308 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
308 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
September 1991
|
||
|
||
|
||
FOREIGN COUNTERIANTELLIGENCE:
|
||
AN FBI PRIORITY
|
||
|
||
By
|
||
|
||
James E. Tomlinson
|
||
Special Agent in Charge
|
||
Foreign Counterintelligence Division
|
||
FBI Field Office
|
||
New York City, New York
|
||
|
||
|
||
To law enforcement agencies and the American public, the
|
||
FBI is recognized traditionally for its criminal investigations
|
||
of bank robberies, kidnapings, and fugitives. Within the last
|
||
decade, they also came to learn about the Bureau's active
|
||
participation in organized crime, white-collar crime, violent
|
||
crime, and drug investigations. However, few Americans realize
|
||
that a major investigative responsibility of the FBI is foreign
|
||
counterintelligence (FCI).
|
||
|
||
This article provides a brief overview of the FBI's foreign
|
||
counterintelligence mission. It then addresses how local and
|
||
State law enforcement can assist the FBI in its FCI efforts.
|
||
|
||
THE FBI'S FCI MISSION
|
||
|
||
The foreign counterintelligence mission of the FBI is to
|
||
collect, analyze, and use information to identify and neutralize
|
||
the activities of foreign powers and their agents that adversely
|
||
affect national security. The Bureau also conducts and/or
|
||
supervises espionage investigations in U.S. diplomatic
|
||
establishments abroad and investigates worldwide espionage
|
||
activity directed against the United States that involves
|
||
non-military U.S. citizens.
|
||
|
||
Historically, the FBI has carried on major intelligence and
|
||
counterintelligence operations since World War II, when it
|
||
actively sought out Axis saboteurs operating in this country.
|
||
Even after the war, the FBI played a role in civilian
|
||
intelligence collection. However, when the National Security
|
||
Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency, which
|
||
was given the responsibility for collecting positive
|
||
intelligence, (1) the FBI's focus was directed to
|
||
counterintelligence.
|
||
|
||
Since FCI investigations are usually classified, little
|
||
information on the FBI's efforts is ever disseminated to the
|
||
public. Only in major espionage cases, such as those involving
|
||
William Holden Bell, the John Walker family, and Ronald Pelton,
|
||
did the public even get a glimpse into the Bureau's
|
||
counterintelligence world. Yet, espionage activity still exists
|
||
in this country. Between 1976 and 1990, there were 67
|
||
successful prosecutions for espionage in the United States.
|
||
|
||
The damage caused by these cases from a financial
|
||
perspective alone is incalculable. For example, William Holden
|
||
Bell, a senior radar engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company in Los
|
||
Angeles, California, received $110,000 for information passed to
|
||
Marian Zacharski, a Polish businessman and covert agent for the
|
||
Polish Intelligence Service. The information Bell provided on
|
||
the F-15 Look Down-Shoot Down Radar, TOW anti-tank missile,
|
||
Phoenix air-to-air missile, and quiet radar saved the Soviets
|
||
(2) approximately $185 million in technological research and
|
||
advanced their technology by about 5 years by permitting them to
|
||
implement proven design concepts. (3) But, the dangers placed
|
||
on each and every U.S. citizen from a national security
|
||
standpoint cannot be measured in dollar figures alone.
|
||
|
||
Arrests and prosecutions for espionage, however, make up
|
||
only a minute portion of the FCI work that the FBI does. Of
|
||
greater importance is the ability to identify those involved in
|
||
espionage activities and to stop them before they pass
|
||
classified or sensitive information. Early detection of
|
||
individuals who might be inclined to sell sensitive information
|
||
or who are targeted for coercive recruitment by foreign
|
||
intelligence agents to provide such information is the primary
|
||
goal of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence program.
|
||
|
||
Prosecution will always be an option for deterrence
|
||
purposes, but complete success will only be achieved if
|
||
detection is accomplished before national security is damaged.
|
||
For example, in the case of the John Walker spy ring, the U.S.
|
||
Navy suffered an unprecedented loss of classified data that
|
||
provided the Soviet Union with information on Naval operations
|
||
and capabilities. It is estimated that damage to national
|
||
security was in excess of $1 billion in research and development
|
||
alone. However, as an expert witness and outside observer noted
|
||
during the trial, "..the information provided by Walker was
|
||
priceless and its acquisition would be beyond the wildest dreams
|
||
and hopes in the office of the KGB." (4)
|
||
|
||
FCI RESOURCES
|
||
|
||
A sizable portion of the Bureau's work force is dedicated
|
||
to its FCI mission. In fact, every FBI field office has
|
||
designated personnel whose primary investigative responsibility
|
||
is foreign counterintelligence. An FCI staff may range in size
|
||
from one Special Agent in a small Midwest office to several
|
||
hundred in the New York City Office, where foreign
|
||
counterintelligence is considered the number one investigative
|
||
priority.
|
||
|
||
Yet, even though the FBI dedicates a sizable portion of its
|
||
resources, both personnel and monetary, to counterintelligence,
|
||
it is still greatly outnumbered by known or suspected foreign
|
||
intelligence officers. There are nearly 3,000 foreign
|
||
diplomatic officials in New York City alone who are affiliated
|
||
with the United Nations or with consular posts and who are from
|
||
countries with interests traditionally viewed as hostile to the
|
||
United States.
|
||
|
||
The FBI has determined that a number of these officials are
|
||
intelligence officers or have some relationship with foreign
|
||
intelligence services. While in this country, these
|
||
intelligence officers enjoy the freedoms of the United States.
|
||
They have generally unrestricted access to public source
|
||
information, as well as contact with U.S. industrial and
|
||
academic personnel from whom they can obtain technology and
|
||
other intelligence-related information. In addition, experience
|
||
has shown that a threat to U.S. security also exists from
|
||
nontraditional adversaries. For example, Jonathan Pollard, an
|
||
intelligence analyst at the Naval Investigative Service, was
|
||
arrested for spying for Israel, for which he received a life
|
||
prison sentence.
|
||
|
||
Despite the resources devoted to FCI investigations, the
|
||
FBI alone cannot monitor all foreign intelligence service
|
||
officers adequately. The Bureau recognizes that it needs help
|
||
to protect the security of this country. And to this end, it
|
||
enlists the help of the U.S. law enforcement community in its
|
||
FCI mission.
|
||
|
||
LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
|
||
|
||
In cities where most foreign intelligence officers are
|
||
assigned, such as New York City and Washington, D.C., the FBI
|
||
has a concentration of FCI resources. However, when foreign
|
||
intelligence officers travel outside these areas, they are often
|
||
afforded less scrutiny. Furthermore, individuals not yet
|
||
identified as intelligence officers, such as diplomats,
|
||
students, or tourists, may also carry out intelligence
|
||
functions. This is where local and State law enforcement can
|
||
assist the FBI.
|
||
|
||
All law enforcement personnel should be aware of vehicles
|
||
registered to foreign embassies, consulates, and U.N. missions,
|
||
and their personnel, traveling in their jurisdictions. These
|
||
vehicles can be identified by their distinctive license plates.
|
||
Through the Office of Foreign Missions Act, the U.S. State
|
||
Department issues special license plates for vehicles of foreign
|
||
missions and their staffs accredited in the United States.
|
||
These license plates are red, white, and blue and have a letter
|
||
code that denotes the status of the registered owner. The
|
||
letter "D" signifies diplomat, "C" means a member of a
|
||
consulate, and "S" denotes a staff member. A separate
|
||
two-letter abbreviation on the license plate identifies the
|
||
country of origin of the registrant. For example, the letter
|
||
designation for the U.S.S.R. is "FC." Therefore, a diplomatic
|
||
license plate that reads "FCD," along with three numbers, means
|
||
that the vehicle is registered to a Soviet diplomat assigned to
|
||
the Soviet mission in New York City. A "DFC" designation
|
||
identifies a Soviet bilateral diplomat assigned to Washington,
|
||
D.C. Local FBI offices have wallet-size cards available that
|
||
list the various diplomatic designations.
|
||
|
||
When these individuals travel outside their diplomatic
|
||
area, their activities may be of interest to the FBI. This is
|
||
especially the case if such a license plate is observed in a
|
||
rural area, near a U.S. military installation, in the vicinity
|
||
of a defense contractor, or for that matter, anywhere at an
|
||
unusual time. Noting the license plate number and reporting it
|
||
immediately to the local FBI office may be of great importance.
|
||
|
||
Of course, individuals operating these vehicles may be
|
||
legitimate diplomats fulfilling their official responsibilities
|
||
or just traveling on personal business. And since only a small
|
||
percentage of diplomats are active in clandestine intelligence
|
||
operations, no action should be taken against these individuals.
|
||
Providing information on the license plate, the number of
|
||
occupants, and the location of the vehicle when observed to the
|
||
local FBI office is all that is necessary.
|
||
|
||
It should be noted, however, that not all individuals
|
||
operating vehicles with these official State Department plates
|
||
automatically enjoy full diplomatic immunity. Such immunity is
|
||
granted only to those who are accredited by the U.S. Department
|
||
of State and only to the extent appropriate to their status.
|
||
Distinctive license plates themselves confer no immunity; they
|
||
simply alert law enforcement officials that the vehicle's
|
||
operator is likely to be a person enjoying some degree of
|
||
immunity. (5)
|
||
|
||
Law enforcement officers who have any questions regarding
|
||
the diplomatic status of any individual need only contact the
|
||
local FBI office or the U.S. Department of State. FBI personnel
|
||
can quickly confirm through FBI Headquarters and the State
|
||
Department the individual's official standing and accompanying
|
||
entitlements.
|
||
|
||
CONTINUED THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
|
||
|
||
Even with the many changes occurring in Eastern Europe and
|
||
the Soviet Union, the FBI must maintain a "business as usual"
|
||
attitude with regard to counterintelligence operations. As long
|
||
as the United States continues to be a leader in technological
|
||
research and design, countries that are less developed will
|
||
continue to seek a "quick fix" to solve their economic problems.
|
||
Therefore, despite an era of Glasnost or "openness," Americans
|
||
cannot afford to disregard the unusual activities of diplomats
|
||
and foreign visitors who pose a threat to national security.
|
||
|
||
In addition, because of this new "openness," the high rate
|
||
of crime and drug problems experienced by Eastern European
|
||
countries and the Soviet Union is coming to light. In their
|
||
efforts to address these crime problems, these countries
|
||
routinely request assistance from U.S. law enforcement. Soviet
|
||
journalists have requested information regarding laboratory
|
||
techniques and drug prevention from both the FBI and the Drug
|
||
Enforcement Administration. More and more, local, State, and
|
||
other Federal law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, are
|
||
also being approached to provide crime-fighting assistance to
|
||
their Eastern European and Soviet counterparts. And, there is
|
||
every reason to believe that these requests for scientific
|
||
training and technological information from U.S. agencies will
|
||
continue.
|
||
|
||
ALERT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
|
||
|
||
Countries seeking assistance from U.S. law enforcement can
|
||
benefit from the vast knowledge that has been developed over the
|
||
years. And, because of the unselfish willingness of local,
|
||
State, and Federal agencies to provide such assistance, the
|
||
world should see significant improvements in the law enforcement
|
||
systems operating in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This,
|
||
in turn, will hopefully result in a more positive image for law
|
||
enforcement worldwide.
|
||
|
||
As is often the case, but particularly within the law
|
||
enforcement community, strong bonds develop between professional
|
||
personnel. However, U.S. law enforcement officers must remain
|
||
alert to the distinct possibility of exploitation by Eastern
|
||
European countries and the Soviet Union. Many foreign law
|
||
enforcement agencies have strong ties to their intelligence
|
||
services. And, these intelligence services, in turn, are very
|
||
interested in access to U.S. law enforcement computer systems,
|
||
equipment, training methods, and operational techniques for
|
||
intelligence purposes.
|
||
|
||
Accordingly, the FBI has expanded its FCI awareness
|
||
education program for defense contractors to include U.S. law
|
||
enforcement agencies that are involved in exchange programs with
|
||
other countries. Law enforcement agencies are strongly urged to
|
||
contact their local FBI offices if they plan to participate in
|
||
an exchange program with a foreign police service. Trained
|
||
personnel will provide appropriate specialized briefings that
|
||
can help to ensure foreign intelligence services do not gain
|
||
information that may be harmful to the interests of national
|
||
security.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
||
The FBI's foreign counterintelligence mission is not as
|
||
publicized as its other law enforcement functions. However,
|
||
individuals committing espionage or aiding agents of foreign
|
||
intelligence services are often greater threats to the American
|
||
public than major criminal offenders. The collective damages
|
||
caused by the John Walker spy ring, Ronald Pelton, William Bell,
|
||
and others, the espionage cases that have occurred since 1985,
|
||
are beyond financial comprehension.
|
||
|
||
The FBI alone cannot hope to identify all intelligence
|
||
activity conducted in the United States and actively monitor all
|
||
intelligence officers operating in this country. The
|
||
cooperation and assistance of the U.S. law enforcement community
|
||
is essential. By working together, local, State, and Federal
|
||
law enforcement personnel can curtail the inimical activities of
|
||
foreign intelligence agents in the United States, and thereby,
|
||
safeguard the security of this Nation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
FOOTNOTES
|
||
|
||
(1) Positive intelligence refers to information gathered
|
||
from both domestic and foreign sources that may be of use to
|
||
U.S. Government agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities.
|
||
|
||
(2) At the time, the Polish Intelligence Service was a
|
||
surrogate of the KGB, and information acquired by its agents was
|
||
funneled directly to Moscow.
|
||
|
||
(3) "Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western
|
||
Technology: An Update," (unclassified), Central Intelligence
|
||
Agency, September 1985, p. 20.
|
||
|
||
(4) Whitworth Trial Transcripts, Federal District Court,
|
||
San Francisco, California, 1986.
|
||
|
||
(5) The Office of Foreign Missions has prepared a booklet
|
||
entitled "Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers: Personal
|
||
Rights and Immunities of Foreign Diplomats and Consular
|
||
Personnel," U.S. Department of State publication No. 9533,
|
||
revised February 1988, which provides guidance on this and other
|
||
related issues.
|
||
|