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908 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
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Archive-name: ar-faq
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Last-modified: 95/Apr/29
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Version: ar_faq.txt 2.08a
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Animal Rights
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Frequently Asked Questions
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(AR FAQ)
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INTRODUCTION
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Welcome to the Animal Rights Frequently Asked Questions text (AR FAQ).
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This FAQ is intended to satisfy two basic goals: a) to provide a source
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of information and encouragement for people exploring the issues involved
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in the animal rights movement, and b) to answer the common questions and
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justifications offered up by AR opponents. It is unashamedly an advocacy
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vehicle for animal rights. Opponents of AR are invited to create a FAQ
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that codifies their views; we do not attempt to do so here.
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The FAQ restricts itself specifically to AR issues; nutrition and
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other vegetarian/veganism issues are intentionally avoided because they
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are already well covered in the existing vegetarianism and veganism FAQs
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maintained by Michael Traub. To obtain these FAQs, contact Michael at
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his e-mail address given below.
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The FAQ was created through a collaboration of authors. The answers have
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been attributed via initials, as follows:
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TA Ted Altar taltar@beaufort.sfu.ca
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JE Jonathan Esterhazy jester@cc.umanitoba.ca
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DG Donald Graft dgraft@gate.net
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JEH John Harrington jeh@bisoym.com
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DVH Dietrich Von Haugwitz vonha001@mc.duke.edu
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LJ Leor Jacobi leor@mellers1.psych.berkeley.edu
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LK Larry Kaiser lkaiser@umich.edu
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JK Jeremy Keens keens@pitvax.xx.rmit.edu.au
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BL Brian Luke luke@checkov.hm.udayton.edu
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PM Peggy Madison madison@alpha.acast.nova.edu
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BRO Brian Owen brian6@vaxc.middlesex.ac.uk
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JSD Janine Stanley-Dunham janine@wlb.hwwilson.com
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JLS Jennifer Stephens jlstephe@uncc.edu
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MT Michael Traub traub@btcs.bt.co.uk
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AECW Allen ECW aecw001@mayfair.demon.co.uk
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The current FAQ maintainer is Donald Graft (see address above). Ideas and
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criticisms are actively solicited and will be very gratefully received. The
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material included here is released to the public domain. We request that it
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be distributed without alteration to respect the author attributions.
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This FAQ contains 96 questions. If they are not all present, then a mailer
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has probably truncated it. Contact the FAQ maintainer for a set of split-up
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files.
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DG
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GENERAL
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-------
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#1 What is all this Animal Rights (AR) stuff and why should
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it concern me?
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The fundamental principle of the AR movement is that nonhuman animals
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deserve to live according to their own natures, free from harm, abuse, and
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exploitation. This goes further than just saying that we should treat
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animals well while we exploit them, or before we kill and eat them. It
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says animals have the RIGHT to be free from human cruelty and
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exploitation, just as humans possess this right. The withholding of this
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right from the nonhuman animals based on their species membership is
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referred to as "speciesism".
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Animal rights activists try to extend the human circle of respect and
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compassion beyond our species to include other animals, who are also
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capable of feeling pain, fear, hunger, thirst, loneliness, and kinship.
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When we try to do this, many of us come to the conclusion that we can no
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longer support factory farming, vivisection, and the exploitation of
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animals for entertainment. At the same time, there are still areas of
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debate among animal rights supporters, for example, whether ANY research
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that harms animals is ever justified, where the line should be drawn for
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enfranchising species with rights, on what occasions civil disobedience
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may be appropriate, etc. However, these areas of potential disagreement do
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not negate the abiding principles that join us: compassion and concern
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for the pain and suffering of nonhumans.
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One main goal of this FAQ is to address the common justifications that
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arise when we become aware of how systematically our society abuses and
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exploits animals. Such "justifications" help remove the burden from our
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consciences, but this FAQ attempts to show that they do not excuse the
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harm we cause other animals. Beyond the scope of this FAQ, more detailed
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arguments can be found in three classics of the AR literature.
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The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan (ISBN 0-520-05460-1)
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In Defense of Animals, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-06-097044-8)
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Animal Liberation, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-380-71333-0, 2nd Ed.)
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While appreciating the important contributions of Regan and Singer, many
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animal rights activists emphasize the role of empathetic caring as the
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actual and most appropriate fuel for the animal rights movement in
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contradistinction to Singer's and Regan's philosophical rationales. To the
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reader who says "Why should I care?", we can point out the following
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reasons:
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One cares about minimizing suffering.
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One cares about promoting compassion in human affairs.
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One is concerned about improving the health of humanity.
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One is concerned about human starvation and malnutrition.
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One wants to prevent the radical disruption of our planet's ecosystem.
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One wants to preserve animal species.
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One wants to preserve wilderness.
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The connections between these issues and the AR agenda may not be obvious.
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Please read on as we attempt to clarify this.
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DG
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The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those
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rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand
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of tyranny.
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Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)
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Life is life--whether in a cat, or dog or man. There is no difference
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there between a cat or a man. The idea of difference is a human
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conception for man's own advantage...
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Sri Aurobindo (poet and philosopher)
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Non-violence leads to the highest ethics, which is the goal of all
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evolution. Until we stop harming all other living beings, we are still
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savages.
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Thomas Edison (inventor)
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The time will come when men such as I will look upon the murder of
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animals as they now look on the murder of men.
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Leonardo Da Vinci (artist and scientist)
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SEE ALSO #2-#3, #26, #87-#91
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#2 Is the Animal Rights movement different from the Animal Welfare
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movement? The Animal Liberation movement?
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The Animal Welfare movement acknowledges the suffering of nonhumans and
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attempts to reduce that suffering through "humane" treatment, but it does
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not have as a goal elimination of the use and exploitation of animals. The
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Animal Rights movement goes significantly further by rejecting the
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exploitation of animals and according them rights in that regard. A person
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committed to animal welfare might be concerned that cows get enough space,
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proper food, etc., but would not necessarily have any qualms about killing
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and eating cows, so long as the rearing and slaughter are "humane".
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The Animal Welfare movement is represented by such organizations as the
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Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the Humane Society.
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Having said this, it should be realized that some hold a broader
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interpretation of the AR movement. They would argue that the AW groups do,
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in fact, support rights for animals (e.g., a dog has the right not to be
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kicked). Under this interpretation, AR is viewed as a broad umbrella
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covering the AW and strict AR groups. This interpretation has the advantage
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of moving AR closer to the mainstream. Nevertheless, there is a valid
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distinction between the AW and AR groups, as described in the first paragraph.
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Animal Liberation (AL) is, for many people, a synonym for Animal Rights
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(but see below). Some people prefer the term "liberation" because it brings
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to mind images of other successful liberation movements, such as the movement
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for liberation of slaves and liberation of women, whereas the term "rights"
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often encounters resistance when an attempt is made to apply it to nonhumans.
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The phrase "Animal Liberation" became popular with the publication of Peter
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Singer's classic book of the same name.
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This use of the term liberation should be distinguished from the literal
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meaning discussed in question #88, i.e., an Animal Liberationist is not
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necessarily one who engages in forceful civil disobedience or unlawful
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actions.
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Finally, intellectual honesty compels us to acknowledge that the account
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given here is rendered in broad strokes (but is at least approximately
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correct), and purposely avoids describing ongoing debate about the meaning
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of the terms "Animal Rights", "Animal Liberation", and "Animal Welfare",
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debate about the history of these movements, and debate about the actual
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positions of the prominent thinkers. To depict the flavor of such debates,
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the following text describes one coherent position. Naturally, it will be
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attacked from all sides!
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Some might suggest that a subtle distinction can be made between the Animal
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Liberation and Animal Rights movements. The Animal Rights movement, at least
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as propounded by Regan and his adherents, is said to require total abolition
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of such practices as experimentation on animals. The Animal Liberation
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movement, as propounded by Singer and his adherents, is said to reject the
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absolutist view and assert that in some cases, such experimentation can be
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morally defensible. Because such cases could also justify some experiments
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on humans, however, it is not clear that the distinction described reflects
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a difference between the liberation and rights views, so much as it does a
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broader difference of ethical theory, i.e., absolutism versus utilitarianism.
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DG
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Historically, animal welfare groups have attempted to improve the lot of
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animals in society. They worked against the popular Western concept of
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animals as lacking souls and not being at all worthy of any ethical
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consideration. The animal rights movement set itself up as an abolitionist
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alternative to the reform-minded animal welfarists. As the animal rights
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movement has become larger and more influential, the animal exploiters have
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finally been forced to respond to it. Perhaps inspired by the efforts of Tom
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Regan to distinguish AR from AW, industry groups intent on maintaining the
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status quo have embraced the term "animal welfare". Pro-vivisection,
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hunting, trapping, agribusiness, and animal entertainment groups now refer
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to themselves as "animal welfare" supporters. Several umbrella groups whose
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goal is to defend these practices have also arisen.
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This classic case of public-relations doublespeak acknowledges the issue
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of cruelty to animals in name only, while allowing for the continued use and
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abuse of animals. The propaganda effect is to stigmatize animal rights
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supporters as being extreme while attempting to portray themselves as the
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reasonable moderates. Nowadays, the cause of "animal welfare" is invoked by
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the animal industry at least as often as it is used by animal protection
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groups.
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LJ
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SEE ALSO: #1, #3, #87-#88
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#3 What exactly are rights and what rights can we give animals?
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Despite arguably being the foundation of the Western liberal tradition,
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the concept of "rights" has been a source of controversy and confusion
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in the debate over AR. A common objection to the notion that animals have
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rights involves questioning the origin of those rights. One such argument
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might proceed as follows:
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Where do these rights come from? Are you in special communication
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with God, and he has told you that animals have rights? Have the
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rights been granted by law? Aren't rights something that humans
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must grant?
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It is true that the concept of "rights" needs to be carefully explicated.
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It is also true that the concept of "natural rights" is fraught with
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philosophical difficulties. Complicating things further is the confusion
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between legal rights and moral rights.
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One attempt to avoid this objection is to accept it, but argue that
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if it is not an obstacle for thinking of humans as having rights, then it
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should not be an obstacle for thinking of animals as having rights. Henry
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Salt wrote:
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Have the lower animals "rights?" Undoubtedly--if men have. That is
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the point I wish to make evident in this opening chapter... The
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fitness of this nomenclature is disputed, but the existence of some
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real principle of the kind can hardly be called in question; so that
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the controversy concerning "rights" is little else than an academic
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battle over words, which leads to no practical conclusion. I shall
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assume, therefore, that men are possessed of "rights," in the sense
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of Herbert Spencer's definition; and if any of my readers object to
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this qualified use of the term, I can only say that I shall be
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perfectly willing to change the word as soon as a more appropriate
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one is forthcoming. The immediate question that claims our attention
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is this--if men have rights, have animals their rights also?
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Satisfying though this argument may be, it still leaves us unable to
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respond to the sceptic who disavows the notion of rights even for humans.
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Fortunately, however, there is a straightforward interpretation of
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"rights" that is plausible and allows us to avoid the controversial
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rights rhetoric and underpinnings. It is the notion that a "right" is the
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flip side of a moral imperative. If, ethically, we must
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refrain from an act performed on a being, then that being can be said to
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have a "right" that the act not be performed. For example, if our ethics
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tells us that we must not kill another, then the other has a right not to
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be killed by us. This interpretation of rights is, in fact, an intuitive
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one that people both understand and readily endorse. (Of course, rights so
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interpreted can be codified as legal rights through appropriate
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legislation.)
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It is important to realize that, although there is a basis for speaking
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of animals as having rights, that does not imply or require that they
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possess all the rights that humans possess, or even that humans possess all
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the rights that animals possess. Consider the human right to vote. (On the
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view taken here, this would derive from an ethical imperative to give humans
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influence over actions that influence their lives.) Since animals lack the
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capacity to rationally consider actions and their implications, and to
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understand the concept of democracy and voting, they lack the capacity to
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vote. There is, therefore, no ethical imperative to allow them to do so,
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and thus they do not possess the right to vote.
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Similarly, some fowls have a strong biological need to extend and flap
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their wings; right-thinking people feel an ethical imperative to make
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it possible for them to do so. Thus, it can be said that fowl have the right
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to flap their wings. Obviously, such a right need not be extended to humans.
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The rights that animals and humans possess, then, are determined by their
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interests and capacities. Animals have an interest in living, avoiding pain,
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and even in pursuing happiness (as do humans). As a result of the ethical
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imperatives, they have rights to these things (as do humans). They can
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exercise these rights by living their lives free of exploitation and
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abuse at the hands of humans.
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DG
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SEE ALSO: #1-#2
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#4 Isn't AR hypocritical, e.g., because you don't give rights to
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insects or plants?
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The general hypocrisy argument appears in many forms. A typical form
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is as follows:
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"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a cow but not for a plant;
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therefore, cows cannot have rights."
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Arguments of this type are frequently used against AR. Not much
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analysis is required to see that they carry little weight. First, one
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can assert an hypothesis A that would carry as a corollary hypothesis
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B. If one then fails to assert B, one is hypocritical, but this does
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not necessarily make A false. Certainly, to assert A and not B would
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call into question one's credibility, but it entails nothing about the
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validity of A.
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Second, the factual assertion of hypocrisy is often unwarranted. In
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the above example, there are grounds for distinguishing between cows
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and plants (plants do not have a central nervous system), so the charge
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of hypocrisy is unjustified. One may disagree with the criteria, but
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assertion of such criteria nullifies the charge of hypocrisy.
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Finally, the charge of hypocrisy can be reduced in most cases to
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simple speciesism. For example, the quote above can be recast as:
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"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a human but not for a plant;
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therefore, humans cannot have rights."
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To escape from this reductio ad absurdum of the first quote, one
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must produce a crucial relevant difference between cows and humans,
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in other words, one must justify the speciesist assignment of rights
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to humans but not to cows. (In question #24, we apply a similar reduction
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to the charge of hypocrisy related to abortion. For questions dealing
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specifically with insects and plants, refer to questions #39 through #46.)
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Finally, we must ask ourselves who the real hypocrites are. The following
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quotation from Michael W. Fox describes the grossly hypocritical treatment
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of exploited versus companion animals.
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DG
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Farm animals can be kept five to a cage two feet square, tied up
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constantly by a two-foot-long tether, castrated without anesthesia, or
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branded with a hot iron. A pet owner would be no less than prosecuted for
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treating a companion animal in such a manner; an American president was, in
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fact, morally censured merely for pulling the ears of his two beagles.
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Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)
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SEE ALSO: #24, #39-#46
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#5 What right do AR people have to impose their beliefs on others?
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There is a not-so-subtle distinction between imposition of one's views
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and advertising them. AR supporters are certainly not imposing their views
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in the sense that, say, the Spanish Inquisition imposed its views, or the
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Church imposed its views on Galileo. We do, however, feel a moral duty to
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present our case to the public, and often to our friends and acquaintances.
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There is ample precedent for this: protests against slavery, protests
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against the Vietnam War, condemnation of racism, etc.
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One might point out that the gravest imposition is that of the exploiter
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of animals upon his innocent and defenseless victims.
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DG
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If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what
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they do not want to hear.
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George Orwell (author)
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I never give them hell. I just tell the truth and they think it's hell.
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Harry S. Truman (33rd U.S. President)
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SEE ALSO: #11, #87-#91
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#6 Isn't AR just another facet of political correctness?
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If only that were true! The term "politically correct" generally refers
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to a view that is in sync with the societal mainstream but which some might
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be inclined to disagree with. For example, some people might be inclined
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to dismiss equal treatment for the races as mere "political correctness".
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The AR agenda is, currently, far from being a mainstream idea.
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Also, it is ridiculous to suppose that a view's validity can be
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overturned simply by attaching the label "politically correct" or
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"politically incorrect".
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DG
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#7 Isn't AR just another religion?
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No. The dictionary defines "religion" as the appeal to a supernatural
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power. (An alternate definition refers to devotion to a cause; that is
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a virtue that the AR movement would be happy to avow.)
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People who support Animal Rights come from many different religions
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and many different philosophies. What they share is a belief in the
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importance of showing compassion for other individuals, whether
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human or nonhuman.
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LK
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#8 Doesn't it demean humans to give rights to animals?
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A tongue-in-cheek, though valid, answer to this question is given by
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David Cowles-Hamar: "Humans are animals, so animal rights are human rights!"
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In a more serious vein, we can observe that giving rights to women and
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black people does not demean white males. By analogy, then, giving rights to
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nonhumans does not demean humans. If anything, by being morally consistent,
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and widening the circle of compassion to deserving nonhumans, we ennoble
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humans. (Refer to question #26 for other relevant arguments.)
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DG
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The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way
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its animals are treated.
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Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)
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It is man's sympathy with all creatures that first makes him truly a man.
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Albert Schweitzer (statesman, Nobel 1952)
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For as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other. Indeed, he
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who sows the seed of murder and pain cannot reap joy and love.
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Pythagoras (mathematician)
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SEE ALSO: #26
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#9 Weren't Hitler and Goebbels in favor of animal rights?
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-----------------------
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This argument is absurd and almost unworthy of serious consideration.
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The questioner implies that since Hitler and Goebbels allegedly held views
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supportive of animal rights (e.g., Hitler was a vegetarian for some time),
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the animal rights viewpoint must be wrong or dubious.
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The problem for this argument is simple: bad people and good people can
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both believe things correctly. Or put in another way, just because a person
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holds one bad belief (e.g., Nazism), that doesn't make all his beliefs
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wrong. A few examples suffice to illustrate this. The Nazis undertook smoking
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reduction campaigns. Is it therefore dubious to discourage smoking?
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Early Americans withheld respect and liberty for black people. Does that
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mean that they were wrong in giving respect and liberty to others?
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Technically, this argument is an "ignoratio elenchus fallacy", arguing
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from irrelevance.
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Finally, many scholars are doubtful that Hitler and Goebbels supported
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AR in any meaningful way.
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DG
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SEE ALSO: #54
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#10 Do you really believe that "a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy"?
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Taken alone and literally, this notion is absurd. However, this
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quote has been shamelessly removed from its original context and
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misrepresented by AR opponents. The original context of the quote is
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given below. Viewed within its context, it is clear that the quote
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is neither remarkable nor absurd.
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DG
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When it comes to having a central nervous system, and the ability to
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feel pain, hunger, and thirst, a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy.
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Ingrid Newkirk (AR activist)
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|
|
SEE ALSO: #47
|
|
|
|
--------------------
|
|
ANIMALS AND MORALITY
|
|
--------------------
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#11 There is no correct or incorrect in morals; you have yours and I
|
|
have mine, right?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
This position, known as moral relativism, is quite ancient but became
|
|
fashionable at the turn of the century, as reports on the customs of
|
|
societies alien to those found in Europe became available. It fell out of
|
|
fashion, after the Second World War, although it is occasionally revived.
|
|
Ethical propositions, we are asked to believe, are no more than statements
|
|
of personal opinion and, therefore, cannot carry absolute weight.
|
|
The main problem with this position is that ethical relativists are
|
|
unable to denounce execrable ethical practices, such as racism. On what
|
|
grounds can they condemn (if at all) Hitler's ideas on racial purity?
|
|
Are we to believe that he was uttering an ethical truth when advocating
|
|
the Final Solution?
|
|
In addition to the inability to denounce practices of other societies,
|
|
the relativists are unable to counter the arguments of even those whose
|
|
society they share. They cannot berate someone who proposes to raise
|
|
and kill infants for industrial pet food consumption, for example,
|
|
if that person sees it as morally sound. Indeed, they cannot articulate
|
|
the concept of societal moral progress, since they lack a basis for
|
|
judging progress. There is no point in turning to the relativists for
|
|
advice on ethical issues such as euthanasia, infanticide, or the use of
|
|
fetuses in research.
|
|
Faced with such arguments, ethical relativists sometimes argue that
|
|
ethical truth is based on the beliefs of a society; ethical truth is
|
|
seen as nothing more than a reflection of societal customs and habits.
|
|
Butchering animals is acceptable in the West, they would say, because
|
|
the majority of people think it so.
|
|
They are on no firmer ground here. Are we to accept that chattel
|
|
slavery was right before the US Civil War and wrong thereafter? Can all
|
|
ethical decisions be decided by conducting opinion polls?
|
|
It is true that different societies have different practices that
|
|
might be seen as ethical by one and unethical by the other. However,
|
|
these differences result from differing circumstances. For example, in
|
|
a society where mere survival is key, the diversion of limited food to
|
|
an infant could detract significantly from the well-being of the
|
|
existing family members that contribute to food gathering. Given that,
|
|
infanticide may be the ethically correct course.
|
|
The conclusion is that there is such a thing as ethical truth
|
|
(otherwise, ethics becomes vacuous and devoid of proscriptive force).
|
|
The continuity of thought, then, between those who reject the evils of
|
|
slavery, racial discrimination, and gender bias, and those who denounce
|
|
the evils of speciesism becomes striking.
|
|
AECW
|
|
|
|
Many AR advocates (including myself) believe that morality is relative.
|
|
We believe that AR is much more cogently argued when it is argued from the
|
|
standpoint of your opponent's morality, not some mythical, hard-to-define
|
|
universal morality. In arguing against moral absolutism, there is a very
|
|
simple objection: Where does this absolute morality come from? Moral
|
|
absolutism is an argument from authority, a tautology. If there were such
|
|
a thing as "ethical truth", then there must be a way of determining it, and
|
|
obviously there isn't. In the absence of a known proof of "ethical truth",
|
|
I don't know how AECW can conclude it exists.
|
|
An example of the method of leveraging a person's morality is to ask the
|
|
person why he has compassion for human beings. Almost always he will agree
|
|
that his compassion does not stem from the fact that: 1) humans use language,
|
|
2) humans compose symphonies, 3) humans can plan in the far future, 4) humans
|
|
have a written, technological culture, etc. Instead, he will agree that it
|
|
stems from the fact that humans can suffer, feel pain, be harmed, etc. It is
|
|
then quite easy to show that nonhuman animals can also suffer, feel pain, be
|
|
harmed, etc. The person's arbitrary inconsistency in not according moral
|
|
status to nonhumans then stands out starkly.
|
|
JEH
|
|
|
|
There is a middle ground between the positions of AECW and JEH. One can
|
|
assert that just as mathematics is necessarily built upon a set of
|
|
unprovable axioms, so is a system of ethics. At the foundation of a system
|
|
of ethics are moral axioms, such as "unnecessary pain is wrong". Given
|
|
the set of axioms, methods of reasoning (such as deduction and induction),
|
|
and empirical facts, it is possible to derive ethical hypotheses. It is
|
|
in this sense that an ethical statement can be said to be true. Of course,
|
|
one can disagree about the axioms, and certainly such disagreement renders
|
|
ethics "relative", but the concept of ethical truth is not meaningless.
|
|
Fortunately, the most fundamental ethical axioms seem to be nearly
|
|
universally accepted, usually because they are necessary for societies to
|
|
function. Where differences exist, they can be elucidated and discussed,
|
|
in a style similar to the "leveraging" described by JEH.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
To a man whose mind is free there is something even more intolerable
|
|
in the sufferings of animals than in the sufferings of man. For with the
|
|
latter it is at least admitted that suffering is evil and that the man
|
|
who causes it is a criminal. But thousands of animals are uselessly
|
|
butchered every day without a shadow of remorse. If any man were to
|
|
refer to it, he would be thought ridiculous. And that is the unpardonable
|
|
crime.
|
|
Romain Rolland (author, Nobel 1915)
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #5
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#12 The animals are raised to be eaten; so what is wrong with that?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
This question has always seemed to me to be a fancy version of "But
|
|
we want to do these things, so what is wrong with that?" The idea that
|
|
an act, by virtue of an intention of ours, can be exonerated morally is
|
|
totally illogical.
|
|
But worse than that, however, is the fact that such a belief is a
|
|
dangerous position to take because it can enable one to justify some
|
|
practices that are universally condemned. To see how this is so,
|
|
consider the following restatement of the basis of the question:
|
|
"Suffering can be excused so long as we breed them for the purpose."
|
|
Now, cannot an analogous argument be used to defend a group of
|
|
slave holders who breed and enslave humans and justify it by saying "but
|
|
they're bred to be our workers"? Could not the Nazis defend their
|
|
murder of the Jews by saying "but we rounded them up to be killed"?
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
Shame on such a morality that is worthy of pariahs, and that fails to
|
|
recognize the eternal essence that exists in every living thing, and
|
|
shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that see
|
|
the sun!
|
|
Arthur Schopenhauer (philosopher)
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #13, #61
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#13 But isn't it true that the animals wouldn't exist if we didn't raise
|
|
them for slaughter?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner
|
|
may be referring to "the animals" as a species, in which case the argument
|
|
might be more accurately phrased as follows:
|
|
|
|
"The ecological niche of cows is to be farmed; they get continued
|
|
survival in this niche in return for our using them."
|
|
|
|
Second, the questioner may be referring to "the animals" as individuals,
|
|
in which case the phrasing might be:
|
|
|
|
"The individual cows that we raise to eat would not have had a
|
|
life had we not done so."
|
|
|
|
We deal first with the species interpretation and then with the
|
|
individuals interpretation. The questioner's argument applies
|
|
presumably to all species of animals; to make things more concrete,
|
|
we will take cows as an example in the following text.
|
|
It is incorrect to assert that cows could continue to exist only if
|
|
we farm them for human consumption. First, today in many parts of India
|
|
and elsewhere, humans and cows are engaged in a reciprocal and reverential
|
|
relationship. It is only in recent human history that this relationship
|
|
has been corrupted into the one-sided exploitation that we see today.
|
|
There IS a niche for cows between slaughter/consumption and extinction.
|
|
(The interested reader may find the book Beyond Beef by Jeremy Rifkin
|
|
quite enlightening on this subject.)
|
|
Second, several organizations have programs for saving animals
|
|
from extinction. There is no reason to suppose that cows would not
|
|
qualify.
|
|
The species argument is also flawed because, in fact, our intensive
|
|
farming of cattle results in habitat destruction and the loss of other
|
|
species. For example, clearing of rain forests for pasture has led to
|
|
the extinction of countless species. Cattle farming is destroying
|
|
habitats on six continents. Why is the questioner so concerned about
|
|
the cow species while being unconcerned about these other species?
|
|
Could it have anything to do with the fact that he wants to continue
|
|
to eat the cows?
|
|
Finally, a strong case can be made against the species argument from
|
|
ethical theory. Arguments similar to the questioner's could be
|
|
developed that would ask us to accept practices that are universally
|
|
condemned. For example, consider a society that breeds a special race
|
|
of humans for use as slaves. They argue that the race would not exist
|
|
if they did not breed them for use as slaves. Does the reader accept
|
|
this justification?
|
|
Now we move on to the individuals interpretation of the question. One
|
|
attempt to refute the argument is to answer as follows:
|
|
|
|
"It is better not to be born than to be born into a life of
|
|
misery and early death."
|
|
|
|
To many, this is sufficient. However, one could argue that the fact that the
|
|
life is miserable before death is not necessary. Suppose that the cows are
|
|
treated well before being killed painlessly and eaten. Is it not true that
|
|
the individual cows would not have enjoyed their short life had we not
|
|
raised them for consumption? Furthermore, what if we compensate the taking
|
|
of the life by bringing a new life into being?
|
|
Peter Singer originally believed that this argument was absurd because
|
|
there are no cow souls waiting around to be born. Many people accept this
|
|
view and consider it sufficient, but Singer now rejects it because he accepts
|
|
that to bring a being to a pleasant life does confer a benefit on that being.
|
|
(There is extensive discussion of this issue in the second edition of Animal
|
|
Liberation.) How then are we to proceed?
|
|
The key is that the AR movement asserts that humans and nonhumans have a
|
|
right to not be killed by humans. The ethical problem can be seen clearly
|
|
by applying the argument to humans. Consider the case of a couple that gives
|
|
birth to an infant and eats it at the age of nine months, just when their
|
|
next infant is born. A 9-month old baby has no more rational knowledge of
|
|
its situation or future plans than does a cow, so there is no reason to
|
|
distinguish the two cases. Yet, certainly, we would condemn the couple. We
|
|
condemn them because the infant is an individual to whom we confer the right
|
|
not to be killed. Why is this right not accorded to the cow? I think the
|
|
answer is that the questioner wants to eat it.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
It were much better that a sentient being should never have existed,
|
|
than that it should have existed only to endure unmitigated misery.
|
|
Percy Bysshe Shelley (poet)
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #12
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#14 Don't the animals we use have a happier life since they are fed and
|
|
protected?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
The questioner makes two assumptions here. First, that happiness or
|
|
contentment accrues from being fed and protected, and second, that
|
|
the animals are, in fact, fed and protected. Both of these premises can
|
|
be questioned.
|
|
Certainly the animals are fed; after all, they must be fattened for
|
|
consumption. It is very difficult to see any way that, say,
|
|
factory-farmed chickens are "protected". They are not protected from
|
|
mutilation, because they are painfully debeaked. They are not protected
|
|
from psychological distress, because they are crowded together in
|
|
unnatural conditions. And finally, they are not protected from predation,
|
|
because they are slaughtered and eaten by humans.
|
|
We can also question the notion that happiness accrues from feeding
|
|
and protection alone. The Roman galley slaves were fed and protected
|
|
from the elements; nevertheless, they would presumably trade their
|
|
condition for one of greater uncertainty to obtain happiness. The same
|
|
can be said of the slaves of earlier America.
|
|
Finally, an ethical argument is relevant here. Consider again the
|
|
couple of question #13. They will feed and protect their infant up to
|
|
the point at which they consume it. We would not accept this as a
|
|
justification. Why should we accept it for the chicken?
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #13
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#15 Is the use of service animals and beasts of burden considered
|
|
exploitative?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
A simple approach to this question might be to suggest that we all must
|
|
work for a living and it should be no different for animals. The problem is
|
|
that we want to look at the animals as like children, i.e., worthy of the
|
|
same protections and rights, and, like them, incapable of being morally
|
|
responsible. But we don't force children into labor! One can make a
|
|
distinction, however, that goes something like this: The animals are
|
|
permanently in their diminished state (i.e., incapable of voluntarily
|
|
assenting to work); children are not. We do not impose a choice of work for
|
|
children because they need the time to develop into their full adult and
|
|
moral selves. With the animals, we choose for them a role that allows them
|
|
to contribute; in return, we do not abuse them by eating them, etc. If this
|
|
is done with true concern that their work conditions are appropriate and not
|
|
of a sweat-shop nature, that they get enough rest and leisure time, etc.,
|
|
this would constitute a form of stewardship that is acceptable and beneficial
|
|
to both sides, and one that is not at odds with AR philosophy.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#16 Doesn't the Bible give Humanity dominion over the animals?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
It is true that the Bible contains a passage that confers on humanity
|
|
dominion over the animals. The import of this fact derives from the
|
|
assumption that the Bible is the word of God, and that God is the ultimate
|
|
moral authority. Leaving aside for the moment consideration of the meaning
|
|
of dominion, we can take issue with the idea of seeking moral authority from
|
|
the Bible. First, there are serious problems with the interpretation of
|
|
Biblical passages, with many verses contradicting one another, and with
|
|
many scholars differing dramatically over the meaning of given verses.
|
|
Second, there are many claims to God-hood among the diverse cultures of
|
|
this world; some of these Gods implore us to respect all life and to not
|
|
kill unnecessarily. Whose God are we to take as the ultimate moral
|
|
authority?
|
|
Finally, as Tom Regan observes, many people do not believe in a God and
|
|
so appeals to His moral authority are empty for such people. For such
|
|
people, the validity of judgments of the supposed God must be cross-checked
|
|
with other methods of determining reasonableness. What are the cross-checks
|
|
for the Biblical assertions?
|
|
These remarks apply equally to other assertions of Biblical approval of
|
|
human practices (such as the consumption of animals).
|
|
Even if we accept that the God of the Bible is a moral authority, we
|
|
can point out that "dominion" is a vague term, meaning "stewardship" or
|
|
"control over". It is quite easy to argue that appropriate stewardship
|
|
or control consists of respecting the life of animals and their right
|
|
to live according to their own nature. The jump from dominion to approval
|
|
of our brutal exploitation of animals is not contained in the cited
|
|
Biblical passage, either explicitly or implicitly.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#17 Morals are a purely human construction (animals don't understand
|
|
morals); doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality
|
|
to animals?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
The fallaciousness of this argument can be easily demonstrated by making
|
|
a simple substitution: Infants and young children don't understand morals,
|
|
doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality to them? Of course
|
|
not. We refrain from harming infants and children for the same reasons that
|
|
we do so for adults. That they are incapable of conceptualizing a system of
|
|
morals and its benefits is irrelevant.
|
|
The relevant distinction is formalized in the concept of "moral agents"
|
|
versus "moral patients". A moral agent is an individual possessing the
|
|
sophisticated conceptual ability to bring moral principles to bear in
|
|
deciding what to do, and having made such a decision, having the free will
|
|
to choose to act that way. By virtue of these abilities, it is fair to hold
|
|
moral agents accountable for their acts. The paradigmatic moral agent is the
|
|
normal adult human being.
|
|
Moral patients, in contrast, lack the capacities of moral agents and thus
|
|
cannot fairly be held accountable for their acts. They do, however, possess
|
|
the capacity to suffer harm and therefore are proper objects of consideration
|
|
for moral agents. Human infants, young children, the mentally deficient or
|
|
deranged, and nonhuman animals are instances of moral patienthood.
|
|
Given that nonhuman animals are moral patients, they fall within the
|
|
purview of moral consideration, and therefore it is quite rational to accord
|
|
them the same moral consideration that we accord to ourselves.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #19, #23, #36
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#18 If AR people are so worried about killing, why don't they become
|
|
fruitarians?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
Killing, per se, is not the central concern of AR philosophy, which is
|
|
concerned with the avoidance of unnecessary pain and suffering. Thus, because
|
|
plants neither feel pain nor suffer, AR philosophy does not mandate
|
|
fruitarianism (a diet in which only fruits are eaten because they can be
|
|
harvested without killing the plant from which they issue).
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #42-#46
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#19 Animals don't care about us; why should we care about them?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
The questioner's position--that, in essence, we should give rights only
|
|
to those able to respect ours--is known as the reciprocity argument. It is
|
|
unconvincing both as an account of the way our society works and as a
|
|
prescription for the way it should work.
|
|
Its descriptive power is undermined by the simple observation that we
|
|
give rights to a large number of individuals who cannot respect ours.
|
|
These include some elderly people, some people suffering from degenerative
|
|
diseases, some people suffering from irreversible brain damage, the
|
|
severely retarded, infants, and young children. An institution that, for
|
|
example, routinely sacrificed such individuals to test a new fertilizer
|
|
would certainly be considered to be grievously violating their rights.
|
|
The original statement fares no better as an ethical prescription.
|
|
Future generations are unable to reciprocate our concern, for example, so
|
|
there would be no ethical harm done, under such a view, in dismissing
|
|
concerns for environmental damage that adversely impacts future
|
|
generations.
|
|
The key failing of the questioner's position lies in the failure to
|
|
properly distinguish between the following capacities:
|
|
|
|
The capacity to understand and respect others' rights (moral agency).
|
|
The capacity to benefit from rights (moral patienthood).
|
|
|
|
An individual can be a beneficiary of rights without being a moral
|
|
agent. Under this view, one justifies a difference of treatments of two
|
|
individuals (human or nonhuman) with an objective difference that is
|
|
RELEVANT to the difference of treatment. For example, if we wished to
|
|
exclude a person from an academic course of study, we could not cite the
|
|
fact that they have freckles. We could cite the fact that they lack
|
|
certain academic prerequisites. The former is irrelevant; the latter is
|
|
relevant. Similarly, when considering the right to be free of pain and
|
|
suffering, moral agency is irrelevant; moral patienthood IS relevant.
|
|
AECW
|
|
|
|
The assumption that animals don't care about us can also be
|
|
questioned. Companion animals have been known to summon aid when
|
|
their owners are in trouble. They have been known to offer comfort
|
|
when their owners are distressed. They show grief when their human
|
|
companions die.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO: #17, #23, #36
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#20 A house is on fire and a dog and a baby are inside. Which do you
|
|
save first?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
The one I choose to save first tells us nothing about the ethical
|
|
decisions we face. I might decide to save my child before I saved yours,
|
|
but this certainly does not mean that I should be able to experiment on
|
|
your child, or exploit your child in some other way. We are not in an
|
|
emergency situation like a fire anyway. In everyday life, we can choose to
|
|
act in ways that protect the rights of both dogs and babies.
|
|
LK
|
|
|
|
Like anyone else in this situation, I would probably save the one to
|
|
which I am emotionally more attached. Most likely it would be the child.
|
|
Someone might prefer to save his own beloved dog before saving the baby
|
|
of a stranger. However, as LK states above, this tells us nothing about
|
|
any ethical principles.
|
|
DVH
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#21 What if I made use of an animal that was already dead?
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner
|
|
might really be making the excuse "but I didn't kill the animal", or
|
|
second, he could be asking about the morality of using an animal that
|
|
has died naturally (or due to a cause unassociated with the demand for
|
|
animal products, such as a road kill). For the first interpretation, we
|
|
must reject the excuse. The killing of animals for meat, for example,
|
|
is done at the request (through market demand), and with the financial
|
|
support (through payment), of the end consumers. Their complicity is
|
|
inescapable. Society does not excuse the receiver of stolen goods because
|
|
he "didn't do the burglary".
|
|
For the second interpretation, the use of naturally killed animals,
|
|
there seems to be no moral difficulty involved. Many would, for esthetic
|
|
reasons, still not use animal products thus obtained. (Would you use the
|
|
bodies of departed humans?) Certainly, natural kills cannot satisfy the
|
|
great demand for animal products that exists today; non-animal and
|
|
synthetic sources are required.
|
|
Other people may avoid use of naturally killed animal products because
|
|
they feel that it might encourage a demand in others for animal products,
|
|
a demand that might not be so innocently satisfied.
|
|
DG
|
|
|
|
This can be viewed as a question of respect for the dead. We feel
|
|
innate revulsion at the idea of grave desecration for this reason.
|
|
Naturally killed animals should, at the very least, be left alone rather
|
|
than recycled as part of an industrial process. This was commonly
|
|
practiced in the past, e.g., Egyptians used to mummify their cats.
|
|
AECW
|
|
|
|
You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughterhouse is
|
|
concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity.
|
|
Ralph Waldo Emerson (author)
|
|
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
#22 Where should one draw the line: animals, insects, bacteria?
|
|
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AR philosophy asserts that rights are to be accorded to creatures that
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have the capacity to experience pain, to suffer, and to be a "subject of
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a life". Such a capacity is definitely not found in bacteria. It is
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definitely found in mammals. There is debate about such animals as molluscs
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and arthropods (including insects). One should decide, based upon available
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evidence and one's own conscience, where the line should be drawn to adhere
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to the principle of AR described in the first sentence.
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Questions #39 and #43 discuss some of the evidence relevant to drawing
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the line.
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DG
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SEE ALSO: #39, #43
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