paid $1,000. The reason is, rewards are raised
|
||
by donations and local fund-raising events. There's a limit on how much
|
||
they can afford to pay. Further, they pay an amount based on a formula, and
|
||
not everyone gets top dollar. Very few tipsters can provide the kind of
|
||
information needed for a conviction. Often, they aren't personally involved
|
||
in solving the crime, obtaining evidence, making arrests, or taking risks
|
||
of physical harm to qualify for the maximum reward.
|
||
|
||
The following information is how Crime Stoppers calculate rewards. Most
|
||
privately funded organizations have similar formulas.
|
||
|
||
Point Systems for calculating Rewards Paid to Tipsters
|
||
|
||
Part 1.
|
||
|
||
Points Category of Crimes
|
||
------- -------------------------------
|
||
3.5 Capital murder. (First degree)
|
||
|
||
3.0 Murder, sale, distribution and manufacture of narcotics, in penalty
|
||
group I.
|
||
|
||
2.5 Aggravated offenses of robbery, robbery, sexual assault, assault,
|
||
kidnapping, indecency with a child. Sale or distribution or
|
||
manufacture of narcotics in penalty group II
|
||
|
||
2.0 Burglary, arson. Sale or distribution or manufacture of narcotics in
|
||
penalty group III.
|
||
|
||
1.5 Felony possession of narcotics in penalty groups I, II, and III.
|
||
Felony theft.
|
||
|
||
1.2 Felony offenses against public health, safety and morals. (Weapons,
|
||
gambling, prostitution, pornography, felony criminal mischief).
|
||
|
||
1.0 Auto theft, fraud, hit and run with injury, and fugitive and felon
|
||
apprehensions.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Part 2. Additional Points
|
||
|
||
(a) Personal risk to tipsters
|
||
|
||
1.2 High risk
|
||
0.8 Medium risk
|
||
0.5 Moderate risk
|
||
0.0 Low or no risk
|
||
|
||
(b) Number of Crimes solved
|
||
|
||
0.8 for three or more
|
||
0.6 for Two
|
||
0.2 for one
|
||
|
||
(c) Property recovered/narcotics seized
|
||
|
||
1.3 if greater than $100,000
|
||
0.8 if greater than $ 20,000
|
||
0.6 if greater than $ 10,000
|
||
0.3 if greater than $ 2,500
|
||
0.1 if greater than $ 1,000
|
||
0.0 if less than $1,000
|
||
|
||
|
||
(d) Number of persons arrested
|
||
|
||
0.8 if three or more
|
||
0.6 if two persons
|
||
0.4 if one person
|
||
|
||
Part 3. Conversion of points to dollars
|
||
|
||
Total points Reward is between - -
|
||
|
||
1.0 $ 75 - - 200
|
||
1.1 - 1.2 - - $100 - 250
|
||
1.3 - 1.4 - - $125 - 300
|
||
1.5 - 2.0 - - $150 - 350
|
||
2.1 - 2.5 - - $200 - 400
|
||
2.6 - 3.0 - - $250 - 450
|
||
3.1 - 3.5 - - $300 - 500
|
||
3.6 - 4.0 - - $350 - 550
|
||
4.1 - 4.5 - - $400 - 600
|
||
4.6 - 5.0 - - $450 - 650
|
||
5.1 - 5.5 - - $500 - 700
|
||
5.6 - 6.0 - - $550 - 1,000
|
||
|
||
The maximum points (6.0) are seldom attained and $1,000 seldom paid. To
|
||
determine how much would be paid for a certain crime and under varying
|
||
circumstances, add up the points you might get and calculate the amount.
|
||
|
||
Rewards will be approximately as shown in the above formula. Rewards may
|
||
vary $100 or so, depending on a few other factors. A sudden crime wave,
|
||
in a small community, with many rewards pending might force them to pay
|
||
rewards less than indicated in their formula. Thus, there is no guarantee
|
||
of how much you will be paid.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers vs Government Agencies
|
||
|
||
When a person who just happens to notice something and makes a 2-minute
|
||
telephone call, a reward of $100 to $200 is fair and reasonable. Privately
|
||
funded organizations who use such a formula usually have it geared to
|
||
compensate and satisfy a one-time tipster.
|
||
|
||
However, if someone were to go undercover and infiltrate a drug ring or
|
||
spend a few weeks or months to get information and evidence, the extra
|
||
points (and dollars paid) are not in direct proportion to effort. Extra
|
||
points earned for high personal risk (1.2) means the reward might be
|
||
increased only by $120 according to their formula. If there is significant
|
||
time, effort, expense or personal risk involved, it would be smarter to
|
||
contact the FBI and negotiate for a reward of $10,000 to $250,000!
|
||
|
||
The comments above are directed to full-time CrimeFighters. They need to
|
||
know what they can expect from We-Tip and Crime Stoppers, and why they
|
||
should zero in on Federal rewards.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters are in a different category than tipsters. They aren't people
|
||
who just happen to hear about, or see, a crime in progress. CrimeFighters
|
||
may spend considerable time, money and effort establishing a network of
|
||
street people and ex-convicts to get tips or evidence of criminal activity.
|
||
They require appropriate compensation in proportion to their time, effort,
|
||
expense, and personal risk when they become personally involved in
|
||
investigative work.
|
||
Double-Dipping
|
||
|
||
Scenario: A CrimeFighter learns of a drug distribution network. He obtains
|
||
information concerning felony charges of drugs, firearms violations,
|
||
smuggling, income tax evasion, traffic violations and a few other felonies.
|
||
The information includes many different violations.
|
||
|
||
Question: If many laws were broken, would he be paid a reward from each
|
||
department if each department had provisions to pay rewards? The answer is
|
||
no. In most cases he would be paid only from the department to whom he
|
||
reported the original information. Some laws (Customs, for example) specify
|
||
rewards are to be paid for "original information," or words to that effect.
|
||
Because of the discretionary powers of agencies who authorize payment of
|
||
rewards, very few would allow double-dipping. If the information was first
|
||
given to Crime Stoppers, Crime Stoppers would pay, but it might be the only
|
||
reward paid!
|
||
|
||
An exception is drug-related offenses. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
|
||
reward, Title 18, USCS 886, specifically mentions this reward may be paid
|
||
in addition to any other reward. However, it is also subject to
|
||
discretionary powers of its administrator.
|
||
|
||
The problem is that no matter how large or small the amount paid may be,
|
||
any payment from privately funded organizations usually makes it impossible
|
||
to collect a larger reward from the government. A larger reward might be
|
||
paid by the federal government if the CrimeFighter contacts them first.
|
||
|
||
Recommendation
|
||
|
||
Privately funded organizations (PFOs), such as We-Tip, CrimeStoppers and
|
||
others, should continue offering their small rewards to one-time tipsters
|
||
but could advise tipsters they may be eligible for $1,000 or more from the
|
||
Federal Government. If the tipster chooses to apply for a larger reward,
|
||
PFOs could offer to introduce them to a Federal agent (usually the FBI)
|
||
with whom they would negotiate for a Federal reward.
|
||
|
||
This procedure will allow PFOs to work with rather than compete with the
|
||
Federal government. It will also help PFOs to (indirectly) obtain funding
|
||
for larger rewards from the Federal Government. PFOs can then advertise
|
||
that larger rewards, such as $1,000 to $250,000, is available. That would
|
||
increase interest in their programs and provide stronger incentives to
|
||
tipsters -- at no cost to them!
|
||
|
||
The best solution is to have PFOs join forces to ask their legislators to
|
||
pass a state law that are as good as or better than the hodgepodge of
|
||
Federal laws. When such state reward laws are passed, there would be no
|
||
need to use Federal laws to obtain maximum rewards! (Chapter 28 has a
|
||
proposed CrimeFighter reward law that could be used as guidelines.)
|
||
|
||
Shopping for Rewards
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement agencies often squabble over who has jurisdiction because
|
||
they compete with each other for certain cases. As in football, each team
|
||
wants to make the touchdowns and get the glory. It's understandable team
|
||
leaders in such agencies want to get all the tips for their team.
|
||
|
||
I have noticed a few letters, memos and suggestions in official
|
||
correspondence to field agents that suggest shopping around for larger
|
||
rewards by tipsters should be discouraged. These comments were either
|
||
motivated by the team effort or because of their funding limitations. Such
|
||
short-sighted policies minimize law enforcement incentives and results.
|
||
|
||
A full-time CrimeFighter isn't in the same class as a casual, one-time
|
||
tipster. CrimeFighters are self-employed private investigators. They need
|
||
to be paid according to their investment of time, money and personal
|
||
danger. Token rewards may be suitable for tipsters who chance upon certain
|
||
information and make a short phone call. Token rewards do not provide
|
||
sufficient incentives for full-time, private, licensed or unlicensed
|
||
investigators.
|
||
|
||
The bottom line is, if the job doesn't pay enough, no one will be seriously
|
||
interested. If the job can pay from $50,000 to $100,000 a year, thousands
|
||
of ex-police, licensed private investigators, and trained security
|
||
personnel might consider becoming full-time professional CrimeFighters.
|
||
That's what we really need! And, that's what I hope to achieve with an
|
||
invitation to you to become a voting member in a local CrimeFighter group.
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
Rewards - General Information, and
|
||
The Catch-all Reward Law
|
||
|
||
Six (reward) laws are of special importance and reward potential to a
|
||
CrimeFighter. They are:
|
||
|
||
(1) 18 USCS 1962: Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) pays a
|
||
percentage (up to 50%) of all fines and forfeitures with no dollar limit.
|
||
This law covers virtually all felonies that are profit motivated.
|
||
|
||
(2) 18 USCS 3059 pays rewards up to $25,000 for information leading to the
|
||
arrest for any state or Federal felonies. It's a Bounty Hunter law, with a
|
||
dead-or-alive clause!
|
||
|
||
(3) 21 USCS 886 Drug Enforcement Agency pays additional rewards of 25% of
|
||
all fines and forfeitures for information on drug-related felonies -- up to
|
||
$150,000!
|
||
|
||
(4) 19 USCS 1619 (Customs) pays 25% of fines and forfeitures up to
|
||
$250,000.
|
||
|
||
(5) 26 USCS 7623 (Internal Revenue Service) pays a percentage (up to 50%)
|
||
of fines and forfeitures, with no dollar limit!
|
||
|
||
(6) 33 USCS 411 (Environmental Protection Agency) pays 50% of fines and
|
||
forfeitures levied against navigable-water polluters -- no limit!
|
||
|
||
All of the above may not seem to hold much interest to CrimeFighters, but
|
||
they're sleepers. They'll surprise you with their potential. These, plus
|
||
quite a few more reward laws and related topics, are mentioned in detail in
|
||
following Chapters.
|
||
|
||
The Bounty Hunter Reward Law
|
||
|
||
USCS 3059 is the main catch-all law. It offers a reward for information
|
||
leading to the arrest of any felon, anywhere in the United States, whether
|
||
under federal or state law, and is payable after the arrest without being
|
||
contingent on obtaining a conviction. It's a very important reward law for
|
||
CrimeFighters. Here's the details:
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 3059 "Rewards and appropriations therefrom.
|
||
|
||
"There is authorized to be appropriated out of any money in the Treasury
|
||
not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $25,000 as a reward or rewards for
|
||
the capture of anyone who is charged with violations of criminal laws of
|
||
the United States or any State or of the District of Columbia, and an equal
|
||
amount as a reward or rewards for information leading to the arrest of any
|
||
such person, to be apportioned and expended in the discretion of, and upon
|
||
such conditions as may be imposed by, the Attorney General of the United
|
||
States. Not more than $25,000 shall be expended for information or capture
|
||
of any one person.
|
||
|
||
If any of the said persons shall be killed in resisting lawful arrest, the
|
||
Attorney General may pay any part of the reward money in his discretion to
|
||
the person or persons whom he shall adjudge to be entitled thereto but no
|
||
reward money shall be paid to any official or employee of the Department of
|
||
Justice of the United States.
|
||
|
||
(b) The Attorney General each year may spend not more than $10,000 for
|
||
services or information looking toward the apprehension of narcotic law
|
||
violators who are fugitives from justice."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Unofficial Interpretation of USCS 3059
|
||
|
||
Clause (1) A CrimeFighter may be paid up to $25,000 for the CAPTURE of "any
|
||
one person" who has been charged with a violation of state or federal laws
|
||
but has not been captured or who has escaped from authorities.
|
||
|
||
This law authorizes and encourage citizens to make a citizen's arrest or
|
||
otherwise physically capture (at gun point when necessary) any person who
|
||
has been charged (not necessarily convicted) of violating any felony law.
|
||
In effect, this is a Bounty Hunter reward law.
|
||
|
||
Clause (2) Up to $25,000 may be paid to a citizen for INFORMATION leading
|
||
to the arrest of "any one person" who has violated any state or federal
|
||
felony laws who has not yet been arrested or charged.
|
||
|
||
If the lawbreaker is known to be dangerous, and you have time to call the
|
||
FBI and negotiate a reward, let them make the arrest. You will still be
|
||
paid for the information. However, the amount may be less than that paid if
|
||
you were to make the arrest yourself.
|
||
|
||
Also important is the wording "any one person." That might be interpreted
|
||
as meaning the reward can be increased if many felons are arrested. In the
|
||
latter event, the rewards could be as high as $250,000 (the maximum) for
|
||
information leading to the arrest of a large drug ring.
|
||
|
||
The unique part of this law (3059) is that the reward will be paid for the
|
||
information leading to the arrest (only) and doesn't contain the words
|
||
"upon conviction." Authorities wouldn't authorize an arrest if sufficient
|
||
evidence wasn't available for a successful prosecution, but the "guilty"
|
||
person might get off on a technicality. In such an unfortunate event,
|
||
although the guilty party would go free, the reward would still be paid. A
|
||
CrimeFighter should get paid within a short period of time, and won't have
|
||
to wait until the person charged has exhausted all legal appeals available
|
||
in the court system.
|
||
|
||
Clause (3) The last condition is a "dead or alive" clause. The reward paid
|
||
under this clause is at the discretion of the U.S. District Attorney, who
|
||
decides the amount to be paid depending on the circumstances of the death
|
||
of the felon. If the lawbreaker is killed in a gunfight resisting arrest or
|
||
in a high-speed automobile chase, which are common occurrences, the full
|
||
amount would probably be paid. But if the death of the felon could have
|
||
been avoided but wasn't, or deadly force was used but not justified, or is
|
||
under suspicious circumstances, the rewards might not be paid. This
|
||
clause is mainly to discourage temptation by bounty hunters to deliver dead
|
||
bodies instead of live ones.
|
||
|
||
Clause 2 (b) was added Sept 1982. Presumably, the number of uncaught
|
||
narcotics violators are now so numerous, lawmakers were forced to exempt
|
||
them to avoid depleting the reward fund. However, Title 21, 886 is a DEA
|
||
law for drug-related crimes. It takes up the slack caused by the
|
||
elimination of rewards in 3059 for uncaught drug-related violators.
|
||
|
||
* * * * *
|
||
|
||
Incidentally, when a reward law says the Attorney General, the Secretary,
|
||
or the President, is authorized to pay rewards, it's not necessary or
|
||
advisable to actually contact those high ranking individuals. While the
|
||
named official is ultimately responsible, they are seldom involved in
|
||
authorizing rewards. In a few situations where the highest rewards are
|
||
justified, they may become involved to approve maximum payments.
|
||
|
||
Decision making and authorization for federal rewards are delegated to
|
||
Assistants who have offices in many cities. They are the ones who decide
|
||
how much the reward should be. When the amount of the reward is higher than
|
||
their authority to pay, they will contact their superiors and pass it on to
|
||
the person who can authorize it - providing that the amount is justified.
|
||
CrimeFighters should contact the FBI, or nearest U.S. Attorney's office as
|
||
the starting place to start negotiating for federal rewards. (Rewards are
|
||
seldom paid after disclosure if the reward is not negotiated first!)
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
RICO covers just about all serious felonies that involve a profit motive.
|
||
Payment of a percentage of fines and forfeitures are available but subject
|
||
to negotiation, as it is with most reward laws. RICO law is very important
|
||
to CrimeFighters because the majority of felony violations will fall under
|
||
the broad scope of RICO, which has far reaching and broad powers such as
|
||
confiscating a lifetime of accumulated illegal profits from convicted
|
||
felons. Negotiated rewards can pay up to 50 percent of same, with no dollar
|
||
limit. RICO is explained in detail in chapter 8.
|
||
|
||
Where to Find Reference Material on Laws
|
||
|
||
Federal laws mentioned in this book are found in the multi-volume sets of
|
||
"U.S. Codes" in Federal Depository libraries in major cities. Not all
|
||
libraries are designated as Federal Depository Libraries. Ask your local
|
||
librarian where they're located. If there is no Federal Depository library
|
||
in your area, U.S. Codes are also available in law libraries, which are
|
||
usually found near courthouses. These libraries are for the convenience of
|
||
lawyers, but they're available to the public for legal research. When you
|
||
need to know the details of any law, refer to these volumes. (Tip: look in
|
||
the back of each volume for the latest updates.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Fines and Forfeiture Laws
|
||
|
||
This chapter is about existing laws which contain provisions to pay a
|
||
percentage of fines and forfeitures to those who provide information
|
||
leading to the conviction of felons. Examples of maximum fines for various
|
||
felonies are listed in the last part of this chapter. The next chapter will
|
||
tell you how to get the money.
|
||
|
||
In certain circumstances the courts may assess a fine as part of the
|
||
punishment. The amount depends on a lawbreaker's ability to pay as well as
|
||
the appropriateness of such a fine. The courts realize that it serves the
|
||
public interest to levy fines and forfeitures in lieu of, or with, jail
|
||
terms. This is especially so when the felon has made huge profits by
|
||
violating the law, and, the courts feel a need to take away ill-gotten
|
||
gains. Fines and forfeitures are used to deny felons the "fruits of their
|
||
criminal activity."
|
||
|
||
Many laws contain provisions to pay 50 percent of resultant fines and
|
||
forfeitures. This creates an unusual opportunity for CrimeFighters. As you
|
||
look at the large dollar amounts involved, visualize yourself being
|
||
eligible and being paid 50% of the fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
Some Examples
|
||
|
||
On October 31, 1990, headlines in the Arizona Republic stated, "Underground
|
||
Pot Factories Raided". Entrepreneurs had built two large houses designed
|
||
specifically for marijuana growing in underground rooms. The rooms
|
||
contained irrigation, lighting, diesel generators, and a compactor for
|
||
making bales of pot worth an estimated $50 million. The houses cost
|
||
$400,000. The sentence for each charge was 10 years to life in prison and
|
||
a fine of up to $4 million.
|
||
|
||
On April 13, 1990 a San Antonio Express-News headlines stated,"Mexican
|
||
Agents Held in Border Cash Haul." Two customs agents were placed under
|
||
arrest in Brownsville, Texas, when they were caught red-handed trying to
|
||
smuggle $2.4 million into Mexico. The money was in various denominations,
|
||
mostly small bills, and stashed in cardboard boxes. Only $10,000 can be
|
||
legally taken out of the United States without registration. The violation
|
||
of U.S. currency laws provide a maximum penalty of 15 years and fines up to
|
||
$500,000. In this case, the Mexican customs agents violated the law, were
|
||
caught, and the $2,400,000 in cash was seized and forfeited under customs
|
||
law. In addition, their 1990 Jeep station wagon was also forfeited.
|
||
|
||
The Bellingham (Washington) Herald (Bellingham, Washington) on June 11,
|
||
1990 stated, "Huge Heroin Bust in Bellingham." The story tells how U.S.
|
||
Border Patrol agents became suspicious of three men in a parked car. Having
|
||
"reasonable grounds" They searched the vehicle and found 13 packages of
|
||
Asian heroin with a wholesale value of about $1.25 million. When blended
|
||
with other ingredients for street sale, it could be worth about $15
|
||
million. The vehicle and heroin were forfeited.
|
||
|
||
In 1981, also in Bellingham, 40 tons of marijuana valued at $25 million was
|
||
seized from a ship on Bellingham Bay. The ship and its cargo were
|
||
forfeited, and the ringleader was sentenced to 25 years in prison and fined
|
||
$155,000.
|
||
|
||
Almost every week a newspaper story tells of another large drug bust.
|
||
Thousands of small drug busts of $100,000 are commonplace and hardly worth
|
||
mentioning except in the local news media.
|
||
|
||
It's been reported that 90 percent of all criminal activity is directly or
|
||
indirectly related to narcotics. Drug-related crimes are the single largest
|
||
law enforcement problem in America. On the other hand, they also provide
|
||
CrimeFighters with an opportunity to make a better than average income to
|
||
help police obtain evidence and to put violators in jail. RICO laws are
|
||
being used more and more to remove the profit from criminal activity. With
|
||
50% of the fines and forfeitures from just a dozen or more small drug
|
||
busts, a CrimeFighter can become financially independent!
|
||
|
||
Fraudulent Tax Shelter Schemes vs IRS
|
||
|
||
Title 26 USCS 7302 provides that "it shall be unlawful to have or possess
|
||
any property intended for use in violating the provisions of internal
|
||
revenue laws... and no property rights shall exist in any such property."
|
||
|
||
An unofficial interpretation of this law follows.
|
||
|
||
Any person using any property as "bait" in illegal tax shelter schemes
|
||
loses title to said property, which is then seized by the IRS.
|
||
|
||
One case (United States vs One 1954 Rolls Royce Silver Dawn, 777F.2d 1358
|
||
(9th Cir. 1985) involved a fraudulent tax shelter scheme in which the
|
||
automobile was the "object" used in the illegal tax shelter. The Court of
|
||
Appeals agreed it was an "active aid" in the illegal activity and was
|
||
forfeited under civil procedure.
|
||
|
||
Any object whether real estate or other property, used for illegal tax
|
||
shelters, or any other fraud, are subject to forfeiture. Under RICO and
|
||
other federal reward laws, the informant can get paid up to 50 percent of
|
||
the value of confiscated assets that are involved in criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
The courts may authorize seizure of cars, boats, airplanes, homes, and even
|
||
going businesses when they are used in the commission of a felony. Most
|
||
people know that customs laws, for example, provide for the forfeiture of
|
||
contraband items plus the vehicles or vessels if drugs are found in them.
|
||
|
||
Homes May Be Seized and Forfeited
|
||
|
||
A recent (1989) newspaper article in the Harlingen (Texas) Valley Times
|
||
mentioned a Brownsville man was arrested for 10 separate violations of
|
||
importing photographs of naked children engaged in sexually explicit
|
||
conduct. In many states, pornography of adults is permitted and tolerated
|
||
by law. When it involves underage children the law is harsh on offenders.
|
||
In this case, the possible penalty for each count is 10 years in jail and
|
||
up to $250,000 in fines for each violation. The indictment includes a
|
||
notice that the lawbreaker's house will be seized and forfeited under a
|
||
pornography law (Title 18, Sections 2251 - 2254). This law allows the
|
||
forfeiture of property used in the commission of pornographic offenses.
|
||
|
||
If the Brownsville man had legitimate businesses (other than the porn
|
||
business) and it was proven that part of the proceeds of his illegal
|
||
business was used to finance the legitimate business, or the legitimate
|
||
business was used to "launder" the illegal profits, the legitimate business
|
||
and its bank accounts could also have been seized and forfeited.
|
||
|
||
Money Laundering Problems
|
||
|
||
Al Capone was indicted for income tax evasion after the government couldn't
|
||
pin him down on other criminal charge. All they could prove was that Capone
|
||
was spending a lot of money that wasn't reported on his income tax forms.
|
||
Al couldn't account for the money or wouldn't say where it came from.
|
||
|
||
Most criminals know if they don't have a job or a business to support
|
||
expensive tastes, they will come under scrutiny for income tax evasion.
|
||
Money laundering is the obvious solution.
|
||
|
||
Money laundering is accomplished by investing illegally obtained money into
|
||
a legitimate business. Criminals then report profits from the business.
|
||
Laundering money solves one problem but creates another. If a criminal owns
|
||
the business it becomes "tainted" with illegal money. When that can be
|
||
proven, the business or business investments may be forfeited under various
|
||
laws as the fruits of criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
The Use of Corporations
|
||
|
||
Most racketeering businesses are incorporated. Corporations provide tax
|
||
sheltering and lower personal taxes. They also facilitate selling shares to
|
||
raise money for investments. When a business owner has many legitimate
|
||
business investments, accountants will recommend the use of a separate
|
||
corporation as a holding company. Such a corporation "holds" the shares of
|
||
various investments in the holding company's name. Dividend income from
|
||
various corporations are paid to the holding company and not to the owner.
|
||
That allows the owner to defer surplus business income and to reduce his
|
||
personal income taxes. This common business practice is a legal tax-
|
||
sheltering strategy. A successful criminal can become a rich business
|
||
owner, obtain legal tax breaks, and receive a legitimate income to avoid
|
||
suspicion of illegal activity.
|
||
|
||
However, if it can be proved that a business was financed by the profits
|
||
from criminal activity, the business can be forfeited. If illegal money can
|
||
be traced to a holding company, that holding company (which "owns" the
|
||
shares of all the various businesses) can itself be forfeited and the crime
|
||
boss loses everything!
|
||
|
||
Civil Forfeiture Cases
|
||
|
||
United States vs Cauble. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). Cauble placed
|
||
various legitimate businesses under the umbrella of a holding company which
|
||
was the RICO enterprise named in the indictment for a marijuana smuggling
|
||
enterprise. Although not all the businesses were involved in the illegal
|
||
activity, the jury felt that it is impossible to determine which weren't
|
||
tainted. They decided it would be better to declare forfeit all the
|
||
businesses rather than none. It was estimated the total value of Cauble's
|
||
enterprises was worth $15 to $20 million!
|
||
|
||
United States vs $4,255,000. 762, F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985) is a case in
|
||
which a person, who claimed to be an honest and well established money-
|
||
exchanger, moved $242 million in drug proceeds through a Miami bank in less
|
||
than eight months during 1981. The lawbreaker said he had no idea the money
|
||
delivered to him were the proceeds of illegal drug activity. The government
|
||
filed a $10 million civil penalty action against the defendant's company,
|
||
Sonal, Inc. (under 31 USCS 5321 (a)(2)) and seized $453,731 that was in a
|
||
Sonal's bank account.
|
||
|
||
Most of the criminal laws mentioned in this book offer rewards based on
|
||
either the arrest or conviction. An exception is Title 28, USCS 524, which
|
||
states: "payment of awards may be paid for information or assistance
|
||
leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture under the comprehensive Drug
|
||
Abuse Prevention and Control Act or a criminal forfeiture under the
|
||
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Statute (RICO) 18 USCS 1961
|
||
et seq."
|
||
|
||
Keep USCS 524 in mind for RICO civil suits. The payment of awards provides
|
||
legal standing to citizens to initiate civil actions against drug dealers.
|
||
It's one of the keys to a CrimeFighter's financial success. (More on civil
|
||
suits in chapter 8)
|
||
Customs' Forfeiture Law
|
||
|
||
Also an exception is 19 USCS 1619, mentioned later in more detail in
|
||
Chapter 14. This Custom's law is very broad law and provides compensation
|
||
to informers. USCS 1619 doesn't mention (therefore doesn't specifically
|
||
prohibit) payment based on civil action fines and forfeitures. Payment is
|
||
not tied to an arrest or conviction -- only that such information "leads to
|
||
a recovery of any duties withheld, or any fine, penalty, or forfeiture of
|
||
property incurred: the Secretary may award and pay such person an amount
|
||
that does not exceed 25 percent of the net amount so recovered."
|
||
|
||
Smuggling often involves large quantities of contraband. Drugs have a very
|
||
high value (currently $100,000 per kilogram from Columbia which is sold for
|
||
$1 million on the street.) This "drug value" seems to be anticipated in the
|
||
25 percent Custom's reward. The reward is limited to $250,000 for each
|
||
case. That's about where the total value of fines and forfeitures is
|
||
expected to be $1 million or more.
|
||
|
||
Bonuses
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 886, Drug Enforcement Agency pays an additional reward, up to
|
||
$25,000, for information leading to the conviction of any drug-related
|
||
criminal activity. Whether or not there is a conviction, but providing the
|
||
case goes to trial, you can also qualify for up to $25,000 under Title 18
|
||
USCS 3059, which pays a reward for information leading to the arrest for
|
||
any state or Federal felony.
|
||
|
||
If a conviction is obtained on drug-related crimes, you can qualify for up
|
||
to 50% of the fines and forfeitures (vehicles, equipment, cash, jewelry,
|
||
businesses, guns, stocks and bonds, etc.), plus rewards of up to $50,000
|
||
via USCS 3059 and USCS 886.
|
||
|
||
Free Vehicles, Guns, Boats and Aircraft?
|
||
|
||
State and Federal district attorneys hardly ever try to sell forfeited
|
||
items at retail prices. They usually sell them at wholesale prices or less
|
||
to get rid of them as soon as possible. This is especially so when the
|
||
items, such as vehicles, boats and airplanes, require maintenance charges,
|
||
storage or are subject to vandalism, weathering, theft, or obsolescence
|
||
which would quickly reduce their value.
|
||
|
||
A CrimeFighter who has 50% claim to the items forfeited might be able to
|
||
persuade authorities to use the 50% and possibly related rewards as the
|
||
purchase amount. That would provide the authorities with immediate disposal
|
||
of the forfeited property.
|
||
|
||
Fines - How Much?
|
||
|
||
USCS 3571 provides the courts with guidelines and amounts of fines:
|
||
|
||
18 USCS 3571 Sentence of fine.
|
||
|
||
(a) In general. A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
sentenced to pay a fine.
|
||
|
||
(b) Fines for individuals. Except as provided in this subsection (e) of
|
||
this section, an individual who has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
fined not more than the greatest of -
|
||
|
||
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
|
||
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
|
||
(3) for a felony, not more than $250,000;
|
||
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death not more than $250,000;
|
||
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not
|
||
more than $100,000;
|
||
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death,
|
||
not more than $5,000; or
|
||
(7) for an infraction, not more than $5,000.
|
||
|
||
- - - - - - - - -
|
||
|
||
(c) Fines for organizations. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this
|
||
section, an organization that has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
fined not more than the greatest of -
|
||
|
||
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
|
||
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
|
||
(3) for a felony, not more than $500,000;
|
||
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death, not more than $500,000;
|
||
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not
|
||
more than $200,000;
|
||
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death,
|
||
not more than $10,000; or
|
||
(7) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
|
||
|
||
(d) Alternative fines based on gain or loss. If any person derives
|
||
pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary
|
||
loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not
|
||
more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss,
|
||
unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate
|
||
or prolong the sentencing process.
|
||
|
||
(e) Special rule for lower fine specified in substantive provisions. If a
|
||
law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than
|
||
the fine otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific
|
||
reference, exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise
|
||
applicable under this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the
|
||
amount specified in the law setting forth the offense."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: Note that under ordinary law, sub-paragraph (d) allows a fine to
|
||
be doubled, as in a case of fraud, swindle, or larceny such as those often
|
||
used by confidence artists and unethical businesses via shady dealings.
|
||
Also note that organizations also pay twice as much in fines resulting in a
|
||
maximum fine of up to four times the illegal profit! However, the amount
|
||
and imposition of fines are contingent on individual personal or business
|
||
finances of the defendant.
|
||
|
||
Fines that are not suspended by the court constitute a lien until paid in
|
||
full. Though the lawbreaker (or business) can't pay the full amount of the
|
||
fine, it hangs over their head like any other debt and must be paid sooner
|
||
or later. Bankruptcy laws do not include relief for fines based on criminal
|
||
violations. Significant assets that are later obtained by a lawbreaker may
|
||
be seized and sold to satisfy the debt.
|
||
|
||
When prosecutions are under RICO laws, triple damages are possible. If you
|
||
have a choice, RICO laws are best for prosecution to get maximum awards by
|
||
the court. Prosecutions are easier under civil lawsuits than under criminal
|
||
charges. If you decide to do the actual prosecution (which is possible) you
|
||
can be awarded 50% of the total fines and forfeitures. In addition, you can
|
||
also be paid for your investigative and related costs, plus legal fees to
|
||
your lawyer who acts as your assistant to prosecute offenders.
|
||
|
||
State Forfeiture Laws
|
||
|
||
State laws are organized differently from Federal laws. That is, rewards
|
||
for forfeitures (if any) are often found in separate laws that deal only
|
||
with forfeitures. For example, Arizona's forfeiture law, 13-4315, has a
|
||
provision that says "Payment of awards for information or assistance
|
||
leading to a civil or criminal proceeding may be made under this Title."
|
||
|
||
Awards (rewards) are authorized in any civil or criminal case, including
|
||
Arizona's RICO law and any other law where and when forfeitures are
|
||
imposed. When no reward dollar amount or percentage is specified it's
|
||
purposely left negotiable. Always negotiate for 50% of all fines and
|
||
forfeitures. That's the usual amount paid under various Federal laws.
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
|
||
In most criminal statutes the law provides for forfeiture of assets used or
|
||
instrumental in the crime to prevent the crime from being easily repeated.
|
||
Most readers know that customs laws and "zero tolerance" drug laws allow
|
||
forfeiture of contraband items. If drugs are found, the law permits the
|
||
seizure of vehicles, boats and airplanes if the vehicles were used to
|
||
assist or commit the criminal act.
|
||
|
||
No matter what the crime is, it can include fines. If the lawbreaker has
|
||
the money to pay a fine, fines are imposed. Forfeiture is usually imposed
|
||
on money used as working capital, money found in a drug bust, businesses,
|
||
tools, guns, vehicles, etc. when the items are used in the execution of the
|
||
crime. Any significant asset proven to be the fruits of criminal activity
|
||
may be seized. CrimeFighters can get 50% of the value of same!
|
||
|
||
Which law you should use to prosecute a lawbreaker depends on an analysis
|
||
of state vs Federal laws. Determine which authority pays the maximum
|
||
amount, or has the best advantages, all things considered. That's what
|
||
State prosecutors do. In any event, USCS 3059 and 886 still apply no matter
|
||
if you use state or Federal RICO laws.
|
||
|
||
State laws are too numerous to try to fit into this book (and you'd only be
|
||
interested in 1/50th of them). Instead, I'll recommend that you familiarize
|
||
yourself with your state laws. They will be found in almost every public
|
||
library or in local law libraries. (Chapter 20 includes some state laws
|
||
that provide for suitable payment of rewards comparable to Federal laws.)
|
||
|
||
Keep in mind that rewards (or awards) may be contained in a separate law.
|
||
Look in the index for Rewards, Fines, Forfeitures, and Informants. As in
|
||
Arizona law, they may not be specifically mentioned within the criminal
|
||
statute itself. Criminal statutes may deal only with the definitions of the
|
||
crime and assigns specific classes of felonies and misdemeanors, as
|
||
appropriate, depending on the severity of the violation. Fines,
|
||
forfeitures, and jail sentences are contained in other sections which are
|
||
cross-referenced to the class of the felony or misdemeanor.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Do-It-Yourself Lawsuits
|
||
|
||
Legal tools for Crimefighters are:
|
||
|
||
(1) Personal damage lawsuits, (2) Qui Tam law, and (3) RICO law.
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law (pronounced "kee tam") is is mentioned briefly in this chapter,
|
||
and thoroughly explained in the next Chapter.
|
||
|
||
RICO is the special law for Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations. It
|
||
is explained in detail in Chapter 8. Many other reward laws are in the rest
|
||
of this book. All of them are important, but personal damage civil suits
|
||
may be the most important legal tool for CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
This chapter concentrates on how CrimeFighters can obtain lawsuit awards in
|
||
lieu of or in addition to state or federal rewards.
|
||
|
||
Lawsuits are a viable remedy for victims of crime who were not compensated
|
||
for their injuries (physical, mental or monetary). This applies to police,
|
||
security guards and social workers who are physically assaulted by those
|
||
they try to help or arrest. It applies to anyone who may want to sue law-
|
||
breakers for personal damages caused by the lawbreaker's contribution to
|
||
their neighborhood crime rate and the adverse effects criminal activity
|
||
has on their basic freedoms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
|
||
|
||
The reasons for entertaining such a wild idea are:
|
||
|
||
(1) Almost all rewards are based on felonies. But, prosecutors routinely
|
||
downgrade felony charges to misdemeanors for first offenders. That scuttles
|
||
payment of pending rewards. Or the only charge is a misdemeanor (drunk
|
||
driving and using soft drugs, for example) and few rewards are available.
|
||
|
||
(2) There are seldom rewards paid for information on misdemeanors. Even
|
||
when they're paid, it's usually a token amount of $100. That's hardly worth
|
||
the effort to collect nor adequate compensation when many hours and dollars
|
||
are spent to gather the required evidence.
|
||
|
||
(3) Many felony prosecutions fail to obtain convictions because of errors
|
||
and omissions of law enforcement officers, incompetent prosecutors, or
|
||
technicalities. And, most rewards aren't paid when there's no conviction.
|
||
|
||
(4) Many criminal prosecutions are unsatisfactory to victims of crime.
|
||
When the justice system fails to deliver proper punishment to lawbreakers
|
||
because of plea bargaining, dismissal of charges, ineptitude of prosecutors
|
||
and/or police, or the lack of the state's financial resources to prosecute,
|
||
victims feel frustrated, cheated and betrayed. Victims can (and should) sue
|
||
lawbreakers for monetary compensation as an alternate form of punishment.
|
||
|
||
When defendants get off the hook on felony charges because of foul-ups or
|
||
technicalities, it may make the jury eager to punish the defendant as much
|
||
as possible via civil suits -- with maximum awards to obtain "justice."
|
||
|
||
(5) Police, security guards, and social workers are often verbally and
|
||
physically assaulted by those they try to help, or arrest. Until now, such
|
||
abuse was considered as an occupational hazard and endured. But, they can
|
||
initiate civil suits too, and sue for personal damages in their own name.
|
||
|
||
(6) Criminal activity in some areas makes it unsafe to go for leisurely
|
||
walks -- especially at night. Any criminal activity, drunk drivers, drug
|
||
users buying drugs from dealers in their neighborhood, or hookers plying
|
||
their trade on street corners, all deprive honest citizens their basic
|
||
freedoms: the right to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
|
||
Anyone living in such a neighborhood are entitled by law to sue the guilty
|
||
persons for an award as compensation for the deprivation of their basic
|
||
freedoms, plus punitive damages, and their related legal costs.
|
||
|
||
(7) Criminal activity increases the cost of living. Burglary and related
|
||
insurance costs are passed on to consumers of products and services. And,
|
||
taxes are increased to pay the cost of extra police and the ever expanding
|
||
judicial and penal systems. Lawsuits against convicted criminals you catch
|
||
and prosecute help you recover these crime-related cost of living.
|
||
|
||
(8) Lawsuits provide CrimeFighters with leverage to obtain information on
|
||
criminal activity. If the defendant has insider information about criminal
|
||
activity, the information can be traded for an appropriate amount to offset
|
||
all or part of the civil suit award. In effect, CrimeFighters can buy the
|
||
information with the lawbreakers' own money!
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' Personal Damage Lawsuits
|
||
|
||
Only one criminal suit is possible for a specific crime to prevent anyone
|
||
from being tried twice for the same criminal offense (double jeopardy).
|
||
However, lawbreakers can be be charged with a criminal offense and at the
|
||
same time be sued via a civil suit -- for the same criminal act! Civil
|
||
suits are remedial while criminal suits are punitive. A civil suit does not
|
||
bar a criminal suit or vice versa. This chapters explains how you can use
|
||
criminal and civil suits at the same time to obtain a unique advantage.
|
||
|
||
A conviction or guilty plea is conclusive proof you need to sue lawbreakers
|
||
for personal damages in a lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
Said personal damages are "a serious loss of your civil rights because
|
||
of the defendant's criminal activity and the resultant detrimental effect
|
||
on your basic rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
|
||
|
||
Your lawsuits ask that convicted lawbreakers pay you an appropriate amount
|
||
for their proportionate share of personal damages they have inflicted upon
|
||
you by their negligent criminal activity in your neighborhood. The amount
|
||
of the lawsuit award depends mainly on what defendants can afford to pay.
|
||
|
||
Lawsuits aren't practical if defendants have no personal assets. But not
|
||
all lawbreakers are penniless or paupers. When they have sufficient assets,
|
||
or steady jobs, they can be sued by victims for suitable compensation.
|
||
|
||
The main reason personal damage lawsuits for misdemeanors are seldom used
|
||
by citizens is because legal costs of many thousands of dollars are usually
|
||
far more than most lawbreakers can afford to pay.
|
||
|
||
The high cost of legal fees often make it impractical to sue for small
|
||
amounts from the working class. Until now, $500 and $1,000 lawsuits against
|
||
people without assets were impractical.
|
||
|
||
The first step to solving this problem is to eliminate lawyers' fees by
|
||
doing it yourself. (A do-it-yourself litigation kit is available. More
|
||
information on the kit at the end of this chapter.)
|
||
|
||
The next step is to make the lawsuit demand reasonable, in line with
|
||
the offense and ability to pay. Eliminating the high cost of legal fees
|
||
can reduce a simple lawsuit demand to a few hundred or a thousand dollars
|
||
or so. That's what most the majority of defendants can afford to pay.
|
||
|
||
Suing lawbreakers for modest amounts is a lot easier than you might think
|
||
because virtually none of them will go to trial. CrimeFighter lawsuits will
|
||
almost always be settled out of court or awarded by summary judgment!
|
||
|
||
Civil Remedies May be Better than Criminal Charges
|
||
|
||
Civil remedies such as personal damage or class action lawsuits can be more
|
||
effective against affluent lawbreakers than criminal suits because there is
|
||
no legally defined limit on the dollar amount of the "fine", and the cost
|
||
of prosecution (the lawsuit) is paid by the defendant who loses the suit.
|
||
While no jail time can be levied in a civil suit, the fine (award) can be
|
||
as much as possible to remove accumulated profits from illegal activities.
|
||
|
||
Fines are often used as punishment, but many laws are woefully out of date.
|
||
Prostitution is an example where the fines are relatively small and easily
|
||
affordable. Fines are not on par with the actual cost of investigation and
|
||
prosecution. Hookers consider such fines like salesmen consider parking
|
||
tickets -- as part of the cost of doing business. Perhaps that's why many
|
||
such violations are often ignored by police: it takes too much time, gets
|
||
very little money in return, and has virtually no deterrent value.
|
||
|
||
Insufficient Evidence May be Sufficient
|
||
|
||
Example: A pimp may have a few women working for him. Snaring the hookers
|
||
may be easy, but getting enough evidence against the pimp for criminal
|
||
conviction may be difficult. If you can connect the pimp to a hooker with a
|
||
preponderence of evidence, the pimp could be sued for personal damages and
|
||
criminal negligence: contributing to the crime rate in your community. The
|
||
award sought could be for (say) $100,000. While no jail time or criminal
|
||
convictions are given to the pimp, the $100,000 lawsuit award will cause
|
||
far more distress and pain and suffering than a few months in jail.
|
||
|
||
The preponderence of evidence: The pimp owns a $50,000 automobile, flashes
|
||
large rolls of money and wears a lot of gold jewelry. He appears to be very
|
||
rich, but it's known he hasn't worked at a regular job for years. He has
|
||
been seen consorting with one or more currently unemployed women (who are
|
||
convicted prostitutes). The CrimeFighter takes photographs or videotapes
|
||
showing the women in their usual provocative and skimpy attire (hooker's
|
||
uniform) talking to the accused on numerous occasions within a week or so,
|
||
indicating a close relationship.
|
||
|
||
Proving his innocence, where he got the money to support his lavish life
|
||
style, is almost impossible for most criminals. Thus he has no defense.
|
||
Most of it is purely circumstantial evidence leading to a conclusion of
|
||
guilt. That evidence wouldn't stand up in a criminal proceeding but may be
|
||
more than enough for two-thirds of civil suit jurors who would probably
|
||
agree the pimp is guilty as accused. A court award (paid to the Crime-
|
||
Fighter instead of the court) is similar to a fine, but can be much larger,
|
||
to take away the accumulated profit from the criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
Same thing for drug dealers who are unemployed but own expensive homes,
|
||
automobiles, and boats. If they can't prove where the money comes from to
|
||
support their lavish lifestyles and possessions, they have little or no
|
||
defense. All you need is documented proof of ownership of the assets as
|
||
well as proof of little or no other income. Add a few photographs or
|
||
videotapes to support your allegations of criminal activity. That may not
|
||
be enough for a grand jury, but may be sufficient for a civil suit.
|
||
|
||
The above example can be applied to many other known lawbreakers police
|
||
can't arrest because of a lack of conclusive evidence. Police don't use
|
||
civil suits because that's not how the game of cops and robbers is played.
|
||
|
||
But, lawsuits can be used by CrimeFighters as a viable means of prosecution
|
||
of known but unproven lawbreakers. Civil suits are easier to win, and you
|
||
don't have to be a cop or make arrests. The Rules of Discovery in civil
|
||
suits let you dig for information that may lead to an arrest for other
|
||
crimes. Civil liberty restraints that tie the hands of police do not apply
|
||
to citizen arrests or civil suits. Crime-Fighters can take action when
|
||
police can't. That's Justice, CrimeFighter style.
|
||
|
||
(News item: Olympia Washington, Oct 16, 1992.
|
||
"Law enforcement authorities can continue seizing homes of drug-trade
|
||
suspects even though they haven't been tried in court, the State Supreme
|
||
Court ruled. The court seizures amount to a civil action independent of any
|
||
pending criminal actions.")
|
||
|
||
Civil Suits vs Criminal Law
|
||
|
||
Civil suits are easier than criminal suits to obtain convictions by a
|
||
preponderance of evidence -- meaning the side with the best argument or
|
||
evidence wins. It may include circumstantial evidence, and hearsay evidence
|
||
is sometimes allowed. In criminal suits, the evidence must prove beyond a
|
||
reasonable doubt and there must be a guilty verdict from all 12 jurors. By
|
||
comparison, civil suits require only that a majority of the jury (usually
|
||
two-thirds) find the defendant liable. Prosecutors of civil suits don't
|
||
have to show absolute proof of "guilt" as they must in criminal cases. In
|
||
civil suits, the burden of proof of innocence is on the defendant!
|
||
|
||
The person or property owner's assumed innocence of the actual crime is
|
||
generally not a defense. The person or property has the burden of proving
|
||
their innocence. This makes it more difficult for defendants, and much
|
||
easier for prosecutors.
|
||
CrimeFighters' Strategy
|
||
|
||
While you have to be a lawyer to represent other parties, when you are the
|
||
plaintiff (or defendant) you have the right to represent yourself. Injured
|
||
parties (CrimeFighters) can sue lawbreakers, without a lawyer, when they
|
||
have the legal standing. The legal standing is met when you claim personal
|
||
damages were inflicted on you by the (alleged or proven) criminal activity
|
||
of the defendant in the suit.
|
||
|
||
Negotiation, not plea bargaining, is used in civil suits. The names are
|
||
different but the procedure and goals are the same: a trade for mutual
|
||
benefit. If CrimeFighters can't get money from defendants, get information.
|
||
In some cases, information of criminal activity may be more valuable than
|
||
a $1,000 cash award. Sometimes you can get both!
|
||
|
||
You can usually get paid at least $500 for misdemeanors and up to $5,000
|
||
for felony violations. You will settle the suit out of court 99.9% of the
|
||
time. When you can't get all the money (or only a small fraction of what
|
||
you ask) you can offer to settle the suit if they provide information on
|
||
past or pending criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
If that sounds like the tactics used by police in coercing drug users to
|
||
get information on drug dealers, it is. And, it works.
|
||
|
||
The big payoff comes when you sue the big players, the pushers who are
|
||
connected to the misdemeanor (or felony) violation. You need to build a
|
||
case against them. The sworn statements from the little fish you catch help
|
||
you build the case against the sharks with deep pockets and insurance, or
|
||
against drug dealers with visible and tangible assets. Then the lawsuit can
|
||
be for a hundred thousands of dollars, or more.
|
||
|
||
You can also charge for your undercover investigation work as part of the
|
||
legal costs to prosecute the case. If the case involves little personal
|
||
risk of bodily harm, you can charge lawbreakers the going rate for private
|
||
investigators, about $60 to $75 per hour. If it involves dangerous work,
|
||
with a greater risk of injury or death, you would be justified in charging
|
||
$150+ an hour for your time.
|
||
|
||
Drunk Drivers and Drug Users
|
||
|
||
Primary targets for CrimeFighters are drunk drivers, drug users, and drug
|
||
dealers, mainly because they are in abundance everywhere. While not all of
|
||
them are found in bars, a considerable number are. Bars are known to be
|
||
favorite businesses for career criminals to launder their dirty money. Bars
|
||
are favorite meeting places to plan or conduct illegal transactions, dope
|
||
dealing, prostitution and fencing stolen property. And, CrimeFighters can
|
||
frequent such places to make contacts. So, that's where the search begins.
|
||
|
||
But, you can't just walk up to people in bars and demand answers to your
|
||
questions about illegal activity. You need leverage. That's why you go
|
||
after drunk drivers leaving bars and favorite hangouts of criminals. You
|
||
report them to police to make the DUI arrests. When they're convicted, you
|
||
sue them for personal damages. Then you lean on them, offering to dismiss
|
||
your lawsuit for $200 (your out-of-pocket costs) if they provide informa-
|
||
tion on criminal activity. Either they pay you for your time controlling
|
||
DUI drivers, or you trade their money for information on criminal activity.
|
||
That's the game plan.
|
||
|
||
(The Drunk Driver Terminator Patrol is in Chapter 9. The war on drug
|
||
dealers is detailed in chapter 10.)
|
||
|
||
Five hundred to a thousand dollars (whatever the defendant can afford) may
|
||
be a small sum for a lawsuit, but may be a sufficient reward for a Crime-
|
||
Fighter for each drunk driver or drug user he snares in his net.
|
||
|
||
The small amount is to encourage early lawsuit settlement for convicted
|
||
drunk drivers whereby you ask for the costs of your investigation. You
|
||
aren't trying to bankrupt the person who has already been punished via
|
||
traffic court. All ask is to be paid for your time, and/or get leads.
|
||
|
||
While the surveillance time might be just a few hours, you can include the
|
||
time to prepare and file the legal papers, and the time involved in the
|
||
Discovery process - if it goes that far. It should be easy to accumulate
|
||
about 10 hours or so which can be billed at $50 to $75 an hour.
|
||
|
||
The easy settlements can provide you with a bread-and-butter income. That
|
||
is, if you consider $130,000 a year in that category. (If you average $500
|
||
per drunk driver or drug user, and snare at least one every eight hour
|
||
shift, and work five shifts a week, that's about what it comes to.) But it
|
||
doesn't include the big-dollar awards from negligent bar owners and others
|
||
with deep pockets. That could be an extra $130,000 a year.
|
||
|
||
Besides the drunk driver income and getting leads on criminal activity,
|
||
your secondary goal is to get at the bar owners who serve drinks to people
|
||
who are obviously drunk. OR to find and prosecute bar owners and managers
|
||
who encourage, condone, or are participating in illegal activities such as
|
||
prostitution, drug dealing or fencing stolen property. To get negligent bar
|
||
owners, convicted drunk drivers have to be "encouraged" to help you build a
|
||
case against them on criminal charges or a violation of liquor laws. $1,000
|
||
lawsuits against drunk drivers and drug users are effective leverage you
|
||
can use to get that information.
|
||
|
||
The Rules of Discovery
|
||
|
||
Unlike criminal suits, where the accused can plead the Fifth Amendment and
|
||
refuse to provide witness against himself, civil suits require defendants
|
||
to provide free and easy access to all relevant records, and to answer all
|
||
questions asked on interrogatories (questionnaires) or by depositions
|
||
(sworn statements).
|
||
|
||
The concept of Discovery is an acknowledged invasion of privacy sanctioned
|
||
by the courts. That's a strong reason most litigants prefer to settle the
|
||
suit even if they believe they could win. Most people have secrets of one
|
||
kind or another that they'd rather not be forced to disclose (or might) by
|
||
an indirect line of questioning, or by an audit of their financial records.
|
||
When in court, the same questions might be asked and the answers extracted
|
||
under oath. Any lies made in the discovery process or in court, and later
|
||
brought to light, will result in a felony charge of perjury.
|
||
|
||
If it's proven the defendant lied, or failed to disclose information that
|
||
was requested via the Rules of Discovery, he usually loses the lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
The rules of Discovery provide a legalized fishing expedition for lawyers
|
||
(and Crimefighters) to back up initial charges or find new evidence that
|
||
could be even more damaging to the defendant. (Disgruntled employees may
|
||
provide information on criminal activity such as fencing stolen property,
|
||
drug dealing or money laundering). Lawyers often use Discovery and the
|
||
taking of numerous and lengthy Depositions to intimidate defendants and
|
||
encourage easy settlements.
|
||
|
||
If the person being sued resents the intrusion of privacy, and fails to
|
||
attend scheduled meetings, the court can levy a fine as well as assume
|
||
their liability (or guilt) and award the lawsuit dollar amount.
|
||
|
||
In a lawsuit over a slip-and-fall case in a Walmart store, Sam Walton was
|
||
ordered to attend a deposition hearing. Evidently Sam thought his time was
|
||
too valuable to waste on a small-scale lawsuit for just $36,000. The court
|
||
was irked that anyone, no matter how big they are, can ignore the court's
|
||
orders with impunity. The court ordered Walmart to pay the award of $36,000
|
||
plus a fine (for contempt of court, presumably) of $11,550,000!
|
||
|
||
Fighting a lawsuit can cost thousands of dollars. Most are settled out of
|
||
court. In the case of a drunk driver who can afford it, you can settle for
|
||
$500 to $2,500, depending on your time, expenses, and what they can afford.
|
||
That's for EACH drunk driver or drug user.
|
||
|
||
A lawyer trick mentioned in "The Litigation Explosion", (a book by Walter
|
||
K. Olson, and recommended for CrimeFighters) is an incorrect filing of
|
||
papers will cause the paperwork to be returned to you by the court clerk
|
||
for correction. In such an event, the defendant will have received a copy
|
||
and the notice of your suit. They will realize you can correct the filing
|
||
mistake and get it back on the court calendar. At that point, they may want
|
||
to negotiate it outside of the court's supervision. They won't want it to
|
||
go to court, be under the spotlight, and get bad publicity. (Business and
|
||
liquor licenses may be jeopardized by the adverse publicity.)
|
||
|
||
Out-of-Court Settlements
|
||
|
||
Crimefighter civil suits against convicted drunk drivers and drug users
|
||
(and others) will hardly ever go to trial when evidence of wrongdoing has
|
||
already been established. Virtually all of them will be settled out of
|
||
court because they have no valid defense: they've either pled guilty or
|
||
were convicted of a violation of law. When a convicted lawbreaker doesn't
|
||
want to settle out of court, summary judgment may be used to bypass the
|
||
trial. That's possible when evidence of liability (guilt) is available.
|
||
|
||
Summary Judgments
|
||
|
||
Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows conclusive proof of
|
||
liability which cannot be disputed by the defendant. A guilty plea or
|
||
conviction by a jury trial in criminal court is proof of liability. It's
|
||
a fact criminal activity seriously erodes the quality of life and puts
|
||
fear of personal and financial harm in the hearts and minds of all honest
|
||
citizens. Both are indisputable facts. Together, they satisfy the Court's
|
||
requirement of conclusive proof to obtain a summary judgment.
|
||
|
||
All the Court has to decide is whether the amount you ask for damages is
|
||
reasonable. If you ask for a reasonable amount, there should be no problem.
|
||
That's why virtually 99% of them will be either settled out of court in the
|
||
early stages, or awarded by a summary judgment after conviction.
|
||
|
||
Here's what the Court's have said in regards to summary judgment:
|
||
|
||
"Summary judgment is a disposition which effectively removes the contro-
|
||
versy from the province of the trier of fact, and resolves it as a matter
|
||
of law. It should not be awarded, accordingly, unless a review of the
|
||
record satisfies the Court "there is no genuine issue as to any material
|
||
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
|
||
If the Court's review of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrog-
|
||
atories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits" show the
|
||
absence of any factual issues to be resolved at trial, summary judgment
|
||
should be granted to the party entitled to prevail."
|
||
|
||
Negligent Entrustment
|
||
|
||
In a litigation case, mentioned in "The Litigation Explosion," a 92-year-
|
||
old widow almost lost her house after lawyers won a $950,000 jury verdict.
|
||
Mrs. Wilson's offense was that she had negligently entrusted or loaned the
|
||
money to a nephew to buy a car. The car was loaned by the nephew (a marine)
|
||
to a buddy who had an accident.
|
||
|
||
Common sense and our concept of justice would say Mrs. Wilson had nothing
|
||
to do with the accident. Not so, said the lawyers. They claimed negligent
|
||
entrustment. Of course, the real reason the widow was targeted was simply
|
||
because the marines involved had insufficient assets to gain anything from
|
||
a lawsuit. The lawyers looked further and found Mrs. Wilson had insurance
|
||
as well as a house.
|
||
|
||
Mrs. Wilson lived in Texas and had never set foot in North Carolina, where
|
||
the accident occurred. That was no defense. No matter where you live or
|
||
where the accident (or wrong) takes place, you can be sued by other
|
||
parties you never met in states you've never personally visited as long as
|
||
it can be proven you are connected in any way. Mrs. Wilson's lawyers
|
||
appealed. The Federal Court of Appeals, in 1961, said she could be legally
|
||
forced to come into North Carolina to stand trial under the State's long
|
||
arm law.
|
||
|
||
While you and I may deplore the greed of lawyers in going after 92-year-old
|
||
widows, the case tells something of value to CrimeFighters:
|
||
|
||
No one is safe from the long arm of the law if they are connected in any
|
||
way, whether for profit or otherwise, and distance is no barrier.
|
||
|
||
Olson's book tells a few other examples how anyone, however remotely
|
||
connected, can be included in lawsuits. For drunk drivers you can include
|
||
in the suit any place or person who provided the alcohol (or drugs) plus
|
||
the manager of the business.
|
||
|
||
This allows you to include owners, investors and employees who may have
|
||
been or are involved in other criminal activity. Naming them in the same
|
||
lawsuit lets you use the Rules of Discovery to ask embarrassing questions
|
||
from them, or from employees, to obtain incriminating information. The
|
||
bigger the net, the more fish you catch, and the more leads you'll have.
|
||
|
||
If the business is owned by a corporation, officers and directors can be
|
||
sued for negligence. In closely held non-public corporations (with just a
|
||
few shareholders), shareholders could be charged with negligence by not
|
||
providing guidance to the directors. You can include the corporation that
|
||
owns the bar or rents a building to the bar. All of them are connected and
|
||
can be named in the one lawsuit. While they may be innocent by not directly
|
||
lifting the glass to a person's lips, their sharing in the profits in any
|
||
way provides a link and indirect connection to (possibly) RICO civil suits.
|
||
The charge of gross negligence, negligent entrustment, criminal negligence,
|
||
or plain negligence, may be sufficient.
|
||
|
||
When you find violators of misdemeanors and felonies who have been either
|
||
encouraged or facilitated by any person, group or business, the pushers,
|
||
profiteers, or instigators may be liable for damages, punitive fines, and
|
||
your costs of investigation to obtain evidence.
|
||
|
||
It's more effective when CrimeFighters make the big players and profiteers
|
||
pay huge fines (or awards). When lawsuits are hanging over their heads, it
|
||
will significantly reduce the incentive to be pushers for profit. Those
|
||
who have knowingly contributed to illegal and irresponsible behavior, and
|
||
profited immensely and got away with it, won't get away with it any more.
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law - The Right To Be The Prosecutor
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law is a reward law designed specifically for CrimeFighters 400
|
||
years ago! Old English Common Law (Qui Tam law) says that anyone who has a
|
||
financial interest in the outcome of any civil or criminal suit has the
|
||
right to be the prosecutor in the name of the king (government) as well as
|
||
himself. A pending reward for a CrimeFighter provides the legal standing
|
||
necessary to assume the role of state or federal prosecutor.
|
||
|
||
(In case you wondered, Qui Tam law is alive and well in America, and has
|
||
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Details are in the next chapter.)
|
||
|
||
Asserting your legal right to be prosecutor provides a unique advantage for
|
||
CrimeFighters: If, during a civil suit you uncover information on criminal
|
||
activity, you may have sufficient evidence for an arrest. As prosecutor,
|
||
you have legal leverage to use plea bargaining to lesser charges for an
|
||
out-of-court settlement of your civil suit.
|
||
|
||
Converting Fines to Awards
|
||
|
||
As prosecutors, CrimeFighters can allow plea bargaining to lesser charges
|
||
the same as, and for the same reasons, regular prosecutors allow and
|
||
encourage it. But lesser charges might reduce or cancel pending federal
|
||
rewards. To offset the loss of pending federal rewards, CrimeFighters'
|
||
lawsuits can be used to transfer pending fines to lawsuit awards. The end
|
||
result is the same for defendants and the judicial system. But, in this
|
||
case, the fines (converted to lawsuit awards) are based on the original
|
||
charges and accumulated profits of illegal activity, not the plea-bargained
|
||
lesser charges and small fines. That's more appropriate for CrimeFighters
|
||
as well as to properly punish lawbreakers.
|
||
|
||
Normally, when an informant provides the information leading to an arrest
|
||
and conviction, the tipster gets paid half the fines and forfeitures. The
|
||
other half is paid to the law enforcement agency who makes the arrest and
|
||
does the prosecution to compensate them for their time and costs. If the
|
||
Crimefighter makes the arrest and does the prosecution, he should collect
|
||
all of it. By shifting the fine to a lawsuit award, he accomplishes that
|
||
goal, and lawbreakers are properly punished.
|
||
|
||
If the defendant pleads not guilty and wants a jury trial, you can mention
|
||
that judges are prone to punish suspects for causing the extra time and
|
||
legal costs of a jury trial. State and federal prosecutors, and judges, use
|
||
this threat to get a quick conviction to save court time. (More information
|
||
on prosecutors and plea bargaining is in Chapter 26.)
|
||
|
||
You can offer deals which provide you with maximum awards in exchange for
|
||
lighter sentences. The public benefits with this arrangement. Payment of
|
||
the reward/award doesn't come from taxpayers. The lawbreaker is punished by
|
||
losing the profits from illegal activity and taxpayers won't have to pay
|
||
$25,000 a year for the felon's room and board in already overcrowded jails.
|
||
|
||
Crimefighters' Advantages Summarized
|
||
|
||
(1) When you obtain information on alleged (or known) criminal activity,
|
||
you can initiate a lawsuit to use the Rules of Discovery to compel suspects
|
||
to provide you with additional information, and to compel witnesses to make
|
||
statements under oath (depositions). When the suspect is worried you might
|
||
uncover incriminating evidence, he will want to settle the suit out of
|
||
court to get you off his back. But, while your lawsuit may be settled, it
|
||
doesn't mean you have to forget it. You can then pass on the information to
|
||
the FBI and negotiate for a reward for the information you have obtained.
|
||
|
||
When you have sufficient evidence of criminal violations, you can:
|
||
|
||
(2) Lay charges and possibly make the arrest yourself, or ask for police
|
||
assistance. When you make the arrest or provide information leading to
|
||
the arrest, you are eligible for rewards plus Qui Tam to be the prosecutor.
|
||
Take charge and maintain control of the prosecution.
|
||
|
||
(3) Use RICO laws for prosecution, plus any others that may be applicable.
|
||
Use pending criminal charges as leverage for settling civil suit awards.
|
||
|
||
(4) Plea bargaining may reduce original charges to a misdemeanor. When the
|
||
suspect has sufficient assets, your personal damage lawsuit will pay a
|
||
comparable reward via lawsuit awards.
|
||
|
||
(5) In addition to a RICO criminal suit, also initiate a RICO civil suit.
|
||
RICO civil suits pays 50% of fines and forfeitures to the person providing
|
||
information leading to such fines and forfeitures, with no limit on the
|
||
amount. Forfeitures include bail money if the suspect skips bail and
|
||
becomes a fugitive. You get 50% of all of the fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
(6) Also initiate a CrimeFighter personal damage lawsuit to transfer as
|
||
much money as possible from the RICO civil suit to your personal damage
|
||
lawsuit. The lawsuit award to include the costs of your investigation and
|
||
related expenses. This you keep 100%.
|
||
|
||
(a) If the lawbreaker settles you personal lawsuit out of court, you get
|
||
paid immediately or within a short period of time. Since a lawsuit award
|
||
is not a reward, you are still eligible for federal rewards.
|
||
|
||
(b) If no out-of-court settlement is reached, the lawsuit can be held in
|
||
abeyance. A later guilty plea (even to lesser charges) or jury conviction
|
||
of criminal charges related to your civil suit, provides proof of personal
|
||
damages. You can then apply for summary judgment to be awarded the sum of
|
||
money or physical assets asked for in your CrimeFighter lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
(7) If any law enforcement agency wants to take over the prosecution to get
|
||
credit for it as well as get 50% of the fines and forfeitures, you can
|
||
negotiate a suitable reward to compensate you for your time and risk.
|
||
|
||
(8) If the defendant doesn't show up at scheduled meetings to contest the
|
||
civil suit, he could, by default, lose the lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
(9) If the suspect shows up to defend the civil suit, he may be arrested
|
||
and thrown in jail and tried on the criminal charges. While he may be
|
||
released on bail, as prosecutor you can ask for a high bail amount. If he
|
||
skips bail, you get half of the forfeited bail money via RICO lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
(10) When defendants don't have the ability to pay fines (as awards) the
|
||
lawbreakers can be turned over to the FBI for prosecution. Apply for $500
|
||
federal rewards under 3059 (and 886 when drugs are involved) for a total
|
||
of $1,000 each, per person.
|
||
|
||
When you have sufficient evidence, you win no matter which way it goes.
|
||
|
||
Collecting the Money
|
||
|
||
When a fine can't be paid in cash, or financed in one way or another, any
|
||
assets defendants own - cars, homes, businesses - can be seized and sold to
|
||
satisfy the outstanding debt. (Bankruptcy laws do not allow criminal-
|
||
related fines to be discharged via bankruptcy proceedings.)
|
||
|
||
Settlement of lawsuits can be more flexible than fines. Monthly payments
|
||
can be arranged if the defendant has a job or business. The interest rate
|
||
on time payments can be at 2% per month to encourage fast payment. If the
|
||
defendant has credit cards and credit available, he will be encouraged to
|
||
get a cash advance at lower interest rates and pay off the lawsuit award.
|
||
|
||
After many months of being an active Crimefighter, you may wind up with
|
||
$100,000 or more on your Crimefighter's Accounts Receivable. At 2% per
|
||
month, the monthly interest alone would be $2,000, or about $25,000 a year.
|
||
|
||
Even if, in some cases, the debt is recognized as uncollectible from
|
||
debtors, it gives you a valid reason to visit them, and apply pressure,
|
||
to provide you with crime-related information instead of cash payments.
|
||
|
||
You may be able to recruit a few dozen or a hundred or more people who
|
||
can be coaxed into being bird dogs for you to locate and report criminal
|
||
activity. Payment being a suitable reduction of the outstanding balance.
|
||
And, in some cases, some of your bird dogs may be converted to full-time
|
||
confidential informants for cash payments that are twice as much as they
|
||
could get paid by Crime Stoppers or We-Tip.
|
||
|
||
Filling in Lawsuit Forms
|
||
|
||
Filling in Crimefighter's customized litigation forms with names, addresses
|
||
and other information you have at hand, is like filling out a credit
|
||
application. In this case, each application is worth about $1,000. But,
|
||
unlike credit card applications, you can make out as many as you like.
|
||
The number of criminals and CrimeFighter lawsuits are virtually unlimited!
|
||
|
||
It's been said that 70% of suits are settled out of court. That includes
|
||
many suits without merit. You can raise that to 99% if you have sufficient
|
||
evidence. You won't have to know much beyond how to file the papers (or
|
||
misfile them) to initiate a lawsuit. A little clerical work to fill in the
|
||
forms, and some leg work to walk the papers to the filing clerk, plus a
|
||
filing fee, is all that's required. With a little instruction and pretyped,
|
||
fill-in-the-blank forms, anyone can do it.
|
||
|
||
If the award sought is a very large amount, the defendant may choose to
|
||
fight it in court. In that event, you can easily sub-contract your case to
|
||
a lawyer on a fee-splitting arrangement. Most litigation lawyers do this
|
||
routinely ("sharing the work"). If you have sufficient evidence, lawyers
|
||
will be eager to take the case. The deal would be that your lawyer will pay
|
||
you your investigation costs (which will be also significantly increased)
|
||
from his legal fees and out-of-pocket expenses awarded to him by the court.
|
||
|
||
What if you lose the suit? "The Litigation Explosion" explains that costs
|
||
are usually awarded to the successful prosecutor because it's in the best
|
||
interests of justice to do so. However, the defendant's legal costs are not
|
||
charged to the plaintiff if the plaintiff loses the lawsuit. That too, is
|
||
to encourage civil suits to obtain justice. If you are the plaintiff, and
|
||
your lawyer takes the case on a contingency basis, and you lose, all you
|
||
lose is your time, plus out-of-pocket expenses of both sides (about $250).
|
||
|
||
The defendant has to pay for his own legal defense win or lose. That's a
|
||
lopsided deal, and may be unfair, but that's American justice.
|
||
|
||
In Canada and other English-based countries, if you lose, you are required
|
||
to pay the defendant's legal costs.
|
||
|
||
But, if the lawbreaker has been convicted, or pled guilty in the criminal
|
||
action, there is no valid defense of their liability! A lawbreaker's
|
||
lawyer will recognize that too, and recommend an early settlement.
|
||
|
||
Do-it-Yourself Litigation Kits
|
||
|
||
The most important thing when you use do-it-yourself litigation kits is,
|
||
lawsuits of relatively small amounts become possible and practical. That
|
||
alone may open the door for you to sue dozens to hundreds of lawbreakers,
|
||
and scumbags who do you dirty in one way or another during your lifetime.
|
||
|
||
All it takes about ten minutes to fill in the blank spaces of standard,
|
||
pre-printed forms. And all it costs is about $150 (in Yuma, AZ) to file the
|
||
papers with the county clerk. You can easily do it yourself. In this
|
||
situation, $750 to $1,500 lawsuits are affordable, and may be better than
|
||
nothing! (If you win, you usually are awarded costs, which includes the
|
||
filing fees, your investigation time, and related out-of-pocket expenses.
|
||
A $750 award, plus costs, would pay you about $1,250.)
|
||
|
||
If the most you can lose (by not collecting) is less than $200, you can
|
||
afford to sue lawbreakers for small amounts of $1,000 to $5,000. But, of
|
||
course, you aren't limited to small amounts. The limitation is only on what
|
||
defendants can afford to pay. If they have liability insurance, the ceiling
|
||
is much, much higher -- often in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
|
||
|
||
All CrimeFighters need is a Litigation Kit to join in the fun and games
|
||
lawyer's play. Then, if the State or Federal prosecutor elbows you out of a
|
||
felony case (somehow) and you obtain no satisfactory compensation, you can
|
||
use the courts via civil suits to extract compensation from lawbreakers.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' Litigation Kit
|
||
|
||
I asked a local lawyer how much he would charge for a customized, sample
|
||
set of fill-in-the-blank forms, plus instructions, required to initiate a
|
||
CrimeFighter lawsuit and a RICO civil suit. Included would be a few sample
|
||
interrogatory forms, request for subpoenas, deposition forms, etc. His
|
||
quote was "around $5,000 or so, depending on how long it takes."
|
||
|
||
Not having that much loose change in my jeans, I decided to forego having
|
||
a lawyer prepare the forms. I had planned to copy them and make them avail-
|
||
able to CrimeFighters. But, there's another way it can be done: by sharing
|
||
the costs among a few hundred CrimeFighters. That way, preparation costs
|
||
are shared by many instead of borne by yours truly.
|
||
|
||
If you'd like to participate in funding the legal costs to prepare all the
|
||
forms for civil litigation, customized for CrimeFighters' use as outlined
|
||
in this chapter, here's my proposition:
|
||
|
||
Prepay $20 towards a "CrimeFighter Litigation Kit." When I have enough
|
||
money to pay the lawyer, I'll have him prepare the documents. When they are
|
||
delivered to me, I'll make copies and mail them to you.
|
||
|
||
The membership application form at the end of this book contains a check-
|
||
off box to indicate you are pre-paying $20 and are entitled to a copy
|
||
of the Crimefighters' Litigation Kit. I'll mail a copy to you when it's
|
||
ready. (Or your money back if there is insufficient financial support to
|
||
have it done.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam Law
|
||
How to be the Prosecutor
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam are the first two words of the Latin phrase "qui tam prodomino rege
|
||
quam pro se ipso sequitur." A literal translation is: he who brings the
|
||
action for the King (Crown, or government) as well as himself.
|
||
|
||
This law originated four centuries ago when law enforcement was up to the
|
||
King of England and his appointed agents (Sheriffs). However, they had a
|
||
couple of problems. First, there weren't enough law enforcement officers to
|
||
go around. Laws were constantly being broken and the majority of violators
|
||
seldom punished.
|
||
|
||
Second, the King sometimes didn't favor certain laws passed by Parliament
|
||
as they sometimes interfered with his whims and pleasures or those of the
|
||
nobility. As a result, politics entered the scene of law enforcement: only
|
||
laws the King liked were enforced, and the laws the King didn't like
|
||
weren't enforced.
|
||
|
||
In desperation, early lawmakers sought ways and means to recruit a few
|
||
thousand volunteers to act as unofficial crime fighters to enlarge their
|
||
law enforcement staff.
|
||
|
||
To solve the first problem, they passed a law that said, with words to the
|
||
effect, "any citizen, who provides or gives evidence leading to conviction,
|
||
shall receive 50% of the fines collected."
|
||
|
||
To solve the second problem of politics and corrupt officials not properly
|
||
enforcing the law, they passed another law: Qui Tam law. Informants who had
|
||
financial interest in the fines and forfeitures automatically had the
|
||
legal standing to start prosecution "in the name of the King and himself"
|
||
when there was any delay or political reluctance to prosecute the offender.
|
||
|
||
The same problems apply to today's world: Not enough police (i.e. drug wars
|
||
and the rate of pollution everywhere). Politicians with their financial
|
||
sponsors often put their interests first and the public interest last. And,
|
||
sad to say, graft and corruption still exist at all levels of government.
|
||
|
||
Because Qui Tam is based on old English law, it's probably also valid in
|
||
Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and former British colonies. If you live
|
||
in any of these countries, look into it.
|
||
|
||
Broad Application
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam has been used in many environmental lawsuits where no criminal law
|
||
has been broken but a planned project threatens to spoil the ecology,
|
||
environment, water table, or poses a threat to those that live in the area.
|
||
In this situation, the rights of those involved may be in jeopardy. Rather
|
||
than wait until the damage has been done, Qui Tam law allows environmenta-
|
||
lists or others having an "interest" to take legal action via this law to
|
||
stop the development before it gets too far underway. Getting an injunction
|
||
to halt the project is the first step and puts the project in limbo until
|
||
the case goes to court.
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law has been successfully used many times to prohibit certain
|
||
harmful development in wilderness areas. Such lawsuits allege that
|
||
development would create an intangible loss to the public who enjoy their
|
||
many benefits or may cause other harmful effects.
|
||
|
||
In recent years this law has been used mostly for pollution control and to
|
||
protect the environment via class action suits, but it isn't limited to
|
||
those issues. It's a stand-alone common law that can be used when you have
|
||
a financial interest, or other considerations, which provides the standing
|
||
requirement. Pending rewards, when you're eligible, provide legal standing.
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law hasn't been used very often (lately) in criminal prosecutions
|
||
because regular law enforcement and prosecution have usually been adequate.
|
||
Now, it's being dusted off for modern-age CrimeFighters. Use Qui Tam to
|
||
control plea bargaining in prosecution to protect your financial interests.
|
||
Your reward is not the prosecutor's interest. He or she is concerned with
|
||
the number of cases pending prosecution, limited budgets and legal
|
||
resources to do the job, and the always-crowded court calendar. When it's
|
||
possible and practical, CrimeFighters should control plea bargaining. Take
|
||
charge of the case and you won't be disappointed in the outcome.
|
||
|
||
Case Law
|
||
|
||
In an historic case (United States vs Griswold, F Cas 15266 (1877) the
|
||
action involved false claims or fraudulent acts against the government. The
|
||
counsel for the defense objected on the grounds the informer wasn't a
|
||
district attorney and therefore had no standing to lay charges. He asked
|
||
that the case be dismissed on those grounds. The Court denied the
|
||
defendant's motion to dismiss the case because, as the court observed, Qui
|
||
Tam law provides an informer with the right to initiate an action against a
|
||
lawbreaker. The court said: "When, as in this case, a statute imposed a
|
||
penalty for the commission of an act, and also gave such penalty in part to
|
||
whomever would sue for it, and the remainder to the King or other public
|
||
use, the action to recover such penalty, if brought by a private person,
|
||
was brought in his own name and subject to his control. Although a judgment
|
||
obtained therein was for the benefit of the King or other public use as
|
||
well as the plaintiff, yet the action was, to all intents and purposes, the
|
||
private action of the latter."
|
||
|
||
The court also said: "For all purposes, except the discontinuance of the
|
||
action, the attorney employed by the informer to commence and conduct the
|
||
same is the attorney of the United States therein. Neither does the fact
|
||
that the district attorney is required to be diligent to enforce the
|
||
statute against persons violating it, make him the attorney of the United
|
||
States in that action... Whichever -- the informer or the district attorney
|
||
- first starts an action for a particular violation of the statute, thereby
|
||
excludes the other from so doing."
|
||
|
||
The court concluded: "Neither does the provision in section 771 of the
|
||
Revised Statutes which make it the duty of the "district attorney to
|
||
prosecute in his district... all civil actions in which the United States
|
||
are concerned," authorize or require him to act as an attorney for the
|
||
plaintiff in this (Qui Tam) action."
|
||
|
||
Section 5 of the Informers Act says U.S. Attorneys should be diligent in
|
||
inquiring into any violation of the provisions of this act... and they
|
||
prosecute all offenders. However, the Court ruled that a private citizen
|
||
could bring a Qui Tam action to enforce the act and the U.S. attorney could
|
||
not interfere with the action after it was started.
|
||
|
||
The rule of law is, and the practice has always been, a Qui Tam action is
|
||
the action of the person who brings it, and the government, although
|
||
concerned in the outcome of same, has no right to interfere with it, except
|
||
as provided by statute.
|
||
Validity and Precedents
|
||
|
||
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1905: "Statutes providing for actions by a
|
||
common informer, who himself has no interest whatever in the controversy
|
||
other than that given by statute, have been in existence... in this country
|
||
since the foundation of our Government."
|
||
|
||
Still later, in 1943, the Supreme Court, in rejecting the views of the
|
||
third circuit court of appeals that informer actions, "have always been
|
||
regarded with disfavor," stated: "Qui Tam suits have been frequently
|
||
permitted legislative action..."
|
||
|
||
Conclusion: It is the legal right of a person (or corporation) to initiate
|
||
actions under Qui Tam law, providing the standing requirement is met for
|
||
the action. Although the wording in the law being violated may state that
|
||
U.S. attorneys should prosecute all offenders, it doesn't bar an individual
|
||
from hiring his own lawyer and bringing a Qui Tam action. And, once the
|
||
action is underway, the U.S. Attorney has no right to interfere with it or
|
||
take it away from the CrimeFighter.
|
||
|
||
American case law supports the proposition that a law providing for a
|
||
reward to informers is to be considered as authorizing the Qui Tam action.
|
||
You too, can be a Federal prosecutor!
|
||
|
||
Being the Prosecutor
|
||
|
||
When a guilty plea is given, there is no trial, only sentencing. The job of
|
||
the prosecutor at that point is mainly to recommend a suitable sentence
|
||
and to advise the court of any reasons for leniency or stiff sentences.
|
||
The judge doesn't have to accept the recommendations but usually takes it
|
||
into consideration. Most of the time it takes about 10 or 15 minutes per
|
||
case. Read the book "Rough Justice" (in CRIMCAT) to learn all about it.
|
||
|
||
If you're not sure you can handle it, hire a lawyer to process a few cases
|
||
for you until you learn court procedure and feel comfortable in your new
|
||
job. From then on, there's no need to have a lawyer involved (and costing
|
||
you) for each person who pleads guilty.
|
||
|
||
First, you have to be eligible for a reward. Title 18, Section 3059, the
|
||
catch-all reward law (any felony, any state) provides eligibility.
|
||
|
||
Second, the defendant must have sufficient financial resources, a steady
|
||
job, real estate equity or tangible assets to make a lawsuit worthwhile.
|
||
If the defendant has at least a steady job, voluntary monthly payments,
|
||
or wage garnishment enforced by the courts can make it worth the effort.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters are not usually lawyers and won't want to be involved in
|
||
lengthy, expensive, jury trials. The basic strategy is to avoid a trial.
|
||
All you need is a guilty plea. Ninety percent of the time the lawbreaker
|
||
will WANT to plea bargain to lesser charges. But, lesser charges would
|
||
jeopardize or minimize the pending federal reward. Happily, there's a
|
||
simple solution called plea bargaining.
|
||
|
||
The accused doesn't want to go to jail any more than you want to have a
|
||
jury trial. You make an offer: If the accused settles the civil suit out
|
||
of court, you can consider reduced charges on the criminal suit. That's a
|
||
win-win situation.
|
||
|
||
The previous chapter explains how you use your prosecutor position to allow
|
||
plea bargaining and, when possible, transfer possible fines and forfeiture
|
||
of assets to the Crimefighter's lawsuit. Said lawsuit being settled out of
|
||
court as part of the plea bargaining deal to pay an alternate form of a
|
||
federal reward via a lawsuit award.
|
||
|
||
If the lawbreaker was cooperative and you obtained a settlement of the
|
||
lawsuit. You can accept a guilty plea to reduced charges, just like regular
|
||
prosecutors do, and for the same reasons - to avoid jury trials. You may
|
||
ask for "probation without ajudication" for first time violators (no trial
|
||
or guilty verdict, just probation). Another recent innovation is "pretrial
|
||
diversion." This is where first offenders are placed in a rehabilitation
|
||
program, with their consent, immediately after arrest, and the prosecutor
|
||
agrees to drop all charges. The problem is, if there's no felony conviction
|
||
there is no federal reward eligibility. That's where your lawsuit comes in.
|
||
|
||
The lawbreaker will want you to go ahead with the criminal charges to get
|
||
it off his or her back. If you don't clear the criminal charges, the state
|
||
prosecutor may decide to take it over and ask for maximum jail time. That
|
||
makes you the "good cop" and the state prosecutor the "bad cop." That
|
||
gives you leverage for cooperation and settlement of your civil suit.
|
||
|
||
Doing It
|
||
|
||
When possible, contact the nearest FBI agent to negotiate rewards and let
|
||
them make the arrests. If there is no time to negotiate a reward with the
|
||
FBI agent and you are capable of making the arrest yourself, or with a
|
||
CrimeFighter partner, take the lawbreaker into custody and turn him/her
|
||
over to a law enforcement agency as soon as possible.
|
||
|
||
If necessary, call the local police department and ask for "back up" for
|
||
your citizen arrest (like Bounty Hunters do when re-arresting a bail bond
|
||
skip). But remember, it's important for you to get official credit for the
|
||
arrest when you can. The law enforcement agency who gets credit for the
|
||
arrest and handles the prosecution usually gets 50% of the fines and
|
||
forfeitures. The informant gets the other half, sometimes! It depends on
|
||
which law you use. That's why you need to control the prosecution! If it's
|
||
you, you have no problem. If it's not you, you may have a problem.
|
||
|
||
If a law enforcement agency helps you make the arrest, they may elbow you
|
||
out of the way, take credit for it and ask the court for 50% of fines and
|
||
forfeitures. That may cause you problems when you lay claim to 100% in your
|
||
lawsuit. But, if you beat them to the draw, by including all the known
|
||
assets in your civil suit before you make the arrest, you have first claim.
|
||
If you are the prosecutor you can usually negotiate an out of court settle-
|
||
ment of your civil suit before the criminal prosecution is completed!
|
||
|
||
If there is a negotiated reward, the agency authorizing payment of a reward
|
||
will most likely want to prosecute the case. Compare what you might get
|
||
from them against what you might get from the defendant in your lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
If the pending reward plus 50% of the fines and forfeitures is about the
|
||
same amount as your lawsuit, you could hand it over to the law enforcement
|
||
agency who provides the reward. The drawback is, rewards are contingent on
|
||
a conviction. There is a possibility of many delays because of appeals.
|
||
And, there's an uncertainty of full and speedy payment (even when it's in
|
||
writing!) You could be stonewalled when asking for payment, as Billy Breen
|
||
and many other informants have been. It may be better to prosecute the case
|
||
yourself and be paid an award via a civil suit that can be settled in a
|
||
week or so. Weigh your options before you disclose the details to the FBI.
|
||
|
||
As soon as possible after the arrest tell the regular district attorney
|
||
you are asserting your Qui Tam right to prosecute the case. Ask to be
|
||
put on record as the prosecuting attorney. If you're asked about your legal
|
||
qualifications, aside from Qui Tam law, you can mention that, if no guilty
|
||
plea is obtained and a trial is required, at that time you will either
|
||
hire a qualified lawyer to be your assistant to handle the legal work for
|
||
you, or you will turn the case over to the regular prosecutor.
|
||
|
||
If the D.A. ignores your legal right to be the prosecutor of your arrests,
|
||
initiate a lawsuit against the city, county or state for triple the amount
|
||
of your possible loss of rewards, fines and forfeitures, and civil suit
|
||
awards. If it's not settled out of court, hire a lawyer on a contingency
|
||
basis to take it to trial. (He gets 40%) Don't let anyone push you aside
|
||
because of their official position. You have the right to be prosecutor.
|
||
|
||
Plea bargaining between defense lawyers and prosecutors is usually a
|
||
friendly, informal negotiating procedure, often over a cup of coffee.
|
||
|
||
If you feel you can handle it on your own, you won't need to pay a lawyer
|
||
to supervise the plea bargaining. Since 90% of the time plea bargaining
|
||
will be requested, you can handle 90% of the cases. To minimize your costs,
|
||
you can arrange to meet the defendant or his lawyer at the lawyer's office,
|
||
nearby coffee shop, or in a (free) prosecutor's room in the courthouse.
|
||
|
||
When you have the opportunity to talk to the defendant in your prosecutor
|
||
role, you can explain who you are, what you want, and the reason for the
|
||
personal lawsuit. When he learns you are a bounty hunter, and in it mainly
|
||
for rewards and the lawsuit award, he will realize he can (maybe) negotiate
|
||
reduced charges by settling the civil suit and/or providing information on
|
||
other criminal activity. At that point, the negotiating process will be
|
||
under way. He may or may not want a lawyer to do the negotiating. If he
|
||
does, you deal with his lawyer instead.
|
||
|
||
Tell the defendant and/or his lawyer the monetary amount or assets listed
|
||
in the civil suit are to provide an alternate reward/award when (and if)
|
||
plea bargaining results in converting a felony to a misdemeanor. If that
|
||
happens, you lose the federal reward. The lawsuit is the means to divert
|
||
the pending federal rewards and your 50% share of fines and forfeitures of
|
||
the criminal suit into your civil suit. If there is no deal, the criminal
|
||
suit will be pressed for the original charges (and maximum penalty) to
|
||
qualify for the maximum reward, and you will ask for the same fines and
|
||
forfeitures in the criminal suit of which you get 50%.
|
||
|
||
The difference is, if there's no deal, you both lose. The defendant gets
|
||
prosecuted on original charges so you qualify your for the maximum reward.
|
||
You lose 50% of the fines and forfeitures. Negotiating an out of court
|
||
settlement, in exchange for a guilty plea to reduced charges is a win-win
|
||
situation for both parties.
|
||
|
||
If you're unsure of your ability to handle the plea bargaining part, and
|
||
if the defendant has sufficient assets to pay for it, hire a lawyer to
|
||
handle the first one or two cases. The lawyer's legal fees will be added
|
||
to your civil suit costs which the defendant will be required to pay when
|
||
he is either convicted or agrees to a guilty plea on lesser charges.
|
||
|
||
(If you belong to a CrimeFighter lodge there may be an ex-cop or lawyer who
|
||
will coach you or help you with the first one or two cases.)
|
||
|
||
When plea bargaining isn't successful, and there is sufficient assets to
|
||
make it worth while, ask your lawyer to take over the criminal prosecution
|
||
for you on a contingency basis. The arrangement: he will be paid from 30
|
||
to 50 percent of the rewards, fines and forfeitures you receive. The
|
||
percentage is negotiable. It depends on the complexity of the case, and
|
||
rewards, fines and forfeitures available.
|
||
|
||
(The many reasons for you to use your own lawyer instead of the regular
|
||
prosecutor is mentioned in detail in chapter 27.)
|
||
|
||
If the anticipated rewards, fines and forfeitures are minimal, your lawyer
|
||
won't be interested. In this situation, turn the prosecution over to the
|
||
state or federal prosecutor and apply for all possible rewards.
|
||
|
||
When there is a conviction or guilty plea, and the lawbreaker has enough
|
||
assets to make it worthwhile, apply for summary judgment of the pending
|
||
civil suit to collect your award as an alternate reward and to pay for the
|
||
investigation time and costs.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Environmental Lawsuits
|
||
|
||
If the Qui Tam action is based on environmental issues, a better strategy
|
||
is to contact one of the many organizations who might be interested in the
|
||
action being prosecuted. In some instances they may do the prosecuting for
|
||
you because of their special interest in the matter. Environmental groups
|
||
have thousands of members and can raise large amounts to pay the sometime
|
||
huge costs of prosecution. Large corporations and municipalities can afford
|
||
to raise a million-dollar defense fund. In that case, you'll want and need
|
||
many good lawyers to match the big guns hired by the violator! If the case
|
||
drags on for years, it could cost more than CrimeFighters or their lawyers
|
||
could afford.
|
||
|
||
A CrimeFighter strategy would be to initiate a civil suit and lay criminal
|
||
charges (if applicable) to get them both on record in his name, to qualify
|
||
for rewards and 50% of the fines and forfeitures. Then, if the civil suit
|
||
can't be settled out of court, look for organizations who have their own
|
||
interest in the case. Ask them to provide either the funding or their own
|
||
lawyers to prosecute the case for you. When you win the suit, the court
|
||
will award your financial claims as well as "costs" to pay the lawyers.
|
||
|
||
Other Considerations
|
||
|
||
First, find out if the violator has the money or assets to pay the amount
|
||
asked for in your suit. A large award or fines can't and won't be imposed
|
||
against an almost bankrupt corporation or a person with few assets. That
|
||
means your award actually collected may be far less than the costs involved
|
||
and not worth pursuing.
|
||
|
||
The Rules of Discovery can be used to obtain financial information in great
|
||
detail, but only within the framework of a civil suit. Before you spend the
|
||
filing fees (about $150) try to find out how much the lawbreaker has in the
|
||
way of assets that can be seized to pay the sought for lawsuit amount.
|
||
|
||
Use a skip tracer, or learn how to be one yourself. Learn to uncover hidden
|
||
assets and sham transactions. The CrimeFighter Catalog (CRIMCAT) has a few
|
||
good books on skip tracing.
|
||
|
||
Many lawyers looking for work may consider working for you on a contingency
|
||
basis. When you win a civil suit the defendant is usually required to pay
|
||
your legal and investigative costs. Thus, the defendant indirectly provides
|
||
you with the money to pay your lawyer. An alternative is to ask your lawyer
|
||
to work for a percentage of your share of the award/reward or fines and
|
||
forfeitures if it's large enough for such an arrangement.
|
||
|
||
Limiting Your Liability
|
||
|
||
Using a corporation can limit a CrimeFighter's personal liability against
|
||
possible counter-lawsuits from cases that are not successfully prosecuted.
|
||
|
||
Courts recognize American corporations as "citizens" and corporations can
|
||
sue and be sued in their corporate name. The main reason corporations were
|
||
given legal status was to limit personal liability of shareholders to the
|
||
amount of money invested. With that idea in mind, it may be a good idea to
|
||
incorporate as a business entity before starting Qui Tam actions. Then, if
|
||
incorporated, sue in the corporation's name.
|
||
|
||
Crimefighters should consider incorporating their CrimeFighter business as
|
||
a separate business entity, like most private detectives do. Your corpor-
|
||
ation can "hire' and pay you as an employee. That can provide many tax
|
||
sheltering and payroll fringe benefits. It can also limit your personal
|
||
liability against possible lawsuits for CrimeFighter activity.
|
||
|
||
Incorporating costs are about $300 if you do it yourself with Kits that are
|
||
now available. ($29.95 Incorporation Kits are listed in CRIMCAT.) Consider
|
||
the cost of your corporation like insurance. Actually, it's much less than
|
||
liability insurance -- if a Crimefighter could buy such insurance -- and
|
||
the annual corporation registration fee is far less than annual premiums
|
||
for even minimal liability insurance.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Law
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 1961 et seq, Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization
|
||
(RICO) law covers just about all criminal acts that are profit-oriented and
|
||
are repetitious. ("Proof of a "pattern of racketeering activity" defined by
|
||
this law [Title 18: 1961 et seq] requires showing at least two separate
|
||
instances of "racketeering activity.")
|
||
|
||
When you can, use RICO for prosecution of lawbreakers. It has advantages
|
||
that other laws may not have, such as the very wide range of fines and
|
||
forfeitures possible, including confiscating the "fruits of criminal
|
||
activity" from those convicted of racketeering offenses.
|
||
|
||
"Racketeering" used to mean any business of related criminal activity
|
||
operated like a business, such as those often operated by the Mafia. It has
|
||
now been expanded by most state laws to include any felony violation that
|
||
involves money as the motive and the offenses are repetitious in nature.
|
||
Examples are: robbery, bribery, fraud (cons and scams), and other felonies
|
||
where victims lose their money or valuable possessions. The exception
|
||
being personal crimes not committed for profit: homicide, rape, auto theft
|
||
for joyriding, poaching, arson, and other crimes which do not by themselves
|
||
have financial gain as the primary motive. If there's a profit involved in
|
||
a felony, RICO laws (criminal and/or civil) can probably be used to take
|
||
all of the accumulated profit away from the lawbreaker. Your reward(s) are
|
||
a negotiated percentage of the fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
The Law
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 1962 (Racketeering)
|
||
|
||
"Prohibited Activities
|
||
|
||
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
|
||
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
|
||
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-
|
||
pated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
|
||
States Code (18 USCS Section 2), to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
|
||
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
|
||
any interest in, or the establishment or operations of, any enterprise
|
||
which it engages in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
|
||
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes
|
||
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in
|
||
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be
|
||
unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the
|
||
purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his other accomplices
|
||
in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
|
||
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
|
||
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
|
||
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
|
||
|
||
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
|
||
activity or through collection of unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
|
||
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
|
||
is engaged in, or the activities of which may affect, interstate or foreign
|
||
commerce.
|
||
|
||
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
|
||
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
|
||
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
|
||
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
|
||
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
|
||
|
||
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
|
||
provisions or subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 1963 Criminal Penalties
|
||
|
||
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter (18 USCS
|
||
1962 et seq.) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more
|
||
than 20 years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any
|
||
interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962 and (2)
|
||
any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual
|
||
right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise
|
||
which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted or participated
|
||
in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
|
||
|
||
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the
|
||
district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such
|
||
restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions,
|
||
including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance
|
||
bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to
|
||
forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
|
||
|
||
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
|
||
authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest
|
||
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the
|
||
court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not
|
||
exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall
|
||
expire, and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provisions of law
|
||
relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale
|
||
thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the
|
||
customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to
|
||
informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures
|
||
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this
|
||
section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
|
||
hereof. Such duties as respect to the disposition of property under the
|
||
customs laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney General.
|
||
The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon as commer-
|
||
cially feasible, making due provisions for the rights of innocent persons."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
RICO law doesn't provide a stated reward for information "leading to the
|
||
conviction", but the above clause "and the award of compensation to
|
||
informers ..." implies that rewards are available and can be negotiated.
|
||
The important thing is, there's no upper limit restriction. Your percentage
|
||
can be up to 50% of the forfeitures, as it is in many other laws. It
|
||
depends on the information you provide, personal involvement and risk, and
|
||
the amount of control you have of the case. Control is the most important!
|
||
|
||
When fines and forfeitures are available, a percentage (usually 50%) is
|
||
awarded to the person providing essential information, and the remainder or
|
||
other half is paid to the law enforcement agency who made the arrest and
|
||
prosecuted the case.
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement agencies compete with each other like football teams. Each
|
||
agency wants the credit for the prosecution as well as 50 percent of the
|
||
fines and forfeitures. That's why they usually don't share information with
|
||
each other, which is detrimental to law enforcement generally. The flip
|
||
side is, when you have control, you are in a good position to negotiate
|
||
rewards. Each major law enforcement agency will want the case. If they
|
||
agree to 50% of forfeitures plus federal rewards, they still get the other
|
||
50 percent of the forfeitures. If they are too tight-fisted, they get
|
||
nothing! They know that. Always ask for 50 percent of forfeitures, plus
|
||
maximum rewards. Give it to the highest bidder. That's businesslike.
|
||
|
||
RICO Civil Suits
|
||
|
||
RICO civil suits are mentioned in "The Litigation Explosion", The obscure
|
||
mail and wire fraud statute can be included when defendants use national
|
||
advertising to encourage use of their product. That includes the big
|
||
players with deep pockets and liability insurance.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters can legally demand access to personal and business financial
|
||
records of the defendant to determine his financial status. The unlimited
|
||
access to personal and business financial records often makes reluctant
|
||
defendants cave in and want to settle out of court. That means you don't
|
||
have to hunt or dig for the information. You can, under civil suits, simply
|
||
demand it from the defendant.
|
||
|
||
When can you use RICO? The answer is mentioned in Olson's book:
|
||
"According to an A.B.A. (American Bar Association) study, more than 90
|
||
percent of the targets of civil-RICO lawsuits have no connection whatsoever
|
||
with organized crime. Nearly half of RICO suits rely solely on mail or wire
|
||
fraud charges, and another third rely on at least primarily on securities
|
||
fraud charges. By now, lawyers have deployed civil RICO in divorces, will
|
||
contests, and landlord-tenant disputes; against abortion protesters and
|
||
others demonstrating on the streets for their political beliefs; and of
|
||
course, in countless straight money suits over commercial disagreements."
|
||
|
||
State Laws
|
||
|
||
Most state RICO laws may be listed under the heading of organized crime and
|
||
fraud. Most state RICO laws now include all felonies primarily motivated
|
||
for financial gain. As an example, Arizona's RICO laws list a few defini-
|
||
tions of racketeering. I'll mention a few of them because they apply to
|
||
other states that have similar RICO laws. The wording might be slightly
|
||
different from state to state but the intent and definitions are the same.
|
||
|
||
Arizona's Definitions
|
||
|
||
"Extortionate extension of credit" means any extension of credit [lending
|
||
money] with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and
|
||
the debtor at the time such extension is made that delay in making repay-
|
||
ment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or
|
||
other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation or property
|
||
of any person. [loansharking]
|
||
|
||
"Traffic" means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise
|
||
dispose of stolen property to another person, or to buy, receive, possess
|
||
or obtain control of stolen property, with intent to sell, transfer,
|
||
distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of to another person.
|
||
[trafficking in stolen property]
|
||
|
||
"Criminal syndicate" means any combination of persons or enterprises
|
||
engaging, or having the purpose of engaging, on a continuing basis, in the
|
||
conduct which violates any one or more provisions of any felony statute of
|
||
this state. Drug dealing networks are included.
|
||
|
||
"Combination" means persons who collaborate in carrying on or furthering
|
||
the activities or purposes of a criminal syndicate even though such persons
|
||
may not know each other's identity or membership in the combination changes
|
||
from time to time or one or more members may stand in a wholesaler-retailer
|
||
or other arm's length relationship with others as to activities or dealings
|
||
between or among themselves in an illicit operation.
|
||
|
||
"Enterprise" means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union,
|
||
or other legal entity or any group of persons associated in fact although
|
||
not a legal entity.
|
||
|
||
"Control", in relation to an enterprise, means the possession of sufficient
|
||
means to permit substantial direction over the affairs of an enterprise
|
||
and, in relation to property, means to acquire or possess.
|
||
|
||
"Racketeering" means any act, including any preparatory or completed
|
||
offenses, committed for financial gain, which is chargeable or indictable
|
||
under the laws of the state in which the act occurred and, if the act
|
||
occurred in a state other than this state, would be chargeable or
|
||
indictable under the laws of this state had the act occurred in this state
|
||
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, regardless of
|
||
whether such act is charged or indicted, involving:
|
||
|
||
(a) Homicide
|
||
(b) Robbery
|
||
(c) Kidnapping
|
||
(d) Forgery
|
||
(e) Theft
|
||
(f) Bribery
|
||
(g) Gambling
|
||
(h) Ursury
|
||
(i) Extortion
|
||
(j) Extortionate extension of credit
|
||
(k) Prohibited drugs, marijuana or other prohibited chemicals or substances
|
||
(l) Trafficking in explosives, weapons or stolen property
|
||
(m) Leading organized crime
|
||
(n) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecution
|
||
(o) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims
|
||
asserted through fraud or arson
|
||
(p) False statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or
|
||
sale of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands
|
||
(q) Resale of realty with intent to defraud
|
||
(r) Fraud in the purchase or sale of securities
|
||
(s) Sale of unregistered securities by unregistered dealers or salesmen
|
||
(t) A scheme or artiface to defraud [cons, scams, pyramid schemes]
|
||
(u) Obscenity
|
||
(v) Child pornography
|
||
(w) Prostitution
|
||
(x) Restraint of trade or commerce
|
||
(y) Terrorism
|
||
(z) Money laundering
|
||
(aa) Obscene or indecent telephone communications to minors for commercial
|
||
purposes.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
RICO laws cover almost every crime for profit. But that doesn't mean RICO
|
||
must be used when there are other laws available for prosecution. Examine
|
||
all applicable laws to determine which provides the maximum rewards for
|
||
CrimeFighters. As a CrimeFighter prosecutor, you can choose which laws to
|
||
use, and which law enforcement agency to negotiate with.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
A forerunner to RICO, presumably to control drug dealing (it's listed under
|
||
Food and Drug laws) is called "Continuing Criminal Enterprises." While CCE
|
||
has been more or less replaced by RICO, it's still on the books. Title 21
|
||
USCS 886 provides for rewards up to $25,000. CCE is similar to RICO in
|
||
wording and intent, but the unusual feature of this law is it's possible
|
||
sentences of life imprisonment for ringleaders which can not be suspended
|
||
and probation is prohibited. If monetary rewards are not your main concern,
|
||
but harsh punishment is, CCE may be used instead of RICO.
|
||
|
||
The Law
|
||
|
||
Title 21 USCS 848 Continuing Criminal Enterprise
|
||
|
||
(a) Penalties; Forfeitures. (1) Any person who engages in a continuing
|
||
criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may
|
||
not be less than 10 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a
|
||
fine of not more than $100,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in para-
|
||
graph (2); except that if any person engages in such activity after one or
|
||
more prior convictions of him under this section have become final, he
|
||
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20
|
||
years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than
|
||
$200,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2).
|
||
|
||
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a
|
||
continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States--
|
||
|
||
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
|
||
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual
|
||
rights of any kind according a source of influence over, such enterprise
|
||
if:
|
||
|
||
(1) he violates any provision of this title or title III the punishment for
|
||
which is a felony, and
|
||
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this
|
||
title or title III, and:
|
||
|
||
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
|
||
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer,
|
||
a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
|
||
|
||
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
|
||
|
||
(c) Suspension of Sentence and Probation Prohibited. In the case of any
|
||
sentence imposed under this section, imposition or execution of such
|
||
sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be granted, and
|
||
section 4202 of title 18 of the United States Code and the Act of July 15,
|
||
1932 (D.C. Code, secs. 24-203-24-207), shall not apply.
|
||
|
||
(d) Jurisdiction of Courts. The district courts of the United Sates
|
||
(including courts in the territories or possessions of the United States
|
||
having jurisdiction under subsection (a)) shall have jurisdiction to enter
|
||
such restraining orders or prohibition, or to take such other actions,
|
||
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bond, in connection
|
||
with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this
|
||
section, as they deem proper.
|
||
(October 27, 1970
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
If RICO is used, it has a provision to pay CrimeFighters a negotiated share
|
||
in the forfeitures involved. The practice now is to lump all assets, cash
|
||
and bank accounts into a forfeiture process rather than impose fines and go
|
||
through a separate collection process. Forfeiture under RICO usually means
|
||
they take everything they can lay their hands on that can be related to the
|
||
offense.
|
||
|
||
Most states will have a similar list of offenses covered by their RICO
|
||
laws. The exception being those activities permitted by law such as
|
||
gambling and prostitution in a few counties in Nevada, for example.
|
||
|
||
Most criminals who have been successful have expensive cars, jewelry, bank
|
||
accounts, real estate, stocks and bonds, savings accounts, and other items
|
||
of value which can be forfeited as fruits of criminal activity if they
|
||
can't prove it was paid for with honest money.
|
||
|
||
Expansion of State RICO Laws
|
||
|
||
Two years ago, the Texas State prosecutor brought suit to seize a house
|
||
owned by a man and a woman arrested on drug dealing charges. Under state
|
||
laws existing then, it was difficult to prove that the house had been
|
||
purchased with the profits derived solely from drug dealing activity. The
|
||
state turned the prosecution of the case over to Federal authorities who
|
||
have RICO and other laws at their disposal to seize drug-related property.
|
||
That solved that particular problem, but it prompted Texas lawmaker Dan
|
||
Morales of San Antonio to pass a new Texas law that would make it easier to
|
||
remove the "ill-gotten gains" from criminals, whether drug related or not.
|
||
|
||
The San Antonio Express-News ran a story on April 15, 1991, with the
|
||
headlines: "D.A. tripling asset grabs in felonies." The essence of the
|
||
story is that a new Texas law was passed on October 18, 1990, allows the
|
||
Texas State prosecutor to legally seize property used in the commission of
|
||
all first and second degree felonies. Until this new State law was
|
||
implemented it was possible to seize property used only in illegal drug
|
||
deals. The new law expands the number of seizures possible, in effect
|
||
tripling the number of forfeitures by including a larger number of felony
|
||
violations.
|
||
|
||
The new law defines contraband used in commission of felonies as "property
|
||
of any nature, including real, personal, tangible or intangible."
|
||
|
||
It also includes any personally owned items such as cash and bank accounts,
|
||
guns, jewelry, vehicles, furniture, businesses, and stocks and bonds. While
|
||
the courts often seize exotic pets and horses as part of the fines and
|
||
forfeitures, the Texas prosecutor wasn't interested in anything that
|
||
"eats." But, he is interested in anything and everything of value if it's
|
||
connected to the commission of the crime, or considered as the fruits of
|
||
illegal activity, as defined by law.
|
||
|
||
Most States have adopted similar RICO laws which have been expanded in
|
||
their scope and coverage to include virtually all illegal activity. For
|
||
example, the recent Arizona sting operations involving crooked politicians
|
||
who accepted bribes have been prosecuted under Arizona's RICO laws.
|
||
|
||
Hidden Assets
|
||
|
||
The courts are well aware of the tricks used by crooks to hide their
|
||
assets. The most common one is buying a car, boat, airplane, or condominium
|
||
in a friend's or relative's name. Another ploy is selling an asset already
|
||
owned to someone who is under their control or influence. The amount of the
|
||
sale price is usually an amount much less than the fair market value ("$1
|
||
and other considerations", for example). The court will investigate. The
|
||
legal owners will be required to show proof of where they obtained the
|
||
money to make the purchase. If it's proven to be a sham transaction the
|
||
court will seize the assets.
|
||
|
||
The court might discover that a friend, for example, has no job, no money,
|
||
and no inheritance to put up the money. In most cases the friend is usually
|
||
dependent on the lawbreaker. If he or she can't provide proof of legal
|
||
purchase, it will be considered a sham transaction to frustrate the court
|
||
(like creditors in bankruptcy actions). The sham transaction will be swept
|
||
aside as though it doesn't exist. The courts refer to the second person as
|
||
a "strawman" -- one who is without real substance.
|
||
|
||
If you find your suspect has a lot of assets, but they're in someone else's
|
||
name, keep that in mind. They are still vulnerable. All you have to do (as
|
||
prosecutor) is to "lean" on the strawmen. Advise them if they don't confess
|
||
now, they will be called as a witnesses and forced to testify under oath.
|
||
If they lie, and it's proven they lied, they will be guilty of perjury,
|
||
which is a felony punishable by stiff sentences. If they tell the truth
|
||
right away, you can promise they will escape punishment. In most cases
|
||
that's all that's required to get a signed statement.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
RICO Civil Suits
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 1964
|
||
|
||
"(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
|
||
prevent and restrain violations of sections 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS
|
||
1962] by issuing appropriate orders, including but not limited to: ordering
|
||
any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
|
||
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
|
||
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any
|
||
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
|
||
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
|
||
ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
|
||
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
|
||
|
||
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In
|
||
any action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall
|
||
proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.
|
||
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
|
||
restraining order or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including
|
||
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
|
||
|
||
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
|
||
of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS 1962] may sue therefore in any
|
||
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
|
||
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
|
||
attorney's fee.
|
||
|
||
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in
|
||
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter [18
|
||
USCS 1962 et seq] shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
|
||
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
|
||
brought by the United States."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Clause (c) is important to victims of RICO related crimes. "Any person" may
|
||
sue the lawbreaker in a private suit for THREE times the damages to his
|
||
business or property. Instead of a ordinary civil suit to be reimbursed for
|
||
actual damages, crime victims should use this law to obtain three times the
|
||
business or property damages. (In addition, an "injured party" could also
|
||
file personal damage lawsuits in a separate suit. Triple damages probably
|
||
doesn't apply in CrimeFighter lawsuits for personal damages, although it
|
||
might!) A RICO civil suit should be initiated as soon as possible to lay
|
||
claim to the defendant's assets before they are forfeited in the pending
|
||
criminal action.
|
||
|
||
Clause (d) means if a conviction is obtained, or a guilty plea is entered,
|
||
the defendant has no legal defense as to the summary judgment that may be
|
||
obtained in a civil suit.
|
||
|
||
As you read the other laws that pay rewards, compare them with RICO for
|
||
effectiveness to maximize your rewards.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
Drunk Driver Terminator (DDT) Patrols
|
||
|
||
The primary goal of DDT Patrols is to reduce the number of drunk drivers
|
||
on the streets and highways, and to obtain leads on criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
Because drunk driving violations are usually misdemeanors and no rewards
|
||
are available, CrimeFighter lawsuits are used when possible and practical
|
||
to have lawbreakers pay appropriate awards to compensate CrimeFighters for
|
||
their time and effort. DDT Patrols also provide a low-risk, basic training
|
||
experience for rookie Crimefighters.
|
||
|
||
DDT Patrols are a good place for rookies to practice newly-learned skills
|
||
of surveillance; tailing people/vehicles; reporting to police dispatchers;
|
||
using simple disguises to alter their appearance; and wearing body mikes to
|
||
record their conversations with bartenders and patrons to get information.
|
||
|
||
If you don't have any police training or experience in making arrests, you
|
||
can give the information you obtain on criminal activity (drug dealing and
|
||
other felony crimes) to an experienced CrimeFighter in your group. And
|
||
negotiate for a fair share of the reward he obtains with your leads.
|
||
|
||
The worst case scenario is you'll be spotted and/or identified as a member
|
||
of the DDT Patrol. You may be "asked" in rough language to leave the bar,
|
||
but you probably won't be attacked or threatened with bodily harm. If you
|
||
are verbally and physically assaulted, and wear a wire and have a verbatim
|
||
recording, you may have evidence for a lawsuit. If you are assaulted, sue
|
||
them for assault and battery, and have the last laugh at their expense.
|
||
|
||
That's a reason to wear simple disguises, and to rotate bars and shifts so
|
||
you aren't easily noticed by your sparse drinking habits. If you belong to
|
||
a local CrimeFighter group, your CrimeFighter "shift supervisor" may do the
|
||
scheduling and rotation of personnel in your area.
|
||
|
||
Eventually, the DDT Patrol will lead to criminal-related information and
|
||
RICO charges against the bad guys with deep pockets to pay larger awards,
|
||
and federal rewards for dope dealers and other organized crime groups.
|
||
|
||
All you need for a DDT Patrol is a vehicle, camcorder, and a cellular
|
||
phone. If you can't afford to buy them, you can lease them for about $40
|
||
a month from Radio Shack (time payments). If you only snare one or two
|
||
drunk drivers per week, you'll make $1,000 or more per month, or about
|
||
$15,000 a year,. Then you can afford to buy the tools of your trade.
|
||
|
||
This job is probably the easiest one for CrimeFighters -- you don't have to
|
||
approach, arrest or talk to the drunk. All you have do do is:
|
||
|
||
(1) be on the lookout for obvious drunks when they're seen leaving a bar
|
||
|
||
(2) make a home movie of a drunk staggering to his car in the parking lot
|
||
and climbing into the driver's seat of a vehicle;
|
||
|
||
(3) call the police and let them stop, test, and arrest the drunk driver;
|
||
|
||
(4) Look for their conviction in your local newspaper (or visit the
|
||
courthouse to read the notices); and
|
||
|
||
(5) Initiate a lawsuit for personal damages and ask for an out-of-court
|
||
settlement, and try to obtain information on criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Just for the fun of it, I've prepared a CrimeFighters "Operations Manual"
|
||
to give you an idea of what you do, and how to go about it.
|
||
|
||
DDT Patrols
|
||
|
||
Visit popular bars in your neighborhood, especially those that advertise
|
||
"happy hours" (order one, get one free). Patrons at this kind of bar will
|
||
buy at least two drinks and wind up with four or more. For most people,
|
||
four is one too many! Once a person starts to drink, it leads to another,
|
||
and another. The free drinks coax a person to spend more than intended and
|
||
drinking more than he/she can hold.
|
||
|
||
Park your vehicle where you can photograph drunks leaving the bar.
|
||
|
||
Go inside, order a beer, and sit and watch the action inside for about half
|
||
an hour or so to locate and memorize faces and clothes of the inebriated.
|
||
Also observe the bartender serving customers additional drinks while they
|
||
are, in your opinion, obviously too drunk to drive. When someone has had
|
||
four or more ounces of hard liquor (or four or more bottles of beer) in one
|
||
hour, they're probably close to or over their limit -- but it also depends
|
||
on body size and physical activity.
|
||
|
||
By the way, if you belong to a CrimeFighter lodge, there will be someone in
|
||
charge, like a training officer, who knows what each CrimeFighter is doing,
|
||
and the shifts they work. That will help to avoid duplication of effort in
|
||
assignments. It will also prevent too many vehicles tailing the same person
|
||
-- possibly spooking them into high speed driving to escape from suspected
|
||
robbers or rapists. And, in emergencies, you can call for backups.
|
||
|
||
DUI Arrests
|
||
|
||
If you try to make the arrest before he/she drives away, you have no legal
|
||
cause to make an arrest for "drunk driving". Besides, you'd blow your cover
|
||
when possible scuffling and shouting takes place on the bar's parking lot.
|
||
Once the vehicle's rolling, call the police. Let them make the arrest.
|
||
|
||
Police need your official "complaint" because they aren't allowed to pull
|
||
over vehicles without probable cause. Your official complaint is what they
|
||
need to justify stopping the vehicle. If they smell booze or can tell by
|
||
the slurry voice the driver needs a sobriety test, the officer will do the
|
||
questioning and, if permitted by law, take a breatholizer or blood test.
|
||
|
||
If drivers refuse, they're automatically charged with DUI. If they're over
|
||
the limit (if you've done your job, that's almost a certainty) you won't
|
||
need to testify. The officer obtains and gives the evidence needed for a
|
||
conviction.
|
||
|
||
You can follow (tail) the driver, but don't chase or spook them. Citizens
|
||
don't have the authority to make arrests for misdemeanors. If you tried to
|
||
pull over a drunk driver in an unmarked car it could be misinterpreted by
|
||
the driver as an attempted robbery. If the driver has a gun, he may shoot
|
||
at you. Or, if he spots you following him in a suspicious manner he might
|
||
try to run away from you at high speed and cause an accident. Resultant
|
||
lawsuits might be directed at you for "forcing" the driver into reckless
|
||
driving. (Chapter 23 explains high-speed pursuit regulations.)
|
||
|
||
If he gets away, don't worry about it. If you get the vehicle license plate
|
||
number, and have it on a videotape, there's another way to nail the perp.
|
||
|
||
No Police Arrests
|
||
|
||
On busy week-end nights, when all hell breaks loose for the local P.D.,
|
||
you may not get fast police patrol service for DUI calls. If not, you may
|
||
be able to use your videotape along with you and your partner's sworn
|
||
statements to initiate a lawsuit. Police should also have a record of your
|
||
phone calls (complaints) which will add credibility to your claim.
|
||
|
||
Use the DMV to get the drunk's name and address. File the paperwork to
|
||
initiate a personal damage lawsuit. Mail a copy of your lawsuit demand with
|
||
a copy of the videotape recording showing the person staggering and his
|
||
vehicle weaving on the road home after driving away from the bar. The tape
|
||
should convince the driver you have sufficient evidence for a conviction.
|
||
|
||
Your pending lawsuit permits you to mail a lawsuit interrogatory form to
|
||
the defendant and he/she is legally required to answer all your questions
|
||
concerning the drunk driving episode. A key question will be "at what bar
|
||
or tavern did you have your last alcoholic drink." That helps you to keep
|
||
track of bars or taverns who serve drunks their last drink. Interrogatories
|
||
become part of your evidence against the bar. And, of course, you will ask
|
||
other questions to reveal any other "problems" with the bar or tavern, such
|
||
as prostitutes on the premises, drug dealing, gun toting customers, etc.
|
||
|
||
Another key question will ask for his insurance company agent's name and
|
||
address. At that point, the defendant will realize if the tape is given to
|
||
his insurance company, he will be subject to a rate increase and possibly
|
||
insurance cancellation. Besides the cost of the rate increase for future
|
||
insurance, he will have to pay a lawyer to fight the lawsuit. The least
|
||
costly option is for an out-of-court settlement. At that point, and in this
|
||
situation, a $1,250 out of court settlement may be the lesser of two evils.
|
||
($1,000 for personal damages and about $250 or more for your costs.)
|
||
|
||
Note: If you don't try to get police to make an arrest at the time of the
|
||
crime, and just use the tape to threaten disclosure to the lawbreaker's
|
||
insurance company, it might be called blackmail! Citizens are required by
|
||
moral obligation and by law, to report a crime in progress, but are not
|
||
required (or allowed) to make arrests for misdemeanors. When police have
|
||
the information and don't follow up on it, that's not your problem. You've
|
||
done your duty. Use lawsuits to collect your reward and to obtain crime-
|
||
related information when you can.
|
||
|
||
If the lawsuit isn't easily settled out of court (no job, no money, etc.)
|
||
you have one more option: Contact Crime Stoppers and the local chapter of
|
||
M.A.D.D. Ask for a reward for the information on the videotape and related
|
||
documentation. Crime Stoppers or M.A.D.D. might pay occasional (small)
|
||
rewards for DUI.
|
||
|
||
Besides payment of the lawsuit, or in lieu of payment when you know they
|
||
can't afford to pay, you can ask them to sign a statement concerning the
|
||
bar operation. You might discover some damaging information that may be
|
||
used against the bar in a separate lawsuit. These are bonus coupons to be
|
||
redeemed later in your lawsuit against the bar owner and connected parties,
|
||
such as the building or hotel owner if the premises are leased to the bar.
|
||
|
||
Bonus Payments
|
||
|
||
Police Departments don't bother to keep a separate record or compile a list
|
||
of bars related to drunk driver convictions. Bar owners are seldom charged
|
||
with any violation unless the police want to close down the bar by revoking
|
||
their liquor license. However, you could keep or compile such a record --
|
||
and make another $25,000 or so, as a bonus -- from each bar.
|
||
|
||
To prove that a certain bar has routinely and habitually served liquor to
|
||
drunks, list the names and addresses of convicted drunk drivers that have,
|
||
within a short period of time (about 3 months), frequented each bar. Your
|
||
complaint will list all drunk drivers who were served their last drink in
|
||
the same bar.
|
||
|
||
Police records of DWI arrests connected to the bar is the main evidence,
|
||
plus videotapes, depositions and interrogatories from drunk drivers when
|
||
available. You lay charges against the bar owners accordingly and (if it's
|
||
a felony charge) assume the role of prosecutor to protect your interests.
|
||
Negotiate your civil suit at the same time you allow plea bargaining. Your
|
||
out-of-court (lawsuit) settlement will be scaled to fit the severity of the
|
||
offense as well as the ability the defendant's ability to pay. When you
|
||
have conclusive evidence, and allow plea bargaining to lesser charges (when
|
||
possible), means your lawsuit will be settled quickly and out of court.
|
||
|
||
Getting the Evidence
|
||
|
||
When you've identified a few probable drunks inside the bar and have
|
||
personally seen the bartender serving them, go to the parking lot and be
|
||
prepared to take a home movie on a camcorder (with a 12:1 zoom lens) that
|
||
shows the drunk leaving the bar. Many camcorders have sensitive low LUX
|
||
image-taking features that make recordings even in dim light. (1 lux = one
|
||
candle power). But to make sure of a clear picture, ask your partner in the
|
||
driver's seat to start up the motor and turn on the headlights when the
|
||
drunk exits from the bar to provide the extra lighting you may need.
|
||
|
||
Try to get the videotape to include a portion of the building (signs are
|
||
best) that disclose the building location and business name. A camcorder is
|
||
better than a 35 mm camera because it can "pan" to show the bar entrance
|
||
(for identity) and can zoom in on the license plate of the vehicle that's
|
||
shown in the parking lot. A camcorder panning from one location to another,
|
||
picking up all the action on the one film, is more convincing. It's even
|
||
better if the date and time are shown in the tape.
|
||
|
||
Keep the camera recording until you get pictures of the drunk getting into
|
||
the driver's seat, starting up the vehicle, and driving away. The movie
|
||
should show the drunk driving a vehicle after consuming many drinks. If he
|
||
is staggering like a drunk -- make sure that's on the videotape. The movie
|
||
should show certain features of the parking lot that fix the location of
|
||
the drunk's vehicle on the bar's parking lot or near the bar or tavern,
|
||
plus a videotape's date stamp. Police records will also show the location,
|
||
time and date, plus vehicle license. Put them both together and you have a
|
||
case, plus an excellent (cop) witness, if needed.
|
||
|
||
You won't need videotapes as evidence against the drunk. The police will
|
||
lay charges if the driver fails the sobriety, breatholizer, or blood test.
|
||
That's all a judge needs to convict a drunk driver. The camcorder evidence
|
||
is used against bar owners for habitually serving liquor to drunks. That's
|
||
why you need to identify the bar and the driver (either with a picture of
|
||
faces and/or license plate number of the vehicle) to tie them to the bar.
|
||
|
||
When there is a conviction, you have the hard evidence to justify your
|
||
lawsuit demand for "personal damages" as explained in previous chapters.
|
||
Having convictions on the record will help you obtain an out-of-court
|
||
settlement because they have no valid defense. If they're stubborn, apply
|
||
for summary judgment. With the conviction notice of the drunk driver and
|
||
your claim for personal damages, it's usually all you need to obtain
|
||
summary judgment. Payment is enforced by the court, if it's needed.
|
||
|
||
Traffic offenses are usually scheduled and disposed of within 90 days.
|
||
Usually, the fine must be paid promptly and few Appeals will be made. As
|
||
soon as you find out from police records or newspaper report of court
|
||
activity, use your word processor to crank out the paperwork to initiate a
|
||
civil suit against the convicted driver for gross negligence.
|
||
|
||
Partners
|
||
|
||
If you're a loner, that's alright. However, partners provide camouflage and
|
||
can verify your statements so it's not one person's word against another.
|
||
Also, one can drink beer while the other sips soft drinks. The worst that
|
||
can happen is you'll be suspected as a member of the DDT Patrol. You may be
|
||
roughed up by angry patrons or bar owners. If there's two or three in your
|
||
team, you can provide backup for each other. And, when there's two or three
|
||
in your group, it will discourage any violence. If you're all alone, you
|
||
might be vulnerable, especially in "roughneck" bars.
|
||
|
||
Bartenders and waiters/waitresses aren't necessarily nosy (some are) but
|
||
they may try to make friends to encourage you to come back again. Instead
|
||
of being stand-offish, be prepared to make friends and future contacts.
|
||
|
||
It's usually unwise to use your own identity in an undercover role. Phoney
|
||
I.D. may come in handy. It would be essential if you learn about criminal
|
||
activity and are instrumental in making arrests. With that thought in mind,
|
||
it might be a good idea to create a new name and address with matching I.D.
|
||
for your undercover role. (CRIMCAT has a few good books on that subject.)
|
||
|
||
This is where you can practice role playing and simple disguises that are
|
||
natural (not artificial) but can alter your appearance. Undercover agents
|
||
are actors who can assume another person's identity and personality. They
|
||
can put it on and take it off like a suit of clothes. The important thing
|
||
is to make your new identity look natural and fit your own personality too.
|
||
|
||
Camcorders - Indisputable Evidence?
|
||
|
||
The Las Vegas Review-Journal, May 27, 1990, in a story entitled, "Videos
|
||
Record DUI Suspects," reported that before they used videos police often
|
||
had problems of obtaining a conviction. But with the evidence on tape --
|
||
showing the suspect staggering while he walked in the parking lot to his
|
||
car, or the suspect's vehicle weaving on the road -- the video evidence was
|
||
enough to convince the defendant to plead guilty. "It's just indisputable
|
||
evidence," said Jimmy Stallings, a deputy chief in the Tampa Police
|
||
Department. "Once the defense attorney sees what their client looks like at
|
||
that particular point...it's very obvious, it's not even close. Many times,
|
||
you've got a person who says they had only two drinks, and they're falling
|
||
down drunk on the videotape."
|
||
|
||
No Camcorder
|
||
|
||
If you don't have a camcorder, wait until the drunk starts the vehicle and
|
||
is verified to be the driver, leaves the parking lot, and drives off. Use
|
||
a cellular phone to report it to the police. Give them the license number,
|
||
make and model of the car, the location of the bar, and the direction of
|
||
the suspect's car as it left the parking lot. They'll automatically ask for
|
||
your name as the person making the complaint. Your name on the complaint
|
||
helps to justify your lawsuit to recover your "costs", plus an award.
|
||
|
||
Note: Camcorders and cellular phones are "essential equipment" when working
|
||
the DDT Patrol. More info on them is in Chapter 26 - High Tech Equipment.
|
||
|
||
Cellular Phone versus Citizen's Band (CB) Radio
|
||
|
||
Cellular phones cost more than a CB, but a telephone call to the police is
|
||
preferred. When you use a telephone a formal complaint is made out. A CB
|
||
call may be heard by a patrol car, but may or may not be acted upon, and no
|
||
complaint sheet will be made out. A CB call may not get a response if the
|
||
nearby patrol car is already assigned and en route to a different call.
|
||
|
||
A CB call on an emergency or police channel isn't a private call. These
|
||
channels are usually monitored by scanners and overheard by many people
|
||
including the bar owner. They and others would soon spot the pattern of
|
||
calls and your DDT Patrol operation would be discovered. Don't use CB's.
|
||
|
||
Tail the drunk until the police arrive and pull the car over and test the
|
||
driver. If police don't arrive within five minutes, give them another call
|
||
and advise the new location. Tell them if the driver's weaving all over the
|
||
road, running red lights, and driving over the speed limit. Get it on tape
|
||
with your verbal comments as you drive. Make a recording of the ongoing,
|
||
vehicle surveillance. When you see the drunk driver pulled over by a patrol
|
||
car, that's the end of your surveillance.
|
||
|
||
Use your phone to call your CrimeFighter shift supervisor. Ask for another
|
||
assignment. Go to a different bar and repeat the procedure until closing
|
||
time or the end of your shift.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Traffic offenses are usually scheduled and disposed of within 90 days.
|
||
Usually, the fine must be paid promptly and very few appeals will be made.
|
||
Initiating a lawsuit and negotiating a settlement may take a week or two.
|
||
|
||
If you're a hard worker, you may be able to report two or more drunks per
|
||
night. That's good for two reasons: First, the $500 per drunk ups the ante
|
||
to about $1,000 per shift; second, it also provides "proof" (after about
|
||
three or more convictions related to the same bar) that the bar routinely
|
||
serves liquor to drunks. Serving one drunk might be held to be a mistake in
|
||
judgment. A dozen or more within a few weeks or months from the same bar
|
||
makes it "routinely and habitually."
|
||
|
||
Question: How many bars in your vicinity (within 50 miles of your home)
|
||
offer "Happy Hours," hustle patrons for extra drinks, and maybe allow
|
||
hookers or drug dealers on the premises?
|
||
|
||
Busy bars may be like gold mines for their owners. They could prove to be
|
||
gold mines for active CrimeFighters too.
|
||
|
||
End of DDT Patrol Operator's Manual
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
How to Calculate Lawsuit Awards for DDT Patrols
|
||
|
||
Drunk driving is a felony after two or three prior convictions within a
|
||
certain period. It's usually a felony when combined with driving without a
|
||
license, a suspended license, or driving without required insurance. Each
|
||
State has slightly different conditions and time periods but generally
|
||
their laws are quite similar.
|
||
|
||
When felony charges are laid, you're eligible for a reward under 18: 3059.
|
||
Assert your right to prosecute. When the person asks for plea bargaining,
|
||
use your prosecutor position as leverage to negotiate a fast and easy
|
||
settlement of your lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
Penalties for drunk driving are close to $1,000 in most States and even
|
||
more for subsequent convictions. Adjust your lawsuit to match the fines.
|
||
|
||
California and Texas fines for first-offense DWI (Driving While
|
||
Intoxicated, in other states called DUI or Driving Under the Influence) is
|
||
close to $1,000, and up to $2,000 for the second offense. Other states
|
||
average about $1,000.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Drunk Driving, an American Dilemma," by James B. Jacobs, mentions that
|
||
fines have been declining over the years and that a $500 fine is not as
|
||
strong a deterrent as it used to be.
|
||
|
||
Some States levy a "flat" fine of a specific amount regardless of the
|
||
degree of blood alcohol content (BAC). Example: a BAC of .08 to .10
|
||
(depending on the State) is defined as "impaired." A BAC of .15 means the
|
||
driver is seriously impaired, and at .20 or more the driver is criminally
|
||
impaired. Why not consider fines that charge the minimum for DUI -- plus
|
||
$250 for each percent increment in BAC? A person with a BAC of .18 would
|
||
pay the minimum fine of (say) $500 plus an additional $2,000 for the extra
|
||
8 points. While many courts may not use this scale, CrimeFighters can use
|
||
it to calculate the award amount in their personal damage lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
In addition, fines should be set according to the person's income. Fines
|
||
for a young teenager could be scaled at minimum-wage incomes. A corporate
|
||
president or a professional person should pay proportionately larger fines.
|
||
Germany and Sweden assess "day fines" of so many "units" for each offense.
|
||
The monetary value placed on each unit is rated at the person's daily pay
|
||
scale or ability to pay as well as suitably punish.
|
||
|
||
A $150 fine for someone earning $150 a week might be suitable punishment.
|
||
For someone earning $1,000 a week or more, $150 is just a nuisance fine. It
|
||
doesn't have the same deterrent value. By calculating the $ unit at the
|
||
person's weekly pay scale, anyone making $1,000 a week would have to pay
|
||
$1,000, which is proportionate to income.
|
||
|
||
Combining these two factors, a CrimeFighter can calculate a suitable amount
|
||
to be asked for in his personal damage lawsuit, plus an amount of (say)
|
||
$250 as his costs for time in gathering evidence and related expenses.
|
||
|
||
The formula = (the person's weekly income) X (BAC X 10) + $250
|
||
|
||
A person with a weekly income of $250, and with a BAC of .10 would be
|
||
assessed ($250) X (.10 X 10) or $250, + your costs of $250 = $500.
|
||
|
||
A person making $1,000 a week with a BAC of .18 would pay ($1,000) X (.18 X
|
||
10) or $1,800, + your costs of $250 = $2,050.
|
||
|
||
The award (or fine) is relative to income as well as the BAC reading.
|
||
|
||
Anyone with a BAC of .20 or more, who is criminally impaired should be
|
||
placed in the same category as a felony assault with a deadly weapon, and
|
||
their vehicles should be forfeited as well as their license revoked for a
|
||
year or more. A CrimeFighters' lawsuit could claim criminal negligence and
|
||
up the ante accordingly -- to $2,500 or more, depending on the individual.
|
||
|
||
Each drunk driver you report and is convicted can be sued via a personal
|
||
damage lawsuit for an amount based on the above CrimeFighter formula. At
|
||
busy and boisterous bars and taverns, you should be able to catch one drunk
|
||
driver per shift, or about five per week. At an average of just $500 each,
|
||
you can make about $130,000 per year, plus bonuses -- if you work at it.
|
||
|
||
Lawsuit Amounts from Bars and Connected Parties
|
||
|
||
A "fair" award from bars (and connected parties when applicable) might be
|
||
the same amount that was used against each drunk driver according to the
|
||
above CrimeFighter formula. In this case, it's appropriate to levy a fine
|
||
according to the BAC reading. If a bar serves someone just slightly over
|
||
the limit, the fine is just $500. But if the bar serves a person already
|
||
stinking drunk, they should be fined accordingly -- or according to the
|
||
driver's BAC reading. On the average, fines may be more than $500 each, but
|
||
for easy calculation let's say about $500 per drunk who was served the
|
||
last "over the limit" drink in the bar.
|
||
|
||
Sue the various bars (and connected parties when applicable) in individual
|
||
lawsuits for a personal damage award of $500 for each drunk driver. Each
|
||
bar will be liable for only a few thousand dollars and will want to settle
|
||
out of court rather than face the burden of a hard-to-win-lawsuit. If you
|
||
have convictions of drunk drivers, and possibly a few statements from drunk
|
||
drivers of illegal activity against the bars, they have no valid defense.
|
||
If they don't want to settle out of court, you can apply for summary
|
||
judgment to avoid a costly and lengthy trial.
|
||
|
||
If you snare (say) 5 drunk drivers per week, at $500 each, on the average,
|
||
you will make about $130,000 per year. If you sue the bars as well for the
|
||
same amount, add another $130,000 from bar owners and connected parties
|
||
for a total of about $260,000 per year!
|
||
|
||
Other Things to Look For
|
||
|
||
Alcohol-Related Laws
|
||
|
||
Most States have an "Open Container" law making it illegal to drink
|
||
alcoholic beverages in a moving vehicle. Having an open container of an
|
||
alcoholic beverage within reach of a driver or passengers indicates a high
|
||
probability of drinking while driving. Proof that drinks were taken from
|
||
the container while driving is not required. The open container is all
|
||
that's needed. Violators are automatically fined as DUI drivers.
|
||
|
||
If your State has such a law, it provides another business opportunity:
|
||
staking out liquor stores to observe patrons who load the booze in their
|
||
vehicle, open a can or bottle, have a few swigs, then drive away to finish
|
||
it off -- with an open container.
|
||
|
||
Dram Shop Laws
|
||
|
||
All businesses that serve alcohol are required by the terms of their liquor
|
||
license to maintain a safe and orderly place for their customers.
|
||
|
||
Such places should not knowingly and willfully: serve minors; serve drinks
|
||
to intoxicated patrons directly or indirectly (serving drinks to friends
|
||
who, the bartender knows, will pass it on to a drunk person); allow
|
||
prostitutes or drug pushers or anyone with a gun to be on their premises;
|
||
allow fights or brawls; or otherwise run a disorderly and potentially
|
||
dangerous place of business. In any of the above situations (or violations)
|
||
a licensee is required to call the police as soon as possible to remedy the
|
||
situation. When they don't, they could be in violation of State liquor
|
||
laws, which assesses any of the above violations as a class 1 (serious)
|
||
misdemeanor. (In Arizona, a fine of up to $20,000 is levied for class 1.)
|
||
|
||
Co-defendants in Lawsuits
|
||
|
||
Some state liquor laws have a provision that say, in words to the effect,
|
||
that licensees can be held equally financially responsible when a person
|
||
who has been served drinks in their place of business, is involved in an
|
||
accident, charged with DUI, or sued by an injured party.
|
||
|
||
If a lawsuit by a Crimefighter is deemed to be in the latter category,
|
||
(an injured party) it might be the bar or tavern can be legally required
|
||
to pay the drunk driver's lawsuit award.
|
||
|
||
Check it out. If a driver has very little in assets, and lawsuit payment
|
||
will be difficult to collect from the driver alone, make the bar or tavern
|
||
a co-defendant and make them jointly liable for the payment.
|
||
|
||
By the way, DUI includes driving under the influence of drugs. Keep that
|
||
in mind if you know any addicts who drive. Their open containers of dope
|
||
is all the evidence police need for an arrest, conviction, and possible
|
||
forfeiture of the vehicle if the driver is also a drug dealer.
|
||
|
||
Blood Alcohol Content
|
||
|
||
A person is legally drunk when the blood/alcohol ratio exceeds the legal
|
||
content, which varies slightly in various States. Drivers can be impaired
|
||
when their blood alcohol shows a reading of .05 (50 milligrams per 100
|
||
milliliters of blood. When their ratio reaches .08 they're "too drunk to
|
||
drive." Anything over that is usually illegal. As you can imagine, a large
|
||
person, say 200 pounds in weight, can drink twice as much as a 100-pound
|
||
person and still have the same blood-alcohol ratio. With that in mind we
|
||
can come up with a fairly accurate rule of thumb.
|
||
|
||
Examples with a person's weight, number of drinks, and approximate blood
|
||
alcohol content:
|
||
|
||
100 pounds = 2 drinks = .087
|
||
150 pounds = 3 drinks = .087 to .103
|
||
200 pounds = 4 drinks = .087 to .108
|
||
250 pounds = 5 drinks = .087 to .097
|
||
|
||
Generally, small people get drunk after 2 or 3 drinks. Medium-sized people
|
||
get drunk after 3 or 4 drinks, and big people get drunk after 4 or 5 drinks
|
||
-- depending on the time between drinks.
|
||
|
||
If you control your drinking to about one per hour, you will seldom be over
|
||
the limit. But, it also depends on body weight and physical activity.
|
||
|
||
Unlimited Earnings Potential?
|
||
|
||
How many drunk drivers are in your area? "Driving The Drunk Off the Road,"
|
||
a book by Sandy Golden published by Acropolis Books, Ltd., presents these
|
||
and other statistics on drunk drivers.
|
||
|
||
"The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) report reveals
|
||
that, where enforcement is lax, 2,000 intoxicated drivers escape detection
|
||
for every driver arrested. When enforcement is vigorous, it drops to about
|
||
500 who escape detection for each one caught. The average DWI violator may
|
||
drive in an intoxicated condition for nearly four years before being
|
||
arrested. The odds against being caught is so slight, it encourages drunk
|
||
drivers to ignore DWI laws." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
Why don't Police stake out bars like the DDT Patrol? First, it would take
|
||
officers off other, more serious assignments. And, it would be politically
|
||
unacceptable from a public-relations viewpoint for police to hound, harry
|
||
and harrass inebriated patrons of licensed businesses.
|
||
|
||
But that doesn't mean it can't or shouldn't be done by CrimeFighters!
|
||
|
||
Happy hunting (and don't get drunk on the job!)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Drug Wars and Drug Laws
|
||
|
||
"Deep Cover," a $5.95 pocketbook, by Dell, written by a former DEA group
|
||
supervisor and international undercover agent, gives the inside (true)
|
||
story of how DEA infighting, incompetence, and subterfuge lost the biggest
|
||
battle of the drug war. If there was a textbook on undercover work, Michael
|
||
Levine would have written it. For 25 years he was an insider in the DEA -
|
||
their top undercover cop. A man with a proven record of arrests -
|
||
personally accounting for more than 3,000 criminals serving 15,000 years in
|
||
jail. A man who now calls America's war on drugs "the biggest, costliest,
|
||
most dangerous failure of American policy since Vietnam. In his book "Deep
|
||
Cover" he takes you on one of the most dramatic, ambitious cases ever
|
||
mounted - an operation in which the drug kingpins of three countries were
|
||
caught red-handed... and tells you why they were never brought to justice.
|
||
The result is an explosive expose of why we're losing the war on drugs -
|
||
told in the words of an American who has devoted his life to winning it."
|
||
|
||
The above description was taken from the covers of his book. If you're the
|
||
least bit interested in doing something about the drug war farce, read this
|
||
book. It may come as a bit of a shock to learn that (on page 64, for
|
||
example,) DEA's Staff coordinator, Art Egbert said, "They are making so
|
||
much cocaine down there (in Bolivia) that just seizing another 10, 20, or
|
||
30 thousand kilos isn't going to make any difference whatsoever. There are
|
||
probably 150 or 200 guys like Roman down there. It's just not worth making
|
||
a buy."
|
||
|
||
Michael Levine's thoughts at that time were, "I wanted to scream. "Why the
|
||
fuck have two DEA undercover agents died this year after going after ounces
|
||
of cocaine? Was it for nothing? And why are you sending agents into the
|
||
jungles like an invading army, like Vietnam? For nothing?" The words were
|
||
on the tip of my tongue. Only the realization that it would have meant an
|
||
instant end to Trifecta (code name for the operation) silenced me -- but
|
||
not completely."
|
||
|
||
And it didn't. His book, "Deep Cover," written after his retirement, blows
|
||
the lid off political ambitions and bureaucratic bungling and the shameful
|
||
waste of lives and billions of dollars on the biggest con of all - DEA's
|
||
operation "Snowcap."
|
||
|
||
The essence of the Michael's story, besides shocking revelations that will
|
||
make you both angry and dismayed, mentions a viable alternative that may
|
||
not be politically expedient, but could be the most effective way to fight
|
||
the drug war.
|
||
|
||
On page 227 he says "Over the next week, from March 24th to March 29th,
|
||
night after night, Group 22 (his group) kept locking up buyers. Most of
|
||
them flipped (gave evidence against the pusher who sold them the dope),
|
||
signed statements, and blubbered that they would never do it again. The one
|
||
thing that seemed apparent to me was that most of them never would have
|
||
been buying drugs in the first place if they'd believed there was a chance
|
||
they'd be busted. WHEN WILL WE EVER LEARN!" (Mike's emphasis.)
|
||
|
||
Another pocketbook, "Cocaine Wars," by Paul Eddy with Hugo Sabogal and Sara
|
||
Waden, Bantam Books, 1988, makes similar remarks and has come to the same
|
||
conclusion:
|
||
|
||
" ...When the task force began work in 1982, one kilo of cocaine of any
|
||
purity cost $47,000 to $60,000 in Miami. In late 1987 one kilo cost between
|
||
$9,000 and $14,000 in Miami, and there were places in the city where at
|
||
night cocaine was more easily and openly available than cigarettes.
|
||
|
||
What went wrong? "We win battles while they win the war," said Special
|
||
Agent William Yout, a blunt Boston Irishman who until 1987 was the DEA's
|
||
exceptionally forthright spokesman in Miami. In Yout's view -- a view
|
||
widely shared in law enforcement and by the other side -- the task force
|
||
failed, and continues to fail, because its strategy is flawed, because it
|
||
fights on the wrong front, and because for all the hoopla and all the
|
||
political rhetoric, there is in Washington neither the understanding nor
|
||
the political will to win."
|
||
|
||
Another book of Michael Levine's exploits, "Undercover," written by Donald
|
||
Goddard (Dell) and available in paperback ($5) contains a series of
|
||
"seminars" that Levine uses to teach law enforcement agents how to go
|
||
undercover. In the book, the gist of his seminars are told, along with the
|
||
background information in story form on how he made the busts. It's
|
||
fascinating to read, and in a way, is a training manual for CrimeFighters.
|
||
It explains what going undercover is really like and exactly how to do it!
|
||
|
||
Levine reiterates (in Chapter 9 of "Undercover") "We can win, if you want
|
||
to". In this Chapter, Mike is talking to a PTA group and explains why the
|
||
war on drugs is already lost, and what can and should be done about it. He
|
||
emphatically repeats the claim that all the big busts have damn little
|
||
effect and never will. It's only when users of illegal drugs are hounded,
|
||
harried, and harassed out of existence will the drug wars be won. As long
|
||
as the demand is there, drug dealers will be able to make a lot of money
|
||
meeting the demand. Taking out dealers, who are replaced immediately by
|
||
another group who are waiting in line to move up the ladder, is not the way
|
||
to fight the war on drugs. Going after the users is the only effective way
|
||
to eliminate drug use. When no one (or hardly anyone) uses drugs anymore,
|
||
there'll be no dealers.
|
||
|
||
What Levine recommends is not going to be a popular remedy supported by the
|
||
public or police departments. First, it means making arrests in record
|
||
numbers that won't be currently practical. Wholesale arrests would tie up
|
||
the entire judicial system. Most of these arrests will be considered as
|
||
"nuisance" arrests as far as the courts are concerned. Second, most of
|
||
these lawbreakers are almost immediately released with a slap on the wrist
|
||
-- plea bargained down to a petty offense or misdemeanor and a small fine
|
||
or a few days in jail. For the cops on the street, it's just not worth the
|
||
time and hassle when they have too many other things to do. So they don't
|
||
bother. They can't. There are too many users and not enough police.
|
||
Prosecutors are already overworked, court calendars too crowded, and jails
|
||
are overflowing. That's the problem. (But, CrimeFighters could provide a
|
||
simple solution. More on that coming up.)
|
||
|
||
Drug Wars: Just a GAME?
|
||
|
||
Both "Deep Cover" and "Cocaine Wars," about different narc agents, draw
|
||
similar but separate conclusions that sum up their opinion of the War on
|
||
Drugs:
|
||
|
||
In" Cocaine Wars," Ex-Lieutenant Raul Diaz (homicide, with nine years of
|
||
service), said that in the War on Drugs, he had lost sight of that, and
|
||
gone for overall victory, and, consequently, he had lost. He was, he said,
|
||
no longer naive: "the whole thing's a game. It's all a fucking game."
|
||
|
||
Michael Levine, in "Deep Cover," says "I listened to Hooper talk and
|
||
realized I was no better than he, or any of the other DEA agents who
|
||
realize that the whole drug war is nothing more than a game -- a dangerous
|
||
game, but a game nonetheless -- and continue to play, risking their lives
|
||
but afraid to risk their jobs. I was as afraid as any of them -- afraid of
|
||
a truth I had refused to see ever since the nightmare of the Roberta Suarez
|
||
case."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Another book, "Drug Agent, U.S.A.," written by Richard F. Radford and Jack
|
||
Crowley, published by St. Martin's Paperbacks is another "true detective
|
||
story" of the street war on drugs as experienced by undercover drug agents.
|
||
This one, beside relating fascinating stories, provides clear insight in
|
||
the drug scene and the jobs of undercover cops. It also sheds additional
|
||
light on the reason for failure of the war on drugs!
|
||
|
||
The authors of "Drug Agent U.S.A." mention something generally overlooked
|
||
by the public as well as politicians:
|
||
|
||
"...fully half the drugs OD's that get reported in this country derive from
|
||
prescription drugs. That's not to say they've all been negligently
|
||
prescribed: there are as many methods of illegal diversion as there are
|
||
criminals. Drugs get stolen, prescriptions get forged, some people
|
||
deliberately overdose.
|
||
|
||
"As a supervisor for the DEA, my first concern is about the sheer size of
|
||
the problem. From an enforcement point of view, the numbers are staggering.
|
||
There are approximately 800,000 registrants in the United States -- that
|
||
is, over three-quarters of a million legally registered pharmacists,
|
||
doctors, manufacturers, distributors and others who handle, somewhere along
|
||
the line, drugs listed under the Controlled Substances Act. All of these
|
||
registrants are potential diverters, people who divert legal drugs to an
|
||
illegal end, so the logistics of tracking down a crooked handler are mind-
|
||
boggling.
|
||
|
||
"Add to the problem of this number the fact there are several thousand
|
||
different drugs listed under the Controlled Substances Act. Those several
|
||
thousand items factor out to about 20 million dosage units of drugs that
|
||
can, as the DEA says, "have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
|
||
health and welfare of the American people.
|
||
|
||
"Obviously, not all the drugs are ending up where they're supposed to. Of
|
||
the 20 billion legally produced dosage units, estimates range from a low
|
||
250 million to a high of 650 million dosage units diverted into the illicit
|
||
market annually. That's a lot of pills."
|
||
|
||
Chapter 2 of "Drug Agent U.S.A." reveals that generally speaking, if the
|
||
case isn't profitable moneywise, won't advance legal careers, or won't
|
||
enhance their political aspirations, most prosecutors tend to ignore,
|
||
stonewall, discourage, and sidestep the little cases. They're just not
|
||
interested.
|
||
|
||
It seems logical that prosecutors don't want to waste their time on the
|
||
little busts because, if they win the cases, there's no glory or big
|
||
reputations to be made. On the other hand, if they lose too many, it could
|
||
ruin their reputation, derail their careers, and hinder political ambitions
|
||
for higher office. From a business point of view, It's smarter to play the
|
||
odds when their in your favor. I'd do the same thing, and so would most
|
||
people if they were ambitious lawyers who want to climb the ladder to
|
||
higher office. But, that's part of the problem -- politics!
|
||
|
||
Perhaps politicians and bureaucrats at the top are also knowingly "playing
|
||
the game" -- to hang on to their big-paying jobs with billions of dollars
|
||
worth of assets at their disposal, plus large expense accounts. If the Drug
|
||
War is won, they'll be out of a job. Maybe that's what Yout meant when he
|
||
said, "there is in Washington neither the understanding nor the political
|
||
will to win." I believe both.
|
||
|
||
End result: Everybody claims to want to stop the plague of drugs and drug
|
||
addiction, but no one wants to make the little busts if there's no money or
|
||
glory to be made. And the drug use continues to spread without being
|
||
stopped or controlled. Obviously, we need a new strategy.
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
|
||
1. Federal agents aren't effective in stopping or slowing the drugs from
|
||
coming into the country. Many other people, like Levine who know enough to
|
||
make factual comments, say that the amount of drugs seized amount to only
|
||
about 10% of the total volume. Even if the percentage was increased to 50%
|
||
or more, it would only mean that the price would go up slightly. That would
|
||
spur the manufacture of drugs already being made within the United States -
|
||
- and make it even more difficult to control.
|
||
|
||
2. The production of crack and increasing cultivation of marijuana, for
|
||
example, is made in the United States. Spending billions in bribes (by
|
||
various names) to South America can't and won't do anything to solve the
|
||
home-grown problem that is rapidly taking over. Added to that is the
|
||
diversion of thousands of other drugs (besides marijuana, crack, cocaine,
|
||
and heroin) that are all but overlooked by politicians at higher levels,
|
||
and by the media. The little busts are so common, they just aren't worth
|
||
mentioning.
|
||
|
||
3. The "war" on Panama to capture Manuel Noriega didn't solve the
|
||
Panamanian or Bolivian problem. A recent TV program mentioned that when
|
||
Noriega controlled Panama he also controlled drug distribution. Now that
|
||
he's in prison (at what cost?) there are about a dozen more relatively
|
||
unknown and uncontrolled dealers who have quickly and eagerly stepped into
|
||
his place -- and taken over.
|
||
|
||
South American drug manufacturers are like mushrooms. When you step on a
|
||
mushroom it releases spores that create hundreds more. Stamping on the big
|
||
ones only creates hundreds of smaller ones who sprout up overnight and take
|
||
their place. Ditto with drug dealers. Nailing Noriega didn't solve the
|
||
problem. When he was operational they knew who it was and could take some
|
||
action. Now, they don't know who's in charge, who the dealers are, where
|
||
the drugs are coming from or going to, or what to do about it. The problem
|
||
now is worse than ever!
|
||
|
||
4. District Attorneys are reluctant to prosecute ("waste their time") on
|
||
small cases. Ditto with Police Departments. That's why there are millions
|
||
of buyers who make it profitable for dealers to accept the risks of jail.
|
||
|
||
If we can't stop the source, why not try a different tactic as Michael
|
||
Levine's book suggests -- hit the users to reduce the demand!
|
||
|
||
The history of Drug Wars indicates it's another quagmire like Vietnam.
|
||
We'll never win it by fighting the war like a standard, organized military
|
||
operation. It's time to try guerrilla warfare; by sniping at recreational
|
||
drug users with an all-out war against them!
|
||
|
||
Drug Wars - CrimeFighter Style
|
||
|
||
After working the DDT Patrol for a few weeks or months, you'll probably see
|
||
or hear about drug use and sources of supply. If you have experience in
|
||
playing an undercover role, and have mastered your camcorder and other
|
||
electronic equipment, you may be ready to join the CrimeFighter NARC squad.
|
||
|
||
If you haven't worked the DDT Patrol for a few weeks or months you might
|
||
not have any inside information on drug users and drug dealers. If not,
|
||
there's another way to obtain leads: advertise for them.
|
||
|
||
Buy and distribute "reward brochures" from We-Tip that offers to pay "up to
|
||
$1,000" for information concerning illegal drug use. Put your phone number
|
||
(rented from an answering service) as the person to contact. Payment of the
|
||
reward to a tipster is contingent on conviction. When you collect a larger
|
||
reward, you pay the tipster his $100 to $200 according to Crime Stopper's
|
||
formula. Or, when suitably dressed for the role, ask street people to
|
||
locate a drug dealer's place of business such as a crack house. Sooner or
|
||
later you'll get leads.
|
||
|
||
If you read the book "Undercover," you'll learn how to flip users to get
|
||
names and addresses of other users and their dealers. You'll find out one
|
||
lead often becomes two or more, and it becomes a pyramid of leads.
|
||
|
||
Stakeouts
|
||
|
||
If you know of, or learn where a dealer lives and operates, stake out the
|
||
place of business or stash house. Make camcorder movies of the drug traffic
|
||
and license plate numbers of about a dozen cars or more that make pit
|
||
stops. When possible, use the 12:1 zoom feature of a camcorder to get
|
||
close-ups of buyer's faces and license plates. After getting the evidence
|
||
on tape: (a) Contact the FBI and negotiate for a suitable reward for the
|
||
bust of the dealer. When an agreement is reached, and in writing, give them
|
||
the information they need, including a copy of the videotapes showing many
|
||
buyers going in and out of the place of suspected drug-related business.
|
||
The videotapes of suspects making pit stops at the buyer's place of
|
||
business will provide them with probable cause to get a warrant for a
|
||
search of the premises.
|
||
|
||
Let the FBI make the arrests. But be aware they may want to flip the dealer
|
||
to nail his suppliers. They may let him off the hook (and even stay in
|
||
business) in exchange for additional information. Your negotiations for a
|
||
reward should allow for plea bargaining to a lesser charge, dismissals,
|
||
errors and omissions of police, and indifferent prosecutors. Nail down a
|
||
specific minimum reward amount plus 50% of all fines and forfeitures so
|
||
that no matter what happens to the case afterwards, you know you'll get
|
||
paid an agreed-upon amount. And get it in writing from an FBI agent.
|
||
|
||
If negotiations for a reward isn't possible because there was no time to
|
||
negotiate, or if the agency doesn't want to pay a "decent" reward, assert
|
||
your right to be prosecutor (that's what Qui Tam is for). Plea bargain with
|
||
the defendant for lesser charges in exchange for a suitable lawsuit award.
|
||
|
||
Use RICO civil suit for prosecution in addition to or in lieu of criminal
|
||
charges -- where you get 50% of the fines and forfeitures when there are
|
||
significant amounts involved and include the fruits of criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
The FBI will obtain names and addresses of suspected users from the DMV via
|
||
the license plate numbers shown on your videotapes. Search and arrest
|
||
warrants would be obtained based on probable cause. Immediately after the
|
||
dealer is busted the warrants would be served on the users. It's a good
|
||
possibility that arresting officers would find incriminating evidence of
|
||
drugs or other contraband on the premises or in their vehicles. That's all
|
||
they need to make an arrest.
|
||
|
||
Negotiate the same deal for drug users, or when necessary, use Qui Tam to
|
||
prosecute them to get federal rewards plus 50% of fines and forfeitures,
|
||
when applicable. The FBI probably won't be interested in the small fry
|
||
anyway. If so, you can take over as prosecutor via Qui Tam law. Use civil
|
||
suits to extract payment for your undercover time. The concurrent criminal
|
||
charge will provide leverage to get an friendly settlement of your civil
|
||
suit in exchange for downgrading or dismissing the pending drug charges.
|
||
|
||
Under 3059, you qualify for a reward and have the legal right to be the
|
||
prosecutor. If you have the experience, you won't need a lawyer for plea
|
||
bargaining. Very few will want a trial if you're willing to let them buy
|
||
their way out of jail. When they insist on their innocence, turn them over
|
||
to the regular prosecutor and apply for federal rewards. When and if
|
||
they're convicted or change their mind and plead guilty, initiate a civil
|
||
suit to be paid for your undercover time.
|
||
|
||
When they can afford it, users will gladly accept the chance to settle the
|
||
problem out of court for just $1,000 in exchange for a suspended sentence
|
||
or reduced charges from a felony to a misdemeanor. If they insist on a
|
||
trial, they'll probably wind up paying more than $1,000 in lawyer's fees
|
||
anyway, and might lose the case and face jail time and a criminal record --
|
||
if they don't already have one.
|
||
|
||
You can recommend Probation without Adjudication for first-time offenders.
|
||
That means, if there are no repeat violations during a 12 month period, the
|
||
charges will be dropped and no criminal sentence is on their record.
|
||
|
||
If the FBI wants to prosecute all users, to get official credit for their
|
||
bureau, a suitable reward of $1,000 per user should be negotiated in lieu
|
||
of the rewards under 3059 and 886.
|
||
|
||
If you make the arrest or provide the information that leads to the arrest
|
||
and there are rewards pending (3059 and 886), you have the right to be the
|
||
prosecutor. If the FBI (or others) wants to prosecute, they have to get
|
||
your permission. That gives you leverage to negotiate a suitable reward.
|
||
|
||
When you get a few leads and informants working for you, you should be able
|
||
to snare at least 10 drug users per month who pay you $1,000 or more, each.
|
||
That's how you can make $100,000 a year. (Plus bonuses of rewards from
|
||
dealer busts and your 50% share of resultant fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
Part II - Reward Laws
|
||
|
||
In addition to the catch-all reward law for any felony anywhere (18: 3059),
|
||
there's another reward law that concerns Drug Abuse Prevention:
|
||
|
||
Title 21, Section 886
|
||
Payment and Advances
|
||
|
||
"(a) Payment to informers. The Attorney General is authorized to pay any
|
||
person, from funds appropriated for the Drug Enforcement Administration,
|
||
for information concerning a violation of this title, such sum or sums of
|
||
money as he may deem appropriate,without reference to any moieties or
|
||
rewards to which such person may otherwise be entitled by law."
|
||
|
||
Unofficial interpretation: If, for example, a CrimeFighter were to provide
|
||
information leading to the arrest of a drug dealer, he or she would be
|
||
first entitled up to $25,000 as a reward under section 3059, plus an
|
||
additional amount under section 886. The reward amount under section 886
|
||
isn't specific. It's under the discretion of the DEA (and FBI). But, this
|
||
reward can be paid even though the tipster receives a reward from another
|
||
source. (Most reward laws prohibit "double-dipping," but this one
|
||
intentionally provides a bonus reward when directly related drug activity
|
||
is involved.)
|
||
|
||
"Reimbursement for purchase of controlled substances. Moneys expended from
|
||
appropriations of the Drug Enforcement Administration for purchases of
|
||
controlled substances and subsequently recovered shall be reimbursed to the
|
||
current appropriation for the Bureau."
|
||
|
||
Unofficial interpretation: When and if money used to make purchases in
|
||
sting operations is recovered, it is to be put back where it came from.
|
||
Sometimes the sting operation isn't successful and the money is "lost," or
|
||
stolen!
|
||
|
||
"Advance of funds for enforcement purposes. The Attorney General is
|
||
authorized to direct the advance of funds by the Treasury Department in
|
||
connection with the enforcement of this title."
|
||
|
||
Unofficial interpretation: Authorizes general funding for the DEA and
|
||
would, it seems, cover the cost of miscellaneous items and expenses to set
|
||
up a sting operation. It might also authorize the FBI to pay an alternate
|
||
form of compensation to a CrimeFighter to provide a "cover" in setting up
|
||
a sting operation.
|
||
|
||
(Incidentally, David Wheeler, a DEA informant and convicted drug dealer, is
|
||
reported to have been paid $285,000 for services rendered to the DEA. The
|
||
pocketbook "Deep Cover," mentioned later on, gives the full story.)
|
||
|
||
A former law enforcement agent, Mr. X (who prefers to be anonymous) who
|
||
worked drug details, now retired, claims has recently collected hundreds of
|
||
thousands of dollars in the last year alone and said that 21 USCS 886
|
||
allows the FBI to award 25% of all fines and forfeitures, up to $150,000
|
||
per case.
|
||
|
||
Mr. X also mentioned, "I have found the FBI to be very trustworthy in
|
||
paying this money." (Note: The FBI took over control of DEA in 1980.)
|
||
|
||
You can deal either with the DEA or FBI for a reward to be paid under 21
|
||
USCS 886. After reading the book "Deep Cover," you may lean towards the FBI
|
||
as more reliable and trustworthy. But, it might depend more on the agent
|
||
you deal with.
|
||
"Original Information"
|
||
|
||
The wording "original information" means that once you have disclosed the
|
||
details to any law enforcement agency it is no longer original information.
|
||
You might collect a reward from the first party, but no one else if the
|
||
wording of their law specifies "original information." Look for that
|
||
phrase. If you give the information to Crime Stoppers, for example, and
|
||
later try to sell it to Customs, the information is no longer original
|
||
information and you would lose the larger Customs reward.
|
||
|
||
State Rewards
|
||
|
||
Most states have provisions to pay rewards for information on drug
|
||
violations but they may be buried in forfeiture laws.
|
||
|
||
Example: Arizona's forfeiture law, 13-4315, has a provision for: "Payment
|
||
of awards for information or assistance leading to a civil or criminal
|
||
proceeding under this (drug law) title."
|
||
|
||
When such provisions are available in state forfeiture laws, it may be
|
||
possible to obtain 50% of the forfeitures and fines from lawbreakers as
|
||
well as obtain rewards under federal laws.
|
||
|
||
The 13-4315 law also says that "Fines that are not suspended constitute a
|
||
lien until paid." If a large fine can't be paid right away, it remains in
|
||
force as a lien on the lawbreaker's future assets.
|
||
|
||
Drug-Related Fines and Penalties
|
||
|
||
For an example, I extracted the essence of Arizona drug laws and itemized
|
||
them in abbreviated form for your reference. Each state law will vary
|
||
slightly. Some may impose harsher or lenient penalties. In most cases,
|
||
assume all violations of drug laws are felonies unless stated otherwise in
|
||
your own state's Revised Statutes.
|
||
|
||
An analysis of Arizona drug laws reveals: 99% of violations are felonies;
|
||
that the minimum fine (range) is $750 and up to $2,000 or three times the
|
||
value of drugs found, involved in or giving rise to the charge, but not
|
||
more than $150,000; Fines for violations involving "hard" drugs (cocaine,
|
||
heroin, etc) increase to a maximum of $250,000; One of the provisions of
|
||
most fines under drug laws includes the statement "A judge shall not
|
||
suspend any part or all of the imposition of any fine required by this
|
||
section."
|
||
|
||
Felonies are rated by classes, with class 1 being the most serious and
|
||
class 2 through 6 being decreasingly less serious. Penalties, fines, and
|
||
forfeitures are adjusted according to the many factors involved in each
|
||
case. It's not possible to state a specific fine and penalty for each class
|
||
of felony.
|
||
|
||
Here's a table to estimate your rewards (50% of the fines and forfeitures,
|
||
plus other rewards from USCS 3059 and 886.) To calculate your approximate
|
||
rewards, assume the fine is the minimum stated in the law: $750 for
|
||
marijuana use, to $100,000 for Class 1 drug violations.
|
||
|
||
Class 1 from $100,000 to $150,000
|
||
Class 2 from $50,000 to $100,000
|
||
Class 3 from $25,000 to 50,000
|
||
Class 4 from $10,000 to $25,000
|
||
Class 5 from $5,000 to $10,000
|
||
Class 6 from $750 to $2,000
|
||
|
||
(Remember, in most cases you can convert these fines to lawsuit awards.)
|
||
|
||
Abbreviated drug laws - penalties
|
||
|
||
Marijuana
|
||
Possession
|
||
less than 1# = class 6 felony
|
||
between 1# but less than 8 # = class 5 felony
|
||
more than 8# = class 4 felony.
|
||
|
||
Selling
|
||
less than 1# = class 4 felony
|
||
more than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
|
||
Growing
|
||
less than 1# = class 5 felony
|
||
more than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
|
||
Transporting
|
||
less than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
more than 1# = class 2 felony.
|
||
|
||
Minimum fine $750, maximum $150,000.
|
||
|
||
Prescription Drugs
|
||
|
||
Possession or use = class 1 misdemeanor - Fines: up to a maximum of $2,500
|
||
|
||
Sells or transports = class 6 felony - Fines: up to a maximum of $250,000
|
||
|
||
Dangerous Drugs - Cocaine, Heroin, etc.
|
||
|
||
Possess or use = class 4 felony
|
||
sell = class 3 felony
|
||
Possess equipment to manufacture = class 4 felony
|
||
Manufacture = class 3 felony
|
||
Administer drugs to others = class 2 felony
|
||
Obtain by fraudulent means = class 3 felony
|
||
transport for sale = class 2 felony
|
||
|
||
Drugs to Minors
|
||
|
||
No person shall employee any minor in any capacity involving any part of
|
||
the selling or distribution of drugs
|
||
|
||
Employ any minor = class 2 felony
|
||
sell or transfer to any minor = class 2 felony
|
||
|
||
Drugs on School Grounds
|
||
|
||
It is prohibited for any person to be present with one or more persons,
|
||
within 300 feet of a school;
|
||
|
||
to possess, use, or sell marijuana. = class 2 felony
|
||
to possess, use, or sell hard drugs = class 2 felony
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Conclusion: Anyone selling or dealing in illegal drugs would be prosecuted
|
||
under RICO laws. Drug users who don't sell it (and make a profit) wouldn't
|
||
come under RICO, but CrimeFighters would be eligible for basic felony
|
||
rewards under 3059 and 886, plus a CrimeFighter civil suit award.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter should negotiate for Federal rewards under 3059 and 886 for a
|
||
minimum reward of $500 + $500 for users, depending on the kind of drugs,
|
||
and $5,000 to $50,000 for dealers depending on the quantity and value of
|
||
drugs seized.
|
||
|
||
In addition, any cash found in the drug dealer's place of business would be
|
||
confiscated as drug proceeds, and the CrimeFighter could get half of the
|
||
amount -- often a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars!
|
||
|
||
If a CrimeFighter videotaped about a dozen or so buyer's license plates, he
|
||
or she could make about $600 per buyer (15 - 20 buyers?) or about $20,000
|
||
for one week's stake-out and movie-making effort, plus an extra reward of
|
||
$5,000 to $25,000 for the dealer. A full time Narc CrimeFighter, working
|
||
with the FBI, could make $200,000 a year. A hustler, like Michael Levine,
|
||
could make a million! After you read his books, I'm sure you'll agree.
|
||
|
||
Recommended reading for Narc CrimeFighters
|
||
|
||
Five pocket books: "Undercover," "Deep Cover," "Drug Agent U.S.A.,"
|
||
"Cocaine Wars," and "Rough Justice," Total is about $25. They're listed in
|
||
CRIMCAT. They're educational, and fascinating reading.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Polluter Tooters for Pollution Control
|
||
|
||
A recent TV program concerning hazardous waste mentioned that, in America
|
||
alone, one ton of hazardous waste is created per person per year -- or
|
||
about 260 millions tons per year!
|
||
|
||
Some of the tonnage includes pesticides, fungicides, and rodenticides used
|
||
by farmers, ranchers, and homeowners on crops or landscapes to kill
|
||
insects, molds, and other pests. Some are strong plant defoliants, such as
|
||
Agent Orange, used by individuals and others to kill roadside weeds and
|
||
unwanted vegetation.
|
||
|
||
Industrial wastes fall into a different category than wastes generated by
|
||
individuals. Most of industry's toxic wastes are by-products of chemical,
|
||
manufacturing, and processing plants. Companies that generate these highly
|
||
toxic wastes solve their problem by paying another company to haul it away
|
||
and "properly" dispose of it.
|
||
|
||
Tragically, proper disposal happens only occasionally; 90% of the time the
|
||
disposal company illegally dumps the waste and gets away with it! Most
|
||
companies who are involved know it. Paying someone else to haul the waste
|
||
away lets many well known corporations evade legal responsibility for it.
|
||
|
||
Illegally disposed waste often ends up in abandoned fields, leaky drums,
|
||
and pits where the toxins drain into underground water tables and wells.
|
||
When the waste is discovered, sometimes years later, it becomes someone
|
||
else's financial or medical problem. These illegal dump sites are prime
|
||
targets for CrimeFighters.
|
||
Laying Waste
|
||
|
||
The book "Laying Waste" is a frightening true story of the poisoning of
|
||
America by toxic chemicals and focuses on Love Canal in Niagara Falls, N.Y.
|
||
Michael Brown, the author, reveals similar episodes in almost every part of
|
||
the United States. This book will, or should, scare the hell out of you.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, "Laying Waste" is out of print but may be found in some
|
||
libraries (I found a copy in a used book store). Although Canada isn't
|
||
targeted in Brown's book, that country isn't immune from pollution, either!
|
||
|
||
America the Poisoned
|
||
|
||
"America the Poisoned," by Lewis Regenstein, details another aspect of
|
||
(legal) poisoning of the earth, water, air, and food we eat -- by
|
||
pesticides, rodenticides, and defoliants worse than Agent Orange! This
|
||
legalized poisoning covers millions of acres of national forests and
|
||
farmlands. This book is worth reading too, even though there are no rewards
|
||
paid because this pollution is legally sanctioned by the government!
|
||
|
||
The back cover of this book says:
|
||
|
||
"Today, on the twentieth anniversary of "Silent Spring," almost all of the
|
||
toxic chemicals that Rachel Carson warned us about are still in widespread
|
||
use. The few that have been restricted have often been replaced by equally
|
||
or more dangerous compounds. And a thousand new and largely untested
|
||
chemicals are introduced each year.
|
||
|
||
"America The Poisoned, written by respected environmentalist Lewis
|
||
Regenstein, is the shocking story of what the U.S. Environmental Protection
|
||
Agency has called the "most grievous error in judgment we as a nation have
|
||
ever made." It documents for the first time, how toxic substances are
|
||
literally killing and disabling millions of Americans as well as
|
||
contaminating our environment -- in some cases permanently.
|
||
|
||
"The results of our contact with cancer-causing chemicals are now apparent:
|
||
one out of every four Americans can expect to get cancer. This means that
|
||
of Americans now alive, over 56 million will contract the disease, which
|
||
kills over 1,000 of us every day. The chances of having cancer by the age
|
||
74 are almost one in three.
|
||
|
||
"America the Poisoned" reveals that by the time the government got around
|
||
to generally banning some of the most deadly chemicals and pesticides --
|
||
dieldrin, PCBs, BHC, and DDT -- these toxins were being found in the flesh
|
||
of 99% of all Americans tested, as well as in our food, air, and water.
|
||
They cause cancer, birth defects, and other disorders at extremely low
|
||
doses in laboratory animals, and are presumably capable of doing so in
|
||
humans as well. Mother's milk has become so contaminated with banned
|
||
chemicals that it would be illegal to sell it in supermarkets!
|
||
|
||
"The amount of toxic wastes produced in the United States each year amounts
|
||
to over 600 pounds for every man, woman, and child -- and only 10% of it is
|
||
properly disposed of. We are now sowing the seeds for future epidemics of
|
||
cancer, deformed children, and Love Canals." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
Poisoning for Profit
|
||
|
||
"Poisoning for Profit," by Alan Block and Frank Scarpitti, contains a few
|
||
excerpts from Michael Brown's book but concentrates on the increasingly
|
||
dangerous role of the Mafia in the waste industry.
|
||
|
||
The author concentrates of the prosecution of the mafia and the problems
|
||
encountered (and made) by prosecutors. It emphasizes the dangerous role of
|
||
undercover agents and the part they play. It also reveals their failure due
|
||
mainly to insidious graft and corruption of government officials, including
|
||
the EPA!
|
||
|
||
Many stories concern sloppy record keeping and casual control of evidence
|
||
by the EPA. This book reaffirms my contention that CrimeFighters need to
|
||
assume control of a case (via Qui Tam) or they will become as frustrated as
|
||
the police when a prosecutor loses evidence, fails to prosecute, or plain
|
||
refuses to prosecute.
|
||
|
||
If you plan on being an active "polluter tooter," collecting and revealing
|
||
evidence of pollution, be sure to read this book. It may scare you off, but
|
||
if it doesn't, at least you'll know what you're getting into. On the plus
|
||
side, million-dollar rewards are possible from nailing the Mafia and large
|
||
corporations that seemingly don't give a damn.
|
||
|
||
Excerpt from "Poisoning for Profit":
|
||
|
||
"The poisoning of America, by the illegal and indiscriminate disposal of
|
||
toxic and hazardous waste, is a problem of enormous magnitude. Industrial
|
||
poisons are seeping their way into the food chain and the drinking water
|
||
supply in ways that make it unlikely if not impossible to stop. Among the
|
||
many reasons why this is so is that organized crime is involved in the
|
||
illegal and dangerous disposal of the most deadly wastes known to humans.
|
||
|
||
"There is little doubt that part of the waste industry has been penetrated,
|
||
dominated, and controlled by organized crime. Our contention, however, is
|
||
that organized crime's waste racket is larger and more dangerous to the
|
||
public welfare than anyone has yet recognized. One of the differences
|
||
between the waste racket and other businesses run by organized crime is
|
||
that in matters of waste there are potentially vast numbers on unknowing
|
||
victims. Unlike gambling, for instance, the public has no choice of
|
||
participation. No one can simply decide not to be a victim of industrial
|
||
poisons that have been dumped in landfills, on highways, into sewers,
|
||
rivers, and streams by organized crime.
|
||
|
||
"Organized crime is not the only culprit involved in this extraordinarily
|
||
dangerous development. Responsibility for the situation also rests with
|
||
many of the generators of toxic and hazardous waste. Some of the largest
|
||
and most prestigious companies in the petro-chemical industry knowingly
|
||
deal with organized crime disposal firms because they provide a cheap way
|
||
of getting rid of their most harmful wastes. Government, too, has failed in
|
||
its protection of the public welfare. The laws passed to regulate the toxic
|
||
and hazardous waste disposal industry have enough loopholes in them to
|
||
allow the biggest tankers through. And if that isn't enough encouragement
|
||
for organized crime and its industrial partners, the almost total lack of
|
||
meaningful enforcement is." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
Key words in the above quote are some of the largest and most prestigious
|
||
companies... knowingly deal with organized crime ... and the almost total
|
||
lack of meaningful enforcement.
|
||
|
||
The problem is, there aren't enough EPA "cops" following tanker trucks when
|
||
they leave petro-chemical industrial sites, or checking on tankers when
|
||
they're dumping in (legal) landfills. The EPA and local police can't handle
|
||
it because of the sheer numbers of such trucks nationwide. It's up to
|
||
CrimeFighters to volunteer to be environmental cops - or polluter tooters!
|
||
|
||
Trucks hauling toxic and hazardous wastes are required to have signs on
|
||
them (skull and crossbones) indicating they are hauling toxic wastes. If
|
||
you see any on the road, tail them, find where they're going, and where
|
||
they dump their loads. Check at the dump site and take samples of the
|
||
material dumped. Have an independent lab test the material for toxic and
|
||
hazardous waste material. When you tell them it's a sample from a suspected
|
||
illegal toxic waste dumping, there may be no charge for the testing. Ask
|
||
first. Try to recruit a chemist as a polluter tooter buddy. Also, be sure
|
||
to use your camcorder to record the suspected criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
If they are illegally dumping toxic and hazardous wastes, use a camcorder
|
||
to get the evidence you need to nail both the "prestigious companies" and
|
||
the illegal waste disposal firms. If you have a cellular phone, call the
|
||
police to make an arrest. It's dirty and dangerous work, but odds are, the
|
||
fines and forfeitures will be in the multi-million dollar range. You can
|
||
get half, plus rewards!
|
||
|
||
Around 1980, the EPA had conservatively estimated more than 50,000
|
||
hazardous waste dumps. A recent (1990) TV documentary on pollution
|
||
mentioned 28,000 known and EPA registered hazardous waste dump sites. But
|
||
an estimated 425,000 similar, unregistered dumps are hidden from sight
|
||
throughout the United States. The majority of them are potential polluters
|
||
of the nation's drinking water.
|
||
|
||
EPA-registered sites are not necessarily "safe" just because they're known.
|
||
They need to be monitored to make sure the contents of toxic materials
|
||
doesn't enter an underground water table and well water.
|
||
|
||
It has taken nature thousands of years to build up water tables from which
|
||
we obtain well water for drinking. When a water table becomes poisoned it
|
||
takes ten times longer (if ever) to purify itself. There is no practical
|
||
method to undo water table pollution. Using water filters and even reverse
|
||
osmosis can't strain water-soluble chemicals. Distilling the water may be
|
||
the only solution, but that's not practical for the billions of people and
|
||
wild animals in the world.
|
||
|
||
Contaminated areas endanger human and animal populations similar to and to
|
||
the same extent as animals were endangered years ago by DDT poisoning, as
|
||
mentioned in Rachael Carson's best-selling book "Silent Spring."
|
||
|
||
Many illegal hazardous waste dump sites are located in wooded areas, out of
|
||
sight from the road. They usually contain a mixed bag of refuse, such as
|
||
wrecked and rusting vehicles, construction waste materials, and old tires.
|
||
Hidden in the garbage are dozens to hundreds of barrels of PCBs and other
|
||
dangerous chemicals. These unregistered, uncontrolled dump sites (close to
|
||
10,000 in each State) are ticking ecological time bombs -- rusting barrels
|
||
about to leak or break and spill their poisonous contents on the ground.
|
||
Then cancer-causing contents will wind up in the underground water
|
||
reservoirs used by thousands of communities and millions of people.
|
||
|
||
You can obtain a list of registered dump sites from the EPA in your State,
|
||
or from Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes (CCHW), a center for
|
||
Environmental Justice. Ask them for a listing of Toxic Waste Sites for your
|
||
State. Each list costs $2.50 from CCHW. They have dozens of other related
|
||
publications for educational purposes; ask for their catalog. The address
|
||
is: P.O. Box 926, Arlington, VA 22216. (703) 276-7070.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Here's a few quotes from "Laying Waste" that mention illegal, toxic waste
|
||
dumps, which is what this chapter is mainly concerned with - illegal dump
|
||
sites, and how they're spawned.
|
||
|
||
"A common practice for disposers, especially small ones, is to collect
|
||
enough drums to fill several acres of a lot, charge industries for non-
|
||
existent waste treatment, and then simply abandon the leach beds and
|
||
deteriorating drums for the taxpayer to contend with. There are enough of
|
||
these cases to fill a huge book. A company ironically called Pollution
|
||
Abatement Services of Oswego, New York, left about 8,000 drums in one
|
||
parcel and hundreds of others at several other disposal sites; no one is
|
||
quite sure what is in all of them. The firm was founded by several
|
||
professionals in Oswego who, after deciding that they could not operate
|
||
properly and profitably at the same time, declared the firm "hopelessly
|
||
insolvent" and simply left the toxicants near the shores of Lake Ontario,
|
||
where the nauseating fumes permeate the immediate vicinity.
|
||
|
||
"One such toxic waste dump site operator was interviewed by ABC Television
|
||
network and was quoted as saying "the economics behind it is if you don't
|
||
have to treat it, there's no cost except for transport." In this manner, it
|
||
was suggested, a hauler could purchase a truck, charge up to $30 a barrel
|
||
for disposal of each drum, fill the trailer with the drums of toxic waste
|
||
material, and simply abandon the vehicle at the side of the road, escaping
|
||
with the profits. William Carracino of New Jersey, the acknowledged
|
||
polluter in the TV interview further suggested another alternative: "You
|
||
can go out and rent a piece of property - rent it, don't buy it. Rent ten
|
||
acres, twenty acres, get a permit to handle drums. Bring it on the property
|
||
and just store them. As soon as the heat gets too great, just go bankrupt,
|
||
get out of it.
|
||
|
||
"The awesome difficulty of controlling pollutants is implied in the sheer
|
||
tonnage of chemical production. Whereas 25 million gallons of the solvent
|
||
benzene were manufactured in 1940, by the early 1980's the figure will
|
||
approach 2 billion gallons in the United States alone. In the last fifteen
|
||
years the production of organic solvents rose more than 700 percent, while
|
||
during the same period plastics shot up 2,000 percent and synthetic fibers
|
||
more than double that figure.
|
||
|
||
"As important as the specific actions of chemical agents are the sheer
|
||
volume and variety of their wastes. During the period from 1943 to 1968,
|
||
United States consumption of selected toxic materials increased by 43
|
||
percent. Production of synthetic organic chemicals has grown at a yearly
|
||
rate of more than 10 percent per year since 1954 in the form of such
|
||
materials as dyes, pigments, and the biocides. Meanwhile, each year
|
||
approximately 1,000 new chemicals are added to the 70,000 already in
|
||
existence, often more sophisticated than their predecessors and even more
|
||
alien to the human system.
|
||
|
||
"It can be roughly estimated that during the past several years, upwards of
|
||
35 million tons, or 70 billion pounds, of hazardous waste have been
|
||
generated per year, far in excess of the ten million tons produced in 1970.
|
||
And the trend is expected to maintain this same rate of increase at least
|
||
until 1984, when more than 400 million tons of hazardous waste and semi-
|
||
hazardous waste or innocuous industrial waste - more than twice the
|
||
combined amount of municipal garbage and sewage - will be piling into the
|
||
environment each year." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
The above paragraphs were taken from a few pages of the 335 pages in
|
||
"Laying Waste," which describes in grisly detail hundreds of even more
|
||
terrifying examples of the extent of human suffering and land devastation
|
||
that illegal dumping (abandonment) of toxic wastes has caused -- and the
|
||
book was written in 1952!
|
||
|
||
Current tonnage of toxic waste is anyone's guess because only legal dumping
|
||
is reported; Michael Brown estimated about 400 million tons by 1984. I'd
|
||
estimate close to 800 million tons (legal and illegal) by 1993, and it's
|
||
growing by leaps and bounds each year. The amount dumped illegally and
|
||
unknown to the government is probably close to 400 million tons per year.
|
||
|
||
Waste disposal is proliferating, but the EPA doesn't have the resources to
|
||
monitor all of it. Illegal dump sites are not a thing of the past. There
|
||
are probably ten times more illegal dump sites now than there were in 1980,
|
||
and ten times the horror stories. They'll be told when the toxic dumps are
|
||
found. We hope they'll be found before they've poisoned the water in rivers
|
||
that provide drinking water to millions of people.
|
||
|
||
Incidentally, another book "Nor Any Drop To Drink," by William Ashworth and
|
||
published by Summit Books, tells about our dwindling supply of drinking
|
||
water. The back cover of his book is worth quoting:
|
||
|
||
Not a Drop to Drink
|
||
|
||
"We are so used to turning on the tap and having fresh pure water instantly
|
||
available that it is difficult to imagine that it won't always be there.
|
||
But the way we handle our water is nothing short of disastrous.
|
||
|
||
The Great Plains groundwater supplies, which sustain a large part of our
|
||
agriculture, will be exhausted by the year 2000.
|
||
|
||
Orlando, Florida, is caving in on itself and Houston is sinking into the
|
||
sea because they have overdrawn their underground resources.
|
||
|
||
The main underground reservoir for Long Island has become an industrial
|
||
sewer.
|
||
|
||
The Colorado River is turning to salt.
|
||
|
||
None of these problems were naturally inevitable. They, and many more like
|
||
them, are all man-made." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Comment: Most of the main rivers and watersheds are also becoming polluted
|
||
to the point they'll soon be unsafe to drink. And, if the toxic chemicals
|
||
are water soluble, as many of them are, filtering polluted water through
|
||
sand and gravel, or even reverse osmosis won't make it safe for drinking.
|
||
What will we do then?
|
||
|
||
Our wells and aquifers are running dry, and other fresh water resources are
|
||
in danger of irreversible pollution. We can't stop drinking water, but we
|
||
can help to stop the pollution by enlisting the aid of a few thousand
|
||
Polluter Tooters.
|
||
|
||
That's your assignment, if you care enough to accept it.
|
||
|
||
Piercing the Corporate Veil
|
||
|
||
Mentioned above is the possibility of plain and simple abandonment of toxic
|
||
wastes by an individual or a corporation. That doesn't let them off the
|
||
hook. When a corporation does it, directors and officers of the corporation
|
||
can be held personally responsible when there is evidence of criminal
|
||
intent (knowingly and willfully, or aiding and abetting criminal activity)
|
||
or evidence of indifference to prevent illegal activity (criminal
|
||
negligence). Saying "I didn't know about it", is usually not satisfactory.
|
||
The civil suit charge of "negligent entrustment" may be applicable.
|
||
|
||
Directors and officers are supposed to know about corporate activity and
|
||
control the actions of employees. When they don't, and laws are broken for
|
||
corporate profit, officers and directors can also be charged. In legal
|
||
circles this is known as "piercing the corporate veil."
|
||
|
||
If the corporation makes a profit from illegal activity, the profit can
|
||
usually be traced via an audit trail. If the audit trail is incomplete, the
|
||
IRS may decide to lay charges of tax evasion as well. All illegal profits
|
||
might be forfeited directly as fruits of criminal activity, or indirectly
|
||
by fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
This is where a "skip tracer" comes in. A good one knows how to use
|
||
computers to search corporate records to find the owners of corporations,
|
||
locate their bank accounts, and find hidden assets.
|
||
|
||
In most cases of illegal pollution, profits from the illegal activity are
|
||
usually not declared and taxes are not paid. If the CrimeFighter can prove
|
||
it, he should consider asking laying charges of tax evasion.
|
||
|
||
In civil suits, a freeze on assets can be immediate -- to safeguard the
|
||
assets in the suit. In most cases, illegal profits are invested in a
|
||
legitimate business. The legal investments become "the fruits of criminal
|
||
activity." Use RICO and Qui Tam to take their businesses away from them.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Examples of Pollution
|
||
|
||
Three cities in Indiana were fined $20 million for polluting the Allegheny
|
||
River after repeated warnings to cease and desist. The EPA finally hauled
|
||
them into court, and the court levied an appropriate fine in proportion to
|
||
the amount and extent of the pollution as a warning to others.
|
||
|
||
During the same month, a chemical manufacturer, who allowed leaking drums
|
||
of toxic chemicals to spill their contents into the ground and pollute the
|
||
ground water, was fined $3.2 million.
|
||
|
||
These two incidents were reported in the New York Times and were found on
|
||
microfiche in a public library. During the last ten years, many other
|
||
pollution incidents have resulted in huge fines being levied by the courts.
|
||
|
||
A fairly recent one, on June 1, 1990, was reported in the Register-Guard
|
||
(Eugene,Oregon). The headline read, "Company accused of illegal dumping".
|
||
|
||
An excerpt from that story:
|
||
|
||
"A defunct petroleum company was charged Thursday with illegally burning,
|
||
dumping and storing hazardous waste, including surplus napalm bombs.
|
||
Prosecutors alleged that a puddle of waste from the company was so toxic it
|
||
melted the shoe soles of a passing jogger." (This "waste disposal" plant
|
||
operated about three miles from downtown Salt Lake City.)
|
||
|
||
"A 12-count indictment alleges that Steven Self of Fallbrook, Calif., and
|
||
his defunct Ekotek Inc. of knowingly ignoring federal environmental laws.
|
||
The indictment alleges Ekotek "duped environmentally conscious businesses
|
||
into believing that waste materials were being properly disposed of."
|
||
Company vice president Steven Miller pleaded guilty Wednesday to three
|
||
felony charges of conspiracy and violations of federal environmental laws.
|
||
|
||
"Ekotek -- which was in the business of recycling or destroying waste oil
|
||
products -- discharged into the public sewer system approximately 10,000
|
||
gallons of (toxic) waste water per day, the indictment said.
|
||
|
||
"Miller, who agreed to testify against Self and cooperate with cleanup
|
||
officials in exchange for his plea (bargaining), faces up to 13 years in
|
||
prison and a fine of up to $750,000.
|
||
|
||
"If convicted on all charges, Self and the company (Ekotek) may be fined up
|
||
to $24 million and Self would face a prison term of up to 45 years."
|
||
|
||
Air Pollution
|
||
|
||
Another book, by Michael Brown, "The Toxic Cloud" ($9.95), tells about the
|
||
poisoning of America's air. It's another bombshell disclosure about
|
||
corporations and others, who pollute the air with extremely dangerous
|
||
chemical fumes, toxic smoke from burning hazardous waste, industrial trash,
|
||
and all kinds of plastics, which create highly toxic clouds of poisonous
|
||
vapors -- many unseen -- wafting across the nation and breathed by
|
||
everyone.
|
||
|
||
AIDS pales in comparison to the poisoning of America's air and water which,
|
||
in the long run, may kill or seriously impair the health of everyone.
|
||
|
||
Here's what the back cover of "The Toxic Cloud," says:
|
||
|
||
"Something in the air is wearing away the tombstones of Jacksonville,
|
||
Arkansas. It's caused a rash of leukemia deaths in Port Neches, Texas, and
|
||
dime-sized holes between the nostrils of workers in Newark, N.J. In rural
|
||
Michigan, geese are born with their wings on backwards; in Casmalia,
|
||
California, a man explodes from pulmonary swelling; in Tennessee,the Blue
|
||
Ridge Mountains are turning dark brown.
|
||
|
||
" Respiratory disease is the most rapidly increasing form of death in the
|
||
United States. Yet Industrial leaks, accidents, and completely unregulated
|
||
emissions throw billions of pounds of gases, particles, and vapors into the
|
||
air we breathe. Some of these toxins are like World War II nerve gas; some
|
||
are what caused the tragedy of Bhopal; some are dioxins; and some we know
|
||
nothing about." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
Comment: The tonnage of pollutants quoted above vary in number by each
|
||
author mainly because they were taken at different years. I've quoted them
|
||
correctly (for those different time periods). However, their figures need
|
||
to be increased proportionately for the passage of time, the increased
|
||
proliferation of toxic chemicals, and the increase in legal and illegal
|
||
dumping and spraying.
|
||
Incentives
|
||
|
||
Everyone is adversely affected by pollution -- especially toxic pollution
|
||
of land, water and air. I agree with politicians who say that helping to
|
||
prosecute pollution violators is reward in itself. However, being a
|
||
Polluter Tooter can be an very hazardous job. You should be paid, too.
|
||
|
||
Protective clothing is essential when you approach a suspected polluted
|
||
area. Rubber gloves and boots, and even a gas mask, are recommended. A
|
||
bullet-proof vest might also be part of your gear. "Poisoning for Profit"
|
||
explains Organized Crime's heavy infiltration in this illegal but very
|
||
lucrative activity. Because of the danger, Polluter Tooters should be
|
||
compensated by substantial monetary rewards.
|
||
|
||
Fortunately, a couple of current laws provide appropriate and substantial
|
||
rewards plus 50% of the fines and forfeitures!
|
||
|
||
Environmental Laws
|
||
|
||
Title 33 - Navigation and Navigable Waters
|
||
33 USCS 407
|
||
|
||
Deposit of Refuse in Navigable Water Generally
|
||
|
||
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer,
|
||
or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any
|
||
ship, barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
|
||
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any
|
||
kind or description whatsoever other than that flowing from streets and
|
||
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of
|
||
the United States, or into the tributary of any navigable water from which
|
||
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be
|
||
lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of
|
||
any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of
|
||
any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be
|
||
washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by
|
||
storms or floods, or otherwise whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
|
||
or obstructed...."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: the remainder of this section makes exceptions for the lawful
|
||
construction of, and improvements to, bridges, wharfs, or projects that are
|
||
authorized by the government.
|
||
|
||
The term "navigable waters" includes any flowing stream that has water deep
|
||
enough to float a boat or log at high tide. The term "refuse" has been
|
||
broadly defined by the Supreme Court to include all foreign substances and
|
||
pollutants, including solids of all kinds, oils, chemicals, and any other
|
||
liquid pollutants. The only materials excepted are runoffs from sewers in
|
||
liquid form.
|
||
|
||
Manufacturing plants, pulp mills, and similar industrial firms are
|
||
conveniently located on rivers and waterways for both fresh water intake
|
||
and to discharge their (polluted) wastewater and other matter. The latter
|
||
is usually illegal unless the company has a permit form the Corps of
|
||
Engineers and is monitored by them. Companies know the Corps would not give
|
||
them a permit to discharge hazardous wastes, and hauling their many tons of
|
||
toxic waste is very expensive. They are tempted to illegally discharge it
|
||
in nearby rivers and streams. They're the ones to watch for late night
|
||
discharges from pipes, truck tankers, and drums.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
33 USCS Section 411
|
||
|
||
Reward for Information Leading to the Arrest of Anyone who Violates the
|
||
Refuse Act and Resultant Pollution of Navigable Waters.
|
||
|
||
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
|
||
knowingly aid, abet, authorize or instigate a violation of the provisions
|
||
of sections thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen of this Act (33 USCS sec 407,
|
||
408, 409) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall
|
||
be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by
|
||
imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty
|
||
days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
|
||
discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the person or
|
||
persons giving information which shall lead to conviction."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters will seldom chance upon a one-time violator. Repetitive
|
||
violators are the ones most likely to be found. A fine of up to $2,500 to
|
||
$25,000 per day, for each violation, can become hundreds of thousands of
|
||
dollars. Fines range into millions of dollars for corporate or municipal
|
||
violators.
|
||
|
||
The phrase "in the discretion of the court" applies to the size of the
|
||
fine, not how much will be paid to the CrimeFighter. CrimeFighters get paid
|
||
50% of the fines and forfeitures!
|
||
|
||
The 1972 Water Pollution Control Act amendments provide more stringent
|
||
federal standards for toxic discharges, a heavier fine from $2,500 up to
|
||
$25,000 PER DAY for first offense and up to $50,000 a day for subsequent
|
||
convictions. The 1972 amendments includes a specific provision by which
|
||
citizens can initiate lawsuits to enforce standards (under Qui tam law).
|
||
|
||
In addition, the court may authorize forfeiture of vehicles and related
|
||
equipment when they're actually used in the violation.
|
||
|
||
A more recent law, known as the "Comprehensive Environmental Response,
|
||
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980," is referred to as Title 42, USCS
|
||
9601 et sequence. This one, more or less replaces the "1899 Refuse Act"
|
||
(Title 33 USCS 407). But, since both are still on the books, either one
|
||
may be used, whichever is the most "rewarding" to the Crimefighter.
|
||
|
||
The 1899 Refuse Act provides the maximum reward percentage of 50%, but not
|
||
necessarily the largest reward. If violations have occurred repeatedly
|
||
over a long period, the $2,500 to $25,000 per day accumulated fines may be
|
||
a considerable amount. Both laws should be analyzed to determine which one
|
||
provides the maximum financial penalty and reward.
|
||
|
||
Title 42 USCS 9602
|
||
|
||
USCS 9602 is rather long. I'll omit some of the sections and paragraphs for
|
||
the sake of brevity, but will include those I believe are relevant to a
|
||
CrimeFighter.
|
||
|
||
"USCS 9602 - Designation of Additional Hazardous Substances and
|
||
Establishment of Reportable Released Quantities; Regulations
|
||
|
||
(a) The Administrator (E.P.A.) shall promulgate and revise as may be
|
||
appropriate, regulations designating as hazardous substances, in addition
|
||
to those referred to in section 101(14) of this title [42 USCS 9601(14)],
|
||
such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when
|
||
released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public
|
||
health or welfare or the environment, and shall promulgate regulations
|
||
establishing that quantity of any hazardous substance the release of which
|
||
shall be reported pursuant to section 103 of this title [42 USCS 9603]. The
|
||
Administrator may determine that one single quantity [one pound] shall be
|
||
the reportable quantity for any hazardous substance, regardless of the
|
||
medium into which the hazardous substance is released. For all hazardous
|
||
substances for which proposed regulations establishing reportable
|
||
quantities were published in the Federal Register under this subsection on
|
||
or before March 1, 1986, the Administrator shall promulgate under this
|
||
subsection final regulations establishing reportable quantities not later
|
||
than December 31, 1986. For all hazardous substances for which proposed
|
||
regulations establishing reportable quantities were not published in the
|
||
Federal Register under this subsection on or before march 1, 1986, the
|
||
Administrator shall publish under this subsection proposed regulations not
|
||
later than December 31, 1986, and promulgate final regulations not later
|
||
than April 30, 1988.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: That means, in effect, any toxic (hazardous) material released in
|
||
any way into the environment, whether in the air, on the land, or in the
|
||
water, directly or indirectly, must be reported by the person disposing of
|
||
such hazardous waste and if such is not reported and regulated (under
|
||
stringent conditions), is illegal and punishable by law (Title 42, Public
|
||
Health and Welfare, USCS 9609). This law is applicable to illegal dump
|
||
sites.
|
||
|
||
42 USCS 9603 - 9608 are exceptionally long and deal with directions to the
|
||
EPA to establish regulations, reporting and bookkeeping requirements for
|
||
companies, and so on. If you want to be a serious Polluter Tooter, go to
|
||
your library and make photocopies of the entire text which takes about ten
|
||
pages of copy. I'll skip those in this book to get to the penalties and
|
||
reward section.
|
||
|
||
(Where the law says "the President", it doesn't really mean the President
|
||
himself. It means the U.S. Attorney, or the local Assistant U.S. Attorney,
|
||
or in the event you are eligible via Qui Tam law, and want to assert your
|
||
right to be the prosecutor, it means YOU!)
|
||
|
||
42 USCS 9609 Civil Penalties and Awards
|
||
|
||
(a) Class I administrative penalty. (1) Violations. A civil penalty of not
|
||
more than $25,000 per violation may be assessed by the President in the
|
||
case of any of the following-
|
||
|
||
(A) A violation of the requirements of section 103(a) or (b) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to notice).
|
||
|
||
(B) A violation of the requirements of section 103 (d)(2) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to destruction of records, etc.).
|
||
|
||
(C) A violation of the requirements under section 108 [42 USCS 9608]
|
||
(relating to financial responsibility, etc., the regulations issued under
|
||
108, or with any denial or detention order under section 108.
|
||
|
||
(D) A violation of an order under section 122(d)(3) [42 USCS 9622]
|
||
(relating to settlement agreements for action under section 104(b).
|
||
|
||
(E) Any failure or refusal referred to in section 122(l) [42 USCS 9622(l)]
|
||
(relating to violations administrative orders, consent decrees, or
|
||
agreements under section 120 [42 USCS 9620]
|
||
|
||
(2) Notice and hearings. No civil penalty may be assessed under this
|
||
subsection unless the person accused of the violation is given notice and
|
||
opportunity for a hearing with respect to the violation.
|
||
|
||
(3) Determining amount. In determining the amount of any penalty assessed
|
||
pursuant to this subsection, the President shall take into account the
|
||
nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation or violations
|
||
and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of
|
||
such violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings (if
|
||
any) resulting from the violation, and such other matters as justice may
|
||
require.
|
||
|
||
(4) Review. Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed under this
|
||
subsection may obtain review thereof in the appropriate district court of
|
||
the United States by filing a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days
|
||
from the date of such order and by simultaneously sending a copy of such
|
||
notice by certified mail to the President. The President shall promptly
|
||
file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which such violation
|
||
was found or such penalty imposed. If any person fails to pay an assessment
|
||
of a civil penalty after it has become final an unappealable order or after
|
||
the appropriate court has entered final judgment in favor of the United
|
||
States, the President may request the Attorney General of the United States
|
||
to initiate a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United
|
||
States to collect the penalty, and such court shall have jurisdiction to
|
||
hear and decide any such action. In hearing such action, the court shall
|
||
have authority to review the violation and the assessment of the civil
|
||
penalty on the record.
|
||
|
||
(5) Subpoenas. The President may issue subpoenas for the attendance and
|
||
testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books, or
|
||
documents in connection with hearings under this subsection. In case of
|
||
contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to this paragraph
|
||
and served upon any person, the district court of the United States for any
|
||
district in which such person is found, resides, or transacts business,
|
||
upon application by the United States and after notice to such person,
|
||
shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear
|
||
and give testimony before the administrative law judge or to appear and
|
||
produce documents before the administrative law judge, or both, and any
|
||
failure to obey such order of the court may be punishable by such court as
|
||
a contempt thereof.
|
||
|
||
(b) Class II Administrative penalty. A civil penalty of not more than
|
||
$25,000 per day for each day during which the violation continues may be
|
||
assessed by the President in the case of any of the following -
|
||
|
||
(1) A violation of the requirements of section 103(a) or (b) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to notice).
|
||
|
||
(2) A violation of the requirements of section 103 (d)(2) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to destruction of records, etc.).
|
||
|
||
A violation of the requirements under section 108 [42 USCS 9608] (relating
|
||
to financial responsibility, etc., the regulations issued under 108, or
|
||
with any denial or detention order under section 108.
|
||
|
||
(4) A violation of an order under section 122(d)(3) [42 USCS 9622]
|
||
(relating to settlement agreements for action under section 104(b).
|
||
|
||
(5) Any failure or refusal referred to in section 122(l) [42 USCS 9622(l)]
|
||
(relating to violations administrative orders, consent decrees, or
|
||
agreements under section 120 [42 USCS9620]
|
||
|
||
In the case of a second or subsequent violation the amount of such penalty
|
||
may not be more than $75,000 for each day during which the violation
|
||
continues. Any civil penalty under this subsection shall be assessed and
|
||
collected in the same manner, and subject to the same provisions, as in the
|
||
case of civil penalties assessed and collected after notice and opportunity
|
||
for hearing on the record in accordance with section 554 of title 5 of the
|
||
United States Code. In any proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty
|
||
under this subsection the President may issue subpoenas for the attendance
|
||
and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books and
|
||
documents and may promulgate rules for discovery procedures. Any person who
|
||
requested a hearing with respect to a civil penalty under this subsection
|
||
and who is aggrieved by an order assessing the civil penalty may file a
|
||
petition for judicial review of such order with the United States Court of
|
||
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or for any other circuit in
|
||
which such person resides or transacts business. Such a petition may only
|
||
be filed within a 30-day period beginning on the date the order making such
|
||
an assessment was issued.
|
||
|
||
(c) Judicial assessment. The President may bring an action in the United
|
||
States district court for the appropriate district to assess and collect a
|
||
penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for each day during which the
|
||
violation (or failure or refusal) continues in the case of any of the
|
||
following -
|
||
|
||
(1) A violation of the requirements of section 103(a) or (b) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to notice).
|
||
|
||
(2) A violation of the requirements of section 103 (d)(2) [42 USCS 9603]
|
||
(relating to destruction of records, etc.).
|
||
|
||
(3) A violation of the requirements under section 108 [42 USCS 9608]
|
||
(relating to financial responsibility, etc., the regulations issued under
|
||
108, or with any denial or detention order under section 108.
|
||
|
||
(4) A violation of an order under section 122(d)(3) [42 USCS 9622]
|
||
(relating to settlement agreements for action under section 104(b).
|
||
|
||
(5) Any failure or refusal referred to in section 122(l) [42 USCS 9622(l)]
|
||
(relating to violations administrative orders, consent decrees, or
|
||
agreements under section 120 [42 USCS9620]
|
||
|
||
(d) Awards. The President may pay an award of up to $10,000 to any
|
||
individual who provides information leading to the arrest and conviction of
|
||
any person for a violation subject to a criminal penalty under this Act,
|
||
including any violation of section 103 [42 USCS 9603]and any other
|
||
violation referred to in this section. The President shall, by regulation,
|
||
prescribe criteria for such an award and may pay any award under this
|
||
subsection from the Fund, as provided in section 111 [42 USCS 9611].
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: The maximum reward of $10,000 is relatively small when compared to
|
||
other laws that pay 50% of all fines and forfeitures. Depending on the
|
||
circumstances, RICO may apply. If RICO can be used, it may provide a larger
|
||
reward via 50% of fines and forfeitures. Also negotiate a $25,000 reward
|
||
under the catch-all reward law 18 USCS 3059.
|
||
|
||
Remember, as prosecutor, you determine which laws you want to use. If any
|
||
agency wants to do the prosecution, you should negotiate to get the same
|
||
reward if you prosecuted the case yourself.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Here's another law that pertains to solid wastes.
|
||
|
||
Title 42 USCS 6901 et seq. is a specific law to control solid wastes, and
|
||
in particular, is relevant to illegal and unregulated dump sites for
|
||
hazardous wastes.
|
||
|
||
42 USCS 6901 is also very lengthy. I'll try to condense the two or three
|
||
pages of the usual preamble, and administrators duties and other lengthy
|
||
wording to just a couple of short chapters -- in my own words.
|
||
|
||
|
||
6928(c) Federal enforcement, deals with penalties for violations.
|
||
|
||
6928 Violation of compliance orders. Violators are warned to comply with
|
||
EPA's rules, regulations and standards. If they don't, they may be fined a
|
||
civil penalty of $25,000 for each day of continued non-compliance.
|
||
|
||
6928(d) Criminal penalties. Any person who knowingly transports, treats or
|
||
disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter
|
||
to a facility which does not have a permit, or omits information, or lies
|
||
about it to cover it up, or does anything that is intended to violate this
|
||
law, can be fined up to $50,000 for each day of violation or imprisonment
|
||
not to exceed two years, or five years if knowingly and willfully trans-
|
||
ports, treats and stores hazardous wastes in violation of this section.
|
||
|
||
In addition, if the violator knows at the time of the violation he places
|
||
any other person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, he
|
||
can be fined up to $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years,
|
||
or both. A violator who is an organization shall be fined not more than
|
||
$1,000,000.
|
||
|
||
(g) Civil penalty. May be fined $25,000 for each violation. Each day of
|
||
such violation shall be considered as a separate violation.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: Unfortunately, lawmakers have overlooked the usual reward for
|
||
information leading to the arrest and conviction for this law [42 USCS 6901
|
||
et seq.], which is the heart and guts of serious pollution control of
|
||
illegal dump sites. However, unless the law forbids rewards, assume they
|
||
are available and negotiable. Where a law is weak or fails to provide a
|
||
reward, use RICO and other laws that pay more generous rewards.
|
||
|
||
33 USCS 1319, a law on enforcement of pollution standards (mentioned
|
||
below), provides for civil action related fines. It doesn't provide a
|
||
reward to be paid for information leading to the conviction of violators.
|
||
If there's no felony charges, there is no possible reward available under
|
||
USCS 3059. In this situation, use civil suits to maximize your rewards via
|
||
out-of-court settlements of a Crimefighters' civil suit.
|
||
|
||
Each State has similar criminal and anti-pollution laws, that may be used
|
||
instead of Federal laws, providing they are at least as strict as Federal
|
||
laws and pay generous rewards.
|
||
|
||
If the violator is in the business of handling and disposing of toxic
|
||
wastes for large corporations as an example, RICO can be used. RICO may
|
||
also apply to the toxic waste corporations if it can be proved they were
|
||
negligent in ensuring proper disposal ("negligent entrustment").
|
||
|
||
Be sure to talk to a lawyer before deciding on which law to use to maximize
|
||
your rewards. There are many to choose from, but not all are equal.
|
||
|
||
Title 33 USCS 1315 et seq. provides National standards of performance
|
||
(guidelines) for toxic wastes and pollution controls. The information in
|
||
these sections are important to Polluter Tooters who want to zero in on
|
||
this aspect of criminal activity. It's too lengthy to include here. This
|
||
book is mainly concerned with laws that provide rewards to citizens to help
|
||
law enforcement. (Visit a library and make photocopies of pages you want.)
|
||
|
||
USCS 1316 contains a shopping list of possible pollution sources that may
|
||
provide you with more specific direction. If any are in your neighborhood,
|
||
check them out for possible pollution violations:
|
||
|
||
Pulp and paper mills; paperboard, builders paper and board mills; meat
|
||
product and rendering processing; dairy product processing; grain mills;
|
||
canned and preserved fruit and vegetable processing; canned and preserved
|
||
seafood processing; sugar processing; textile mills; cement manufacturing;
|
||
feedlots; electroplating; organic chemicals manufacturing; inorganic
|
||
chemicals manufacturing; plastic and synthetic materials manufacturing;
|
||
soap and detergent manufacturing; fertilizer manufacturing; petroleum
|
||
refining; iron and steel manufacturing; nonferrous metals processing;
|
||
ferroalloy manufacturing; phosphate manufacturing; steam electric power
|
||
plants; leather tanning and finishing; glass and asbestos manufacturing;
|
||
rubber processing; and timber products processing.
|
||
|
||
Recommended Reading
|
||
|
||
Try to obtain Michael Brown's books," Laying Waste," and "The Toxic Cloud"
|
||
for facts and figures, names of companies, cities and towns with severe
|
||
pollution. Both are out of print. Look for them in used book stores. They
|
||
may be found in public libraries.
|
||
|
||
If you're interested in learning about water pollution, and want to know
|
||
more about it, write to Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, Inc.,
|
||
P.O. Box 926, Arlington, VA 22216. Ask for their catalog.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Terrorists, Police Corruption, and Assassination
|
||
|
||
Terrorist activity isn't confined to the Middle East or Ireland.
|
||
|
||
There always has been, and probably will always be radical groups in a free
|
||
society. In America, our freedom of speech tolerates radical groups --
|
||
especially when they are based on religion. Radical groups too often use
|
||
violence or threats of violence to get their way. When they are ignored, it
|
||
usually leads to death threats, bombings and other means of deadly
|
||
violence. When that happens, they are terrorists by legal definition.
|
||
|
||
Sometimes it starts out as just another way to make a living, by collecting
|
||
donations from members and financial supporters. But leaders of such groups
|
||
are on an ego trip. They enjoy the power over their followers. They impose
|
||
strict rules on followers and harsh punishment when they break the rules.
|
||
Eventually, it gets out of control. To remain a leader, the self-appointed
|
||
person must eventually practice what he's been preaching -- physical
|
||
violence. If he doesn't, a more aggressive member will take over and lead
|
||
the group to it's final conclusion -- deadly violence!
|
||
|
||
Recent escalation of Anti-abortionists' activities include fire bombing,
|
||
nauseous chemical spraying of clinics, and finally, the murder of a medical
|
||
doctor. Anti-abortionists who use violence or threats of violence to force
|
||
their viewpoints on the public (and clerics who publicly support and
|
||
encourage them) are terrorists by definition. They should be prosecuted as
|
||
terrorists, and pay the price for terrorizing innocent people who don't
|
||
agree with their religious or political beliefs.
|
||
|
||
When a "priest" uses his official position or the pulpit to encourage or
|
||
support terrorist acts, the church itself, or any building where church
|
||
services are performed, should be forfeited as the "vehicle" instrumental
|
||
and related to proven terrorist acts!
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Another example: "60 minutes" devoted a segment of their program on Dec. 9,
|
||
1990 to an activist group in Milwaukee called the Black Panthers. Their
|
||
leader, Mike McGee, an alderman of the city, was shown wearing a khaki
|
||
uniform similar to Fidel Castro's. The theatrical effect showed the
|
||
militant posture of his group -- presumably as a revolutionary leader.
|
||
|
||
He was openly preaching that violence is the only way to get "proper"
|
||
attention to make economic reforms for the black community. Unless their
|
||
(vague) demands for a better life are met by 1995, he promised violence in
|
||
the streets.
|
||
|
||
When I read the following definition of Acts of terrorism, I believe
|
||
that Mike McGee and many others like him are simply terrorists. Many
|
||
radicals use violence as a means of drawing attention to their groups.
|
||
Their main goal in life (it seems) is to be constantly embroiled in a
|
||
conspiracy to threaten, or actually commit, terrorist acts!
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters should look for such groups. Join them as undercover agents
|
||
to get the required evidence for prosecution as terrorists. There are large
|
||
rewards from $100,000 to $500,000 to pay for your time and personal risk.
|
||
Terrorists are dangerous. Religious terrorists are the deadliest because
|
||
members often feel they are martyrs to the cause and "expendable", and
|
||
blessed, when they Kill in the name of their God!
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
18: USCS 3071 through 3074
|
||
Reward for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts
|
||
|
||
3071. Information for which rewards authorized
|
||
|
||
With respect to acts of terrorism primarily within the territorial
|
||
jurisdiction of the United States, the Attorney General may reward any
|
||
individual who furnishes information - -
|
||
|
||
(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any individual
|
||
or individuals for the commission of an act of terrorism against a United
|
||
States person or United States property; or
|
||
|
||
(2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any individual
|
||
or individuals for conspiring or attempting to commit an act of terrorism
|
||
against a United States person or property: or
|
||
|
||
(3) leading to the prevention, frustration, or unfavorable resolution of an
|
||
act of terrorism against a United States person or property.
|
||
|
||
3072. Determination of Entitlement; maximum amount; Presidential approval;
|
||
conclusiveness.
|
||
|
||
The Attorney General shall determine whether an individual furnishing
|
||
information described in section 3071 is entitles to a reward and the
|
||
amount to be paid. A reward under this section may be in an amount not to
|
||
exceed $500,000. A reward of $100,000 or more may not be made without the
|
||
approval of the President or the Attorney General personally. A
|
||
determination made by the Attorney General or the President under this
|
||
chapter (204) shall be final and conclusive, and no court shall have power
|
||
or jurisdiction to review it.
|
||
|
||
3073. Protection of identity
|
||
|
||
Any reward granted under this chapter shall be certified for payment by the
|
||
Attorney General. If it is determined that the identity of the recipient of
|
||
a reward or of the members of the recipient's immediate family must be
|
||
protected, the Attorney General may take such measures in connection with
|
||
the payment of the reward as deemed necessary to effect such protection.
|
||
|
||
3074. Exception of government officials
|
||
|
||
No officer or employee of any government entity who, while in the
|
||
performance of his or her official duties, furnishes the information
|
||
described in section 3071 shall be eligible for any monetary reward under
|
||
this chapter.
|
||
|
||
3075. Authorization for appropriations
|
||
|
||
There are authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitations,
|
||
$5,000,000 for the purpose of this chapter.
|
||
|
||
3076. Eligibility for witness security program
|
||
|
||
Any individual (and the immediate family of such individual) who furnishes
|
||
information which would justify a reward by the Attorney General under this
|
||
chapter or by the Secretary of State under section 36 of the State
|
||
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 may, in the discretion of the
|
||
Attorney General, participate in the Attorney General's witness security
|
||
program authorized under chapter 224 of this title.
|
||
|
||
3077. Definitions
|
||
|
||
As used in this chapter, the term -
|
||
|
||
(1) "act of terrorism" means an activity that -
|
||
|
||
(a) Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a
|
||
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
|
||
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
|
||
United States or of any State; and
|
||
|
||
(b) appears to be intended -
|
||
|
||
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
|
||
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
|
||
or
|
||
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
|
||
kidnapping."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comments: This definition seems to fit many radical groups - who use bomb
|
||
threats, bombing, arson, destruction of private and public property or
|
||
other illegal acts of coercion and violence -- to broadcast their objection
|
||
to government policy.
|
||
|
||
Peaceful demonstrations are not illegal. They are a desirable democratic
|
||
means to make public objection to government policy or any other issue. But
|
||
when peaceful demonstrators habitually use violence to get their message
|
||
across in the media, they are stepping over the line. Sooner or later,
|
||
they'll use more violence or threats of violence and become terrorists.
|
||
|
||
When any self-appointed leader or any of their followers actually do
|
||
something that constitutes an act of violence as defined by law, and you
|
||
know about it, blow the whistle on them. Acts of violence against innocent
|
||
people solely as a means of expressing dissent against government policies
|
||
by radical groups cannot be condoned. Large rewards of $100,000 to $500,000
|
||
provides CrimeFighters the incentive to do something about it!
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Police Corruption
|
||
|
||
It's no surprise to anyone when a politician is accused of bribery. There
|
||
is no specific reward for corruption, but if bribes, payoffs, kickbacks, or
|
||
malfeasance of public office is involved, it's usually a crime and rewards
|
||
are available under 3059, and possibly RICO. Besides a multitude of crooked
|
||
politicians, there are also crooked cops!
|
||
|
||
Police corruption isn't anything new. It's been with us ever since police
|
||
forces were created. As long as there are temptations, anyone can be
|
||
corrupted. The bigger the temptation, the easier it is. It's not just cops.
|
||
It applies to all people in any profession -- doctors, lawyers, judges, and
|
||
priests. Cops are exposed to far more temptations than others. It's so easy
|
||
to put money in their pockets. Being a cop is a tough job. Being an honest
|
||
cop is tougher still. (That also applies to CrimeFighters!)
|
||
|
||
The reason for mentioning police corruption in this otherwise pro-cop book
|
||
is: (a) to tell CrimeFighters to resist temptation because they'll get
|
||
caught eventually; (b) to look for police corruption and report it to the
|
||
FBI; and (c) to work mainly with the FBI and federal agents. Not that all
|
||
FBI agents are guaranteed 100% "untouchable", but the odds favor the Feds
|
||
more than local cops.
|
||
|
||
The pocketbook "Cocaine Wars," mentions that 1 out of 10 Miami cops were on
|
||
the take. (Note the past tense.) While that situation is over, I don't
|
||
believe corruption has been completely eradicated, and those incidents are
|
||
not confined to Miami alone.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * * * * *
|
||
|
||
From the book "Serpico," a true story of one brave cop's fight against
|
||
widespread police corruption in the N.Y. P.D.:
|
||
|
||
Pg 138: ".....This situation was not unique to New York. During the past
|
||
quarter century scandals have repeatedly shaken police departments around
|
||
the country, in Atlanta, Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, in Newark,
|
||
Louisville, Reno, Kansas City, and Detroit, Reading, and Albany, N.Y."
|
||
|
||
"In the summer of 1966 -- just about the time Serpico was meeting with
|
||
Captain Foran -- a study of police corruption in Boston, Washington, D.C.,
|
||
and Chicago showed that one out of every five policemen "was observed in a
|
||
criminal violation," even though they knew they were being watched. The
|
||
study, conducted by Dr. Albert J.Ries of Yale University under a grant from
|
||
the President's Crime Commission, involved 36 trained observers reporting
|
||
on the activities of 597 cops chosen at random in the three cities. Crimes
|
||
that were witnessed embraced actual theft, receiving protection payoffs,
|
||
and accepting money to alter sworn testimony. They did not include such
|
||
examples of petty graft as free meals and drinks, small gifts, and
|
||
discounts on purchases."
|
||
|
||
Here's a quote from "Wiseguy, Life in a Mafia Family," by Nicholas Pileggi,
|
||
Pocketbooks (1985) that may shake you up. (The book is full of similar
|
||
revealing "secrets" N.Y. cops weren't happy with.)
|
||
|
||
Pg 120: "After about four months I took my first pinch for running a wire
|
||
room. It was in August of 1967, and the cops who broke in said we were
|
||
doing $2 million worth of business a week. I only wish. We'd gotten word
|
||
from the cops we'd paid off that we were going to be busted. We were due.
|
||
They just went through the motions. It was done right. No cuffs or
|
||
anything. After we were booked we took the cops for dinner on Mulberry
|
||
Street before we went to night court for the arraignment. Al Newman, our
|
||
bondsman, was already in court when we got there. I grabbed a cab home. The
|
||
cops dropped Milty off. The next day we were back in action at a different
|
||
apartment. We had taken a pinch and now were okay for a while. John Sutter,
|
||
my lawyer, bounced the case around the courts for a year until I finally
|
||
pleaded guilty. I got fined $100 and went home. The city was spending
|
||
millions of dollars for plainclothes cops to catch bookmakers, but it was
|
||
obvious that the whole thing was set up so the cops could shake us down.
|
||
The cops didn't want to put us out of business any more than they wanted to
|
||
shoot the golden goose."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Another interesting book to read is "The Cops are Robbers," by Gerald W.
|
||
Clemente with Kevin Stevens, published by Avon Books, 1987.
|
||
|
||
From the back cover:
|
||
|
||
"MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND, 1980 - MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS
|
||
|
||
"A uniformed police sergeant in his cruiser patrols the darkened street
|
||
outside the Depositors Trust Bank. A conscientious cop safeguarding the
|
||
life savings of the citizenry?
|
||
|
||
"Hardly. While the sergeant keeps lookout, his five pals, including two
|
||
other cops, dynamite their way into the bank's vault and raid hundreds of
|
||
safe deposit boxes. Gold, diamonds, cash -- they snatch it all. Returning
|
||
the next two nights, they make a total haul estimated as high as $25
|
||
million. And they get away clean.
|
||
|
||
"The problem was they couldn't stay clean.
|
||
|
||
"In `The Cops are Robbers,' ex-police captain Jerry Clemente tells the
|
||
whole truth about the tale even "60 Minutes" couldn't unravel. And how
|
||
drugs, gambling, and greed finally turned the perfect crime into a
|
||
headline-making expose of police corruption."
|
||
|
||
Comment: The book covers many other areas of police corruption besides the
|
||
main story -- including supervisors selling answers to exams to a large
|
||
number of cops so they could "buy" their promotion for $3,000, instead of
|
||
earning it by studying.
|
||
|
||
At the back of the book, in the Epilogue, Gerald Clemente says:
|
||
|
||
"There is some sign that times are changing. The old guard, with its code
|
||
of silence and fanatical sense of brotherhood, is beginning to be replaced
|
||
by a younger corps of police administrators eager to bring corruption to
|
||
light. These new men often have motives that are less than noble -- many
|
||
are trying to garner media interest that will spread their names and
|
||
advance their careers. In the same way, many of the old guard did what they
|
||
did out of a true sense of honor. But the final result, it seems, will be a
|
||
cleaner police force. Whatever the case, it seems clear to me that without
|
||
a recognition that policemen are human and subject to temptation, and
|
||
without a policy that provides someone to watch over the individual
|
||
activities of the police, the problem of corruption will never be solved."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Not all cops are crooked or corruptible. The vast majority are honest,
|
||
hard-working, and conscientious. But there are enough crooked cops
|
||
percentage-wise to be a serious threat to CrimeFighters if they should
|
||
chance upon police corruption and report it to local cops. I recommend
|
||
CrimeFighters report police corruption, if they find any, only to the FBI
|
||
(And apply for a reward, too.) The FBI will report it to the Internal
|
||
Affairs Division (IAD) of the local P.D., and will monitor the case to
|
||
prevent a cover up.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Assassination
|
||
|
||
18 USCS 1751 Presidential and Presidential staff assassination,
|
||
kidnapping, and assault; penalties.
|
||
|
||
(a) Whoever kills (1) any individual who is the President of the United
|
||
States, the President-elect, the Vice President, or, if there is no Vice
|
||
President, the officer next in the order of succession to the Office of the
|
||
President of the United States, the Vice-President-elect, or any person who
|
||
is acting as President under the Constitution and laws of the United
|
||
States, or; (2) any person appointed under section 105(a)(2)(A) of title 3
|
||
employed in the Executive Office of the President or appointed under
|
||
section 106(a)(1)(A) of title 3 employed in the Office of the Vice
|
||
President, shall be punished as provided by sections 1111 and 1112 of this
|
||
title.
|
||
|
||
(b) Whoever kidnaps any individual designated in subsection (a) of this
|
||
section shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for
|
||
life, or (2) by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
|
||
death results to such individual.
|
||
|
||
(c) Whoever attempts to kill or kidnap any individual designated in
|
||
subsection (a) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for any
|
||
term of years or for life.
|
||
|
||
(d) If two or more persons conspire to kill or kidnap any individual
|
||
designated in subsection (a) of this section and one or more of such
|
||
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
|
||
punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or (2) by
|
||
death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if death results
|
||
to such individual.
|
||
|
||
(e) Whoever assaults any person designated in subsection (a)(1) shall be
|
||
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
|
||
Whoever assaults any person designated in subsection (a)(2) shall be fined
|
||
not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and if
|
||
personal injury results, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
|
||
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
|
||
|
||
(f) skipped
|
||
|
||
(g) The Attorney General of the United States, in his discretion is author-
|
||
ized to pay an amount not to exceed $100,000 for information and services
|
||
concerning a violation of subsection (a)(1). Any officer or employee of the
|
||
United States or of any State or local government who furnishes information
|
||
or renders service in the performance of his official duties shall not be
|
||
eligible for payment under this subsection.
|
||
|
||
(h) skipped
|
||
|
||
(i) Violations of this section shall be investigated by the Federal Bureau
|
||
of Investigation. Assistance may be requested from any Federal, State, or
|
||
local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule,
|
||
or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Bounty Hunters, Bail Bond Recovery Agents and Skip Tracers
|
||
and How to Get Valuable Information
|
||
|
||
Why We Need Bounty Hunters
|
||
|
||
A recent T.V. show (produced by Rattlesnake Productions, about Bail Bond
|
||
Recovery Agents) said 40 % of all arrests made last year (1992) were made
|
||
by Bounty Hunters. Think about it.
|
||
|
||
It takes a hundred thousand or more law enforcement agents nationwide to
|
||
make the original arrests, but just a hundred or so Bounty Hunters to find
|
||
and re-arrest about 40% of them when they skip bail. When you think about
|
||
the numbers and percentages you realize how efficient and important Bounty
|
||
Hunters are to our justice system.
|
||
|
||
It's a crying shame that only 5% of lawbreakers are caught, arrested and
|
||
charged with their crimes. (And 90% of those are plea bargained to lesser
|
||
charges to make it easier on the court system.) Imagine what a mockery of
|
||
Justice it would be if 40% of the 5% caught and released on bail could skip
|
||
bail and never worry about being put in jail!
|
||
|
||
Bounty Hunters are essential to the justice system now more than ever.
|
||
|
||
It's not the police's fault or responsibility when lawbreakers are released
|
||
on bail and skip town. In most cases, police don't have authority to travel
|
||
outside of their jurisdiction to make official, police arrests. Their hands
|
||
are tied by legal and financial restraints. But Bounty Hunters have no such
|
||
territorial limitations. That's why Bounty Hunters are turned loose, like
|
||
bloodhounds, to track them down and bring them back dead or alive.
|
||
|
||
Bounty Hunters are, in some cases, more important to the justice system
|
||
than police who wear guns and badges but seldom make felony arrests!
|
||
|
||
I'm looking forward to the day when I can say half of all lawbreakers
|
||
arrested and prosecuted for their crimes are by Crimefighters! When, not
|
||
if, that happens, we'll need double the number of Bounty Hunters to track
|
||
down the bail bond skips. Here's some information on Bounty Hunters:
|
||
|
||
Bail Bond Theory and Practice
|
||
|
||
When someone is arrested, they can be released on bail and money or
|
||
property is pledged as security so they will appear in court later. Only
|
||
when the money is paid to the court or a bail bond is posted (a promise to
|
||
pay the court) is the person released from jail until trial.
|
||
|
||
When a defendant doesn't have enough money for bail, a bail bondsman, who
|
||
is essentially a money lender, may help out. The bail bondsman puts up the
|
||
bail (his bond) and charges a fee, about 10 to 12%, for the use of the
|
||
money and risk. The bondsman expects to have his bond (promise to pay)
|
||
returned to him when the client shows up in court. That doesn't always
|
||
happen. When the defendant doesn't appear, the bond is forfeited, meaning
|
||
the bail bondsman must then pay the money to the court.
|
||
|
||
The client may fail to show up; the bondsman may receive advance word from
|
||
an insider that the bailee doesn't intend to show for his trial; and others
|
||
who guaranteed the bond with various forms of security (usually relatives)
|
||
may become worried and want to cancel it. In all these cases, the bondsman
|
||
must find and return the bailee to protect his/her investment.
|
||
|
||
As you might expect, some felons would rather forfeit the bail amount
|
||
(especially if it isn't their money) than face trial, and sentencing.
|
||
|
||
When a person fails to show up at trial the bond is forfeited and the
|
||
bondsman must pay. The law recognizes the right of the bondsman to protect
|
||
the investment and grants unique legal privileges to the bondsman to
|
||
capture and return the bail jumper.
|
||
|
||
The bondsman usually employs a specialized type of "skip tracer" to track
|
||
down and capture the fugitive. This person may be called a Recovery Agent,
|
||
Bounty Hunter or "Hunter" to those in the trade. The Hunter locates,
|
||
arrests, and returns the fugitive to local police. Then the bail bondsman
|
||
is off the hook.
|
||
Case Law on Bail Bonding
|
||
|
||
Case law dealing with bail bondsmen mentions that a surety (the person who
|
||
puts up the bond, or bondsman) is entitled to take into custody the
|
||
principal (the person for whom the surety has posted bond) when that person
|
||
jumps bond or violates the bail bond agreement. The recapture by a surety
|
||
or a delegate (usually a bail enforcement agent) is similar to an arrest by
|
||
the sheriff of an escaped prisoner.
|
||
|
||
The right of a bondsman to protect an investment is clarified in many court
|
||
cases.
|
||
|
||
"The right of a surety to capture his principal is not a matter of criminal
|
||
procedure, but arises from private rights established by the bail contract
|
||
between the principal and his surety." and "A bail bondsman has authority
|
||
to arrest when he sees his principal in a dwelling, properly identifies
|
||
himself, and acts in a reasonable manner to enter the dwelling to
|
||
effectuate the arrest. The bail bondsman is not required to have the
|
||
permission or consent of the owner of the dwelling to enter for that
|
||
purpose." (Livingston vs Browder, 51 Ala App 366, 285 So 2d 923)
|
||
|
||
The Hunter or surety "...whenever they choose to do so may seize him and
|
||
deliver him up to their discharge; and if this cannot be done at once they
|
||
may imprison him until it can be done. They may pursue him to another
|
||
State; may arrest him on the Sabbath, and, if necessary, may break and
|
||
enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of a
|
||
new process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff
|
||
of an escaping prisoner." (U.S. Supreme Curt: Taylor vs Taintor.)
|
||
|
||
The right of a surety to recapture his principal is not a matter of
|
||
criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking implied in the
|
||
furnishing of bond." (Fitzpatrick vs William, (CA5 La) 46 F2d 40, 73 ALR
|
||
1365).
|
||
Delegating Authority
|
||
|
||
Under most state laws a surety may empower a person of sufficient age and
|
||
discretion to arrest the accused by endorsing the authority on a copy of
|
||
the undertaking; without this authority no agent of the surety may make the
|
||
arrest.
|
||
Places of Arrest and Pursuit
|
||
|
||
The rearrest by a bail bondsman is not based on criminal procedure. As a
|
||
result, the bondsmen may make an arrest anywhere they choose or at any time
|
||
or place and in any State within the United States.
|
||
|
||
A bondsman has no limiting jurisdictional boundaries as State Police
|
||
usually have. However, some States require bondsmen to obtain an arrest
|
||
warrant from the State in which the arrest will take place.
|
||
|
||
Forced Entry
|
||
|
||
Arrest or rearrest of a principal by the bondsman is considered in the same
|
||
light as a regular arrest and capture of a criminal. Accordingly, a
|
||
bondsman has similar authority as police to break down the locked doors of
|
||
the dwelling to make the arrest when the principal refuses to unlock and
|
||
open the door.
|
||
Bounty Hunters
|
||
|
||
The right of bail in criminal and civil cases allows the Hunter to take
|
||
back into custody the bail skipper who does not appear for trial when
|
||
required. This arrest, because it is a rearrest, does not require the
|
||
Hunter to read the person his/her "rights." The bondsman or Hunter (a duly
|
||
authorized agent of the bondsman) takes the person back into custody just
|
||
like an escaped convict is taken into custody. When necessary and advisable
|
||
the Hunter may ask for and usually obtains police backup when apprehending
|
||
a dangerous criminal.
|
||
|
||
In 1990 there were 400,000 defendants in the Unites States who had jumped
|
||
bail. But there are fewer than 50 full-time bounty hunters do business in
|
||
the United States. We need more, according to Bob Burton, President of
|
||
NABEA, a Bounty Hunter's organization. The commissions paid, about 10%, are
|
||
based on the amount of bail. The commissions may range from $500 to $50,000
|
||
depending on the bail amount and the percentage rate you negotiate with the
|
||
bail bondsman.
|
||
|
||
Having bail bond experience could provide suitable training to enter the
|
||
CrimeFighter business, and knowing the job of a skip tracer will give you a
|
||
few advantages over someone without this training, experience, contacts,
|
||
and police assistance or facilities.
|
||
|
||
Building a Database of Contacts
|
||
|
||
The number of arrests police make is usually in proportion to the number of
|
||
"snitches" feeding police insider information on criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters need to recruit their own snitches to improve their results.
|
||
You'll need to meet people who commit felonies. Get to know a few and
|
||
you'll soon know a few more. Being a Hunter is one way to become acquainted
|
||
with a few lawbreakers. If you have access to a bail bondsman's records you
|
||
can quickly build a long list of potential contacts.
|
||
|
||
Let it be known to potential snitches you're not a law enforcement officer
|
||
but a private investigator and you'll pay up to $1,000 for information on
|
||
criminal activity. Try to develop a large number of contacts. Most of them
|
||
will sell information to you because they haven't read this book (and
|
||
probably never will). But when you know how to go about it, and obtain more
|
||
information and/or incriminating evidence, you can make many thousands of
|
||
dollars by confirming it, and either making the arrests yourself, or by
|
||
passing it on to the FBI for federal rewards. (In a way, you could say
|
||
you're in the "information brokerage" business.)
|
||
|
||
Criminal partnerships seldom last and when they break up they're like
|
||
unhappy marriages -- there is often animosity and a desire for revenge. An
|
||
ex-convict turned snitch wouldn't want friends to know, and so may not
|
||
report crimes to the police and become exposed to lengthy police
|
||
interrogation. But he could be tempted to tell someone who isn't a cop --
|
||
for revenge or a confidential cash payment of up to $1,000, for example.
|
||
|
||
If the person asks for more money than you can afford or want to pay and
|
||
the information might involve a major bust in terms of rewards and fines
|
||
and forfeitures, the FBI case agent maybe able to provide government money
|
||
to pay for it. (Incidentally, this is one of the reasons why dealing with
|
||
the FBI is better than dealing with local authorities: the FBI has access
|
||
to larger bankrolls and aren't reluctant to use it or pay big rewards.)
|
||
|
||
Part of the deal with the case agent would be an understanding that the
|
||
amount "borrowed" is just an advance of "expense money," and doesn't reduce
|
||
your negotiated reward or your share of the fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
Your source of information must be kept strictly confidential because:
|
||
|
||
(a) A snitch is a valuable asset and you don't want to lose him to the FBI,
|
||
who might cut you out of that bust or future busts;
|
||
|
||
(b) Snitches expect you to keep their identity secret, top secret; and
|
||
|
||
(c) The snitch may not want to be known to the police. Police have been
|
||
known to "lean" on snitches, and will treat them as expendable if they lead
|
||
to bigger game. Snitches know that. That may be the reason why a potential
|
||
snitch will talk to a CrimeFighter or private investigator but not to cops.
|
||
|
||
Most snitches are either street people or active criminals. Street people
|
||
see and hear a lot of insider information and $20 to $50 is a lot of money
|
||
to them for a little bit of information. Most of the time police pay small
|
||
amounts of money from their own pockets for this information. Criminal
|
||
snitches are the ones who have been caught and "flipped." That is, they
|
||
are not charged with their crime if they cooperate and provide information
|
||
to others. Sometimes they're even allowed to stay in a criminal-related
|
||
business to maintain a cover and introduce undercover agents into the crime
|
||
ring. That's why and how a cop can "lean" on them when they want to.
|
||
Generally speaking, police despise snitches and have little concern for
|
||
their safety. Often the snitch must either cooperate or go to jail.
|
||
|
||
(CrimeFighters should refer to snitches as "Confidential Informants" or
|
||
CI's to make the name palatable to their potential sources of information.)
|
||
|
||
The idea is to know a lot of criminals, who they are, where they hang out,
|
||
and who does what. Let it be known you will pay up to $1,000 to anyone who
|
||
provides you with confidential information that leads to an arrest and
|
||
conviction. (Use Crime Stoppers' formula to calculate rewards.)
|
||
|
||
The pay for being a trainee Hunter isn't much but will give you valuable
|
||
experience and introduce you to a lot of potential CI's.
|
||
|
||
Information is valuable. A dozen or more good CI's are like money in the
|
||
bank. It may take a few months to a few years to develop a dozen or more
|
||
of these valuable contacts. When you do, you'll have a lot of insider
|
||
information available at all times, leading to much larger federal rewards,
|
||
and a generous share of resultant fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
Skip Tracers
|
||
|
||
Skip tracers are mostly employed by credit collection agencies. When a
|
||
person "skips" out of town without paying bills a series of collection
|
||
letters follow in an increasing demanding tone. When letters don't get a
|
||
response skip tracers may be asked to locate the skip. When they do, a
|
||
repossession agent may be used to recover automobiles or other goods. If
|
||
the money owed was secured by collateral creditors, they may try to
|
||
repossess the items. Bail recovery agents are usually experienced at skip
|
||
tracing too, for a different reason: to track down people who jump bail.
|
||
CrimeFighters can use the same expertise and tricks of the trade of a skip
|
||
tracer to find and locate escaped or wanted felons who also skip town to
|
||
escape jail.
|
||
|
||
A skip tracer uses telephone directories, license plates, Department of
|
||
Motor Vehicle (DMV) files, and various trade directories. He/she also
|
||
searches data bases with a computer, spends time on stakeouts, and does
|
||
legwork to locate the missing person.
|
||
|
||
Sometimes a skip tracer just locates the missing person or needed financial
|
||
information then turns it over to someone else to take appropriate action.
|
||
A skip tracer working with a CrimeFighter would give the information to a
|
||
CrimeFighter who would make further investigation to make an arrest, or to
|
||
use financial information to determine the amount of fines and forfeitures
|
||
to be imposed on a lawbreaker.
|
||
|
||
Becoming an experienced skip tracer will help you to find people and obtain
|
||
difficult-to-get information on criminals, including credit reports from
|
||
credit-reporting agencies to obtain names and addresses of relatives and
|
||
former addresses. Skip tracers also check corporate and business records
|
||
to obtain other information, names and addresses of associates, and banking
|
||
information on the lawbreaker.
|
||
|
||
According to a book called "You Can Find Anyone," by Eugene Ferraro, DMV
|
||
records can be accessed to obtain name and address information, driving and
|
||
accident records (DUI convictions), mailing and residential addresses, and
|
||
a description of any vehicles registered to any one person or business.
|
||
|
||
Massachusetts and Washington are the only two States in which DMV records
|
||
aren't available to the public. But even if you live in one of these two
|
||
States and are working with an FBI case agent, the agent will get the info
|
||
for you if it involves a criminal investigation.
|
||
|
||
In the majority of States, CrimeFighters can set up an account with the
|
||
DMV. When you want to access DMV files use your computer and modem. At
|
||
the end of the month you get a bill for the number of times you have used
|
||
the service. The rates vary.
|
||
|
||
The National Crime Investigation Computer (NCIC) is maintained and operated
|
||
by the FBI. It contains about 30 million names. Law enforcement agencies
|
||
at all levels, including local, County, State and Federal agencies, input
|
||
the information, which includes wanted persons, and stolen items of all
|
||
kinds such as vehicles, license plates, jewelry, securities, and other
|
||
articles of significant value. The database also lists criminal histories
|
||
and missing children. Access to this database is restricted to law
|
||
enforcement personnel. If you're working on a case, and working with the
|
||
FBI, an agent may get that information for you.
|
||
|
||
In addition to DMV records and NCIC, dozens of other computer databases,
|
||
including the National Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies, exist. Just
|
||
about everyone has a credit history, and their files not only include
|
||
information about credit but about past and current employers, residences,
|
||
phone numbers, relatives, friends, associates, and other data. Business
|
||
credit-reporting agencies, such as Dunn and Bradstreet or Poor's & Moody,
|
||
can provide personal as well as financial information about businesses and
|
||
their owners. The name of the company's bank accounts and even their
|
||
account numbers are often listed for verification of the balance, plus
|
||
debtors and creditors of their business (more leads to follow).
|
||
|
||
Corporate records at the State Capitol are available to the public. They
|
||
can be searched to find names and addresses of directors, officers, and
|
||
(sometimes) shareholders. Names of corporate banks are sometimes listed in
|
||
corporate records, too. That leads to the next step: banks.
|
||
|
||
Banks withhold confidential information, but skip tracers use "gags" (lies)
|
||
to obtain bank balances and other information they want. They sometimes
|
||
pose as a businessman and ask if a check issued to them by Mr. X or the XYZ
|
||
company is "good" for a certain amount. Other creative methods are used to
|
||
extract current addresses of bank customers by checking to verify current
|
||
addresses. A good skip tracer can wheedle information from any source by
|
||
using ingenious and clever gags. You can, too, but remember never pose as a
|
||
law enforcement agent.
|
||
|
||
If you're interested in learning more about how to be a skip tracer -- to
|
||
work as an independent agent for credit collection agencies, or as a
|
||
CrimeFighter, read one or more of the few excellent books written by
|
||
experts on that subject. (There's a few of them listed in CRIMCAT.)
|
||
|
||
If you have a computer and experience at using a modem, you have the basic
|
||
equipment to find almost anyone. Knowing how to find people who don't want
|
||
to be found or finding other information they don't want you to know is an
|
||
essential part of a skip tracer's job as well as that of a CrimeFighter.
|
||
|
||
The Last Word
|
||
|
||
On the last page in "The Hunter," Papa Thorson says "I would recommend to
|
||
anyone wanting to be a bounty hunter to forget about it. It's one of those
|
||
cyclical occupations that comes around every hundred years. The `Wanted:
|
||
Dead or Alive' guys served the purpose in the last century and faded. The
|
||
cycle's about over for this century. Maybe in another hundred years the
|
||
demand will arise for bounty hunters in space."
|
||
|
||
Comment: That may be true for bail enforcement agents, but it isn't going
|
||
to take another hundred years. The `Wanted: Dead or Alive' guys are now
|
||
being resurrected as CrimeFighters. Their incentives are the huge federal
|
||
rewards possible plus 50% of fines and forfeitures, and lawsuit awards.
|
||
|
||
Study Aids
|
||
|
||
It's not easy to obtain a job as a Hunter if you don't know what it's all
|
||
about or how to go about it. But books on the subject have been written by
|
||
a professional Hunter who has made more than 3,000 successful "captures" of
|
||
bail bond skips. His name is Bob Burton, who has written two books:
|
||
"Bounty Hunter" and "Bail Enforcer" (both listed in CRIMCAT). Both books
|
||
are recommended reading by prospective Bail Bond Recovery Agents.
|
||
|
||
An excellent book on what skip tracers do and how they go about it is,
|
||
"True Detectives," by William Parkhurst, Crown Publishers, This isn't a
|
||
how-to-do-it manual, but provides insight into skip tracers as people who
|
||
are sometimes used in a boiler room operation for a well-known, successful
|
||
New York private detective agency. The book provides a different look at
|
||
real-life, professional skip tracers. (It's listed in CRIMCAT.)
|
||
|
||
Another pocketbook, "Prince of the City," by Robert Daley, is a story of
|
||
widespread corruption in New York City. It focuses on the aftermath of a
|
||
cop who is forced to turn in his buddies. Interspersed in the story is
|
||
factual information on snitches and the role of prosecutors -- what they
|
||
can and can't do. Incidentally, this is a true story told like it happened.
|
||
It may give you some (wrong) ideas on how cops let crooks off the hook for
|
||
under-the-table payments. But if you do, the truth will out sooner or later
|
||
and you'll wind up like those New York cops: in jail!
|
||
|
||
(Concealing a crime (misprision) and blackmail are criminal offenses. Plea
|
||
bargaining and lawsuits aren't illegal. Use the law to obtain your rewards
|
||
and/or Crimefighter lawsuit awards.)
|
||
|
||
Another pocketbook, "Finder," also published by Crown, is a true story of
|
||
Marilyn Greene, a successful woman private investigator who finds missing
|
||
persons via telephone, without leaving her home, and without a computer at
|
||
the time the book was published. (It's not too difficult when you know
|
||
how.)
|
||
Movies
|
||
|
||
Some movies portray Hunters. Three of them may be available at your video
|
||
rental store. One is about Ralph ("Papa") Thorson, who is probably the
|
||
most popular bounty hunter on record. "The Hunter" is the name of the
|
||
movie. Steve McQueen plays the role of Thorson and portrays how Papa goes
|
||
about doing his job. The pocketbook was written by Christopher Keane and
|
||
published by Bantam Books in 1976 under the same title, from which the
|
||
movie was made. It's a true story about Papa Thorson and enlarges upon 10
|
||
histories of the 5,000-plus arrests from Thorson's files. The book is out
|
||
of print but might be found in libraries or used book stores.
|
||
|
||
Clint Eastwood plays the part of a resourceful skip tracer in "Pink
|
||
Cadillac." Some of the hilarious gags he uses are probably close to those
|
||
actually used to obtain information. View this one and you'll have a
|
||
pretty good idea of the skip tracer does.
|
||
|
||
The third movie is "Midnight Run," starring DeNiro. Bob Burton, who was
|
||
kind enough to review this chapter, called it "the most recent and fairly
|
||
realistic."
|
||
|
||
Movies show a lot of tire screeching, fender-bending, high-speed chases,
|
||
and shooting from moving vehicles on city streets --all of which are
|
||
forbidden by law and common sense. They make better movies than the actual
|
||
dry and often humdrum facts. After reading the chapters on illegal wire
|
||
taps and police rules and regulations on high-speed chases, you'll realize
|
||
that almost all "Cops and Robbers" movies bend the truth and liberally
|
||
exaggerate the facts. Don't use movies or TV shows as a guide on how to
|
||
behave as a bounty hunter or CrimeFighter.
|
||
|
||
A new video called "Wanted... Bounty Hunter", ($29.95) shows how Gary
|
||
Stafford, a ten-year veteran bounty hunter, uses his proven techniques and
|
||
skills to hunt down and arrest fugitives. (It's listed in CRIMCAT.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for the next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
U.S. Customs, Auto Mechanics' Reward laws,
|
||
Coast Guard, IRS, and Military Reward laws,
|
||
|
||
In addition to generous rewards for helping to bust drug dealers, Crime-
|
||
Fighters can get a substantial share (25%) of the forfeiture of cars,
|
||
boats, planes, houses and business empires of convicted lawbreakers via
|
||
customs laws.
|
||
Customs Laws
|
||
|
||
Customs enforces many laws concerning goods coming into or going out of the
|
||
United States. The U.S. Coast Guard enables Customs to intercept and board
|
||
marine vessels. In recent years the Coast Guard has played an increasing
|
||
role in law enforcement against smugglers of contraband of all kinds.
|
||
Lately, the emphasis is on drug smuggling from South American countries.
|
||
|
||
If you live on the coast or along the Mexican border, look for drug smugg-
|
||
ling, illegal aliens, importation or exportation of illegal merchandise of
|
||
all kinds, including, but not limited to, endangered species, trademark
|
||
infringement of merchandise (counterfeit jeans, watches, computer hardware
|
||
and software, for example), liquor and tobacco violations and the export of
|
||
war materials.
|
||
|
||
To encourage citizens to participate in law enforcement, one Customs law
|
||
pays a generous reward of 25% of fines and forfeitures collected up to a
|
||
maximum of $250,000.
|
||
|
||
"19 USCS 1619 Award of compensation to informers.
|
||
|
||
(a) In general. If-
|
||
(1) Any person who is not an officer of the United States-
|
||
|
||
(A) detects and seizes any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage subject
|
||
to seizure and forfeiture under the customs laws or the navigation laws and
|
||
who reports the same to a customs officer, or
|
||
|
||
(B) furnishes to a United States attorney, to the Secretary of the
|
||
Treasury, or any customs officer original information concerning-
|
||
|
||
(i) any fraud upon the customs revenue, or
|
||
(ii) any violation of the customs laws or the navigation laws which is
|
||
being, or has been, perpetrated or contemplated by any other person; and
|
||
|
||
(2) such detection and seizure or such information leads to a recovery of-
|
||
|
||
(A) any duties withheld, or (B) any fine, penalty, or forfeiture of
|
||
property incurred; the Secretary may award and pay such person an amount
|
||
that does not exceed 25% of the net amount so recovered.
|
||
|
||
(b) Forfeited property not sold. If-
|
||
(1) Any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise or baggage is forfeited to
|
||
the United States and is thereafter, in lieu of sale-
|
||
(A) destroyed under customs or navigation laws, or
|
||
(B) delivered to any governmental agency for official use, and
|
||
|
||
(2) any person would be eligible to receive an award under subsection (a)
|
||
but for the lack of sale of such forfeited property, the Secretary may
|
||
award and pay such person an amount that does not exceed 25% of the
|
||
appraised value of such forfeited property.
|
||
|
||
(c) Dollar limitation.
|
||
The amount awarded and paid to any person under this section may not exceed
|
||
$250,000 for any case.
|
||
|
||
(d) Source of payment.
|
||
Unless otherwise provided by law, any amount paid under this section shall
|
||
be paid out of appropriations available for the collection of customs
|
||
revenue.
|
||
|
||
(e) Recovery of bail bond. For purposes of this section, an amount
|
||
recovered under a bailbond shall be deemed a recovery of a fine incurred."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Customs' reward law has a specific dollar amount limit of up to $250,000.
|
||
However, under (2) above, it pays up to 25% of the appraised value of items
|
||
that can't be sold -- such as drugs and machineguns, etc. If there is no
|
||
large cash amounts or vehicles forfeited, only drugs and weapons from dope
|
||
runners, this may be better than RICO laws. If time permits, negotiate
|
||
first with Customs, but don't provide full disclosure until you have a
|
||
decent reward offer in writing. If no deal is made, try the FBI next.
|
||
|
||
If the anticipated reward and fines and forfeitures might exceed Customs'
|
||
$250,000 limit, contact the FBI instead. Use RICO and other laws for
|
||
prosecution to get 50% of fines and forfeitures plus appropriate rewards.
|
||
|
||
In the book "Cocaine Wars" there is a picture of $5.4 million that was
|
||
seized by the U.S. Customs Service from a private Jet in Fort Lauderdale,
|
||
Florida. The cash, all neatly bundled in "bricks", looks like bales of hay.
|
||
Customs would pay the maximum reward of $250,000. However, if you assert
|
||
your right to prosecute the case yourself under RICO, if it is your case,
|
||
you have control. The FBI or DEA will want to take over the prosecution
|
||
from you, to get official credit for it. If they did, they'd also receive
|
||
half of the forfeitures. Knowing that, you should negotiate with the FBI or
|
||
DEA for a larger share of the fines, forfeitures and rewards for a total of
|
||
about 50% -- or $2.7 million of the confiscated money.
|
||
|
||
(Remember, law enforcement agencies compete with each other like football
|
||
teams. Each agency wants to get the credit for the prosecution as well as
|
||
50 percent of the fines and forfeitures. That's why they usually don't
|
||
share information with each other, which is detrimental to law enforcement
|
||
generally. The flip side is, when you have control, you are in a good
|
||
position to negotiate rewards. Each major law enforcement agency will want
|
||
the case. If they agree to 50% of forfeitures plus federal rewards, they
|
||
still get 50 percent of the forfeitures. If they are too tight-fisted, they
|
||
get nothing! They know that too. Negotiate for 50 percent of forfeitures,
|
||
plus maximum rewards. Give it to the highest bidder. Be businesslike.)
|
||
|
||
If you live near the Mexican Border, you'll probably hear or read about
|
||
large narcotics busts every week. Recently, I heard on the Yuma, Arizona TV
|
||
news that Customs found a Mexican national trying to smuggle through the
|
||
San Luis, Mexico, border $6 million worth of cocaine! In this case, there
|
||
was no cash and fines and lawsuits wouldn't be practical against a Mexican
|
||
national. Customs law would be better than RICO because the $6 million of
|
||
drugs generate a reward under Customs' law but not under RICO. Customs'
|
||
might pay you the maximum reward of $250,000.
|
||
|
||
Sometimes, along with the contraband, agents often seize large amounts of
|
||
cash and expensive vehicles. When smugglers manage to slip past the border,
|
||
check points just North of the border stop and search suspected vehicles
|
||
and catch a few more. But, the shocking part is, that's only the tip of the
|
||
iceberg! Authorities catch only 10%; 90% get through!
|
||
|
||
Drug running is a multi-billion dollar a year business on the border. It's
|
||
also a multi-million dollar business potential for CrimeFighters!
|
||
|
||
A conviction is required in order to levy fines and forfeitures under this
|
||
law. However, 18 USCS 3059 and 21 USCS 886 pay rewards for the arrest of
|
||
felons and drug-related activity. Apply for those too.
|
||
|
||
Drug-Related Citizen's Arrests
|
||
|
||
Always try to obtain assistance from law enforcement agents to make an
|
||
arrest. Remember, rewards are paid for "information leading to the arrest"
|
||
-- not for making the arrest. When there is no lawman handy and no time to
|
||
find one or call and wait for them, and the arrest must be made "right
|
||
then" or you'll lose the opportunity for a $25,000 to $100,000 reward, then
|
||
you might seriously consider a citizen's arrest. In this case, if you stick
|
||
your neck out and risk physical harm to yourself, the rewards are usually
|
||
increased in direct proportion to your risk. But, you can't spend the
|
||
generous rewards if you're dead!
|
||
|
||
Fifty years ago smugglers were relatively harmless when compared to today's
|
||
drug and alien smugglers. The new breed of smugglers would rather shoot
|
||
someone trying to make an arrest than run from them. And, they also firmly
|
||
believe in the old saying that "dead men don't talk." Not having a firearm
|
||
with you when making an arrest is foolish. And, if you don't have a permit
|
||
to carry a concealed weapon but carry one anyway, it could lead to your
|
||
arrest for firearm violations. Don't carry concealed weapons unless you
|
||
have a permit or are authorized by a case agent!
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
The following is a cram course in how to detect narcotics smugglers, taken
|
||
from a U.S. Customs' Brochure:
|
||
|
||
"Y O U... CAN HELP!
|
||
|
||
Report drug smuggling to U.S. Customs
|
||
|
||
1-800-BE-ALERT or 1-800-232-5378
|
||
|
||
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SMUGGLING AWARENESS PROGRAM
|
||
|
||
The smuggling of illegal and dangerous drugs into the United States is a
|
||
serious criminal problem which threatens the well-being, health and safety
|
||
of the citizens of the United States. The Customs Service and your local
|
||
police authorities are devoting more time, energy, and resources than ever
|
||
before in an effort to combat this great menace to the safety and welfare
|
||
of your families and society.
|
||
|
||
The purpose of the Drug Smuggling Awareness Program is to establish and
|
||
implement a successful smuggling awareness effort along the southwestern
|
||
border of the United Sates. It will provide you, the local citizens, an
|
||
easy method and opportunity to provide information about the suspected
|
||
smuggling activities to Customs and allow you to remain anonymous.
|
||
|
||
Many citizens see suspicious activity which they believe to be drug
|
||
smuggling but they are not sure and they don't know what to do or whom to
|
||
call. This pamphlet will cite examples of suspicious activity to be on the
|
||
lookout for and step by step instructions on how to anonymously report it
|
||
to U.S. Customs.
|
||
CASH REWARDS
|
||
|
||
Customs will pay cash rewards ranging from $250 to $2,500 for anonymous
|
||
information, or up to $250,000 for a documented confidential source, for
|
||
information leading to the arrest and conviction of drug smugglers. The
|
||
size of the reward will depend on the circumstances of the case and
|
||
results.
|
||
|
||
FOR MORE INFORMATION CALL 1-800-BE ALERT - 24 HOURS A DAY
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
HOW TO DETECT A SMUGGLER
|
||
|
||
United States Customs would like you to be on the lookout for potential
|
||
drug smugglers. A number of characteristics have been found to be common
|
||
among smuggling operations. Among them, and worthy of arousing suspicion,
|
||
are the following examples:
|
||
|
||
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE BORDER OR BORDER CHECK POINTS
|
||
|
||
* Persons exhibiting a lifestyle which is inconsistent with their claimed
|
||
occupation.
|
||
|
||
* Passenger acting on behalf of someone who has paid cash for airfare being
|
||
used for "business."
|
||
|
||
* International carrier employees who never take time off or who insist on
|
||
always working the same shift (which may coincide with particular flights).
|
||
Includes freight forwarders, ground crews, baggage and cargo handlers.
|
||
|
||
* Person who consistently purchase very small quantities of gas for a
|
||
vehicle (this vehicle could have a modified gas tank used to transport
|
||
contraband.
|
||
|
||
* Persons depositing unusually large amounts of cash.
|
||
|
||
* A person who buys insurance for a vehicle he does not own.
|
||
|
||
* One requesting a specific hotel room having a view of the Customs lanes.
|
||
|
||
* Paying cash for a rental vehicle.
|
||
|
||
* Purchasing large quantities of masking (or similar) tape, plastic bags,
|
||
etc., which could be used to cover windows of planes or other conveyances.
|
||
|
||
* Suspicious vehicles visiting or frequenting a residence at all hours of
|
||
the day and night.
|
||
|
||
* Persons doing an excessive amount of travelling in and out of the United
|
||
States when they have no visible means of support.
|
||
|
||
* Persons doing business strictly on a cash basis involving no receipts.
|
||
|
||
* Persons claiming to have modifications or special compartments in their
|
||
vehicles.
|
||
|
||
* Private aircraft owners making frequent trips out of the country for
|
||
recreational purposes or for no apparent reason.
|
||
|
||
* Business/body shops offering to install or service secret compartments or
|
||
modifications to vehicles.
|
||
|
||
* Persons receiving large amounts of mail from outside the United States
|
||
(especially from narcotic source countries, such as Columbia, Thailand,
|
||
India, Peru, Brazil, and Pakistan).
|
||
|
||
* Persons operating currency exchange businesses from their personal
|
||
residences or personal vehicles.
|
||
|
||
AMONG AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELDS:
|
||
|
||
* Passenger seats missing from aircraft.
|
||
|
||
* Aircraft windows covered by curtains or temporarily taped over.
|
||
|
||
* Numerous boxes, duffel bags, plastic bags, or other containers inside the
|
||
aircraft.
|
||
|
||
* Aircraft flying or landing after dark without lights.
|
||
|
||
* Trucks, campers, or vans waiting at or near area suitable to aircraft
|
||
landings; often equipped with radios for use in communications with an
|
||
aircraft.
|
||
|
||
* Landing at provisional runways in a desolate area lit by vehicle
|
||
headlights, signal fires, or lanterns.
|
||
|
||
* Refueling from 55 gallon drums or from the back of pickup trucks.
|
||
|
||
* Paint chipped, muddy wheels, dirty or dusty aircraft, beat-up propellers
|
||
or other evidence of operating from dirt strips.
|
||
|
||
* Strong or unusual odors, such as perfume, emanating from the aircraft.
|
||
These are used to cover the scent of marijuana.
|
||
|
||
* Aircraft with new paint, added doors, extra fuel tanks, and false or
|
||
altered registration numbers.
|
||
|
||
* Pilot or passengers reluctant to leave the aircraft unattended during
|
||
ground servicing.
|
||
|
||
* Pilot or passengers displaying large amounts of cash and/or making cash
|
||
payments for fuel and services.
|
||
|
||
AT A MARINA OR ON THE WATER
|
||
|
||
* Boats purchased with large cash payments.
|
||
|
||
* Immediate demands for electronics equipment or repairs without regard to
|
||
cost.
|
||
|
||
* Loading or unloading activity dockside at unusual hours.
|
||
|
||
* The purchase of heavy duty trailers which have a load capacity which far
|
||
exceeds the weight of the boat.
|
||
|
||
* Boats specifically designed as sport fishers where there is an absence of
|
||
any type of fishing gear.
|
||
|
||
* The purchase of more than one trailer for the same boat.
|
||
|
||
* Boats changed in internal configuration, i.e., raised deck, no access to
|
||
bilges, fuel tanks added or modified, construction of concealed
|
||
compartments, or modified bulkheads.
|
||
|
||
* Boats with false water line.
|
||
|
||
* Improper or false registration.
|
||
|
||
* Boats riding very low in the water.
|
||
|
||
* Boats which are encountered at night running without lights.
|
||
|
||
* Observing the transfer of cargo from one boat to another at sea.
|
||
|
||
* Communications between a boat and a shore vehicle by unusual means, i.e.,
|
||
lights, flags, etc.
|
||
|
||
TO REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
|
||
|
||
CALL 1-800-BE-ALERT - 24 HOURS A DAY
|
||
|
||
You need only to follow these few steps to report suspicious activity to
|
||
U.S. Customs. By reporting these activities you will not only remain
|
||
anonymous, but also perform a great service to preserve and protect your
|
||
community.
|
||
|
||
* BE ALERT: In your observations, note the date, time and location of
|
||
activity and write this information down. Take extra care to note any
|
||
registration numbers of vehicles or distinctive features of the suspects.
|
||
|
||
* BE ACCURATE: Call U.S. Customs toll-free at 1-800-BE-ALERT. Tell the
|
||
officer that you have information about narcotics smuggling activities. Ask
|
||
for your special caller identification number. You will be given a code
|
||
number to protect your identity. After you receive your caller number give
|
||
an accurate account of your information to the Customs officer.
|
||
|
||
* FOLLOW THROUGH: Call Customs again at 1-800-BE-ALERT 10 days after your
|
||
initial contact. Identify yourself by your assigned code. At this time you
|
||
can learn if any action resulted from your information, and if so, you can
|
||
arrange for payment of your cash award.
|
||
|
||
YOU CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE!
|
||
|
||
YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS VITAL PROGRAM CAN BE A BIG FIRST STEP IN HELPING
|
||
SECURE OUR NATION'S SOUTHWEST BORDER."
|
||
|
||
(End of Customs' brochure)
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Auto Mechanics Reward Laws
|
||
|
||
Title 15 -- Commerce and Trade -- has a special law related to automotive
|
||
vehicles -- among others. If you like cars, are a mechanic, or hang around
|
||
with auto mechanics, you probably know that setting back odometers is
|
||
against the law.
|
||
|
||
This practice is so widespread 20/20 (the TV program), presented a full
|
||
documentary and expose of an auto wholesaler in Houston, Texas. It told how
|
||
he makes about $50,000 a month in purchasing cars at auctions, paying a
|
||
freelance "mile buster" mechanic $50 to set back odometers in good-looking
|
||
cars with abnormally high mileage. Setting back the odometer in each car
|
||
cost him $50 but increases the car's value by about $2,000. The wholesaler
|
||
then sells the car to an unsuspecting used car dealer.
|
||
|
||
Unsuspecting purchasers, who look at mileage as an indicator of wear and
|
||
remaining value, are swindled. That's fraudulent practice and specifically
|
||
covered in Title 15 USCS 1982 et seq.
|
||
|
||
The first section of USCS 1988 details registration requirements and
|
||
procedures, which are lengthy and are not too interesting to CrimeFighters.
|
||
However, registration of vehicles sold must (by law) disclose the mileage
|
||
at the time of sale. A record is made at each transaction and dealers keep
|
||
a mileage record of servicing when the car is under warranty. That leaves
|
||
an audit trail to verify mileage -- or to find a 50,000 to 100,000 mile
|
||
discrepancy!
|
||
|
||
There are many people besides dealers who buy and sell used cars. These
|
||
people often place classified ads buying or selling one or two vehicles at
|
||
a time. They sometimes buy clunkers, fix them up, and re-sell them as
|
||
"private sales", without a license or paying sales or income tax. They are
|
||
also quite likely to set back odometers too, if they can. And, sometimes,
|
||
they buy parts from stolen cars to fix up their wrecked cars. Look for
|
||
these people too -- in classified ads.
|
||
|
||
The odometer law doesn't have a reward clause, but rewards are covered
|
||
under USCS 3059. They are available and negotiable up to $25,000. Since the
|
||
fines are paid by the car dealer and not the government, a CrimeFighter
|
||
should be able to negotiate 50% of the fine to keep it in line with other
|
||
rewards. And, as the fines can reach $100,000, the reward could reach
|
||
$50,000 per used-car lot. It's a safe bet that in large cities or
|
||
population centers there may be one or more mile-busters at work and
|
||
hundreds of car odometers set back. Each mechanic you nail might pay you
|
||
$1,000. If there's one in your town, the mile buster mechanic will most
|
||
likely be working a few other used-car lots too. Use your lawsuit via
|
||
interrogatories, plus your prosecutor's authority, to encourage mechanics
|
||
to provide information and sign sworn statements against dealers.
|
||
|
||
How to Do it
|
||
|
||
Go auto shopping at used car lots. Look for advertised "creampuffs" or "low
|
||
mileage" cars, and if the insides of these vehicles look brand new, it
|
||
could indicate complete refurbishing that means the seats and floor mats
|
||
were so worn they had to be replaced. Read the mileage and license plate
|
||
numbers of dozens of these cars. Use a computer to check the official
|
||
records at the State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for recent owners,
|
||
dates of transfer and mileage. If you find a lot of mileage difference,
|
||
you've spotted the work of a mileage buster.
|
||
|
||
Check out the rest of the cars on that lot. If you find a few more, you
|
||
could get $1,000 for each "rollback" you find. When you have sufficient
|
||
evidence (actually the evidence is on the discrepancy between DMV records
|
||
and service records at dealerships) contact an FBI case agent. Make a
|
||
preliminary disclosure and negotiate for a reward of 50% of the fines and
|
||
forfeitures of the business, plus a reward for each mile-buster under USCS
|
||
3059. Or, if negotiating a suitable reward seems difficult, prosecute the
|
||
case yourself under RICO. Use plea bargaining as leverage to be paid an
|
||
out-of-court settlement of your personal lawsuit -- to get paid a suitable
|
||
amount for your investigation and related expenses.
|
||
|
||
Tip: Often, when an odometer is rolled back, a number or two of the mileage
|
||
shown on the speedometer may be out of alignment. If they are, it might
|
||
indicate a rollback by an amateur mechanic.
|
||
|
||
Odometer Law
|
||
|
||
15 USCS 1984. Change of mileage indicated on odometer prohibited.
|
||
|
||
No person shall disconnect, reset, or alter or cause to be disconnected,
|
||
reset, or altered, the odometer of any motor vehicle with intent to change
|
||
the number of miles indicated thereon.
|
||
|
||
15 USCS 1986. Conspiracy to violate odometer requirements.
|
||
|
||
No person shall conspire with any other person to violate section 1983,
|
||
1984, 1985, 1987, or 1988 of this title.
|
||
|
||
15 USCS 1990b. Civil Penalty
|
||
|
||
(a) Maximum amounts,
|
||
|
||
Any person who commits any act or causes to be done any act that violates
|
||
any provision of this subchapter or omits to do any act or causes to be
|
||
omitted any act that is required by any such provision shall be subject to
|
||
a civil penalty not to exceed $2,000 for each violation. A violation of any
|
||
such provision shall, for purposes of this section, constitute a separate
|
||
violation with respect to each motor vehicle or device involved, except
|
||
that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $100,000 for any related
|
||
series of violations.
|
||
|
||
15 USCS 1990c Criminal Penalties
|
||
|
||
(a) maximum amounts
|
||
|
||
Any person who knowingly and willfully commits any act or causes to be done
|
||
any act that violates any provision of this subchapter or knowingly and
|
||
willfully omits to do any act or causes to be omitted any act that is
|
||
required by any such provision shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
|
||
imprisoned not more than three years or both.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: "any person", mentioned above, also means any company, used car
|
||
lot, or automobile dealership. While the mechanic is nailed for rolling
|
||
back odometers, the last paragraph nails the people or firm that pays him.
|
||
|
||
The same TV show (20/20) highlighted another automotive-related law,
|
||
about counterfeit automotive parts, which are usually substandard in
|
||
quality and are falsely labeled as a well-known brand. That's misleading,
|
||
or a fraud (and cheats the honest manufacturer as well). In some cases,
|
||
it's also a violation of copyright or patent laws. If you're a mechanic,
|
||
maybe you know about such parts and know where to locate the distributor or
|
||
manufacturer. If so, get the information you need, and evidence (parts
|
||
falsely marked) with receipts of purchase from the store, and blow the
|
||
whistle on them. Contact an FBI agent to negotiate a reward.
|
||
|
||
Incidentally, there are many business-related law violations to be on the
|
||
lookout for: counterfeit money, art, auto parts, jeans, watches, cosmetics,
|
||
etc. Copyright and trademark violations are illegal, and rewards available.
|
||
(Software pirates are the latest.) Look for bait-and-switch advertising
|
||
(false advertising) and fraud, cons, scams, chain letters, pyramid schemes,
|
||
etc. Anything that seems to be to good to be true, probably isn't.
|
||
Investigate -- but don't get stung on a con.
|
||
|
||
By the way, the "CrimeFighter Catalog" has a few good books that tell you
|
||
all about cons, frauds, swindles, and scam operators. When you know all
|
||
about it, try conning a con, (the ultimate con) and make a bust.
|
||
|
||
If it's a felony violation, Title 18, Section 3059 qualifies you for a
|
||
reward. If it's operated as a regular business (like a "chop shop" selling
|
||
used parts from stolen automobiles), it also comes under RICO.
|
||
|
||
(There are many garage mechanics who swindle car owners in various ways.
|
||
Cons, frauds and false advertising are mentioned in the next chapter.)
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
IRS - Internal Revenue Laws
|
||
|
||
26 USCS 7623 Reward for information concerning violations of internal
|
||
revenue laws.
|
||
|
||
"The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is
|
||
authorized to pay such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum
|
||
appropriated therefore, as he may deem necessary for detecting and bringing
|
||
to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue
|
||
laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not
|
||
otherwise provided for by law."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comments: The wording in this law doesn't seem impressive but it carries a
|
||
strong potential for CrimeFighters. The unspecified reward is at the sole
|
||
discretion of the Secretary, but it's usually 10% of the amount recovered
|
||
in back taxes but could also include fines, interest due, and forfeitures.
|
||
Remember, it's negotiable! (Always try for 50%)
|
||
|
||
Ten percent seems skimpy when compared to the majority of laws that offer
|
||
50%, but 10% of a large tax bill owed can be substantial. One case (Faul vs
|
||
Commissioner, 1959, CA9, 263 F2D645) paid the informer $68,837.96.
|
||
|
||
Note: Internal Revenue laws aren't just for income tax. They also include
|
||
unpaid liquor tax (on moonshine made in illegal distilleries) and tobacco
|
||
tax (cigarettes sold without tax stamps). Lawbreakers also include almost
|
||
all criminals, prostitutes, and gamblers, who neglect to report their
|
||
illegal income and pay taxes on it!
|
||
|
||
All business, whether legal or illegal (dope dealing for example) are
|
||
subject to income taxes too! That may seem ridiculous, but the IRS thereby
|
||
sets a catch-22 trap for criminals who may not be convicted of any crime,
|
||
but can be convicted for income tax evasion. (That's how they nailed Al
|
||
Capone!) If you declare any income from illegal sources, you can expect to
|
||
be arrested for it. But if you don't declare it, the IRS can nab you!
|
||
|
||
Keep that in mind when you see any criminal activity. Chances are, the
|
||
crook hasn't paid any taxes on his illegal income and is guilty of tax
|
||
evasion by failing to file and report income - no matter how it's obtained.
|
||
Look for a successful drug dealer with an expensive car and valuable
|
||
jewelry. He probably hasn't paid any taxes for many years.
|
||
|
||
To qualify for a (negotiated) reward, the IRS will want something tangible
|
||
to go on, not just your hunch. (The crook may also have a legitimate
|
||
business and is actually paying taxes on sufficient income to support his
|
||
lavish lifestyle.) But if he pays no taxes at all, that may be enough for
|
||
the IRS to ask embarrassing questions. When they do an audit, they may
|
||
discover large sums of money has been invested, but the source of the money
|
||
might be traced to prior or continuing criminal enterprises or racketeering
|
||
-- that opens the door to RICO and maximum fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
As always, use RICO whenever possible. Lay charges and initiate a civil
|
||
suit. When you have control of the case, you are the prosecutor and can
|
||
choose which laws you want to use. You can use more than one law if more
|
||
than one is applicable. Negotiate with the FBI for 50% of resultant fines
|
||
and forfeitures plus appropriate rewards.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
26 USCS 7214 Reward for information concerning offenses of government
|
||
officers and employees in connection with revenue law.
|
||
|
||
"(a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents.
|
||
|
||
Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any
|
||
revenue law of the United States -
|
||
|
||
(1) who is guilty of any extortion or willful oppression under color of
|
||
law; or
|
||
|
||
(2) who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law,
|
||
or receives any fee, compensation or reward, except as by law prescribed,
|
||
for the performance of any duty; or
|
||
|
||
(3) who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this
|
||
title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; or
|
||
|
||
(4)who conspires or colludes with any other person to defraud the United
|
||
States; or
|
||
|
||
(5) who knowingly makes opportunity for any person to defraud the United
|
||
States; or
|
||
|
||
(6) who does or omits to do any act with intent to enable any other person
|
||
to defraud the United States; or
|
||
|
||
(7) who makes or signs any fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs
|
||
any fraudulent certificate, return, or statement; or
|
||
|
||
(8) who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue
|
||
law by any person, or of fraud committed by any person against the United
|
||
States under any revenue law, fails to report, in writing, such knowledge
|
||
or information to the Secretary; or
|
||
|
||
(9) who demands, or accepts, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly
|
||
as payment or gift, or otherwise, any sum of money or other thing of value
|
||
for the compromise, adjustment, or settlement of any charge or complaint
|
||
for any violation or alleged violation of law, except as expressly
|
||
authorized by law to do so; shall be dismissed from office or discharged
|
||
from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
|
||
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its
|
||
discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of
|
||
one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be
|
||
ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render
|
||
judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages
|
||
sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution."
|
||
|
||
(The key phrase is "one-half" or 50% of the fines and forfeitures.)
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Miscellaneous Customs/Coast Guard (reward) laws
|
||
|
||
There a few miscellaneous (small) rewards paid by the Coast Guard and the
|
||
various branches of the Armed Forces. Most of these reward laws were made
|
||
during WWII, and the rewards (up to $500) are piddly by today's standards.
|
||
Instead of wasting disk space on them, I suggest you look for alternative
|
||
rewards from the FBI when it involves a felony. Title 18: 3059 makes you
|
||
eligible to be the prosecutor. Initiate both criminal and civil suits.
|
||
Negotiate a plea bargain to settle your $1,000+ civil suit out of court.
|
||
Get paid by the lawbreaker when you can, instead of using piddly rewards.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Rewards for Conviction of Mail Order Fraud,
|
||
Cons, Scams, Bait and Switch,
|
||
False Advertising, and Pyramid Schemes
|
||
|
||
Every year some new scheme, and many old ones, succeed in bilking people
|
||
out of their hard-earned money. CrimeFighters can help bring the
|
||
perpetrators to justice and collect rewards for doing so.
|
||
|
||
A common method used to defraud the public is the use of a phoney lottery
|
||
operated via telephone "boiler rooms" (telemarketing), or by direct mail.
|
||
The scam is, you are told you have won a fantastic prize, but to "qualify"
|
||
you have to make a small purchase -- often costing a few hundred dollars.
|
||
Needless to say, the junk you receive isn't worth the money you had to pay
|
||
to get them, and of course you never see the big prize. Boiler rooms and
|
||
mailboxes are easily set up to get into business, and simply closed down
|
||
when the scam has run its course or the law starts nosing around.
|
||
|
||
A recent newspaper article mentions that experienced con artists and scam
|
||
operators are well aware of the postal inspectors powers and arrest rate.
|
||
To avoid violating postal laws, they often insist on delivering the offer
|
||
or receiving the money in person, or by sending or receiving it via Federal
|
||
Express. Possibly, anyone who is reluctant to use the postal service when
|
||
delivering the solicitation, the offer, the merchandise, or receiving the
|
||
money or any part of the transaction, may be a scam operator trying to
|
||
avoid postal inspectors. Look for that as an indication of a scam.
|
||
|
||
Another scam is a phoney lottery that may be registered as a non-profit
|
||
corporation that has obtained permits to lend credence to the scam.
|
||
Incorporation, registration, and permits may be impressive but provide no
|
||
guarantee of legitimacy. The phoney lottery rigs the contest to favor the
|
||
owners, a confederate, or a fictitious person who "wins" the big prize.
|
||
|
||
Another example is an illegal tax shelter plan, where the corporation sells
|
||
shares in a multimillion-dollar condominium. If the IRS later finds such a
|
||
scheme unauthorized and illegal, the property could be forfeited because it
|
||
was the instrument used to make the fraud effective.
|
||
|
||
Often with a fine, there is also a forfeiture of the property used to
|
||
commit the crime, especially if the property was essential to the fraud or
|
||
crime committed. For example, if the prize in an illegal lottery was a
|
||
$125,000 Rolls Royce automobile that was essential for the perpetration of
|
||
the fraud, the Rolls can and probably would be seized and forfeited. A
|
||
CrimeFighter instrumental in conviction would receive, in addition to half
|
||
of the fines, half of the value of the automobile.
|
||
|
||
Spotting Mail Order Scams and Frauds
|
||
|
||
Here's an easy job for stay-at-home CrimeFighters. Read classified ads to
|
||
spot illegal mail order scams, investigate to obtain the required evidence,
|
||
report fraudulent schemes, and collect the rewards. When you find a get-
|
||
rich quick scheme that looks too good to be true, it usually is and may
|
||
also be illegal. The TV program "Deals and Steals" is worth watching for
|
||
examples of scam operations. Another one is "20/20." The following scams
|
||
occur over and over.
|
||
|
||
Multi-Level Marketing Schemes (MLMs)
|
||
|
||
There are legal and illegal multi-level marketing schemes. AMWAY and a few
|
||
other similarly operated businesses are legal MLMs because they pay over-
|
||
ride commissions based on ongoing and repeat-sales of actual products at
|
||
various distribution levels throughout their chain. Paying override
|
||
commissions to sales managers and distributors is a common business
|
||
practice. MLMs take it to its maximum degree possible.
|
||
|
||
Illegal MLMs do not expect continuing retail sales of expendable items,
|
||
such as soap powder or vitamins. Their only source of continuing income is
|
||
additional lump-sum amounts paid up-front as membership or distributorship
|
||
fees from new recruits. Various names are used by illegal MLMs for each
|
||
level of distribution or management to make them sound plausible. When they
|
||
run out of recruits, they run out of income to pay override commissions and
|
||
the MLM collapses. The people at the top make money at the expense (and
|
||
chagrin) of the people at the bottom.
|
||
|
||
A new MLM wrinkle is to sell "reports". The sales pitch tells the mark to
|
||
mail a thousand or more letters to names found on mailing lists. The sales
|
||
letter describes the operation as a bonafide MLM. The "product" is a group
|
||
of five reports which sells for $5. The person who buys them can copy them
|
||
and do the same thing and sell them to umpteen more marks, and so on.
|
||
|
||
No one wants to continue to buy the reports again and again (as they do for
|
||
vitamins or cosmetics). The money paid to the man at the top of the list
|
||
(or the first to mail a few thousand letters) has to come from the pockets
|
||
of marks. Somewhere down the road, the second and subsequent levels of
|
||
marks won't be able to find any more suckers. The last few thousand people
|
||
who joined the MLM will never get their money back. They've been stung!
|
||
|
||
The sale of the reports supposedly legitimize the use of the MLM name. The
|
||
actual value of the reports is questionable, but the main problem with the
|
||
illegal MLM is that it does not sell "repeat" items such as those sold by
|
||
legitimate MLMs. They do not expect a continuous flow of income and so
|
||
cannot pay commissions. Instead, payments to each new con man in the scam
|
||
must come from new marks, who try to sell five sheets of paper to other
|
||
marks, and so on. The "reports" are just a ruse to rationalize the scam.
|
||
As any lawyer will tell you, a rose is a rose, no matter what you call it.
|
||
|
||
By the same token, paper reports (costing less than $1) or like items of
|
||
insignificant value become sham sales. Selling them would be determined by
|
||
the courts as simply a ruse to make the scam plausible to gullible people.
|
||
|
||
More and more phoney MLMs are making the rounds. Every week someone hatches
|
||
a new one. Look for them, and prosecute them. However, before you jump the
|
||
gun and possibly make false accusations (or false arrests), check them out
|
||
first with a lawyer or the FBI.
|
||
|
||
Chain Letters Called by Various Names
|
||
|
||
In chain letters, or similar dressed-up MLM schemes, it's not possible for
|
||
everyone in the pyramid to get their money back, let alone make a profit.
|
||
That means new recruits who pay into the scheme at a later date can't get
|
||
paid as promised. Those who initiate the scheme and their immediate
|
||
followers have a good chance of collecting more than they put into it, but
|
||
the majority of investors wind up losers. That's fraud, which falls under
|
||
RICO statutes.
|
||
|
||
You don't have to catch the person who originated these scams. Each and
|
||
every person involved in and participating in pyramid schemes is guilty of
|
||
breaking the law. If you can establish an audit trail of names, you may be
|
||
able to snare a few hundred to a few thousand violators.
|
||
|
||
The list of names on the chain letter doesn't contain the names of everyone
|
||
involved, only the current list. However, each person on the letter may be
|
||
"persuaded" to produce the list they received (and probably kept) to
|
||
provide an audit trail back to almost all of the people involved.
|
||
|
||
Police, prosecutors, and the courts are far too busy to be enthusiastic
|
||
about the huge chore to convict every person on a pyramid scheme. But if a
|
||
CrimeFighter wanted to, he could "volunteer" (Qui Tam law) to prosecute a
|
||
few hundred or a few thousand (felony) lawbreakers. Even if the reward paid
|
||
is only $100 per person (under 3059), you qualify for Qui Tam. That puts
|
||
you in the driver's seat to lay charges and do the plea bargaining. You can
|
||
also file a $1,000 personal lawsuit at the same time to collect for your
|
||
time and expenses involved.
|
||
|
||
Lay criminal charges under RICO as well as a personal civil suit for $1,000
|
||
against each lawbreaker. Using the Rules of Discovery and interrogatories
|
||
and depositions, you can obtain the names and addresses of participants
|
||
from list-to-list all the way to the top. There's usually a few hundred to
|
||
a thousand or more participants in most chain-letter schemes. If you track
|
||
them down, and prosecute 1,000 of them, using RICO and civil suits, at
|
||
$1,000 each you could wind up with a million dollars!
|
||
|
||
By now you should know how to use plea bargaining on pending criminal
|
||
charges as leverage to settle your civil suit for $1,000. An out-of-court
|
||
settlement lets you dismiss the criminal charges with a warning for first
|
||
time violators. I believe 99.9% would be happy to settle out of court.
|
||
|
||
Arizona Revised Statutes, under Trade and Commerce, which follows, can be
|
||
used as an example. All states have similar statutes. Look them up.
|
||
|
||
ARS 44-1731 (pyramid schemes) Definitions.
|
||
|
||
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
|
||
|
||
1. "Compensation" includes a payment based on a sale or distribution made
|
||
to a person who either is a participant in a pyramid promotional scheme or
|
||
has the right to become a participant upon payment.
|
||
|
||
2. "Consideration" means the payment of cash or the purchase of goods,
|
||
services or intangible property but does not include:
|
||
|
||
(a) The purchase of goods or services furnished at cost to be used in
|
||
making sales and not for resale.
|
||
|
||
(b) Time and effort spent in pursuit of sales or recruiting activities.
|
||
|
||
3. "Pyramid promotional scheme" means any plan or operation by which a
|
||
participant gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation
|
||
which is derived primarily from any person's introduction of other persons
|
||
into participation in the plan or operation rather than from the sale of
|
||
goods, services or intangible property by the participant or other persons
|
||
introduced into the plan or operation.
|
||
|
||
ARS 44-1732 Violation; classification
|
||
|
||
A. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this article is guilty
|
||
of a class 6 felony.
|
||
|
||
B. The attorney general or county attorney, or both, shall institute the
|
||
criminal actions to enforce provisions of this article.
|
||
|
||
An act or practice in violation of this article constitutes an unlawful
|
||
practice under 44-1522. The attorney general may investigate and take
|
||
appropriate action as prescribed by chapter 10, article 7 of this title
|
||
(Section 44-1521 et seq.)
|
||
|
||
ARS 44-1735 Pyramid promotional scheme; prohibition; defenses excluded.
|
||
|
||
A. A person shall not establish, operate, advertise or promote a pyramid
|
||
promotional scheme.
|
||
|
||
B. A limitation as to the number of person who may participate or the
|
||
presence of additional conditions affecting eligibility for the opportunity
|
||
to receive compensation under the plan or operation does not change the
|
||
identity of the scheme as a pyramid promotional scheme nor is a defense
|
||
under this article that a participant, on giving consideration, obtains any
|
||
goods, services or intangible property in addition to the rights to receive
|
||
compensation."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Selling five flimsy reports (or any other item or providing services of any
|
||
kind, of any value) does not make an illegal pyramid scheme legitimate. The
|
||
test is that if there are no repeat sales to generate a normal profit from
|
||
which distributors can actually earn their commissions, it's probably a
|
||
pyramid scheme. Check it out.
|
||
|
||
Fraud and Deception
|
||
|
||
There is a subtle difference between falsity and deception. Blatantly false
|
||
statements such as "the best burger in the world" is not considered false
|
||
advertising, no matter how true or untrue the statement is (who knows?).
|
||
These generalized statements are classified as "puffery" and often used to
|
||
some extent by many companies. Hardly anyone takes them seriously.
|
||
|
||
However, a false or unproven statement that says, in effect, one product
|
||
will do something better than a competitive product may, comes under the
|
||
scrutiny as a false advertising claim. And when something is knowingly and
|
||
willfully done to deceive the public into buying a product, it's illegal.
|
||
|
||
For example, a well-known company advertised a can of shaving cream as
|
||
their competitor's brand ("brand X") to demonstrate how quickly brand X
|
||
evaporated compared to their brand. The deception was that brand X didn't
|
||
contain shaving cream but a concoction that foamed like shaving cream and
|
||
evaporated quickly.
|
||
|
||
A famous brand of "chunky style" Soup was once advertised on TV using a few
|
||
marbles in the bottom of a soup bowl to make it appear as though the soup
|
||
was "brim-full" of meat and vegetables. The use of marbles in soup was done
|
||
"knowingly and willfully" to deceive the public. That's illegal.
|
||
|
||
Bait and Switch Advertising
|
||
|
||
Another type of fraud is accomplished by a company or individual that
|
||
advertises to sell a product for a very low price. People who ask for the
|
||
item are often advised, "sorry, we just sold the last one." They're
|
||
steered to a more expensive product the company really wants to sell.
|
||
Having just one or two of the products available and advertised at a low
|
||
price won't get the company off the hook for bait and switch advertising
|
||
unless the number of units available is mentioned in the ad. Fraud occurs
|
||
when the intent was not to sell the advertised item(s) but simply to lure
|
||
the public into the place of business to buy higher-priced items.
|
||
|
||
Example: A few years ago I wanted to buy some furniture. A bedroom suite
|
||
was advertised for about half the usual price. When I went to the store I
|
||
was shown a bedroom set of flimsy furniture. For what I had in mind, the
|
||
price was O.K. so I decided to purchase it anyway - to the consternation of
|
||
the salesman. It turned out that bedroom set was their one and only. It was
|
||
used as "bait." They didn't expect to sell it and didn't want to sell it.
|
||
They tried to talk me out of it by "discounting" a better-looking group. I
|
||
didn't realize it at that time, but they were using a bait and switch
|
||
operation.
|
||
|
||
Bait and switch is very common. It's also against the law because it's
|
||
"deceptive advertising." Used car dealers are notorious for bait and
|
||
switch advertisements ("creampuffs" turn out to be "clunkers") but they
|
||
lure you to their salesroom so they can work on you to sell you a
|
||
different, higher-priced vehicle.
|
||
|
||
Another incident: Many years ago I read an advertisement offering a low-
|
||
cost automatic transmission drain and refill plus a free inspection. After
|
||
the truck was up on a rack and the transmission partially disassembled, l
|
||
was shown the "burnt" oil and parts and was strongly advised to have an
|
||
overhaul done. I couldn't afford the $300 or so they said it would cost, so
|
||
I told them to just put it back together as I had no problem with it
|
||
before. The mechanic worked on me, the head mechanic worked on me, and the
|
||
sales manager worked on me - trying to convince me to have it "overhauled."
|
||
It took almost an hour to convince them I was absolutely not going to be
|
||
coerced into expensive repairs when I felt none was necessary. (The truck
|
||
transmission never gave me any problems afterwards.)
|
||
|
||
It was a typical bait and switch operation. The company was later charged
|
||
and convicted for this illegal practice. If I had known the law at that
|
||
time, I would have reported it and collected a reward -- and might have
|
||
been able to buy a new truck!
|
||
|
||
Automotive repair chains that offer "free inspection" are sometimes used
|
||
like bait and switch ads. Free inspections often lead to expensive repairs.
|
||
Some may be required, some not.
|
||
|
||
Ghost Cars
|
||
|
||
Occasionally, news reporters will take a "ghost" car, which has been
|
||
checked by a couple of reliable mechanics and certified that no repairs are
|
||
necessary, to a franchised shop for inspection. They find that quite a few
|
||
mechanics claim the car needs expensive repairs. The undercover investiga-
|
||
tion or "sting operations" by reporters always make a good news story.
|
||
If you're a reporter, remember that you can also collect a reward!
|
||
|
||
If you're mechanically inclined, get an older car, have it checked out and
|
||
verified as "mechanically sound" by two certified mechanics who know what
|
||
you're up to. Advise them they may be required to be "expert witnesses."
|
||
(They get paid for their time.) Then set up your auto-mechanic sting
|
||
operation, and snare a dozen or so dirty-dealing garage-mechanic bandits!
|
||
|
||
The supply of garage-mechanic bandits is unlimited. If they're part of a
|
||
franchise chain, so are the fines! In a large city there's enough
|
||
"business" for a full-time garage-buster. If you go after the franchise
|
||
chains, and snare a few dealers, it could lead to megabuck fines, of which
|
||
you can get half when you prosecute under RICO civil suits.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
False Advertising
|
||
|
||
Look for intentionally misleading wording that seems to promise one thing,
|
||
but delivers another -- sometimes by implying what isn't stated but leading
|
||
readers to believe they will get what seems to be promised, but which is
|
||
never intended to be delivered.
|
||
|
||
According to Section 15 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, deceptive
|
||
advertisements are those that are "misleading in material respect," which
|
||
has been interpreted by the courts to mean the deceptive advertisement must
|
||
somehow affect the purchasing decisions of the customer.
|
||
|
||
If the wording is designed skillfully, knowingly and willfully to entice
|
||
buyers by implying something that isn't true, but coaxes the purchase by
|
||
deliberate omission of the true facts, or play of words, it's deceptive
|
||
advertising.
|
||
|
||
For a complete definition of what constitutes fraudulent practices, look up
|
||
your state laws concerning trade and commerce. State law books, usually
|
||
called "Revised Statutes," cite a few cases for quick reference. They will
|
||
help you decide the type of evidence you need and help you analyze the
|
||
strengths and weaknesses in the potential fraud case you may have
|
||
discovered.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
U.S. Post Office Rewards
|
||
|
||
This section isn't about the "Wanted" posters hanging in the U.S. Post
|
||
office. It's about rewards offered for information leading to the arrest
|
||
and conviction of persons violating postal laws.
|
||
|
||
This law is long and humdrum for CrimeFighters, so I'll skip the many pages
|
||
that lead up to the reward clause.
|
||
|
||
Title 39 USCS 101 et seq.
|
||
|
||
404. Specific Powers.
|
||
|
||
"(a) Without limitation of the generality of its powers, the Postal Service
|
||
shall have the specific powers, among others:
|
||
|
||
(skipped (1) through (6) the non-reward paragraphs)
|
||
|
||
(7) to investigate postal offenses and civil matters relating to the postal
|
||
Service;
|
||
|
||
(8) to offer and pay rewards for information and services in connection
|
||
with violations of the postal laws, and, unless a different disposal is
|
||
expressly prescribed, to pay one-half of all penalties and forfeitures
|
||
imposed for violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues,
|
||
or property, to the person informing for the same, and to pay the other
|
||
one-half into the Postal Service Fund; and ..." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
While almost all of the wording in it pertains to postal property, stamps
|
||
and mail, it covers almost all crimes that uses postal services in one way
|
||
or another. Almost all scams either use the mails to distribute their
|
||
offerings, or to receive money though the mails. (More on that at the end
|
||
of this chapter.)
|
||
|
||
The key words are "to pay one-half." Under this law, negotiations aren't
|
||
required to qualify for 50% of the resultant fines and forfeitures. At
|
||
least that's what appears to be the case.
|
||
|
||
Protecting Your Claim for Postal Rewards
|
||
|
||
I mailed the evidence of a pyramid scheme letter I received to the postal
|
||
authorities in California. I didn't get a reward. The inspector I dealt
|
||
with brushed me off and didn't answer my letters requesting a follow up. In
|
||
other words, I was stonewalled -- a common occurrence from bureaucrats.
|
||
|
||
I was told by a U.S. Postal Agent that the Service has no provision to pay
|
||
rewards for fraud cases even if it's called "mail fraud." According to the
|
||
person I dealt with, Title 39 USCS 404 refers only to the crimes listed on
|
||
Notice 96 (below). After reading the words and phrases in USCS 404 (above)
|
||
you may agree I was eligible, but just stonewalled by a petty bureaucrat at
|
||
the bottom of the decision-making ladder.
|
||
|
||
Their rationale is, I suppose, they're saving taxpayers' money. While that
|
||
may be true, it also discourages any further disclosures. In this case, a
|
||
thousand dollars "saved" might well mean many postal violations and many
|
||
thousands of dollars worth of potential fines and forfeitures are lost.
|
||
In England, that's called being penny-wise and pound foolish.
|
||
|
||
My mistake was in not negotiating first and keeping the evidence. I felt
|
||
that if I provided the information, rewards would be paid without any
|
||
hassle. Unfortunately, that's not how bureaucrats think. In most cases,
|
||
they begrudge paying citizens for what they feel is their duty. It doesn't
|
||
matter if there is a law saying rewards will be paid. If they can avoid
|
||
paying it, they'll stonewall your requests and letters of inquiry, and
|
||
simply brush you off.
|
||
|
||
If you receive or obtain evidence of any kind of mail fraud, do not mail it
|
||
to postal authorities (or any other law enforcement agency). Make a brief
|
||
preliminary disclosure of the details but don't provide the name and
|
||
address of the person or company. Negotiate for a reward, and get the
|
||
promise to pay in writing.
|
||
|
||
Also, another thing to look out for: be sure the person who promises to
|
||
pay a reward has the authority to legally bind the agency to the payment.
|
||
If the person who makes the promise isn't authorized to make any such
|
||
promises, the promise can be swept aside. To avoid that problem, insist
|
||
that the promise to pay a reward (and a share of the fines and forfeitures)
|
||
also includes a separate paragraph that clearly states the person offering
|
||
the reward is duly authorized to pay the reward as outlined in the letter
|
||
to you. If the person who signs such a statement isn't authorized (and
|
||
knowingly lies) you can sue him personally, as well as the department he
|
||
represents, for breach of promise.
|
||
|
||
If you want the largest reward possible, prosecute the case yourself under
|
||
Federal RICO law. If that's too much trouble, keep in mind that almost all
|
||
felonies are covered by their own respective Federal laws according to the
|
||
crime committed. Use them instead of Postal laws for prosecution. Or,
|
||
contact the FBI or U.S. District Attorney for those few cases where RICO
|
||
doesn't apply. The FBI has proven to be more generous in paying rewards
|
||
than the Postal Service, and welcomes information from CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
F9 for Next Chapter
|
||
Wildlife Protection
|
||
|
||
Arizona Sets a Good Example
|
||
|
||
Arizona has a brochure called Operation Game Thief. It lists various
|
||
rewards for information on poachers of certain animals, birds and fish.
|
||
They pay rewards as follows:
|
||
|
||
$350 for Elk, Bighorn Sheep, Buffalo, and Bald Eagles. $250 for Deer,
|
||
Antelope, Bear, Turkey, Lion, and Javelina, or any critter on the
|
||
endangered species list
|
||
|
||
$50 to $150 for other species of wildlife and attendant acts of vandalism.
|
||
|
||
Other Rewards
|
||
|
||
In addition, several sportsmen's groups provide reward funds that allow
|
||
payments ranging from $50 to $1,000 in cases where, under State law,
|
||
Operation Game Thief is not able to pay. The rewards are, nevertheless, for
|
||
cases where the tip was originally provided through Operation Game Thief.
|
||
Decisions on these are made in consultation with the boards of member
|
||
organizations:
|
||
|
||
Operation Game Thief brochures are printed and distributed by Arizona
|
||
department of Game and Fish. The number to call for Arizona's Operation
|
||
Game Thief is 1-800-352-0700.
|
||
|
||
Most States have similar rewards, also under the name Game Thief, or
|
||
similar names, and sponsored by various organizations.
|
||
|
||
By the way, various places throughout California, Idaho, Nevada and Arizona
|
||
offer a $1,000 reward for information on poachers. I believe all States
|
||
have similar rewards, and almost every store that sells hunting and fishing
|
||
licenses probably know of a person, group, sheriff, or local DFG warden.
|
||
They can advise you if there are any rewards available. They'll also tell
|
||
you the number to call or person to contact. If all else fails, remember
|
||
WE-TIP. In California dial 1 (800) 78-CRIME, or outside of California dial
|
||
1 (800) 73-CRIME.
|
||
|
||
The following hotline numbers were noticed in The American Hunter, one of
|
||
the NRA's official publications. While they may or may not pay a reward, if
|
||
you just want to blow the whistle on poachers, here's the 800 numbers to
|
||
call:
|
||
Poaching Hotline Numbers
|
||
|
||
Help Stop Game Thieves! Use These Toll-Free 800 Numbers
|
||
(Note: all the following are to be preceded with 800)
|
||
|
||
Alabama 242-4263 Alaska 478-3377 Arizona 352-0700 Arkansas 482-9262
|
||
Califor 952-5400 Colorad 332-4155 Connect 842-4357 Delaware 292-3030
|
||
Fla NE 342-8105 Fla NW 342-1676 Fla Cen 342-9620 Everglds 432-2046
|
||
Fla Sou 282-8002 Georgia 241-4113 Hawaii 548-5918 Idaho 632-5999
|
||
Illinoi 252-0163 Indiana 847-4367 Iowa 532-2020 Kansas 228-4263
|
||
Kentuck 252-5378 Louisia 442-2511 Maine 253-7887 Maryland 635-6124
|
||
Massach 632-8075 Michign 292-7800 Minneso 652-9093 Mississi 237-6278
|
||
Missour 392-1111 Montana 847-6668 Nebrask 742-7627 Nevada 992-3030
|
||
New Ham 344-4262 New Jer 222-0456 New Mex 432-4263 New York 847-7332
|
||
N Carol 662-7137 N Dakot 472-2121 Ohio 762-2437 Oklahoma 522-8039
|
||
Oregon 452-7888 Penn NW 533-6764 Penn SW 243-8519 Pen NCen 422-7551
|
||
Pen SCen422-7554 Penn NE 228-0789 Penn SE 228-0791 Rhode Is 525-0770
|
||
S Carol 922-5431 S Dakot 592-5522 Tenness 255-8972 Texas 792-4263
|
||
Utah 662-3337 Vermont 752-5378 Virgini 237-5712 Washngtn 477-6224
|
||
W Virgin638-4263 Wiscons 847-9367 Wyoming 442-4331
|
||
|
||
Park Rangers Asked to Don Body Armor
|
||
|
||
"GRAND CANYON, Arizona - Skyrocketing crime in some of America's wilderness
|
||
vacation spots has compelled the National Park Service to urge rangers to
|
||
wear bulletproof vests.
|
||
|
||
Park Service officials say car thieves, drug smugglers and gangs flourish
|
||
in parks because the remote areas are difficult to patrol and tourists, who
|
||
believe the sites are immune to crime, take fewer precautions in protecting
|
||
their property.
|
||
|
||
Although crime statistics are sketchy, mounting incidents show park areas
|
||
are not immune from the worst of urban crime.
|
||
|
||
Last year park ranger Robert L. McGhee, 50, was shot to death after making
|
||
a traffic stop on a park road in Gulf Islands National Park in Mississippi.
|
||
|
||
In the past year, rangers shot two men to death in separate armed battles
|
||
at Lake Mead National Recreational Area near Las Vegas, Nevada.
|
||
|
||
Drugs have also played a part in park crime waves. A major drug smuggling
|
||
operation was uncovered in Big Bend National Park in Texas, and a
|
||
laboratory for the illegal drug methamphetamine was found in Joshua Tree
|
||
National Park in California. Remote areas on BLM land is often used to set
|
||
up drug factories, or to grow marijuana.
|
||
|
||
A pocketbook, "Outlaw" (The true story of Claude Dallas), by Jeff Long,
|
||
tells about a self-styled mountain man who lived off the land hunting and
|
||
trapping in the Idaho/Nevada/Oregon triangle (Owyhee region) in 1980.
|
||
Claude shot and killed two Department of Fish and Game wardens. He was
|
||
caught, prosecuted, went to prison, and escaped in 1986 and is still on the
|
||
loose, probably in the same area.
|
||
|
||
The book has a surprising statistic quoted, and a cautionary comment for
|
||
anyone considering being a game warden or a CrimeFighter specializing in
|
||
patrolling Parks and Forests:
|
||
|
||
"The Wyoming Fish and Game Department report showed that a game warden has
|
||
roughly SEVEN times the chance of getting shot at or threatened with a gun
|
||
as a regular police officer, and almost NINE times as great a chance of
|
||
dying if assaulted."
|
||
|
||
With those statistics, the Department of Fish and Game should up the ante
|
||
from $1,000 and make the reward $10,000 for the arrest of any poacher, and
|
||
lawmakers should upgrade poaching from a misdemeanor to a felony - to make
|
||
it commensurate with the increased seriousness and risk.
|
||
|
||
Canadians have similar problems. A recent Canadian TV program featured a
|
||
story about poachers in Quebec. It mentioned the increasing number of
|
||
incidents that have taken place in the last few years. Many game wardens
|
||
have been threatened, beaten, and hospitalized, or shot and killed by
|
||
poachers. Until recently, game wardens in Canada carried no firearms but
|
||
after the last incident mentioned on the TV show, where a game warden was
|
||
shot to death by a crossbow, the need for well-armed law enforcement
|
||
personnel in parks and forests as well as urban areas are now obvious and
|
||
recommended.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters (and campers, fishermen, etc.) are advised to have the means
|
||
to protect themselves in remote areas where there are few armed rangers to
|
||
provide them with protection. CrimeFighters on park patrols should likewise
|
||
carry a weapon for self defense in case they're discovered and a poacher
|
||
makes a life-threatening move against them.
|
||
|
||
When you decide to patrol a national forest or national park, stop at the
|
||
ranger station and read the park rules concerning weapons. If in doubt,
|
||
check with the ranger or game warden. Obey the posted rules.
|
||
|
||
Have a chat with the ranger first. He'll be more likely to believe you when
|
||
you call to report poaching or other illegal activity. When talking to the
|
||
ranger or game warden, ask for their telephone number or CB channel that
|
||
you can use to give them a call.
|
||
|
||
Patience is a Virtue (and a Necessity)
|
||
|
||
Stake-outs and covert surveillance require endless patience, That's an
|
||
accepted part of a lawman's job. The U.S. Customs or the Border Patrol
|
||
officers describe their job as "95% boredom, with 5% sheer terror."
|
||
CrimeFighters on stake-outs should remember that. If you keep a discreet
|
||
distance and not expose yourself to dangerous situations, you can avoid the
|
||
5% sheer terror. That way it might be 95% boredom and 5% happy excitement.
|
||
The latter occurs when you obtain evidence resulting in an arrest and a
|
||
conviction and qualify for the rewards.
|
||
|
||
Remember: "... a game warden has roughly SEVEN times the chance of getting
|
||
shot at or threatened with a gun as a regular police officer, and almost
|
||
NINE times as great a chance of dying if assaulted."
|
||
|
||
Whenever possible, call the police or law enforcement agencies to make the
|
||
arrest. Keep a low profile. Never expose yourself to unnecessary physical
|
||
danger or lawsuits. If you're a full-time CrimeFighter, and in it mainly
|
||
for the money, don't jeopardize your life or bank account by sticking your
|
||
neck out. Your job is to supply the information to law enforcement agents.
|
||
Let a lawman make the arrest.
|
||
|
||
In addition to Fish and Game poachers, there's another type of poacher who
|
||
is even more dangerous: those who threaten the extinction of wildlife
|
||
listed as endangered species. There are Federal laws that offer rewards for
|
||
information leading to their arrest and conviction.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
The Law
|
||
|
||
The following law quotations are included for your convenience in case you
|
||
wanted the information. But reading them is slow and tedious. If you're not
|
||
interested in pursuing a career in wildlife law enforcement, use F9 to skip
|
||
the remainder of this chapter.
|
||
|
||
Conservation Reward Laws
|
||
|
||
16 USCS Section 668 Reward for information concerning violations of the
|
||
Protection of Bald and Golden Eagles.
|
||
|
||
(a) Prohibited acts; criminal penalties.
|
||
|
||
Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
|
||
thereof, without being permitted do so as hereinafter provided, shall
|
||
knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the consequences of his act take,
|
||
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter,
|
||
transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle
|
||
commonly known as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead,
|
||
or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever
|
||
violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant to this Act, shall be
|
||
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both:
|
||
Provided, That in the case of a second or subsequent conviction for a
|
||
violation of this section committed after the date of the enactment of this
|
||
provision (enacted Oct 23, 1972), such person shall be fined not more than
|
||
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both: Provided further,
|
||
That the commission of each taking or other act prohibited by this section
|
||
with respect to a bald or golden eagle shall constitute a separate
|
||
violation of this section: Provided further, That one-half of any such
|
||
fine, but not to exceed $2,500, shall be paid to the person or persons
|
||
giving information which leads to conviction: Provided further, That
|
||
nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation
|
||
of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof,
|
||
lawfully taken prior to the addition of this Act of the provisions relating
|
||
to the preservation of the golden eagle.
|
||
|
||
(b) Civil Penalties.
|
||
|
||
Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
|
||
thereof, without being permitted do so as hereinafter provided, shall
|
||
knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the consequences of his act take,
|
||
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter,
|
||
transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle
|
||
commonly known as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead,
|
||
or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever
|
||
violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant to this Act, may be
|
||
assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $5,000 for each
|
||
such violation. Each violation shall be a separate offense. No penalty
|
||
shall be assessed unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a
|
||
hearing with respect to such violation. In determining the amount of the
|
||
penalty, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of
|
||
the person charged shall be considered by the Secretary. For good cause
|
||
shown, the Secretary may remit or mitigate any such penalty. Upon failure
|
||
to pay the penalty assessed under this section, the Secretary may request
|
||
the Attorney General to institute a civil action in a district court of the
|
||
United States for any district in which such person is found or resides or
|
||
transacts business to collect the penalty and such court shall have the
|
||
jurisdiction to hear and decide any such action. In hearing any such
|
||
action, the court must sustain the Secretary's action if supported by
|
||
substantial evidence."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
16 USCS Section 1371 - 1376, Reward for information on violation of Marine
|
||
Mammal Protection Act.
|
||
|
||
Section 1375 Penalties
|
||
|
||
(a)(1) Any person who violates any provision of this title or of any permit
|
||
or regulation issued thereunder may be assessed a civil penalty by the
|
||
Secretary of not more than $10,000 for each such violation. No penalty
|
||
shall be assessed unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a
|
||
hearing with respect to such violation. Each unlawful taking or importation
|
||
shall be a separate offense. Any such civil penalty may be remitted or
|
||
mitigated by the Secretary for good cause shown. Upon any failure to pay a
|
||
penalty assessed under this subsection, the Secretary may request the
|
||
Attorney General to institute a civil action in a district court of the
|
||
United States for any district in which such person is found, resides, or
|
||
transacts business to collect the penalty and such court shall have
|
||
jurisdiction to hear and decide any such actions.
|
||
|
||
(2) In any case involving an alleged unlawful importation of a marine
|
||
mammal or marine mammal product, if such importation is made by an
|
||
individual for his own personal or family use (which does not include
|
||
importation as an accommodation to others or for sale or other commercial
|
||
use), the Secretary may, in lieu of instituting a proceeding under
|
||
paragraph (1), allow the individual to abandon the mammal or product under
|
||
procedures to be prescribed by the Secretary, to the enforcement officer at
|
||
the port of entry.
|
||
|
||
(b) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this title or of any
|
||
permit or regulations issued thereunder shall, upon conviction, be fined
|
||
not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not more
|
||
than one year, or both. (Oct 21, 1972 and amended on Oct 9, 1981)
|
||
|
||
Section 1376 Seizure and forfeiture of Cargo
|
||
|
||
(a) Application of consistent provisions.
|
||
|
||
Any vessel or other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the United
|
||
States that is employed in any manner in the unlawful taking of any marine
|
||
mammal shall have its entire cargo or the monetary value thereof subject to
|
||
the seizure and forfeiture. All provisions of law relating to the seizure,
|
||
judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of cargo for violation of the customs
|
||
laws, the disposition of such cargo, and the proceeds form the sale
|
||
thereof, and the remission or mitigation of any such forfeiture, shall
|
||
apply with respect to the cargo of any vessel or other conveyance seized in
|
||
connection with the unlawful taking of a marine mammal insofar as such
|
||
provisions of law are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
|
||
of this title.
|
||
|
||
(b) Penalties.
|
||
|
||
Any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United Sates that is employed
|
||
in any manner in the unlawful taking of any marine mammal shall be liable
|
||
for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000. Such penalty shall be
|
||
assessed by the district court of the United States having jurisdiction
|
||
over the vessel. Clearance of a vessel against which a penalty has been
|
||
assessed, from a port of the United Sates, may be withheld until such
|
||
penalty is paid, or until a bond or otherwise satisfactory surety is
|
||
posted. Such penalty shall constitute a maritime lien on such vessel which
|
||
may be recovered by action in rem in the district court of the United
|
||
States having jurisdiction over the vessel.
|
||
|
||
(c) Reward for information leading to conviction.
|
||
|
||
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury is
|
||
authorized to pay an amount equal to one-half of the fine incurred but not
|
||
to exceed $2,500 to any person who furnishes information which leads to a
|
||
conviction for a violation of this title. Any officer or employee of the
|
||
United States or of any State or local government who furnishes information
|
||
or renders service in the performance of his official duties shall not be
|
||
eligible for payment under this section.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: If any breach of law includes a felony, and the crime was based on
|
||
financial gain, RICO law may also apply. If that's possible, a CrimeFighter
|
||
should weigh the anticipated reward to be paid compared to what might be
|
||
gained by prosecution under RICO law where 50% of the fines and forfeitures
|
||
from civil and criminal suits may be obtained. Be the prosecutor when you
|
||
can to assure substantial rewards via fines and forfeitures, unless they
|
||
are expected to be minimal. In that case, let the Rangers do the
|
||
prosecution and apply for appropriate rewards.
|
||
|
||
* * * * **
|
||
|
||
16 USCS Section 1540. Reward for information leading to the arrest, a
|
||
criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment or forfeiture of property
|
||
concerning a violation of the Endangered Species Act.
|
||
|
||
Section 1540 Penalties and enforcement
|
||
|
||
(a) Civil Penalties.
|
||
|
||
Any person who knowingly violates, or who knowingly commits an act in the
|
||
course of a commercial activity which violates any provision of this Act,
|
||
or any provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder, or any
|
||
regulation issued in order to implement subsection (a)(1)(A), (B), (C),
|
||
(D), (E), or (F),(a)(2)(A),(B), (C), or (D), (c), (d) (other than
|
||
regulation relating to record keeping or filing of reports), (f) or (g) of
|
||
section 9 of this Act may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of
|
||
not more than $25,000 for each violation. Any person who knowingly
|
||
violates, and any person engaged in business as an importer or exporter of
|
||
fish, wildlife, or plants, who violates any provision of any other
|
||
regulation issued under this Act may be assessed a civil penalty by the
|
||
Secretary of not more than $12,000 for each such violation. Any person who
|
||
otherwise violates any other provision of this Act, or any regulation,
|
||
permit, or certificate issued hereunder, may be assessed a civil penalty by
|
||
the Secretary of not more than $500 for each violation. No penalty may be
|
||
assessed under this subsection unless such person is given notice and
|
||
opportunity for a hearing with respect to such violation. Each violation
|
||
shall be a separate offense. Any such civil penalty may be remitted or
|
||
mitigated by the Secretary. Upon any failure to pay a penalty assessed
|
||
under this subsection, the Secretary may request the Attorney General to
|
||
institute a civil action in a district court of the United States for any
|
||
district in which such person is found, resides, or transacts business to
|
||
collect the penalty and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
|
||
decide such action. The court shall hear such action on the record made
|
||
before the Secretary and shall sustain his action if it is supported by
|
||
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
|
||
|
||
(2) Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of civil penalties
|
||
authorized by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be be conducted in
|
||
accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code. The Secretary
|
||
may issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
|
||
production of relevant papers, books, and documents, and administer oaths.
|
||
Witnesses summoned shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid to
|
||
witnesses in the courts of the United States. In case of contumacy or
|
||
refusal to obey a subpoena served upon any person pursuant to this
|
||
paragraph, the district court in which such person is found or resides or
|
||
transacts business, upon application by the United States and after notice
|
||
to such person, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such
|
||
person to appear and produce documents before the Secretary, or both, and
|
||
any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court
|
||
as a contempt thereof.
|
||
|
||
(b) Criminal violations.
|
||
|
||
(1) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this Act, of any
|
||
permit or certificate issued hereunder, or of any regulation issued in
|
||
order to implement subsection (a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D),(E), or (F);
|
||
(a)(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D), (c), (d) (other than regulation relating to
|
||
record keeping or filing of reports), (f) or(g) of section 9 of this Act
|
||
shall upon conviction, be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not
|
||
more than one year, or both. Any person who knowingly violates any
|
||
provision of any other regulation issued under this Act shall, upon
|
||
conviction, be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than
|
||
six months, or both.
|
||
|
||
(2) The head of any Federal agency which has issued a lease, license,
|
||
permit, or other agreement authorizing a person to import or export fish,
|
||
wildlife, or plants, or to operate a quarantine station for imported
|
||
wildlife, or authorizing the use of Federal lands, including grazing of
|
||
domestic livestock, to any person who is convicted of a criminal violation
|
||
of this Act or any regulation, permit, or certificate issued hereunder may
|
||
immediately modify, suspend, or revoke such lease, license, permit, or
|
||
other agreement. The Secretary shall also suspend for a period of up to one
|
||
year, or cancel, any Federal hunting or fishing permits or stamps issued to
|
||
any person who is convicted of a criminal violation of any provision of
|
||
this Act or any regulation, permit, or certificate issued hereunder. The
|
||
United States shall not be liable for the payments of any compensation,
|
||
reimbursement, or damages in connection with the modification, suspension,
|
||
or revocation of any leases, licenses, permits, stamps, or other agreements
|
||
pursuant to this section.
|
||
|
||
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defense
|
||
to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense
|
||
based on good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or
|
||
herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from
|
||
bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species.
|
||
|
||
(c) District court jurisdiction.
|
||
|
||
The several district courts of the United States, including the courts
|
||
enumerated in section 460 of title 28, United States Code, shall have
|
||
jurisdiction over nay actions arising under this Act. For the purpose of
|
||
this Act, American Samoa shall be included within the judicial district of
|
||
the District Court of the United States for the District of Hawaii.
|
||
|
||
(d) Rewards and certain incidental expenses.
|
||
|
||
The Secretary or the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, from sums
|
||
received as penalties, fines, or forfeitures of property for any violation
|
||
of this Act or any regulations issued hereunder
|
||
|
||
(1) a reward to any person who furnishes information which leads to an
|
||
arrest, a criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment, or forfeiture of
|
||
property for any violation of this Act or any regulation issued hereunder,
|
||
and
|
||
|
||
(2) the reasonable and necessary costs incurred by any person providing
|
||
temporary care for any fish, wildlife or plant pending the disposition of
|
||
any criminal proceeding alleging a violation of this Act with respect to
|
||
that fish, wildlife or plant. The amount of the reward, if any, is to be
|
||
designated by the Secretary or the Secretary of the Treasury, as
|
||
appropriate. Any officer or employee who furnishes information or renders
|
||
service in the performance of his official duties shall not be eligible for
|
||
payment under this section. Whenever the balance of sums received under
|
||
this section and section 3375(d) of the Act of November 16, 1981, as
|
||
penalties or fine, or from forfeitures of property, exceed $500,000, the
|
||
Secretary of the Treasury shall deposit an amount equal to such excess
|
||
balance in the cooperative endangered species conservation fund established
|
||
under section 1535(d) of this Act.
|
||
|
||
(e) Enforcement.
|
||
|
||
(1) The provisions of this Act and any regulations or permits issued
|
||
pursuant thereto shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Treasury, or the
|
||
Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or all
|
||
such Secretaries. Each such Secretary may utilize by agreement, with or
|
||
without reimbursement, the personnel, services, and facilities of any other
|
||
Federal agency or any State agency for purposes of enforcing this Act.
|
||
|
||
(2) The judges of the district courts of the United States and the United
|
||
States magistrates may, within their respective jurisdictions, upon proper
|
||
oath and affirmation showing probable cause, issue such warrants or other
|
||
process as may be required for enforcement of this Act and any regulations
|
||
issued thereunder.
|
||
|
||
(3) Any person authorized by the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury,
|
||
or the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
|
||
to enforce this Act may detain for inspection and inspect any package,
|
||
crate, or other container, including its contents, and all accompanying
|
||
documents, upon importation or exportation. Such person may make arrests
|
||
without a warrant for any violation of this Act if he has reasonable
|
||
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is committing the
|
||
violation in his presence or view, and may execute and serve any arrest
|
||
warrant, search warrant, or other warrant or civil or criminal process
|
||
issued by any officer or court of competent jurisdiction for enforcement of
|
||
this Act. Such person so authorized may search and seize, with or without a
|
||
warrant, as authorized by law. Any fish, wildlife, property, or item so
|
||
seized shall be held by any person authorized by the Secretary, the
|
||
Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of the Department in which the
|
||
Coast Guard is operating pending disposition of civil or criminal
|
||
proceedings, or the institution of an action in rem for forfeiture of such
|
||
fish, wildlife, property, or item, pursuant to paragraph (4) of this
|
||
subsection; except that the Secretary may, in lieu of holding such fish,
|
||
wildlife, property, or item, permit the owner or consignee to post a bond
|
||
or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary, but upon forfeiture of any
|
||
such property to the United States, or the abandonment or waiver of any
|
||
claim to any property, it shall be disposed of (other than sale to the
|
||
general public) by the Secretary in such a manner, consistent with the
|
||
purposes of this Act, as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe.
|
||
|
||
(4)(A) All fish or wildlife or plants taken, possessed, sold, purchased,
|
||
offered for sale or purchase, transported, delivered, received, carried,
|
||
shipped, exported, or imported contrary to the provisions of this Act, any
|
||
regulations made pursuant thereto, or any permit or certificate issued
|
||
hereunder shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States.
|
||
|
||
(B) All guns, traps, nets and other equipment, vessels, vehicles, aircraft,
|
||
and other means of transportation used to aid the taking, possessing,
|
||
selling, purchasing, offering for sale or purchase, transporting,
|
||
delivering, receiving, carrying, shipping exporting or importing of any
|
||
fish or wildlife or plants in violation of this Act, any regulation made
|
||
pursuant thereto, or any permit or certificate issued thereunder shall be
|
||
subject to forfeiture to the United States upon conviction of a criminal
|
||
violation pursuant to subsection (b)(1) of this Act.
|
||
|
||
(5) All provisions of law relating to the seizure, forfeiture and
|
||
condemnation of a vessel for violation of the customs laws, the disposition
|
||
of such vessel or the proceeds form the sale thereof, and the remission or
|
||
mitigation of such forfeiture, shall apply to the seizures and forfeitures
|
||
incurred or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this
|
||
Act, insofar as such provisions of law are applicable and not inconsistent
|
||
with the provisions of this Act.; except that all powers, rights, and
|
||
duties conferred or imposed by the customs laws upon any officer or
|
||
employee of the Treasury Department shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
|
||
exercised or performed by the Secretary or by such persons as he may
|
||
designate.
|
||
|
||
(6) The Attorney General of the United States may seek to enjoin any person
|
||
who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this Act or
|
||
regulations issued under authority thereof.
|
||
|
||
(f) Regulations. The Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
|
||
Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, are
|
||
authorized to promulgate such regulations as may be appropriate to enforce
|
||
this Act, and charge reasonable fees for expenses to the Government
|
||
connected with permits or certificates authorized by this Act including
|
||
processing applications and reasonable inspections, and with the transfer,
|
||
board, handling, or storage of fish or wildlife or plants and evidentiary
|
||
items seized and forfeited under this Act. All such fees collected pursuant
|
||
to this subsection shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the
|
||
appropriation which is current and chargeable for the cost of furnishing
|
||
the service. Appropriated funds may be expended pending the reimbursement
|
||
from parties in interest.
|
||
|
||
(g) Citizen suits.
|
||
|
||
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may
|
||
commence a civil suit on his own behalf -
|
||
|
||
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
|
||
governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
|
||
eleventh amendment to the constitution), who is alleged to be in violation
|
||
of any provision of this Act or regulation issued under the authority
|
||
thereof; or
|
||
|
||
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section 1535(g)(2)(B)
|
||
(ii) of this Act, the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to
|
||
section 1533(d) or section 1538 (a)(1)(B) of this Act with respect to the
|
||
taking of any resident endangered species or threatened species within any
|
||
State; or
|
||
|
||
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary
|
||
to perform any Act or duty under section 1533 which is not discretionary
|
||
with the Secretary.
|
||
|
||
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
|
||
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such
|
||
provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or
|
||
duty, as the case may be. In any civil suit commenced under subparagraph
|
||
(B) the district court shall compel the Secretary to to apply the
|
||
prohibition sought if the court finds that the allegation that an emergency
|
||
exists is supported by substantial evidence.
|
||
|
||
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of this section
|
||
-
|
||
|
||
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been
|
||
given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision
|
||
or regulation; (ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a
|
||
penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; or
|
||
|
||
(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
|
||
criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a
|
||
violation of any such provision or regulation.
|
||
|
||
B) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(B) of this section-
|
||
|
||
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice has been given to the
|
||
Secretary setting forth the reasons why an emergency is thought to exist
|
||
with respect to an endangered species or a threatened species in the State
|
||
concerned; or
|
||
|
||
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced and is diligently prosecuting action
|
||
under section 1535 (g)(2)(B)(ii) to determine whether any such emergency
|
||
exists.
|
||
|
||
(C) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(C) of this section
|
||
prior to sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secretary;
|
||
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification
|
||
in the case of an action under this section respecting an emergency posing
|
||
a significant risk to the well-being of any species of fish or wildlife or
|
||
plants.
|
||
|
||
(3)(A) Any suit under this subsection may be brought in the judicial
|
||
district in which the violation occurs.
|
||
|
||
(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the United States is
|
||
not a party, the Attorney General, at the request of the Secretary, may
|
||
intervene on behalf of the United States as a matter of right.
|
||
|
||
(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to
|
||
paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including
|
||
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the
|
||
court determines such award is appropriate.
|
||
|
||
(5) The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict
|
||
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
|
||
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek
|
||
any other relief (including relief against the Secretary or a State
|
||
agency).
|
||
|
||
(h) Coordination with other laws. The Secretary of Agriculture and the
|
||
Secretary shall provide for appropriate coordination of the administration
|
||
of this Act with the administration of the animal quarantine laws. Nothing
|
||
in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed as
|
||
superseding or limiting in any manner the functions of the Secretary of
|
||
Agriculture under any other law relating to prohibited or restricted
|
||
importations or possession of animals and other articles and no proceeding
|
||
or determination under this Act shall preclude any proceeding or be
|
||
considered determinative of any issue of fact or law in any proceeding
|
||
under any Act administered by the Secretary of Agriculture. Nothing in this
|
||
Act shall be construed as superseding or limiting in any manner the
|
||
functions and responsibilities of the secretary of the Treasury under the
|
||
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USCS section 1527), relating to the importation of
|
||
wildlife taken, killed, possessed, or exported to the United States in
|
||
violation of the laws or regulations of a foreign country.
|
||
(Enacted Dec 28, 1973 and amended on July 12, 1976, Nov 10, 1978, Nov 16,
|
||
1981, Oct 13, 1982, and June 25, 1984.
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
National Parks and Forests
|
||
U.S. and Canada
|
||
|
||
National Forests
|
||
|
||
Ann Minden, Special Agent, Okanogan National Forests, provided a copy of
|
||
the law as it pertains to National Forests. Ann mentioned she was just
|
||
finishing a press release to advertise they now offer a reward up to $5,000
|
||
for information leading to the conviction of vandals who destroy National
|
||
Forest property. She also said they offered a reward of $500 for
|
||
information on the theft of two government horses. (They got the horses
|
||
back, and a conviction, but the tipster declined the reward.)
|
||
|
||
It appears that individual Parks and Forests have the authority to offer
|
||
rewards, but many do not. Perhaps that's because Park Rangers don't know
|
||
they can, or they have few problems and no need for advertising rewards for
|
||
information on lawbreakers in their territory. That doesn't mean rewards
|
||
are not available!
|
||
|
||
U.S. Department of Agriculture -- Forest Service
|
||
|
||
Title 36 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 262 - Law Enforcement Support
|
||
Activities 262.1 Rewards in connection with fires or property prosecutions
|
||
|
||
(a) Hereafter, provided Congress shall make the necessary appropriation or
|
||
authorize the payment thereof, the Department of Agriculture will pay the
|
||
following rewards.
|
||
|
||
(1) Not exceeding $5,000 for information leading to the arrest and
|
||
conviction of any person on the charge of willfully or maliciously setting
|
||
on fire, any timber, underbrush, or grass upon the lands of the United
|
||
States within the National Forest System or nearby.
|
||
|
||
(2) Not exceeding $1,000 for information leading to the arrest and
|
||
conviction of any person on the charge of having kindled or caused to be
|
||
kindled a fire on the lands of the United States within the National Forest
|
||
System or nearby, and leaving said fire which escapes before the same has
|
||
been totally extinguished.
|
||
|
||
(3) Not exceeding $5,000 for information leading to the arrest and
|
||
conviction of any person charged with destroying or stealing any property
|
||
of the United States; and
|
||
|
||
(b) A reward may be paid to the person or persons giving the information
|
||
leading to such arrest and conviction upon presentation to the Department
|
||
of Agriculture of satisfactory evidence thereof, subject to the necessary
|
||
appropriation as aforesaid, or otherwise as may be provided.
|
||
|
||
(c) Officers and employees of the Department of Agriculture are barred from
|
||
receiving such rewards.
|
||
|
||
(d) The Department of Agriculture reserves the right to refuse payments of
|
||
any claim for rewards when, in its opinion, collusion or improper methods
|
||
have been used to secure arrest and conviction. The Department also
|
||
reserves the right to allow only one reward where several persons have been
|
||
convicted of several offenses, unless the circumstances entitle the person
|
||
to a reward on each conviction.
|
||
|
||
(e) Application for reward should be forwarded to the Regional Forester,
|
||
Research Director, or Area Director who has responsibility for the land or
|
||
property involved in the trespass. However, no application will be
|
||
considered unless presented to a responsible Forest Service officer within
|
||
three months from the date of conviction of an offender. In order that all
|
||
claimants for rewards may have an opportunity to present their claims
|
||
within the prescribed limit, the Department will not take action with
|
||
respect to rewards for three months from the date of the conviction of an
|
||
offender."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: re (c) above. Active-duty police officers vacationing in National
|
||
Forests seem to be eligible for rewards from the Department of Agriculture.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
262.2 Purchase of information in furtherance of investigations.
|
||
|
||
Approval of payments. Payments for purchase of information to further
|
||
investigations of felonies and misdemeanors related to Forest Service
|
||
administration are authorized for each transaction as follows:
|
||
|
||
(1) Criminal investigators in the GS-1811 series and such other personnel
|
||
as the Chief of the Forest Service or a Regional Forester may designate,
|
||
and without prior approval, pay up to but not exceeding $200 for the
|
||
purchase of information under this section.
|
||
|
||
(2) For payments of amounts over $200 but not exceeding $500, advance
|
||
approval of the Forest Supervisor is required.
|
||
|
||
(3) For payments of amounts over $500 but not exceeding $2,500, advance
|
||
approval of the Regional Forester is required.
|
||
|
||
(4) For payments of amounts over $2,500, advance approval of the Chief of
|
||
the Forest Service is required.
|
||
|
||
(5) For purchase of information to further investigations within a Regional
|
||
Office, Forest and Range Experiment Station, State and Private Forestry
|
||
Area Office, or the National Office, payments in excess of $200 must be
|
||
approved in advance by the Chief of the Forest Service or by such other
|
||
personnel as the Chief may designate.
|
||
|
||
(b) Limitations. Purchase of information under this section is restricted
|
||
to furthering investigations of felony and misdemeanor violations. Payment
|
||
for information to further investigations of petty offenses as classified
|
||
in Title 18 USCS 1, are not authorized under this section."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: The above section authorizes payment for information on felonies
|
||
and misdemeanors. The following section is almost identical in wording but
|
||
the amounts have been doubled for the purchase of evidence of same, perhaps
|
||
a videotape of the crime in action.
|
||
|
||
262.3 Purchase of evidence in furtherance of investigations.
|
||
|
||
(1) Criminal investigators in the GS-1811 series and such other personnel
|
||
as the Chief of the Forest Service or a Regional Forester may designate,
|
||
and, without prior approval, pay up to but not exceeding $400 for the
|
||
purchase of evidence under this section.
|
||
|
||
(2) For payments of amounts over $400 but not exceeding $1,000, advance
|
||
approval of the Forest Supervisor is required.
|
||
|
||
(3) For payments of amounts over $1,000 but not exceeding $5,000, advance
|
||
approval of the Regional Forester is required.
|
||
|
||
(4) For payments of amounts over $5,000, advance approval of the Chief of
|
||
the Forest Service is required.
|
||
|
||
(5) For purchase of evidence to further investigations within a Regional
|
||
Office, Forest and Range Experiment Station, State and Private Forestry
|
||
Area Office, or the National Office, payments in excess of $400 must be
|
||
approved in advance by the Chief of the Forest Service or by such other
|
||
personnel as the Chief may designate.
|
||
|
||
(b) Limitations. Purchase of evidence under this section is restricted to
|
||
furthering investigations of felony and misdemeanor violations. Payment for
|
||
evidence to further investigations of petty offenses as classified in Title
|
||
18 USCS 1, are not authorized under this section."
|
||
|
||
National Parks
|
||
|
||
National Park laws are under the Department of the Interior, which is found
|
||
in Title 16 - Conservation. USCS 7421 (k) provides rewards for information
|
||
or evidence leading to the arrest of violators, and includes reimbursement
|
||
of undercover operations as well.
|
||
|
||
Title 16 USCS 742(L) (k) Law enforcement operations.
|
||
|
||
"With respect to any undercover or other enforcement operation which is
|
||
necessary for the detection and prosecution of violations of any laws
|
||
administered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service or the National
|
||
Marine Fisheries Service relating to fish, wildlife, or plants, the
|
||
Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce may, notwithstanding
|
||
any other provision of law -
|
||
|
||
1) direct the advance of funds which may be deposited in commercial banks
|
||
or other financial institutions;
|
||
|
||
(2) use appropriations for payment for information, rewards, or evidence
|
||
concerning violations, without reference to any rewards to which such
|
||
persons may be otherwise be entitled by law, and any moneys subsequently
|
||
recovered shall be reimbursed to the current appropriation; and
|
||
|
||
(3) use appropriations to establish or acquire proprietary corporations or
|
||
business entities as part of an undercover operation, operate such
|
||
corporations or business entities on a commercial basis, lease space and
|
||
make other necessary expenditures, and use the proceeds from such
|
||
undercover operations to offset necessary and reasonable expenses incurred
|
||
in such operations:
|
||
|
||
Provided, That at the conclusion of each such operation the proceeds shall
|
||
be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous
|
||
receipts."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: There are no specific amounts established for rewards or payment
|
||
for evidence. That means it's negotiable. Use the amounts mentioned below
|
||
as guidelines for National Parks' fish and wildlife rewards. Campground
|
||
violations are considered petty offenses, but theft of valuable items,
|
||
especially guns, are usually considered felonies. Report violations, but
|
||
don't expect rewards except for serious misdemeanors or felonies. In the
|
||
latter situation, apply for rewards from WE-TIP or other appropriate State
|
||
or Federal laws found elsewhere in this book.
|
||
|
||
Note: National Parks law (2) above may pay a reward in addition to any
|
||
other reward(s) paid under other laws, such as USCS 3059 and 886.
|
||
|
||
State Parks and related campground laws (and rewards) are not included in
|
||
this book because they usually vary from State to State. If readers know of
|
||
any such reward laws are available from your State Parks, please forward
|
||
the information to us for inclusion in the next version of CRIMFTR.
|
||
|
||
Archaeological Resources
|
||
|
||
Most State and Federal Parks, National Forests and Wildlife Refuges have
|
||
prohibitions against excavations and removing archaeological treasures.
|
||
|
||
Title 16 USCS, section 470ee
|
||
|
||
"Prohibited acts and criminal penalties.
|
||
|
||
No person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface, or
|
||
attempt to excavate, remove or otherwise alter or deface any archaeological
|
||
resource located on public lands or Indian lands unless such activity is
|
||
pursuant to a permit issued under section 470cc, a permit referred to in
|
||
section (h)(2), or the exemption contained in 470cc (g)(1).
|
||
|
||
(b) No person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to
|
||
sell, purchase, or exchange any archaeological resource if such resource
|
||
was excavated or removed from public lands or Indian lands in violation of
|
||
-
|
||
(1) the prohibition contained in subsection (a), or
|
||
|
||
(2) any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance or permit in effect under
|
||
any other provision of Federal law.
|
||
|
||
(c) No person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to
|
||
sell, purchase, or exchange in interstate or foreign commerce, any
|
||
archaeological resource excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged,
|
||
transported, or received in violation of any provision, rule, regulation,
|
||
ordinance, or permit in effect under State or local law.
|
||
|
||
(d) Any person who knowingly violates, or counsels, procures, solicits, or
|
||
employs any other person to violate, any prohibition contained in
|
||
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section shall, upon conviction, be
|
||
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both:
|
||
Provided, however, That if the commercial or archaeological value of the
|
||
archaeological resource exceeds the sum of $5,000, such person shall be
|
||
fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
|
||
In the case of a second or subsequent such violation upon conviction such
|
||
person shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than
|
||
five years, or both.
|
||
|
||
(e) The prohibitions contained in this section shall take effect on the
|
||
date of enactment of this Act. (enacted Oct 31, 1979, and amended on Nov 3,
|
||
1988)
|
||
|
||
(f) Nothing in subsection (b)(1) of this section shall be deemed applicable
|
||
to any person with respect to an archaeological resource which was in
|
||
lawful possession of such person prior to the date of enactment of this
|
||
Act.
|
||
|
||
(g) Nothing in subsection (d) of this section shall be deemed to be
|
||
applicable to any person with respect to the removal of arrowheads located
|
||
on the surface of the ground.
|
||
|
||
Section 470ff Civil penalties
|
||
|
||
(a)(1) Any person who violates any prohibition contained in an applicable
|
||
regulation or permit issued under this Act may be assessed a civil penalty
|
||
by the Federal land manager concerned. No penalty may be assessed under
|
||
this subsection unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a
|
||
hearing with respect to such violation. Each violation shall be a separate
|
||
offense. Any such civil penalty may be remitted or mitigated by the Federal
|
||
land manager concerned.
|
||
|
||
(2) The amount of such penalty shall be determined under regulations
|
||
promulgated pursuant to this section taking into account, in addition to
|
||
other factors-
|
||
|
||
(a) the archaeological or commercial value of the archaeological resource
|
||
involved, and
|
||
|
||
(b) the cost of restoration and repair of the resources and the
|
||
archaeological site involved.
|
||
|
||
Such regulations shall provide that, in case of a second or subsequent
|
||
violation by any person, the amount of such civil penalty may be double the
|
||
amount which would have been assessed if such violation were the first
|
||
violation by such person. The amount of any penalty assessed under this
|
||
subsection for any violation shall not exceed an amount equal to double the
|
||
cost of restoration and repair of resources and archaeological sites
|
||
damaged and double the amount the fair market value of resources destroyed
|
||
or not recovered.
|
||
|
||
(3) No penalty shall be assessed under this section for the removal of
|
||
arrowheads located on the surface of the ground.
|
||
|
||
(b)(1) Any person aggrieved by an order assessing a civil penalty under
|
||
subsection (a) may file a petition for judicial review of such order with
|
||
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or for any
|
||
other district in which such a person resides or transacts business. Such a
|
||
petition may only be filed within the 30-day period beginning on the date
|
||
the order making such assessment was issued. The court shall hear such
|
||
action on the record made before the Federal land manager and shall sustain
|
||
his action if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record
|
||
considered as a whole.
|
||
|
||
(2) If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil penalty -
|
||
|
||
(a) after the order making the assessment has become a final order and such
|
||
person has not filed a petition for judicial review of the order in
|
||
accordance with paragraph (1), or
|
||
|
||
(b) after a court in an action brought under paragraph (1) has entered a
|
||
final judgment upholding the assessment of a civil penalty, the Federal
|
||
land managers may request the Attorney General to institute a civil action
|
||
in a district court of the United States for any district in which such
|
||
person is found, resides or transacts business to collect the penalty and
|
||
such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide any such action. In
|
||
such action, the validity and amount of such penalty shall not be subject
|
||
to review.
|
||
|
||
(c) Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of civil penalties
|
||
authorized by subsection (a) shall be conducted in accordance with section
|
||
554 of title 5 of the United States Code. The Federal land manager may
|
||
issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
|
||
production of relevant papers, books and documents, and administer oaths.
|
||
Witnesses summoned shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid to
|
||
witnesses in the courts of the United States. In case of contumacy or
|
||
refusal to obey a subpoena served upon any person pursuant to this
|
||
paragraph, the district court of the United States for any district in
|
||
which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon
|
||
application by the United States and after notice to such person, shall
|
||
have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and
|
||
give testimony before the Federal land manager or to appear and produce
|
||
documents before the Federal land manager, or both, and any failure to obey
|
||
such an order may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
|
||
|
||
(a) Rewards
|
||
|
||
Upon the certification of the Federal Land Manager concerned, the Secretary
|
||
of the Treasury is directed to pay from penalties and fines collected under
|
||
sections 470ee and 470ff of this title an amount equal to one-half of such
|
||
penalty but not to exceed $500, to any person who furnishes information
|
||
which leads to the finding of civil violations or the conviction of
|
||
criminal violation with respect to which such penalty or fine was paid. If
|
||
several persons provided such information, such amount shall be divided
|
||
among such persons. No officer or employee of the United States or of any
|
||
State or local government who furnishes information or renders service in
|
||
the performance of his official duties shall be eligible for payment under
|
||
this subsection.
|
||
|
||
Forfeitures
|
||
|
||
All archaeological resources with respect to which a violation of
|
||
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 470ee of this title occurred and
|
||
which are in the possession of any person, and all vehicles and equipment
|
||
of any person which were used in connection with such violation, may be (in
|
||
the discretion of the court or administrative law judge, as the case may
|
||
be) subject to forfeiture to the United States upon -
|
||
|
||
(1) such person's conviction of such violation under section 470ee of this
|
||
title.
|
||
|
||
(2) assessment of a civil penalty against such person under section 470ff
|
||
of this title with respect to such violation, or
|
||
|
||
(3) a determination by any court that such archaeological resources,
|
||
vehicles, or equipment were involved in such violation.
|
||
|
||
(c) Disposition of penalties collected and items forfeited in cases
|
||
involving archaeological resources excavated or removed from Indian lands.
|
||
|
||
In cases in which a violation of the prohibition contained in subsection
|
||
(a), (b), or (c) of section 470ee of this title involve archaeological
|
||
resources excavated or removed from Indian lands, the Federal land manager
|
||
or the court, as the case may be, shall provide for the payment to the
|
||
Indian tribe involved of all penalties collected pursuant to section 470ff
|
||
of this title and for the transfer to such Indians or Indian tribe of all
|
||
items forfeited under this section.
|
||
|
||
(c) Disposition of penalties collected and items forfeited in cases
|
||
involving archaeological resources excavated or removed from Indian lands.
|
||
|
||
In cases which a violation of the prohibition contained in sub-section (a),
|
||
(b), and (c) of section 470ee of this title involve archaeological
|
||
resources excavated or removed from Indian lands, the Federal land manager
|
||
or the court, as the case may be, shall provide for the payment to the
|
||
Indian tribe involved of all penalties collected pursuant to section 470ff
|
||
of this title and for the transfer to such Indian or Indian or Indian tribe
|
||
of all items forfeited under this section."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
As you can see, National Forest rewards are very small in comparison to
|
||
other federal agencies. As prosecutor you have a choice of which law to use
|
||
to punish lawbreakers. Use RICO when you can to up the ante to 50% of fines
|
||
and forfeitures. Also use personal lawsuits to collect $1,000 to $10,000 to
|
||
tie up the assets used in the violation and subject to forfeiture.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
(If you're not a Canadian, or don't expect to visit Canadian wilderness
|
||
areas, use F9 to jump to the next chapter.)
|
||
|
||
* * * C A N A D A * * *
|
||
|
||
Canadian laws, like Canadians, are far more conservative than their
|
||
American counterparts. The Department of Justice, Canada, advised me that:
|
||
|
||
"According to the information currently available, the former Customs Act
|
||
was the last federal statute to include an informant revenue procedure,
|
||
which involved giving an informant 10% of the value of the property seized.
|
||
In recent years, the value of goods such as prohibited weapons, drugs and
|
||
pornography became more difficult to estimate or establish. An analysis by
|
||
Treasury Board of the informant revenue procedure revealed that it was an
|
||
unnecessary operational expense of doing business. Thus, since the 1988
|
||
amendments, the Customs Act no longer provides for payment to informants,
|
||
although administrative procedures for informant compensation exist,
|
||
sanctioned by as part of operating policies under the Act. Such procedures,
|
||
however, are classified as "secure" and are not made known to the public."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
I'll refrain from disparaging the Canadian (Federal) government's "official
|
||
policy" except to say that a reward law paying only 10% and kept under
|
||
wraps has no virtually no chance to be successful.
|
||
|
||
Many Provincial laws, particularly those relating to their wildlife, do
|
||
offer rewards. If you're a Canadian or travelling in the beautiful Canadian
|
||
Provinces, here's a few of them to remember.
|
||
|
||
B.C. Wildlife Federation
|
||
|
||
The British Columbia Wildlife Federation has a Wilderness Watch program
|
||
which is privately funded. They also have their own reward fund. They pay
|
||
up to $2,000 for information leading to arrest and conviction of any
|
||
individual.
|
||
|
||
Other Provinces also have similar rewards programs -- Saskatchewan and
|
||
Manitoba have TIPS (Turn in Poachers). Alberta has a government funded
|
||
rewards program. You may contact the Alberta Fish and Game for more
|
||
information at (403) 437-2342.
|
||
|
||
The B.C. Provincial government has ORR (Observe Record and Report), which
|
||
is the vehicle for the B.C. Wildlife Federation's program. Call 604) 533-
|
||
2293 or Fax (604) 533-1592.
|
||
|
||
For more information from this worthy group, write to Charles Cornfield,
|
||
Senior Executive Assistant, B.C. Wildlife Federation, 102 - 6070 - 200th
|
||
Street, Langley, B.C. Canada V3A 1N4
|
||
|
||
Note: Crime Stoppers and WE-TIP are also active in Canada.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comments to Canadian conservationists: Instead of waiting for the
|
||
government to rise to the occasion, or be pressured into doing something
|
||
about the problem, Canadians can become CrimeFighters too, perhaps make
|
||
citizens arrests when necessary, and follow the examples in this book.
|
||
|
||
Qui Tam law originated in England and was imported to the United States.
|
||
I'm sure it's essentially the same and available in Canada. If so, Qui Tam
|
||
law may be used by anyone who has a financial stake in the successful
|
||
prosecution of an offender. The rewards available provide the necessary
|
||
financial consideration.
|
||
|
||
The B.C. Wildlife Federation could, for example, recruit a lawyer who would
|
||
represent any such member in court to prosecute lawbreakers. Contingency
|
||
fee arrangements are permissible in British Columbia in civil cases.
|
||
|
||
West Coast Environmental Law Association (1001-207 West Hastings Street,
|
||
Vancouver,B.C. V6B 1H7, (604) 684-7378 FAX (604) 684-1312) is a non-profit
|
||
society which provides legal assistance to those who wish to litigate
|
||
environmental matters. The association has three staff lawyers, and also
|
||
administers an Environmental Dispute Resolution Fund which makes available
|
||
funds for persons who wish to hire lawyers to litigate environmental
|
||
issues, both civilly and criminally.
|
||
|
||
The most noteworthy Canadian law in this respect is the Penalties and
|
||
Forfeitures Proceeds Regulations C.R.C. 1978. Chapter 827 to the Canada
|
||
Fisheries Act, which provides that informants and complainants who assist
|
||
in gaining a conviction under the fisheries Act are entitled to one-half of
|
||
the proceeds of the fine. This regulation is quite important, since the
|
||
Canada Fisheries Act is one of Canada's chief anti-pollution statutes.
|
||
|
||
The former Chief enforcement compliance officer for Environment Canada
|
||
(Linda Duncan at this writing) has recommended this provision be extended
|
||
to all federal pollution statutes.
|
||
|
||
Maybe there's some hope the Canadian Federal Government may eventually get
|
||
around to offering its citizens some incentives like the dozens of American
|
||
laws -- before it's too late.
|
||
|
||
Fisheries Act
|
||
|
||
Penalties and Forfeitures Proceeds Regulations
|
||
c.r.c. 1978. C. 827
|
||
|
||
1. Short title.
|
||
|
||
2. Interpretation. "Act" means the Fisheries Act.
|
||
|
||
3. General. Where, under the Act
|
||
|
||
(a) a penalty is imposed or an article is confiscated, or
|
||
|
||
(b) a penalty is imposed and an article is confiscated following an
|
||
information or a complaint laid by an employee of a provincial government,
|
||
and
|
||
|
||
(c) all expenses incurred (i) in the prosecution that resulted in the
|
||
imposition of the penalty, or the confiscation of the article or both, and
|
||
(ii) in connection with the custody and disposal of any confiscated article
|
||
that is not collected from the persons prosecuted are paid by the
|
||
provincial government. The proceeds of the penalty or of the sale of the
|
||
confiscated article or both shall be paid to the provincial government.
|
||
|
||
4. Where under the Act
|
||
|
||
(a) a penalty is imposed or an article is confiscated, or
|
||
|
||
(b) a penalty is imposed and an article is confiscated following an
|
||
information or a complaint laid by an fishery officer or a fishery guardian
|
||
employed by the Department of the Environment, the proceeds of the penalty
|
||
or the sale of the confiscated article or both shall be paid to the
|
||
minister of environment.
|
||
|
||
5. Where, under the Act
|
||
|
||
(a) a penalty is imposed or an article confiscated, or
|
||
|
||
(b) a penalty is imposed and an article is confiscated following an
|
||
information or complaint laid by a person who is not an employee of the
|
||
provincial government or a fishery officer or a fishery guardian of the
|
||
Department of the Environment.
|
||
|
||
(c) One half of the proceeds of (i) the penalty, together with any costs
|
||
taxed to that person in respect thereof (ii) the sale of the confiscated
|
||
article, less any expenses incurred in connection with the custody and sale
|
||
thereof, or (iii) both the amounts described in subparagraphs (i) and (ii)
|
||
shall be paid to that person, and
|
||
|
||
(d) one half of the proceeds of (i) the penalty (ii) the sale of
|
||
confiscated article, or (iii) both the amounts described in subparagraphs
|
||
(i) and (ii) shall be paid to the Minister of the Environment."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comments: paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 seems to be repetitious and confusing but
|
||
it's for three different "people."
|
||
|
||
(3) applies to a provincial employee when a provincial government
|
||
prosecution is made. When the persons convicted can't pay (or doesn't pay)
|
||
all the expenses involved in the prosecution, they are to be paid by the
|
||
provincial government and reimbursement is made (as much as possible) by
|
||
the fine paid and the proceeds of the sale of confiscated items to the
|
||
provincial government as full or partial reimbursement.
|
||
|
||
(4) applies when the reporting and complaint is made by a federal employee,
|
||
all expenses are borne by the Federal government and all proceeds (if any)
|
||
are paid to the government as full or partial reimbursement.
|
||
|
||
(5) applies to anyone who is not a government employee (CrimeFighters, for
|
||
example). In addition to one-half of the proceeds from fines and
|
||
forfeitures (if any) the tipster is also awarded (reimbursed) legal and
|
||
other costs involved and paid by the defendant ("taxed" to that person).
|
||
This means that Qui Tam law might be used. The costs of prosecution and all
|
||
other costs involved would be awarded to the person or firm doing the
|
||
successful prosecution (B.C. Wildlife Federation, for example). A Canadian
|
||
CrimeFighter's company could submit an invoice from $1,000 to $10,000,
|
||
depending on the time and actual expenses, for "investigative costs" in
|
||
addition to other rewards.
|
||
|
||
Let the Federal government prosecute if they are willing to do so. If they
|
||
are reluctant to prosecute or pay rewards, use Qui Tam law to lay charges
|
||
and prosecute via criminal procedure and also initiate a civil suit. Use
|
||
plea bargaining as leverage to settle the civil suit to your satisfaction
|
||
(in lieu of rewards). When in doubt, check it out with the West Coast
|
||
Environmental Law Association.
|
||
|
||
(Canadian feedback requested, to update/add to Canadian laws in the book.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for Next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
Wiretap Laws and Surveillance Equipment
|
||
|
||
Wiretap and covert surveillance equipment is legally advertised and sold
|
||
"for educational purposes only." That disclaimer protects the seller by
|
||
doesn't mean it's permissible to use them in illegal applications.
|
||
|
||
Wiretap equipment ("interception devices") and burglar tools are often
|
||
advertised in survival magazines. If you buy such equipment be careful not
|
||
to get caught with it. In most states, mere possession of these items is a
|
||
felony. In Arizona, both are class 6 felonies.
|
||
|
||
My recommendation is, don't buy anything, use it, or carry it if it can get
|
||
you in trouble. If you have it, you'll be tempted to use it -- probably
|
||
without legal sanction. Eventually you'll be caught red-handed. Never use
|
||
such items unless you use them under police supervision.
|
||
|
||
When you have a strong lead on an illegal activity, report it to the FBI as
|
||
a partial disclosure and negotiate for rewards. At that time, if they feel
|
||
that wiretaps or lock picks are needed, they may provide such equipment.
|
||
They will also obtain needed warrants and operate the devices.
|
||
|
||
A pocketbook called "Prince of the City" contains a lot of information on
|
||
wiretapping, and how New York cops used it illegally, took bribes,
|
||
concealed evidence, and were caught. It's a good example of wiretap abuse
|
||
and the consequences of being caught. Another good pocketbook, "Cop
|
||
Hunter," by Vincent Murano, a retired NYPD detective,is a sequel to
|
||
"Serpico" and "Prince of the City." It's mainly about NYPD's Internal
|
||
Affairs Division (IAD) who ferret out corrupt cops, how undercover cops
|
||
work, and the dangers encountered. The author, Murano, complains frequently
|
||
about the ineffective electronic equipment they use and that undercover
|
||
agents risk their lives with it. With that comment in mind, perhaps Crime-
|
||
Fighters should purchase their own equipment, use it at home, and to become
|
||
familiar with and depend upon. But be sure to obtain legal authorization
|
||
before using use it on a case. If you are found using it illegally (without
|
||
a warrant when a warrant is required) you could be charged with a felony.
|
||
|
||
Cordless Telephones
|
||
|
||
Newspaper article by John Waggoner, in USA Today, July 30, 1990:
|
||
"IRS cups its ear to cordless phones.
|
||
|
||
If you're thinking about declaring a few imaginary dependents this year,
|
||
don't mention it on your cordless phone. The Internal Revenue Service may
|
||
be listening. Under new guidelines for its criminal investigators, the IRS
|
||
can use radio scanners to eavesdrop on suspected tax dodgers while they
|
||
chat on their cordless phones. No warrant is necessary. The IRS policy,
|
||
issued as an update to a handbook for investigators, comes in the wake of a
|
||
recent Supreme Court action.
|
||
|
||
The high court declined in January (1990) to review a federal appeals court
|
||
ruling that conversations on cordless phones are not subject to federal
|
||
privacy laws.
|
||
|
||
The IRS thinks that since there are no legal or constitutional protection
|
||
against listening in to cordless phones, its agents aren't bound by any
|
||
higher principles," says Janlori Goldman of the American Civil Liberties
|
||
Union's Privacy Project.
|
||
|
||
The ACLU has asked Congress to overhaul the 1986 Electronic Communications
|
||
Privacy Act, which extended federal privacy protection to such areas as
|
||
cellular telephones and electronic computer mail -- but specifically
|
||
omitted the emerging technology of cordless phones.
|
||
|
||
The current law makes no sense," says Goldman. "If your telephone happens
|
||
to have a cord, your privacy is protected by federal law. If not, you have
|
||
none." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
Radio Shack and other companies now have cordless phone Scramblers to solve
|
||
the privacy problem. The hand-held phone has a built-in scrambler that
|
||
transmits garbled info to the base set, which unscrambles it and transmits
|
||
normal conversations over the regular phone line. That eliminates air-waves
|
||
eavesdropping. But, not everyone has them or are aware they're available.
|
||
|
||
Cellular Phones
|
||
|
||
Cellular phones are the latest target of eavesdroppers. Scanners are
|
||
available on the market, similar to a CB or radio scanner, which seek out
|
||
signals (broadcasts). The scanners automatically tune in and you can listen
|
||
to other people's conversations -- like radio scanners.
|
||
|
||
A newspaper article in USA Today (April 20, l990), featured an expose on
|
||
this illegal practice. The article mentioned how David Murphy, of Boston,
|
||
eavesdrops on cellular phone conversations taking place in the cars around
|
||
him -- ably demonstrating an illegal but increasingly popular hobby. His
|
||
headset looks like a Walkman radio so no one suspects his illegal but
|
||
amusing high-tech hobby -- voyeurism by telephone.
|
||
|
||
David says he hears all kinds of confidential matters discussed, such as
|
||
credit card numbers and expiration dates when someone is making a purchase,
|
||
plus intimate details between married people who live with other spouses.
|
||
It would seem, according to David's accomplishments, the use of a cellular
|
||
phone may be hazardous to your wealth or marriage --if cellular phone users
|
||
aren't more careful.
|
||
|
||
Normally, trying to eavesdrop on cellular phones is difficult, especially
|
||
when travelling in a vehicle because "handoffs" from one cell to another
|
||
often change the frequency. In crowded areas, where a lot of calls are on
|
||
the air at the same time it's more difficult to "find" the conversation
|
||
during handoffs. But it can be done.
|
||
|
||
Cellular phone frequencies are between 800 to 900 megahertz. Hackers are
|
||
adept at tracking the handoffs, and can fine-tune the reception to hear
|
||
just as well as the two people on their respective phones who are unaware
|
||
their security has been breached. There are no tell-tale clicks or
|
||
background noise of the eavesdropper on a cellular phone because it's a
|
||
short-wave radio broadcast.
|
||
|
||
A hacker who finds an interesting conversation can also note the frequency
|
||
being used, which is similar to a telephone number temporarily used for
|
||
that particular transmission. In a stationary location, where no handoffs
|
||
are needed, it's relatively simple to lock on to a frequency --identical to
|
||
planting a wire tap but without any telltale evidence.
|
||
|
||
When police want to, they can obtain wiretap authorization to tap cellular
|
||
phones from switching stations. They don't have to use a scanner.
|
||
|
||
This new hobby of eavesdropping is gaining popularity, and the costs are
|
||
coming down to an affordable level. That's bad, not good. It's just a
|
||
matter of time before enterprising crooks will be using them to "fish" for
|
||
juicy gossip for blackmail purposes or credit card fraud.
|
||
|
||
Why am I telling you all about an illegal activity? First, so you don't
|
||
think it's legal (with the possible exception of cordless phones, it
|
||
isn't). Second, because it's illegal, you should know the use of scanners
|
||
and eavesdropping on cellular phones whether for "fun" or other purposes
|
||
violates the laws mentioned in this chapter. However, it can be authorized
|
||
like an ordinary wiretap, and therefore may be something you should know
|
||
about. Last but not least, the bad guys, whose gang you may be trying to
|
||
infiltrate, might know about it too. They might tap your cordless or
|
||
cellular phone. Be careful of that, too!
|
||
|
||
The only remedy for absolute confidentiality is to use a telephone
|
||
scrambler, available for about $299 a pair. They're small units that slip
|
||
over the telephone handset. You speak through them to the phone mouthpiece.
|
||
The conversation is scrambled at the transmitting end and unscrambled by a
|
||
similar device at the receiving end. They use a 9V battery so they're also
|
||
portable and can be used with cordless or cellular phones. Both scrambler
|
||
units are manually adjusted to use the same codes. There are 52,488
|
||
selectable codes so you can change codes at any time, or daily, to
|
||
frustrate eavesdropping or bugging. More sophisticated and more expensive
|
||
units automatically select random codes for each phone call. They are
|
||
virtually impossible to decode -- even with powerful computers.
|
||
|
||
If David Murphy, or anyone else, were to "accidentally" listen to a
|
||
confidential telephone conversation and found a juicy bit of information
|
||
that was damaging to one or both of the parties, he might be able to learn
|
||
their names and addresses and be tempted to try a bit of blackmail, also
|
||
illegal. However, there might be a situation in which you do not perceive
|
||
the situation as illegal blackmail.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' Blackmail
|
||
|
||
Blackmail in its usual form means obtaining or possessing damaging
|
||
information about another person or company and threatening to disclose
|
||
that information unless payment is made.
|
||
|
||
Another form of blackmail is more subtle. Say that you found a company
|
||
polluting water and liable for a million dollar fine. Under pollution laws,
|
||
you might receive half of the fine when a fine is levied. However, the
|
||
company may be expected to fight it all the way to the Supreme Court if
|
||
possible to weaken the effect of bad publicity and to obtain extra time to
|
||
earn the money to pay the expected fine. That could take many years and,
|
||
charges might be reduced considerably because of plea bargaining, deals and
|
||
compromises with the prosecution, and politics. The half a million dollar
|
||
reward may or may not be paid, and if paid, may take a long time.
|
||
|
||
You might be tempted to contact the company, advising them of your
|
||
knowledge and conclusive proof of violation and suggest settling the matter
|
||
out of court (provided the company stops polluting and cleans up the
|
||
existing pollution) and you suggest payment of the reasonable sum of
|
||
$250,000 instead of an much larger reward if the case were taken to court.
|
||
|
||
You might reason to yourself that justice has been served, the same as if
|
||
it had gone to court. Under normal circumstances you might be paid about
|
||
$500,000, but for a quick settlement out of court, you would be happy to be
|
||
paid $250,000 right away with no hassles and no waiting.
|
||
|
||
While justice may seem to be served, it is also justice denied. The purpose
|
||
of law enforcement is to take violators to court to punish them via due
|
||
process to the appropriate extent of the severity of pollution. The added
|
||
burden of legal fees and bad publicity, plus a conviction on the record, is
|
||
also part of the punishment -- not to mention the half a million the EPA
|
||
would lose by non-payment to the court.
|
||
|
||
From a law enforcement perspective, the bad publicity serves as a warning
|
||
to others that violators will be punished. When anyone interferes with
|
||
enforcement of laws, by taking the law into their own hand in this manner
|
||
no matter how good the intention, it's illegal! There is a law to
|
||
"discourage" blackmail of any kind.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 Section 873 Blackmail
|
||
|
||
"Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not
|
||
informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands
|
||
or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than
|
||
$2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
When a person has knowledge of a violation of any law he is required by law
|
||
to report it. When a person makes a "deal" not to report it, he or she can
|
||
expect to be charged with blackmail.
|
||
|
||
(The penalty seems woefully inadequate when the expected "profit" from
|
||
blackmail can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. That's a common
|
||
problem with laws which state a specific amount or terms of imprisonment --
|
||
they aren't updated often enough to keep up with the times, technology, and
|
||
inflation.)
|
||
The Blackmail Double Cross
|
||
|
||
In the above scenario, if you weren't aware you were using blackmail, the
|
||
company's lawyer would be quick to recognize it. The company might
|
||
encourage you to sign an agreement to not disclose the damaging information
|
||
in exchange for the $250,000 check being offered. But, as soon as the
|
||
agreement was signed, the company could refuse to pay (by putting a stop
|
||
payment on the check). They might say "if you report our violation, we'll
|
||
report your blackmail attempt." At that time, they would have evidence of
|
||
your blackmail scheme and could use it in court to destroy your credibility
|
||
as an "honest" witness. You might be charged and convicted of blackmail!
|
||
|
||
Plea bargaining Isn't Blackmail!
|
||
|
||
You can make almost the same deal as above, but make it in your legal
|
||
capacity as prosecutor under Qui Tam law. For example: (a) Initiate a
|
||
personal damage lawsuit for $90,000 plus $10,000 for the cost of
|
||
investigation and other costs. (b) Lay charges. Use pending charges of
|
||
criminal violations as leverage to settle the civil suit out of court if
|
||
possible. (c) If your lawsuit has been settled, you can ask the (criminal)
|
||
court for a $300,000 fine to be levied under appropriate pollution laws
|
||
where you get half. If the civil suit is not easily settled, let it hang in
|
||
abeyance, and ask for the $500,000 fine in the criminal suit. (d) Turn over
|
||
the actual prosecution to the appropriate law enforcement agency. If the
|
||
defendant loses, and pays the maximum fines you can still get half but may
|
||
have to wait for it because of anticipated lengthy appeals.
|
||
|
||
If plea bargaining is acceptable to both parties, the usual bargain is: in
|
||
exchange for a guilty plea, the prosecutor (you) will recommend a smaller
|
||
fine and possibly downgrade criminal charges. A guilty or nola contendere
|
||
plea provides the evidence of liability in your civil suit, if it's not
|
||
already settled, and allows you to ask for summary judgment. The result:
|
||
you can offer almost the same deal as above as a prosecutor. The difference
|
||
is, plea bargaining isn't blackmail. All prosecutors use plea bargaining to
|
||
apply pressure on defendants to reduce their time and court costs. More
|
||
details on this subject is in chapter 27 ("Problems with Prosecutors and
|
||
Plea Bargaining").
|
||
|
||
Wiretapping or Eavesdropping
|
||
|
||
It's important CrimeFighters fully understand this law as it's easy to
|
||
cross the line from legal to illegal use. As mentioned earlier, many
|
||
devices on the market can be used for eavesdropping or bugging. Sometimes
|
||
it's legal, but most of the time it's illegal. It's important you avoid
|
||
temptation to indiscriminately use such devices to obtain evidence. And,
|
||
look for violations of anyone who might be illegally using such devices.
|
||
|
||
There is a reward paid for information concerning violations of this law,
|
||
section (18 USCS 2510 et seq.). Here's some background information.
|
||
|
||
The laws on wiretapping are based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
|
||
Constitution of the United States.
|
||
|
||
The Constitution of the United States
|
||
|
||
Fourth Amendment
|
||
|
||
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
|
||
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
|
||
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
|
||
Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
|
||
persons or things to be seized."
|
||
|
||
Comment: The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right against unreasonable
|
||
searches, such as random searches or "fishing expeditions." Unauthorized
|
||
wiretapping or bugging "without reasonable cause" and a court order
|
||
violates the Fourth Amendment.
|
||
|
||
Fifth Amendment
|
||
|
||
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
|
||
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury, except in
|
||
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
|
||
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
|
||
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,
|
||
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
|
||
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
|
||
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
|
||
compensation".
|
||
|
||
Comment: The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be compelled
|
||
to be a witness against himself or herself. Our lawmakers probably had in
|
||
mind an admission of guilt obtained under coercion or mental duress. Often
|
||
the threat of torture or other threats may result in phoney "confessions"
|
||
such as those obtained in dictatorship controlled countries. In the U.S.,
|
||
overzealous law enforcement agents might also be tempted to mentally or
|
||
physically "force" a confession from a suspect who is truly innocent.
|
||
|
||
To prevent that from happening in the United States, the Fifth Amendment
|
||
provides the right to remain silent and not answer questions that might
|
||
incriminate an individual. An accused person is deemed innocent until
|
||
proven guilty, and the burden of providing the proof is on the accuser via
|
||
due process of law.
|
||
|
||
The Miranda case is used as a precedent to illustrate the strength of the
|
||
Fifth Amendment. Miranda was convicted by his "voluntary" admission of
|
||
guilt under pressure by police officers, but the court found the admission
|
||
of guilt was not admissible as evidence because the accused was not aware
|
||
of his right to remain silent. ("No one shall be compelled to be a witness
|
||
against himself"). Police are required to "read the rights" to a person
|
||
before any questioning is used to determine guilt (not immediately after
|
||
arrest as most people believe), to make sure the accused is aware of his
|
||
rights. But after being advised of the rights, anything said by the accused
|
||
can be used against that person in court.
|
||
|
||
When police have sufficient reason (probable cause) to believe criminal
|
||
activity is being planned, underway, or already executed, they can obtain a
|
||
court order under the rules and procedures listed in 18 USCS 2516. In such
|
||
a situation the search is "reasonable," for a specific person and purpose.
|
||
When a court order authorizes the wiretap or bug, evidence obtained
|
||
therefrom is admissible in court.
|
||
|
||
Eavesdropping Devices
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2510 lists the definitions of wiretapping and bugging devices
|
||
in lengthy legal format. The listed items described, and manner in which
|
||
they are used, can be condensed to read -- "any device or apparatus used to
|
||
listen in on private communications in any manner".
|
||
|
||
Advertising
|
||
|
||
Advertisements are legal when they suggest personal use such as calling
|
||
from a distant phone to check on your home by listening for sounds of an
|
||
intruder, or to listen for a baby crying in a separate bedroom of the
|
||
house, or sound magnifying devices that can be used for bird watching or
|
||
hunting, or any other personal use which doesn't violate another person's
|
||
private communications and confidentiality. Anyone can advertise and sell
|
||
wiretapping equipment and other forms of surveillance equipment for
|
||
"personal use." When an advertisement says, hints at, suggests or implies
|
||
illegal use, the advertiser could be charged with violation of the law.
|
||
|
||
There are many advertisements in Popular Science, Soldier of Fortune, and
|
||
similar magazines selling surveillance equipment of various kinds that
|
||
strongly suggests a person can listen to private conversations in one form
|
||
or another. The manufacturing, advertising, sale, and use of any device
|
||
that is specifically manufactured and used to intercept or record private
|
||
and confidential conversation of other parties without their knowledge and
|
||
consent is illegal. Upon conviction, the person or firm placing such an
|
||
advertisement could forfeit his entire inventory of such equipment under
|
||
confiscation law (Section 2513) and face a large fine.
|
||
|
||
Design and Intended Use
|
||
|
||
The case of United States vs. Bast (1974, 161 App DC 312, 495 F2d 138)
|
||
stated an important definition, "manufacture of device may be illegal
|
||
because it is primarily used for surreptitious interception, even though
|
||
device may have innocent uses."
|
||
|
||
Another case, United States vs. Schweihs (1978, CA5 Fla 569 F2d 965)
|
||
mentioned that Congress intended to ban such devices as martini olive
|
||
transmitters, spike mikes, and microphones disguised as wrist watches and
|
||
fountain pens, which, by the nature of their design, are obviously intended
|
||
to be used for covert listening, without prohibiting possession of other
|
||
legitimate electronic devices merely because they are small or may be used
|
||
for wire-tapping or eavesdropping.
|
||
|
||
Wiretapping by Court orders
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement agents must obtain a court order to tap a phone line or
|
||
otherwise intercept private communication to obtain admissible evidence
|
||
against criminal activity. Without a court order, it is not admissible as
|
||
evidence. (18 USCS 2515)
|
||
|
||
A court order is not easily obtained. Other evidence (or "probable cause")
|
||
is required first to indicate criminal activity is being planned or in
|
||
progress and a wire tap or "bug" is essential to obtain information
|
||
concerning the known or strongly suspected criminal activity. This legal
|
||
requirement prevents overzealous police from going on fishing expeditions -
|
||
tapping and listening to conversations at random ("unreasonable searches")
|
||
until they found something that might indicate criminal activity or could be
|
||
used as incriminating evidence.
|
||
|
||
The following Sections spell out the details of his law. Notice that USCS
|
||
2513 offers a reward for information leading to an arrest for a violation
|
||
of covert wiretapping or bugging, in any way.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2511.
|
||
|
||
Interception and disclosure of wire or oral communications prohibited.
|
||
|
||
This section is too lengthy to quote verbatim, but deals with the
|
||
definitions of any person who "willfully" intercepts, directly or
|
||
indirectly, any form of private communications without the consent of the
|
||
parties thereto, and or discloses same to other parties, and the penalty
|
||
for same, which "shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
|
||
more than five years, or both."
|
||
|
||
Paragraph (1)(a),(b) and (c) of this law says with words to the effect
|
||
that, if the communication is overheard by accident or by the performance
|
||
of a person's normal employment such as a switchboard operator or telephone
|
||
repairman or any other person during their normal job activity without
|
||
willful intent to eavesdrop, it is not a violation of this section.
|
||
|
||
The following paragraphs are of interest to CrimeFighters:
|
||
|
||
"(2)(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter (18 USCS 2510 et seq.)
|
||
for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral
|
||
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of
|
||
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
|
||
interception."
|
||
|
||
"(2)(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter (18 USCS 2510 et seq.)
|
||
for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral
|
||
communication where such person is a party to the communication or one of
|
||
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
|
||
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
|
||
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or
|
||
laws of the United States or of any State or for the purpose of committing
|
||
any other injurious act."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Unofficial interpretation: Private conversations may be (legally) recorded
|
||
by one of the parties to the conversation, such as in business calls where
|
||
the recording is made for convenience of one or more of the parties to the
|
||
conversation and not intended to be used for illegal purposes.
|
||
|
||
"Under color of law" means for law enforcement purposes.
|
||
|
||
A CrimeFighter who carries a bug to record a conversation between a suspect
|
||
and himself, with the intent to make a recording of their conversation,
|
||
would seem to comply with the law as it's not illegal to make a recording
|
||
of his own conversation. He doesn't need a court order or authorization for
|
||
same. Another defense might be that it's not being made for illegal
|
||
purposes (blackmail, for example) but rather for law enforcement purposes.
|
||
Or, if it's made with police knowledge and a warrant it would be "under
|
||
color of law." As such it would be admissible as evidence.
|
||
|
||
Hypothetical situation: Supposing a CrimeFighter sets out to meet and
|
||
become friendly with a known drug dealer called "Bob." During subsequent
|
||
phone calls to and from Bob, the CrimeFighter makes (legal) recordings of
|
||
his conversations and hints to Bob he'd like to make some money being a
|
||
mule to transport drugs. When the conversation includes information
|
||
concerning drugs, and proposals from Bob to become part of the drug scene,
|
||
the first step has been established.
|
||
|
||
After the conversation is recorded, the next step is to take the recording
|
||
to the FBI. Let them listen to it. The tape recording is for law
|
||
enforcement purposes. It isn't "misuse" of the information.
|
||
|
||
At this point, the CrimeFighter might suggest to the FBI case agent that he
|
||
would like to help them obtain further evidence for rewards available.
|
||
Before a CrimeFighter does anything illegal, he should make sure he is
|
||
officially authorized as an undercover agent working for law enforcement.
|
||
Get a written agreement as to your role and specific rewards promised.
|
||
|
||
There's a chance that "Bob" might be an undercover cop or another
|
||
CrimeFighter. If both have disclosed their information to the FBI, both
|
||
will be told to "back off." No harm has been done, and no time wasted.
|
||
|
||
If Bob happens to be a local cop setting up a sting operation with you as
|
||
the stingee, and arrests you, you'll have the FBI as a witness that it was
|
||
a double sting operation - and help get you off the hook.
|
||
|
||
(That's also a good reason to coordinate CrimeFighter activity with your
|
||
CrimeFighters' group -- to avoid embarrassment and duplication of effort.)
|
||
|
||
The recordings unofficially made by the CrimeFighter may or may not be
|
||
admissible as evidence in court, but if the FBI hears tantalizing
|
||
information on the first tape, they could probably convince a judge to
|
||
authorize a legal wiretap for further taped conversations which could be
|
||
used for evidence.
|
||
|
||
The following law can be useful when analyzing advertisements of vendors
|
||
who either manufacture or sell bugs and bugging devices.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2512
|
||
|
||
"Manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire or oral
|
||
communication intercepting devices prohibited.
|
||
|
||
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter (18 USCS 2510
|
||
et seq.) any person who willfully -
|
||
|
||
(a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or foreign
|
||
commerce, any electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having
|
||
reason to know the design of such device renders it primarily useful for
|
||
the purpose of surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications;
|
||
|
||
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic,
|
||
mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the
|
||
design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the
|
||
surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications, and that such
|
||
device or any component thereof has been or will be sent through the mail
|
||
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
|
||
|
||
(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any
|
||
advertisement of -
|
||
|
||
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to
|
||
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the
|
||
purpose of surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications; or
|
||
|
||
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where such
|
||
advertisement promotes the use of such device for the purpose of
|
||
surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications, knowing or
|
||
having reason to know that such advertisement will be sent through the mail
|
||
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
|
||
|
||
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
|
||
years, or both.
|
||
|
||
(2) It shall not be unlawful under this section for -
|
||
|
||
(a) a communications common carrier or an officer, agent, or employer of,
|
||
or a person under contract with, a communications common carrier, in the
|
||
normal course of communications common carrier's business, or
|
||
|
||
(b) an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, the
|
||
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, in the normal
|
||
course of the activities of the united States, a State, or a political
|
||
subdivision thereof, to send through the mail, send or carry in interstate
|
||
or foreign commerce, or manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell any
|
||
electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to know
|
||
that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose
|
||
of surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications."
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2513.
|
||
|
||
"(5) 18 USCS Section 2513 Reward for information concerning Wire Tapping
|
||
devices used, sold or manufactured in violation of Interception of Wire or
|
||
Oral or Electronic Communications (wiretapping or deliberate eavesdropping
|
||
on private communications with or without criminal intent).
|
||
|
||
Confiscation of wire or oral communication intercepting devices.
|
||
|
||
Any electronic, mechanical, or other device used, sent, carried,
|
||
manufactured, assembled, possessed, sold, or advertised in violation of
|
||
section 2511 or section 2512 of this chapter (18 USCS 2511 or 2512) may be
|
||
seized and forfeited to the United States. All provisions of law relating to
|
||
|
||
(1) the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of
|
||
vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage for violations of the customs
|
||
laws contained in title 19 of the United States Code (19 USCS 1 et seq),
|
||
|
||
(2) the disposition of such vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage or
|
||
the proceeds from the sale thereof,
|
||
|
||
(3) the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture,
|
||
|
||
(4) the compromise of claims, and
|
||
|
||
(5) the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures,
|
||
shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been
|
||
incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and
|
||
not inconsistent with the provisions of this section; except that such
|
||
duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person
|
||
with respect to seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, merchandise
|
||
and baggage under the provisions of the customs laws contained in Title 19
|
||
of the United States Code (19 USCS 1 et seq) shall be performed with
|
||
respect to seizure and forfeiture of electronic, mechanical, or other
|
||
intercepting devices under this section by such officers, agents, or other
|
||
persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney
|
||
General." (Added June 19, 1968
|
||
|
||
|
||
Not Admissible as Evidence
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2515
|
||
|
||
"Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral or electronic
|
||
communications
|
||
|
||
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
|
||
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
|
||
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
|
||
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
|
||
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or
|
||
a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information is in
|
||
violation of this chapter (18 USCS 2510 et seq.)."
|
||
(As of June 19, 1968)
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comments: Many people and firms advertise electronic bugs and sophisticated
|
||
bugging equipment. While their advertising methods may seem to be in
|
||
violation of the above laws, most have a legal disclaimer in the catalog
|
||
that says, in effect, "The electronic devices in this catalog are for
|
||
security, demonstrational and scientific purposes only. They are not to be
|
||
used for surreptitious interception of oral communications and are sold
|
||
subject to public law 90-351 Title 3, 18 USCS 2511 and all other pertinent
|
||
laws, regulations and ordinances. It is the sole responsibility of the
|
||
buyer (not the seller!) to ascertain through competent legal counsel how
|
||
any law or laws may apply to the use of any items purchased and act
|
||
accordingly."
|
||
|
||
That lets them off the legal hook. Unfortunately, not everyone reads,
|
||
understands, or pays attention to the fine print. All they see is dozens of
|
||
ads selling the items. They assume it must be O.K. to buy and use them if
|
||
they can make them and sell them. That assumption is not correct.
|
||
|
||
The main thing for CrimeFighters to remember is, using such devices without
|
||
legal sanction (under color of law) is illegal. The only exception is the
|
||
instance in which one or more of the parties involved give their consent.
|
||
|
||
A CrimeFighter who is one of the parties of a conversation may make a legal
|
||
recording for his personal use. Wiretaps made without the consent of any of
|
||
the parties involved, whether a recording is made or not made, is illegal.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Miscellaneous Laws and Income Opportunities
|
||
|
||
Financial Institutions
|
||
|
||
There are quite a few laws pertaining to financial institutions: too many
|
||
to list each and every one in this book. Instead, just remember that when
|
||
anyone, in one way or another, violates any banking laws there are rewards
|
||
for information leading to the prosecution of lawbreakers. For example:
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 3059(a) Special Rewards for Information Relating to Certain
|
||
Financial Institution Offenses.
|
||
|
||
(a)(1) In special circumstances and in the Attorney General's sole
|
||
discretion, the Attorney General may make payments to persons who furnish
|
||
information unknown to the government relating to a possible prosecution
|
||
under section 215, 287, 656, 657, 1001, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1032, 1341,
|
||
1343, or 1344 of this title affecting a depository institution insured by
|
||
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other agency or entity of
|
||
the United States, or to a possible prosecution for conspiracy to commit
|
||
such an offense.
|
||
|
||
(2) The amount of payment under paragraph (1) shall not exceed $50,000 and
|
||
shall be paid from the Financial Institution Information Award Fund under
|
||
section 2569 of the Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act of
|
||
1990 [12: USCS 4209].
|
||
|
||
(b) A person is not eligible for a payment under this section (a) if -- "
|
||
|
||
(1) The person is a current or former officer or employee of a Federal or
|
||
State government agency or instrumentality who furnishes information
|
||
discovered or gathered in the course of his government employment;
|
||
(2) the furnished information consists of allegations or transactions that
|
||
have been disclosed to a member of the public in a criminal, civil or
|
||
administrative proceeding, in a congressional, administrative, or General
|
||
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, from any other
|
||
government source, or from the news media unless the person is the original
|
||
source of the information;
|
||
|
||
(3) the person is an institution-affiliated party (as defined in section
|
||
3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 USC 1813(u) which withheld
|
||
information during the course of any bank examination or investigation
|
||
authorized pursuant to section 10 of such Act (12 USC 1820) who such party
|
||
owed a fiduciary duty to disclose;
|
||
|
||
(4) the person is a member of the immediate family of the individual whose
|
||
activities are the subject to the declaration or where in the discretion of
|
||
the Attorney General, it appears the individual could benefit from the
|
||
award; or
|
||
|
||
(5) the person knowingly participated in the violation of this section with
|
||
respect to which the payment would be made.
|
||
|
||
(c) For the purpose of this subsection (b)(2), the term "original source"
|
||
means a person who has direct and independent knowledge of the information
|
||
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
|
||
information to the government prior to the disclosure.
|
||
|
||
(d) Neither the failure of the Attorney General to authorize a payment nor
|
||
the amount authorized shall be subject to judicial review.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
(Comment: The remainder of this law pertains to anyone who is threatened,
|
||
harassed or fired from his job as a result of the disclosure, is entitled
|
||
to reinstatement with back pay, etc. If the reader is in this category,
|
||
look up full text of the law for details.)
|
||
|
||
And, as with many laws, legislators make a generous offer to make it sound
|
||
good, and then put vague strings on the payment so they can take it away.
|
||
Section (d) means if you provide the information you may or may not get
|
||
paid, and if you don't, there's nothing you can do about it.
|
||
|
||
Conclusion: Use other laws when there are other rewards available, or be
|
||
sure to get a promise of a reward in writing.
|
||
|
||
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
|
||
|
||
To control the flow of drug-related profits to and from the U.S.A., and to
|
||
control the flow of profits from any other criminal enterprise from and to
|
||
the United States, there is a law that limits the amount of cash imported
|
||
or exported. Anyone who violates the reporting requirements of the follow-
|
||
ing law is subject to harsh penalties. And, anyone who provides information
|
||
leading to their prosecution may receive a reward.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Title 31 USCS 5316 Reports on Exporting and Importing Monetary Instruments
|
||
|
||
(A) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person or an
|
||
agent or bailee of the person shall file a report under subsection (b) of
|
||
this section when the person, agent or bailee knowingly --
|
||
|
||
(1) transports or has transported monetary instrument of more than $5,000
|
||
at one time --
|
||
|
||
(a) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the
|
||
United States; or
|
||
|
||
(b) to a place in the United States from or through a place outside of the
|
||
United States; or
|
||
|
||
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $5,000 at one time
|
||
transported into the United States from or through a place outside of the
|
||
United States.
|
||
|
||
(B) A report under this section shall be filed at the time and place the
|
||
Secretary of the Treasury prescribes. The report shall contain the
|
||
following information to the extent the Secretary of the Treasury
|
||
prescribes:
|
||
|
||
(1) the legal capacity in which the person filing the report is acting.
|
||
(2) the origin, destination, and route of the monetary instruments.
|
||
(3) when the monetary instruments are not legally and beneficially owned by
|
||
the person transporting the instruments personally is not going to use
|
||
them, the identity of the person that gave the instruments to the person
|
||
transporting them, the identity of the person who is to receive them, or
|
||
both.
|
||
(4) the amount and kind on monetary instruments transported.
|
||
(5) additional information.
|
||
|
||
(C) This section or a regulation under this section does not apply to a
|
||
common carrier of passengers when a passenger possesses a monetary
|
||
instrument, or to a common carrier of goods if the shipper does not declare
|
||
the instrument.
|
||
* * * * * **
|
||
|
||
Comment: the last provision means the common carrier is not held
|
||
responsible for the violations of this law by passengers.
|
||
|
||
The above law pertains to "persons". There is another law (31 USCS 5321)
|
||
that provides civil penalties to financial institutions and officers and
|
||
directors for failing to comply with the reporting requirements.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Title 31 USCS 5322 Criminal Penalties
|
||
|
||
(a) A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 USCS 5311 et seq] or a
|
||
regulation prescribed under this subchapter [31 USCS 5311 et seq] (except
|
||
section 5315 of this title [ 31 USCS 5315] or a regulation prescribed under
|
||
sections 5315 shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more
|
||
than one year, or both.
|
||
|
||
(b) A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 USCS 5311 et seq] or a
|
||
regulation prescribed under this subchapter [31 USCS 5311 et seq] (except
|
||
section 5315 of this title [ 31 USCS 5315] or a regulation prescribed under
|
||
sections 5315, while violating another law of the United States or as part
|
||
of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions of more than
|
||
$100,000 in a 12-month period, shall be fined not more than $500,000,
|
||
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
|
||
|
||
(c) For a violation of section 5318(2) of this title [31 USCS 5318(2)] or a
|
||
regulation prescribed under section 5318(2), a separate violation occurs
|
||
for each day the violation continues and at each office, branch, or place
|
||
of business at which a violation occurs or continues.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Title 31 USCS 5323 Money and Finance. (Reward)
|
||
|
||
(a) The Secretary may pay a reward to an individual who provides original
|
||
information which leads to a recovery of a criminal fine, civil penalty or
|
||
forfeiture, which exceeds $50,000, for a violation of this chapter.
|
||
|
||
(b) The Secretary shall determine the amount of a reward under this
|
||
section. The Secretary may not award more than 25 per centum of the net
|
||
amount of the fine, penalty, or forfeiture collected or $150,000, whichever
|
||
is less.
|
||
|
||
(c) An officer or employee of the United States, a State, or a local
|
||
government who provides information described in subsection (a) in the
|
||
performance of official duties is not eligible for a reward under this
|
||
section."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
|
||
|
||
The Generic Drug Enforcement Act of 1991 should put some teeth into the
|
||
FDA's control over false advertising and swindling by generic drug makers.
|
||
A recent news article mentioned that many makers of generic drugs (mainly
|
||
medical suppliers) are touted as good as or better than name brands and
|
||
advertised and marketed as such when they're not. People who buy them
|
||
(mostly seniors) are not only short-changed but their health, pain, and
|
||
suffering may be adversely affected too.
|
||
|
||
The new bill, if it becomes law (and it probably will) will pay rewards up
|
||
to $250,000. Companies convicted of falsification of reports, lying, or
|
||
bribery of FDA officials to get their products approved could be fined up
|
||
to $250,000 each.
|
||
|
||
Workers at such chemical companies and independent chemists should be on
|
||
the alert. If you know of any false claims or skullduggery by Generic drug
|
||
manufacturers, or false and misleading advertising claims, blow the whistle
|
||
on the perps.
|
||
|
||
You don't have to wait until this bill becomes law. RICO laws and Qui Tam
|
||
also apply. Always negotiate for 50% of the huge fines and forfeitures.
|
||
Rewards that say "up to" should be interpreted as "maybe." When a reward
|
||
law says 50 percent, it means 50 percent. Look for and use those laws that
|
||
state a specific amount -- when you have a choice.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
|
||
|
||
"Section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")
|
||
Title 15 USCS 78u-1(e) authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission
|
||
("Commission") to award a bounty to a person who provides information
|
||
leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider trader, from a
|
||
person who "tipped" information to an insider trader, or from a person who
|
||
directly or indirectly controlled an insider trader."
|
||
|
||
|
||
Comment: "Insider trading" generally refers to buying and selling a
|
||
security (stocks and bonds of corporations) in breach of a fiduciary duty
|
||
or other relationship of trust and confidence while in possession of any
|
||
material or nonpublic information about the security. Insider tipping
|
||
violations may also include "tipping" such information, securities trading
|
||
by the person "tipped" (the recipient of nonpublic, insider information)
|
||
and securities trading by those who misappropriate (steal) the information.
|
||
|
||
Generally, people who violate this law are corporate officers and directors
|
||
who are privileged to know in advance certain corporate plans before they
|
||
are publicly announced. But "insiders" could include employees of the firm
|
||
who might be privy to the confidential information, lawyers, accountants,
|
||
engineers, business consultants who are part of the decision making group,
|
||
or outsiders who may accidentally, or through illegal means, obtain such
|
||
insider information.
|
||
|
||
Anyone having this insider knowledge could purchase or sell large numbers
|
||
of shares in the company in anticipation of their increase or decrease in
|
||
value after public disclosure of the confidential information. To allow
|
||
that would encourage manipulation of the stock market where a few people
|
||
could take unfair advantage of the public who bought and sold shares on the
|
||
open market without the same privileged information. In the vernacular of
|
||
politicians, that's not playing on a level playing field. If inside trading
|
||
were allowed it would undermine the confidence in the stock market, which
|
||
is essential to business and world commerce. Accordingly, insider trading
|
||
is illegal and punishable by very large fines -- often in the millions of
|
||
dollars.
|
||
|
||
The Commission is permitted to make bounty awards from the civil penalties
|
||
that are actually recovered from violators. Except for employees of the
|
||
Commission or Justice Department, any person who provides information
|
||
leading to the imposition of a civil penalty may be paid a bounty. However,
|
||
the total amount of bounties that may be paid from a civil penalty may not
|
||
exceed 10% of that penalty.
|
||
|
||
Insider trading on publicly traded stocks and bonds ar usually in the
|
||
megabuck range. Fines and forfeitures are scaled in direct proportion.
|
||
Ten percent of a $5 million fine is still a very nice $500,000!
|
||
|
||
For more information on this law, and how and where to submit the
|
||
information and application for the reward, write to the Office of the
|
||
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W.,
|
||
Washington, D.C. 20549
|
||
|
||
(Use Qui Tam law and this law, or Qui Tam and RICO laws and prosecute the
|
||
case yourself to protect your interests from a D.A.'s plea bargaining.)
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
22: USCS 401 Illegal exportation of war material
|
||
|
||
(a) Seizure and forfeiture of materials and carriers.
|
||
|
||
Whenever an attempt is made to export or ship from or take out of the
|
||
United States any arms or munitions of war or other articles in violation
|
||
of law, or whenever it is known or there shall be probable cause to believe
|
||
that any arms or munitions of war or other articles are intended to be or
|
||
are being or have been exported or removed from the United States in
|
||
violation of law, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any person duly author-
|
||
ized for the purpose by the President, may seize and detain such arms or
|
||
munitions of war or other articles and may seize and detain any vessel,
|
||
vehicle, or aircraft containing the same or which have been or is being
|
||
used in exporting or attempting to export such arms or munitions of war or
|
||
other articles. All arms or munitions of war and other articles, vessels,
|
||
vehicles, and aircraft seized pursuant to this sub section shall be
|
||
forfeited.
|
||
|
||
(b) Applicability of laws relating to seizure, forfeiture, and
|
||
condemnation,
|
||
|
||
All provisions of law relating to seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture
|
||
and condemnation for violation of the customs laws, the disposition of the
|
||
property forfeited or condemned or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the
|
||
remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims
|
||
and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures
|
||
shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have
|
||
incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and
|
||
not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Awards of compensation to
|
||
informers under this section may be paid only out of funds specifically
|
||
appropriated therefore.
|
||
|
||
(c) Disposition of forfeited materials.
|
||
|
||
Arms and munitions of war forfeited under subsection (b) of this section
|
||
shall be delivered to the Secretary of Defense for such use or disposition
|
||
as he may deem in the public interest, or in the event that the Secretary
|
||
of Defense refuses to accept such arms and munitions of war, they shall be
|
||
sold or otherwise disposed of as prescribed under existing laws in the case
|
||
of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws.
|
||
(Last amendment Aug. 13, 1953)
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: The awards to informers mentioned above, are 25%, and authorized
|
||
by Title 19, Section 1619. If the contraband items are on a ship or
|
||
aircraft and outward bound, Customs agents may be the ones to notify. Check
|
||
with the FBI first via a partial confidential disclosure to see if they're
|
||
interested. If not, contact Customs agents and after negotiating for a
|
||
reward, give them the full (original) disclosure.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Government & Military
|
||
|
||
There are a few minor reward laws that are offered by the Military forces
|
||
for recovery of stolen material and equipment. Most of them are piddly
|
||
amounts (by RICO standards) and not worth listing in detail this book.
|
||
Remember, there are more generous Federal rewards relating to the same
|
||
criminal activity. Title 18: 3059 can pay as much or more than the Armed
|
||
Forces offer. And, a criminal prosecution with a civil suit will probably
|
||
obtain more financial rewards/awards than the Military would pay.
|
||
|
||
Atomic Weapons
|
||
|
||
50 USCS Section 47a Reward for information concerning specified violations
|
||
of nuclear material or atomic weapons.
|
||
|
||
"Any person who furnishes original information to the United States-
|
||
|
||
(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of
|
||
special nuclear material or an atomic weapon which has been introduced into
|
||
the United States or manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws
|
||
of the United States, or
|
||
|
||
(b) with respect to the introduction or attempted introduction into the
|
||
United States or the manufacture or acquisition or attempted manufacture or
|
||
acquisition of, or a conspiracy to introduce into the United States or to
|
||
manufacture or acquire, special nuclear material or an atomic weapon
|
||
contrary to the laws of the United States, or
|
||
|
||
(c) with respect to the export or attempted export, or a conspiracy to
|
||
export, special nuclear material or an atomic weapon from the United States
|
||
contrary to the laws of the United States,
|
||
|
||
shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $50,000."
|
||
|
||
Oil and Gas Leases
|
||
|
||
30 USCS Section 1723 Reward for information leading to recovery of oil and
|
||
gas revenues due under oil and gas lease on federal lands.
|
||
|
||
"Where amounts representing royalty or other payments owed to the United
|
||
States with respect to any oil and gas lease on Federal lands or the Outer
|
||
Continental Shelf are recovered pursuant to any action taken by the Secre-
|
||
tary under this Act as a result of information provided to the Secretary by
|
||
any person, the Secretary is authorized to pay to such person an amount
|
||
equal to not more than 10% of such recovered amounts. The preceding
|
||
sentence shall not apply to information provided by an officer or employee
|
||
of the United States, an officer or employee of a State or Indian tribe
|
||
acting pursuant to a cooperative agreement or delegation under this Act,
|
||
or any person acting pursuant to a contract authorized by this Act."
|
||
|
||
Indian Related Laws
|
||
|
||
"18 USCS 3113 Reward for information concerning Liquor violations in Indian
|
||
Country.
|
||
|
||
If any superintendent of Indian Affairs, or commanding officer of a
|
||
military post, or special agent of the Office of Indian Affairs for the
|
||
suppression of liquor traffic among Indians and in the Indian country and
|
||
any authorized deputies under his supervision has probable cause to believe
|
||
that any person is about to introduce or has introduced any spirituous
|
||
liquor, beer, wine or other intoxicating liquors named in sections 1154 and
|
||
1156 of this title into the Indian country in violation of law, he may
|
||
cause the places, conveyances, and packages of such person to be searched.
|
||
If any such intoxicating liquor is found therein, the same, together with
|
||
such conveyances and packages of such person, shall be seized and delivered
|
||
to the proper officer, and shall be proceeded against by libel in the
|
||
proper court, and forfeited, one-half to the informer and one-half to the
|
||
use of the United States. If such person be a trader, his license shall be
|
||
revoked and his bond put in suit.
|
||
|
||
Any person in the service of the United States authorized by this section
|
||
to make searches and seizures, or any Indian may take and destroy any
|
||
ardent spirits or wine found in the Indian country, except such as are kept
|
||
or used for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes or
|
||
such as may be introduced therein by the Department of the Army.
|
||
|
||
In all cases arising under this section and sections 1154 and 1156 of this
|
||
title, Indians shall be competent witnesses."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Privately Funded Rewards from Businesses
|
||
|
||
Convenience stores such as 7-11, and ARCO am-pm stores have a sticker on
|
||
their stores' windows and doors offering rewards up to $25,000 for
|
||
information leading to the conviction of robbers.
|
||
|
||
Banks and financial institutions also pay rewards for information on
|
||
robbers and pay up to $25,000.
|
||
|
||
Security Guard firms, such as Pinkertons, Burns, Wells Fargo, and similar
|
||
companies who transport cash and securities in armored trucks, also offer
|
||
large rewards for recovery and/or convictions.
|
||
|
||
Insurance companies, especially those who sell policies on personal
|
||
possessions (jewelry, furs, stamp collections, etc.), and life insurance,
|
||
are interested in recovering the property or proving fraudulent intent on
|
||
insurance claims.
|
||
|
||
Most large insurance firms have full-time investigators. They are also
|
||
known to pay rewards up to 50% of the insurance claim. Keep that in mind if
|
||
you know of any fraud that uses insurance as a means to collect money.
|
||
Arson is the main insurance fraud, auto "theft" is another high volume
|
||
insurance fraud. If you want leads, contact the insurance company's fraud
|
||
investigators, and be a free-lance insurance fraud investigator. (A license
|
||
may be required if you solicit private investigator business from the
|
||
public.)
|
||
|
||
You may be able to collect from the insurance company if you provide them
|
||
with the information first. But reserve the (Qui Tam) right to be the
|
||
prosecutor under RICO civil and criminal suits, or get a written guarantee
|
||
that you will receive similar benefits from RICO laws if they want their
|
||
lawyers to do the legal work.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
State Reward Laws
|
||
|
||
States also offer rewards, and this chapter contains one example. In
|
||
general, however, State rewards are usually much smaller than Federal
|
||
rewards and for that reason this book mentions them only briefly. A
|
||
significant reward starts at $1,000 and up, not "up to $1,000," as those
|
||
offered by Crime Stoppers and WE-Tip. However, some State laws, as in the
|
||
example given in this chapter, the reward is worth mentioning.
|
||
|
||
NEVADA:
|
||
|
||
(Newspaper release, printed in Senior Spectrum, October, 1991.)
|
||
|
||
CONSUMER NEWS, By Frankie Sue Del Papa - Nevada Attorney General
|
||
|
||
"Illegal dumping has become a big problem in Nevada -- especially solid,
|
||
liquid and hazardous wastes. Some people don't know any better -- others
|
||
just don't care. Then there's the professional dumper who disposes of toxic
|
||
wastes in the desert to avoid paying for proper disposal. All of this is at
|
||
your and my expense -- and our environment's.
|
||
|
||
The Southern Nevada Environmental Crime Task Force -- in which my office
|
||
participates -- is targeting desert dumpers for enforcement action. The
|
||
task force is working with law enforcement agencies statewide in this
|
||
regard.
|
||
|
||
The law provides some pretty stiff penalties. Unlawful disposal of garbage
|
||
or sewage is a misdemeanor with a civil penalty of up to $2,000 for each
|
||
conviction. Half of that amount is paid as a reward to anyone who provides
|
||
information leading to the arrest and conviction of a violator.
|
||
|
||
First-time violation of water pollution is a gross misdemeanor and carries
|
||
a fine of up to $25,000 for each day of violation and up to one year in
|
||
prison. Felony charges can be levied for a second conviction -- along with
|
||
up to six years in prison and up to $50,000 for each day of violation.
|
||
|
||
The Nevada legislature recently increased the criminal penalty for the
|
||
unauthorized disposal or discharge of hazardous waste to a felony. The
|
||
penalty is a one- to six-year imprisonment and up to $50,000 for each day
|
||
of violation. Civil penalties for hazardous waste violations carry up to
|
||
$10,000 per day and damages to the state for correcting the problems caused
|
||
and destroyed fish and wildlife.
|
||
|
||
In addition, violations of county and city ordnances on dumping can result
|
||
in civil and criminal penalties as well.
|
||
|
||
My office, the task force and law enforcement agencies are working together
|
||
to investigate and prosecute illegal dumping and to impose the maximum
|
||
punishment possible. We believe a consistent, coordinated effort will
|
||
result in more prosecutions and, in turn, heighten the deterrent effect. We
|
||
encourage people to report dumping incidents to local law enforcement
|
||
agencies.
|
||
|
||
It's so important to protect our fragile desert environment and to ensure
|
||
that we -- the citizens of this beautiful state -- don't bear the cost of
|
||
cleaning up after illegal dumpers."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Note: Federal reward laws do not provide rewards for misdemeanors. The
|
||
above Nevada law provides half of a possible $2,000 fine. In this case,
|
||
it's worth mentioning. And, it's more generous than Crime Stoppers and We-
|
||
Tip's rewards of $100 to $200.
|
||
|
||
The news release also mentions fines for hazardous waste, up to $50,000 per
|
||
day, but doesn't mention if any reward or a sharing of the fines and
|
||
forfeitures may be paid to CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
However, if the dumping is done by a person or company to make/save money,
|
||
by avoiding the cost of proper disposal (the profit motive), it may come
|
||
under RICO and other federal laws that assess larger fines and forfeitures,
|
||
and pays 50% to the CrimeFighters involved. For example:
|
||
|
||
Nevadans: The Nevada anti-dumping law also pertains to individuals dumping
|
||
garbage -- any kind, whether in garbage bags or from the back of a pickup
|
||
truck. If you find a garbage bag dumped, look inside. If you find a name
|
||
and address on mail or receipts, you have evidence that might be worth
|
||
$1,000! Leave the garbage bag or refuse where you found it, contact local
|
||
authorities and negotiate for a $1,000 reward under Nevada law.
|
||
|
||
Many state laws assess stiff fines, some up to $2,000, for littering. If
|
||
the state were to adopt a law (like Nevada's), and pay 50% of the fines
|
||
to CrimeFighters, citizens would have more incentive to enforce the anti-
|
||
litter, anti-dumping laws. (The proposed Crimefighter Reward Law mentioned
|
||
in chapter 28 could be used for anti-litter and other misdemeanor laws.)
|
||
|
||
Federal Dumping Reward Laws
|
||
|
||
Federal law Title 42, USCS 6901 (Chapter 11 in this FloppyBook) mentions
|
||
hazardous waste fines and forfeitures can be up to $250,000 for an
|
||
individual and up to $1,000,000 for an organization (any business) if the
|
||
effect of the dumping places any innocent party in imminent danger or death
|
||
or serious bodily injury. If the toxic wastes contaminate a drinking water
|
||
resource, directly or indirectly, it would impose a serious threat to the
|
||
health and welfare of innocent parties. In this case, it might be more
|
||
suitable and profitable to a CrimeFighter to use federal anti-pollution
|
||
laws for prosecution. (It also depends on the extent of the pollution.)
|
||
|
||
Professional dumpers, either individual contractors or drivers of company
|
||
vehicles who dispose of garbage or hazardous wastes, are usually not one-
|
||
time violators. Some of them have may been dumping for years. When that
|
||
can be proven, the fines and forfeitures can become very, very large.
|
||
|
||
Proof Needed
|
||
|
||
A videotape recording is the best evidence of dumping, especially if it can
|
||
positively identify the vehicle, license plate, printed signs, a clear
|
||
picture of the driver's face, and the complete sequence of driving up to
|
||
the dump site, dumping, and leaving. Use the camcorder's date and time
|
||
stamp in the recording to pinpoint when it occurred. Also, pan the area to
|
||
include mileage markers and other identifying features of the landscape to
|
||
provide identification of the dump site.
|
||
|
||
The usual law enforcement tactic is to lay charges against the driver and
|
||
allow plea bargaining if he provides evidence against his employers. The
|
||
driver will want to escape maximum punishment and will usually provide a
|
||
sworn statement that implicates supervisors or company officials who
|
||
authorized or ordered the dumping. That could lead to a confession of how
|
||
many times it was done. If a considerable amount of dumping has been done,
|
||
and the company or individual contracting firm has limited assets, the
|
||
accumulated fines and forfeitures might bankrupt the company. It could also
|
||
make the CrimeFighter rich. Both are highly desirable.
|
||
|
||
Federal and State Laws
|
||
|
||
Be sure to examine and compare Federal reward laws to those in your State
|
||
to ascertain the best one to use both to obtain a larger reward and to
|
||
retain control of the prosecution. If you lose control, you may lose the
|
||
promised reward if it's contingent on a conviction of a felony.
|
||
|
||
Why bother to include State reward laws in this book if they aren't better
|
||
than Federal laws? Answer is:
|
||
|
||
(a) To bring the comparison to the attention of State lawmakers to
|
||
encourage them to raise rewards up to or higher than Federal rewards;
|
||
|
||
(b) To provide an alternative in the event it's expeditious to use State
|
||
laws instead of federal laws. Example: If the time-delay contacting and
|
||
negotiating with a Federal agent might jeopardize the arrest and conviction
|
||
of a violator. (Better a smaller reward than no reward);
|
||
|
||
(c) To compare rewards available and locate misdemeanor rewards;
|
||
|
||
(d) To provide an alternative when negotiating with State or Federal
|
||
agents. If either party knows you can negotiate with another agency,
|
||
they'll be usually match the offer or better it. Each agency wants credit
|
||
for convictions, and the agency that prosecutes usually gets half of the
|
||
fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
If you're in business as a CrimeFighter, be businesslike. Find out which is
|
||
the best law to use by comparing State or Federal reward laws. Know which
|
||
is the best deal first. (That's the purpose of this book.) Negotiate if
|
||
and when possible. Get a signed agreement before you make full disclosure.
|
||
Make sure the person who sign the agreement is duly authorized to make
|
||
binding commitments, and have them include a statement to that effect in
|
||
the signed agreement.
|
||
|
||
Getting More Information on State Laws
|
||
|
||
I tried to obtain information on state laws but ran into a problem:
|
||
Obtaining reward information from State District Attorney offices is not
|
||
easy. The letters I received, in response to my request for detailed
|
||
information and photocopies, said (with words to the effect): they receive
|
||
many requests for legal information and cannot provide a free staff and
|
||
photocopies; they do not provide research facilities or personnel to assist
|
||
the public to obtain specific information on legal subjects; Public offices
|
||
have limited facilities, staff, and budgets, etc.
|
||
|
||
As a result, reward information from State officials or law enforcement
|
||
agencies may be difficult to obtain by individuals. It will be up to you,
|
||
the reader, if you have access to your state (reward) laws, to provide
|
||
copies to CrimeFighters in your state.
|
||
|
||
Or, if you have any State law reward information you'd like to contribute,
|
||
please mail a photocopy to: CrimeFighters, 1400 Colorado Street, Boulder
|
||
City, Nevada 89005. Your contribution will be appreciated, and will be
|
||
passed along to other CrimeFighter lodges in those states via newsletters.
|
||
|
||
If and when State laws are as tough, or tougher in fines and forfeitures
|
||
than Federal laws, then it may be better to use them. So far, it seems that
|
||
most State laws pay woefully inadequate rewards. They don't even come
|
||
close to the rewards offered under Federal laws. In addition, Federal laws
|
||
offer more options, such as sharing of fines and forfeitures. And, Federal
|
||
agents (especially the FBI) are less likely to be tight-fisted to a
|
||
CrimeFighter's request for payment of a reward; they're used to paying
|
||
large rewards. Local politicians might believe $1,000 is big money "just
|
||
for information," and may be difficult to negotiate with.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
Crime Information - a Valuable Commodity
|
||
Your Right to Withhold it While Negotiating for Rewards
|
||
|
||
Rewards from the Government
|
||
|
||
Each law enforcement branch of government has one or more provisions to pay
|
||
rewards for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of anyone
|
||
violating the laws under their jurisdiction. Usually, the tipster must
|
||
contact the appropriate department first to qualify for the reward from
|
||
that department. Since most good rewards are paid under Federal laws, the
|
||
person to contact for negotiating rewards is an FBI agent.
|
||
|
||
Most federal laws offer rewards for information leading to the arrest,
|
||
conviction, apprehension of felons. or the recovery of missing equipment.
|
||
Your information on criminal activity can be worth anywhere from $100 to
|
||
$250,000. CrimeFighters should know how much information they can divulge
|
||
to get authorities interested -- without giving them all the information
|
||
before they get a binding agreement for payment. It's important to know
|
||
where you stand if a law enforcement officer tries to bully you into a full
|
||
disclosure without a written agreement to pay a reward.
|
||
|
||
Information Concerning a Crime
|
||
|
||
Title 18, Section 4, Misprision of Felony
|
||
|
||
"Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
|
||
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible
|
||
make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military
|
||
authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
|
||
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch 645, section
|
||
1, 62 Stat. 684)"
|
||
* * * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: Misprision is probably an unfamiliar word to you. A simple
|
||
translation is concealing or covering up a crime. The term felony might
|
||
also need explanation. It was defined by lawmakers as the following:
|
||
|
||
Title 28, Section 1, Offenses - Classified
|
||
|
||
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the contrary:
|
||
(1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding
|
||
one year is a felony.
|
||
|
||
(2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor.
|
||
|
||
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for
|
||
a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty
|
||
offense." (June 25, 1948)"
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: The above definition was prepared more than 43 years ago! The $500
|
||
amount may now be considerably more (or should be). It says a felony is any
|
||
crime punishable by death or more than one year in jail. This is a simple
|
||
rule of thumb to distinguish between a felony and a misdemeanor. There are
|
||
some exceptions, depending on the crime.
|
||
|
||
Negotiating a Reward
|
||
|
||
The law of misprision requires some positive action to conceal a crime from
|
||
authorities. There was a unique case concerning an informer who made a
|
||
partial disclosure to the District Attorney, but the informer withheld the
|
||
details while he negotiated a reward. The D.A. got hard-nosed about it and
|
||
made threatening noises. The tipster was stubborn. The negotiations
|
||
collapsed and the details weren't divulged. As a result, the informer was
|
||
charged with misprision of a felony -- but wasn't convicted!
|
||
|
||
Reason: To successfully prosecute a person for misprision, the intent to
|
||
conceal or cover up is essential. Withholding details while an informer
|
||
negotiates for a reward is not an positive act of concealment or cover up.
|
||
In fact, the intent of the informer is to tell the details; delay was just
|
||
a matter of successfully negotiating a reward. A prosecutor would find it
|
||
hard to get a conviction of misprision when it may be the FBI agent who
|
||
refuses to negotiate in good faith to pay a reasonable reward!
|
||
|
||
The key word is reasonable. The informer has the right to withhold the
|
||
details until negotiations are successfully concluded. On the other hand,
|
||
it doesn't mean the FBI agent or D.A. has to agree to pay unrealistic
|
||
rewards just because it's demanded. In such an event, the D.A. might be
|
||
able to force the informer, by subpoena, to appear in front of a grand jury
|
||
and to witness under oath for regular witness fees!
|
||
|
||
Suggestion: Be reasonable and flexible in your negotiations. See chapter 28
|
||
for a formula to use as a guide for negoiating rewards.
|
||
|
||
Case Law
|
||
|
||
"Defendant who made truthful, though partial disclosure to Secret Service
|
||
of information about counterfeiting operation, but who withheld other
|
||
information because Secret Service agent would not pay him for it did not
|
||
take affirmative step to conceal crime, and thus his actions did not
|
||
constitute misprision of a felony." United States vs Ciambrone (1984, CA9
|
||
Nev) 750 F2d 1416)
|
||
|
||
|
||
"Conviction for violation of 18 USCS section 4 requires proof of
|
||
affirmative act of concealment and addition to failure to disclose."
|
||
People vs West (1980, 408 Mich 332, 291 NW2d 48)
|
||
|
||
|
||
"Mere failure to report felony is not sufficient to sustain conviction for
|
||
misprision of felony in that violation of 18 section 4 requires some
|
||
positive fact designed to conceal from authorities fact that felony has
|
||
been committed." United States vs Davila. (1983, CA5 Tex F2d 715, reh den
|
||
(CA5 Tex) 703 F2d 557)
|
||
|
||
|
||
"In order to sustain conviction for misprision of felony, government must
|
||
prove that felony was committed, that defendant had knowledge of felony,
|
||
that he failed to notify authorities, and that he took affirmative step to
|
||
conceal crime." United States vs Davila (1983, CA5 Tex) 698 F2d 715, reh
|
||
den (CA5 Tex) 703 F2d 557"
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Case law indicates a CrimeFighter may make a partial disclosure to start
|
||
negotiations but can hold back details until an amount is agreed upon and
|
||
put in writing. Law enforcement agents can't (and shouldn't) threaten a
|
||
CrimeFighter with misprision of a felony because he won't provide full
|
||
disclosure without a signed agreement for reasonable payment. The FBI may
|
||
not like being forced to be compete with other agencies, but no agent or
|
||
agency can force you to divulge the confidential information or prevent you
|
||
from shopping for rewards.
|
||
|
||
If negotiations bog down with an agency, try a different agency, and try
|
||
for a better offer - providing it is in their jurisdiction to handle the
|
||
prosecution. For example: Drug smuggling involves many law violations and
|
||
may come under the FBI, DEA and Customs. State laws may also be applicable.
|
||
State Police, Highway Patrol and local Police Departments may be prepared
|
||
to offer suitable rewards to obtain 50% of possible fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Informer's Anonymity Guaranteed by Law
|
||
|
||
Federal law guarantees no one may get the name of the tipster who provides
|
||
confidential information or evidence against a lawbreaker.
|
||
|
||
Title 5 Section (n)68 is a long section that deals with the do's and don'ts
|
||
about confidential information. The following are excerpts from Title 5
|
||
section 552 (n)68 that relate to restrictions on confidential information.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
"Section 552 Public Information: agency rules, opinions, orders, records
|
||
and proceedings.
|
||
|
||
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
|
||
|
||
(Part (a) deals with the access to government information and the
|
||
availability of non-confidential information. Section (b) deals with the
|
||
restrictions)
|
||
|
||
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
|
||
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
|
||
information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
|
||
proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair or an
|
||
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to disclose the
|
||
identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign
|
||
agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information
|
||
on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record of information
|
||
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
|
||
investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
|
||
intelligence investigation, information from a confidential source, (E)
|
||
would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations
|
||
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement
|
||
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could be reasonably be
|
||
expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be
|
||
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
An idea of what may be paid for information can be found in Title 28 USCS
|
||
524 - Availability of Appropriations. This law authorizes the Attorney
|
||
General of the United States to disburse funds to various departments. Of
|
||
importance to readers, it also mentions specific reward limits and who may
|
||
authorize them.
|
||
|
||
Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund
|
||
|
||
Title 28 United States Code (USCS) 524
|
||
|
||
"(c)(1) There is established in the United States Treasury a special fund
|
||
to be known as the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund
|
||
(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "Fund") which shall be
|
||
available to the Attorney General without fiscal year limitation for the
|
||
following purposes of the Department of Justice -
|
||
|
||
(A) the payment, at the discretion of the Attorney General, of any expenses
|
||
necessary to seize, detain, inventory, safeguard, maintain, advertise, or
|
||
sell property under seizure, detention, or forfeited pursuant to any law
|
||
enforced or administered by the Department of Justice, or any other
|
||
necessary expenses incident to the seizure, detention, or forfeiture of
|
||
such property: such payments may include -
|
||
|
||
(B) the payment of awards for information or assistance directly relating
|
||
to violations of the criminal drug laws of the United States;
|
||
|
||
(C) the payment of awards for information or assistance leading to a civil
|
||
or criminal forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
|
||
Control Act of 1970 (21 sec 800 et seq) or a criminal forfeiture under the
|
||
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Statute (18 USC 1961
|
||
et seq), at the discretion of the Attorney General.
|
||
|
||
(G) for purchase of evidence of any violation of the Controlled Substances
|
||
Act, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Chapter 96 of Title
|
||
18 (sections 1961 et seq) or sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18; and
|
||
|
||
Amounts for paying the expenses authorized by subparagraphs (A)(ii), (B),
|
||
(C), (F), and (G) shall be specified in appropriations acts. Amounts for
|
||
other authorized expenditures and payments from the Fund, including
|
||
equitable sharing payments, are not required to be specified in
|
||
appropriations acts. The Attorney General may exempt the procurement of
|
||
contract service under subparagraph (A) under the fund from section 3709 of
|
||
the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 USC 5), title III of the
|
||
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 USC 251 and
|
||
following), and other provisions of law as may be necessary to maintain the
|
||
security and confidentiality of related criminal investigations.
|
||
|
||
(2) any award paid from the Fund for information, as provided in paragraph
|
||
(1)(B) or (C), shall be paid at the discretion of the Attorney General or
|
||
his delegate, under existing departmental delegation policies for the
|
||
payment of awards, except the authority to pay an award of $250,000 or more
|
||
shall be not be delegated to any person other than the Deputy Attorney
|
||
General, the Associate Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau
|
||
of Investigation, or the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
|
||
Administration. Any award for information pursuant to paragraphs (1)(B)
|
||
shall not exceed $250,000. Any award for information pursuant to paragraph
|
||
(1)(C) shall not exceed the lesser of $250,000 or one-fourth of the amount
|
||
realized by the United States from the property forfeited.
|
||
|
||
(9) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for the
|
||
purposes described in subparagraphs (A)(ii), (B), (C), (F) and (G) of
|
||
paragraph (1). At the end of each of fiscal years 1990, 1991, and 1992,
|
||
unobligated amounts not to exceed $150,000,000 remaining in the fund shall
|
||
be deposited in the Special Forfeiture Fund, except that an amount not to
|
||
exceed $150,000,000 or, if determined necessary by the Attorney General to
|
||
meet asset specific expenses, an amount equal to one-twelfth of the
|
||
previous year's expenditures may be carried forward and remain available
|
||
for appropriation in the next fiscal year.
|
||
|
||
(10) For the purposes of this subsection, property is forfeited pursuant to
|
||
a law enforced or administered by the Department of Justice if it is
|
||
forfeited pursuant to -
|
||
|
||
(A) any criminal forfeiture proceeding;
|
||
|
||
(B) any civil forfeiture proceeding; or
|
||
|
||
(C) any civil administrative forfeiture proceeding conducted by the
|
||
Department of Justice, except to the extent that the seizure was effected
|
||
by a Customs officer or that custody was maintained by the United States
|
||
Customs Service in which case the provisions of section 613A of the Tariff
|
||
Act of 1930 (19 USC 1613A) shall apply."
|
||
|
||
As amended Nov. 18, 1988 P.L. 100-690, Title VI, Subtitle B, section 102
|
||
Stat 4320)"
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Another, similar fund is the Customs Forfeiture Fund, mentioned in more
|
||
detail in Chapter 14.
|
||
|
||
As you can see, awards (or rewards) authorized paid under subparagraph
|
||
(1)(B) or (C) can be up to $250,000! Of course that doesn't mean all
|
||
rewards will be that amount. That's the maximum authorized. The reward for
|
||
turning in a small-time teenage dope dealer, peddling marijuana, for
|
||
example, might net you $1,000 but probably not much more. It's difficult
|
||
to state a specific amount for any level of criminal activity because each
|
||
situation varies and that's why it's negotiable. The reward amount depends
|
||
on many factors, including personal risks involved.
|
||
|
||
The above is basic information to determine a reward amount that may be
|
||
worth anywhere from $1,000 to $250,000. The U.S. District Attorney or an
|
||
FBI agent is the one you negotiate with. They are bound by existing
|
||
departmental policies (or guidelines) for the payment of awards.
|
||
|
||
Incidentally, if an agent or agency says they are restricted by such
|
||
guidelines to pay minimal rewards, that's their problem, not yours. Take it
|
||
to the highest bidder. "Guidelines" aren't inflexible. They can be changed
|
||
if they want the case bad enough. When there's a lot of money in fines and
|
||
forfeitures, and they get half, they may bend the rules to pay you half. If
|
||
not, try someone else. If no one is interested in paying 50 percent of
|
||
fines and forfeitures to you as a reward, the lawbreaker might be very
|
||
happy to settle your civil suit for the same amount -- 50% of anticipated
|
||
and pending fines and forfeitures -- for reduced charges.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter Reward Strategy
|
||
|
||
(1) When you provide the information leading to the arrest, you have a
|
||
reward pending under 3059, among others. That makes you eligible for Qui
|
||
Tam law. You then have the legal right to be the prosecutor. As prosecutor
|
||
you can choose which laws you want to use to prosecute. When you can, use
|
||
RICO. Under RICO you can negotiate with the FBI for 50% of fines and
|
||
forfeitures with no upper limit.
|
||
|
||
(2) Initiate a CrimeFighter lawsuit whether or not the lawbreaker has any
|
||
significant assets. List the known assets, if any. If none, the award
|
||
sought will be $1,000 plus costs to be paid for your time, and to exert
|
||
pressure to obtain additional information on other criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
(3) Negotiate with the FBI for suitable rewards plus 50% of forfeitures. If
|
||
they want the case and offer a suitable reward, turn the case over to them.
|
||
|
||
(4) In the unlikely event no agency is interested in paying a suitable
|
||
reward, plea bargaining is next. Negotiate with the defendant to settle
|
||
your CrimeFighter lawsuit, which includes all the defendant's known assets
|
||
and or a suitable amount to pay for your time and costs -- in exchange for
|
||
reduced charges. Make lawbreakers pay a suitable reward and buy their way
|
||
out of jail.
|
||
|
||
(5) If there are no possible fines or forfeitures of any significance
|
||
involved, and no one wants to prosecute, negotiate plea bargaining to
|
||
obtain information and future payment of your investigative costs.
|
||
|
||
When lawbreakers don't have any money, ask them to sign a promissory note
|
||
and schedule monthly payments of any amount they can afford. Offer cash
|
||
credits for information on criminal activity they may already know about or
|
||
will learn about in the future. The money owed to you gives you control
|
||
over the person and provides legal pressure to pay the money owed, or to
|
||
provide future (crime-related) information.
|
||
|
||
(6) When all else fails, just turn the case over to the regular prosecutor
|
||
and apply for rewards under 3059 (first), and 886 if drugs were involved,
|
||
or the last resort -- Crime Stoppers or WE-TIP.
|
||
|
||
(7) CrimeFighters are asked to report to CFI their good and bad experiences
|
||
when negotiating for rewards with certain agents and agencies. CFI's
|
||
newsletters will help CrimeFighters decide who to go to, who not to go to,
|
||
and what to expect from each law enforcement agency. Who knows, the best
|
||
agency to negotiate with might be your local police department!
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Citizen Arrest Under Common Law
|
||
|
||
Common law and most State laws provides a citizen with extensive powers to
|
||
make an arrest without a warrant for felonies and "breaches of peace"
|
||
committed in the citizen's presence, or on probable cause for past felonies
|
||
providing they have been actually committed.
|
||
|
||
The State of Louisiana, whose law is based on Napoleonic Code rather than
|
||
on English common law, is an exception. In recent years, Louisiana laws
|
||
have been brought in line with those of other States, but they still
|
||
contain significant differences which CrimeFighters operating in the State
|
||
of Louisiana should keep in mind. Unless they are familiar with Louisiana
|
||
State laws and Napoleonic Code, CrimeFighters should seek the advice of a
|
||
lawyer before attempting citizen arrests.
|
||
|
||
Police vs. Citizen Arrests
|
||
|
||
It's easier for police to make an arrest and handcuff the person arrested
|
||
because the suspect knows police will use force when necessary and will
|
||
shoot back when shot at. When a citizen attempts a citizen arrest, the
|
||
first question in the mind of the person being arrested is "what authority
|
||
do you have?" And the next question is, "do you have a gun to enforce an
|
||
arrest?" Lawbreakers know citizens don't usually have permits to carry
|
||
handguns. If they intend to resist arrest, they may pull a gun or knife on
|
||
you. When making an arrest for a serious crime, the lawbreaker may be
|
||
desperate or doped up. They may try to wound or kill you to escape. If you
|
||
don't have a weapon to defend yourself you could get seriously wounded or
|
||
killed.
|
||
|
||
Lawyers and police officers will advise you to just report the criminal
|
||
activity and never attempt a citizen arrest. Generally, this is the best
|
||
advice you'll get. However, sometimes police aren't handy, a telephone is
|
||
far away, and the criminal will escape if you don't do something right then
|
||
and there -- and you might lose many thousands of dollars in reward money!
|
||
|
||
If (1) you know the difference between petty offenses, misdemeanors, and
|
||
felonies, (2) the simple rules of making a citizens arrest, (3) have the
|
||
required evidence or probable cause (felonies only), (4) and know the
|
||
danger (if any) and personal risk, and (5) think you're right: do it!
|
||
|
||
Misdemeanors vs. Felonies
|
||
|
||
Some States authorize a citizen arrest for misdemeanors committed in a
|
||
citizen's presence, but other States limit a citizen arrest for a
|
||
misdemeanor to "disturbing the peace," such as a fight or a noisy party
|
||
late at night that won't quiet down, for example. In some States, citizen
|
||
arrests for misdemeanors may be justified only if the person arrested is
|
||
later convicted! (Meaning you better have iron-clad evidence.)
|
||
|
||
In some jurisdictions, a citizen arrest may be authorized when a crime,
|
||
like purse snatching, is made and observed by the citizen even though it is
|
||
considered petty larceny or a misdemeanor. If violence is used to snatch
|
||
the purse it may upgrade the crime to a felony, depending on the degree of
|
||
violence used.
|
||
|
||
In some States a citizen is required by law to arrest anyone caught in the
|
||
act of committing a felony or immediately afterward. Citizens may be fined
|
||
or put in prison when they don't try to make an arrest. Although this is
|
||
seldom enforced, anyone witnessing a felony is supposed to make an arrest
|
||
or assist an officer or a citizen (when asked) to make an arrest. It's your
|
||
duty. Find out if there is such a law in your state, and if so, that law
|
||
is your authority to quote if anyone asks "what authority do you have?"
|
||
|
||
Title 18, Section 3059 is a Federal catch-all law that provides citizens
|
||
with authority to make arrests, by force if necessary, and by deadly force
|
||
if deadly force is required. If there is no state law that provides you
|
||
with authority to make citizen arrests, quote the federal law. Or display
|
||
your CrimeFighter I.D. card that has this Title 18: 3059 quotation.
|
||
|
||
State and Federal laws
|
||
|
||
In order to determine whether a crime is a felony or a misdemeanor, become
|
||
familiar with your State laws. About 80% to 90% of the violations a Crime-
|
||
Fighter will encounter are under State law. Most States have felony laws
|
||
that parallel Federal laws, with a few exceptions. State laws often vary;
|
||
some States have liberal laws and others restrictive laws. A misdemeanor in
|
||
one State may be a felony in another, and vice-versa. When in doubt, check
|
||
it out first. Know your own state laws.
|
||
|
||
A comprehensive listing of all the laws for all 50 States would fill a
|
||
large book. While it's possible to compile such a book, few readers would
|
||
want to buy a large, expensive book to obtain one chapter relevant to the
|
||
State in which they live. Instead, visit a public library, or law library,
|
||
and look up your State laws concerning petty offenses, misdemeanors, and
|
||
felonies. Compile your own list. At the same time you'll become familiar
|
||
with them. You'll also learn where to find references to Federal laws.
|
||
|
||
If there is a CrimeFighters Chapter in your area, contact them first. If
|
||
they have a lawyer as a member, he or she may have compiled such a list of
|
||
State laws.
|
||
|
||
How to Make a Citizen Arrest -- Simplified
|
||
|
||
When possible, introduce yourself by name and say "I am not a police
|
||
officer but I'm making a lawful citizen arrest." Then say" you are now
|
||
under arrest for .........)".
|
||
|
||
If the person appears to be ready to fight or make threatening words or
|
||
gestures, advise the person that resisting arrest is a misdemeanor, and if
|
||
the person hits you it will result in assault and battery charges, and if
|
||
he or she flees from arrest, additional charges of fleeing from arrest will
|
||
be made. (Memorize this part so, when it's called for, you can say it fast
|
||
before any physical action takes place.)
|
||
|
||
If the lawbreaker submits to the arrest, handcuffs may not be necessary or
|
||
available. It may be sufficient to say, "I have handcuffs, but if you give
|
||
me your word you won't try to escape and will come peacefully with me, I
|
||
won't put them on you. Do I have your promise to come peacefully?" In most
|
||
cases the suspect will either flee or will appreciate not being handcuffed
|
||
in public and will be resigned to the arrest.
|
||
|
||
Needless to say, the polite approach won't work if the suspect is a member
|
||
of Hell's Angels or another notorious gang. When the situation requires
|
||
tough street talk to properly communicate, and verbal commands are ignored
|
||
or useless, you may have to resort to physical force. If you must subdue
|
||
the person, match the degree of violence used against you -- fist against
|
||
fist, club against club, or even deadly force if deadly force is about to
|
||
used on you. But you mustn't escalate the degree of violence excessively
|
||
where it could be said you used considerably more force than was required
|
||
under the circumstances.
|
||
|
||
Never use violence or abusive language when it's not called for. Behaving
|
||
like a gentlemen lessens the probability of physical violence, or lawsuits
|
||
if the suspect is found not guilty. Police academies teach transactional
|
||
analysis, or how to stay in control of an argument. When a suspect shouts
|
||
or shows anger, it's recommended you don't allow his actions to make you
|
||
raise your voice and let your temper get out of hand. (He's leading you.)
|
||
Talk quietly and firmly and make the other person lower their voice to
|
||
match yours (if possible) to reduce the threat of further escalation of the
|
||
argument. (You're leading him.) That's theory. As police soon find out, it
|
||
doesn't always work. Sometimes force is necessary. That's why uniformed
|
||
police carry batons. If you happen to be carrying a 5-cell, rubber cased
|
||
flashlight, it can be used like a baton, if and when the resistance
|
||
escalates to a fight.
|
||
|
||
(Police batons and similar items may be considered as "weapons". Citizens
|
||
in some States may be forbidden to have them. But there is usually no
|
||
restriction on having a long, sturdy 5-cell flashlight. It can be openly
|
||
carried without raising eyebrows of passing pedestrians. And, if you know
|
||
how to use a police baton, the flashlight can be an effective substitute.
|
||
(Books on how to use police batons are in CRIMECAT.) CFI will try to locate
|
||
a source of supply of rubber-case flashlights and make them available to
|
||
CrimeFighters. Look for announcements in future newsletters or CRIMECAT.)
|
||
|
||
If the violation involves a strong or violent argument, or force used in
|
||
resisting the arrest, you might consider putting handcuffs on the suspect
|
||
if you have them with you. (Nylon "ties" are inexpensive and lightweight.)
|
||
|
||
Search and Seizure
|
||
|
||
A search and seizure may be required as part of the arrest procedure when
|
||
the person being arrested might be known to be, or is reasonably suspected
|
||
of carrying a dangerous weapon or stolen property or drugs.
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement agents are trained to search a suspect's body (frisking).
|
||
If you don't know exactly what you're doing or how to go about it, don't
|
||
do it. It may put you into physical danger unless you have another person
|
||
backing you up. When it's known by police that the arrest may involve
|
||
women suspects, a policewoman is used to conduct a body search of female
|
||
suspects. A male citizen attempting a body search of a female suspect could
|
||
be accused of unlawful sexual assault.
|
||
|
||
Most lawbreakers won't become violent if they are just "talked to," but
|
||
they may strongly resent a citizen CrimeFighter forcing them into an
|
||
embarrassing situation -- such as "taking up the position" for a body frisk
|
||
and the further indignity of handcuffing. When possible, avoid such
|
||
tactics. Try to be polite and considerate as possible when dealing with
|
||
people. Bullying tactics can backfire by escalating a simple arrest into a
|
||
brawl and the possibility of tempers exploding with weapons being drawn and
|
||
used. Never start a fight or provoke someone into a fight. CrimeFighters
|
||
should try be a perfect gentleman as much as possible -- when practical.
|
||
|
||
Turning Suspects Over to Police
|
||
|
||
If you have a cellular phone, call the police and ask them to take the
|
||
suspect into custody. If you don't have a cellular phone, ask anyone at
|
||
hand to call the police for you. Or, tell the person to "come with me to a
|
||
pay phone so I can call the police".
|
||
|
||
Remind suspects that if they refuse to accompany you to a police station or
|
||
wait for the police to arrive at the scene, they can be charged with
|
||
"resisting arrest" and "escaping from an arrest" -- which are either
|
||
misdemeanors or a felonies depending on the charges pending. Refusing to go
|
||
with you to a pay phone where you can call the police might be considered
|
||
by the court as the same as resisting arrest and might justify force, if
|
||
force is required.
|
||
|
||
If you have no cellular phone to contact police, politely order the person
|
||
to accompany you to a police station via taxi. (Your own vehicle is not
|
||
recommended if you have to do the driving and are alone.)
|
||
|
||
If the lawbreaker refuses to accompany you to a police station or wait for
|
||
police to arrive, try to obtain a name and address by tailing the person or
|
||
obtaining the vehicle's license plate number. If you have witnesses, obtain
|
||
their names and addresses. If you have all the information and witnesses
|
||
(or other evidence such as a videotape recording) notify police as soon as
|
||
possible. Let the police take the suspect into custody. Never use brute
|
||
force when force isn't required -- or can be avoided.
|
||
|
||
According to Bob Burton, a seasoned veteran at making arrests in his bail
|
||
recovery business, most people arrested (about 70% of the time) recognize
|
||
they're caught and don't offer physical resistance. The majority who resist
|
||
arrest do so by attempting to run away. You might get shoved or pushed but
|
||
seldom knifed or shot. But you never know. Expect violence and be prepared
|
||
for it. Always have a backup person with you when you know you're arresting
|
||
a lawbreaker who is known to be a dangerous person.
|
||
|
||
Common sense should be exercised when making an arrest. Unless it's an
|
||
emergency, try to avoid making an arrest inside a shopping mall or public
|
||
place where there are many pedestrians. If the suspect is a woman, a common
|
||
tactic is making a screaming accusation of sexual assault or molestation
|
||
against you. Other people might then get involved by thinking you are
|
||
unlawfully attacking an innocent person and may otherwise block or thwart
|
||
the attempted arrest. If you or the suspect use weapons, innocent bystand-
|
||
ers may get hurt -- or become hostages. When possible, wait for a better
|
||
time and place to apprehend lawbreakers. Choose uncrowded places to reduce
|
||
risk to bystanders and to yourself.
|
||
|
||
When and if violence is required, or is considered imminent by the law-
|
||
breaker against you, it's wise to back off if you can. Report it as soon
|
||
as possible and let law enforcements agents make the arrest. Although
|
||
there may be exceptions to this rule of "no violence," it's better to be
|
||
safe than sorry. Other than physical risk to life and limb to either party,
|
||
there's also a lawsuit liability to consider and avoid.
|
||
|
||
Follow Up
|
||
|
||
If the lawbreaker drives away, write down the license plate number and
|
||
describe the vehicle. Follow the car if you can while you notify the police
|
||
on your cellular phone and ask for their assistance. If the pursued suspect
|
||
notices you and takes evasive action, such as a high-speed driving, abort
|
||
the chase. Immediately contact the police, advise them of the particulars
|
||
and let them dispatch patrol cars to intercept and apprehend the violator.
|
||
|
||
Other Things to Know and Understand
|
||
|
||
When an arrest is made the person is physically detained or "taken into
|
||
custody" (usually by handcuffing). The general rule was (note the past
|
||
tense) actual contact had to be made. For many years it was considered
|
||
important to at least touch the person, however gently, when saying "you
|
||
are under arrest". That is no longer the rule.
|
||
|
||
Reaching out to touch a person on the arm or shoulder could be dangerous.
|
||
Such a move could be interpreted as a hostile gesture and the beginning of
|
||
physical violence. It could prompt a similar or more violent reaction. The
|
||
resultant shoving and pushing could escalate to a fist fight or the drawing
|
||
of weapons. However, if someone resists arrest, physical contact and
|
||
matching force is usually necessary.
|
||
|
||
Elements of an Arrest
|
||
|
||
1. Intent: Stopping a person without intending to make an arrest is not an
|
||
arrest. For example, just stopping someone to ask questions doesn't
|
||
constitute an arrest.
|
||
|
||
An arrest isn't official until the intent to arrest is communicated to the
|
||
person being arrested by the person making the arrest. The arrestor must
|
||
identify himself or herself and the authority to make the arrest (if the
|
||
arrestor is not in police uniform) and the reason for the arrest.
|
||
|
||
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution includes specific phrases to
|
||
protect citizens from unreasonable search and seizure ("The right of the
|
||
people to be secure in their persons,... against unreasonable search and
|
||
seizures ... shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
|
||
probable cause, and particularly describing the persons...to be seized.")
|
||
|
||
In addition, the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of the right of privacy is
|
||
enforceable through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
|
||
identical or similar provisions are found in the constitutions of each
|
||
state. Law officers (and private citizens) are not permitted to randomly
|
||
stop anyone for "questioning" unless they have probable cause. It also
|
||
means that officers or anyone else can't stop someone and say that they are
|
||
under arrest in order to detain them for personal reasons (false arrest).
|
||
|
||
Example: A motorcycle cop sees a pretty woman in a car and wants to talk to
|
||
her to get her name and address, and perhaps a date. He signals her to pull
|
||
over to the curb under authority of law (his uniform) to answer his
|
||
personal questions and engage in ordinary conversation. If she wasn't
|
||
amused, and complained, the amorous cop could be sued for violating her
|
||
civil rights. He could also face disciplinary action. But she couldn't sue
|
||
for false arrest if she wasn't placed under arrest and the officer didn't
|
||
intend to arrest her. Stopping someone doesn't, by itself, constitute an
|
||
arrest until the intent to arrest and to detain the person is communicated.
|
||
Apprehending or physically stopping anyone from continuing on their way,
|
||
for personal reasons but under the guise of law, is a violation of civil
|
||
rights.
|
||
|
||
2. Authority. Police officers are restricted to their own respective areas
|
||
of jurisdiction. An officer who crosses into another area outside his or
|
||
her jurisdiction has no legal authority as an officer to make a lawful
|
||
arrest. There are two exceptions. A hot pursuit of a felony suspect can be
|
||
arrested in another jurisdiction. (Generally, "hot pursuit" authority to
|
||
make an arrest in another State does not apply to misdemeanors.) Also, a
|
||
police officer can make a citizen arrest outside his or her jurisdiction.
|
||
|
||
3. Control. The actions of the person making an arrest must result in
|
||
physical and mental control over the person arrested. In 1889 the Supreme
|
||
Court of North Carolina stated: "The certain and most unequivocal method of
|
||
making an arrest is by the actual seizure of the person to be arrested, but
|
||
this is not essential; it is sufficient if the person be within the control
|
||
of the officer, with power of actual seizure if necessary. The officer need
|
||
not touch the person of such party to make the arrest effectual, but he
|
||
must have, or intend to have, control of the party's person. This seems to
|
||
be necessary to constitute a valid arrest."
|
||
|
||
4. Probable Cause. Reasonable cause, probable cause, or good reason to
|
||
believe, have been deemed to exist when: (a) a person resembles the one
|
||
accused and fails to identify himself or herself as a person who did not
|
||
commit the felony. (b) the person's movements or actions are similar to
|
||
those of the suspect; (c) it becomes known that the person to be arrested
|
||
committed a felony or was in the company of the perpetrator before or after
|
||
commission of same; or (d) the person to be arrested has some of the
|
||
proceeds of the felony in his or her possession or has been seen leaving
|
||
the place where the felony was committed.
|
||
|
||
Probable cause may be defined as: having many known facts, based on what
|
||
has been seen and heard, knowledge of the person, time of day or night, and
|
||
other incriminating circumstantial evidence, plus the officer's experience
|
||
and training, all of which might lead a person to a conclusion the suspect
|
||
is probably guilty and should be arrested. A few excerpts from court
|
||
decisions may help to provide better understanding on the subject of
|
||
probable cause:
|
||
|
||
"We have indicated on many occasions that there are a few absolutes in the
|
||
area of law dealing with what constitutes probable cause for arrest. We
|
||
have also emphasized from time to time that probable cause is not to be
|
||
evaluated from a remote vantage point of a library, but rather from the
|
||
view point of a prudent and cautious police officer on the scene at the
|
||
time of the arrest."
|
||
|
||
"Mere suspicion is not enough to constitute probable cause...especially if
|
||
it is mere general suspicion. An arrest cannot be justified on the mere
|
||
belief that a person has been guilty of an offense, if such belief has no
|
||
foundation in fact or has insufficient circumstances on which to rest, or
|
||
if the person arresting unreasonably acts at the request of a third person
|
||
who himself has a mere suspicion of the guilt of the one arrested.
|
||
Furthermore, to afford a justification, there must be not only a real
|
||
belief and reasonable grounds for it, but also, where there is opportunity
|
||
to make inquiry, proper investigation into the facts."
|
||
|
||
"Mere suspicion, based on the arrested person's reputation and his presence
|
||
in the vicinity where the crime occurred, does not constitute probable
|
||
cause. Thus, the fact that the person arrested has a jail record and has
|
||
admitted previous commissions of the same offense for which he is arrested
|
||
does not enlarge the authority of the officer to arrest, and is no justi-
|
||
fication for an illegal arrest without a warrant."
|
||
|
||
"Flight of the suspect is an important circumstance in the knowledge of the
|
||
officer, tending to justify arrest without a warrant. However, it has been
|
||
said that every man has a right to oppose an illegal arrest by flight, and
|
||
the fact that he does so will not authorize his arrest as a fugitive."
|
||
|
||
Comment: If an officer receives first-hand information from a witness, plus
|
||
tangible and intangible facts also known to the officer, that may create
|
||
probable cause.
|
||
Citizen Arrest Based on "Suspicion"
|
||
|
||
Police often make arrests based on "probable cause" or" sufficient reason"
|
||
to believe a crime has been committed or might be committed. A citizen
|
||
arrest for misdemeanors is restricted in this sense. In most States, a
|
||
citizen arrest for misdemeanors or petty offenses based on suspicion only
|
||
isn't authorized no matter what the circumstances might be.
|
||
|
||
Citizen arrests for felonies should not be made on "probable cause." Few
|
||
citizens are trained and experienced enough to make this important judgment
|
||
call. If the arrest is not lawfully made and violence was required to
|
||
subdue the arrested person fleeing from an unlawful arrest, it could result
|
||
in a valid lawsuit against the citizen.
|
||
|
||
Disturbing the Peace
|
||
|
||
Almost any illegal activity could be broadly interpreted by some courts as
|
||
"disturbing the peace." The law states that it is a citizen's right and
|
||
duty to make a citizen's arrest of the parties involved for disturbing the
|
||
peace (1) to prevent its continuance, (2) immediately after it has been
|
||
committed, or (3) if it appears that the disturbance may be continued
|
||
afterwards. This right and duty usually includes the right for a citizen to
|
||
pursue and apprehend lawbreakers but doesn't include high-speed pursuit by
|
||
a vehicle to make an arrest after suspects leave the scene of the crime.
|
||
|
||
"Reading The Rights"
|
||
|
||
Most readers are aware of this standard procedure when an arrest is made by
|
||
police. For those not familiar with the Miranda case, it's the right of a
|
||
person arrested to call a lawyer for advice, and not to incriminate
|
||
oneself, among others. The following rights statement is recited to persons
|
||
who have just been arrested:
|
||
Miranda Warning
|
||
|
||
1. You have the right to remain silent and not make any statements at all
|
||
and any statement you make may be used against you at your trial;
|
||
|
||
2. Any statements you make may be used as evidence against you in court;
|
||
|
||
3. You have the right to have a lawyer present to advise you prior to and
|
||
during any questioning;
|
||
|
||
4. If you are unable to employ a lawyer, you have the right to have a
|
||
lawyer appointed to advise you prior to and during any questioning; and
|
||
|
||
5. You have the right to terminate the interview at any time.
|
||
|
||
Waiver
|
||
|
||
After the warning is made, and in order to secure a waiver, the following
|
||
questions should be asked and an affirmative reply secured to each
|
||
question)
|
||
|
||
1. Do you understand each one of these rights that are explained to you?
|
||
|
||
2. Having in mind these rights, do you want to talk with us now?
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
An arrest properly made in all other respects may or may not be valid if
|
||
the officer doesn't advise the lawbreaker of these rights. A police
|
||
officer making an arrest is required by law to advise the suspect of his
|
||
rights "as soon as possible," -- but not necessarily at the time of the
|
||
arrest! It can be at a later time, but should be before questioning begins.
|
||
A police officer who interrogates a suspect without a Miranda warning can
|
||
find any inculpatory statements suppressed by the courts.
|
||
|
||
A private citizen is not constrained by this constitutional issue. Few, if
|
||
any, citizens carry Miranda cards in their pockets to read from and haven't
|
||
memorized them. Accordingly, damaging statements made to a private citizen
|
||
without Miranda warnings have been admissible in court.
|
||
|
||
Again, it boils down to the Constitution and the restrictions on "police
|
||
powers." In this case, the Fifth Amendment is designed to prevent police
|
||
from browbeating or forcing persons to confess or testify against them-
|
||
selves. Although a security guard may dress like a police officer, the
|
||
guard isn't a sworn officer. Any questioning by a security guard or a
|
||
private citizen that results in the admission of guilt ("I did it") is
|
||
admissible in court even if the Miranda warning was not given.
|
||
|
||
Legal Terminology & Search Warrants
|
||
|
||
Complaint
|
||
|
||
A complaint is a charge, presented to a magistrate or Justice of the Peace
|
||
having legal jurisdiction, that a person named (or an unknown person) has
|
||
committed a particular offense, in order that a prosecution may be started.
|
||
To allow a magistrate to issue a warrant, a proper complaint under oath
|
||
must be brought before the magistrate. The magistrate will then decide
|
||
whether a crime has been committed and if probable cause exists to suspect
|
||
the accused.
|
||
|
||
(A "magistrate" is the title of a judge of an inferior (lower) court with
|
||
limited criminal, and sometimes limited civil, jurisdiction.)
|
||
|
||
Arrest by Warrant
|
||
|
||
A warrant is a writ issued by an authorized magistrate to an officer,
|
||
requiring the officer to arrest the lawbreaker or suspect named in the
|
||
warrant, and to bring that person before the magistrate to be dealt with
|
||
according to law.
|
||
|
||
(A "writ" is an order issued by a court or judge directing a public officer
|
||
or private person to do a specific act.)
|
||
|
||
Issuance of a Warrant
|
||
|
||
To obtain a warrant for an arrest, a formal complaint must be made before a
|
||
magistrate. The complaint must show either that a crime has been committed
|
||
or that probable cause exists to suspect the accused. After indictment, a
|
||
bench warrant for the accused's arrest is usually issued.
|
||
|
||
(Indictment: A formal accusation made by a grand jury charging a person
|
||
with having committed a crime. Bench warrant: An arrest warrant issued from
|
||
the bench, or court, for the arrest of one named or described therein.)
|
||
|
||
Method of Arrest with a Warrant
|
||
|
||
When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer or CrimeFighter
|
||
must tell the suspect of the cause of the arrest and that a warrant has
|
||
been issued for the arrest. This requirement is waived if the suspect runs
|
||
away or forcibly resists lawful arrest. (The officers or CrimeFighters may
|
||
not have the opportunity to tell the suspect who they are or why the arrest
|
||
is being made.) The officer or CrimeFighter doesn't need to have the arrest
|
||
warrant at the time of the arrest but it must be produced as soon as
|
||
possible after the arrest.
|
||
|
||
Method of Arrest Without a Warrant
|
||
|
||
The officer or CrimeFighter must tell the suspect of his or her authority
|
||
(if not in police uniform) as well as the reason for their arrest. This
|
||
requirement is waived when the suspect is caught in the commission of a
|
||
crime, is chased immediately after the crime was committed, after an escape
|
||
from custody, or if the suspect forcibly resists arrest before the officer
|
||
or CrimeFighter can identify himself and say why the arrest is being made.
|
||
|
||
Warrants -- General
|
||
|
||
A citizen's arrest is usually authorized (or required, for a felony
|
||
committed in the arrestor's presence), but a citizen making an arrest is
|
||
restricted in some ways that a police officer is not. The most common
|
||
restriction, when applicable by State law, is that a citizen arrest may or
|
||
may not be made without a warrant. It is also usually further restricted
|
||
to felony violations only. (Check with your District Attorney or lawyer.)
|
||
|
||
A warrant for an arrest is allowed only for a specific violation(s) and a
|
||
person must be named in the warrant. A "John Doe" warrant may be used, but
|
||
requires extenuating circumstances not usually available for a citizen
|
||
arrest. A separate application and warrant must be issued for each
|
||
individual being arrested. Warrants for arrest are usually obtained from a
|
||
magistrate, a Justice of the Peace, or a judge.
|
||
|
||
In some situations, a citizen may be issued a warrant for the arrest of a
|
||
lawbreaker but they aren't issued easily to a private person who is unknown
|
||
to the magistrate or Justice of the Peace.
|
||
|
||
Exceptions: In a felony observed by a citizen or when an act involves
|
||
disturbing the peace, a warrant for the arrest is usually not necessary.
|
||
It's usually not necessary when a crime is being committed or a "wanted"
|
||
person is seen in a public place where an arrest can be made.
|
||
|
||
Warrants are sometimes required for misdemeanors but never issued for petty
|
||
offenses. A summons to appear in court is the usual procedure for
|
||
prosecution of petty offenses and most misdemeanors. Failing to answer the
|
||
summons and appear in court is a "contempt of court" violation, which may
|
||
result in a felony charge.
|
||
|
||
Search Warrants
|
||
|
||
Search warrants are not required when an arrest has been made and a frisk
|
||
(not a strip) search is made for hidden weapons. The "pat down" for weapons
|
||
is incidental to the arrest and no search warrant is needed. When a
|
||
vehicle is stopped for a driving infraction, it's permissible for the
|
||
officer to look around the immediate area (including the interior of a car)
|
||
for dope, booze, and guns that may be visible.
|
||
|
||
A complete search of the vehicle is not authorized without a search
|
||
warrant, unless there is "probable cause" to believe the vehicle or its
|
||
occupants have contraband or incriminating evidence. The common-sense
|
||
reason is that if a search isn't made at that time, the vehicle will be
|
||
moved and the evidence also removed. When police make an arrest, they are
|
||
authorized to make a cursory search "incidental to the arrest."
|
||
|
||
Search warrants are required when a suspect's vehicle or home is searched
|
||
for contraband before an arrest is made. Police who make such illegal
|
||
searches "looking for a reason to make an arrest" would be violating a
|
||
citizen's rights against unreasonable search and seizure laws. Any evidence
|
||
found during an illegal search would not be allowed as evidence. This law
|
||
discourages unlawful searches by excluding any such evidence. This is
|
||
called the "exclusionary rule".
|
||
|
||
The exclusionary rule applies to law enforcement agents to prevent abuse of
|
||
police powers. It does not apply to citizens. If a CrimeFighter were to
|
||
obtain evidence by an illegal search and gave it to the police it could be
|
||
used as evidence. The qualifier is the citizen must not be working under
|
||
the direction of police. If the CrimeFighter was working with the police,
|
||
or under their control, it could be said the action was instigated by
|
||
police. Any such evidence obtained would fall under the exclusionary rule.
|
||
|
||
If a citizen acting on his own initiative, without police knowledge or
|
||
sanction, and unknowingly or accidentally but illegally, obtained certain
|
||
evidence and later gave the evidence to the police anonymously (or under a
|
||
confidential agreement when negotiating for a reward), it could be used
|
||
against the lawbreaker in court.
|
||
|
||
That doesn't make it legal for any citizen to break the law, but he might
|
||
get away with it if police were to later (after the fact) guarantee
|
||
immunity from prosecution in exchange for the evidence they need. This is
|
||
standard procedure when a lawbreaker is "flipped" to provide information on
|
||
other lawbreakers. The snitch's own crime is "overlooked" or dismissed in
|
||
order to get information on other criminals who are more important. I
|
||
believe that's called "police's discretionary powers". As the official
|
||
prosecutor, you may have similar discretionary powers.
|
||
|
||
Of course, there is a possibility the citizen might be sued for violating
|
||
the lawbreaker's civil rights -- if the defendant learned the name of the
|
||
citizen who illegally obtained the evidence.
|
||
|
||
But, if the information or physical evidence was given to police under a
|
||
confidential agreement by an informant, or anonymously by mail, the source
|
||
of the information can't be disclosed. Confidentiality of informants is
|
||
guaranteed by law. That law is Title 5 USCS 552.
|
||
|
||
Civil Rights
|
||
|
||
Courts are protective of the civil liberties of its citizens - even though
|
||
it means a few criminals may go free. Criminal law and civil law systems
|
||
are different and carry different burdens of proof. Even if criminal
|
||
charges are accepted (and in some cases even if the suspect is found
|
||
guilty) the person making an arrest can be sued for civil damages. This is
|
||
a dilemma every police officer faces daily. (And police are better trained
|
||
than CrimeFighters!)
|
||
Example
|
||
|
||
Five person arrested in a Dekalb, Illinois, drug raid were awarded $22,000
|
||
by a Federal jury which found that three policemen had violated the
|
||
plaintiff's civil rights. The former Northern Illinois University students
|
||
and their wives were among 12 persons who sued the police for $1.2 million
|
||
in damages. The suit alleged that three law enforcement officers planned
|
||
and executed the raid without search or arrest warrants. One Northern
|
||
Illinois University security officer, a Dekalb city police officer, and a
|
||
Dekalb County sheriff's deputy were held liable for false arrest, false
|
||
imprisonment, and assault and battery. (Richards vs. Busby)
|
||
|
||
As you can see, police aren't exempt from the law either. Many such
|
||
incidents are generally ignored by citizens without lawsuits, mainly
|
||
because of intimidation factor by a badge and uniform. Be that as it may,
|
||
citizens will be quickly pounced upon for infringing anyone's civil rights.
|
||
CrimeFighters will be even more vulnerable. Be extra cautious. Make sure
|
||
you know what you're doing. Protect yourself against such lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
Federal vs State laws
|
||
|
||
The information in this book pertains to Federal law, but you can use it as
|
||
a guide. When working with the FBI and prosecution in federal courts
|
||
federal law is used. Most misdemeanors will be prosecuted under State laws,
|
||
which are similar to but not always identical to Federal law. Every State
|
||
has different standards for search warrants. You will need to know the laws
|
||
of the State in which you reside.
|
||
|
||
Arrest Laws (Federal)
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2231
|
||
|
||
Assault or Resistance (search and seizure)
|
||
|
||
(a) Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, prevents, impedes,
|
||
intimidates, or interferes with any person authorized to serve or execute
|
||
search warrants or to make searches and seizures while engaged in the
|
||
performance of his duties with regard thereto or on account of the
|
||
performance of his duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
|
||
imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and-
|
||
|
||
(b) Whoever, in committing any act in violation of this section, uses any
|
||
deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
|
||
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2232
|
||
|
||
Destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure.
|
||
|
||
Whoever, before, during, or after seizure of any property by any person
|
||
authorized to make searches and seizures, in order to prevent the seizure
|
||
or securing of any goods, wares, or merchandise by such person, staves,
|
||
breaks, throws overboard, destroys, or removes the same, shall be fined not
|
||
more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2233
|
||
|
||
Rescue of seized property
|
||
|
||
Whoever forcibly rescues, dispossess, or attempts to rescue or dispossess
|
||
any property, articles, or objects after the same shall have been taken,
|
||
detained, or seized by any officer or other person under the authority of
|
||
any revenue law of the United States, or by any person authorized to make
|
||
searches and seizures, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned
|
||
not more than two years, or both.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2234
|
||
|
||
Authority Exceeded in Executing Warrant
|
||
|
||
Whoever, in executing a search warrant, willfully exceeds his authority or
|
||
exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000
|
||
or imprisoned not more than one year.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2235
|
||
|
||
Search Warrant Procured Maliciously
|
||
|
||
Whoever maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant to
|
||
be issued and executed, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
|
||
not more than one year.
|
||
Title 18 USCS 2235
|
||
|
||
Searches Without Warrant
|
||
|
||
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or any
|
||
department or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the
|
||
United States, searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such
|
||
dwelling without a warrant directing such search, or maliciously and
|
||
without reasonable cause searches any other building or property without a
|
||
search warrant, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
|
||
than one year, or both.
|
||
|
||
This section shall not apply to any person-
|
||
|
||
(a) serving a warrant of arrest; or
|
||
|
||
(b) arresting or attempting to arrest a person committing or attempting to
|
||
commit an offense in his presence, or who has committed or is suspected on
|
||
reasonable grounds of having committed a felony; or
|
||
|
||
(c) making a search at the request or invitation or with the consent of the
|
||
occupant of the premises.
|
||
|
||
Unofficial Analysis
|
||
|
||
Search warrants are normally restricted to law enforcement agents. However,
|
||
under (2236)(a) any citizen who has obtained a warrant for an arrest would
|
||
seem to be operating "under color of law" and have the same authority to
|
||
search without a separate search warrant.
|
||
|
||
By the same reasoning, a private person who has authority under common law
|
||
to arrest any person who falls into the description in 2236 (b) and (c)
|
||
(above) might also have the same authority for search warrants as a police
|
||
officer, when acting under the guidelines and provisions of common law or
|
||
under various State laws pertaining to citizens arrests.
|
||
|
||
The Law is Not Guaranteed to be Equal Everywhere
|
||
|
||
The law is not determined by a precise mathematical formula. Court
|
||
decisions are based on many unique circumstances with varying degrees of
|
||
intent or guilt determined by the evidence presented to the court. In
|
||
different courts, and in different States, the verdict and penalties levied
|
||
are often quite different. Lawyers recognize this and often try to obtain a
|
||
change of trial date or a different jurisdiction to avoid a judge with a
|
||
known harsh attitude towards certain offenses ("shopping for judges").
|
||
Criminal law is not determined equally or justice rendered the same in
|
||
every court. In civil law, decisions are influenced more by the best
|
||
lawyer's argument, and how it's presented, than by anything else.
|
||
|
||
The law on citizen's arrest and search and seizure varies from State to
|
||
State and often seems contradictory. What's valid in one State may be
|
||
invalid in another or simply not enforced under circumstances that are
|
||
often unknown at the time of pursuit and a citizen arrest.
|
||
|
||
The above Federal laws are useful as guidelines for general information.
|
||
State laws vary and all laws are constantly being changed. Before you
|
||
assume you have the right to make citizen arrests or searches, verify your
|
||
standing first. Check it out with a magistrate, justice of the peace, chief
|
||
of police, or a lawyer who specializes in criminal law.
|
||
|
||
Get Specific Legal Advice
|
||
|
||
There is no Federal law (as such) on citizens arrests, but many States have
|
||
enacted statutes that provide guidelines as well as restrictions. In the
|
||
absence of State law, common law and common sense prevail. If you plan on
|
||
being an active CrimeFighter, obtain specific advice from a lawyer in in
|
||
your State on making citizen arrests.
|
||
|
||
Obtaining Further Information
|
||
|
||
Visit a library to read case law under the subjects "Arrest," and "Search
|
||
and Seizure." They are mentioned in detail in American Jurisprudence
|
||
volumes. Case law mentions the problems of both prosecution and defense and
|
||
the courts' decisions on same. Use case law as a guide to how the courts
|
||
might rule on your similar actions.
|
||
|
||
Like Qui Tam law, common law on citizen arrests has been established by
|
||
precedents that go way back in time. Decisions handed down from various
|
||
cases (case law) help to ascertain what can be done or shouldn't be done.
|
||
|
||
R E V I E W
|
||
|
||
The Steps Involved in a Citizen Arrest
|
||
|
||
(1) A CrimeFighter may make an arrest when the person to be arrested has,
|
||
in his or her presence, committed a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of
|
||
the peace or a felony, or when a felony has been committed and reasonable
|
||
grounds exist to believe the person to be arrested has committed the act.
|
||
|
||
(2) A CrimeFighter, when making an arrest, must tell the suspect being
|
||
arrested of the intention to arrest and the cause of the arrest. That's not
|
||
necessary if the suspect is engaged in the commission of an offense, is
|
||
chased after its commission, after an escape, or forcibly resists before
|
||
the CrimeFighter has opportunity to inform the person.
|
||
|
||
(3) After making an arrest a citizen must, without unnecessary delay,
|
||
deliver the suspect to a police officer, or take them to a magistrate or
|
||
police station.
|
||
Other Things to be Considered
|
||
|
||
(4) The fact that an authorized arrest is made in an unauthorized manner
|
||
(excessive force or illegal actions) may make the CrimeFighter liable, but
|
||
will not adversely affect the state's right to detain the accused if lawful
|
||
cause exists.
|
||
|
||
(5) If an arrest is authorized, attempted, or made in a proper manner, the
|
||
person making it, whether an officer or a CrimeFighter, merely performs a
|
||
duty, and that person incurs no liability, because the law protects the
|
||
arrestor. (An honest mistake by a CrimeFighter will usually be forgiven by
|
||
an innocent person -- if you act like a gentleman. Lawful citizen arrests
|
||
(under color of law) are protected by law from malicious lawsuits the same
|
||
as policemen are.) However, if the CrimeFighter uses unnecessary force on
|
||
anyone or subjects them to verbal abuse, and the arrest is later considered
|
||
unlawful a CrimeFighter can expect a lawsuit.
|
||
|
||
(6) If the suspect resists arrest, he or she is criminally liable for the
|
||
result of the resistance. That is, if the resistance involves force, the
|
||
suspect is liable for assault and battery charges. If the suspect, or
|
||
anyone helping the suspect in resisting, kills the officer or CrimeFighter
|
||
making the arrest, the charge will be murder.
|
||
|
||
(7) If a person unlawfully flees from custody after having been legally
|
||
arrested, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor known as "escape." If the
|
||
suspect breaks from or forcibly escapes from the place of imprisonment, he
|
||
or she is guilty of "prison breach," which is either a misdemeanor or a
|
||
felony, depending on the circumstances.
|
||
|
||
(8) Third parties: If third persons interfere and try to prevent an arrest,
|
||
such interference is considered a misdemeanor or a felony. If they use
|
||
force, they are also guilty of assault and battery. If any deadly force
|
||
used results in the killing of the officer or CrimeFighter trying to make
|
||
the arrest, they are guilty of murder. If they help the escape of the
|
||
person after the arrest has been made, they are guilty of "rescue," which
|
||
can be either a misdemeanor or a felony.
|
||
|
||
(9) An illegal arrest, without legal authority, warrant, or probable cause
|
||
may result in charges of false arrest and false imprisonment. If unnecess-
|
||
ary force was used, the arrest may lead to charges of assault and battery.
|
||
|
||
(10) A false arrest may be lawfully resisted by anyone using any necessary
|
||
force required to obtain freedom from restraint. This resistance does not
|
||
include the use of deadly force which could kill or cause serious harm.
|
||
|
||
(11) If the person resisting an unlawful arrest kills the person trying to
|
||
make the illegal arrest, the fact that the arrest was illegal is a
|
||
mitigating factor which may downgrade homicide charges to manslaughter.
|
||
|
||
(12) Within certain limits, other people, especially relatives, may legally
|
||
interfere to prevent an unlawful arrest.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
High Speed Pursuit - UNlike Smokey and the Bandit
|
||
|
||
Making cops and robbers movies requires a lot of tire screeching, vehicles
|
||
blown up as if fire-bombed, their use as battering rams, and the inevitable
|
||
shooting from moving vehicles.
|
||
|
||
All of the foregoing are forbidden to police departments. CrimeFighters
|
||
please take note.
|
||
|
||
Hot pursuits are not taken lightly or for trivial reasons. They are at the
|
||
least officially discouraged for all minor offenses, or when it's too
|
||
dangerous to innocent pedestrians, motorists, public property, police
|
||
officers, and their patrol cars.
|
||
|
||
More than 300 deaths and 20,000 injuries occur each year as a result of
|
||
high-speed police chases -- and about 25% of those involved in the chases
|
||
are innocent motorists and pedestrians. Police are injured in about 2% of
|
||
such traffic accidents, while the person being pursued is the victim 75% of
|
||
the time. Yet police initiate two-thirds of all high-speed chases for
|
||
simple traffic violations. (From a study by the Automobile Association of
|
||
America Foundation for Traffic Safety, 1730 M Street NW, Washington, DC.
|
||
|
||
A citizen is not empowered to make high-speed chases. If a citizen
|
||
initiated a chase, in addition to motor vehicle violations, the person
|
||
could be charged with criminal negligence for ignoring the safety of
|
||
innocent parties. And, if anyone is injured or any property is damaged,
|
||
negligent CrimeFighters will be required to pay all the costs. If you
|
||
violate traffic laws, no insurance company will pay the damages or lawsuit
|
||
awards. You're on your own. It could cost you far more than the reward you
|
||
hope to collect. Last but not least, if innocent parties are injured, you
|
||
can expect million-dollar lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
Fresh, or Hot Pursuit
|
||
|
||
Fresh pursuit" and "hot pursuit" are used interchangeably in most
|
||
jurisdictions. Fresh pursuit might be defined as normal pursuit immediately
|
||
after a criminal act was witnessed, but not necessarily at high speed. Hot
|
||
pursuit usually indicates a high-speed pursuit, when lawbreakers attempt to
|
||
avoid capture. Fresh pursuit (at legal speed limits, and obeying traffic
|
||
lights and stop signs) is authorized for a citizen to make an arrest, such
|
||
as immediately following the lawbreaker after a felony has been made in the
|
||
citizen's presence or view.
|
||
|
||
If a lawbreaker notices you following and takes off at high speed or runs
|
||
red lights and stop signs, you are not allowed to also break the law, and
|
||
endanger innocent parties, to enforce the law. If you have a CB tuned to
|
||
police frequency, call it in. Give the description of the vehicle, license
|
||
number, and a brief description of the crime just witnessed. If you have a
|
||
cellular phone, call 911 to report it. If you have a camcorder, get all the
|
||
action and the vehicle license number on tape.
|
||
|
||
According to case law, when the citizen or officer loses sight of the
|
||
lawbreaker for more than a few minutes, other than temporarily losing sight
|
||
of the suspect when turning corners or driving on adjacent streets, or
|
||
other maneuvers, it is no longer fresh pursuit. Stopping to make a phone
|
||
call, or otherwise diverting attention from the chase even for just a few
|
||
minutes, technically cancels the concept of fresh pursuit.
|
||
|
||
"Smokey and the Bandit" was a highly entertaining movie, but Jackie
|
||
Gleason's claim to be in hot pursuit ignored the rule of fresh pursuit (as
|
||
they almost always do to make movies). Don't use movies as training films.
|
||
|
||
Interrupted Hot Pursuit
|
||
|
||
A hot pursuit in vehicles at a later time (after a few minutes when the
|
||
lawbreaker has left the scene and is completely lost from view) is usually
|
||
not authorized or condoned by police or the courts. That's because of the
|
||
inherent danger to the public or innocent parties when it would most likely
|
||
be unsuccessful anyway. The definition of a "few minutes" could be
|
||
considered as "long enough to make a successful chase an improbability."
|
||
|
||
Most Police Departments are officially discouraging high-speed chases,
|
||
because of the high risk to police and to innocent parties. Police cars
|
||
must turn on their siren and flashing lights to run stop signs or red
|
||
lights when they're in hot pursuit. Their flashing lights and sirens warn
|
||
traffic to pull over and get out of the way. Your vehicle doesn't have (and
|
||
shouldn't have) flashing lights and a siren. A hot pursuit in an unmarked
|
||
car will more likely be broadsided by another vehicle. People can be hurt
|
||
and killed.
|
||
Flashing Lights and Sirens
|
||
|
||
Because of the many fatalities and property damage that have resulted from
|
||
high-speed chases, many States now restrict police pursuit vehicles to
|
||
those that have flashing lights mounted on a bar on top of the vehicle and
|
||
the vehicle equipped with sirens or special horns. In addition, chase
|
||
vehicles must be clearly marked by special colors to easily identify them
|
||
as police vehicles. Another good reason for a clearly marked police car is
|
||
that a suspect fleeing from the scene of a crime will not be able to say
|
||
that he or she didn't know the chase vehicle was a police car.
|
||
|
||
Flashing lights and sirens identify police vehicles. It is illegal for
|
||
private citizens to have simulated police horns, or cars painted with
|
||
colors similar to those used by official police vehicles. A high-speed
|
||
chase without these special features is prohibited (even by police in some
|
||
jurisdictions) and having them on a private vehicle is strictly prohibited.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters should use the following police regulations as a common sense
|
||
guide when following a suspect's vehicle. Remember, only properly marked
|
||
police cars are permitted to drive over the speed limit, run red lights and
|
||
stop signs, or drive on the wrong side of the road. Citizens should never
|
||
try any of the above.
|
||
|
||
Chief John Pape, of the Weslaco, Texas, Police Department has kindly
|
||
provided a copy of Weslaco's police regulations concerning high speed
|
||
chases by police vehicles. It's included as general information and
|
||
guidelines. Where you see the word police officer, substitute the word
|
||
CrimeFighter. You'll be surprised at the difference between TV shows and
|
||
official police policy.
|
||
|
||
Weslaco Police Department
|
||
|
||
Emergency Driving
|
||
|
||
Section 1: Definitions
|
||
|
||
1.01 OVERTAKE - Pursuit of a motorist, who does not yet realize he is being
|
||
pursued, in order to:
|
||
|
||
(a) Position the Police vehicle so that the audible and/or visual signals
|
||
can effectively be communicated to the motorist; and/or
|
||
|
||
(b) Position the Police vehicle so that the officer may more effectively
|
||
observe the motorist, his vehicle, his passengers and/or his load.
|
||
|
||
1.02 EVADER - A driver who continues to drive his vehicle and fails to pull
|
||
to the right and stop when he knows or should know of the audible and/or
|
||
visual signals to do so directed at him by an officer, but who does not
|
||
attempt to escape by driving recklessly and/or at an excessive speed.
|
||
|
||
1.03 HIGH SPEED PURSUIT (VEHICLE HOT PURSUIT) - Police vehicular pursuit of
|
||
another vehicle at speeds which exceeds the legal speed for non-emergency
|
||
vehicles.
|
||
|
||
1.04 RECKLESS EVADER - A driver who, in order to escape or avoid
|
||
apprehension by a police officer, drives his vehicle recklessly and/or at
|
||
speeds which are so extreme under the condition prevailing that his
|
||
involvement in a collision is probable should he continue.
|
||
|
||
1.05 ROADBLOCK - Any method, restriction, or obstruction used to prevent
|
||
free passage of motor vehicles on a highway, in order to effect the
|
||
apprehension of an actual or suspected violator in a motor vehicle.
|
||
|
||
1.06 PRIMARY PURSUING UNIT - The Police unit which initiates pursuit or any
|
||
unit which assumes control of the pursuit.
|
||
|
||
1.07 PROBABLE CAUSE - The total set of apparent facts and circumstances
|
||
based on reasonably trustworthy information which would warrant a prudent
|
||
person (in the position of and with the knowledge of the particular peace
|
||
officer) to believe something, for example, that a particular person has
|
||
committed some offense against the law.
|
||
|
||
Section 2: General provisions
|
||
|
||
2.01 - An officer may be held liable for the consequences of his reckless
|
||
disregard for the safety of others, An officer's duty to avoid damage or
|
||
injury to third parties takes precedence over pursuit or emergency
|
||
response. No officer shall engage in negligent or reckless actions, even in
|
||
pursuit of actual or suspected violators or in response to emergencies,
|
||
which may damage property or injure innocent persons.
|
||
|
||
2.01 - Officers shall balance the need for pursuit and apprehension against
|
||
the probability and severity of damage or injury. The officer shall
|
||
consider the seriousness of the offense which the evader or reckless evader
|
||
committed.
|
||
|
||
Section 3: Warning Equipment and Traffic Regulation
|
||
|
||
3.01 - An officer operating a police vehicle shall not disregard stop signs
|
||
or signals, exceed maximum speed limits, or disregard regulations governing
|
||
the specified direction of traffic or turning, unless he continuously
|
||
sounds a siren (and continuously display an emergency light system if his
|
||
vehicle has such equipment) as a warning to others.
|
||
|
||
3.02 - An officer must drive with due regard for the safety of all persons
|
||
and shall never operate any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of
|
||
life and property.
|
||
|
||
3.03 - An officer engaged in overtaking shall not exceed the apparent or
|
||
maximum speed limit by more than 20 miles per hour (MPH) unless such a rate
|
||
would unreasonably extend the pursuit which makes a higher speed necessary.
|
||
|
||
3.04 - An officer engaged in responding to a call for emergency service may
|
||
not exceed the speed limit by more than 20 MPH, unless a life-threatening
|
||
situation exists and traffic conditions permit a higher speed without
|
||
causing an unreasonable risk.
|
||
|
||
Section 4: High Speed Pursuit Policy
|
||
|
||
4.01 - An officer shall not engage in high-speed pursuit whenever it
|
||
reasonably appears that the potential harm to person or property arising
|
||
from such pursuit overweighs the potential harm threatened by the escaping
|
||
offender. In the absence of an overweighing danger to person or property, a
|
||
peace officer shall not engage in high-speed pursuit whenever it reasonably
|
||
appears the apprehension of the escaping offender by another means is
|
||
likely. In determining whether to engage in pursuit, an officer should
|
||
consider all relevant factors including:
|
||
|
||
(a) the nature of the offense committed by the offender;
|
||
|
||
(b) the method of the offender's escape;
|
||
|
||
(c) the extent to which the offender may be identified;
|
||
|
||
(d) knowledge of the offender's possible destination or direction of
|
||
movement;
|
||
|
||
(e) the present ability of other officers to apprehend the offender;
|
||
|
||
(f) knowledge of previous activities of the offender;
|
||
|
||
(g) the likelihood that the offender may use weapons or forcibly resist
|
||
apprehension;
|
||
|
||
(h) the potential for physical harm to person or property resulting from
|
||
high-speed pursuit of the offender;
|
||
|
||
(i) the condition of the officer's vehicle; road and weather conditions.
|
||
|
||
4.02 - An officer shall not engage in high-speed pursuit to arrest someone
|
||
for any misdemeanor except:
|
||
|
||
(a) a breach of peace which just occurred in the presence of the officers
|
||
and will likely re-occur; or
|
||
|
||
(b) a violation of state highway and vehicle laws.
|
||
|
||
4.03 - An officer engaged in high-speed pursuit need not maintain a
|
||
constant view of the escaping offender, but the pursuit must be constant
|
||
and continuous and without unreasonable and extraneous delays. If the
|
||
officer engages in activities unrelated to the pursuit, which remove him
|
||
from the pursuit, the officer may not renew the pursuit.
|
||
|
||
4.04 - An officer shall notify dispatch upon engaging in any high-speed
|
||
pursuit. Dispatch will immediately notify the shift supervisor.
|
||
|
||
4.05 - When an officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit finds that the
|
||
offender will flee beyond the boundary of the officer's local jurisdiction
|
||
or onto a government reservation, the officer shall notify dispatch and
|
||
request dispatch to notify officers of the jurisdiction into which the
|
||
pursuit will lead. Dispatch will immediately make such notifications and
|
||
will also immediately notify the shift supervisor.
|
||
|
||
4.06 - A peace officer in high-speed pursuit may never enter the Republic
|
||
of Mexico, and any such high-speed pursuit must cease at the International
|
||
border.
|
||
|
||
Section 5: High-Speed Pursuit Procedure
|
||
|
||
5.01 - When not coordinated by dispatch or a supervisor, the officer in the
|
||
primary pursuing unit of the high-speed pursuit shall direct the pursuit of
|
||
both his unit and others.
|
||
|
||
5.02 - The officer in the primary pursuing unit of a high-speed pursuit may
|
||
request all units and the base station to observe radio silence whenever
|
||
necessary to the proper conduct of the pursuit. The base station will
|
||
immediately repeat that request to all units on the frequency used by the
|
||
primary pursuing unit. Thereafter, until termination of the pursuit, only
|
||
message involving that pursuit or emergency radio traffic shall be
|
||
transmitted.
|
||
|
||
5.03 - Only the primary pursuing unit and one back-up unit shall engage in
|
||
high-speed pursuit, unless a supervisor or communications authorizes
|
||
additional units to engage in the pursuit. Such authorization shall be
|
||
given only when articulable circumstances require the additional
|
||
assistance.
|
||
|
||
5.04 - Intercepting units shall never intersect the path of an oncoming
|
||
high-speed vehicle. No assisting unit shall move toward the route of a
|
||
high-speed pursuit without notifying the pursuing officer, supervisor, or
|
||
communications of that moment.
|
||
|
||
5.05 - At no time will a police motorcycle engage in a high-speed pursuit.
|
||
|
||
5.06 - Any time an officer is ordered to discontinue a pursuit by a
|
||
supervisor, the officer will comply with that order immediately.
|
||
|
||
5.07 - The use of a police vehicle as a blockade or roadblock is strictly
|
||
prohibited.
|
||
|
||
5.08 - The use of a police vehicle to ram the fleeing vehicle, or to force
|
||
the fleeing vehicle off the roadway and/or into another object is
|
||
prohibited.
|
||
|
||
5.09 - Officers shall not fire their weapons at a fleeing vehicle unless
|
||
the use of deadly force would be authorized by law, and there is a minimum
|
||
chance of hitting other motorists, structures, homes or persons. Weapons
|
||
shall never be fired from moving vehicles.
|
||
|
||
5.10 - If a high-speed pursuit continues out of the city limits, the
|
||
pursuing officer shall obtain authorization from the shift supervisor to
|
||
continue the pursuit. If the shift supervisor is not immediately available
|
||
to grant such authorization, it shall be up to the discretion of the
|
||
primary pursuing officer to decide if the pursuit will be continued.
|
||
|
||
5.11 - Officers involved in a high-speed pursuit are to maintain a safe
|
||
following distance from the pursued vehicle to allow for sudden stops and
|
||
changes in direction.
|
||
|
||
5.12 - A safe and reasonable speed shall be maintained at all times.
|
||
"Reasonable" is based on road condition, traffic congestion, population
|
||
condition, visibility, and special areas such as school zones and high
|
||
pedestrian areas.
|
||
|
||
5.13 - An officer will discontinue a high-speed pursuit when:
|
||
|
||
(a) when the officer has lost visual contact with the violator;
|
||
|
||
(b) when ordered to discontinue by a supervisor;
|
||
|
||
(c) when unfavorable conditions exist due to congestion, unfavorable
|
||
weather, road conditions, or other factors which cause the risk factor of
|
||
continuing the pursuit outweighs the need to apprehend the violator;
|
||
|
||
(d) when the officer has lost his or her sense of direction and/or
|
||
location;
|
||
|
||
(e) when the pursuing officer's ability to communicate via police radio is
|
||
lost;
|
||
|
||
(f) when the suspect's identity has been established to the point that
|
||
later apprehension can be accomplished, and there is no logical need for
|
||
immediate apprehension;
|
||
|
||
(g) when requested to do so by another agency with jurisdiction to stop the
|
||
pursuit.
|
||
|
||
Section 6: Emergency Call Response
|
||
|
||
6.01 - An officer shall use emergency warning equipment in responding to
|
||
calls for service only when specifically authorized to do so by the officer
|
||
or dispatcher assigning him to the call.
|
||
|
||
6.02 - Any officer acting as a radio dispatcher or in any other way
|
||
assigning a police officer in a vehicle to respond to a call for service
|
||
shall, in addition to providing all other pertinent information, designate
|
||
the response code which the assigned officer must use.
|
||
|
||
6.03 - Responses shall be designated as follows:
|
||
|
||
(a) Non-emergency calls - Officers must respond to the call without using
|
||
emergency equipment or procedures;
|
||
|
||
(b) Emergency calls - Officers must respond to the call immediately by
|
||
proceeding directly to the call location as quickly as reasonably possible
|
||
while utilizing emergency warning equipment and obeying traffic regulations.
|
||
|
||
6.04 - Emergency call may only be designated, but are not required, for the
|
||
following categories:
|
||
|
||
(a) officer in trouble;
|
||
|
||
(b) felony in progress;
|
||
|
||
(c) assault, involving weapon, in progress;
|
||
|
||
(d) accident, fire, or other calls which may jeopardize human life; and
|
||
|
||
(e) others as the supervisor or dispatch may provide.
|
||
|
||
6.05 - A field supervisory officer may override the provisions of this
|
||
section and order an officer to use a different response call designation
|
||
than here indicated, if he deems it necessary under the circumstances.
|
||
|
||
6.06 - A responding officer who changes the response call designation shall
|
||
immediately notify the radio dispatcher or field supervisory officer. The
|
||
responding officer shall state his reasons for changing the response
|
||
designation."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Many police officers, in the heat of battle, so to speak, often forget or
|
||
ignore the above police regulations - with tragic results described by the
|
||
above Automobile Association report. Police may get reprimands from their
|
||
superiors for "breaking the rules." When citizens ignore safety and common
|
||
sense, they won't get off so easy.
|
||
|
||
The person being pursued might speed up and create a dangerous situation
|
||
for innocent parties as well as yourself and the suspect. And, if the
|
||
suspect is armed and dangerous, shots may be fired at you. If the bullets
|
||
don't hit you, they might hit someone else. If any of the foregoing could
|
||
have been avoided, but safety conditions were ignored, you can expect to be
|
||
charged with various traffic offenses, possibly criminal charges, as well
|
||
as many lawsuits for negligent behavior. It's not worth it. Don't do it.
|
||
|
||
When and if your surveillance pursuit turns into a high speed pursuit,
|
||
abort the chase. Call the police via CB and/or cellular phone. Give them
|
||
the vehicle description and other information they can use to intercept the
|
||
vehicle or continue covert surveillance. Let them make the arrest when
|
||
the suspect arrives at his destination or when it's safe to do so.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Rules of Evidence,
|
||
Entrapment, and other Technicalities
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters shouldn't consider the following information all the legal
|
||
reference there is available. When you're working on a criminal case,
|
||
especially during the final stages, you should also be working with an FBI
|
||
case agent or the police. At that time, the prosecutor (or your lawyer if
|
||
you assume the role of the prosecutor) and others will advise and teach you
|
||
the rules of evidence in a court of law. In the meantime, here's a few
|
||
things to keep in mind.
|
||
Kinds of Evidence
|
||
|
||
Direct evidence. This is solid proof that is indisputable and stands alone
|
||
without the need for further evidence. A videotape recording is both direct
|
||
and real evidence. It carries more weight than the testimony of a witness -
|
||
- especially if the witness is a CrimeFighter asking for a reward based on
|
||
the conviction of the suspect!
|
||
|
||
Direct evidence examples: The sworn testimony of a witness to a crime;
|
||
drugs sold to undercover agents in a sting operation; or a letter or
|
||
written contract with signatures; a videotape recording of a crime in
|
||
progress that clearly identifies the violators; a videotape showing a
|
||
license plate of the vehicle leaving the scene of the crime at the time the
|
||
crime was committed; a legally obtained wiretap recording. All of the above
|
||
evidence links the suspect directly to the crime.
|
||
|
||
Real evidence is tangible, physical evidence, as opposed to verbal, where
|
||
something is described. Real evidence can be looked at, handled, or both.
|
||
It is often shown in court, when practical, as exhibits. Videotape record-
|
||
ings of crimes in progress are both direct and real evidence.
|
||
|
||
Circumstantial evidence, or indirect evidence, is an accumulation of facts
|
||
and presumptions based on known facts that allow us to draw a conclusion or
|
||
inference concerning a crime. Example: An ex-con, convicted of armed robb-
|
||
ery, out on parole, is found in the vicinity of a robbery just committed by
|
||
a masked, armed robber. The suspect has weapons described in the robbery in
|
||
his possession. These facts are sufficient to justify suspicion of robbery,
|
||
but is not conclusive evidence that the suspect committed the robbery.
|
||
However, if the suspect also has in his possession some of the loot (watch,
|
||
rings, etc.) taken from the victim, then the circumstantial evidence is
|
||
supported by real evidence and is usually sufficient for a conviction.
|
||
|
||
Inculpatory (damning) evidence, is similar to circumstantial evidence. It's
|
||
sufficient to make a presumption of guilt, but without supporting evidence
|
||
is insufficient by itself if it can't be proved. The robber mentioned
|
||
above, with weapons in possession, provides inculpatory evidence, but
|
||
without direct evidence to link the person to the crime, the person remains
|
||
only a suspect of the robbery.
|
||
|
||
Hearsay evidence is not obtained from the personal knowledge of the witness
|
||
but consists of information that was given by another person. The person
|
||
giving hearsay evidence as testimony in court can't swear to the accuracy
|
||
of the information passed on. The unreliable nature of this kind of
|
||
evidence shows its weakness.
|
||
|
||
In all criminal prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
|
||
provides protection against rumors or hearsay by including the words "to be
|
||
confronted with the witness against him." This statement provides the
|
||
accused with the right to cross-examine the witness. If the witness is not
|
||
available, can't give testimony and be cross-examined, the hearsay evidence
|
||
can't be used.
|
||
|
||
Hearsay evidence is seldom heard or accepted by the court -- except in
|
||
unusual circumstances. In civil suits, the sixth amendment doesn't apply.
|
||
"Qualified" hearsay evidence is sometimes heard and may be included as part
|
||
of the preponderence of evidence.
|
||
|
||
Civil Suits vs Criminal Suits
|
||
|
||
Preponderence of evidence means all the evidence weighed for conviction
|
||
against that offered by the defendant for acquittal, and which is is more
|
||
convincing in the minds of the jury.
|
||
|
||
In criminal cases, "guilt" must be established in the minds of a jury,
|
||
based on the evidence presented to them beyond a reasonable doubt and moral
|
||
certainty, and the jury must be unanimous in its decision.
|
||
|
||
In civil suits, a preponderence of evidence against the defendant usually
|
||
results in a conviction (or, more correctly in civil suits, a "verdict of
|
||
liability"). Only a majority (usually two-thirds) of the jurists need to
|
||
agree on the verdict. Generally speaking, in civil cases, the lawyer who
|
||
presents the best argument ("preponderence of evidence") which outweighs
|
||
the defense lawyer's argument, usually wins the case.
|
||
|
||
In criminal courts the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
|
||
rests with the prosecutor. However, in civil suits, the situation is
|
||
reversed. Defendants have the burden of proving themselves innocent of the
|
||
accusations. When there is a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence,
|
||
proving themselves innocent may be difficult to do. Only a majority of the
|
||
jurists, not all of them, need to be convinced of the defendant's guilt.
|
||
|
||
Civil actions may be best when real and/or direct evidence isn't available
|
||
or sufficient to ensure a criminal conviction, or when politics and special
|
||
interests may influence the jury! For example:
|
||
|
||
If the accused is a corporation and is the main source of employment in
|
||
that area, one or more jurists may be influenced more by lost jobs or
|
||
political favors than the need to close down an industrial polluter. One
|
||
"undecided" or dissenting vote will result in a hung jury. Most prosecutors
|
||
are politically ambitious and expect to receive large corporate donations
|
||
for political campaigns from big companies - who expect favors in return.
|
||
As a result, many D.A.'s are bribed (by political donations) and influenced
|
||
to allow plea bargaining to lesser offenses or dismiss the case for lack of
|
||
evidence. Or, the D.A. may have too many cases to handle and is likely to
|
||
give the case minimal effort. In these situations, a Qui Tam RICO civil
|
||
suit by a Crimefighter, with experienced lawyers who are paid on a no-win,
|
||
no-pay, contingency basis, would obtain more satisfactory results.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Expert evidence is testimony given in relation to some scientific,
|
||
technical, or professional matter by experts in their respective fields who
|
||
are qualified by reason of their special training, skill, or experience.
|
||
Independent water testing laboratories, for example, are considered as
|
||
"expert witnesses" to support claims of water pollution from certified
|
||
samples sent to them for analysis.
|
||
|
||
The EPA will also conduct water pollution tests. However, many books on
|
||
pollution of the environment ("Laying Waste", "The Toxic Cloud," plus
|
||
others) accuse the EPA of being lax in their past enforcement of pollution
|
||
laws, mainly because of built-in bureaucracy, politics, and budget cuts.
|
||
It may be better to use independent commercial laboratories because they
|
||
provide fast turnaround, unbiased results, and tighter security to avoid
|
||
"lost" samples.
|
||
|
||
To fully control a water-pollution case, use independent laboratories, hire
|
||
a lawyer on a contingency basis, and use Qui Tam law to prosecute cases.
|
||
In civil suits, the courts usually award the plaintiff the legal costs of
|
||
prosecution when that party is successful in winning the case. That means
|
||
the defendant must pay your lawyer's fees, laboratory tests, and costs of
|
||
your investigation.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
State's evidence, which is testimony given by an accomplice or participant
|
||
in the commission of a crime, tends to incriminate or convict the
|
||
defendant. It's usually given under actual or implied promise of immunity
|
||
from prosecution. (In the vernacular of criminals -- "The first to talk,
|
||
the first to walk.")
|
||
|
||
Impeachment of witnesses is a strategy that both prosecutors and defense
|
||
attorneys use to discredit witnesses. A witness may feel like the person
|
||
being tried when subjected to cross-examination to discredit his or her
|
||
testimony. CrimeFighters should keep in mind this is a standard legal
|
||
tactic and means nothing personally. If the only evidence is the verbal
|
||
testimony of a witness, the usual legal strategy of lawyers is to discredit
|
||
(and impeach) a witness if they can.
|
||
|
||
While jurists are not supposed to take into consideration the witness may
|
||
be paid a reward, the defense lawyer will be sure to make it known
|
||
(directly or indirectly) and may try to dismiss your verbal testimony on
|
||
the grounds that you "make a profit" if you obtain a conviction. The
|
||
implication is that your motive is "questionable" and your testimony should
|
||
be discounted accordingly. If the CrimeFighter has a criminal record, it
|
||
too, would be brought to light and the defense attorney will imply the
|
||
testimony is further questionable to the maximum degree. But, it doesn't
|
||
mean the jury will dismiss the CrimeFighter's testimony. Most jurists are
|
||
well aware of that defense strategy and will usually ignore it when there
|
||
are other things to be considered. The D.A., or your lawyer, will provide
|
||
extensive coaching on how to handle defense lawyers' tactics.
|
||
|
||
Lack of Evidence
|
||
|
||
A witness who gives verbal testimony that isn't supported by any other
|
||
evidence will find his or her testimony offset by the accused's assertion
|
||
of innocence. Since it's one man's word against another, it will result in
|
||
a draw, with the case being dismissed for lack of evidence. In addition to
|
||
verbal testimony, you need direct, real or circumstantial evidence and/or
|
||
additional witnesses. A good videotape of the crime or audio recording is
|
||
usually sufficient to prove your accusations. The D.A. or your own lawyer
|
||
will advise you when you have insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Entrapment
|
||
|
||
Entrapment happens when law enforcement agents (or a CrimeFighter) coax
|
||
someone into committing a criminal act which the person, without the
|
||
prompting and coaxing, would not normally consider. Leading a person to
|
||
commit a criminal act and then making an arrest is not legally or morally
|
||
right. In entrapment the person doing the coaxing and manipulating of the
|
||
accused is guilty of instigating a criminal act that would not otherwise
|
||
have taken place. Instead of discouraging or preventing crime, the act of
|
||
entrapment makes it happen.
|
||
|
||
In a lecture given at the Mississippi Law Enforcement Officers' Training
|
||
Academy, in Jackson, Mississippi, the following definition of entrapment
|
||
was provided.
|
||
|
||
"When used in its original sense of merely trapping the criminal, the fact
|
||
of entrapment is obviously not a defense. Thus a defendant cannot raise a
|
||
defense that money was marked by means of which he was detected; that
|
||
marked goods were exposed to a suspected thief; that a door was purposely
|
||
left open for him; or that an opportunity was intentionally given him to
|
||
commit the crime. Similarly, it is no defense that the victim, on learning
|
||
of the proposed crime, does nothing to stop its commission but allows the
|
||
defendant to begin the commission of the crime so that he may be apprehend-
|
||
ed in the act.
|
||
|
||
When the doing of a particular act is a crime regardless of the consent of
|
||
anyone, and the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused, that
|
||
fact that an opportunity is furnished, or that the accused is aided in the
|
||
commission of the crime in order to secure the necessary evidence to
|
||
prosecute him therefore, constitutes no defense.
|
||
|
||
The purpose of a law enforcement officer is not to solicit the commission
|
||
of, nor to create, an offense, but to ascertain if the accused in engaged
|
||
in an unlawful business, or to entrap the defendant in the act of
|
||
committing an offense which he has reasonable grounds to believe the
|
||
accused has commenced, or is about to commence.
|
||
|
||
In the case of those crimes into which enters as an essential element the
|
||
violation of civil rights of persons, such as the offense of Larceny,
|
||
Burglary, and Robbery, the situation is different. Here, it will be seen,
|
||
the entrapment must not be under such circumstances as would amount to the
|
||
consent of the person affected, or a necessary ingredient of guilt, the
|
||
want of such consent, will be lacking, and the crime will not have been
|
||
committed. The line of distinction seems to be whether there has been an
|
||
active, as distinguished from passive, inducement to the taking on the part
|
||
of the persons affected or his duly authorized agents; and where such
|
||
active inducement can be shown, no conviction can be had.
|
||
|
||
Where the owner, in person or by his duly authorized agent, suggests to
|
||
the accused the criminal design, and actively urges, cooperates with, and
|
||
assists the accused in the taking of the goods, such conduct amounts to a
|
||
consent of the taking, and the criminal quality of the act is wanting.
|
||
Consent to the crime is not shown, however, by proof that the owner or
|
||
victim remained passive and made no effort to prevent the commission of the
|
||
crime, such as Larceny, Burglary, or Robbery. It is likewise no defense
|
||
that the agent of the owner or victim or law enforcement officer pretended
|
||
to cooperate with the defendant. The fact that the defendant was led to
|
||
commit the crime by his friends or confederate does not, under any
|
||
circumstances, constitute entrapment." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Sting operations are based on legal entrapment. For example, suppose and
|
||
officer or CrimeFighter knows that a person regularly commits certain drug
|
||
law violations, and a CrimeFighter poses as a customer to make an offer to
|
||
purchase a supply of narcotics to obtain evidence. The intent to commit a
|
||
criminal act was already in the mind of the accused and is part of his
|
||
normal business activity. In this instance, entrapment is not a defense.
|
||
|
||
Neither is entrapment a defense when a suspected or known prostitute is
|
||
seen on street corners and an undercover agent solicits services. The offer
|
||
to use the services described by the hooker isn't planted in the
|
||
prostitute's mind by the agent. When she (or he) names the services and
|
||
prices and takes money for payment, it is admissible as evidence of
|
||
prostitution.
|
||
|
||
Entrapment usually occurs when the defendant isn't the instigator of the
|
||
criminal act and would not normally have done such a thing on his or her
|
||
own. If the defendant was coaxed or coerced into the crime or criminal
|
||
activity by the officer or CrimeFighter simply to make an arrest, that
|
||
would be entrapment.
|
||
|
||
The Latest Word on Entrapment From the Supreme Court
|
||
|
||
An excerpt from the Las Vegas Review Journal, April 7, 1992:
|
||
By David G. Savage, L.A. Times.
|
||
|
||
Postal Inspectors Erred, Justices Rule, By Enticing a Nebraska Farmer To
|
||
Buy Banned Child Pornography
|
||
|
||
WASHINGTON -- In a surprise ruling that limits government "sting opera-
|
||
tions," the Supreme Court said Monday that investigators may not seek to
|
||
trap an "unwary innocent" unless they first have clear evidence that the
|
||
person is likely to commit a crime.
|
||
|
||
The 5-4 decision overturns the conviction of a Nebraska farmer who ordered
|
||
illegal child pornography through the mails, but only after U.S. postal
|
||
service inspectors sent him at least 10 solicitations over 26 months.
|
||
|
||
In their zeal to enforce the law, government agents may not originate a
|
||
criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to
|
||
commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the
|
||
government may prosecute," wrote Justice Byron R. White for the court.
|
||
|
||
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was
|
||
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by
|
||
government agents," he added.
|
||
|
||
The message here is that the government's job is to catch criminals, not
|
||
turn law-abiding citizens into criminals," said Steven R. Shapiro, an
|
||
American Civil Liberties Union lawyer. "It is not a new message, but one
|
||
that the court has to repeat every so often."
|
||
|
||
While many defendants claim they were entrapped, few succeed. To prevail,
|
||
the defendant must show both that the government "induced" his criminal act
|
||
and that he was not "predisposed" to commit such a crime.
|
||
|
||
If a man solicits sex from a policewoman posing as a street walker, he
|
||
cannot claim entrapment. His request "amply demonstrates (his)
|
||
disposition," the court said. Similarly, government agents may take
|
||
elaborate steps to trap a person who, based on other evidence, is quite
|
||
likely to commit a further crime.
|
||
|
||
But in this case (Jacobson vs U.S., 90-1124), the court was confronted with
|
||
a law-abiding citizen who broke the law only after being encouraged
|
||
repeatedly to do so by postal inspectors.
|
||
|
||
The government may not play on the weaknesses of an innocent party and
|
||
beguile him into committing crimes which he would not otherwise have
|
||
attempted," White said." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The essence of the entrapment ruling is that police may not originate and
|
||
plan a criminal activity, then implant in an innocent person's mind the
|
||
disposition, by persuasion, to commit a criminal act, and then aggressively
|
||
encourage commission of the crime so the law may prosecute.
|
||
|
||
In court, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (a)
|
||
defendant was actually looking for such a criminal opportunity; (b)
|
||
defendant was more than willing (eager) to do such a criminal act; and (c)
|
||
defendant was mentally prepared and predisposed to commit the criminal act
|
||
BEFORE being contacted by an undercover agent.
|
||
|
||
When working undercover, CrimeFighters should wear a "wire" or otherwise
|
||
make tape recordings of conversations that prove (a) (b) and (c) for
|
||
successful prosecution. Always work with law enforcement agents before
|
||
undertaking a sting operation on your own. If you don't, you might get
|
||
caught in a sting operation yourself and it would be difficult to explain
|
||
in court. If you work with law enforcement officials, make sure you have an
|
||
agreement in writing as to exactly what your role is, and what you need to
|
||
do to qualify for the reward and expenses promised.
|
||
|
||
Recommended Reading (in CRIMCAT)
|
||
|
||
"Legal Handbook for Special Agents," a book used by the FBI to advise
|
||
their agents what they can do without crossing the line of legality. The
|
||
book explains probable cause, warrants, arrests, confessions, and
|
||
interrogations, civil and criminal liability, search and seizure,
|
||
diplomatic immunity, and eyewitness identification.
|
||
|
||
D.E.A. Narcotics Investigator's Manual," an exact reprint of the same
|
||
manual used by the Drug Enforcement Administration to train its narcotics
|
||
investigators. This one covers all aspects and every angle involved with
|
||
drug law enforcement. It covers interviews and interrogations, case
|
||
preparation, testifying in court, informants, surveillance operations,
|
||
undercover operations, entrapment, penetration of drug rings, search
|
||
operations, raids, clandestine laboratories, raid and surveillance
|
||
equipment, and a lot more. The section of use of informants and preparation
|
||
for court testimony are especially enlightening. ($50, but worth it.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Where to Obtain the Training to be a CrimeFighter
|
||
|
||
If you're not an ex-cop, you might consider being a police officer for a
|
||
year or two, to get the training and experience.
|
||
|
||
Metropolitan Police Departments often are looking for police officers.
|
||
Eligibility requirements usually require: 21+ years of age; High School
|
||
diploma or GED; no felony convictions; U.S. Citizen; visual acuity no worse
|
||
than 20/200 correctable to 20/20 with glasses.
|
||
|
||
Highway Patrols have similar but tougher physical requirements. The FBI has
|
||
the most stringent educational, and physical fitness requirements. Ask
|
||
them for details if you are interested.
|
||
|
||
Details on the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Academy training were not
|
||
available, but it is probably similar to that at the Nevada Highway Patrol,
|
||
which lasts 22 weeks. Besides a base pay of $411.42 per week, students
|
||
receive free room and board. But, in some states, eligibility for academy
|
||
training is 12 month's service - to protect their financial investment.
|
||
|
||
Police academies resemble military Boot Camps for basic training. They have
|
||
vigorous physical training and strong emphasis on armed and unarmed self-
|
||
defense and all phases of law enforcement. If you attend a police academy,
|
||
the training you receive will be of considerable benefit to you the rest of
|
||
your life, whether you decide to become a full-time career police officer
|
||
or not. If you're "between jobs" and eligible, check it out.
|
||
|
||
If you want to preview police academy life, read the ($5) pocketbook "The
|
||
Making of a Cop", by Harvey Rachlin, published by Pocketbooks (1991).
|
||
Besides finding out about the academy, you'll also see the unpleasant
|
||
aspects of police work, including baby-sitting rotting corpses. (The book
|
||
is listed in CRIMCAT.)
|
||
|
||
Police academy training, while considered essential for police officers,
|
||
may be less important for CrimeFighters. In "The Making of a Cop," the
|
||
author tells how a rookie feels when he goes through the N.Y. Police
|
||
Academy, what it's like, and what happens after the academy. In
|
||
particular, he mentions the following:
|
||
|
||
"It seems to be a normal evolutionary process for academy graduates in
|
||
their first year out on the streets to tell themselves, after witnessing
|
||
the depraved conditions and being in constant contact with the worst in
|
||
society, "We can just forget all that bullshit we learned at the academy."
|
||
This is somewhat demoralizing when they think back at how earnestly they
|
||
applied themselves, only to find out that that's not what real life as a
|
||
cop is about. Yet they would do better to consider the academy, in Captain
|
||
DeRienzo's words, as "the beginning of training, not the end." The course
|
||
work may be idealistic in today's world, but it does establish a critically
|
||
important perspective: the need to treat others as human beings -
|
||
respectable, decent and innocent until proven guilty. Anything less would
|
||
risk turning the law enforcement system into a farce and the society it
|
||
protects into a police state." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
If you don't have the time or opportunity to attend Police Academies, but
|
||
have either military training and/or street experience, you may be just as
|
||
qualified to be a CrimeFighter. The rest of the training you can learn from
|
||
videotapes and books on law enforcement subjects listed in CRIMCAT, and by
|
||
taking a few courses at various schools that are listed below.
|
||
|
||
Security Guards and CrimeFighters
|
||
|
||
Many states have or are considering regulation, training and licensing of
|
||
private police. Private security firms, and security guards themselves, are
|
||
becoming more aware of their own lawsuit liability from overzealous and
|
||
untrained personnel. In the near future, licensing, regulation and training
|
||
will be required in all states. Some private security firms already have
|
||
training programs. Look for them. Check them out first before you sign up.
|
||
If training is available, you may get paid to attend classes as well as
|
||
receive valuable basic training in all aspects of making citizen arrests.
|
||
|
||
A training manual for security guards, "Private Security and the Law,"
|
||
written by Charles P. Nemeth, is also a training manual for CrimeFighters.
|
||
As the book explains, a security guard has no more police authority than a
|
||
civilian. Accordingly, everything in the book also applies 100 percent to
|
||
CrimeFighters. The book includes (among other subjects) the law of arrest,
|
||
search, and seizure and their applications in the private sector; civil and
|
||
criminal liability of security personnel; the enforcement of laws and
|
||
interpretation of evidence; and public and private law enforcement. It also
|
||
includes dozens of examples and case histories explaining various scenarios
|
||
and court decisions. As a recent publication (1989), it's tailor-made for
|
||
CrimeFighters. CrimeFighters need to know all they can learn about citizens
|
||
arrests and the inherent problems they may face.
|
||
|
||
If you'd like to try the job, before you plunge into full-time police work
|
||
(as a cop or CrimeFighter) try working as a security guard for Pinkertons,
|
||
Brinks, Wells-Fargo, or other well-known company. The pay will be minimal,
|
||
but you will receive some training and get to know other security guards,
|
||
cops and ex-cops, and if you're lucky, have the opportunity to make a few
|
||
citizen arrests.
|
||
|
||
If you make an arrest for a felony while on duty as a security guard, you
|
||
may not earn a big reward, but you will be eligible to apply under 3059. If
|
||
you think the reward may not be as much as you think it's worth and fines
|
||
and forfeitures are involved, you might consider prosecuting the case under
|
||
Qui Tam law. Remember, security guards are eligible for rewards, Qui Tam,
|
||
and can use RICO as well as CrimeFighters' personal lawsuits.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter Seminars
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter lodges will, as part of their educational, fraternal and
|
||
social activities, present low-cost, local CrimeFighter Seminars every
|
||
month. The purpose of Crimefighter Seminars is to educate the public,
|
||
recruit members, and promote the name and concept of CrimeFighters. Look
|
||
for the local advertising of them in your area.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter lodges will host the seminars and invite qualified people,
|
||
such as various law enforcement agents and criminal defense lawyers to be
|
||
guest speakers on various law enforcement related subjects. Seminar topics
|
||
and guest speakers will vary from month-to-month to avoid repetition.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter seminars will provide question and answer sessions that will
|
||
supplement material in this book and others. Seminars will be presented as
|
||
a public service. They will be held at local libraries or high schools
|
||
where suitable rooms are available for about $10 per night cleaning charge.
|
||
A small charge of $10 may be charged to defray the cost of the room rent as
|
||
well as paying for printing of handout material.
|
||
|
||
Not everybody will want to be full-time, active CrimeFighters. The majority
|
||
of people attending these seminars will acquire the motivation to look
|
||
and dig for information and pass it on to CrimeFighters or police. They'll
|
||
be instructed to leave dangerous work to experienced professionals.
|
||
|
||
Special Schools
|
||
|
||
Rocky Mountain Combat Applications Group, 2888 Bluff St., # 118, Boulder,
|
||
Colorado 80301. This is a five day training course in street fighting,
|
||
conducted by Peyton Quinn, author of Bouncer's Guide to Barroom Brawling.
|
||
If you read CRIMCAT you'll see a few of his books and videos listed there.
|
||
|
||
Incidentally, if you'd like a preview of this course, it's on video. Send
|
||
$15 for the video, and if you attend the course, it's refundable.
|
||
|
||
The emphasis is on street fighting, low blows and all the dirty sneaky
|
||
tricks that aren't usually taught in any school -- until now!
|
||
|
||
From a recent brochure: "This is you opportunity for 5 days of instruction
|
||
in 'Real World' self defense by the instructors of BLACK MEDICINE, the
|
||
video and the author of A BOUNCERS GUIDE TO BARROOM BRAWLING. If you apply
|
||
yourself at this 5 day training camp you will definitely leave with a
|
||
significantly improved ability to defend yourself in a 'real world'
|
||
assault... and a lot more. This is primarily because your instructors at
|
||
the camp have such "real world" experience. Each has worked as a "bouncer"
|
||
or "cooler" and in other security related fields and this experience has
|
||
provided them with a very unique opportunity to study the reality of how
|
||
"sucker punchers", "knifers', and assorted types of "ambushers" actually
|
||
operate.
|
||
|
||
The program of instruction at this camp has been developed based on that
|
||
collective knowledge of real fights: How they start, how they can be
|
||
avoided, and how you can finish them when demanded. There is much more to
|
||
self defense than is ever discussed in most martial arts Dojos.
|
||
|
||
Testimonial from Al Tino, 2nd degree black belt. "I'm always in a constant
|
||
search for what's going to really work in an emergency situation... I've
|
||
learned an awful lot at the camp. I think I'm much better prepared for a
|
||
real world encounter now."
|
||
|
||
The brochure didn't list the cost of the 5 day course, but the 3 day course
|
||
mentioned in Peyton's letter was $325 per person. Assume the 5 day course
|
||
is around $500. Write for their current brochure, schedule and prices.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
The G. Gordon Liddy Institute, which operates in Miami, Florida, uses as a
|
||
mailing address P.O. Box 7570, Van Nuys, CA91409 (818) 989-1000 Fax (818)
|
||
989-1508. This school is headed by a former FBI Agent and a Staff Assistant
|
||
to the President of the United States. The school instructors are known to
|
||
be leading experts in their respective fields, such as firearms, tactical
|
||
defense training, and bail bond recovery. Five courses require a stay in
|
||
Miami at your own expense: (a) Executive Protection (3 days, $825); (b)
|
||
Bail Enforcement (2 days, $550) taught by Bob Burton, President of NABEA.;
|
||
(c) Surveillance Techniques (2 days, $550); (d) Electronic Counter-measures
|
||
(2 days, $490); and (e) Defensive Weapons Tactics and Personal Defense
|
||
Tactics (2 days, $500). The latter is required for all certificate courses.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters who want basic training might consider the last three courses
|
||
at Liddy (c, d, and e) mentioned above. Total cost might be close to
|
||
$3,000. If you can afford it, you might consider this school as being
|
||
close to what you might need. Add a few books on other subjects that you'd
|
||
like to pursue as your specialty, for the rest of your training.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
The American Pistol Institute (API), P.O. Box 401, Paulden, AZ 86334, (602)
|
||
636-4565, is strictly a firearms training school located on a 850-acre
|
||
ranch called Gunsite, about 25 miles from Prescott, Arizona. A testimonial
|
||
from a former graduate says, "If you took ALL the facilities owned by ALL
|
||
the other U.S. Shooting Schools and combined them into one, at best you
|
||
would come up with about 25% of what is available at Gunsite."
|
||
|
||
API's Managing Director is Jeff Cooper, noted author, teacher, lecturer,
|
||
and firearms consultant. He is generally considered to be the world's
|
||
foremost authority of sidearm techniques. API teaches virtually everything
|
||
you want to know and learn about guns and shooting. Individual courses are
|
||
taught at $700 each.
|
||
|
||
Each one (pistols, rifles, shotguns, and carbines) includes combat
|
||
simulated action, like those in police academy courses, with pop up targets
|
||
of "good guys" and "bad guys," plus indoor, outdoor, and shooting-in-the-
|
||
dark target practice. Each course uses up about 1,000 rounds. Standard
|
||
ammunition is used, not magnum loads, and .38's to .45 caliber, double-
|
||
action revolvers or pistols are recommended for the handgun courses.
|
||
Factory ammunition and reloads are available at the ranch. If you want to
|
||
become a better-than-average law enforcement officer with a handgun, rifle,
|
||
and shotgun, this is the place to get that specialized training.
|
||
|
||
To be a Top Gun among handgunners, you can take four pistol courses, each a
|
||
prerequisite to others: General Pistol, Intermediate, Special, and
|
||
Pistolcraft Extension "Clinics."
|
||
|
||
Because of the proficiency acquired by graduates of their courses, a
|
||
requirement for enrollment is that the applicant must provide sufficient
|
||
evidence that he or she is not a convicted felon, and is recommended by a
|
||
respected public official. A letter from your local chief of police
|
||
stating there you have no criminal record, and a letter from a local public
|
||
figure or your lawyer who says you are known to be a responsible person,
|
||
may be accepted as satisfactory for enrollment. The majority of attendees
|
||
seem to be law enforcement and military personnel who want to be much
|
||
better with guns than the bad guys -- to have an edge -- and Jeff Cooper
|
||
doesn't want it the other way around.
|
||
|
||
The API provides limited camping space for self-contained RVs, but no hook-
|
||
ups. Hotels and motels in Prescott are available, and all meals are on
|
||
your own. A caterer visits the ranch at noon dispensing sandwiches and
|
||
beverages for lunch.
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters can learn most techniques, such as skip tracing, surveillance
|
||
techniques, using special equipment, and others. from books written by
|
||
people who are trained and experienced in those areas. Many videotapes are
|
||
available on related topics. But there is no substitute for hands-on
|
||
training with weapons and personal self-defense.
|
||
|
||
A word to the wise: learning boxing (al la Marquis of Queensbury rules),
|
||
wrestling, and learning the martial arts also help. They're good exercise
|
||
and may give you confidence, but don't rely totally on that knowledge.
|
||
When you're in a back alley or barroom brawl you need to know street
|
||
fighting and dirty tricks. Books on these subjects are also available.
|
||
|
||
Examples: "Fists, Wits, and a Wicked Right" (Surviving on the Wild Side of
|
||
the Street); "Pool Cues, Beer Bottles, and Baseball Bats," a guide to
|
||
improvised weapons for self-defense; "Kill Shots" (a videotape); "101
|
||
Sucker Punches"; "Bouncer's Guide to Barroom Brawling"; "Anything Goes";
|
||
"Danger Zones"; "Fight for Your Life" (Secrets of Street Fighting); and
|
||
many others.
|
||
|
||
Street fighting isn't (usually) taught in gymnasiums. You can learn street
|
||
fighting the hard way, by being on the receiving end, or by reading a few
|
||
good books by the guys that know street fighting and teach you all the
|
||
nasty tricks they use to stay alive.
|
||
|
||
A large amount of knowledge you need can be obtained by reading special-
|
||
interest books on subjects relevant to your field of interest. Further
|
||
education and training may be gained through contact with other people who
|
||
will share their knowledge, books, equipment, and experiences with you.
|
||
That's one of the reasons, and benefits, of being a member and belonging to
|
||
a CrimeFighter lodge.
|
||
|
||
Not all CrimeFighters will carry a gun or expect to be in life-threatening
|
||
situations, but it wouldn't hurt to be capable and competent with handguns
|
||
and other self-defense skills. You never know when it might be needed.
|
||
|
||
National Rifle Association (NRA)
|
||
|
||
If you can't attend Jeff Cooper's classes, you can attend similar handgun
|
||
courses offered by the National Rifle Association for firearms training,
|
||
law enforcement courses taught in universities.
|
||
|
||
The NRA has dozens of shooting courses being offered in various cities
|
||
throughout the United States. In response to my request for information on
|
||
where and when classes are offered, they wrote:
|
||
|
||
"The NRA trains and certifies the instructors who introduce the public to
|
||
the fundamentals of pistol shooting, handgun operation and gun safety. Live
|
||
firing is included in this 10-hour pistol course. The instructors are NRA
|
||
volunteers; some will only charge their students for the cost of course
|
||
materials, while others also charge for their time. It is up to the
|
||
individual instructor to set a fee. Likewise, when, where, and how often
|
||
the instructors hold their classes is their decision. Therefore, because of
|
||
the nature of this program, I think it would be better to mention in your
|
||
book that the reader may call or write to the NRA Education and Training
|
||
Division, 1600 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 or (202) 828-
|
||
6245 and request a list of local certified instructors in his or her area.
|
||
Rather than print a list that may be quickly outdated, stating that the
|
||
reader should contact the NRA is the best route."
|
||
|
||
Tip: Local gun stores usually know about NRA classes or NRA-authorized gun
|
||
ranges in your area. Ask them first. If no gun store in your area knows
|
||
anything about local NRA gun course/ranges, write to: Ms. Brenda K.
|
||
Dalessandro, Manager, Communications Department, Education and Training
|
||
Div., 1600 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036-40610-62 or Phone
|
||
(202) 828-6000 Fax(202) 223-2691.
|
||
|
||
If gun-carrying permits can be obtained in their State, you need to be
|
||
aware of the serious responsibility of using a firearm, when not to use it,
|
||
and the legal and financial consequences of using one. Massad Ayoob covers
|
||
this topic in his two books, "In the Gravest Extreme" and "The Truth About
|
||
Self Protection." (In CRIMCAT.)
|
||
|
||
Gun Laws
|
||
|
||
The NRA has issued a pamphlet overview of each State's gun laws. It covers
|
||
just about everything about purchasing, registration, and carrying a weapon
|
||
and about handgun, rifle, shotgun, and machinegun laws. These pamphlets,
|
||
one for each State, are FREE for the asking. Write to: NRA Institute for
|
||
Legislative Action, 1600 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036
|
||
(Please include a dollar to cover printing and mailing costs.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
High Tech Tools of the Trade
|
||
|
||
Electronic tools CrimeFighters can use, such as cellular phones and
|
||
camcorders, rapidly and constantly improve. This chapter is intended to
|
||
provide general information only as it will eventually be outdated by the
|
||
passage of time. Talk to sales reps and read periodical literature to keep
|
||
up-to-date on new high tech equipment and current prices.
|
||
|
||
Cellular Phones
|
||
|
||
The most important piece of equipment for CrimeFighters is a cellular
|
||
phone. Radio Shack and other chain stores offer special discounts with
|
||
service contracts and activate the phone. The company that provides the
|
||
phone service pays the store a commission up front amounting to the
|
||
difference between the store's regular price without the 12-month service
|
||
contract. Discounts a few years ago amounted to as much as $300, lowering
|
||
the purchase price of a cellular phone to about $200.
|
||
|
||
Cellular phones are basically radio transmitters, with limited power up to
|
||
three watts. Because of the relatively low power for long-distance trans-
|
||
missions, receiver/transmitter/relay stations called "cells" are situated
|
||
along popular corridors beside freeways and major highways. Cells overlap
|
||
to form a relay when you progress through one cell to another. That makes
|
||
it possible to use them in cars. These cells hand-off (relay) the conver-
|
||
sation to the next cell as you travel. In some areas, off the main high-
|
||
ways, there may not be any receiving stations and the use of a cellular
|
||
phone isn't possible. But it won't be long before that problem is solved.
|
||
|
||
Excerpts from the Toronto Globe and Mail: "Telesat Mobile, Inc. has reached
|
||
an agreement with French-based Arianespace to launch a satellite in 1994
|
||
designed to improve mobile communications throughout North America. Once
|
||
the satellite is in operation, individuals using portable computers,
|
||
portable fax machines and a new generation of cellular phones will be able
|
||
to send and receive messages throughout North America... the satellites
|
||
would be particularly useful for sending and receiving transmissions in the
|
||
85 percent of North America that is not now served by cellular phones."
|
||
|
||
Costs
|
||
|
||
The receiver/transmitter/relay stations are serviced by firms who charge
|
||
for the service. Cellular One, of Yuma, Arizona, has the following:
|
||
|
||
V.I.P Plan -- for low volume users -- charges a flat monthly rate of $29.95
|
||
for basic service called an access fee, whether you use the phone or not.
|
||
In addition when you use the phone, for all incoming or outgoing calls, it
|
||
costs an extra 38 cents per minute during peak air time (from 7 a.m. to 7
|
||
p.m. Monday through Friday. At other time (off-peak) the rate drops to 24
|
||
cents per minute. There is no free air time.
|
||
|
||
The Business Plan is for higher usage. The monthly access fee is $59.95,
|
||
peak rate is 35 cents and the off-peak rate is 20 cents, and the extra $30
|
||
for the access fee allows 100 minutes of free air time. Actually, the "free
|
||
air time" cost $30, or at a packaged rate of 30 cents per minute for extra
|
||
air time. If you use the phone frequently during business hours, this plan
|
||
gives a volume discount.
|
||
|
||
The Executive Plan is for busy people who use the phone a lot -- like a
|
||
business executive. Monthly access fee is $99.95, peak rate is 32 cents and
|
||
the off-peak rate is 18 cents, plus you get 240 free minutes of air time.
|
||
Or the 240 minutes cost $70 per month more than V.I.P. service, and the
|
||
"free" air time of 240 minutes cost 29 cents a minute -- whether it's peak
|
||
or off-peak.
|
||
|
||
You are charged for air time whether you make an outgoing call or someone
|
||
calls you. Since you pay for air time when people call you on your cellular
|
||
phone, don't give out that phone number for regular use -- unless it's a
|
||
business necessity (or you can afford large phone bills). If you're a
|
||
ratchet jaw, or have a teenager lurking close by to use your phone when
|
||
you're not looking, the extra charge for air time can cost a bundle. Keep
|
||
and use a regular phone besides the cellular phone. Reserve the cellular
|
||
phone for emergency calls, business, and on-the-road use.
|
||
|
||
Long distance calls are still put through as long distance calls. Your call
|
||
is picked up by the nearest cell and connected to a long distance telephone
|
||
line in that cell. You are then charged regular long distance rates in
|
||
addition to air time. The long distance connection allows you make calls to
|
||
virtually anywhere in the world. (The downside: you get stuck for the air
|
||
time when people call you long distance -- even wrong numbers.)
|
||
|
||
Regular telephone features, such as call waiting, call forwarding, call
|
||
transfer, no-answer transfer, no-busy call forward, and 3-way conference
|
||
calling, are available for an extra $2.50 for each feature, or $6 per month
|
||
for 3 or more. There's dozens of various hardware features for cellular
|
||
phones which are too numerous to mention here.
|
||
|
||
Radio Shack Deals
|
||
|
||
Radio Shack in Yuma uses Contel Cellular phone service, which has slightly
|
||
different rates. Monthly service is $30, peak time rate is 40 cents per
|
||
minute, off-peak time rate is 20 cents per minute, and no free time. But
|
||
Radio Shack charges a $25 "activate" fee to program the phone to you new
|
||
telephone number, etc. The latter is a one-time only fee, unless you change
|
||
your number.
|
||
|
||
The difference between Cellular One and Contel is insignificant. For
|
||
example, let's say you use the cellular phone strictly for emergencies and
|
||
CrimeFighter calls which might total about 30 minutes per month. For simple
|
||
calculation, assume you use the phone 50% of the time during peak time and
|
||
50% during off-peak.
|
||
|
||
Your costs for Cellular One: $29.95 monthly service fee, plus 15 minutes at
|
||
38 cents = $5.70, plus 15 minutes at 24 cents = $3.60, or a total of $39.25
|
||
per month.
|
||
|
||
Your costs for Contel: $30 monthly service fee, plus 15 minutes at 40 cents
|
||
= $6, plus 15 minutes at 20 cents = $3, or a total of $39 per month.
|
||
|
||
Chain stores like Radio Shack are numerous and convenient. If you have
|
||
mechanical problems, they'll fix or replace the instrument. Other models
|
||
may have to be sent to a repair depot and may take weeks to get it back.
|
||
|
||
Camcorders
|
||
|
||
The second most valuable piece of equipment for CrimeFighters is also the
|
||
most expensive, about $1,000 or so. They aren't essential, but videotapes
|
||
provide the best evidence possible when you make a "movie" of lawbreakers
|
||
committing a crime. If you're serious about being a full time CrimeFighter
|
||
you'll want one sooner or later. I'll skip the mechanical description and
|
||
concentrate on the models and features available.
|
||
|
||
VHS format is the most popular. Beta models are obsolete. Sony has a "new"
|
||
Beta format called Extended Definition (ED) Beta. This one's disadvantages
|
||
outweigh its advantages for CrimeFighter use. Forget Beta models.
|
||
|
||
VHS Camcorders (cameras) are available in standard format, compact format
|
||
VHS-C, Super VHS, and 8mm. Compact models are usually marked as VHS-C. The
|
||
cartridge and camera are smaller and lighter in weight. The tradeoff is
|
||
they have a smaller amount of recording time available, about twenty
|
||
minutes at the fastest speed (which makes a better picture) and ninety
|
||
minutes at the slowest recording speed. A cartridge adapter allows the use
|
||
of compact tape cartridges in a standard VCR. The adapter sells for about
|
||
$40 via mail order. The limited recording time is a tradeoff for lighter
|
||
weight and smaller bulk.
|
||
|
||
S-VHS produces a super high-resolution image which provides a much better
|
||
picture, similar to the high-res screens on computers. The drawback is that
|
||
standard TV screen can't show the details in excess of 240 lines of
|
||
resolution. S-VHS cameras make superior pictures, but you won't find many
|
||
super high-resolution TV monitors to take advantage of their high
|
||
resolution image.
|
||
|
||
(Note: Computer technology now includes the ability to view videotapes on
|
||
computers. If your computer has a high-res screen (SVGA) you could use the
|
||
computer for viewing high-resolution tapes when it's too fuzzy on ordinary
|
||
TV. There's also hardware and software available to route TV broadcasts,
|
||
including hi-fi sound, to be viewed and heard on a computer. Scan through
|
||
current issues of Computer Shopper for the latest products and prices.)
|
||
|
||
Eight millimeter tapes and cameras are the smallest and lightest. Recording
|
||
time is about two hours, the same as standard VHS models. A small drawback
|
||
(or benefit) is, in 8mm format, the camcorder is also the VCR playback
|
||
machine. You hook up the camcorder to play back through your TV -- like
|
||
hooking up your VCR player to the TV. Using a VHS VCR, you can copy the
|
||
8mm tape to VHS format, or vice-versa.
|
||
|
||
At the time of this writing, the top of the line was a Sony EVC-X10. Radio
|
||
Shack or similar stores won't have them because of its unusual features
|
||
(for professionals) and its price. It listed for $3,900 (1989). Street
|
||
prices on computers run about 50% of list prices shown in news releases.
|
||
That lets stores offer discounts. The markup on Camcorders is about 25%,
|
||
so a realistic discount price you might get is 10 to 15% off list price.
|
||
|
||
The Sony EVC-X10 is an 8mm video camera recorder. The main feature is that
|
||
it accepts any C-mount video or photographic lens, including wide angle,
|
||
high magnification zoom, telephoto and night vision lens. It also accepts
|
||
16mm film-type lens with commercially available adapters and can be used
|
||
with microscopes and telescopes for some pretty specialized work. It comes
|
||
with a broadcast quality 1-to-14 zoom lens which is the equivalent to 40-
|
||
560mm SLR (camera) zoom lens. (For example: with a 500mm camera lens you
|
||
can record a close-up of your subject a block or two away from the camera.
|
||
|
||
Compact and lightweight, the Sony EVC-X10 features a high density (420k
|
||
pixels) 2/3" precision CCD color imager, 2 lux sensitivity (night vision
|
||
lens may improve low light performance); an auto and manual iris control;
|
||
adjustable high precision external view finder; simultaneous time/date
|
||
generator; auto white balance; edit and review capabilities; and, a
|
||
variable speed shutter from 1/60 to 1/2000 of a second. Additional features
|
||
include a built-in mike, battery lamp, audio/ visual output jacks with RFU
|
||
power supply for playback on TV, five pin remote connector, external mike
|
||
input (for CamEar zoom or directional mikes), 11 function external LCD
|
||
panel, eight function internal VF display, and noiseless slow/still frame
|
||
advance. It also comes with an attachable pistol grip and shoulder frame to
|
||
increase balance and comfort, but it also mounts on a standard video tripod
|
||
- handy for stakeouts.
|
||
|
||
When you can afford it, get this one or its successor model. Ask your local
|
||
dealer who handles Sony products. Shop for prices.
|
||
|
||
If you can't afford the Sony EVC-X10, the alternative might be a Panasonic
|
||
PV760. It has a computerized 1 to 30 power zoom, two lux, and lists for
|
||
$1,499 (1989). They are available from Tandy's subsidiary stores, Video
|
||
Concepts, which are located in many cities throughout the United States.
|
||
They had them on sale last year for $1,299.
|
||
|
||
PV760 features are: 30:1 digital zoom; 10 W color enhancement light; 12 X
|
||
Power Zoom (besides the 30:1 digital zoom); Flying erase head for editing;
|
||
self-timer recording: digital electronic image stabilizer that's needed for
|
||
long-range zoom recording, and needed for automobile use when on the move
|
||
or in moving surveillance: a High Speed shutter; and a carrying case.
|
||
|
||
Also available for the PV760 is a four-piece electronic mike. It consists
|
||
of two microphones: One is a pen mike; one is a concealable bow tie mike.
|
||
The receiver slides on to the camcorder to plug the sound into the camcord-
|
||
er as you tape the action. Another receiver can be attached to your belt,
|
||
or on another person who needs to hear what's going on -- or going down.
|
||
|
||
Update: Seen in a (1992) VIDEO BUYERS GUIDE. A $1,200 Hitachi VM-E25A 8mm
|
||
camcorder with a 1:8 normal Zoom plus digital Zoom that boosts it by a
|
||
factor of 8 to obtain 64 Zoom.
|
||
|
||
The VM-E25A is very small, lightweight, easily fits in one hand, and has
|
||
all kinds of options and accessories as standard, plus optional equipment.
|
||
For surveillance work, you can replace the standard (removable) lens with a
|
||
5X telephoto and/or wide angle lens.
|
||
|
||
The camera lens gives clearer pictures than the (electronic) digital zoom
|
||
(although the digital zoom is clear enough until you get around 32 power).
|
||
At 64 digital Zoom, the pictures get fuzzy. By changing the lens to (say) 5
|
||
power, you then have a 5:40 regular Zoom via lens, for clearer pictures,
|
||
plus digital Zoom multiplying that to about 300 power for longer range.
|
||
|
||
Some camcorders, like the Panasonic 660, ($948) which has a 1:12 Zoom plus
|
||
digital Zoom cranks it up to 96 Zoom. Add a 5 power telephoto lens and you
|
||
can get (theoretically) up to 480 magnification.
|
||
|
||
At strong magnification, you need a solid rest or tripod to eliminate the
|
||
small quivering of hand movement which is also magnified in proportion to
|
||
the Zoom factor. An image stabilizer feature would be a must for this kind
|
||
of long distance recording.
|
||
|
||
Lux, or Candle Light
|
||
|
||
All camcorders are rated with a lux designation. One lux is equivalent to
|
||
one candle power. Theoretically, a one lux camera can take a picture when
|
||
there is a brightness of one candle, one foot away, lighting the object.
|
||
Manufacturer's claims are not always the same as performance. Aside from
|
||
that comment, you can use the lux rating of a camera as a pretty good
|
||
indicator of its ability to make a reasonably clear picture under less
|
||
than perfect light.
|
||
|
||
For undercover work, a one- or two-lux rated camera is best. It will
|
||
perform better than a seven lux camera -- all things considered, but not
|
||
always equal. The lens has a lot to do with picture clarity: a camcorder
|
||
with a good quality lens and rated four lux may provide better picture
|
||
quality than a camcorder rated two lux but has poor quality lens. If you
|
||
can, lease a couple of cameras for a day or two and compare results. Try
|
||
before you buy, or try to get a money-back option.
|
||
|
||
Zoom Lens and Telephoto Adapters
|
||
|
||
The next important requirement of a camcorder for a CrimeFighter is to take
|
||
pictures at a distance. Most cameras have a zoom lens. Some models have at
|
||
least six-to-one zoom, but newer models have 12-to-one, variable-power
|
||
zoom. Digital zoom (microcomputer technology) increases the lens zoom by a
|
||
factor of 8. A 1:12 zoom with digital = 64, a 12;1 lens zoom with digital
|
||
zoom = 96.
|
||
|
||
In addition, you can add telephoto lens from 1.5 to 5 power, plus wide-
|
||
angle lens to increase the magnification and field of view. A 12:1 lens
|
||
zoom, with a 5 X telephoto lens makes it 60:1. Add digital zoom of 8 power
|
||
to get (theoretically) 60:480 zoom. Of course, you'd have to have a steady
|
||
mount to suppress the small movement of shaking hands which would also be
|
||
multiplied. However, some cameras have a "stabilizer" that acts like a
|
||
ship's gyroscope to suppress rolling and dipping. It's computer controlled
|
||
"fuzzy logic" (artificial intelligence software). As the years go by, more
|
||
and more improvements will be made on high tech equipment. Always ask.
|
||
|
||
Telephoto lens vary in cost from about $60 to $300 each. The thing to watch
|
||
out for when buying a camera is whether or not the lens cover lip (or no
|
||
lip) on the camera will prevent you from attaching telephoto lens to the
|
||
camera. Ask knowledgeable store clerks and browse through Camcorder mag-
|
||
azines in supermarket magazine racks for information on where to purchase
|
||
cameras and accessories.
|
||
|
||
Focus System
|
||
|
||
The ability to focus through window glass is important because lots of
|
||
movies will be made through car windows. Focusing systems that use any
|
||
form of sonar or infrared to "find" the subject will be bounced off the
|
||
glass. That makes it difficult to use for covert surveillance work.
|
||
Opening the window may not always be possible. Be sure to get a camera
|
||
that has a manual focusing override control. (The EVC-X10 has a manual
|
||
override control.) Through-the-lens (TTL) viewfinders are recommended for
|
||
through window glass (inside-outside) surveillance. Talk to your local
|
||
sales representative for specific information.
|
||
|
||
Sound
|
||
|
||
Wiretapping is illegal, but not if you are making a recording of a crime in
|
||
progress or recording a conversation of persons who consent to its being
|
||
made for their own protection. With that in mind, external microphone jacks
|
||
on a camcorder are a necessity. Most have them, but look for that feature.
|
||
|
||
There's a "CamEar" (Camera Ear) that provides an audio zoom for video
|
||
camcorders. (about $70 from Silver Creek Industries, 1-800-533-3277.)
|
||
Quite a few other zoom and wireless microphones for long distance pickup
|
||
range in price from $40 to $250. Contact: AZDEN, 147 New Hyde Park Road,
|
||
Franklin Square, N.Y. 11010, phone # (516) 328-7500.
|
||
|
||
Time and Date
|
||
|
||
This is usually a standard feature, but look for it, because it may be
|
||
important to date-stamp the time and day when the tape was made.
|
||
|
||
Instructions on How to Buy and Use a Camcorder
|
||
|
||
Video tapes on "How to Make Video Tapes" and books on this subject can be
|
||
found in the advertising pages of most Camcorder magazines. Here's a few
|
||
books to get you started: "The Video Camcorder Handbook -- How to Select
|
||
and Use a Camcorder -- Any Brand or Format" ($14.95), and a companion book,
|
||
"Pro Techniques of Making Home Video Movies" ($12.95), "How to Understand
|
||
the Multitude of Video Products" ($12.95) and "Basic Instruction on Making
|
||
Home Video Movies" ($9.85). Many video stores have video catalogs to locate
|
||
any video you want to special order. Ask them for a rental/purchase option.
|
||
|
||
Financing Hardware
|
||
|
||
Radio Shack had a $788 special on camcorders recently. It offered their
|
||
Model 126 MovieCorder, a VHS, two-lux, 12-power variable zoom camera. It
|
||
has manual focus override, time and date stamp, and a 12 volt input jack to
|
||
run off a vehicle's batteries for long-term surveillance work. The sale
|
||
will be over by the time you read this, but, with the Shack, you can expect
|
||
there will (probably) be repeat sales in the future. If you don't have the
|
||
cash, you can buy it on time payments at $25 per month. If you can't afford
|
||
the expensive models, this one or a similar one may be sufficient. Radio
|
||
Shack's hand-held cellular phone, model CT-1033, has 3 watts of power for
|
||
maximum output. It's also available on time payments for $15 a month. So,
|
||
for about $40 a month you can get the two most important pieces of equip-
|
||
ment from a local Radio Shack store.
|
||
|
||
Electronic Surveillance Equipment
|
||
|
||
Be advised that unless you have legal authorization for a wiretap, using
|
||
such equipment to eavesdrop is illegal. Two exceptions: when you record a
|
||
conversation with permission from one of the parties of the conversation
|
||
being recorded. The other exception is when a criminal action is observed.
|
||
Recording the incriminating conversation between criminals actually
|
||
committing a crime is not a violation of an innocent person's civil rights.
|
||
|
||
When you're working on a case with law enforcement officials, wiretap
|
||
authorization may be obtained. If so, the appropriate equipment may also
|
||
be available. However, if their surveillance equipment is old, worn out,
|
||
or obsolete, a CrimeFighter may prefer to use personal electronic equipment
|
||
to get reliable results. In that case, you may want to know what's
|
||
available and where to get it. Instead of trying to include and describe
|
||
the hundreds of devices and miscellaneous equipment that's mentioned in
|
||
many catalogs, I'll just refer you to the catalogs and where to get them.
|
||
Most are free, but a few require two or three dollars to pay for the
|
||
printing and mailing. (Send a couple of bucks with your mail request.)
|
||
|
||
1. Sherwood Communications Associates, Ltd., 1310 Industrial Highway,
|
||
Southampton, Pennsylvania 18966 (215) 357-9065. This company sells quite
|
||
a few camcorder models, including the SONY EVC-X7 and X10, plus attachments
|
||
and disguises for camcorders used in undercover surveillance. They have a
|
||
separate catalog of wiretap equipment and various gizmos and gadgets, plus
|
||
an extensive library of unusual books on various subjects. The company was
|
||
founded by Security Professionals and is recognized as one of the leading
|
||
distributors of electronic security and communications systems.
|
||
|
||
2. CRB Research Books, Inc., P.O. Box 56, Commack, N.Y. 11725, (no phone
|
||
number given) has a catalog ($1) that seems to specialize on books and
|
||
equipment on radio frequency registries, hand held (cellular phone)
|
||
scanners and other types of communication monitoring, CB radio, clandestine
|
||
operations, cryptography, electronic surveillance, countermeasures,
|
||
espionage, and computer hacking.
|
||
|
||
3. Protector, P.O. Box 520294, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 (801) 487-3823
|
||
has a catalog of surveillance equipment, including miniature video cameras,
|
||
audio jamming equipment, voice scramblers for phones, and quite a bit more.
|
||
|
||
4. Armo-Tech, P.O. Box 276524, Sacramento, California 95827 (916) 369-7139
|
||
doesn't have a catalog, as such, but they do have hi-performance body armor
|
||
made of light-weight Kevlar. Their vest, front or back ($190) or full wrap
|
||
around coverage ($230), will (so they say) defeat a .45, .357, 00 buckshot,
|
||
and 9mm handgun rounds. If you think you might need one, ask for their
|
||
literature and current prices.
|
||
|
||
5. XANDI Electronics, Box 25647, Tempe, Arizona 85285 -5647, has a mini-
|
||
catalog of miniature radio transmitter/receivers (bugs) and bug detectors,
|
||
telephone "snoops", telephone recorders, vehicle tracking transmitters, and
|
||
voice disguisers. If you're into hi-tech electronics, printed circuit
|
||
boards and electronic kits are available to make your own. They also have
|
||
assembled and tested units for the not-so-handy.
|
||
|
||
The disclaimer in XANDI's catalog is typical of catalogs containing
|
||
illegal-to-use equipment or technical information on locks picks or how to
|
||
pick locks, making silencers, bombs, etc. It's worth mentioning at this
|
||
point. A typical disclaimer is as follows:
|
||
|
||
"The products listed in this catalog are intended to be educational only.
|
||
They are aimed at the electronic hobbyist. Some of these products might be
|
||
used in situations that are illegal depending on State and Federal law.
|
||
XYX Company assumes no responsibility for the illegal use of its products
|
||
and, in fact, strongly recommends against the illegal use of any electronic
|
||
device. You, as the purchaser and user, assume all legal and financial
|
||
responsibility which results from the ultimate use of your purchase."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Remember, the possession of illegal wiretap equipment or burglar tools is a
|
||
felony in most States. If you purchase any such items, don't get caught
|
||
using them or having them in your possession outside of your home under
|
||
"suspicious circumstances" unless you have a warrant or police approval.
|
||
(And get it in writing.).
|
||
|
||
(Feedback from readers who have these camcorders and related equipment will
|
||
be appreciated. I'd also like to hear from vendors of this equipment, who
|
||
may provide CrimeFighters with suitable discounts. I'll add your comments
|
||
and suggestions to the next version of this Crimefighter book.)
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Problems with Prosecutors, the Justice System
|
||
and Reward Laws in General
|
||
|
||
All rewards subject to a conviction of a felony are either out of date, out
|
||
of touch with reality, and (unintentionally) false advertising.
|
||
|
||
No one tells you their advertised rewards are subject to plea bargaining
|
||
and that plea bargaining is used in the majority of felony charges which
|
||
are, 90% of the time, reduced to misdemeanors for first offenders. A felony
|
||
reduced to a misdemeanor usually eliminates rewards paid under all Federal
|
||
laws, Crime Stoppers, and We-Tip.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 3059 is the only exception to the conviction requirement;
|
||
payment is made on a felony arrest, not conviction. All reward laws and
|
||
programs should be similar to 3059. Unfortunately, 3059 is also subject to
|
||
the discretionary powers of bureaucrats, making it doubtful, too.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Here's a quote from the book "Take Back Your Neighborhood", by Richard
|
||
Neely, Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court. (1990) published
|
||
by David I. Fine,Inc.)
|
||
|
||
"... hardly any of the persons arrested on felony charges in New York City
|
||
are ever prosecuted and convicted as felons. New York Police Department
|
||
figures showed that the chance of a person arrested for a felony being
|
||
sentenced to prison was one in one hundred and eight. Although many cases
|
||
can be explained away by "overcharging" on the part of the police, the
|
||
largest number of avoidances of prison sentences come from the prosecuting
|
||
authorities' willingness to permit felons to plead guilty to lesser
|
||
charges. This willingness to cut deals favorable to defendants is a direct
|
||
function of the limited judicial resources available to give jury trials
|
||
and the chronic understaffing of the prosecutor's offices. In 1979 there
|
||
were 104,413 felony arrests in New York City, of which 88,095 cases were
|
||
dismissed, and 16,318 indictments procured. Of those indicted, 56% plead
|
||
guilty to felonies (but often less severe felonies than those which they
|
||
were originally charged), 16% plead guilty to misdemeanors, 12% were
|
||
dismissed after indictment, only 13% went to jury trial and 3% resulted in
|
||
some other disposition."
|
||
|
||
Here's a quote from WISEGUY, by Nicholas Pileggi, Pocketbooks (1985).
|
||
|
||
"According to a 1960s Joint New York State Legislative Committee on Crime
|
||
study, at least 99.5% of highjacking arrests resulted either in the charges
|
||
being dismissed or in the defendants receiving small fines or probation.
|
||
During one year covered by the report the committee traced 6,400 arrests
|
||
for criminal possession of stolen property and found there were only 904
|
||
indictments, 225 convictions, and as few as 30 state prison commitments. A
|
||
committee case study of eight defendants arrested at the time for the
|
||
possession of more than $100,000 worth of stolen property noted that each
|
||
defendant was fined $2,500 and placed on probation by New York Supreme
|
||
Court Judge Albert H. Bosch."
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
The odds of a Crimefighter being paid a reward for truck hijacking info in
|
||
New York at that time was about 6,400 to 225 = .035%. With only 30 prison
|
||
sentences being handed out, the percentage of significant rewards being
|
||
paid was 6,400 to 30 or about .0046875 -- less than one-half of 1%.
|
||
Obviously, current reward laws are based on ivory tower assumptions, not
|
||
real world facts. Plea bargaining is the problem.
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
|
||
Only 5% of crimes that are committed result in an arrest. Then, using Judge
|
||
Neely's figures for an example, out of 104,413 arrested, only 16,318 were
|
||
indicted. And, 12% of those indicted were eventually dismissed and 3% of
|
||
those arrested "resulted in some other disposition". Only 11% were
|
||
prosecuted. Of those who were prosecuted, most of them (56%) agreed to
|
||
plead guilty for a lesser charge. In total, less than 5% were tried on
|
||
their original charges.
|
||
|
||
Under present reward laws, Crime Stoppers, We-Tip, State and Federal reward
|
||
laws, CrimeFighters would get paid only five percent of the time.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters in large cities should be warned the odds are about 20 to 1
|
||
for a conviction and jail time being imposed on original felony charges if
|
||
they let the State District Attorney do the prosecuting. Pending rewards
|
||
are also, unfairly downsized accordingly -- if they're not canceled.
|
||
|
||
From a business point of view, it's a sucker deal when payment depends on
|
||
many variables that are not under the seller's control and subject to
|
||
errors and omissions by third parties. In any business contract, minimum
|
||
and maximum amounts and specific time periods are clearly stated. These are
|
||
the essence of all business contracts. These conditions should also be
|
||
stated in reward laws to provide a reasonable degree of certainty as to the
|
||
amount of the reward and when it will be paid. Ambiguity may be desirable
|
||
from a lawmaker's perspective, but it seriously detracts from the intended
|
||
purpose of providing incentives via rewards.
|
||
|
||
That's why I recommend CrimeFighters use Qui Tam law. Be the prosecutor to
|
||
control plea bargaining. Use plea bargaining to negotiate an out-of-court
|
||
settlement or summary judgment of your civil suit as part of your reward.
|
||
When prosecuting cases, Federal RICO civil and/or criminal suits should be
|
||
used whenever possible to obtain 50% of fines and forfeitures. Use current
|
||
reward laws as back-up laws, to obtain Qui Tam standing, and apply for all
|
||
rewards available. When you have control of the case, negotiate with law
|
||
enforcement agencies for additional rewards.
|
||
|
||
There's an urgent need for a new reward law based on the above facts of
|
||
life. That's the subject of the next chapter.
|
||
|
||
Plea Bargaining Examined
|
||
|
||
Here's a few quotes from books by various authors (judges and prosecutors)
|
||
who try draw attention to the problems and dangers of plea bargaining.
|
||
|
||
1. Questioning Authority, by David L. Bazelon
|
||
"Because of the pressure of numbers, there is often a unanimity of interest
|
||
among defense counsel, trial judge, and prosecutor in pushing defendants
|
||
through the system as quickly as possible. The goal of mass-production
|
||
justice is rapid processing of cases. The most common mechanism to satisfy
|
||
this goal is the guilty plea. When the defendant pleads guilty, defense
|
||
counsel collects one more fee and moves on to the next case; the trial
|
||
judge removes one more trial from his calendar; the prosecutor reduces his
|
||
case load and adds one more "guilty" to his list of courtroom triumphs.
|
||
|
||
It is no secret that in the majority of criminal prosecutions the accused
|
||
is in fact guilty, notwithstanding any initial protestations of innocence.
|
||
It is also no secret that the vast majority of criminal prosecutions
|
||
culminating in conviction are settled through plea bargaining. Indeed, the
|
||
Supreme Court has recognized that plea bargaining will remain "an essential
|
||
component of the administration of justice" in this country until the
|
||
court's resources are greatly expanded."
|
||
|
||
|
||
2. Reflections on Crime, by James A. Inciardi.
|
||
"The rational-instrumental goals of the court organization, in its urgent
|
||
demand for guilty pleas, have produced a bargain-counter, assembly-line
|
||
system of criminal justice which is incompatible with traditional due
|
||
process. The dilemma is sharpened by the fact that the concern for the
|
||
individual envisioned and postulated by the rules of due process in
|
||
determining guilt or innocence, is no longer present at this crucial level.
|
||
Instead, the concern, if any, appears to be the post-guilt, pre-sentence
|
||
stage, while the actual determination of guilt is arrived at through
|
||
perfunctory ministerial procedures which have become the hallmark of the
|
||
criminal court's rationality.
|
||
|
||
Currently, approximately 90% of all persons who are accused of criminal
|
||
offenses plead guilty after the decision is made to prosecute. This
|
||
suggests that in the majority of criminal cases, the prosecutor makes most
|
||
of the decisions regarding innocence or guilt and hence, acts as de facto
|
||
judge."
|
||
|
||
(In the Halls of Justice, justice is made in the halls.)
|
||
|
||
|
||
3. The Prosecutors, by James B. Stewart.
|
||
"Plea bargaining is an inherently difficult area of jurisprudence, since
|
||
the concept is essentially in conflict with the basic notions of due
|
||
process, yet seems to be essential if the criminal-justice system in this
|
||
country is going to function. After all, every plea bargain has an element
|
||
of "retaliation" in it. The usual tacit bargain is that the prosecutor will
|
||
recommend less serious charges or lighter sentences if the defendant spares
|
||
the government the cost and time of putting him through a trial. Since
|
||
every defendant is constitutionally guaranteed a trial by jury, he is
|
||
essentially rewarded if he gives up that right and punished if he insists
|
||
on exercising it."
|
||
|
||
|
||
4. "Crisis in the Courts", written by Howard James, Chief, Midwestern News
|
||
Bureau, The Christian Science Monitor.
|
||
|
||
"While the United States Constitution guarantees a man the right to a trial
|
||
by jury, experienced Chicago defense lawyers warn their clients that
|
||
demanding a trial can be foolhardy.
|
||
|
||
A man may be offered a 1-to-3-year term (by the prosecutor with the judge's
|
||
approval) if he pleads guilty. If he demands a trial before the bench and
|
||
is found guilty, he can expect a 2-to-5-year sentence. If a jury finds him
|
||
guilty, the prison term will probably be 4 to 8 years. That's the penalty
|
||
imposed for taking up the court's time.
|
||
|
||
It is common practice for a prosecutor to try a few men for assault with
|
||
intent to kill, drunken driving, or murder. Then, for the sake of
|
||
expediency or for other reasons, he reduces the charges for others (who
|
||
have broken the same law) to simple assault, reckless driving, or
|
||
manslaughter. Still others are released by the prosecutor, who may be
|
||
convinced of their guilt but feels he lacks evidence to convict.
|
||
|
||
As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
|
||
Justice has pointed out, the prosecutor "decides whether to press a case or
|
||
drop it. He determines the specific charges against the defendant. When the
|
||
charge is reduced, as it is in as many as two-thirds of all cases, the
|
||
prosecutor is usually the official who reduces it." And "he is particularly
|
||
able to influence police operations." While police make the arrests, it is
|
||
the prosecutor who holds the controls in his hands and guides the ship.
|
||
Because his decisions touch more lives, many lawyers assert that he is more
|
||
important than the Judge.
|
||
|
||
In thousands of lower courts (and this is where 90% of all defendants
|
||
appear) a policeman or judge acts as prosecutor, though neither has legal
|
||
training. ... in dozens of courtrooms, where the prosecutor has never seen
|
||
the case before, a folder is thrust into his hands for a preliminary
|
||
hearing or for trial by a lower-court magistrate. Even in more serious
|
||
cases the prosecutor has a limited amount of time to prepare his case,
|
||
unless it is a spectacular crime that will make PAGE ONE in the newspaper.
|
||
|
||
Yet thousands of prosecutors are men fresh out of law school who are
|
||
learning their craft at state expense. Some have studied trial procedures
|
||
for one semester at best. Because of recent innovations a few have spent
|
||
time in court while still law students. Others have practiced law a few
|
||
months or years and take the prosecutor's job while their practice builds
|
||
and to gain experience.
|
||
|
||
Most prosecutors are young men with little trial experience because few
|
||
experienced lawyers want the job," says Robert E. West, president of the
|
||
Vermont State's Attorney's Association.
|
||
|
||
At least two in our state were elected before they passed the bar exam. The
|
||
pay is so low most have a civil practice on the side, so the public isn't
|
||
always properly represented. Often being prosecutor comes second."
|
||
|
||
|
||
5. Driving the Drunk Off The Road, by Sandy Golden.
|
||
"Routine plea bargaining from a drunk driving charge to a lesser non-
|
||
alcohol-related charge to speed up cases and clear court dockets. This
|
||
practice is a dangerous rip-off and should be halted. It results in such
|
||
offenses being repeated.
|
||
|
||
Existence of an attitude among the prosecutor's staff that such cases are
|
||
routine traffic offenses and should be handled as such. Drunk driving in an
|
||
intentional, willful act and a life-threatening crime. Prosecutors need to
|
||
recognize this fact.
|
||
|
||
Some courts are understaffed and unable to cope. Some jurists use such
|
||
legal schemes as "deferred sentencing" and "probation before judgment" to
|
||
speed up court dockets. Purposely or not, such tactics give drunk drivers a
|
||
break. As a result, the public suffers. These judges are indulging in a
|
||
dangerous practice that enables such motorists to continue driving while
|
||
under the influence of alcohol.
|
||
|
||
In some court systems it is possible to "buy" your way out of an alcohol-
|
||
related charge. This is not in any way to imply that judges can be bribed
|
||
(although some can and have been caught). It means that by hiring an
|
||
expensive defense attorney who knows his way around the system, who demands
|
||
a jury trial, who always appeals the case and who seeks continuances to
|
||
cause delays, it is often possible to get the case dismissed or plea
|
||
bargained to a lesser offense."
|
||
|
||
Supreme Court's Decision
|
||
|
||
In the leading case in the field, the Supreme Court tiptoed around this
|
||
plea bargaining controversy by saying:
|
||
|
||
In the give and take of plea bargaining, there is no such element of
|
||
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
|
||
reject the prosecutor's offer.... While confronting a defendant with the
|
||
risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a discouraging effect on
|
||
the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these
|
||
difficult choices is an inevitable - and permissible - attribute of any
|
||
legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of plea.
|
||
|
||
Prosecutor's Authority on Plea Bargaining
|
||
|
||
The Las Vegas Review-Journal, on December 3, 1991, had an editorial
|
||
concerning plea bargaining of key witnesses to nail Manuel Noriega. The
|
||
following information from the editorial will give you an idea of how much
|
||
leeway a prosecutor has and how much he can give away to "turn" defendants
|
||
into witnesses.
|
||
|
||
"The Associated Press reports that the government has dropped three life
|
||
terms without parole and a total of 546 years in prison sentences to win
|
||
the cooperation of four witnesses. In addition:
|
||
|
||
Floyd Carlton faced life in prison plus 145 years for flying cocaine into
|
||
the United States. His cooperation got him out of jail last December after
|
||
he had served three years, and prosecutors let him transfer his assets -
|
||
acquired with drug money - to the United States. The taxpayers also picked
|
||
up the tab to support Carlton's wife, children and a nanny.
|
||
|
||
Ricardo Bilonick, who faced 50 years for running drugs, can keep $3.9
|
||
million in drug-related assets and was assured of no more than a 10-year
|
||
sentence in exchange for his testimony.
|
||
|
||
Robert Steidinger, once called the No. 1 man in the United States for one
|
||
of the major drug cartels, agreed to testify in return for a federal
|
||
guarantee of a sentence of ten years or less. When he gets out of jail, he
|
||
won't have his $14 million Florida home, which the government seized. But
|
||
he'll still enjoy his bank accounts, a Mercedes Benz, his 40 foot yacht, a
|
||
speedboat, airplane, two AK-47 assault rifles, an Uzi and a submachine gun
|
||
-- all of which the government agreed to leave untouched in return for his
|
||
testimony." Unquote.
|
||
|
||
The editorial called it a "despicable affair all around." "Regardless of my
|
||
opinion and yours, it appears the power of a prosecutor to plea bargain is
|
||
virtually unlimited, including giving away millions of taxpayer's dollars,
|
||
allowing convicted crooks to keep and enjoy the bountiful fruits of their
|
||
criminal activity, and allowing a convicted felon to keep and own two
|
||
assault rifles and two machine guns! (Isn't that against the law?)
|
||
|
||
Keep that in mind if you expect to be paid 50% of fines and forfeitures. A
|
||
significant part of the assets can be given away by a prosecutor to get an
|
||
easy conviction. When there are millions of dollars involved, either
|
||
prosecute the case yourself or take it into consideration when negotiating
|
||
for rewards.
|
||
|
||
Plea bargaining is ingrained into the justice system. It's a judicial
|
||
system pressure valve for overcrowded jails, crowded courts, and overworked
|
||
prosecutors, budget cuts, resistance to taxes to build prisons, and
|
||
additional laws to keep criminals in jail and resulting strain on the penal
|
||
system. (Perhaps it's time to decriminalize "victimless" crimes.)
|
||
|
||
Many first offenders receive deferred sentencing to spare the individual a
|
||
criminal record as well as to save the state costs of a jury trial and
|
||
prison. These cases, plus those dismissed from lack of evidence (protected
|
||
snitches, plus evidence mistakes by police, legal technicalities, quirky
|
||
judges) cancel rewards because there are no convictions -- even though
|
||
everyone involved knows the defendants may be guilty.
|
||
|
||
For example, from "Crisis in the Courts," by Howard James:
|
||
|
||
"A judge's attitude towards prosecution for certain offenses also affects
|
||
arrest practices of the police. In one large city, for example, it was
|
||
noted that the number of arrests for prostitution and solicitation declined
|
||
sharply during the months that a judge who routinely dismissed such cases
|
||
was sitting in the misdemeanor division. [And]... it is not uncommon for
|
||
individual judges to regard certain offenses as too trivial to merit any
|
||
substantial penalty or even to merit the court's time in hearing them. An
|
||
experienced prosecutor is reluctant to antagonize the judge by bringing
|
||
these cases to court despite the availability of sufficient evidence to
|
||
convict the defendant."
|
||
|
||
From a pocketbook, What Cops Know," by Connie Fletcher (1990):
|
||
"The judicial process is a laugh, a fucking joke. The public is completely
|
||
unaware of how the court system is run in Narcotics Court. These people are
|
||
let go left and right, not by lack of evidence or by the police officer
|
||
screwing up somehow, but just because the judge thinks it's an insufficient
|
||
amount. That's the travesty. If you don't catch them with a large amount,
|
||
then the judges look at it like you haven't got them big, so we're gonna
|
||
let them go. Even though it's listed as a felony, they still throw it out.
|
||
Time and time again."
|
||
Rookie Prosecutors
|
||
|
||
Another serious flaw with the justice system is pitting inexperienced State
|
||
prosecutors, fresh out of law school, many who haven't even passed the bar
|
||
exam, against highly trained and experienced defense attorneys. The recent
|
||
William Kennedy Smith's rape trial is an example.
|
||
|
||
USA Today, December 11, 1991, stated:
|
||
"The most remarkable thing about William Kennedy Smith's day in court might
|
||
have been the poor performance of prosecutor Moiras Lasch... legal experts
|
||
uniformly criticized Lasch's questioning as unfocused, repetitive and
|
||
largely to Smith's advantage... "It's the worst performance I have ever
|
||
seen in a court-room cross-examination", declared trial lawyer F. Lee
|
||
Bailey, a Court TV commentator. It was rank. It was gross." Miami lawyer
|
||
H.T. Smith who worked with with Black in the public defender's office
|
||
agreed. "We knew (defense attorney) Roy Black was good. But nobody
|
||
suspected the prosecution would be so bad. It's been a total mismatch of
|
||
lawyers. It's really not fair to the people of Florida."
|
||
|
||
* * * * **
|
||
|
||
Anyone interested in law reform should read three excellent books on that
|
||
subject: "Rough Justice" (Days and Nights of a Young D.A.), "With Justice
|
||
for None," and "Crisis in the Courts." The first two are currently
|
||
available in paperback editions. The third is out of print but may be found
|
||
in libraries. These books reveal how state prosecutors and public defenders
|
||
learn their trade and acquire experience. During their on-the-job-training,
|
||
they lose more cases than they win -- for obvious reasons. Then, after a
|
||
year or two, when they have the required experience to become proficient,
|
||
they leave for better paying jobs.
|
||
|
||
Rookie state prosecutors and public defenders use the system as basic
|
||
training and a stepping stone to better paying jobs. That's not all bad for
|
||
fledgling lawyers and the court system in general. Where else can they get
|
||
their hands-on experience? However, in the process, the current system uses
|
||
the defendants involved as guinea pigs.
|
||
|
||
The point is, CrimeFighters should be aware many prosecutors are often
|
||
rookies, inexperienced, overworked and underpaid, who would much rather
|
||
plea bargain to lesser charges for a guilty plea than lose a case. When a
|
||
case goes to trial, as it will if the defendant has any money and can
|
||
afford a battery of lawyers and "expert" witnesses (as in the Kennedy
|
||
case), the odds are more in the defendant's favor. In such a mismatch, the
|
||
odds are stacked against the CrimeFighter who may be depending on a rookie
|
||
prosecutor to win the case against a seasoned lawyer.
|
||
|
||
When the case involves large sums of money available from Federal laws and
|
||
significant fines and forfeitures, it's better to use Qui Tam and hire an
|
||
experienced lawyer on a contingency basis. Paying a good lawyer 30 to 50%
|
||
of your share of fines and forfeitures might be smarter than relying on a
|
||
rookie prosecutor. ("Half a reward is better than none.")
|
||
|
||
West Virginia's Supreme Court Justice Neely mentions in his book, "Take
|
||
Back Your Neighborhood," that adding more police to obtain more arrests and
|
||
convictions will also require additional prosecutors and judges because the
|
||
court system is already overburdened and at the point of collapse. This is
|
||
why the present system won't change -- there isn't enough tax money to pay
|
||
for doubling or tripling the number of prosecutors, court rooms, related
|
||
facilities, and jails.
|
||
|
||
Prosecuting criminals by inexperienced prosecutors results in fewer
|
||
convictions of serious crimes. That may be an unadvertised, intentional
|
||
benefit to the justice system because it alleviates overcrowding in jails.
|
||
However, it fails to provide true Justice to the victims of crime who
|
||
rightfully expect the perpetrators to be punished. It is also detrimental
|
||
to anyone relying on felony convictions for payment of rewards.
|
||
|
||
Other Problems and Solution
|
||
|
||
Problem: Police are severely restricted by their job descriptions and what
|
||
they are expected and required to do. Officers seldom spend more than 3 to
|
||
5% of their time on crime detection and prevention. Doubling the size of
|
||
the police force won't solve the problem. All it will do is increase local
|
||
taxes to pay for them, putting the community even deeper in debt that will
|
||
reduce and severely restrict other vital services.
|
||
|
||
Solution: Paying prompt and meaningful rewards would provide the incentive
|
||
for tens of thousands of CrimeFighters who would be volunteer patrolmen and
|
||
undercover agents, paid on a commission basis. No increase in local taxes
|
||
and no long-term financial commitment for million-dollar pensions are
|
||
required. In most situations, the lawbreaker would pay the rewards via
|
||
lawsuit awards as the alternative to jail.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Problem: Plea bargaining is a permanent safety valve for the judicial
|
||
system. It can't be eliminated. However, it effectively circumvents or
|
||
minimizes current rewards that are paid only on a conviction of a felony.
|
||
|
||
Solution: CrimeFighters can use Qui Tam to control plea bargaining, and
|
||
when possible and practical, extract an alternate reward from lawbreakers
|
||
themselves via civil suits. Plea bargaining by Crimefighters is still
|
||
available and used to alleviate the strain on the courts and penal system.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Problem: Prosecutors are almost always inexperienced, overworked, and
|
||
underpaid. There isn't enough money available now or in the future to
|
||
double or triple the number of assistant prosecutors in large cities that
|
||
desperately need reinforcements.
|
||
|
||
Solution: When significant rewards are available, CrimeFighters would be
|
||
the prosecutors and negotiate plea bargaining for 90% of their arrests.
|
||
Instead of taxpayers paying the salary of state prosecutors, lawbreakers
|
||
would be forced to pay CrimeFighters via civil suits when they can afford
|
||
it. When plea bargaining isn't successful, and there is sufficient money
|
||
involved in potential fines and forfeitures, CrimeFighters would hire their
|
||
own, experienced lawyers on a contingency basis. Only five to ten percent
|
||
of CrimeFighter cases would be turned over to state prosecutors. When law
|
||
enforcement agencies want to prosecute lawbreakers, to get credit for the
|
||
case plus 50% of the fines and forfeitures, they can negotiate payment of a
|
||
suitable reward in exchange for prosecution rights.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Reward Law Reform
|
||
(and How to Calculate Rewards)
|
||
|
||
Eight major problems with current reward laws are:
|
||
|
||
(1) Excessive cost to amend State and federal (reward) laws every year. As
|
||
a result many such laws are seldom updated. Specific dollar amount for
|
||
rewards aren't increased as often as they should be to keep up with
|
||
inflation to make the amount relevant to the times and increasing risks.
|
||
Such reward laws wither on the vine. They are no longer effective or used.
|
||
|
||
(2) Too many variations of reward laws so that they're buried in different
|
||
Titles and Sections of the law. By including them within the framework of
|
||
specific laws, one at a time, here, there and anywhere, they effectively
|
||
buried them. Very few laymen, law officers, or lawyers know they exist.
|
||
There should be only one such State or Federal reward law for all felonies
|
||
and serious misdemeanors.
|
||
|
||
(3) Paying rewards at the "discretion" of government agents. I understand
|
||
the need to size the reward in proportion to the amount of time, expense,
|
||
and personal risk of the informer. That's fair enough and what was
|
||
obviously intended by lawmakers. But, this phrase has an ambiguous effect,
|
||
and seriously detracts from the intended incentive of rewards. It also
|
||
makes negotiations for suitable rewards a prerequisite to disclosure, which
|
||
isn't always possible or practical, and encourages shopping for rewards.
|
||
|
||
(4) Paying rewards upon conviction. Rewards should always be paid upon the
|
||
arrest, as in USCS 3059. The requirement of a conviction further decreases
|
||
the incentives because of the long delays which often include appeals and
|
||
may take years to get a conviction. In the meantime, witnesses "disappear,"
|
||
evidence is often lost, and the case eventually dismissed. When a person
|
||
knows he may have to wait many years, and is also subject to errors and
|
||
omissions from prosecutors and others who are beyond his control, it
|
||
significantly detracts from the incentive rewards are supposed to provide.
|
||
|
||
(5) There are very few Federal or State rewards paid for information on
|
||
"serious" misdemeanors. Poachers, for example, are extremely dangerous.
|
||
(Game wardens are seven times more likely to be shot at and nine times more
|
||
likely to die as a result of injuries sustained than regular police
|
||
officers.) Yet poaching is "just" a misdemeanor by itself. Knowing the risk
|
||
and small rewards paid, it's just not smart for a citizen to take big
|
||
risks for small rewards of about $250 paid by Operation Game Thief.
|
||
|
||
Drunk driving is "just" a misdemeanor for the first two or three offenses,
|
||
but drunk drivers kill and maim thousands of innocent people every year.
|
||
Enforcement is minimal. The odds of being caught are about 1,000 to 1.
|
||
But there are no rewards to encourage citizens to hound and harrass drunk
|
||
drivers. There should be. The CrimeFighters' DDT Patrol will be more
|
||
effective than once-a-year setting up drunk driver "check points" and
|
||
stopping hundreds of innocent drivers to catch a very small percentage of
|
||
seasonal drunk drivers.
|
||
|
||
Police and federal agents don't want to waste their time on small fry (or
|
||
misdemeanors) so they are pretty much left alone. That encourages more
|
||
misdemeanor violations, creates disrespect for the law, and usually leads
|
||
to more serious felony violations.
|
||
|
||
(6) Non-negotiable rewards. If rewards aren't negotiated, payment can be
|
||
anything bureaucrats may, arbitrarily, decide how much to pay. Negotiating
|
||
for serious rewards is required and recommended. But, there may be times
|
||
when immediate action is required and there is no time to negotiate. If
|
||
there is no written agreement, there is no obligation to pay. The need to
|
||
negotiate rewards is evident, but not always practical -- thereby reducing
|
||
incentives to take immediate action and risks to apprehend lawbreakers.
|
||
|
||
(7) Requirement to report to specific bodies. Most rewards are contingent
|
||
of reporting the information to the appropriate branch of government and
|
||
letting them make the arrests and prosecutions. If they are bypassed by
|
||
reporting the vital information to the police department, Crime Stoppers or
|
||
WE-TIP, the reward won't be paid. This causes confusion. Who should it be
|
||
reported to? If you guess wrong, instead of a possible $25,000 reward from
|
||
the FBI, all you might get is $250 from Crime Stoppers or WE-TIP. There
|
||
should be only one place to report serious criminal activity, such as the
|
||
FBI, regardless of which department may have jurisdiction.
|
||
|
||
Ideally, using the phone and dialing 911 should be the first place to
|
||
report ALL criminal activity pending or in progress to get the fastest
|
||
action to make more arrests. But, if you dial 911, you lose any rewards
|
||
payable. Present reporting requirements discourage immediate response.
|
||
|
||
(8) Sharing rewards. Most federal and state forfeiture laws mention the
|
||
sharing of fines and forfeitures. In most reward laws, half is paid to the
|
||
informer and half paid into a fund from which the law enforcement agency
|
||
responsible for the prosecution may draw upon the fund for future law
|
||
enforcement purposes. The annual surplus, if any, is paid to the state or
|
||
federal government.
|
||
|
||
If State reward laws are not enhanced, CrimeFighters will use federal laws,
|
||
with 50% of the fines and forfeitures going to the Federal government.
|
||
That's fair, because they pay the rewards. But communities suffer from the
|
||
effects of crime. They need the money for local law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
If city, county or state governments want to share in the rewards, often
|
||
millions of dollars per case, they should pass a reward law that will make
|
||
it more attractive for CrimeFighters to use County or State reward laws for
|
||
prosecution. When they don't have such a law, they will lose these funds to
|
||
the Federal government.
|
||
Reward Law Recommendations
|
||
|
||
Add a new State law via initiatives, or ask legislators to introduce a bill
|
||
to make ONE state reward law to replace all Federal reward laws. That's far
|
||
easier than trying to get the Federal government to revise a dozen or more
|
||
complex laws relating to sentencing and payment of rewards.
|
||
|
||
The following State reward law would eliminate the necessity of changing
|
||
dozens of existing Federal laws; eliminate the need for negotiation; have
|
||
only one place (911) to expedite report of criminal activity; would give
|
||
full credit and realistic rewards to provide maximum incentives; have a
|
||
specific amount and reasonable payment time to make it attractive and
|
||
effective; We-Tip, CrimeStoppers and similar organizations would still be
|
||
active in the same manner as they are now, to provide confidentiality when
|
||
desired, but could advertise significantly larger state rewards without
|
||
having to obtain reward money via donations and fund raising events.
|
||
|
||
A (Proposed) Crime Fighter Reward Law
|
||
|
||
(1) Any person, not a law enforcement officer of any state or federal
|
||
government, who supplies original information directly or indirectly to
|
||
any law enforcement agency, which leads to the arrest of a lawbreaker,
|
||
or successful prosecution of a civil suit of any individual or business
|
||
organization for any violation of a state felony or misdemeanor law, shall
|
||
be paid a monetary reward and an equal share of any fines and forfeitures
|
||
collected by the court.
|
||
|
||
(a) The reward to be calculated at the rate of $1,000 for each year, or
|
||
proportionately for any fraction thereof, of the maximum jail sentence
|
||
possible according to the penalties prescribed by Title 18 USCS 3581, (or
|
||
the Revised Statutes of the state), for the class of felony or misdemeanor
|
||
committed.
|
||
|
||
(b) The above reward amount to be paid within 30 days after the arrest of
|
||
lawbreakers and based on the original charges deemed appropriate and
|
||
supported by evidence obtained by the arresting officers or citizens.
|
||
|
||
(c) Regardless of the outcome of the case, whether the original charges are
|
||
later dismissed or reduced by the prosecutor by plea bargaining, or the
|
||
prosecutor fails to obtain a conviction, or if the sentence or fine, or
|
||
both, are dismissed, suspended or deferred by the court, the reward in (a)
|
||
shall not be reduced or withheld from payment.
|
||
|
||
(d) When multiple sentences are possible, the largest individual sentence
|
||
possible for each defendant shall be used to calculate the reward.
|
||
|
||
(e) When two or more persons are arrested for the same or directly related
|
||
criminal activity, or fines and forfeitures are levied against two or more
|
||
persons or business entities, the reward shall be based on their combined
|
||
largest individual sentences and on all fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
(f) Payment of the above reward to be made, within 30 days after the
|
||
arrest, by the state Attorney General.
|
||
|
||
(g) The court shall pay the crime fighter half of any fines and forfeitures
|
||
within 30 days after they are collected or paid to the court. The other
|
||
half of all fines and forfeitures shall be paid to the police department or
|
||
law enforcement agency that is in charge of the of the prosecution.
|
||
|
||
(h) When the items forfeited are prohibited items that can not be sold or
|
||
legally used, such as, but not limited to, machineguns, drugs, marijuana,
|
||
or other prohibited items, they shall be retained by the law enforcement
|
||
agency involved for law enforcement purposes, drugs may be sold to
|
||
hospitals, or destroyed. In such an event, the crime fighter shall be paid
|
||
a bonus reward of 25% of the estimated retail value of all such prohibited
|
||
items seized. The retail value of such items to be calculated by the
|
||
prosecutor immediately after the arrest and forfeiture of the prohibited
|
||
items. This bonus payment shall be paid to the crime fighter within 30 days
|
||
after the arrest.
|
||
|
||
(i) In the event the forfeited items are perishable or subject to rapid
|
||
depreciation or storage and insurance costs, either the crime fighter or
|
||
the law enforcement agency involved shall be authorized to take delivery of
|
||
any such forfeited items and sell them at the best possible price. The
|
||
proceeds of such sale shall be shared by both parties on an equal basis.
|
||
|
||
(j) Recognizing that sentences may remain the same for many years with the
|
||
same effect and result but a dollar gradually depreciates in value, the
|
||
dollar amounts mentioned in (a) shall be increased each year, on January
|
||
1st, by the same annual percentage of the Consumer Price Index, rounded to
|
||
the nearest multiple of $100, $1,000, $5,000 or $10,000, as appropriate, to
|
||
maintain current value and effectiveness of this reward law.
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Memo to lawmakers: Title 28 USCS 2461 is a sample of how civil monetary
|
||
penalties laws are updated via the Consumer Price Index. It provides a
|
||
useful formula for rounding a fine to the nearest multiple of $100 or
|
||
$1,000. Unfortunately, it doesn't apply to fines for criminal offenses.
|
||
|
||
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and other Criminal Statutes
|
||
enacted by the 98th Congress, has revised and updated most of the major
|
||
criminal laws. However, many smaller, or less important reward laws are
|
||
overlooked. Updates usually take about ten years. In the meantime, the
|
||
overlooked laws "shrink" with inflation and wither on the vine
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Calculating CrimeFighter Rewards/Awards
|
||
Prison Terms: Guidelines
|
||
|
||
State laws vary but are similar to Federal laws. Use the following as
|
||
guidelines. I've added a dollar amount in brackets ($x,xxx) to show the
|
||
proposed CrimeFighter's reward. A possible sentence of "life" would be
|
||
provide a $50,000 reward to keep it in proportion to the other rewards.
|
||
|
||
Title 18 USCS 3581
|
||
|
||
(a) In general. A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
|
||
|
||
(b) Authorized terms. The authorized terms of imprisonment are -
|
||
|
||
(1) for a Class A felony, the duration of the defendant's life or any
|
||
period of time; ($50,000)
|
||
(2) for a Class B felony, not more than twenty-five years; ($25,000)
|
||
(3) for a Class C felony, not more than twelve years; ($12,000)
|
||
(4) for a Class D felony, not more than six years; ($6,000)
|
||
(5) for a Class E felony, not more than three years; ($3,000)
|
||
(6) for a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year; ($1,000)
|
||
(7) for a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months; ($500)
|
||
(8) for a Class C misdemeanor, not more than thirty days; ($100) and
|
||
(9) for an infraction, not more than five days. ($0)
|
||
|
||
(A similar listing of fines and forfeitures is listed in Chapter 5. They
|
||
are repeated here for your convenience. Chapter 10 lists sentences and
|
||
fines for drug related offenses.)
|
||
|
||
|
||
18 USCS 3571 Sentence of fine.
|
||
|
||
(a) In general. A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
sentenced to pay a fine.
|
||
|
||
(b) Fines for individuals. Except as provided in this subsection
|
||
|
||
(e) of this section, an individual who has been found guilty of an offense
|
||
may be fined not more than the greatest of -
|
||
|
||
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
|
||
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
|
||
(3) for a felony, not more than $250,000;
|
||
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death not more than $250,000;
|
||
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than
|
||
$100,000;
|
||
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more
|
||
than $5,000; or
|
||
(7) for an infraction, not more than $5,000.
|
||
|
||
(c) Fines for organizations. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this
|
||
section, an organization that has been found guilty of an offense may be
|
||
fined not more than the greatest of -
|
||
|
||
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
|
||
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
|
||
(3) for a felony, not more than $500,000;
|
||
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death, not more than $500,000;
|
||
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than
|
||
$200,000;
|
||
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more
|
||
than $10,000; or
|
||
(7) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
|
||
|
||
(d) Alternative fines based on gain or loss. If any person derives
|
||
pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary
|
||
loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not
|
||
more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss,
|
||
unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate
|
||
or prolong the sentencing process.
|
||
|
||
(e) Special rule for lower fine specified in substantive provisions. If a
|
||
law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than
|
||
the fine otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific
|
||
reference, exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise
|
||
applicable under this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the
|
||
amount specified in the law setting forth the offense."
|
||
|
||
* * * * * *
|
||
|
||
Comment: Note that under ordinary law, sub-paragraph (d) allows a fine to
|
||
be doubled, as in a case of fraud or swindle, such as those often used by
|
||
con artists and unethical businesses via illegal practices. Also note that
|
||
organizations also pay twice as much in fines resulting in a maximum fine
|
||
of up to four times the illegal profit. However, the amount and imposition
|
||
of fines are contingent on individual personal or business finances of the
|
||
defendant.
|
||
|
||
Note: The above fines are based on Federal law. Compare your State law on
|
||
fines and forfeitures to see which is the best to use. If state (reward)
|
||
laws are weak or non-existent, hound, harry and harrass your lawmakers to
|
||
do something about it. Having strong, effective reward laws is the first
|
||
step to recruit 100,000 or more crime fighters to fight the war on crime.
|
||
|
||
Crime Stoppers' and We-Tip's Participation
|
||
|
||
When such a law is passed, all misdemeanors and felonies could be reported
|
||
to the local Chapter of Crime Stoppers or We-Tip. They would relay the
|
||
information to local police departments the same as they do now. The
|
||
difference would be: no need for any negotiations; no need to shop for
|
||
rewards; and no need for the CrimeFighter to worry that rewards won't be
|
||
paid because someone else makes a mistake or makes a deal with the D.A.
|
||
|
||
In emergencies, such as witnessing a crime or warning of a pending crime,
|
||
911 could be used to get immediate action. The switchboard operator would
|
||
first ask for details to initiate an immediate police response, then the
|
||
operator would ask for the CrimeFighter's name and address. If the tipster
|
||
wants to retain confidentiality, the operator would assign a number to the
|
||
case and advise the CrimeFighter to quote that number when they contact We-
|
||
Tip or Crime Stoppers for payment of rewards. We-Tip, CrimeStoppers and
|
||
similar organizations could, when asked, apply for the reward on behalf of
|
||
the anonymous caller, make a cash payment, and provide confidentiality.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters will know they will receive at least a minimum reward and
|
||
perhaps more, depending on the severity of the crime and related sentence,
|
||
as well as the possibility of their sharing in fines and forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
When a State law similar to the above is passed, CrimeFighters would be
|
||
eligible for the equivalent of federal laws and rewards; CrimeFighters
|
||
could perform the (simple) role of prosecutor for all guilty pleas that
|
||
doesn't require a jury trial. Or, when a jury trial is required, and there
|
||
is sufficient financial incentive, CrimeFighters would be encouraged to
|
||
hire their own lawyers to be their assistant prosecutors. In both cases, it
|
||
relieves about 90% of the cases sent to the state prosecutor; Rent-a-Judges
|
||
could be used to do the sentencing of those who plead guilty, reducing the
|
||
number of cases heard by regular judges; and local police departments would
|
||
share in the fines and forfeitures to help offset their operating costs.
|
||
|
||
Recommendation for CrimeFighters
|
||
|
||
Until State laws are changed, the best way to protect your financial
|
||
interests is to assert your right to be the official prosecutor. If any
|
||
plea bargaining is done, it should be under your control.
|
||
|
||
An analysis should be made to ascertain which Federal law provides the
|
||
maximum reward. When the lawbreaker has significant assets, and the law
|
||
provides for fines and forfeitures, the reward to a CrimeFighter may be
|
||
considerably larger through fines and forfeitures via RICO and USCS 3059
|
||
than weak or non-existent State (reward) laws.
|
||
|
||
Most State reward laws are way out of date, pay piddly amounts, if and when
|
||
they pay any. When Federal laws can be used, use them for best results.
|
||
|
||
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters International, Inc. (CFI)
|
||
|
||
CFI's Goals
|
||
|
||
* Recruit citizen-based groups of CrimeFighters in every community
|
||
* Create a national and international fraternal and social organization
|
||
* Work with all law enforcement agencies, but mainly with the FBI
|
||
* Sponsor local CrimeFighters' seminars on law enforcement topics
|
||
* Publish CrimeFighters' newsletters for CrimeFighters
|
||
* Encourage local, state-wide and national CrimeFighters' BBSs
|
||
* Persuade lawmakers to replace obsolete, ineffective reward laws
|
||
|
||
Organization
|
||
|
||
CFI has been organized to have one or more groups in each city and State,
|
||
similar to Crime Stoppers, to encourage the development of CrimeFighters'
|
||
lodges throughout the United States, Canada, and other countries with
|
||
similar reward laws. Aside from that similarity, CrimeFighters and Crime
|
||
Stoppers differ significantly.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' lodges will be incorporated as non-profit entities, but
|
||
they will be membership organizations where each member will have a vote
|
||
in the operation, election of directors and officers of their lodge.
|
||
CrimeFighters' lodges will be fraternal and social organizations. Their
|
||
board of directors will provide a variety of social activities for members.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters will be actively looking for criminal activity. They will
|
||
be working (unofficially) for Federal law enforcement agencies. When they
|
||
are trained and capable, they will be actively involved in undercover work
|
||
and making arrests. They can elect to be prosecutor, do plea bargaining of
|
||
their felony suspects, and will have an far more active, interesting and
|
||
profitable role in citizen-based law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
Membership Eligibility
|
||
|
||
Anyone, regardless of age, race, religion, or sex, may become a member of
|
||
CFI. However, any member who is later convicted of any criminal activity,
|
||
or any other conduct detrimental to the desirable image of CrimeFighters,
|
||
will have their CFI membership revoked.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' Name and Logo
|
||
|
||
A sample of a name for your lodge is: "Las Vegas CrimeFighters."
|
||
(The name of your city or community to identify your local lodge.)
|
||
|
||
"CrimeFighters" is a proprietary name owned by Crimefighters International
|
||
Inc. Permission to use our name for lodges will be granted free of charge
|
||
when applications are accepted by CFI. Permission will continue as long as
|
||
the lodge and all its members adhere to the goals and desirable image of
|
||
Crimefighters as outlined in this FloppyBook. (CFI guidelines for operation
|
||
of local CrimeFighters' lodges will be provided when you receive written
|
||
permission to use Crimefighters' name.)
|
||
|
||
Permission to use CrimeFighters' name and logo can be revoked at any time
|
||
should the lodge or any of its members become involved in any disreputable
|
||
activity that discredits the desirable image of CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
It is the responsibility of the board of directors of each lodge to closely
|
||
supervise and control its members, and to cancel memberships if and when
|
||
required. In the event lodges do not supervise and control its members, CFI
|
||
may revoke permission for the lodge to use Crimefighters' name and logo,
|
||
and all CFI memberships in that lodge will be automatically canceled.
|
||
|
||
Forming Local Lodges
|
||
|
||
Charter members will be signed up by CFI to start the membership rolling.
|
||
Members who expressed their desire to be directors of local lodges will be
|
||
contacted by CFI to incorporate their lodge. When incorporated, the new
|
||
lodge will receive an up-to-date membership list of members who live in
|
||
their area. The new board of directors will invite members in their
|
||
neighborhood to join their newly formed lodge.
|
||
|
||
From then on, the new lodge will also recruit new members by personal
|
||
contact and through Crimefighters' seminars. In addition, CFI will continue
|
||
to accept applications generated by this FloppyBook. New members who sign
|
||
up with CFI via this FloppyBook will be regular members. They will be told
|
||
to contact existing lodges in their area. New members may choose which
|
||
lodge he or she wants to join. And, members may transfer membership from
|
||
one lodge to another without any penalty or additional cost.
|
||
|
||
Three months after the lodge is incorporated, a general election will be
|
||
held to elect a regular board of directors to replace the incorporating
|
||
directors. Each member has one vote. Directors and Officers may be re-
|
||
elected by popular vote. Directors elect or appoint a President, Secretary
|
||
and Treasurer. Annual elections are according to the lodge's bylaws.
|
||
|
||
Membership dues for regular members signed up by the lodge's recruiting
|
||
efforts will be $20 per year. Ten dollars of the $20 membership dues will
|
||
be forwarded to CFI for its increasing administrative expenses.
|
||
|
||
Incorporation
|
||
|
||
Most states have similar incorporation requirements and the U.S. Internal
|
||
Revenue Service sets out guidelines on how to qualify for a non-profit
|
||
status. A sample set of filled-in documents, and accompanying fill-in-the-
|
||
blank forms in a professionally-prepared do-it-yourself kit, makes its easy
|
||
to inexpensively prepare the paperwork without a lawyer's help. The Kit
|
||
costs $29.95 from a legal publisher. They're listed in CRIMCAT.
|
||
|
||
Incorporation will be via IRS 501(c)(10) a Domestic Fraternal Association,
|
||
with "educational" rather than "charitable" purposes as the reason for the
|
||
non-profit status.
|
||
Educational Goals via Seminars
|
||
|
||
Lodges will sponsor informal, low-cost, monthly seminars with (possibly) an
|
||
FBI agent or local police representative and appropriate lawyers as guest
|
||
speakers. Seminars will be open to the public and usually advertised free
|
||
in newspapers, TV, and on many public library and supermarket bulletin
|
||
boards. Seminars can soft-sell CrimeFighters' concept. Attendees will
|
||
be invited to be active or supporting members, and will be asked to contact
|
||
active Crimefighters when they have crime-related information.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' seminars will be used to teach members and the public many
|
||
subjects relative to law enforcement. Each month, a different seminar with
|
||
different speakers and subjects can provide additional useful information
|
||
for citizens and CrimeFighters. Seminars may evolve into "courses", taught
|
||
by specialists, on how to make a citizen arrest, drug identification, armed
|
||
and unarmed self-defense, and other law enforcement related subjects.
|
||
|
||
Sponsoring and hosting such seminars will provide CrimeFighters with local
|
||
advertising, widespread recognition, and help build public confidence in
|
||
local CrimeFighters' groups and their unique role in law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
Seminar fees of $10 can be charged to attendees to raise funds for lodges,
|
||
pay transportation costs of guest speakers, and pay low-cost ($10) room
|
||
rent at libraries or public schools. (Check with your library and school
|
||
board.)
|
||
Tax-Exempt Status
|
||
|
||
The Federal tax-exempt status under 501(C)(10) is for the organization on
|
||
money earned or donated to the lodge. It doesn't provide a Federal tax-
|
||
credit to the donor. Since the main fund-raising activity of the lodge is
|
||
holding seminars and not in soliciting donations, this isn't as important
|
||
to Crimefighters as it is to Crime Stoppers. The Fraternal Association
|
||
organization was chosen because it allows the formation of individual
|
||
lodges that are self-governing and provide fraternal and social activities.
|
||
|
||
For specific details, see IRS publication 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your
|
||
Organization, Page 33, 501(C)(10).
|
||
|
||
Getting Started
|
||
|
||
CFI will process membership applications for Charter Members and will issue
|
||
membership cards. During the lodge's formative stages in areas where there
|
||
are no local lodges, CFI will list new members' names, addresses and phone
|
||
numbers (when authorized by the new members) in CFI's monthly newsletters
|
||
to help current members make contact with each other.
|
||
|
||
When there are three or more members in an area, they may decide to start a
|
||
lodge. (Three or more are required for non-profit corporation). They can
|
||
then recruit new members and hold official meetings. Meetings will be
|
||
partly social and partly business discussion.
|
||
|
||
Informal meetings can be held at coffee shops or restaurants (between meal
|
||
times) or at a member's home. For larger groups, many restaurants have a
|
||
separate dining room available for wedding receptions. They also make them
|
||
available for breakfast, lunch or dinner meetings. Once a week luncheon
|
||
meetings is generally the best time for informal or social meetings. The
|
||
cost is minimal, often being only the cost of regular meals. Libraries and
|
||
schools have meeting rooms or classrooms available, either free of charge
|
||
or a $10 - $20 cleaning fee.
|
||
|
||
The cost of incorporating is about $100 when you can use the forms in the
|
||
do-it-yourself kit -- or $300 if you hire a lawyer to do it for you. All
|
||
incorporation costs will be reimbursed to key members from funds later
|
||
available in the lodge's bank account.
|
||
|
||
To raise funds, lodges will sponsor CrimeFighters' Seminars and solicit
|
||
membership applications for new members and collect membership dues. Lodges
|
||
will keep 50% of the fees collected (currently $20). The other 50% (or $10)
|
||
will be mailed to CFI with the application for registration and issuance of
|
||
CFI membership cards. Any profits from seminars, will accrue to the lodge's
|
||
bank account to defray their operating expenses.
|
||
|
||
Computers and BBSs
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighter lodges can set up BBSs to provide CrimeFighters' services as
|
||
skip tracers to members without computers, dial up other BBSs to coordinate
|
||
activities, and provide local Crimefighters' forums.
|
||
|
||
Local BBSs should be available to the public to: post rewards for local
|
||
crimes; advertise local seminars; make available current versions of Crime-
|
||
Fighters' FloppyBooks; and provide inexpensive advertising to recruit new
|
||
members for the lodge.
|
||
|
||
A state-wide BBS will be established to receive inquiries and pass on
|
||
information as a relay station to all CrimeFighters' BBS in their state.
|
||
Lodges in that state will contact the state BBS for up-to-date Crime-
|
||
Fighters-related information and local (state) laws.
|
||
|
||
After State BBSs have been established, CFI will exchange information from
|
||
and to state BBSs only. That way, CFI's limited resources won't be over-
|
||
whelmed by (possibly) thousands of callers nationwide. In the meantime,
|
||
until a CrimeFighters' BBS is operational in your area, CFI will answer all
|
||
requests for additional information by mail only.
|
||
|
||
Newsletters: Sharing Knowledge and Experience
|
||
|
||
Members are asked to submit any information they feel would be helpful
|
||
to other CrimeFighters. The CFI electronic newsletter (in FloppyBook
|
||
format) will feature a nationwide CrimeFighters' forum to provide on-going
|
||
discussion of matters relating to law enforcement. Questions asked one
|
||
month will be answered the following month by other members, like they are
|
||
in BBS forums and magazines. Monthly newsletters may include legal advice
|
||
from lawyers and feedback from law enforcement personnel.
|
||
|
||
Local CrimeFighters' BBSs will also be used as collection points for items
|
||
of interest and comments from local law enforcement agents, which will be
|
||
forwarded to CFI for inclusion in newsletters when they're considered to
|
||
have a common interest for all members.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters' Newsletters will mention each successful CrimeFighter's
|
||
contribution to fighting crime. This will include a report on their success
|
||
as well as errors made, rewards paid, by whom, and the name, office address
|
||
and phone number of cooperative federal agents who work with CrimeFighters.
|
||
|
||
A report from all CrimeFighters of the amount of assistance and attitude of
|
||
their case agents will be very useful as a guide to other CrimeFighters in
|
||
the same area. In this manner, good or bad experiences of each member can
|
||
be shared by all for mutual benefit.
|
||
|
||
The newsletter will also mention, from time to time, various products of
|
||
interest to CrimeFighters. These items may be available at a substantial
|
||
discount because of the combined purchasing power of CFI membership.
|
||
|
||
Uniforms
|
||
|
||
Unlike the Guardian Angels and other civilian police patrols who want to be
|
||
identified and highly visible to deter crime, CrimeFighters will not wear
|
||
distinctive clothing when "on the job." A CrimeFighter's uniform will be
|
||
regular street clothes, suitable to the area and CrimeFighter assignment.
|
||
|
||
An exception may be security personnel who have their own (security guard)
|
||
uniforms and choose to wear them on CrimeFighter Patrols.
|
||
|
||
CrimeFighters may, during special occasions, wear CFI insignia on T-shirts,
|
||
nylon jackets, baseball caps, and shoulder patches. (Example: Large white
|
||
C.F.I. letters on the front and back of dark blue jackets and baseball
|
||
caps.) This might be appropriate during social affairs and lodge meetings.
|
||
They may also be helpful for fast identification when making arrests of
|
||
lawbreakers - like the FBI, DEA, ATF and CIA use as their "battle dress."
|
||
|
||
Individual Membership Benefits
|
||
|
||
(1) You will have an opportunity to make a better than average income, and
|
||
provide a needy and useful law enforcement service to your community.
|
||
|
||
(2) Membership cards from C.F.I. do not have any official law enforcement
|
||
status. But, ID cards might be useful when Crimefighters are (unofficially,
|
||
and eventually) recognized by the FBI and local police. ID cards can be
|
||
helpful when a CrimeFighter is found loitering or "acting suspicious" while
|
||
on a stakeout or patrol.
|
||
|
||
When anyone asks "what authority do you have?", show them your ID card.
|
||
The wording on the front of the card quotes Title 18 USCS 3059 as your
|
||
legal authority to make felony arrests in any state. It also states your
|
||
Qui Tam right to be the prosecutor of those you arrest or provide infor-
|
||
mation leading to their arrest. That's your authority.
|
||
|
||
(3) Monthly newsletters will be distributed on FloppyBooks to each state
|
||
coordinator's BBS. They can be then downloaded by members with computers,
|
||
or printed for non-computer owners. The newsletter will keep members up-to-
|
||
date as to what's happening with other lodges, with CFI, and any changes in
|
||
the federal and state reward laws they should know about.
|
||
|
||
(4) All CrimeFighters' seminars will be free of charge to members, or at
|
||
minimum cost to defray actual expenses.
|
||
|
||
(5) The Domestic Fraternal Association status under IRS (501(C)(10) allows
|
||
group membership insurance eligibility. Full time CrimeFighters and members
|
||
without adequate insurance may want to exercise this group insurance plan
|
||
option in the near future. A large, national organization can obtain a
|
||
group policy with significantly lower premiums than individual plans.
|
||
|
||
(6) Discounts on a wide variety of CrimeFighter equipment as well as
|
||
popular general merchandise will be available in the near future because
|
||
of the purchasing clout of thousands of members. Monthly newsletter will
|
||
list items and their discounted prices.
|
||
|
||
(7) Social activities provide members with the opportunity to make friends
|
||
and evaluate each other's capabilities as potential partners or backups.
|
||
Members can share experiences and CrimeFighter equipment, provide training
|
||
to new members, and form various special-purpose teams such as DDT Patrols,
|
||
and narc teams.
|
||
|
||
(8) Annual conventions will provide an opportunity for delegates of each
|
||
lodge to make suggestions to maximize effectiveness of citizen-based law
|
||
enforcement. Conventions will provide the opportunity for delegates to meet
|
||
other members, encourage cooperation between lodges, and foster national
|
||
unity and common goals.
|
||
|
||
(9) Recognition of the name and logo will (eventually) provide status and
|
||
certain privileges to members from the public, news media and law enforce-
|
||
ment agencies in the United States, Canada, and participating countries.
|
||
|
||
(10) Membership paraphernalia, such as lapel pins, baseball caps, T-shirts,
|
||
shoulder patches, and car window decals will be made available from CFI
|
||
when there are enough members requesting them. (Newsletters will make the
|
||
announcements.)
|
||
F9 for Next Chapter
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
M E M B E R S H I P O P T I O N S
|
||
|
||
Option 1
|
||
|
||
For $10.00 you can become a Charter Member of CrimeFighters International,
|
||
Inc. This option provides a membership card and entitles you to attend
|
||
membership meetings at local CFI lodges.
|
||
|
||
The card comes with a folded plastic sheet which is used to emboss the card
|
||
after you have inserted your picture. When embossed, it can be trimmed to
|
||
the size of your driver's license. (Embossing is done with a regular flat
|
||
iron. A laminating kit with instructions is included with the I.D. card.)
|
||
|
||
The actual membership card looks far nicer and more impressive than the
|
||
following sample because of the limitations of ASCII text. Also not shown
|
||
here is the phantom image of the CrimeFighter logo in the background.
|
||
|
||
===========================================================================
|
||
* C R I M E F I G H T E R *
|
||
(large bold type with white letters on black background)
|
||
===========================================================================
|
||
C r i m e F i g h t e r s I n t e r n a t i o n a l, Inc.
|
||
certify that
|
||
____________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
is a member of Crimefighters International, Inc. and
|
||
authorized by Federal law Title 18 USCS 3059 to make
|
||
place citizen arrests of felony lawbreakers anywhere in the
|
||
U.S.A., and, under Qui Tam common law, upheld by the
|
||
P H O T O U.S. Supreme Court, to be the prosecutor of suspects
|
||
he or she arrests or provides information leading to
|
||
here their arrest. Law enforcement agencies are requested
|
||
to provide their assistance when asked.
|
||
__________________________________
|
||
Issued | Expires
|
||
________________|_________________
|
||
Signature of
|
||
Authenticating Official
|
||
Card No. 007 (__________________________)
|
||
===========================================================================
|
||
|
||
The back of membership cards has places to indicate relevant information
|
||
that may be used for I.D. and emergencies. You fill in this information
|
||
and insert a recent photograph before you laminate your card.
|
||
|
||
===========================================================================
|
||
Persons to contact in emergencies:
|
||
|
||
Age
|
||
|
||
Weight
|
||
Law officer references, name and phone no.
|
||
Height
|
||
|
||
Lawyer's name and phone number Hair color
|
||
|
||
Eye color
|
||
Medical allergies/restrictions/etc.
|
||
Blood Type
|
||
|
||
Other information: Race
|
||
|
||
|
||
==========================================================================
|
||
|
||
Option 2
|
||
|
||
For $14 you get the latest version (2.0+) of CrimeFighters' FloppyBook.
|
||
You'll also receive a membership card and Charter Membership status for 12
|
||
months in Crimefighters International, Inc.
|
||
|
||
Use this option to get early delivery of version 2.0+ of CrimeFighters'
|
||
book in FloppyBook format directly from CFI. Your membership card will be
|
||
delivered immediately, and version 2.0 of CrimeFighters' Floppybook will be
|
||
made as soon as possible after revisions are made from nationwide feedback.
|
||
|
||
Option 3
|
||
|
||
For $22 you get a professionally printed and bound copy of version 2.0 of
|
||
CrimeFighters book at a member's discount price of $9. ($22 price includes
|
||
$3 shipping costs + $10 for membership.) You'll also get a membership card
|
||
and Charter membership status for 12 months.
|
||
|
||
The First batch of printed books from our printer will be delivered around
|
||
December/January '94. The time delay is to obtain feedback and make changes
|
||
to version 1.0. Then the manuscript will be forwarded to our printer who
|
||
needs about 30 days to schedule the printing. Delivery will be made as soon
|
||
as possible thereafter. (Advance orders will be appreciated. They provide
|
||
funding for printing large orders and makes discount prices possible.)
|
||
|
||
The membership application form is on a separate ASCII file called
|
||
APPLIC.DOC. Use the PRINTAPP.BAT file to print it on your printer.
|
||
|
||
(End of CRMFTR1 FloppyBook)
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
FBHF#> |