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403 lines
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| | c o m m u n i c a t i o n s | |
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| |________________________________________________________________| |
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|____________________________________________________________________|
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...presents... What Color Is the Sky in Your World?
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by Tequila Willy
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>>> a cDc publication.......1994 <<<
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-cDc- CULT OF THE DEAD COW -cDc-
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____ _ ____ _ ____ _ ____ _ ____
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|____digital_media____digital_culture____digital_media____digital_culture____|
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FOR YOUR INFORMATION
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This file refers to two central figures in the
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Philosophy of Language. These two men are Bertrand
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Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ludwig was a
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student of Bertrand a long time ago. Ludwig lived
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from 1889 - 1951. Bertrand lived from 1872 - 1970.
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Now, these dates kinda trip me out a little bit.
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Think about it, Billy the Kid was causing trouble
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in the 1880s -- Bertrand was like 8 years old then.
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Bertrand lived all the way up until 1970. Think
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for a moment how much technology has changed since
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then... I mean, as a kid you could be worrying about
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six guns and outlaws... and as an old man you could
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be worrying about nuclear war. Hey, I think about
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these things. Anyway, that's completely irrelevant
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to what I'm going to talk about now.
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ABSTRACT
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There's a debate about the possibility of private
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language being able to refer to private sensations.
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Bertrand Russell says it's possible and Ludwig
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Wittgenstein says it's not. We regularly refer to
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private sensations in public languages. The logical
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possibility exists that the sensations of different
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individuals are unique from each other. The logical
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possibility exists that there can be a language that
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refers to public objects and that only one person knows.
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If we have a clear idea of a sensation we've experienced
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then we can refer to it in a private language. We
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can have clear ideas of sensations we've experienced.
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Thus, the logical possibility exists that we can talk
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about private sensations in private languages.
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WHAT COLOR IS THE SKY IN YOUR WORLD?
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Philosophers who have wondered about the nature of language have debated
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whether human languages are or can be private. Private language does exist in
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the form of special slang or secret languages used by a group. Yet this is not
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the issue that philosophers are interested in. The conundrum is, can there be
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a language known and used by only one person? As many philosophical questions
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do, the quest for solutions to this problem have unearthed an array of
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additional questions. One of the problems unearthed by the private language
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enigma is, "can you have a meaningful private language that refers to private
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sensations?" Predictably, philosophers have developed various positions on the
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issue. The two dominant philosophers on each side of this debate are Bertrand
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Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is the goal of this essay to demonstrate
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that the logical possibility of private language exists. In so doing I'll
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further demonstrate the logical possibility that we aren't communicating at
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some fundamental level. To accomplish these goals I'll be examining the nature
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of sensation. Then I will demonstrate that it is possible to talk
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meaningfully about private sensations in both public and private languages.
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Before examining the issues at hand it would first be helpful to
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understand the concepts of language, private language, and sensations.
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Language can be thought of as a tool used to communicate thoughts and ideas to
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others. The term "private language" denotes "a language known and used by only
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one person" (1). A deliberate examination of the term "private language"
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reveals an apparent contradiction of meanings. The word "private" suggests
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seclusion or secrecy. It seems contradictory to assert there could exist a
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phenomenon which is both secret and yet somehow communicates thoughts and ideas
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to others. This paradox will be examined more closely later in this essay.
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The term "sensations" commonly denotes "the perceptions that result from
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sensory stimulus." With these concepts in mind we can now examine the problems
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at hand.
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Bertrand Russell, a supporter of private language, said words get their
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meanings by private ostension. "Our empirical vocabulary is based upon words
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having ostensive definitions, and an ostensive definition consists of a series
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of percepts which generate a habit" (2). For example, a person may experience
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a sensation and decide to denote it with the word "pain". Now when he
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experiences a new sensation he will be able to decide whether or not to call it
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pain if he remembers his original sensation correctly. Soon this individual
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will have a concept of "pain". Because names denoting private sensations can
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be created in this way, private language can meaningfully talk about private
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sensations and thus private language is possible.
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Contesting Russell's claims, Ludwig Wittgenstein claims that private
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language is not logically possible. He presents an argument refuting the
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notion of private language. "(P1) Communication occurs. (P2) If the meanings
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of words were private, we could not communicate. (C) So, language cannot be
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private," (3). Wittgenstein also insists there cannot be a private language
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because for a word to be meaningful, it must be possible to verify that it is
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being used consistently, and this cannot be done if the words denote private
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objects (4). John Cook, interpreting Wittgenstein's writings, explains
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Wittgenstein's views, "We were taught the names of sensations by others -- by
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others who knew what our sensations were. So we speak a common language" (5).
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So, Wittgenstein contends that because people determine the meaning of
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language by the use of public rule-governed behavior it is not possible to have
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a meaningful private language that talks about private sensations.
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Before examining whether or not it is possible to speak about private
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sensations meaningfully in a private language, it would first be worthwhile to
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discover if it is possible to speak meaningfully about private sensations in
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(public) language. In conducting this examination it will be necessary to
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develop an elementary understanding of the nature of sensation. Certainly
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there is no dispute that private sensations do occur. Indeed, I can stab
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myself in the hand and accurately say, "No one knows this pain!" Because the
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scope of my experiences are limited to my personal being I can only speculate
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that someone may have a sensation that is similar to mine if I observe them
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stabbing their hand in a similar fashion. Certainly, in this sense, although
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our sensations may be similar, they will not be measurably identical;
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technology does not currently enable us to accurately measure our experiences
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on a hedonistic scale. If we had access to a "hedonimeter", a kind of
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thermometer that could take measurements of pleasure/pain units, then it would
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be possible to measure similarities in our pain and pleasure experiences (6).
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Because "hedonimeters" are not available to us now it's still appropriate to
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challenge this question; can we presume that sensations are similar?
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As a result of sensory sensations we experience private sensations (as in
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the above example of stabbing my hand). If we wish to use language to
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communicate these private sensations to others then we are, in a sense, drawing
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upon a public language pool to cause an understanding of our personal sensation
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in another's mind.
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The words in a language are like the tools in a toolbox. To communicate
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specific ideas we use certain words, much in the same sense if we wish to
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accomplish a certain construction job we select the appropriate tool. It does
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not seem unreasonable to suggest that because we use similar words to describe
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our sensations to others that we probably experience things similarly to each
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other. I assert that it is not the case that we necessarily experience things
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similarly to each other. Allow me to elaborate with examples.
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If an individual were raised by and solely interacted with a single
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individual, then he derived his notion of language solely from this person. In
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this sense language is necessarily a social phenomena because our conception
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of the correct use of words depends on how we use the language socially. In
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this hypothetical example, the teacher wants to trick the child into thinking
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that the color yellow is referred to by using the word "red". Perhaps the
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child was told whenever he saw (experienced) the color yellow it was called
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"red" and thus the child learned that to refer to what he saw (experienced) as
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yellow he used the term "red". Now what would happen if this individual, upon
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maturing, were suddenly thrust into social interaction with other people
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besides his teacher. He might see the color yellow and use "red" to refer to
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it. Certainly everyone would point out that he was mistaken. He might examine
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the yellow color more closely and assert, "No, that is indeed red. Are you all
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blind?" In this sense he is using the public tools of language to describe his
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private sensations and the communication is just not happening; he has
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mismatched the (public) word with its object of reference.
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Now let's imagine, drawing upon the previous example, that what I see
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(experience) as yellow, you see (experience) as green, and we both use the term
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"blue" to reference it. Now here we experience private sensations that are
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drastically different yet because we use a public language tool, the term
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"blue," consistently (i.e. whenever you see green you call it "blue" and when I
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see yellow I call it "blue") there is no problem in communicating ideas. So
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there is no confusion if we, by chance, describe the sky as "blue" because we
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would both note the color of the sky, and though we may see different things,
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we would agree that describing it as "blue" would be accurate.
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Even more drastically, let's imagine that what I see as a terrible monster
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with bleeding hairy warts and long fangs, you see as a soft oozing squid-like
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creature, yet because of the way we were each raised we learned to reference
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this creature with the term "human". It's logically possible, in this
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imaginary example, that we are having dramatically different private sensations
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yet we are still communicating efficiently because we both reference each as
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"human". So, in this imaginary example, it doesn't really matter if what I see
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is what you see because we both have a personal concept of what it is to be
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"human".
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Though we usually assume that we have similar experiences when we engage
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in apparently similar activities (e.g., if I stab myself in the hand and
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observeyou to do likewise then I ordinarily assume that your experience is
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similar to mine) it's still logically possible that our experiences really are
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dramatically different. So, the two former imaginary examples are logically
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possible yet we normally assume they are not the necessary case. However,
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because we cannot be sure that they are merely imaginary examples and not
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actual reality it would be worthwhile to examine the consequences of such
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possibilities.
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At this point someone might object, "Yet it is probable that you see the
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same thing. In fact, the idea that you really perceive me as terrible monster
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with bleeding hairy warts and long fangs, and I perceive you as a soft oozing
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squid-like creature is so preposterous that it's not even worth examining." I
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might inquire as to why this possibility is so preposterous. This person might
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respond, "Well, we each are offspring of a pair of parents just as they were,
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and so on and so on. It would be reasonable to speculate that you inherit many
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of the same characteristics, including perceptions. It doesn't make sense to
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suggest that each subsequent generation experiences such a dramatic private
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sensation variation." However, this objection is not conclusively sound. Why
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is it that when I taste broccoli I respond, "This tastes repulsive!" and
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communicate feelings to you which suggest negative overtones. Now when my
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mother tastes broccoli she suggests with the greatest sincerity that she finds
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it to be delicious. Why is there such a great discrepancy between personal
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sensations here? It would not be unreasonable to suggest that we are having
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different experiences and not merely different preferences. I would like to
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pose the question to Wittgenstein, if it is the case that sensations aren't
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different (at least not drastically so) then why don't we all like, dislike, or
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have an indifferent opinion regarding the flavor broccoli?
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To continue with even more dramatic examples, there are people on the
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planet that might comment, "pleasure, pain, what's the difference?" These
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masochists obviously find pleasure in realms that I do not. Why is there such
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a great differentiation between private sensations here? Would Wittgenstein
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declare that we feel the same thing as others do when one individual upon being
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struck with a whip insists that they find pleasure and another individual
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insists that they only feel pain? I assert that these individuals are
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experiencing different sensations of pleasure and pain. However, I do not
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insist that everyone experiences sensations completely different from everyone
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else. After all, it's possible to find two people who both enjoy the flavor of
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broccoli; in this case it wouldn't be unreasonable to speculate that they are
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having similar experiences regarding the flavor of broccoli.
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From these examples it would not be unreasonable to speculate that when I
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see a "human" I see a creature with bleeding hairy warts and long fangs. This
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is my private sensation but I do not find it to be peculiar because that's what
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humans are. And when I describe what a human is I know that the hairy warts
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are to be described as "skin covering the entire body with several
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strategically placed orifices". This is not an unreasonable claim.
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Critics of my examples might point out, "Your claims are a little
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drastic." I naturally would poise the question, "Why?" A critic might, and
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not unreasonably, suggest, "Certainly our sensations could, theoretically, be
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different and we could still talk about them meaningfully because we both
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utilize the same public language to talk about them. Yet we still have a
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notion of things that are alike and similar. For example, red and orange are
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similar. If what you saw (experienced) as orange you knew to refer to with the
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term 'blue', you would not assert that it looked similar to (the experience of)
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purple which you might refer to as 'violet'. And yet it is commonly said that
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blue and violet are similar -- you would perhaps, though you could function and
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operate using a public language, have a 'strange feeling' that something was
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just 'not quite right'." My reply to a critic presenting this argument would
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be that we have also learned what it means to be "alike and similar" -- the
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notion of "alike and similar" is not a priori knowledge. I think that this
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defense of mine would not be entirely unreasonable especially since it is
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defendable with examples. I'm sure we can imagine -- and perhaps we even know
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-- someone who has trouble "matching their clothes". My father has been
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accused of this phenomena and he asserts, with the utmost of sincerity, that
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his clothes match. He cannot see that his clothing appears mismatched in
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colors and yet other people do. With this example in mind it is possible to
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speculate that some people, in learning language, have developed a different
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sense of "alike and similar". Language is a learned and social phenomenon
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while sensations, on the other hand, are private.
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To this claim that it is logically possible that sensations are
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necessarily private (not to demonstrate conclusively that all of person x's
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sensations are alien and completely unique from person y's sensations in their
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nature and makeup) and that language is necessarily public, supporters of
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Wittgenstein's views would surely point out that such a claim is preposterous.
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Such a claim, they might propose, would only lead one into a position of
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solipsism because no one ever knows anyone else's sensations. I assert that if
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all or most of our sensations were indeed unique and different it would not
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imperatively lead us into a position of solipsism because we unquestionably do
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have a functioning public language that meaningfully talks about private
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sensations. Furthermore, to repeat what I explained earlier, not only does it
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not matter if what I see is what you see because we can communicate and speak
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about these experiences in a meaningful way, but there is also no way to verify
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if what I see is what you see or not. Though sensations are necessarily
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private, it does not interfere with the meanings of words in language.
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So there remains the logical possibility that sensations are necessarily
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private and are not necessarily similar to another person's sensations, and, as
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demonstrated by the previous examples, language is public. So it is possible
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to speak about private sensations meaningfully in a public language. Yet a
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conundrum remains, can there be a private language that talks about private
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sensations in a meaningful way?
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Wittgenstein insists that unless we can verify if we are using a word
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consistently then its use is meaningless. This, he insists, is the problem
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with private language -- there is no way to check to see if you are using the
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language consistently. Some words in a private language may be potentially
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verifiable. For example, I may designate a certain private symbol to denote
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what a "coconut" is and it is verifiable because I can even write this symbol
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on a coconut so I don't forgot what it is supposed to be denoting.
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Wittgenstein has no problem with this example, his problem (in relationship
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with private language) is with sensations; how do we know if the symbol we use
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to denote a "headache" is being used consistently? Since we must rely solely
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on our memory to determine if we are using the symbol for "headache" correctly
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there is room for error (i.e. how do I know this is the same pain as the
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previous one?) In essence, Wittgenstein argues there have to be social rules
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for how to apply the word correctly and how to apply the word incorrectly.
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The notion of clear and distinct ideas can prove to be very valuable when
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denoting private sensations in private language. There are certain ideas, no
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matter how I try to question them, that remain clear and distinct in my mind.
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For example, there are certain sensations that consistently bring negative
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feelings and sensations to me, such as when I drive a nail through my hand,
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shut my hand in my car door, or eat broccoli -- when these events happen it is
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as if my whole body is screaming, "No! Stop! This is bad!" On the other
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hand, there are certain sensations that consistently and clearly bring about
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positive feelings, such as eating Ben & Jerry's Cookie Dough Ice Cream, making
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love, or skiing down a mountain -- when these events happen it as if my whole
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body is screaming, "Yes! Again! This is good!" These feelings clearly and
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distinctly polarize, in my mind, as either negative or positive.
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It would not be unreasonable to develop my own private language that,
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among other things, includes names for these clear and distinct private
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sensations and remains meaningful. I would not "misremember" clear and
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distinct ideas because they would not be clear and distinct ideas if it were
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possible to "misremember" them. To make sure I was using the words
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consistently I would only denote names for private sensations that are clear
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and distinct -- such as my personal sensations of negative feelings and
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positive feelings. Theoretically I might address the notion of negative
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feelings as "EE" and the notion of positive feelings as "Goo". Keep in mind,
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sensations that are not either clearly positive or negative (to use the example
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illustrated in this essay) will not be denoted because it is not clear how to
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denote them or differentiate them from other sensations. Private language is
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possible because it can follow verifiable rule-governed behavior. Public
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objects can be denoted with private symbols by actually writing those symbols
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on the objects in question. And private sensations that are clear and distinct
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can be denoted with accuracy. Therefore, private language is possible and it
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can denote both public objects and private sensations.
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Critics of my language might simply challenge that it is not a language at
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all. They may argue that using "Goo" and "EE" do not count as a new language.
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Yet since a private language would, by definition, be known and used by only
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one person, it would be reasonable to suggest that the language would not
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experience a tremendous amount of evolution in relation to public language.
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This is because a private language would only have one contributor and as such
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it would evolve slowly. So we would not expect to find a large variation and
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spectrum of words in a private language in relationship to a public language.
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As mentioned earlier, when the term "language" is combined with the word
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"private" a seemingly contradictory phrase results. How can you have a tool of
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communication that is essentially private? A private language (a language
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known and used by only one person) would not serve the same function as a
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public language. By definition a private language is not meant to communicate
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ideas to others. The fundamental nature of a private language is to assist the
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user/creator in abstract thought. For this reason I would like to suggest that
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instead of using the term "private language" to refer to it we instead use the
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term "centralized abstract" -- for that, in essence, is what private language
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is.
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It is logically possible, as illustrated by the examples in this essay,
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that sensations are necessarily private and are not necessarily similar to
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another person's sensations. Public languages are able to talk meaningfully
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about private sensations. And, as demonstrated by this essay, it is further
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possible to have a private language ("centralized abstract") which meaningfully
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talks about private sensations. Language is a fantastic phenomena and
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continued examination into its applications and nature will undoubtedly
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continue to reap new philosophical insights.
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NOTES
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1. This definition was suggested by Robert Foreman, Ph.D., during a lecture
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that set a foundation for a private language discussion on 10-31-91.
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2. Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, p.126.
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3. This argument was summarized by Robert Foreman, Ph.D., during a lecture
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on private language on 10-29-91.
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4. This information was presented by Robert Foreman, Ph.D., during a
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lecture on private language on 10-29-91.
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5. John Cook, "Wittgenstein on Privacy," The Philosophy of Language, pp.
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471-472.
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6. I'm borrowing from F. Y. Edgeworth's (1881) idea of a "hedonimeter" that
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could act as a kind of political thermometer.
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Bibliography
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Cook, John, "Wittgenstein on Privacy," The Philosophy of Language, 1990
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edition, edited by A.P. Martinich, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Russell, Bertrand, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, third edition, Edinburgh,
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Bishop and Sons Limited, 1948.
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_______ __________________________________________________________________
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(' ') | Save yourself! Go outside! DO SOMETHING! |
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.ooM |Copyright (c) 1994 cDc communications and Tequila Willy. |
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\_______/|All Rights Reserved. 07/01/1994-#263|
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