296 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
296 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
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CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND POLICE MISCONDUCT
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By
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John Epke, M.A.
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Special Agent
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Supervisor, Civil Rights Unit
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Criminal Investigative Division
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Washington, DC
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and
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Linda Davis, J.D.
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Chief, Criminal Section
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Civil Rights Division
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U.S. Department of Justice
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Washington, DC
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On January 11, 1982, a 24-year-old female was found shot to
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death just off an interstate highway near Barstow, California.
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A California Highway patrolman reported the discovery of her
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body. Based on evidence observed at the crime scene, homicide
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investigators from the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office
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concluded that the victim had been stopped either by a law
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enforcement officer or someone impersonating an officer.
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The homicide investigators decided to examine all duty
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weapons of officers who had been in the area around the time of
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the shooting. When the officer who had discovered the body was
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contacted, he advised that his home had been burglarized and
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that his service revolver was missing. A subsequent search
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located the service revolver, which was missing its barrel and
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cylinder, in his locked pick-up truck. On January 18, 1982,
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formal charges were filed in San Bernardino Superior Court,
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charging the officer with homicide. Two efforts by the State of
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California to prosecute the officer resulted in hung juries.
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At the conclusion of the second trial, the FBI initiated a
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civil rights investigation of the officer. He was subsequently
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indicted by a Federal grand jury, and on May 10, 1984, he was
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found guilty for violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 242,
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Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. The officer was later
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sentenced to 90 years in prison, with a minimum of 30 years to
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be served before he would be considered for parole.
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This particular civil rights case raises many questions.
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For example, why was this case, and similar cases, not
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immediately investigated by the FBI and prosecuted federally?
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Why are some cases of this nature never prosecuted federally?
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These questions and others concerning civil rights
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investigations will be examined.
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This article explains the general steps taken to
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investigate the three priority areas of civil rights cases.
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However, it places particular attention to the investigation and
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prosecution of violations involving police misconduct.
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INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
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The two major entities involved in civil rights cases are
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the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the U.S. Department of
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Justice (DOJ) and the FBI's Civil Rights Unit (CRU). The Civil
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Rights Division's mission within the Department of Justice is to
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enforce Federal criminal civil rights statutes and to make
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prosecutive decisions about civil rights cases. The FBI's
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mission in civil rights is to investigate these cases and to
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present them to the Department of Justice for review.
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In late 1988, working in concert with the Department of
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Justice, the FBI established three civil rights program
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priorities--racial violence, misconduct of law enforcement
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officers, and involuntary servitude and slavery. While all
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three areas are deemed priorities, it should be noted that
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approximately 85% of the complaints received and reviewed by DOJ
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concern police misconduct allegations.
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Civil Rights Complaints
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The criminal section of the CRD reviews a large volume of
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criminal civil rights complaints received by DOJ each year. In
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fact, DOJ records indicate that there are as many as 8,000
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complaints and inquiries annually in the form of citizen
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correspondence, phone calls, or personal visits to DOJ, the
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local U.S. Attorney's Office, or most commonly, to the FBI.
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However, only about one-third of these complaints are of
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sufficient substance to warrant investigation. These
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investigations are conducted by the FBI.
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After FBI Agents gather relevant information, they present
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the facts for review to a CRD attorney and a local Assistant
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U.S. Attorney, who decide either to close the investigation or
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to recommend a grand jury presentation. There are at least two
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levels of review--first by the Deputy Chief of the Criminal
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Section and then by the Section Chief--before any particular
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case is approved for grand jury presentation. The Department of
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Justice is very selective about the cases it pursues. Of the
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approximately 3,000 investigations conducted each year, it
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authorizes only about 50 cases for grand jury presentation and
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possible indictment.
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Grand Jury Presentation
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There are several reasons why the Department of Justice
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insists on grand jury presentation. Because criminal civil
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rights prosecutions are generally so sensitive, it is important
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to establish the credibility of each witness under oath. To
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test the believability of the alleged victim's allegations
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before the grand jury is, thus, important to assess the strength
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of the evidence.
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In addition, it is much preferred to have members of the
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community assess the government's evidence before the accused
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stands trial. This provides the Justice Department with a
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better understanding of community attitudes that so frequently
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play a significant role in the ultimate resolution of such
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cases. Indeed, grand jury presentations are not merely
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one-sided summaries of the incident at issue. Not only the
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victim, but all other significant witnesses, are subpoenaed to
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testify. The subject of the investigation is also invited to
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appear.
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At the conclusion of the grand jury proceedings, the
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Justice Department decides whether to request an indictment.
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Here again, the Department proceeds with caution. While a
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criminal indictment can be returned on a showing of probable
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cause, requests for indictments by a grand jury are not made
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unless there is sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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POLICE MISCONDUCT STATUTE
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As mentioned, most of the complaints received and reviewed
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by the DOJ's Civil Rights Division and the FBI's Civil Rights
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Unit involve allegations of police misconduct, generally
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allegations of physical abuse. Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242
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makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law,
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statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to willfully deprive
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any inhabitant of those rights, privileges, or immunities
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secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
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States.
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Section 242 of Title 18 of the U.S.C. dates from the
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post-Civil War era; the rights protected, as amplified by court
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decisions in the ensuing years, have been held to include, among
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others, the right to be free from unwarranted assaults, to be
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free from illegal arrests and illegal searches, and to be free
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from deprivation of property without due process of law. This
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statute applies to persons regardless of their race, color, or
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national origin.
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Section 242 can also apply to the misconduct of public
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officials other than police officers. For example, prosecutions
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of judges, bail bondsmen, public defenders, and even prosecutors
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are possible under the statute and have occurred.
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Police Misconduct Prosecutive Decisions
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Criminal civil rights prosecutions for police misconduct
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are among the most difficult under Federal law. Community
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biases understandably tend to credit (rather than discredit) the
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law enforcement representative. Therefore, the Justice
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Department proceeds whenever possible against police misconduct
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that is clearly offensive and unmistakably violates the rights
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of the individual victim. Thus, on occasion, after a full and
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complete grand jury presentation, the Department has decided not
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to present any indictment to the grand jury.
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Prosecutive decisions are also strongly influenced by how
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local authorities have responded to the alleged misconduct of
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the subject officers. Local actions can include administrative
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proceedings by the law enforcement agency, as well as State
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prosecutions. The Justice Department often monitors the local
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response before deciding on a final course of action. What
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might fall short of "adequate" local action will depend,
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obviously, on the facts of each particular case. To illustrate,
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a suspension of a few days for a brutal beating could well be
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considered insufficient to vindicate the Federal interest under
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the criminal civil rights laws.
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At the other extreme, where it appears that the local law
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enforcement agency is moving quickly and decisively to punish
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misconduct, the Justice Department generally defers to that
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process and does not seek to impose duplicate Federal measures.
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Experience teaches that swift and commensurate discipline,
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imposed on aberrant police officers by their supervisors, is
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generally a more effective deterrent to misconduct than Federal
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prosecution.
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Misconduct Case Factors
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In addition to considering the local administrative and
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prosecutive response to a particular allegation of misconduct,
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great weight is attached to the willfulness of the misconduct.
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The Supreme Court has ruled that in any prosecution under Title
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18, U.S.C., Section 242, the Government must prove the
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defendant's specific intent to engage in misconduct that
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violates the victim's constitutional rights; thus, the
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willfulness of the officer's action is critically important in
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such cases.
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When the misconduct is deliberate and willful--for example,
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a suspect is beaten to coerce a confession, or an arrestee who
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initially resisted police efforts to be apprehended is
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subsequently beaten in retaliation--the Justice Department will
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not hesitate to prosecute. Another factor that can influence a
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decision to prosecute is the severity of injuries.
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Finally, prosecutorial decisions are necessarily guided by
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the evidentiary strength of the case. The extent of
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independent corroboration significantly influences the victim's
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claim. The department does not undertake to prosecute police
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officers on the strength of the victim's statement alone.
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Corroboration may consist of physical evidence, but more likely
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than not, witnesses provide corroboration by their testimony.
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However, the testimony of all witnesses is not equal, and the
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Department places greater weight on corroboration provided by
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the testimony of a fellow officer than on testimony provided by
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the victim's mother or friends.
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False Misconduct Charges
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An issue frequently raised in police misconduct cases is
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the past inability to prosecute persons who make false
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complaints to the FBI. Until a few years ago, such prosecutions
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were extremely difficult from a legal standpoint, because there
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was conflict in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals as to
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whether Section 1001 of Title 18 applied to false statements
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made to FBI Agents. In United States v. Rodgers, decided on
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April 30, 1984, the Supreme Court held that Title 18, U.S.C.,
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Section 1001 does cover false statements to FBI Agents, thus
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paving the way to prosecute such statements.
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There is, however, difficulty in prosecuting these
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cases--they are hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Frequently, the evidence in these cases constitutes a
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disagreement between the declarant and the FBI Agent taking the
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statement, with the declarant insisting the false statement was
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not made, or if made, was the result of having been
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misunderstood by the Agent. Nonetheless, where compelling
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corroboration exists that a false statement was intentionally
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made, criminal prosecution has been authorized by the Department
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of Justice.
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One such case was tried in 1986 in the Western District of
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Louisiana. A jail inmate was convicted of a Section 1001
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violation when he falsely reported to the FBI that he had been
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assaulted and kicked by a deputy sheriff, when in fact, he had
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received his injuries during a fight with another inmate. In
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this case, there was clear and convincing evidence that his
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report to the FBI was false, and accordingly, authorization for
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the Section 1001 prosecution was provided. He was convicted and
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sentenced to 3 years' additional imprisonment. Because of the
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difficulty and sensitivity of these prosecutions, the Department
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of Justice's Civil Rights Division must review and authorize each
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prosecution.
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SUMMARY
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As seen in this review of investigative and prosecutive
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steps, civil rights cases are taken seriously. Throughout its
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56 field divisions, the FBI has a total of 117 Agents dedicated
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to investigating civil rights complaints. Moreover, a
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complement of 27 Department of Justice attorneys prosecute such
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civil rights cases. Despite the minimal amount of investigative
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and prosecutorial resources used in these investigations, a
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steady increase in civil rights convictions has occurred in the
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last 3 years. In 1987, 69 convictions were obtained; in 1988,
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101 convictions; and in 1989, 128 convictions.
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While the statistical accomplishments appear to be low when
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compared to the number of cases opened, as discussed earlier,
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the aggressive investigation and prosecution of civil rights
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matters is absolutely necessary, regardless of cost. Residents
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of the United States must have access to competent Federal
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investigative and prosecutive agencies to redress U.S.
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Constitutional grievances when local mechanisms do not provide
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adequate relief. The obligations of the FBI and DOJ in this
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regard cannot be ignored or delegated if public confidence in
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this Nation's system of government by law is to be maintained.
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Emerging from this aggressive presence is a deterrent
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factor far more effective than merely discouraging individual
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violators. While deterrence is admittedly very difficult to
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measure, a strong Federal presence provides the proper impetus
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for local and State agencies and courts to address civil rights
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complaints effectively. It encourages these agencies to
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maintain an institutional environment in which civil rights
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violations are not tolerated. Law enforcement agencies must
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remain committed to the vigorous upholding of the Federal civil
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rights statutes and remain proud of the responsibility of
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ensuring the constitutional rights of all people in the United
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States.
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