244 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
244 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
September 1991
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING WORLD
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By
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William S. Sessions
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Director
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
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In recent years, the world witnessed some truly amazing
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events--the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of
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East and West Germany, the beginnings of democratic governments
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across Eastern Europe, and the easing of political tensions
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between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result,
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the current perception of most Americans is that foreign
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intelligence activity directed against the United States and the
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West is decreasing, and therefore, the need for an active,
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aggressive counterintelligence response has abated.
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Unfortunately, this is far from true.
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There can be no doubt that important changes are taking
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place in the world today. However, improved diplomatic
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relations do not necessarily decrease the foreign intelligence
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threat to U.S. national security. The truth remains: That
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threat still exists, as it did in the past and as it will in the
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future.
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DECADE OF THE 1980S
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The last decade of the cold war, the 1980s, was designated
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by the media as "The Decade of the Spy." It was a time when
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Americans knew who their enemies were--a time when President
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Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as "The Evil Empire."
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The American public showed strong support of counterintelligence
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efforts and participated in the process by reporting suspicious
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events.
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During the 1980s, more than 45 people were arrested for
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espionage. Increased human and technical resources, enhanced
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analytical and training programs, and improved coordination
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within the U.S. intelligence community and with friendly foreign
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intelligence services contributed significantly to these
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arrests. However, much of the success in counterintelligence
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efforts came as a result of a heightened public awareness of the
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full damage caused by espionage, as well as the public's support
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of the measures designed to protect Americas vital information.
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In addition to the importance of public awareness, the
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1980s taught us several other important lessons. First, the
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American public received a rude awakening regarding the
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vulnerability of the U.S. national security community from spies
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within its own ranks. For example, both John Walker and Jerry
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Whitworth served in the U.S. Navy; Karel Koecher, Larry Chin,
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and Edward Howard all worked for the Central Intelligence Agency
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(CIA); Ronald Pelton was a National Security Agency employee;
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Richard Miller was an FBI Special Agent.
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Second, many of the dangers were posed by volunteers. That
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is, many of those arrested during the 1980s, including Walker,
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simply offered to spy on their country. And they offered to spy
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not because they had ideological differences with the U.S.
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Government or ideological sympathy with a foreign government, as
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was the case during World War II and the first decade of the
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Cold War. They spied for the basest of reasons--money.
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Third, prosecuting spies was found to be an effective tool
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to determine the extent of the damage caused to national
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security. Unfortunately, some of the espionage cases of the
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1980s resulted in grave damage to U.S. national security
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interests. But, without the prosecutions that followed, an
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accurate accounting of what was lost would not have been
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possible, and appropriate steps to minimize the damage would not
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have been taken. Fortunately, in 45 percent of the espionage
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cases during the 1980s, the work the U.S. counterintelligence
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community uncovered either prevented the espionage activity or
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significantly limited the damages.
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THE CHANGING WORLD
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In the 1990s, with the easing of tensions between
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superpowers and military blocs, it is no longer possible to
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identify the U.S. counterintelligence mission in terms of these
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relationships alone--the world has become much too complex for
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that. America has negotiated historic arms reduction treaties
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with the Soviets. The Soviets have introduced their programs of
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Glasnost, openness to the West, and Perestroika, internal
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economic and political restructuring. And, the world has
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witnessed the nations of Eastern Europe revolt against their
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former Communist leaders in favor of new freedom and economic
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diversity, and in some cases, more democratic forms of
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government.
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While all Americans can agree that the world has changed,
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and most see that change as positive in terms of an enhanced
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prospect for world peace, the public tends to view this new
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world order to be devoid of danger. So, the logic goes, that if
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there is no longer a threat to U.S. national security, then
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counterintelligence measures are not needed.
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But, the reality is that arms reduction treaties between
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the United States and the Soviet Union give Soviet "inspectors"
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potential access to some of this country's most sensitive
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projects. Glasnost has dramatically expanded the number of
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exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in such
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areas as business, science, and education. In fact, since
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Glasnost, the number of Soviets traveling to the United States
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increased almost 400 percent; in 1990 alone, more than 100,000
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Soviets visited the United States. Past experience shows that
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these exchange groups often contain intelligence officers.
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Furthermore, the countries of Eastern Europe, while attempting
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to move away from the Soviet sphere of influence, are now
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fighting for their own economic survival--and they, too, have a
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need for Western technology.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THREATS
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Arms control treaties between the Soviet Union and the
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United States will hopefully lead to a diminished threat level
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between the nations. However, from a counterintelligence
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perspective, these treaties will give the Soviet intelligence
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services routine access to sensitive areas and to knowledgeable
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Americans who are linked to classified information which, until
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now, was attainable only on a very limited basis. Other
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treaties presently being negotiated, concerning strategic arms
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reduction and chemical weapons, would require numerous
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verification sites, again expanding Soviet access.
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But, the Soviets are interested in more than American
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military secrets. The Soviet economy is in desperate shape and
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can be revitalized with Western technology, capital, and
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expertise. In order to strengthen that economy, the chairman of
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the KGB has publicly stated that it plans to assist Soviet
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businesses because, as he says, "They are not good businessmen."
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The Soviets have systematically expanded their intelligence
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collection beyond military intelligence targets and now
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routinely include Western economic information and technologies.
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Since the Soviets can no longer rely on their former
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surrogate intelligence services in the Eastern Bloc to collect
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intelligence for them, they must find other sources of
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intelligence and develop new surrogate services. The Soviets
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have started using the intelligence services of other countries
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to obtain Stealth technology and acquire restricted computer
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technologies for themselves.
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Recent repression by the Soviet government of dissent in
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the Baltic Republics may very well signal a new shift in Soviet
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internal policy away from the liberalization of Glasnost. This,
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in turn, may have far-reaching implications involving the Soviet
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military and its intelligence services, U.S. national security,
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and the emerging "new world order."
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All in all, while the nature of the Soviet intelligence
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threat may be changing, its objectives and actions are not. The
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Soviet intelligence services are more active now than they have
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been at any time in the past 10 years, and there is every reason
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to believe that they will continue their pursuit of Western
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intelligence during the 1990s.
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The threat of Eastern European countries to the United
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States cannot be fully assessed because they themselves have not
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yet fully defined the nature and scope of their intelligence
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services. Some of these countries are no longer collecting
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intelligence on behalf of the Soviet Union; however, they will,
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in all likelihood, refocus their collection activities in the
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United States to fulfill their own requirements. Since, as with
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the Soviets, the current major focus of these nations is
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economic reorganization and growth, they also have a real need
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for Western technology.
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What about the People's Republic of China (PRC)? The PRC
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has the largest foreign official presence in the United
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States--2,700 diplomats and commercial officials, 43,000
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scholars, 25,000 commercial delegates visiting the United States
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annually, and 20,000 emigres coming to America each year. The
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PRC remains a major counterintelligence threat to the United
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States. Their intelligence services target well-educated
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Chinese-American scientists and other professionals who have
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access to useful information and technology using the approach:
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"Please help China modernize."
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While the Soviet Union, the former Eastern Bloc countries,
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and the People's Republic of China are all traditional
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intelligence threats, U.S. counterintelligence efforts can no
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longer focus exclusively on these countries. In this
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information age, any number of countries can attempt to
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establish the infrastructure required to carry out intelligence
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collection activities in the United States, both overtly and
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clandestinely. Essentially, Americans need to be concerned
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about nontraditional intelligence threats to this country as
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well.
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With this point in mind, the intelligence activities of
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countries in the Middle East and Central Asia are becoming more
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significant. For example, the Iraqi intelligence service was
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very active in the United States during the 1980s, and in light
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of the recent war in the Persian Gulf, its activities are likely
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to continue.
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES
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The FBI is charged with countering the hostile activities
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of foreign intelligence services in the United States by
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identifying and neutralizing these activities. It does this by
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penetrating these services, disrupting or publicizing their
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illegal activities, and expelling, arresting, or prosecuting
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those responsible.
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However, the FBI cannot meet its counterintelligence
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mission alone. Coordination of counterintelligence operations
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with other members of the intelligence community, and frequently
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joint operations, is critical to the Bureau's success, along
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with the support of the Executive and Legislative Branches of
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the Federal Government, the law enforcement community, and the
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American public.
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While the FBI has the responsibility to make the public
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more aware of the hostile intelligence threat, it relies heavily
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on information from the public to fulfill its
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counterintelligence mission. Because many Americans no longer
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perceive the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries
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as a threat to U.S. security, the FBI must comprehensively
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expose the full scope of this threat to American institutions,
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facilities, and citizens. The purpose behind this is to protect
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national security, not to discourage improved relations and
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trade between the United States and the rest of the world.
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CONCLUSION
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The world is in a constant state of flux. What is true
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today may not be true tomorrow. For this reason, it is
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critical to identify the exact nature of any hostile
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intelligence threat to national security and to counter that
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threat.
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A heightened awareness by all Americans is the most
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effective weapon available to accomplish this task. By working
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together, citizens and law enforcement agencies can successfully
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meet the counterintelligence challenges of today and those of
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the years to come.
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