539 lines
22 KiB
Plaintext
539 lines
22 KiB
Plaintext
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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- Uijt gjmf jt cspvhiu up zpv dpusuftz pg uif D)sbdljoh -
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- -
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- J)otujuvuf pf B)nfsjdb. Tqfdjbm uibolt up uif Fmwfo -
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- -
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- Ijhimpse & uif Topnbo -
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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- Secret Radio Frequencies -
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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Sandwiched into the gap between the AM and FM dials are
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hundreds of secret communications frequencies - some so
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secret that no one owns up to them. The usual consumer gear -
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AM/FM radios, TVs, CB radios - brings in only a small
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portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. To pick up the
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secret signals, you need a shortwave receiver - and you need
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to know the unlisted frequencies.
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Allocation of radio frequencies is quirky. When you flip
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the TV dial from channel 6 to channel 7, you unknowingly jump
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over the entire FM radio band as well as such exotia as
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secret service communications and a special frequency
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designated for emergency use during prison riots. The U.S.
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government will provide information on unclassified
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allocations (those for the Coast Guard, Forestry Service,
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weather reports, etc.). But it is quiet about secret
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government frequencies and those of mysterious illegal
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broadcasters here and abroad.
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Many shortwave-radio hobbyists keep track of the secret
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frequiences, however. Their findings appear in such
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publications as the "Confidential Frequency List" by Oliver
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P. Ferrell (Park Ridge, N.J.: Gilfer Associates, 1982
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[periodically updated]), "How to Tune in the Secret Shortwave
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Spectrum" by Harry L. Helms (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: TAB
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Books, 1981), and "The 'Top Secret' Registry of U.S.
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Government Radio Frequencies" by Tom Kneitel (Commack, N.Y.:
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CRB Research, 1981 [periodically updated]). These and similar
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publications should be consulted for the most up-to-date
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listings. The selection below includes only the most
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noteworthy or inexplicable broadcasts.
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Air Force One
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Many of the in-flight phone calls from Air Force One are
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not scrambled and can be picked up by anyone with a shortwave
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radio. You just have to watch the newspapers for information
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on the presidents travels and listen to the right frequencies
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shortly before landing or after takeoff at Andrews Air Force
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Base (when calls are less likely to be scrambled
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electronically). A presidential phone call is usually
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prefaced by a request for "Crown", the White House
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communications center.
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Air Force One uses several frequencies including those
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assigned to Andrews Air Force Base. Transmissions are on
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single, usually upper, sideband. These transmissions are
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usually secret, but the frequency numbers have long since
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leaked out or have been discovered independently. It is
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suspected that wire services and TV news operations monitor
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them for leads. The reported frequencies (in kilohertz) are:
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6731 13201
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6756 13215
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8967 13247
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9018 15048
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11180 18027
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In addition, 162.685 MHz and 171.235 MHz are secret service
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frequencies used for Air Force One communications. The White
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House staff uses 162.850 MHz and 167.825 MHz. Secret Service
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channel "Oscar", 164.885 MHz, is used for the Presidents
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limousine. Air Force Two uses the same Frequencies as Air
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Force One.
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Although everyone concerned must know that outsiders may
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be eavesdropping, conversations are often surprisingly
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candid. (shortwave listeners heard the White House staff
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urging Air Force Two back to Washington after the 1981
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attempt on President Regan's life, complete with reports that
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then-secretary of state Alexander Haig was confusing
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everybody with his claim of being "in control.") No law seems
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to forbid such eavesdropping. Ironically, it is illegal
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(section 605 of the communications act of 1934) to reveal
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itercepted conversations to anyone else - that being regarded
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as the wireless equivalent to wiretapping. Even so, The New
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York Times has run snippets of Air Force One conversations.
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The Central Intelligence Agency
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The CIA and Other Government agencies with clandestine
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operations are believed to have dozens of authorized
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frequencies, which may be rotated as needed to throw off
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eavesdroppers off the track. Call letters are rarely used and
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several government agencies may share the same frequencies. A
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further, rather thin veneer of security comes from the use of
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code words. Government surveillance opperations use a common
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code: "Our friend" or "Our boy" is, of course, the person
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being followed. "O" is his office. "R" is his residence. A
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"Boat" is his car. Once apprehended a suspect is a "Package"
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and may be taken away to the "Kennel", the agents'
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headquarters. Does this fool anyone? Probably not. Some are
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so obvious that it's questionable if they're code words at
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all.
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Not all U.S. government broadcasts can be identified as
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to agency. Conversations are cryptic; letters to the Federal
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Communications Commission and Commerce Department bring form
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replys. These frequencies (in megahertz) have been identified
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with the CIA:
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163.81
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165.01
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165.11
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165.385
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408.60
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DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration (MHz)
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FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation (MHz)
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SS - Secret Service (MHz)
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DEA FBI SS
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--- --- --
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163.185 120.425 162.375 (note that
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163.535 149.375 162.685 the frequencys are
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165.235 163.835 164.885 usually in bands.
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172.00 163.875 165.025 Search each band
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172.20 163.985 165.085 for more.)
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418.625 167.675 166.405
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418.675 168.885 169.625
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418.725 406.275 168.45
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418.825 408.925 169.925
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418.975 419.525 171.235
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Morse Code Letter Beacons
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Dozens of low-power stations transmit only a letter of
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Morse code endlessly. No one, including government agencies
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and the International Telecommunications Union, admits to
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knowing where the signals are coming from, who is sending
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them, or why.
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"K" (dash-dot-dash) is the most common letter. Letters
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are repeated every two to five seconds, depending on the
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station. The stations never identify themselves. The
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frequency used for the broadcast shifts slowly with time, so
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this list is only an approximate guide:
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Frequency (KHz) Letter
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--------------- ------
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4,005 K
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4,466 U
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5,306 D and W
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5,307 F
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5,795 K
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5,890 K
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5,920 K
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6,203 P
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6,770 A and N
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6,800 F and K
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6,806 Q
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7,590 W
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7,656 W
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7,954 K
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8,137 U
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8,144 K
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8,647 F
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8,703 E
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8,752 K
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9,043 K
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9,058 U
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10,211 U
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10,442 E
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10,570 K
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10,614 F
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10,638 K
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10,644 D
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10,645 F
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10,646 R and K
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11,156 K
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12,151 K
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12,185 U
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12,329 U
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13,328 U
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13,637 F
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14,478 K
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14,587 K
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14,967 K
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15,656 U
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15,700 U
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15,705 U
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17,015 D
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17,016 C
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17,017 F
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17,018 UE and TA
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18,343 K
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20,456 E
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20,992 O and C
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These stations broadcast mostly during the night hours of
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North America. They are most often picked up in North
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America, Australia, and the Orient. But because of the easy
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propagation of shortwave signals, no one is sure where they
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are coming from.
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An analysis in the Confidential Frequency List holds
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that the signals are coming from 25- to 100-watt unattended
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transmitters somewhere in the South Pacific. An alternate
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theory places the Morse code "beacons" in Cuba. It is known
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that there used to be a "W" station operating at 3,584 KHz, a
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frequency supposedly reserved for amateur use. When the
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American amateurs protested to the Federal Communications
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Commission about the interference, the FCC complained to the
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Cuban government. The staion disappeared shortly thereafter.
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Actually, all of the beacons must be presumed to be
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illegal. Shortwave stations are supposed to be registered
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with the International Telecommuncations Union; none of those
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listed above are. The purpose of the stations is as unclear
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as their location. A single letter conveys no information.
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There are legitimate navigational beacon stations, which
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broadcast their call letters. But such stations are
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registered and operate on fixed frequencies from known
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locations. Keeping location and frequency information secret
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would defeat their purpose.
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Maybe, then, the letter beacons are navigational
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stations operated for the benefit of a select few. Some think
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they are operated by the Soviet Union, in Cuba, for some
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military purpose. Still, the globe is crosshatched with
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legitimate navigational beacons. It is hard to see what
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further navigational aid the Soviets could expect to derive
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from their own secret network of beacons.
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It has also been suggested that the beacon stations are
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really teletype or other data transmission stations and that
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the Morse code letters are just a way of keeping the channel
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free between transmissions. A few of the stations started
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transmitting some sort of data - audible as a characteristic
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high-speed typewriterlike sound - in 1980. There are other
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ways of keeping a data channel open, though. Most
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radioteletype stations transmit the code for space between
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transmissions. (The radioteletype code is different from
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Morse code.)
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Finally, still others think the letter transmissions are
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themselves some sort of code. Granted, the letter can't mean
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anything, but some wonder if the precise length of the
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interval between the letters means somthing. Or the frequency
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shifts may hold the message.
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The number of Morse code letter stations seems to be
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increasing.
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Numbers Stations
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Well over a hundred "numbers" or "spy" stations have
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been reported, all rather closely following a pattern. On the
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typical numbers station, the announcer is - or seems to be -
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a woman. No one knows who the woman is or where she is
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broadcasting from. She speaks Spanish, German, or Korean.
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Save for a few words at the begining and the end of the
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transmission, the message consists of reandom numbers,
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announced in groups of five, four, or, rarely, three digits.
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As with the Morse code stations, the numbers stations are all
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on unauthorized frequencies. No government or organization
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owns up to the broadcasts; offically, at least, the FCC
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claims no knowledge of them.
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Many of those who have listened to the broadcasts
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carefully are convinced that the woman is in fact a robot.
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The voice has a mechanical ring, somtimes a click between
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each digit. It seems to be the same type of device used by
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the telephone company to give the time or to forward phone
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numbers.
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The exact format of the messages varies with the
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language and number of digits per group. With Spanish, five
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digit groups, for example, a typical transmission might be:
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Atencion 290 22...Atencion 290 22...Atencion 290 22
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...65438...34742...23453...23454...29584...24836...
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22334...34635...10202...19375...34653...23457...
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12345...94532...24643...27543...14795...24568...
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75744...74755...87194...63549...Final,final.
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Broadcasts are during the night hours of North America
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and seem to start shortly after the hour. After the
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"Final,final," the transmission stops. It is claimed that a
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given transmission is repeated a few minutes later on a
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slightly different frequency.
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There seems to be no escaping the conclusion that the
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messages are numerical code. The second number (22 in the
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example) - is the number of digit groups in the message.
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There dosen't seem to be any demonstrable significance to the
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first number although it probably has some signifigance. Some
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think it is an identifying number for the sender or the
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receiver. It may also indentify the code used if there is
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more than one. Note that the numbers above are only random
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(except for 22) and were never really broadcast.
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The four-digit transmissions in Spanish are different. A
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three-digit number (perhaps that of the sender or receiver)
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is repeated several times, followed by the digits 1 through
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10. ("uno, dos, tres...") and a string of Morse code dashes.
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the word "grupo" is followed by the number of four-digit
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groups to come and repeated once - for example, "Grupo 22,
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grupo 22." The message - groups of four Spanish numbers -
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follows. At the end the voice says, "Repito grupo 22," and
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the message repeats. The station goes off the air after the
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repeat.
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Any attempt to explain these broadcasts is complicated
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by numbers broadcasts in other languages. There are also
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broadcasts in German, Korean, and English. Occasional
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transmissions in Russian, French, Portuguese, and even
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Serbo-Croatian are reported. Somtimes a male (mechanical?)
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voice reads the numbers. The female robot voice doing English
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language broadcasts is often described as having an Oriental
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or German accent. Typical of the uncertainty surrounding
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numbers stations are the reported English messages prefaced
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with a female voice saying "Groups disinformation" and ending
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with "End of disinformation." Perhaps the voice machine has a
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bad rendering of "This information."
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Still other stations transmit messages consisting of
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letters from the phonetic alphabet (Alpha, Bravo,
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Charlie...). Some spice their broadcasts with music, which
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ranges from ethnic tunes to wierd tones that may or may not
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conceal a message. Reported frequencies for numbers and
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phonetic-alphabet stations include:
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F/M = Female/Male
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S = Spanish R = Russian
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F = French E = English
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P = Portuguese C = Czech
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SC= Serbo-Croatian G = German
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Frequency Male language
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(KHz) Female
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--------- ------ --------
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3060 F S (All are numbers stations
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3090 F S unless otherwise noted)
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3365 M SC
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4640 M S
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4642 F F
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4670 F S&E Numbers & phonetic
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4740 M S&P Interlude from Aida
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4770 F G
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5020 F S
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5075 F S
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5110 M C Slavic musical interlude
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5812 F S
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6770 F S
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6790 F S
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8875 F S
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9040 F S&E
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9345 F S
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9450 F E + Musical tones
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9463 F S
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9950 F S
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10450 F K
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10500 F G
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10532 F S
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11545 F G
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11618 F G
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11635 F S
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13320 M R
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14947 F G
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14970 F E + Beep tones
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23120 F G
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30050 E
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30250 E
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30420 E
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30470 E
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Whatever is going on, it's a big operation. Harry L.
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Helms' "How to tune in the shortwave spectrum" has a list of
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sixty-two stations that includes only those with a female
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voice reading five digit codes in Spanish. Much time and
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effort are going into the broadcasts. Some numbers stations
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transmit on the upper sideband rather than using amplitude
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modulation (AM). Signals are usually strong. Because of
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ionospheric reflection, they can be picked up over most of
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the globe. This makes direction finding difficult.
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Two explanations are offered for the numbers stations.
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It is rumored that some of the stations are communications
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links in the drug traffic between the United States and
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Latin America. If so, Spanish is the logical language. The
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numerically coded messages could tell where drops are to be
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made, how much to expect, and other minutiae that would
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change from day to day. Weak support for this comes from some
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amateur direction finding, which seems to place many of the
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Spanish broadcasts Somewhere south of the United States.
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But even those who subscribe to this explanation agree
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that other numbers stations, probably most of them worldwide,
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are engaged in espionage - governmental or organizational
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communication with agents in the field.
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Which government? The Spanish stations are usually heard
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between 7:00 PM and 6:00 AM Eastern Standard Time. The night
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hours are best for clandestine broadcasting as weak signals
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propagate farther. So the spanish language broadcasts are
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probably coming from a time zone not far removed from Eastern
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Standard Time (the EST time zone includes the central
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Caribbean, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru.)
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On the basis of signal strengths and broadcast times, it
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can be similarly be postulated that the German Stations are
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coming from Europe, or maybe Africa, and the Korean stations
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are coming from the Orient - oddly enough.
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As far as the Spanish stations are concerned, suspision
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points to Cuba. In 1975 U.S. listeners reported muffled radio
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Havana broadcasts in the background of the Spanish stations.
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A station at 9920KHz is said to have used the same theme
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music as radio Havana.
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But then there are American ham radio operators who
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swear that the spanish stations must be in the United States.
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"How to Tune the Secret Shortwave Spectrum" tells of
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listeners in Ohio who reported four digit numbers stations
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coming in stronger than anything else on the dial execpt for
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a 50 kilowatt broadcast band station a few miles distant.
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Similar reports come from the Washingtom, D.C., area.
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Probably the simplest of all the many possible
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explanitions is that the Spanish stations are opperated by
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Cuba for the benefit of Cuban agents in the United States.
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The Radio Havana Broadcasts in the background would have been
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a mistake. The engineer was listening to radio Havana and
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forgot the mike was on, or maybe radio Havana and some of the
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numbers stations share facilities and the signals got mixed.
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The local quality broadcasts heard in the U.S. could be Cuban
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agents reporting back to Havana. Each agent would have his
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own mechanical voice setup. Not that you can carry around a
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50000 watt transmitter in your pocket.
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The actual explanation may not be the simplest, though.
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According to Helms, some shortwave listeners believe that the
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four and five digit number transmissions are totally differnt
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opperations. The four digit transmissions, at least some of
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which seem to originate in the United States, may be the work
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of the U.S. government. Only the five-digit transmissions may
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come from Latin America - and may be associated with local
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governments or U.S. foreign agents. Harry L. Helms
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speculates that the United States may have faked the radio
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Havana background just to divert suspission from an American
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espionage operation.
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Any glib explanation of the numbers stations is further
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challenged by another incident Helms cites. An unnamed
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listener was receiving a five digit numbers broadcast in
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Spanish. At the end of the broadcast, the station
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accidentally (?) stayed on the air, and faint female voices
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were heard reading numbers in German and English. If the
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report was accurate, then the numbers stations could be the
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work of one worldwide operation. Choice of language could be
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arbitrary. Whatever his or her native tounge, an agent need
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only need learn ten words of, say, Korean in order to receive
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a numerical broadcast in Korean.
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No one willing to talk has broken the code or codes used
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for the transmissions. If the codes are sophisticated enough
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it may be pointless to even try. A random four or five digit
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number added to each number in the group will scramble the
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code. The numbers would have to be agreed upon before
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transmission. If a different number is used for each number
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block and if they are not repeated it is mathematically
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impossible for outsiders to break the code.
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At 3820KHz there is a four-note electronic tune. At
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12700KHz there is a plaintive, twenty-one-note, flutelike
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melody. At 15507 KHz there are beeps.
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Special thanks to William Poundstone
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.W#04? |