573 lines
38 KiB
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573 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
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| | c o m m u n i c a t i o n s | |
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| |________________________________________________________________| |
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|____________________________________________________________________|
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...presents... The U.S. Mercenary Army
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by Phil Agee
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>>> a cDc publication.......1993 <<<
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-cDc- CULT OF THE DEAD COW -cDc-
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____ _ ____ _ ____ _ ____ _ ____
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|____digital_media____digital_culture____digital_media____digital_culture____|
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Forwarded and contributed by The Deth Vegetable:
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Have you been wondering about the REAL info on the Gulf Crisis?
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Unfiltered by the U.S. Government? This file covers the history of the
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conflict, and how it relates to other situations in U.S. history. It also
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includes the real, uncensored stats on the opposing forces in the Persian Gulf.
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The following is the text of a speech about the Gulf War NOT given by
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former CIA agent Phil Agee. The reason Agee wasn't able to give the speech is
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that Bush and his CIA buddies have deemed that what Agee has to say is too
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dangerous for the American public to know. His passport has been revoked on
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the grounds that Agee's writings and speaking pose "a serious threat to the
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national security of the United States." Following is the text of a speech
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that Agee planned to give at his scheduled engagements.
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-The Deth Vegetable
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______________________________________________________________________________
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Sooner or later it had to happen: the fundamental transformation of U.S.
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military forces was really only a matter of time. Transformation, in this
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sense, from a national defense force to an international mercenary army for
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hire. With a U.S national debt of $3 trillion, some $800 billion owned by
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foreigners, The United States sooner or later would have to find, or produce,
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the proper crisis - one that would enable the president to hire out the armed
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forces, like a national export, in order to avoid conversion of the economy
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from military to civilian purposes. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, encouraged, it
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seems, by the Bush administration, is the necessary crisis.
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Not long after the invasion, I watched on Spanish television Bush's call
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to arms, when he said "our way of life" is at stake. For days afterwards I
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kept watching and reading for news of the tens of millions of people in this
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country, who would take to the streets in joy, in celebration that their days
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of poverty, homelessness, illiteracy and uncared-for illness might soon end.
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What I saw instead, like most of you, was the Bush "way of life" - fishing,
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boating, and golfing on the coast of Maine like any respectable member of the
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Eastern elite. Bush's military machismo of recent weeks reminded me of what
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General Noriega said about Bush a couple of years ago, before Bush decided to
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smash Panamanian nationalism for the foreseeable future. You remember?
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Noriega told his deputy in the Panamanian Defense Forces, who later made it
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public, he said, "I've got George Bush by the balls."
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When I read that, I thought, how interesting - one of those rare
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statements that contain two revelations. Back in the 1970s, when he was
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director of the CIA, Bush tried to get a criminal indictment against me for
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revelations I was making about CIA operations and personnel. But he couldn't
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get it, I discovered later in documents I received under the Freedom of
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Information Act. The reason was that in the early 1970s the CIA had committed
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crimes against me while I was in Europe writing my first book. If they
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indicted and prosecuted me, I would learn the details of those crimes, whatever
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they were: conspiracy to assassination, kidnapping, a drug plant. So they
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couldn't indict because the CIA under Bush, and before him under William Colby,
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said the details had to stay secret. So what did Bush do? He prevailed on
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President Ford to send Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, to Britain
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where I was living, to get them to take action. A few weeks after Kissinger's
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secret trip a Cambridge policeman arrived at my door with a deportation notice.
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After living in Britain nearly five years, I had suddenly become a threat to
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the security of the realm. During the next two years I was not only expelled
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from Britain, but also from France, Holland, West Germany, and Italy - all
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under U.S. pressure. For two years I didn't know where I was living, and my
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two sons, then teenagers, attended four different schools in four different
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countries.
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The latest is the government's attempt to prevent me from speaking in the
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U.S now. Where this will end, we still don't know.
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How many of you have friends or relatives right now in Saudi Arabia or the
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Persian Gulf area? I wonder how they feel, so close to giving their lives to
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protect a feudal kingdom where women are stoned to death for adultery, where a
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thief is punished by having his hand amputated, where women can't drive cars or
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swim in the same pool as men? Where bibles are forbidden and no religion save
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Islam is allowed? Where Amnesty International reports that torture is routine,
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and that last year 111 people were executed, 16 of them political prisoners,
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all but one by public beheading. And not by clean cut, with a guillotine, but
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with that long curved sword that witnesses say requires various chops. Not
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that Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait before the invasion, are any different in terms of
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political repression than any number of U.S.-supported allies. But to give
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your life for those corrupt, cruel, family dictatorships? Bush says we're
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"stopping aggression." If that were true, the first thing U.S. forces would
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have done after landing, they would have dethroned the Gulf emirs, sheiks, and
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kings, who every day are carrying out the worst aggression against their own
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people, especially women. Mainstream media haven't quite said it yet, as far
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as I know, but the evidence is mounting that George Bush and his entourage
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wanted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, encouraged it, and then refused to prevent
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it when they could have. I'll get back to Bush later, but first, a quick
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review of what brought on this crisis. Does the name Cox bring anything
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special to mind? Sir Percy Cox?
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In a historical sense this is the man responsible for today's Gulf crisis.
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Sir Percy Cox was the British High Commissioner in Baghdad after World War I
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who in 1922 drew the lines in the sand establishing for the first time national
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borders between Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. And in each of these
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new states the British helped set up and consolidate ruling monarchies through
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which British banks, commercial firms, and petroleum companies could obtain
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monopolies. Kuwait, however, had for centuries belonged to the Basra province
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of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq and the Iraqis never recognized Sir Percy's
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borders. He had drawn those lines, as historians have confirmed, in order
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deliberately to deprive Iraq of a viable seaport on the Persian Gulf. The
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British wanted no threat from Iraq to their dominance in the Gulf where they
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had converted no less than ten sheikdoms, including Kuwait, into colonies. The
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divide and rule principle, so well-practiced in this country since the
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beginning. In 1958 the British-installed monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in a
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military coup. Three years later, in 1961, Britain granted independence to
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Kuwait, and the Iraqi military government massed troops on the Kuwaiti border
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threatening to take the territory by force. Immediately the British dispatched
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troops, and Iraq backed down, still refusing to recognize the border. Similar
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Iraqi threats occurred in 1973 and 1976.
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This history, Saddam Hussein's justification for annexing Kuwait, is in
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the books for anyone to see. But weeks went by as I waited and wondered why
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the International Herald Tribune, which publishes major articles from the
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Washington Post, New York Times and wire services, failed to carry the
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background. Finally, a month after the invasion, the Herald Tribune carried a
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Washington Post article on the historical context written by Glenn Frankel.
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I've yet to find this history in Time or Newsweek. Time, in fact, went so far
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as to say that Iraq's claims to Kuwait were "without any historical basis."
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Hardly surprising, since giving exposure to the Iraqi side might weaken the
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campaign to Hitlerize Saddam Hussein. Also absent from current accounts is the
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CIA's role in the early 1970s to foment and support armed Kurdish rebellion in
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Iraq. The Agency, in league with the Shah of Iran, provided $16 million in
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arms and other supplies to the Kurds, leading to Iraqi capitulation to the Shah
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in 1975 over control of the Shat al Arab. This is the estuary of the Tigris
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and Euphrates, that separates the two countries inland from the Gulf and is
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Iraq's only access to Basra, its upriver port. Five years later, in 1980, Iraq
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invaded Iran to redress the CIA-assisted humiliation of 1975, and to regain
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control of the estuary, beginning the eight year war that cost a million lives.
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Apart from Iraq's historical claims on Kuwait and its need for access to
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the sea, two related disputes came to a head just before the invasion. First
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was the price of oil. OPEC had set the price at $18 per barrel in 1986,
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together with production quotas to maintain that price. But Kuwait and the
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United Arab Emirates had long exceeded their quotas, driving the price down to
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around $13 in June. Iraq, saddled with a $70 billion debt from the war with
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Iran, was losing billions of dollars in oil revenues which normally account for
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95 percent of its exports. Meanwhile, industrialized oil consumers like the
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United States were enjoying the best price in 40 years, in inflation-adjusted
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dollars. Iraq's other claim against Kuwait was theft. While Iraq was occupied
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with Iran during the war, Kuwait began pumping from Iraq's vast Rumaila field
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that dips into the disputed border area. Iraq demanded payment for oil taken
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from this field as well as forgiveness of Kuwaiti loans to Iraq during the war
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with Iran. Then in July, Iraq massed troops on the Kuwaiti border while OPEC
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ministers met in Geneva. That pressure brought Kuwait and the Emirates to
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agree to honor quotas and OPEC set a new target price of $21, although Iraq had
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insisted on $25 per barrel. After that Hussein increased his troops on the
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border from 30,000 to 100,000. On August 1, Kuwaiti and Iraqi negotiators,
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meeting in Saudi Arabia, failed to reach agreement over the loans, oil thefts,
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and access to the sea for Iraq. The next night Iraq invaded. Revelations
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since then, together with a review of events prior to the invasion, strongly
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suggest that U.S. policy was to encourage Hussein to invade and, when invasion
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was imminent, to do nothing to discourage him. Consider the following.
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During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the U.S. sided with Iraq and
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continued this policy right up to August 2, the day of the invasion. In April,
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the Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, John Kelly, testified
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before Congress that the United States had no commitment to defend Kuwait. On
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July 25, with Iraqi troops massed on the Kuwait border, the U.S. Ambassador to
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Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Hussein. Minutes of the meeting were given by
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the Iraqis to the Washington Post in mid-August.
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According to these minutes, which have not been disputed by the State
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Department, the Ambassador told Hussein that Secretary of State James Baker had
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instructed her to emphasize to Hussein that the U.S. has "no opinion" on
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Iraqi-Kuwait border disputes. She then asked him, in light of Iraqi troop
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movements, what his intentions were with respect to Kuwait. Hussein replied
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that Kuwait's actions amounted to "an economic war" and "military action
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against us." He said he hoped for a peaceful solution, but if not, he said,
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"it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death...." A clearer statement
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of his intentions would be hard to imagine, and hardly a promise not to invade.
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The Ambassador gave no warning from Baker or Bush that the U.S. would oppose an
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Iraqi takeover of Kuwait. On the contrary she said, "I have a direct
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instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq." On the
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same day Assistant Secretary of State Kelly killed a planned Voice of America
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broadcast that would have warned Iraq that the U.S. was "strongly committed" to
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the defense of its friends in the Gulf, which included, of course, Kuwait.
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During the week between the Ambassador's meeting with Hussein and the invasion,
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the Bush administration forbade any warning to Hussein against invasion, or to
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the thousands of people who might become hostages. The Ambassador returned to
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Washington as previously scheduled for consultations. Assistant Secretary
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Kelly, two days before the invasion, again testified publicly before Congress
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to the effect that the U.S. had no commitment to defend Kuwait. And, according
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to press reports and Senator Boren, who heads the Senate Intelligence
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Committee, the CIA had predicted the invasion some four days before it
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happened.
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Put these events together, and add the total absence of any public or
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private warning by Bush to Hussein not to invade, together with no U.S. effort
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to create international opposition while there was time. Assuming the U.S. was
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not indifferent to an invasion, one has to ask whether Bush administration
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policy was in effect to encourage Hussein to create a world crisis. After all,
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Iraq had chemical weapons and had already used them against Iran and against
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Kurds inside Iraq. He was know to be within two to five years of possessing
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nuclear weapons. He had completely upset the power balance in the Middle East
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by creating an army one million strong. He aspired to leadership of the Arab
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world against Israel, and he threatened all the so-called moderate, i.e.,
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feudal regimes, not just Kuwait. And with Kuwait's oil he would control 20
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percent of the world's reserves, a concentration in radical nationalist hands
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that would be equal, perhaps to the Soviet Union, Iraq's main arms supplier.
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Saddam Hussein, then, was the perfect subject to allow enough rein to create a
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crisis, and he was even more perfect for post-invasion media demonization, a la
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Qaddafi, Ortega, and Noriega.
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Why would Bush seek a world crisis? The first suggestion came, for me at
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least, when he uttered those words about "our way of life" being at stake.
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They brought to mind Harry Truman's speech in 1950 that broke Congressional
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resistance to Cold War militarism and began 40 years of Pentagon dominance of
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the U.S. economy. It's worth recalling Truman's speech because Bush is trying
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to use the Gulf crisis, as Truman used the Korean War, to justify what some
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call military Keynesianism as a solution for U.S. economic problems. This is,
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using enormous military expenditures to prevent or rectify economic slumps and
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depressions, while reducing as much as possible spending on civilian and social
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programs. Exactly what Reagan and Bush did, for example, in the early and
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mid-1980s.
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In 1950 the Truman administration adopted a program to vastly expand the
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U.S and West European military services under a National Security Council
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document called NSC-68. This document was Top Secret for 25 years and, by
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error, it was released in 1975 and published. The purpose of military
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expansion under NSC-68 was to reverse the economic slide that began with the
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end of World War II wherein during five years the U.S. GNP had declined 20
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percent and unemployment had risen from 700,000 to 4.7 million. U.S. exports,
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despite the subsidy program known as the Marshall Plan, were inadequate to
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sustain the economy, and remilitarization of Western Europe would allow
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transfer of dollars, under so-called defense support grants, that would in turn
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generate European imports from the U.S. As NSC-68 put the situation in early
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1950: "the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few
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years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions
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unless more positive governmental programs are developed...."
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The solution adopted was expansion of the military. But support in
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Congress and the public at large was lacking for a variety of reasons, not
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least the increased taxes the programs would require. So Truman's State
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Department, under Dean Acheson, set out to sell the so-called Communist Threat
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as justification, through a fear campaign in the media that would create a
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permanent war atmosphere. But a domestic media campaign was not enough. A
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real crisis was needed, and it came in Korea. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, in
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their history of the 1945-55 period, "The Limits of Power," show that the
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Truman administration manipulated this crisis to overcome resistance to
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military build-up and a review of those events show striking parallels to the
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Persian Gulf crisis of 1990. Korea at the end of World War II had been divided
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north-south along the 38th parallel by the U.S. and the Soviets. Five years of
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on-again, off-again conflict continued: first between revolutionary forces in
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the south and U.S. occupation forces, then between the respective states
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established first between the U.S. in the south, then by the Soviets in the
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north. Both states threatened to reunify the country by force, and border
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incursions with heavy fighting by military forces were common. In June 1950,
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communist North Korean military forces moved across the border toward Seoul,
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the South Korean capital. At the time, the North Korean move was called "naked
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aggression," but I.F. Stone made a convincing case, in his "Hidden History of
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the Korean War," that the invasion was provoked by South Korea and Taiwan,
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another U.S. client regime.
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For a month South Korean forces retreated, practically without fighting,
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in effect inviting the North Koreans to follow them south. Meanwhile Truman
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rushed in U.S. military forces under a United Nations command, and he made a
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dramatic appeal to Congress to for an additional $10 billion, beyond
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requirements for Korea, for U.S. and European military expansion. Congress
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refused. Truman then made a fateful decision. In September 1950, about three
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months after the conflict began, U.S., South Korean, and token forces from
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other countries, under the United Nations banner, began to push back the North
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Koreans. Within three weeks the North Koreans had been pushed north to the
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border, the 38th parallel, in defeat. That would have been the end of the
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matter, at least the military action, if the U.S. had accepted a Soviet UN
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resolution for a cease-fire and UN-supervised country-wide elections. Truman,
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however, needed to prolong the crisis in order to overcome congressional and
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public resistance to his plans for U.S. and European rearmament. Although the
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UN resolution under which U.S. forces were fighting called only for "repelling"
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aggression from the north, Truman had another plan. In early October, U.S. and
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South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel heading north, and rapidly
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advanced toward the Yalu River, North Korea's border with China where only the
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year before the communists had defeated the U.S.-backed Kuomintang regime. The
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Chinese communist government threatened to intervene, but Truman had decided to
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overthrow the communist government in North Korea and unite the country under
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the anti-communist South Korean dictatorship. As predicted, the Chinese
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entered the war in November and forced the U.S. and its allies to retreat once
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again southward. The following month, with the media full of stories and
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pictures of American soldiers retreating through snow and ice before hordes of
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advancing Chinese troops, Truman went on national radio, declared a state of
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national emergency, and said what Bush's remarks about "our way of life" at
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stake recalled. Truman mustered all the hype and emotion he could, and said:
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"Our homes, our nation, all the things that we believe in, are in great danger.
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This danger has been created by the rulers of the Soviet Union." He also
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called again for massive increases in military spending for U.S. and European
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forces, apart from needs in Korea.
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Of course, there was no threat of war with the Soviet Union at all.
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Truman attributed the Korean situation to the Russians in order to create
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emotional hysteria, a false threat, and to get the leverage over Congress
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needed for approval of the huge amounts of money that Congress had refused. As
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we know, Truman's deceit worked. Congress went along in its so-called
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bi-partisan spirit, like the sheep in the same offices today. The U.S.
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military budget more than tripled from $13 billion in 1950 to $44 billion in
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1952, while U.S. military forces doubled to 3.6 million. The Korean War
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continued for three more years, after it could have ended, with the final
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casualty count in the millions, including 34,000 U.S. dead and more than
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100,000 wounded. But in the United States, Korea made the permanent war
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economy a reality, and we have lived with it for 40 years.
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What are the parallels with the current Gulf crisis? First, Korea in June
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1950 was already a crisis of borders and unification demands simply waiting for
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escalation. Second, less than six months before the war began Secretary of
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State Dean Acheson publicly placed South Korea outside the U.S. defense
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perimeter in Asia, just as Assistant Secretary Kelly denied any U.S. defense
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commitment to Kuwait. Third, the U.S. obtained quick UN justification for a
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massive military intervention, but only for repelling the North Koreans, not
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for conquest of that country. Similarly, the UN resolutions call for defense
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of Saudi Arabia, not for military conquest of Iraq - contrary to the war
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mongers who daily suggest that the U.S. may be "forced" to attack Iraq,
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presumably without UN sanction or declaration of war by Congress. Fourth, both
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crises came at a time of U.S. economic weakness with a recession or even worse
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downturn threatening ahead. Fifth, and we will probably see this with the
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Gulf, the Korean crisis was deliberately prolonged in order to establish
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military expenditures as the motor of the U.S. economy. Proceeding in the same
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manner now would be an adjustment to allow continuation of what began in 1950.
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NSC-68 required a significant expansion of CIA operations around the world in
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order to fight the secret political Cold War - a war against socialist economic
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programs, against communist parties, against left social democrats, against
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neutralism, against disarmament, against relaxation of tensions, and against
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the peace offensive then being waged by the Soviet Union.
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In Western Europe, through a vast network of political action and
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propaganda operations, the CIA was called upon to create in the public mind the
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specter of imminent Soviet invasion combined with the intention of the European
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left to enslave the population under Soviet dominion. By 1953, as a result of
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NSC-68, the CIA had major covert action programs underway in 48 countries,
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consisting of propaganda, paramilitary, and political action operations - such
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as buying elections and subsidizing political parties. The bureaucracy grew
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accordingly: in mid-1949 the covert action arm of the CIA had about 300
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employees and seven overseas field stations. Three years later there were
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2,800 employees and 47 field stations. In the same period the covert action
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budget grew from $4.7 million to $82 million.
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By the mid-1950s the name for the "enemy" was no longer just the Soviet
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Union. The wider concept of "International Communism" better expressed the
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global view of secret conspiracies run from Moscow to undermine the U.S. and
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its allies. One previously secret document from 1955 outlines the CIA's tasks:
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"Create and exploit problems for International Communism. Discredit
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International Communism and reduce the strength of its parties and
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organization. Reduce international Communist control over any area of the
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world... specifically such operations shall include any covert activities
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related to: propaganda, political action, economic warfare, preventive direct
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action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and invasion and
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evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups, including
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assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee
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liberation groups, support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in
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threatened countries of the free world; deception plans and all compatible
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activities necessary to accomplish the foregoing."
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Another document on CIA operations from the same period said, in extracts:
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"Hitherto accepted norms of human conduct do not apply... long-standing
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American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered... we must learn to
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subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated
|
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and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary
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that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this
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fundamentally repugnant philosophy." And so, from the late 1940s until the
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mid-1950s, the CIA organized sabotage and propaganda operations against every
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country of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. They tried to foment
|
|
rebellion and to hinder those countries' effort to rebuild from the devastation
|
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of World War II. Though unsuccessful against the Soviet Union, these
|
|
operations had some successes in other countries, notably East Germany. This
|
|
was the easiest target because, as one former CIA officer wrote, before the
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wall went up in 1961 all an infiltrator needed was good documents and a railway
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ticket.
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From about 1949, the CIA organized sabotage operations against targets in
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East Germany in order to slow reconstruction and economic recovery. The
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|
purpose was to create a high contrast between West Germany, then receiving
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|
billions of U.S. dollars for reconstruction, and the "other Germany" under
|
|
Soviet control. William Blum, in his excellent history of the CIA, lists an
|
|
astonishing range of destruction: "through explosives, arson, short circuiting,
|
|
and other methods, they damaged power stations, shipyards, a dam, canals,
|
|
docks, public buildings, petrol stations, shops, outdoor stands, a radio
|
|
station, public transformation... derailed freight trains... blew up road and
|
|
railway bridges, used special acid to damage vital factory machinery... killed
|
|
7,000 cows... added soap to powdered milk destined for East German schools,"
|
|
and much, much more. These activities were worldwide, and not only directed
|
|
against Soviet-supported governments.
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|
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During 40 years, as the east-west military standoff stabilized, the CIA
|
|
was a principle weapon in waging the north-south dimension of the Cold War. It
|
|
did so through operations intended to destroy nationalist, reformist, and
|
|
liberation movements of the so-called Third World, through political repression
|
|
(torture and death squads), and by the overthrow of democratically elected
|
|
civilian governments, replacing them with military dictatorships. The Agency
|
|
also organized paramilitary forces to overthrow governments, with the contra
|
|
operation in Nicaragua only a recent example. This north-south dimension of
|
|
the Cold War was over control of natural resources, labor, and markets and it
|
|
continues today, as always. Anyone who thinks the Cold War ended should think
|
|
again: the east-west dimension may have ended with the collapse of communism in
|
|
Eastern Europe, but the north-south dimension, which is where the fighting
|
|
really took place, as in Vietnam, is still on. The current Persian Gulf crisis
|
|
is the latest episode, and it provides the Bush administration with the pretext
|
|
to institutionalize the north-south dimension under the euphemism of a "new
|
|
international order," as he calls it. The means will be a continuation of U.S.
|
|
militarism within the context, if they are successful, of a new multi-lateral,
|
|
international framework. Already James Baker has been testing the winds with
|
|
proposals for a NATO-style alliance in the Gulf, an idea that William Safire
|
|
aptly dubbed GULFO.
|
|
|
|
The goal in seeking and obtaining the current stops short, I believe, of a
|
|
shooting war. After all, a war with Iraq will not be a matter of days or even
|
|
weeks. Public opinion in the U.S. will turn against Bush if young Americans in
|
|
large numbers start coming back in body bags. And Gulf petroleum facilities
|
|
are likely to be destroyed in the process of saving them, a catastrophe for the
|
|
world economy. Nevertheless, press accounts describe how the CIA and U.S.
|
|
special forces are organizing and arming guerrillas, said to be Kuwaitis, for
|
|
attacking Iraqi forces. These operations provide the capability for just the
|
|
right provocation, an act that would cause Hussein to order defensive action
|
|
that would then justify an all-out attack.
|
|
|
|
Such provocations have been staged in the past. In 1964, CIA paramilitary
|
|
forces working in tandem with the U.S. Navy provoked the Tonkin Gulf incidents,
|
|
according to historians who now question whether the incidents, said to be
|
|
North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. ships, even happened. But Lyndon Johnson used
|
|
the events as a pretext to begin bombing North Vietnam and to get a blank check
|
|
resolution from Congress to send combat troops and escalate the war.
|
|
|
|
I think the purpose is not a shooting war but a crisis that can be
|
|
maintained as long as possible, far after the Iraqi-Kuwait problem is resolved.
|
|
This will prolong the international threat - remember Truman in 1950 - and
|
|
allow Bush to prevent cuts in the military budget, to avoid any peace dividend,
|
|
and prevent conversion of the economy to peaceful, human-oriented purposes.
|
|
After all, when you count all U.S. defense-related expenses, they add up to
|
|
more than double the official figure of 26 percent of the national budget for
|
|
defense - some experts say two-thirds of the budget goes for defense in one way
|
|
or another.
|
|
|
|
The so-called national security state of the past 40 years has meant
|
|
enormous riches, and power, for those who are in the game. It has also meant
|
|
population control - control of the people of this and many other countries.
|
|
Bush and his team, and those they represent, will do whatever is necessary to
|
|
keep the game going. Elitist control of the U.S. rests on this game. If
|
|
anyone doubts this, recall that from the very beginning of this crisis,
|
|
projections were coming out on costs, implying that Desert Shield would last
|
|
for more than a year, perhaps that large U.S. forces would stay permanently in
|
|
the Gulf. Just imagine the joy this crisis has brought to U.S. military
|
|
industries that only months ago were quaking over their survival in a post-Cold
|
|
War world. Not six weeks passed after the Iraqi invasion before the Pentagon
|
|
proposed the largest arms sale in history: $21 billion worth of hardware for
|
|
defense of the Saudi Arabian throne. Very clever when you do the sums. With
|
|
an increase in price of $15 per barrel, which had already happened, Saudi
|
|
Arabia stands to earn more than $40 billion extra dollars during the 14 months
|
|
from the invasion to the end of the next U.S. fiscal year. Pentagon
|
|
calculations of Desert Shield costs come to $18 billion for the same 14 months.
|
|
Even if the Saudis paid all that, which they won't because of other
|
|
contributors, they would have more than $20 billion in windfall income left
|
|
over. O.K., bring that money to the States through weapon sales. That, I
|
|
suppose, is why the Saudi Arms sale instantly became known as the Defense
|
|
Industry Relief Act of 1990.
|
|
|
|
As for the price of oil, everyone knows that when it gets above $25-30 a
|
|
barrel it becomes counter-productive for the Saudis and the Husseins and other
|
|
producers. Alternative energy sources become attractive and conservation again
|
|
becomes fashionable. Saddam Hussein accepted $21 in July, and even if, with
|
|
control of Kuwait, he had been able to get the price up to $25, that would have
|
|
been manageable for the United States and other industrial economies. Instead,
|
|
because of this crisis, it's gone over $35 a barrel and even up to $40,
|
|
threatening now to provoke a world depression. With talk of peaceful
|
|
solutions, like Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly, they will coax the
|
|
price down, but not before Bush and others in the oil industry increase their
|
|
already considerable fortunes.
|
|
|
|
Ah, but the issue, we're told, is not the price of oil, or preservation of
|
|
the feudal Gulf regimes. It's principle. Naked aggression cannot be allowed,
|
|
and no one can profit from it. This is why young American lives may be
|
|
sacrificed. Same as Truman said in 1950, to justify dying for what was then,
|
|
and for many tears afterwards, one of the world's nastiest police states. When
|
|
I read that Bush was putting out that line, I nearly choked.
|
|
|
|
When George Bush attacks Saddam Hussein for "naked aggression," he must
|
|
think the world has no knowledge of United States history - no memory at all.
|
|
One thing we should never forget is that a nation's foreign policy is a product
|
|
of its domestic system. We should look to our domestic system for the reasons
|
|
why Bush and his entourage need this crisis to prevent dismantling the national
|
|
security state.
|
|
|
|
First, we know that the domestic system in this country is in crisis, and
|
|
that throughout history foreign crises have been manufactured, provoked, and
|
|
used to divert attention from domestic troubles - a way of rallying people
|
|
around the flag in support of the government of the day. How convenient now
|
|
for deflecting attention from the S&L scandal, for example, to be paid not by
|
|
the crooks but by ordinary, honest people.
|
|
|
|
Second, we know that the system is not fair, that about one in three
|
|
people are economically deprived, either in absolute poverty or so close that
|
|
they have no relief from want. We also know that one in three Americans are
|
|
illiterate, either totally or to the degree that they cannot function in a
|
|
society based on the written word. We also know that one in three Americans
|
|
does not register to vote, and of those who register 20 percent don't vote.
|
|
This means we elect a president with about 25 percent or slightly less of the
|
|
potential votes. The reasons why people don't vote are complex, but not the
|
|
least of them is that people know their vote doesn't count.
|
|
|
|
Third, we know that during the past ten years these domestic problems have
|
|
gotten even worse thanks to the Reagan-Bush policy of transferring wealth from
|
|
the middle and poor classes to the wealthy, while cutting back on social
|
|
programs. Add to this the usual litany of crises: education, health care,
|
|
environment, racism, women's rights, homophobia, the infrastructure,
|
|
productivity, research, and inability to compete in the international
|
|
marketplace, and you get a nation not only in crisis, but in decline as well.
|
|
In certain senses that might not be so bad, if it stimulates, as in the Soviet
|
|
Union, public debate on the reasons. But the picture suggests that
|
|
continuation of foreign threats and crises is a good way to avoid fundamental
|
|
reappraisal of the domestic system, starting where such a debate ought to
|
|
start, with the rules of the game as laid down in the constitution.
|
|
|
|
What can we do? Lots. On the Gulf crisis, it's getting out the
|
|
information on what's behind it, and organizing people to act against this
|
|
intervention and possible war. Through many existing organizations, such as
|
|
Pledge of Resistance, there must be a way to develop opposition that will make
|
|
itself heard and seen on the streets of cities across the country. We should
|
|
pressure Congress and the media for answers to the old question: During that
|
|
week between Ambassador Glaspie's meeting with Hussein, "What did George know,
|
|
when did he know it, and why didn't he act publicly and privately to stop the
|
|
invasion before it happened?" In getting the answer to that question, we
|
|
should show how the mainstream media, in failing to do so, have performed their
|
|
usual cheerleading role as the government's information ministry.
|
|
|
|
The point on the information side is to show the truth, reject the
|
|
hypocrisy, and raise the domestic political cost to Bush and every political
|
|
robot who has gone along with him. At every point along the way we must not be
|
|
intimidated by those voices that will surely say: "You are helping that brute
|
|
Saddam Hussein." We are not helping Hussein, although some may be. Rather we
|
|
are against a senseless destructive war based on greed and racism. We are for
|
|
a peaceful, negotiated, diplomatic solution that could include resolution of
|
|
other territorial disputes in the region.
|
|
|
|
We are against militarist intervention and against a crisis that will
|
|
allow continuing militarism in the United States. We are for conversion of the
|
|
U.S. and indeed the world economy to peaceful, people-oriented purposes. In
|
|
the long run, we reject one-party elitist government, and we demand a new
|
|
constitution, real democracy, with popular participation in decision-making.
|
|
In short, we want our own glasnost and restructuring here in the United States.
|
|
If popular movements can bring it to the Soviet Union, that monolithic tyranny,
|
|
why can't we here in the United States?
|
|
_______ __________________________________________________________________
|
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/ _ _ \|Demon Roach Undrgrnd.806/794-4362|Kingdom of Shit.....806/794-1842|
|
|
((___)) |Cool Beans!..........510/THE-COOL|Polka AE {PW:KILL}..806/794-4362|
|
|
[ x x ] |Metalland Southwest..713/468-5802|Lunatic Labs........213/655-0691|
|
|
\ / |The Works............617/861-8976|Ripco ][............312/528-5020|
|
|
(' ') |ftp - zero.cypher.com in pub/cdc |ftp - ftp.eff.org in pub/cud/cdc|
|
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(U) |==================================================================|
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.ooM |1993 cDc communications by Phil Agee 12/30/93-#245|
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\_______/| Save yourself! Go outside! DO SOMETHING! |
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