65 lines
3.1 KiB
Plaintext
65 lines
3.1 KiB
Plaintext
SHAME, KHADAFY! NAUGHTY!
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President Reagan invoked economic sanctions on Libya last week because of its
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reputation for harboring terrorist camps and antipathy to civilized
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intercourse.
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While giving his prepared statement, Mr. Reagan proved he can still act; he
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scared the daylights out of many Americans as he led up to his announcement of
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economic sanctions--instead of which our ears were prepared to hear a solemn
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declaration of war.
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But what of it? The press quickly seized upon the fact that economic sanctions
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by the U.S. alone will hardly cause Khadafy to break his stride toward utter
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chaos in the Mediterranean basin.
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What's a poor president to do?
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Mention has been made of assassination. The CIA, no doubt, is ready to take a
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healthy swing at Khadafy, given authorization. Given no authorization, the CIA
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has probably bungled several attempts already.
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Mention has also been made of rallying our European allies--which should more
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correctly be stated, 'European acquaintances,' given the European community's
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record of alliance with U.S. actions since WWII--to invoke similar economic
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sanctions. Were it possible, such a course would definitely damage Libya;
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unfortunately, possible it is not.
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Subversion of Khadafy's regime might be a good ploy. Probably, though, the
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patsies in the State Department have spent seven sleepless nights coming up
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with reasons why subversion would occlude the chances of a rapprochement with
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the Soviets.
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We, from our vinyl armchairs so solidly rooted to the carpet in front of our
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television sets, recommend a completely different approach to the problem of
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Libya. (It is the same approach as our solution to the problem of the Soviet
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Union, by the way, in case it sounds familiar.)
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What?
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Oh, we think Khadafy's Libya should be disarmed, dispirited and put into a
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state of disarray by means of socio-cultural weapons, of which we have an
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incredible arsenal, easily deployed.
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We should defame Khadafy with videotapes of aerobic workouts, Rambo films, new
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sofa sleepers, walk around stereos, under the counter coffee makers, golden
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oldies and broadcasts of "The Cosby Show."
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Khadafy's regime would buckle in six weeks under such an onslaught of the best
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mediocrity America can muster; in ten weeks with average doses of pop culture.
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Khadafy can handle assassinations, missiles, fleets sailing nearby and
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political threats. What Khadafy could never handle would be wave upon wave of
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Care Bears, music videos, campaigns for anti-plaque toothpaste, chocolate chip
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cookies and gourmet ice cream. He'd surrender under a deluge of commercialism.
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It's a course of action we highly recommend. It is indefensible; no other
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country in the world save Japan and, maybe Taiwan, can compete with the
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firepower of American advertising. Khadafy's people would forget his ugly face
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quicker than he could say, "Anti-imperialism."
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The only problem with this is what may happen in ten years or so--Libyans might
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prove such quick studies in commercialism that we'd have to enact protectionist
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measures to keep them from putting Americans out of business.
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