216 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
216 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
October 1991
|
||
|
||
|
||
URBAN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
|
||
|
||
By
|
||
|
||
Robert W. Dart
|
||
Commander
|
||
Gang Crimes Section
|
||
Chicago Police Department
|
||
|
||
|
||
Urban transit systems are the very lifeblood of
|
||
metropolitan areas. They preserve our cities as vital
|
||
commercial centers. Their lines carry citizens to and from
|
||
their places of work, as well as to educational, recreational,
|
||
and cultural facilities.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, however, many citizens perceive that their
|
||
personal safety is endangered on urban transit systems because
|
||
they believe that dangerous levels of crime exist in subways.
|
||
For many riders, descending into the noisy, disorienting
|
||
subterranean world of rapid transit increases their fear of
|
||
crime.
|
||
|
||
Also contributing to the false perception of danger is the
|
||
reaction of the media to incidents that occur on subways. Even
|
||
though only about 5 percent of Chicago's total crime occurs on
|
||
the Chicago Transit System, the media tend to publicize these
|
||
crimes, while seeming to ignore these same types of crime when
|
||
they occur on the streets. This action only serves to reinforce
|
||
the belief that subway transit is unsafe.
|
||
|
||
Because citizens believe this to be true, and because
|
||
citizen perception of security affects volume and revenue, (1)
|
||
officers who police these systems must now incorporate into
|
||
their normal duties the critical task of changing citizen
|
||
apprehension about using a subway transit system. Riders must
|
||
not only be safe; they must also feel safe. Using the Chicago
|
||
Transit System as a case study, this article discusses possible
|
||
strategies that departments can use to reduce crime on urban
|
||
transportation systems, thereby changing citizen perception.
|
||
|
||
THE PROBLEM
|
||
|
||
The Chicago Transit System (CTA) operates over 1,000 cars
|
||
that transport approximately one-half million persons daily. It
|
||
has over 140 stations and over 200 miles of track that are
|
||
policed by the Public Transportation Section of the Chicago
|
||
Police Department.
|
||
|
||
Future plans for the CTA call for an additional 9.2-mile
|
||
stretch of line to connect the existing loop to Midway Airport.
|
||
However, since local citizens and tourists arriving at the
|
||
airport will not use a system they believe to be unsafe, the
|
||
City of Chicago was confronted with the dilemma of how to police
|
||
the city's public transportation system more effectively.
|
||
|
||
THE PROGRAM
|
||
|
||
To begin, officials reviewed the nature and scope of crimes
|
||
committed on the transportation system. Their goals were to
|
||
find possible solutions to these crime problems, and at the same
|
||
time, change the public's belief that subways were unsafe.
|
||
|
||
However, reducing the rate of crime required an organized
|
||
effort--a bandaid approach would not be effective. It was
|
||
necessary to reorganize totally in order to establish a program
|
||
with new goals and direction. Officials wanted to make a clear
|
||
commitment to the safety of the ridership.
|
||
|
||
Areas Addressed
|
||
|
||
Personnel
|
||
|
||
A primary consideration in the reorganization was how to
|
||
deploy personnel efficiently. Based on studied needs, transit
|
||
personnel are divided among three watches. The first shift
|
||
(midnights) receives 23 percent of the personnel, the second
|
||
shift (days) receives 34 percent of the personnel, and the third
|
||
shift (afternoons) receives 43 percent of the personnel. In
|
||
addition to patrol personnel, each 8-hour shift includes a
|
||
canine unit, a tactical unit, and a crime assault team (CAT).
|
||
These special units are deployed to any problem areas that need
|
||
their specific skills.
|
||
|
||
Patrol squads
|
||
|
||
Because it was not effective to assign police officers to a
|
||
designated stretch of track during periods of low crime or low
|
||
ridership, the squad concept was born. This concept is designed
|
||
around first-line supervisors (sergeants), who deploy all or
|
||
part of their teams to high-crime platforms during certain times
|
||
and then to other platforms during peak ridership. This
|
||
enhances the citizen perception of safety by increasing the
|
||
presence of uniformed police officers.
|
||
|
||
At any given time, the transportation section has as many
|
||
as 10 squads assigned to different areas of the transit system.
|
||
A typical squad consists of four to six uniformed officers, two
|
||
plainclothes officers, and two canine officers, who are separate
|
||
from the canine units. Although users of transit systems
|
||
commonly believe that plainclothes officers combat crime most
|
||
effectively, riders are not at ease unless they also see
|
||
uniformed officers. And, because both plainclothes and
|
||
uniformed officers can make arrests, officials are able to
|
||
achieve a balance of visibility and productivity.
|
||
|
||
Canine units
|
||
|
||
Canine units are also used to police the transit system.
|
||
The dogs, which are donated by citizens, are given 8 weeks of
|
||
intensive training in aggression, protection of their handlers,
|
||
and moving safely among crowds. Canine units not only give
|
||
transit users a greater sense of safety but they also reinforce
|
||
positive public relations. Riders look forward to seeing their
|
||
dogs and seem to take a personal interest in them.
|
||
|
||
Tactical units
|
||
|
||
Tactical units, which have the flexibility to be deployed
|
||
to any situation or crime pattern, play an integral part in the
|
||
effort to reduce the crime rate. These plainclothes officers
|
||
can move freely through the system without arousing the
|
||
suspicions of potential offenders. They observe all transit
|
||
criminal activity for patterns, such as time of day, day of
|
||
week, and modus operandi. Personnel in the unit then devise a
|
||
plan to address specific crime problems.
|
||
|
||
For example, thieves and pickpockets are a major problem on
|
||
transit systems. Most of them ply their trade during rush-hours
|
||
and during lunch times, when the subways are crowded. However,
|
||
because CTA tactical units target these thieves, the problem has
|
||
been greatly reduced.
|
||
|
||
Crime assault teams
|
||
|
||
The crime assault teams consist of experienced police
|
||
officers who exhibit a high degree of self-discipline and are
|
||
team players. They pose as ordinary transit users and wait for
|
||
criminals to take advantage of their apparent vulnerability. In
|
||
order to avoid a charge of entrapment, these officers react only
|
||
when they have been victimized.
|
||
|
||
During the trials of these criminals, the victim/officer
|
||
testifies as the complainant, and a crime assault team member
|
||
testifies as the arresting officer. These two factors
|
||
contribute to an extrodinarily high conviction rate in these
|
||
cases.
|
||
|
||
Ordinance enforcement team
|
||
|
||
Another major problem the CTA experienced was unlicensed
|
||
vendors. Prior to the new program, these illegal vendors were
|
||
issued ordinance complaint forms or citations similar to traffic
|
||
citations. However, because this method of enforcement provided
|
||
no assurance that offenders would appear in court to answer the
|
||
charge, it failed to serve as a deterrent. For this reason,
|
||
illegal vendors are now arrested by members of ordinance
|
||
enforcement teams, whose primary role is to ensure that vendors
|
||
comply with city ordinances. This approach has reduced the
|
||
number of vendors on the platforms, allowing passengers to move
|
||
freely and safely in the subway areas.
|
||
|
||
Assigning Personnel
|
||
|
||
Watch commanders use three methods to assign personnel,
|
||
including Operation Impact, Operation Vacuum, and Operation
|
||
Saturation. Commanders who use Operation Impact assign their
|
||
officers based on ridership traffic patterns. Officers are
|
||
assigned to stations that handle large numbers of riders, while
|
||
those stations with fewer riders are monitored by moving police
|
||
patrols.
|
||
|
||
Criminals tend to explore transit systems for areas where
|
||
there is no police presence. Operation Vacuum enables watch
|
||
commanders to withdraw uniformed officers from a specific
|
||
station and deploy them to another area. The ostensibly vacant
|
||
station can then become the focal point of a tactical team.
|
||
|
||
When officials want to convey the impression that police
|
||
are everywhere, such as during rush-hour at busy stations, they
|
||
use Operation Saturation. This operation, which may last either
|
||
all or part of a shift, involves saturating particular lines
|
||
with uniformed officers. It is an effective way to both deter
|
||
criminals and build citizen confidence in the CTA's policing
|
||
methods by conveying the impression that officers are
|
||
everywhere.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
||
Mass transit systems are an integral part of large cities,
|
||
and as these cities expand in both population and size, the
|
||
importance of this mode of transportation will also increase.
|
||
However, if citizens refuse to use subways because they believe
|
||
that they are unsafe, the full potential of the systems will
|
||
never be realized. For this reason, officials must begin to
|
||
look at ways to reduce crime on rapid transit systems, which
|
||
will also help to change citizen perception.
|
||
|
||
The initiatives put into operation by the Chicago Mass
|
||
Transit System are examples of how a concerted effort to reduce
|
||
crime can work. During the first year of the program, there was
|
||
a 40-percent reduction in reported serious crime, and the crime
|
||
rate continues to decline. The plan has been a resounding
|
||
success, with ridership on the rise again. The Chicago subway is
|
||
finally becoming a safe--and popular--mode of transportation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
FOOTNOTE
|
||
|
||
(1) "Policing Urban Mass Transit Systems," U.S. Department
|
||
of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National
|
||
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977.
|
||
|