2695 lines
176 KiB
Plaintext
2695 lines
176 KiB
Plaintext
THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
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This is the first of eleven messages that constitute, in their
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entirety, a translation of a best-selling Japanese book called "The
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Japan That Can Say No." If you read no further in this introductory
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note, please at least read this: the group that has typed in and posted
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this translation wishes to secure for it the widest possible
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distribution. Please collect these numbered essays and mail them,
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either in print or electronically, to colleagues, newspaper editors,
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members of the national and local government, academics, radio talk-show
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hosts, friends, and family; hand them out at work; leave piles of them
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by the coffee machine. Note that the book is rather short, and so can
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be conveniently Xerox-copied.
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This book has been a best-seller in Japan, and has been the subject of
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some attention in the United States; members of Congress have read it, and
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some spoke of reading it into the Congressional Record, but none of them
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ever did that. It has been excerpted in newspaper articles and Usenet
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postings, but these excerpts are always the same, because nearly no one has
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available the full text of a translation.
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This has not been an oversight on the part of the authors, Akio Morita
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and Shintaro Ishihara. Akio Morita is the chairman of Sony, the very large
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electronics conglomerate that has recently purchased Columbia Pictures.
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Shintaro Ishihara has been described in some news accounts as a right-wing
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extremist, and Morita's association with him has been described as a
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foolish mistake. These accounts are very misleading; so nearly as I can
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tell, Mr. Ishihara is no more an extremist in his country than, say, Bob
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Dole is in ours. He is a somewhat right-of-center, charismatic and
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powerful member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party who placed third in
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the race to succeed Prime Minister Sosuke Uno this past August. Ishihara
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has served as the Minister of Transport, and is currently a member of the
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Diet, Japan's legislative body.
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The writers of American news accounts that call Mr. Morita's
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co-authorship of the book with Mr. Ishihara a foolish mistake are making a
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basic error of a sort that has complicated our understanding of the
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relationship between the United States and Japan: they are imagining that
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the reception the book would be given in the United States should have
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played a major factor in Morita's decision. But this book was not written
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to be read in the United States (and, so far, it has not been); it was
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written to be read by a Japanese public that questions the nature of the
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post-war political relationship between the United States and Japan. It is
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a political instrument that has helped to define for the public the
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positions of its authors in much the same way that a popular book of
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political essays might do so for an up-and-coming politician in the United
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States, and more so, because the Japanese read such books more avidly than
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does the American public.
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The book's publisher, Kobunsha Publishing Ltd., has said that it has no
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plans to publish the book in English and has authorized no translations.
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Ishihara and Morita have spoken of how the United States government has
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violated their copyright in distributing translations of the book to
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members of Congress, and Morita has gone on record as saying that he does
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not want to publish the book in the United States, as this might inflame
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relations between the two countries.
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According to rumor, the translations available in Washington have been
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written by either DARPA or the CIA. We have no idea if this is true, or
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which translation this might be; however, it is one of those circulated in
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Washington. It was apparently done in haste (and perhaps by non-native
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speakers of English), as it contains numerous typographical errors, errors
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of grammar, and errors of diction, which we have made no attempt to
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rectify.
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This translation has been entered and electronically distributed by a
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group that wishes to remain anonymous. This is because we have no wish to be
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bear-hugged in court by a powerful Japanese politician and the CEO of an
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immense Japanese conglomerate, all under the approving eye of the U.S.
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Department of State. However, we should like to explain why we wished to
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embark on a project whose success could only worsen the trade relationship,
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and even the political relationship between the United States and Japan.
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We Americans live in a country controlled by a variety of interests.
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Over the past ten years we have repeatedly put into government a group of
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people who cannot even make up their minds as to whether public education
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should be funded; who are against the creation of a national industrial
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policy; and who do not believe that the government should take any steps to
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ensure that manufacturing jobs should continue to exist in the United
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States.
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Like many Americans, those of us who have undertaken to distribute this
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book are able to make up our minds about all of these issues. We believe
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that public education should be one of the first national priorities and
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that the United States should have national industrial and trade policies
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to ensure the continued existence of domestic manufacturing. Our feelings
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about this are based on a simple desire to see the United States maintain a
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decent standard of living for its citizens. People who flip burgers are
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able to realize fewer of their dreams than are skilled laborers who build
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things, not least because people who flip burgers create less value for the
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economy and so make less money.
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How does "The Japan That Can Say No" figure in this? Our country is
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obsessed with feeling good, to the exclusion of good sense. The popular
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conception of our time runs something like this: "Everything's great, just
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like the president says. Those crazy folks on Wall Street go up and down,
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but they do okay, and if some more factories close, if a few shiftless
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characters can't afford housing, what the hell, huh? And those clever
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Japanese, what will they think of next? They're always thinking of neat
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new toys to make for us."
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The reality is much more grim. It seems very possible that in ten or
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twenty years there will be no sector in which American-made products are
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internationally competitive. Many American industrial concerns no longer
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establish domestic manufacturing plants because they are unable to find
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laborers sufficiently skilled to operate them efficiently. We educate fewer
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and fewer engineers each year. Much of American commerce is controlled by a
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managerial class that has been trained mostly in marketing, has trouble with
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simple technical concepts, and prefers the ease of marketing foreign products
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to the complexities of managing manufacturing and development. Meanwhile,
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many American citizens are unable to make ends meet, and their number is
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clearly increasing.
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All of these points are made regularly by domestic policy analysts, to
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absolutely no significant effect. We were struck by the fact that they are
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also made repeatedly in "The Japan That Can Say No," although here they are
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often couched in racist and belligerent language. Ishihara and Morita
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wrote their book for domestic consumption, to promote themselves and
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particular Japanese national policies. We wish to use the book for an
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analogous purpose: we hope that reading "The Japan That Can Say No" will
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help to jolt Americans out of their complacency.
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We believe that the urgency of our country's situation justifies our
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disregard for the wishes of the book's authors. Their interest in analyzing
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the United States' problems seems to be motivated at best by a penchant for
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self-congratulation and at worst by one for jingoistic sentiment and
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self-promotion. The fact that they are attempting to ensure that their
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audience remains exclusively Japanese reinforces our sense that they do not
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see our country's interests as theirs. Still, much of what they say is
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accurate, and we believe that reading it may help our country to act in its
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own interests.
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Consider the analogy of a family who make their living by farming, and
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who are in domestic trouble. The head of the family (say the father) is a
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compulsive gambler, and, although some family members do their best to wake
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him up to the fact that he is destroying the family's livelihood, he pays
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no attention, selling off the tractor, the truck, the cows, mortgaging the
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house and the fields. He points out to his family that his good friends in
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town who run the bank, the general store, and the casino are still happy to
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do business with him. The bank still gives him mortgages, the general
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store still buys what's left of the farming equipment, and the casino
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always lets him in to play.
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Perhaps if the farmer knew he was the laugh of the town, he'd pay some
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attention. If he heard his friends clucking their tongues and saying that
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it was an awful shame, what he was doing to his family and that they didn't
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think he'd ever again get back on his feet, even as they eagerly bought his
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tractor and his fields and continued taking his money at the casino, he
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might think twice. Maybe he'd even realize how far he'd fallen, and set
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about the difficult work of putting his farm back in order.
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If this makes sense to you, please work to disseminate copies of this
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book as much as possible, especially to people outside of the Usenet
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community -- those of us with access to networks are, after all, a small
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minority of the national community. Please feel free to disseminate as
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well this introductory note.
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THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO
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The New U.S.-Japan Relations Card
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by
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Akio Morita
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Shintaro Ishihara
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Published in Japan by Kobunsha Publishing Ltd.
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[the cover sheet then says:]
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Kappa-Holmes
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Translator's Note: The material written by Mr. Morita is very
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straightforward; however, Mr. Ishihara tends to ramble, change from one
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subject to another without much transition, and uses a great deal of
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sayings and proverbs which when directly translated to English make no
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sense. What has been translated is the closest equivalent in English we
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could get.
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THE NECESSITY FOR PRESENT DAY JAPANESE TO REFORM THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS (Ishihara)
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Japanese People Have Become Top Heavy
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Each month, there is the Cabinet meeting for the economic report. I am
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one of those kinds of guys who gets up early and goes before the cabinet
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meeting, which winds up by 9 a.m., or 8 at the earliest. While rubbing my
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sleepy eyes, I go over the reports by the Bureau Chief of the Economic
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Planning Agency and by the Director of the Bank of Japan. Each month, the
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reports are almost identical. Generally, the Cabinet ministers sleep through
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it. When I suggested to the Chief Cabinet Secretary that in this age of
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governmental administrative reform, why not give up these meetings, the
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reponse, not entirely unexpected on my part, was that these were absolutely
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necessary, even if there were some Party executives who did not attend.
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Thus, each month, there is a repetition of a nearly identical report.
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The Bureau Chief of the Economic Planning Agency said this month, just as
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he did last month, that the magnitude of Japan's surplus in international
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revenues was tending to shrink. In other words, this means he is saying that
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it is perfectly alright for business not to be so good. The Cabinet members
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all nod and underline this in red.
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Myself, I thought this was a really strange phenomenon, so I turned to the
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Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Kajiyama, who was sitting beside me, and asked
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what was going on here. Everybody is thinking it's just great that business
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isn't prospering that much and eagerly red-lining that information. Couldn't
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you say, however, that a country like that won't last long? Words, words --
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if the meaning of words keeps changing, you can never be really sure what is
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being said. In other words, aren't our values changing?
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If we take Japan's vast trade surpluses as one type of crisis situation,
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then this points to the necessity of changing Japan's economic and industrial
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structure. While leaving undetermined for the moment whether or not the
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conclusions of the Maekawa Report were valid, it is true that the
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"comprehensive and vast" industries are tending to recede and the lean and
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mean knowledge-intensive types are coming into their own. When the term
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"comprehensive and vast" (jukochodai) is applied to human beings, it is a form
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of praise, while the opposite, "light and small" would be to berate the same.
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However, when these terms are applied to the industrial structure, their
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meaning has come to change.
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What matters, however, is whether or not this is good. Should we all be
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at ease, not that we are not dirtying our hands and sweating in order to make
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things with our own hands? Certainly know-how comes about from one type of
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mental activity, and coming up with it is a work worthy of respect. Looking
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at history, however, in cases where the whole society of the country was using
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their brains instead of their hands, not one has lasted to prosper today. In
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some sense, it may be true that the Japanese people are being forced into a
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new historical experience, but can we go on now, as we are, thinking we are
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the chosen people?
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When looking at the actions of the Japanese people these days, I recall
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that these seem similar to ET, the extra-terrestrial, in the Speilburg films.
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I feel that it may well be the Japanese people will evolve into something like
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ET with pronounced eyes and noses and a big head making them top-heavy, over
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an abnormally thin body and slender arms and legs.
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Therefore, it was impossible for Japan to get more than a few gold medals
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at the Seoul Olympics, which many Japanese read as being abnormal. While it
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may be that this is a sign that a new people has arisen to make contributions
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in other areas, it seems more natural to me that our descendants would be able
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to continue to sweat and work to keep the country strong.
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Japan's Advanced Technology Is at the Heart of Military Strength
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This is something advocated by Mr. Morita, who is a company leader that
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has driven Japan's advanced technology and who is known for manufacturing
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excellent products. He pointed out that the INF limitations (the restrictions
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on intermediate range nuclear forces) was something that the Soviet and
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American leaders cam to each other on. While this was an epoch-making event,
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it was certainly not done because Americans and Russians had a new sense of
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the danger of nuclear weapons, they were not acting from the standpoint of
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human morality.
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There may be some people who took the INF negotiaions as a sign that both
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countries were beginning to act from their sense of humanity, but I think the
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reason why they got together on this is different.
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Whether it be mid-range nuclear weapons or inter-continental ballistic
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missiles, what ensures the accuracy of weapons is none other than compact,
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high-precision computers. As everyone knows, current ICBMs use the MIRV
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concept where there are multiple warheads. When an attacking missile gets
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near enough to be detected, the warhead splits into 8 or 9 separate heads.
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Not all of them contain hydrogen bombs, however, some are dummies designed
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just to dupe the enemy.
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The remaining warheads lose speed, reenter from space, fall, run sideways
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and follow complicated paths, but in the end, they hit the targets picked for
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them by spy satellites and destroy them to within 1 second of latitudinal and
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longitudinal accuracy. For a Soviet ICBM, this would mean hitting the silo
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containing the retaliatory ICBM in Vandenburg AFB California.
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These silos go 50 or 60 meters underground and are strong fortresses
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having thick walls of reinforced concrete. If a direct hit is not scored upon
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them, one cannot destroy the hudrogen bombs inside. The equipment will not
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even be affected as much as it is in an earthquake if a direct hit is not
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made. Thus, it is absolutely vital that a direct hit is made.
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At the present time, Soviet technology allows these missiles to hit within
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a 60 meter accuracy, while for the U.S., it is 15 meters, and there is concern
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that this 15 meters has to be brought down to zero. This type of precision
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calls for a more complex orbit the further the attack proceeds, and only
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artificial intelligence can ensure accuracy. It may well be that America was
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the 4th generation leader and that the 1 megabit and several megabit devices
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which will support the next, the 5th generation, can be developed by American
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know-how. However, to use this know-how across diverse applications,
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including weapons, requires a country with dramatically advanced production
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management; it is only Japan that can deliver on it.
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In sum, if Japanese semiconductors are not used, this accuracy cannot be
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assured. It has come to the point that no matter how much they continue
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military expansion, if Japan stopped selling them the chips, there would be
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nothing more they could do.
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If, for example, Japan sold chips to the Soviet Union and stopped selling
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them to the U.S., this would upset the entire military balance. Some
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Americans say that if Japan were thinking of doing that, it would be occupied.
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Certainly, this is an age where things could come to that. The more
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technology advances, the more the U.S. and the Soviet Union will become
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dependent upon the initiative of the Japanese people -- this is getting crazy
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now, but the point is clear.
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The U.S. Defense Department's Science Commission recently prepared a huge
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classified report on electronic engineering. Looking at this, one can well
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understand the sense of crisis that the U.S. has with respect to Japan.
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The report states that if Japan is left to go as it is, it will be
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impossible to get the lead back. This report is very accurate in assessing
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the areas of weakness in the U.S. and the strengths in Japan, but only the
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President and a few select people have seen the report. If it were seen by
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the general public, it would certainly raise quite a commotion. It is in this
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area where the U.S. specialists have their greatest sense of danger, primarily
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centering on Japan's semiconductor technology.
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--We have grown very dependent upon America's technological superiority in
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military strength. In that technology, electronic equipment is the most
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effective technology. Semiconductors are the "key" to preserving this
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superiority in electronic equipment, they are the "heart of the equipment."
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If competitive, mass production of semiconductors is the key, then this is in
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turn dependent upon having the market to support mass production. --
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This dependence on the market for supporting mass production can be seen
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in that America did not have the vast and diverse needs for semiconductors, as
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Japan did in rice cookers and other household appliances. In Japan, these
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sizable and diverse needs created the market for semiconductor production.
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The report continues:
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--American's Semiconductor Industry for its commercial mass production is
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losing its superiority minute by minute. There is a strong relationship
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between superiority in production technology and superiority in semiconductor
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technology, this is being transferred to foreign countries minute by minute.
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Very soon now, the defense of America will become dependent upon supply
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sources abroad. It is the opinion of the task team that this is something
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which is absolutely unacceptable for the United States. --
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What is meant in the report by "foreign supply sources" is none other than
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Japan. Further, they seem to worry about the following:
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--What is more problematic is that the electronic equipment systems are
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being transferred abroad, where they could more easily get transferred into
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the hands of the Soviet Union.--
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In other words, their sense of crisis stems from the fact that the
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semiconductor technology is absolutely vital in maintaining military
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superiority, and that this might flow from Japan to the Soviet Union. I feel
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that what is behind this abnormal hysteria on the part of this country is that
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this pivotal military technology is in the hands of another country, not even
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Europe, but in the hands of an Asian country, Japan.
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Toshiba, etc. which was speared by COCOM is the gault of this hysteria by
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the U.S. If that had been criticism from the pure perspective of the law, it
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would not for a moment have any basis at all.
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The 1 megabit semiconductors which are used in the hearts of computers,
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which carry hundreds of millions of circuits in an area which is one-third the
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size of your little fingernail, are only made in Japan. Japan has nearly a
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100 percent share of these 1 megabit semiconductors.
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The United States has the know-how to make them, but when it comes down to
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actual production, they don't have the technicians; they don't have the
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employees. Further, they don't have the production management. Because they
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don't have development and production linked into one unit, they guard
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know-how like a jewel.
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America went after cheap labor and set up factories in Southeast Asia,
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where they could make 256k chips (1/4 the capacity of 1 megabit chips), but
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they could not catch Japan. Now, Japan is at least 5 years ahead of the U.S.
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in this area and the gap is widening. There is even some kinds of basic
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research which cannot be accomplished without using one of these advanced
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computers. It take excellent computers in order to develop other advanced
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computers -- it is a cycle of technology. In other words, the bigger the gap
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in advanced computer technology, the more difficult it is to catch up.
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The current situation in the world is that those kinds of computers are
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central to military strength and therefore central to national power. This is
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why the U.S. is being driven so hard. For example, in performing simulations
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of what elements would be needed by aircraft flying at mach 2, a regular
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computer might take 40 years to perform the necessary computations. If the
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same query is put to a new, advanced, computer, however, the answer will come
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out in a year. Japan has almost the total share of the 1 megabit chips which
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are at the heart of these computers. In that sense, Japan has become a very
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important country.
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There Is A Need for Japanese to Change Their Consciousness in Light of High
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Technology
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As the world goes smaller, and issues in the world further settle down,
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whether it be China or Siberia, development will proceed. In order to get the
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needed access (participation in the market), the most important possibility
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lies in linear technology. Japan and West Germany are the most advanced
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countries in this research and development, and the theoretical base of
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Japanese technology is far superior. West Germany has given up in research on
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superconducting, but Japan has cleared three technological obstacles which
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were envisioned by West Germany.
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To make a long story short, the West German magnetic floating train
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development realized a levitation of only 8mm, but Japan's "Maglevel"
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superconducting linear motorcar realized a levitation of 10 centimeters, and
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speeds of 500 kilometers per hour. This type of technology does not exist
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anywhere in the Soviet Union or the United States, it only exists in Japan and
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West Germany. If the giants in the economic field and the politicians can
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joing together around this type of technology, it would open up new
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possibilities for our advancement. Whether or not this can be achieved
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depends upon our large and small choices in the future; in sum, it is a
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question involving the sensibilities of our politicians.
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There is a Jiyu Shakai Kenkyu-kai (Free Society Research Association)
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which is presided over by Mr. Morita. This was formed more than 10 years ago
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as an association of politicians and businessmen. I am the youngest, but I
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also participate. We get together for discussions one or twice per year.
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Recently, Mr. Kissinger predicted that Japan might become a military
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superpower. This, however, was not the foolish step of Japan getting ICBMs
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and refurbishing the old Yamato battleship, it pointed to the danger that no
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matter how much the U.S. or Soviet Union developed space, equippped themselves
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with space platform weapons, the military initiative to control these would be
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dependent upon Japanese technology. The question now is whether Japan has
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politicians who accurately understand the history behind what we have now
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become.
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We Japanese now face choices on whether we can boldly proceed or stand
|
||
back quietly. It may be possible that Japan can secure a new culture for
|
||
itself based upon the skeleton of the development of high technology. We must
|
||
not restrain ourselves to what we have done up to this point. The dregs of
|
||
the postwar period are too prominent in the consciousness of Japanese. I feel
|
||
that however hesitatingly, the revolution in our consciousness has already
|
||
begun.
|
||
The Soviet Union implemented a revolution in consciousness with its
|
||
criticism of Stalinism, and China achieved the Great Cultural Revolution. The
|
||
United States also realized a type of consciousness reform through its bitter
|
||
experiences in the Vietnam War. Japan is the only one which has not felt the
|
||
need for some kind of reform since the end of the war. We do not need a
|
||
drastic reform of consciousness, but rather, a smooth reform based upon the
|
||
technology that we have developed for ourselves. I think that only by doing
|
||
this will we realize a society which is mature in the true sense of the word.
|
||
pon the initiative of the Japanese people -- this is getting crazy
|
||
now.
|
||
|
||
THE DECLINE OF AN AMERICAN WHICH CAN ONLY SEE 10 MINUTES AHEAD (Morita)
|
||
|
||
|
||
American Neglects the Significance of Production
|
||
|
||
The gist of the Ishihara message is the importance of production
|
||
activities.
|
||
I have had frequent occasion to deliver speeches, both in Europe and in
|
||
the United States, due to the nature of my business activities, and have
|
||
involved myself in many debates at international conferences. As a result of
|
||
my conversations with Europeans and Americans, I have become very aware of and
|
||
concerned about the fact that they appear to have forgotten the importance of
|
||
production activities.
|
||
Americans make money by playing "money games," namely M&A (mergers and
|
||
acquistions), by simply moving money back and forth. If you look at the
|
||
exchange rate, for example, the dollar is now worth about 120 Japanese yen,
|
||
and enormous and quick profits are made by just moving money by computer,
|
||
satellite, and even by telephone.
|
||
The summer before last, I had the opportunity to talk to a group of three
|
||
thousand foreign currency dealers, who specialize in buying and selling money,
|
||
at a conference on the future of money transfers and financing. I have been
|
||
known to be critical of the floating exchange rate system. Talking to money
|
||
dealers about my ideas was like telling stockbrokers that the movement of
|
||
stock prices is wrong; it takes a lot of courage. I stressed that money
|
||
should not be the subject of speculation, because the fundamental function of
|
||
money should not be to enrich banks and security companies, but to smooth the
|
||
path of production activities. It has been said that America is entering a
|
||
so-called post-industrialist society where the weight of the service industry
|
||
sector is growing. Yet, when people forget how to produce goods, and that
|
||
appears to be the case in America, they will not be able to supply themselves
|
||
even with their most basic needs.
|
||
Last summer, a friend of mine who is always criticizing Japan for being
|
||
"unfair" invited me to his summer home to play golf. At the first tee, I
|
||
pulled out my MacGregor driver whereas my friend had a Japanese Yonex club. I
|
||
criticized him for using Japanese clubs since he had been telling everyone not
|
||
to buy Japanese products. He responded simply: "These clubs give me better
|
||
distance." Well, I was not able to sacrifice distance and so I kept quiet.
|
||
After the game, he invited me to his house and while his wife was preparing
|
||
dinner, he showed me around. In the garage, I saw a Kawasaki snowmobile,
|
||
which he said he needed because winters in the northern part of New York State
|
||
have a lot of snow. Next to it was a Japanese motor boat, which he said he
|
||
needs because his house is surrounded by lakes. I also saw an off-road
|
||
vehicle made in Japan.
|
||
Finally, dinner was ready and as I went into the house, I saw a Sony
|
||
television and numerous other Japanese-made products. I said, "You criticize
|
||
us all the time for not buying American products while it's obvious that you
|
||
prefer Japanese products. Are you asking us to buy something you won't buy
|
||
yourself?"
|
||
Americans today make money by "handling" money and shuffling it around,
|
||
instead of creating and producing goods with some actual value.
|
||
|
||
|
||
America Looks 10 Minutes Ahead; Japan Looks 10 Years
|
||
|
||
I delivered a speech in Chicago entitled "Ten Minutes vs. Ten Years." I
|
||
stated that we Japanese plan and develop our business strategies ten years
|
||
ahead. When I asked an American money trader, "how far ahead do you
|
||
plan...one week?" The reply was "no, no...ten minutes." He was moving money
|
||
through a computer, targeting the fate of that transaction ten minutes later.
|
||
So, as I told the Americans, we are focusing on business ten years in advance,
|
||
while you seem to be concerned only with profits ten minutes from now. At
|
||
that rate, you may well never be able to compete with us.
|
||
A well-known economist, Peter Drucker, wrote recently: "Americans cannot
|
||
live in a symbol economy where businessmen play only with numbers; Americans
|
||
should come back to a real economy where money moves in accordance with real
|
||
production acitivities."
|
||
Unfortunately, in America, stocks are owned and handled by institutional
|
||
investors whose fund managers actually buy and sell stocks in huge numbers in
|
||
an attempt to maximize profits in a given short period of time. At the
|
||
slightest increase in stock prices, they sell, and when the profit margin of
|
||
any company declines as a result of poor management, they sell before the
|
||
company's stock prices begin to decline. For them, the name of the game of
|
||
nothing but quick profits.
|
||
It is expected that the American service industry will flourish. This
|
||
includes finance and financial services, where entrepreneurs and investors
|
||
alike do not leave their money in long-term projects, such as the ten-year
|
||
projects that have been implemented in Japan. The American economy is, then,
|
||
an economy without substance. It must return to a real production economy.
|
||
In America, R&D is closely linked to the military budget. R&D in the
|
||
private sector is heavily dependent on military expenditure. As a result, a
|
||
corporation can engage in the development of a new fighter without worrying
|
||
about profit or loss. On the other hand, budget constraints on NASA and the
|
||
military agencies will directly reduce the volume of R&D.
|
||
A ten-minute profit cycle economy does not permit companies to invest in
|
||
long term development. There are some exceptions, such as IBM, AT&T, DuPont,
|
||
and some others. But they do not represent the mainstream of American
|
||
business nowadays. Gradually but surely, American business is shifting toward
|
||
a symbol economy. In addition, it seems fashionable to call the service
|
||
industry the "futuristic third wave" and information and intelligence is the
|
||
business of the future. But these produce nothing. Business, in my mind, is
|
||
nothing but "value added;" we must add value and wisdom to things and this is
|
||
what America seems to have forgotten. And this is the most deplorable aspect
|
||
of America today.
|
||
Japan will do fine as long as it continues to develop and produce things
|
||
of tangible value; a shift from high-technology industry to quick profits from
|
||
the money game will only serve to accelerate the degeneration of the country.
|
||
We must take precautions against such developments, providing for, for
|
||
example, tax advantages for long term investments.
|
||
It is even more the case in America. A quick profit from a stock deal
|
||
should be taxed at a higher rate than those on long term investments. Capital
|
||
gains should be subject to a lower rate of taxation.
|
||
Recently I said, "America is supposedly the number one industrial country
|
||
in the world. Why don't you have a Department of Industry?" Seated next to
|
||
me was the chairman of the Ford Motor Corporation, Mr. Caldwell, who replied,
|
||
"that's right - we are supervised by the Department of Transportation." The
|
||
Department of Transportation is interested in emissions control and highway
|
||
safety, but has no interest or jurisdiction over the future of the automobile
|
||
industry in the United States.
|
||
America is the only nation among the advanced industrial countries that
|
||
does not have a Department of Industry which is responsible for industrial
|
||
policy. Instead, the Department of Commerce and USTR preside and their only
|
||
real concern is trade-related matters and they criticize others for the
|
||
failure of American industry.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan's Impact on the World Economy Will Be Recognized
|
||
|
||
|
||
The American Economy appears to be deteriorating. I assume that the Bush
|
||
administration will take steps to tackle the present problems, but the country
|
||
as a whole seems to be extremely nonchalant about the so-called twin deficits:
|
||
budget and trade.
|
||
There seems to be the feeling that Reaganomics raised the standard of
|
||
living, taxes are relatively low, and they can buy goods from all over the
|
||
world. When the Republicans captured the White House again, I began to wonder
|
||
if there was any sector in America which was truly concerned about the twin
|
||
deficits since Bush repeatedly denies any possibility of a tax increase. How
|
||
in the world do the Americans expect to restore their economy?
|
||
Let's examine the price of gasoline. Consumption of gasoline is growing
|
||
rapidly, yet the price is still below a dollar a gallon. The ongoing world
|
||
price per gallon is $4 U.S. A one-cent per gallon tax increase means an
|
||
additional $10 billion; think what the government could get if they levied an
|
||
additional 25 cents per gallon. Yet the government will not even begin to
|
||
initiate such a move.
|
||
In fact, even with such an additional tax, American gasoline prices will
|
||
still remain less than international prices. Politicians are simply afraid of
|
||
losing votes by adopting unpopular policies. Some of my closest American
|
||
friends have said that Bush could have been elected without promising not to
|
||
raise taxes. He has so firmly committed himself and his Administration to not
|
||
raising taxes, yet it is so obvious that the twin deficits cannot be solved
|
||
without additional national revenue.
|
||
Bush should have been more realistic if he was, and is, honestly concerned
|
||
with the American bugdet crisis. Tactically, he could have said early on that
|
||
he would not raise taxes, but as he gained support, he should have become more
|
||
honest and direct, and told the people that it was necessary to pursue a more
|
||
realistic financial policy. On the contrary, he confirmed his pledge even
|
||
after he was elected. Solutions to the deficit problem seem even more remote.
|
||
This being the case, the U.S. dollar has continued to decline, and the
|
||
U.S. has had to increase interest rates to further attract foreign money to
|
||
the U.S., for which it will have to pay a great deal of interest. The result
|
||
is an increasingly vicious circle.
|
||
The U.S. inflation situation might well become an even more chronic
|
||
phenomenon. Economic growth without inflation is ideal, whereas endless
|
||
inflation might well bring the dollar's value to the level of trash. This, in
|
||
turn will make European and Japnese assets trash since sizable asset of both
|
||
are in U.S. dollars.
|
||
Both the Europeans and the Japanese cannot sit idly by, ignoring or
|
||
overlooking the trend in the American economy. At one time, when the U.S.
|
||
dollar was very high, the Japanese and Europeans asked Americans if "they
|
||
could absorb the trade deficit caused by the high dollar?" At that time,
|
||
Treasury Secretary Regan was of the opinion that the U.S. dollar should stay
|
||
high and strong. When James Baker became the new Secretary of the Treasury,
|
||
he recognized the problem and entered into the Plaza Accord to lower the value
|
||
of the dollar.
|
||
The American economy does not stand alone. It is not only a domestic
|
||
issue. The collapse of the American economy would cause a worldwide disaster.
|
||
1987's Black Monday chilled all nations momentarily. I am not a pessimist,
|
||
but I cannot help thinking that unless the Bush Adminstration handles economic
|
||
issues very seriously, a worldwide collapse is not just a worry, but a very
|
||
real possibility. The ever-growing American inflation and thus its economic
|
||
crisis will not only make other nations catch cold, but bring their economies
|
||
into crisis as well.
|
||
It is said that Japan contributed to efforts to stop a possible disastrous
|
||
chain reaction ignited by Black Monday which began in America and soon
|
||
affected the London stock market as well. At that point, the Japanese
|
||
Ministry of Finance asked Japanese institutional investors to support prices
|
||
for a time, which instantly normalized Japanese stock prices. Later, the
|
||
chairman of one of the major U.S. banks, who was visiting Japan, told me, "It
|
||
was Japan who put a stop to the chain reaction and it was the Ministry of
|
||
Finance who was able to move the Tokyo stock market. The Japanese government
|
||
now has the clout to sustain Wall Street and the City of London. So-called
|
||
Japanese guidance is truly powerful."
|
||
This gentlemen went on to say, "we are worried about the fact that the
|
||
Japanese people are unaware of the fact that they have a significant impact on
|
||
the world economy. And I believe that it is true that Japan's economic status
|
||
has been much enhanced."
|
||
Like it or not, this is the picture held by Americans, and the Japanese
|
||
people have to recognize it and, inevitably, they have to behave in accordance
|
||
with that status in the world community today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
RACIAL PREJUDICE IS AT THE ROOT OF JAPAN BASHING (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
|
||
America Will Never Hold Its World Leadership Position Unless It Ends Its
|
||
Racial Prejudice
|
||
|
||
I had the opportunity to visit Washingotn, D.C. in April a year ago, and
|
||
was suprised at the very hostile atmosphere. It was only five days after
|
||
Congress passed the resolution condemning Japan on the semiconductor issue. I
|
||
met some of my old friends, senators and congressmen, who with subtle smiles
|
||
admitted that racial considerations, or more directly, racial prejudice,
|
||
played a role in US-Japan relations. This was after I had discussed several
|
||
concrete examples with them. Although they shied away from the subject of
|
||
racial prejudice as if it were taboo, they did admit that it is there.
|
||
Initially, they violently denied my allegations, citing that the Pacific
|
||
War of 40-some years ago as the only real source of prejudice against the
|
||
Japanese. I declared that it was not as simple as that. It appears that the
|
||
Americans were firmly of the opinion that it was the West, namely
|
||
Euro-Americans, who established modernism. My reaction was as follows.
|
||
It may be true that the modern era is a creation of the white race, but
|
||
you have become somewhat presumptous about it. In the pre-modern era, Asiatic
|
||
races such as Genghis Khan and his armies raided the European continent,
|
||
destroying towns and villages, looting and raping. Yet at that time, many
|
||
Europeans actually imitated the style and behavior of Khan's hordes, cutting
|
||
their hair short, shaving their eyebrows, and walking menacingly with knees
|
||
apart. That was nothing compared to the strange ways in which modern
|
||
Europeans and American adopt the style and fashions of some of the
|
||
present era's heros, such as the Beatles and Michael Jackson.
|
||
Even Asian kids do this. Probably Khan was some kind of cult figure
|
||
then and while women regarded him as a "hero" of sorts.
|
||
Some say that the roots of the so-called "yellow peril" can be traced back
|
||
to the atrocities committed by Khan and his men. At any rate, we should keep
|
||
in mind that there is prejudice committed by Khan and his men. At any rate,
|
||
we should keep in mind that there is prejudice against Orientals, as the
|
||
following episode illustrates.
|
||
I had a chance to talk with the Secretary of the Navy about the Amber
|
||
System. Amber is supposed to be the color of caution and danger and this
|
||
system is named for this concept. Under the Amber System, ordinary vessels
|
||
such as tankers and container ships, are equipped with sonar on their bows.
|
||
The sonar can detect underwater objects. Some objects are rocks, etc. which
|
||
navigational charts will show. What the system is looking for are nuclear
|
||
submarines.
|
||
The Amber System alone cannot detect the nationality of the submarines
|
||
detected; it cannot tell if they are American, Russian, or whatever. It
|
||
simply detects the presence of some foreign object and this information is
|
||
relayed directly to the Pentagon, which knows what is on the navigational
|
||
charts and also where U.S. subs are located, so they will be able to ascertain
|
||
whether the particular sub is American or not.
|
||
I suggested that the Navy equip all Japanese commerical vessels with this
|
||
system. Japanese seamen are reliable and the Japanese merchant marine travels
|
||
all the oceans and seas. Japanese vessels, including our oil tankers, could
|
||
gather information along vital cargo routes and the U.S. could analyze the
|
||
information received from the Japanese ships.
|
||
To my suprise, the Americans said that it was none of Japan's business. I
|
||
asked that how, in light of the very limited number of U.S. ships, how can you
|
||
deny the need for such assistance. Their answer: "We cannot leave such a
|
||
critical matter with Japan." I asked if it was appropriate to involve the
|
||
British and the Germans, and they said it would be.
|
||
The fact of the matter is that Americans do not trust Japan. Japan would
|
||
have no basis with which to analyze the information collected by the Amber
|
||
System, yet they were still worried about the Japanese reliability in merely
|
||
collecting the information. It seems that in their minds, even the Sovients
|
||
are more trustworthy than the Japanese. American racial prejudice toward
|
||
Japan is very fundamental and we should always keep it in mind when dealing
|
||
with the Americans.
|
||
During the Second World War, Americans bombed civilian targets in Germany,
|
||
but only on Japan did they use the atomic bomb. While they refuse to admit
|
||
it, the only reason they could use the atomic bomb on Japan was because of
|
||
their racial attitude toward Japan. The fact that they actually dropped the
|
||
atomic bomb on Japan is sufficient indication that racial prejudice was a
|
||
factor.
|
||
It is my firm conviction that the roots of the U.S.-Japan friction lie in
|
||
the soil of racial prejudice. American racial prejudice is based upon the
|
||
cultural belief that the modern era is the creation of the white race,
|
||
including Americans. This confidence appears a bit overwhelming, probably due
|
||
to America's relative youth as a nation, which tends to blind it to other
|
||
cultures. If Americans were ever to be made aware of the presence of a real
|
||
Japanese culture in the Azuchi-Momoyama period as did the Spanish and
|
||
Portuguese missionaries, they might develop some respect for Japanese cultural
|
||
history. Unfortunately, the present American education system does not teach
|
||
children the value of other cultures. In the period noted above, there were
|
||
over 20,000 "terakoya" schools all over Japan. No other nation had such an
|
||
extensive schooling system at such an early point in their history.
|
||
During the Edo period, even farmers and peasants were able to read and
|
||
write at least one or two thousand characters, including hiragana and
|
||
katakana. Japan already, at that time, had a complete postal network, called
|
||
"hikyaku" as far as the southernmost end of Kyushu. Documents and information
|
||
fo various kinds were avialable in libraries in many cities and towns.
|
||
This is the kind of information I give to Americans who exhibit ignorance
|
||
of our culture. Unfortunately, most Americans don't like to see these facts,
|
||
and they tend to change the subject. In short, their historical prejudice and
|
||
cultural narrowness has reached a point where they cannot see another's point
|
||
or see the value of another culture. All this has made Americans, in the post
|
||
war period, very irritable on the issue.
|
||
The American position at this point seems to be that the British and
|
||
Germans can play whatever role the Japanese could, and can do so without
|
||
irritating the U.S. Americans are essentially an honest people, and in fact
|
||
do admit to the existence of racial prejudice, if they are pressed on the
|
||
subject, which I do. However, this is not enough. They should also admit
|
||
that prejudice does not hold any solutions to the problems developing in the
|
||
world today. It is important that they face the situation, aware of the
|
||
historical context, seeing that the reality is that the power in the world,
|
||
including the economic power, is shifting gradually from West to East. It may
|
||
not be as strong a shift as is expressed in the expression the "Pacific era,"
|
||
but at any rate it is in America's interest to rid itself of prejudice against
|
||
Asis, including that against Japan, in order to maintain a position of
|
||
leadership in the world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan Should Become More Cosmopolitan
|
||
|
||
The calendar clearly indicates that we are moving toward the end of a
|
||
century, and with it is coming the end of the modern era as developed by white
|
||
Westerners. History is entering a period of new genesis. The promoter of
|
||
this era is Japan as well as the U.S. It is a historical development which
|
||
America's political leaders should make known, so that America will be better
|
||
equipped to meet the tasks of the future.
|
||
The Japanese have their own problems. They may have to go through a
|
||
mental evolution to meet the needs of this new era. As Mr. Morita has pride
|
||
and confidence in the products of his company, an attitude which has made him
|
||
a truly cosmopolitan man, so must the Japanese develop pride and confidence in
|
||
our culture and our technology. We cannot become overbearing, which will not
|
||
be tolerated in the new era, but by the same token, an inferiority complex is
|
||
equally harmful. The Japanese people must move out of their current mental
|
||
stagnation; I feel this is especially important for Japanese diplomats.
|
||
Except for the young and especially qualified, most Japanese diplomats
|
||
suffer from a peculiar inferiority complex [and] as a result are spreading the
|
||
seeds of misunderstanding throughout the world. When I was young, I had the
|
||
opportunity to live with one of Japan's ambassadors and his family. He was a
|
||
hell of a nice guy -- a really wonderful human being. However, he seldom
|
||
socialized with anyone. At the end of a game of golf, if someone suggested
|
||
dropping into the lounge for beer, he would refuse, saying that he preferred
|
||
to have one when he got home. This is the same attitude that some Japanese
|
||
have when they won't even accept a cup of tea while a guest in another's home.
|
||
It may be for most Japanese that only in his home and only with his family can
|
||
he really relax. If this is true, then the Japanese can never truly be
|
||
cosmopolitan. When the heads of some of Japan's top trading companies, such
|
||
as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, wanted to join prestigious country clubs in the
|
||
countries in which they were stationed, their applications were rejected
|
||
because it was felt that Japanese were too parochial, staying to themselves
|
||
and not socializing with others. Some Japanese diplomats don't hesitate to
|
||
show their inferiority complex. One ambassador even publicly said that the
|
||
Japanese were a race a "pygmies." Such things happen all the time!
|
||
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to cover up the news of the firing
|
||
training by an American cruiser (the Towers, 3370 tons) last year in Tokyo
|
||
Bay. A single cannon on the Towers, the Mark 42, can send a 32kg ball over 23
|
||
kilometers at 36 rounds per minute. American authorities said non-explosive
|
||
training ammunition was being used. But even these could easily damage of
|
||
Uraga class Japanese Coast Guard frigate (33231 [sic] tons), not to mention
|
||
what it could do to small fishing vessels. Tokyo Bay is a busy commerical
|
||
harbor, similar to New York Harbor inside the Verrazano Bridge. American
|
||
television reported that the American people would be furious if that happened
|
||
in their country.
|
||
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Japanese media to hold the story
|
||
until further notice, since that event was incidental. I was very angry and
|
||
protested, saying that I would release the news on my own. This happened on
|
||
Japanese soverign territory in an area clearly barred from such firings due to
|
||
the fact it was a vital maritime channel. It was a clear violation of Japan's
|
||
sovereign rights. I observed that "It was like seeing a ranking Self Defense
|
||
Agency official firing his service revolver at the Ginza junction." I still
|
||
feel the same way.
|
||
Americans can say that they are here to protect Japan under the U.S.-Japan
|
||
Security Treaty. But at times, it appears to me that the Americans behave
|
||
more like mad dogs instead of watch dogs.
|
||
I use the term "mad dogs" when referring to the Americans recalling that
|
||
Mr. Shiina, Deputy President of the LDP, used it when he was Foreign Minister.
|
||
This is another instance where "no" clearly [must be] said when that is what
|
||
is meant [and] would be useful. One must say "no" when he means "no" and
|
||
failure to do so reduces credibility. In the case of the U.S.-Japan
|
||
relationship, such an attitude only further increases American racial
|
||
prejudice. The Japanese people should know that they are in essence
|
||
protecting American interests as the new era in international relations
|
||
begins, something the Americans seem quicker to sense. This is the reality of
|
||
the U.S.-Japan relationship today.
|
||
|
||
BASHING JAPAN GETS VOTES (Morita)
|
||
|
||
The Paradox of Welcoming Investment but Criticism of Japan
|
||
|
||
I am worried about the tide of attitude in America with respect to Japan.
|
||
The U.S. Government and the Congress have adopted a number of harsh policies
|
||
with respect to Japan. Some 37 states in the U.S. have established offices in
|
||
Tokyo. Since I am responsible for investment-related matters in the Keidanren
|
||
(Federation of Economic Organizations), when the state governors visit, I am
|
||
the one to meet with them, if my time permits.
|
||
It never fails, they are always coming to Japan saying, "invest, please
|
||
invest." Just when I am about to assume that America welcomes Japanese, U.S.
|
||
congressmen elected from these same states are bashing Japan. The state
|
||
government has no involvement with this, of course, but they are saying to
|
||
Japan's big business, "come on, come on."
|
||
"What in the world is the meaning of this?" I wonder. In addition,
|
||
recently a number of famous academics and journalists have published books
|
||
which are critical of Japan. Recently, there has been a book, "Buying into
|
||
America" which suggests that Japan is buying up America, and there is a book
|
||
called "Yen" which envisions a future after the year 2000 in which Japan uses
|
||
its financial power to control the world. The latter is rather calm in its
|
||
perspective, but both books reveal a clear Japanese menace - the tides have
|
||
really shifted since "Japan As Number One" was published.
|
||
|
||
A book written by a famous journalist which depicts Japan in a very harsh
|
||
light has become a best seller, so this is indicative of the critical attitude
|
||
on Japan held by the American masses. The more this attitude increases,
|
||
politicians will beat up on Japan in an attempt to make votes for themselves,
|
||
because getting votes is the most important aspect of being a politician.
|
||
The politicians themselves are not at all concerned, however. When asked
|
||
why they bash Japan, they respond that if they say "Japan is good," votes will
|
||
drop off. If Japan is bashed, further, if a Toshiba radio-cassette player is
|
||
smashed, this is not indicative of hating Toshiba, but they think if they do
|
||
such things, votes will increase.
|
||
The state governments welcome Japanese industry because if they invest in
|
||
their state, tax collections increase, along with employment, but among the
|
||
American people, the attitude with respect to Japan is becomming more and more
|
||
critical.
|
||
The Keidanren has established a "Council for Better Investment in the
|
||
United States," which is the English language name of the council (literally
|
||
it is the "Council for Investment in the U.S." - translator). What we mean by
|
||
"better investment" is the type of investment which will get Americans on
|
||
Japan's side. If the number of Americans who view things the way Japan does
|
||
increases, then bashing Japan will cause lower vote counts. That would
|
||
probably make politicians stop bashing Japan.
|
||
I think that it is vital that we help build a feeling of friendship among
|
||
the American masses with respect to Japan. At the present time, everyone buys
|
||
Japanese goods and is delighted with them. They do not hate Japanese
|
||
products. What makes them hate Japan, however, is that when Japanese
|
||
businesses enter the American society, they have the feeling that foreigners
|
||
are coming.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japanese Industries in the U.S. Should Work at Community Service
|
||
|
||
Direct investment in the United States is currently expanding very
|
||
rapidly. The end result of this is that Japanese companies, including Sony,
|
||
have established themselves in local districts throughout the country. When
|
||
the English or French invest in a local area, the communities and local
|
||
society do not see this as an invasion of foreigners. However, when the
|
||
Japanese come, they feel that strangers, or something foreign has entered
|
||
their midst. This gives them strong feelings of fear and anxiety.
|
||
|
||
To give a simple example, when Japanese go to the U.S., their children go
|
||
to schools. The schools have an organization, the P.T.A. This stands for
|
||
Parent and Teachers Association. The corresponding organization in Japan is
|
||
called the "Fathers and Brothers Association" but no fathers and brothers
|
||
participate, it is more of a "mothers and sisters" association. Myself, I
|
||
have never attended the Fathers and Brothers Association in Japan. In the
|
||
case of America, however, husbands go with their wives to attend meetings for
|
||
their elementary school or local area school and discuss how those schools
|
||
should be run. In Japan, it is the mother's duty to take care of educational
|
||
matters for the children, so the father does not attend. In America, however,
|
||
when the father takes off work to attend a PTA meeting, his company does not
|
||
charge him leave. The man, therefore, must go to the PTA meetings.
|
||
When I was living in the U.S., I went to PTA meetings where I was able to
|
||
associate with persons from various walks of life. My daughter went to the
|
||
Nightingale Bonford School in Manhattan and my son went to St. Bernards. I
|
||
got to know Stokowski (the late) conductor at one of the PTA meetings. John
|
||
Gunther, a very influential behind-the-scenes man was also someone I met
|
||
through [the] PTA; he is now the Ambassador to Austria. Henry Grunwald, the
|
||
editor of Time, was [the father of] a classmate of my daughter's who I also
|
||
got to know.
|
||
At a gathering of Japanese businessment in the United States, I got up and
|
||
told them "to go as a couple to the PTA to get to know the other people
|
||
involved and to start getting personally involved in the school." The people
|
||
I was speaking to made such remarks as "I don't like to hear that," or "Why do
|
||
we have to do that?" When I told them there was actually a meeting the other
|
||
night and asked what they did, the responses were "I was too busy, I sent my
|
||
wife," or "My wife can't speak English, so she just gossiped with the other
|
||
Japanese women and came home." Because of instances like this, there is no
|
||
doubt that the PTA would view them as the foreigners who'd come to town.
|
||
Also, when Sunday morning came, the whole community dresses up and goes to
|
||
church. At that time, however, the Japanese are all walking in the opposite
|
||
direction to the country club. When they are asked why they are not going to
|
||
church, they are likely to respond that "I'm a Buddhist," or a similar reply.
|
||
I'm not saying that they should necessarily go to church, but it is natural
|
||
for the people in the community to think that some really strange foreigners
|
||
are in their midst when they see them all trotting off to the golf course on
|
||
Sunday morning.
|
||
I golf in America too. But I always do it with foreigners. When Saturday
|
||
night comes, I take my wife to the country club, have dinner and talk with the
|
||
other members. However, golf for Japanese is usually a business-related
|
||
event; there are usually guests from Japan and a group solely composed of
|
||
Japanese people plays the course. This is another way in which a strange
|
||
image is transmitted to the local community.
|
||
Another example is that American wives often volunteer their spare time
|
||
for community service activities, such as preparing Braille for the visually
|
||
handicapped. Japanese housewives normally do not participate in such
|
||
activities.
|
||
There are also public fund-raising dinner parties for local community
|
||
centers, which do not involve mere contributions, it is a major social event
|
||
where funds are raised. Tickets for the party are $30, $50, $100 and $200
|
||
which represent contributions to the fund-raising event. They view
|
||
participation in these events as a contribution to their local society. While
|
||
this is a little different than the golf example above, it is another area
|
||
where Japanese isolate themselves as strange foreigners.
|
||
It is vital that we participate in the local society in order to resolve
|
||
any racial problems. When Japanese build factories in the United States,
|
||
these usually go to the regional or rural areas due to the large amount of
|
||
space they require. In such a small community context, if Japanese avoid
|
||
contributing to the local community, they will be disliked in the area, and
|
||
then the people of that area will cast their votes for Japan-bashing
|
||
politicians.
|
||
One Japanese company that had established in the U.S. had its headquarters
|
||
in Japan make a very substantial contribution to build a community center, in
|
||
an effort to counter any averse prejudice, even though the local company had
|
||
not yet become profitable. The local community was delighted and named the
|
||
hall after the company that had contributed. When the plant manager was
|
||
reassigned back to Japan, the whole community threw a "sayonara" party for
|
||
him.
|
||
I am not saying that all Japanese companies coming to the United States
|
||
are bad, but just a little kindness and consideration can turn around
|
||
attitudes about Japanese people. The Council for Better Investment in the
|
||
United States is trying very hard to get this information out in an effort to
|
||
have the Japanese company weave itself into the fabric of the local community
|
||
in which it is locating.
|
||
At the current time, two hundred and forty or fifty companies who have
|
||
invested in the U.S. are members of the Council, but it aims to attract even
|
||
more members.
|
||
Information about these efforts is gradually becoming known in the U.S.,
|
||
and this has already done much to change perceptions there. I think Japanese
|
||
people in the U.S. are also making better efforts.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Let's Build an American Society Where Japan Bashing Causes Votes to Decline
|
||
|
||
Therefore, I think that the only way to erase the perception Mr. Ishihara
|
||
points to where Japanese are disliked just for being Japanese is to make the
|
||
above types of efforts. This is because they [Americans] are stubborn and not
|
||
likely to be induced by saying "you guys change."
|
||
I have so many American friends myself that I have been accused of being
|
||
an American. Since I have lived in America and have been counted as a friend
|
||
by many Americans, I am not overly sensitive to what is said about me. As
|
||
Ishihara has said, to Americans, they feel that because their hair color is
|
||
different, it is difficult for them to know what Japanese are thinking. I
|
||
think there is another important point. The structure of the Japanese
|
||
language and English is different, and this affects our discussions together.
|
||
I have written this elsewhere in a book, but when Japanese read Chinese,
|
||
they put in arrows and symbols to change word order, but Chinese read it
|
||
directly and understand the meaning of the sentence immediately. English is
|
||
the same kind of language, which is read one word after another. In sum, this
|
||
means that Americans have a different sequential order in thought processes.
|
||
Therefore, no matter if you use interpreters, it is impossible to interpret in
|
||
the same sequential order as the thought processes that that generated the
|
||
words in Japanese. Thus, when a message is to be delivered, it is regrettable
|
||
but true, that the sequential thought process of Japanese is in the minority
|
||
in the world. When communicating with occidentals, who are in the majority,
|
||
if things are not communicated in an order they can comprehend, they do not
|
||
understand what we are saying. It is necessary that we be cognizant of this
|
||
disadvantage that Japan has in this area.
|
||
While the color of our hair will never be identical to Americans, from the
|
||
point of view of practical businessmen, I think we must recognize that if the
|
||
current trade imbalance with the U.S. is not rectified, America will always
|
||
say Japan is at fault. If Japanese business does not go to the U.S. with
|
||
manufacturing and sales to bring down the imbalance, there is no way the
|
||
problem will be rectified. We must bring our factories to foreign shores, and
|
||
invest in these areas where our goods are sold.
|
||
At this point, if there are any racial problems, it would be the fault of
|
||
the Americans, but that does nothing to resolve them. Through the success of
|
||
Japanese-American citizens' groups, racial problems are not so prominent
|
||
anymore. When the Second World War began, all Japanese-Americans were placed
|
||
in detention camps.
|
||
In the United States, people having different colored skin have realized
|
||
great successes. An example is the Wang company which was founded by a
|
||
Chinese. In our quest to find out why it is only Japan that is bashed, it
|
||
would be a bit strange to say it is because Japan is not internationalized,
|
||
but it is really because we have been lax in not following the "when in Rome,
|
||
do as the Romans do" in incorporating ourselves in the local community. I
|
||
think this is why we remain foreign. That is exactly why I am saying we need
|
||
to make such efforts. I am not saying that everything they do is alright, but
|
||
I am saying there is a need for internationalization by both parties, and we
|
||
have the need to do business.
|
||
The internment of Japanese-Americans during the war was a prime example of
|
||
the emotionalism that the U.S. displayed with respect to Japan. After the
|
||
passage of 40 years, the President has finally publicly recognized that this
|
||
was wrong. It would be nice if emotionalism with respect to Japan ended right
|
||
there, but that is not the case. An example is the Toshiba clause included in
|
||
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Bill -- no buying of Toshiba products --
|
||
Toshiba Machine is bad.
|
||
I said in a speech that this was a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
|
||
This was due to the provision in the Constitution that proscribes the
|
||
enactment of laws which would deal retroactively with crimes. It also allows
|
||
anyone accused of a crime the opportunity to defend himself. In the process
|
||
of compiling this bill, sanctions were put on Toshiba for its crime. Toshiba
|
||
had already been punished for its crime under Japanese law; but by adopting
|
||
these sanctions restricting Toshiba's business activities, the Bill would
|
||
impose retroactive punishment.
|
||
When I recently spoke in Seattle, I suggested that this Bill was
|
||
unconstitutional, that it was an emotional response, and that it should be
|
||
treated as an emotional international issue, which was similar in substance to
|
||
the internment of Japanese-Americans during the war.
|
||
When something can become this emotional, perhaps Mr. Ishihara is right in
|
||
his contention that racial problems lie at the root of the problem. During
|
||
the occupation era, the Americans built fences and stayed inside and didn't
|
||
mingle too much with the Japanese people. This created an unpleasant
|
||
atmosphere. Now, however, there are no occupation zones and we are at peace,
|
||
we must behave appropriately and associate with each other.
|
||
If we do make efforts in this direction I have indicated to establish a
|
||
framework where Japan-bashing politicians are rewarded by fewer votes for
|
||
their efforts, there is no doubt that political pressure will be exerted to
|
||
the point where there can be no reduction in frictions between the countries.
|
||
Thus, it is my way of thinking that Japan must take the kind of action
|
||
this situation calls for.
|
||
|
||
|
||
AMERICAN ITSELF IS UNFAIR (Morita)
|
||
|
||
|
||
America Lacks Business Creativity
|
||
|
||
Americans and Europeans are always saying "We're getting ripped off by
|
||
Japan. They take the ideas we have invented, make products, and then the
|
||
onslaught comes. We are being damaged, they're disgraceful." Japan has
|
||
certainly done better more recently, but the U.S. and Europe are very much
|
||
advanced in basic research.
|
||
Last year, I was invited to speak to about 100 researchers who worked at
|
||
the Bell Laboratories at ATT.
|
||
The Bell Laboratories have about 7 people who have won the Nobel Prize.
|
||
To me, it seemed that I would be speaking before some of the greatest men of
|
||
our time. Prior to the speech, I was shown around the Bell Laboratories,
|
||
where a number of wonderful research projects were underway.
|
||
As you must know, the transistor and the semiconductor, which are at the
|
||
root of the current revolution in industry were invented at the Bell
|
||
Laboratories. It really brought home to me how wonderful America was.
|
||
The basic message I brought that day was that this type of research was
|
||
extremely significant academically in terms of both science and culture, but
|
||
to be significant from the standpoint of business and industry, two other
|
||
types of creativity, in addition to the creativity required to make the
|
||
original invention, were absolutely necessary.
|
||
Industry requires three types of creativity. The first, of course, is the
|
||
basic creativity necessary to make technological inventions and discoveries.
|
||
This alone, however, does not make for good business or good industry.
|
||
The second type of creativity that is necessary is that involving how to
|
||
use this new technology, and how to use it in large quantities and in a manner
|
||
that is appropriate. In English, this would be called "product planning and
|
||
production creativity."
|
||
The third type of creativity is in marketing. That is, selling the things
|
||
you have produced. Even if you succeed in manufacturing something, it takes
|
||
marketing to put that article into actual use before you have a business.
|
||
The strength in Japanese industry is in finding many ways to turn basic
|
||
technology into products and using basic technology. In basic technology, it
|
||
is true that Japan has relied on a number of foreign sources. Turning
|
||
technology into products is where Japan is number 1 in the world.
|
||
Sony was the first company in Japan to license the transistor patent from
|
||
Bell Laboratories, back in 1953. At that time, the transistor was only being
|
||
used in hearing aids. We were repeatedly told to take this transistor and
|
||
manufacture hearing aids.
|
||
When we brought this new transistor back to Japan, however, Mr. Ibuka of
|
||
Sony said, "There is not much potential in hearing aids, let's make a new
|
||
transistor and build radios." At that point, we put all of our energies each
|
||
day in developing radios which used transistors. One of our researchers
|
||
during this development effort, Mr. Esaki, subsequently went to work for IBM
|
||
where he earned a Nobel Prize, but it was at our company where he did work
|
||
worthy of the Prize. There are a number of Japanese who have received Nobel
|
||
Prizes, but Esaki was the only one who worked for a research laboratory of a
|
||
company. We poured money into development of new transistors, and developed
|
||
small radios for the market, an effort that was worthy of the Nobel Prize.
|
||
It was an American company, however, who made the first transistor radio.
|
||
I became a salesman, and took my product with full confidence to the United
|
||
States to sell it. Prior to this sales effort, the newest invention was a
|
||
vacuum tube type of amplifier which required a lot of space. When the
|
||
American company, which was a famous radio manufacturer, was initially
|
||
rebuffed by people telling him "since we have this great sound and large
|
||
speakers, who would want to buy your little radio?", that company just quit
|
||
trying to manufacture transistor radios.
|
||
We, however, had something else in mind as a way to sell these radios.
|
||
"Currently in New York, there are 20 radio stations broadcasting 20 different
|
||
programs during the same time frame. If everyone had their own radio, then
|
||
each person could tune in to the program he or she wanted to listen to. Don't
|
||
be satisfied with one radio for the whole family, get your own radio. The
|
||
next step was to do the same for televisions." This was a new marketing
|
||
concept. One radio for one person became a kind of catch phrase in this
|
||
campaign and the result was that Sony transistor radios became famous
|
||
throughout the world.
|
||
While it was true that Sony was second in developing the transistor radio,
|
||
the company who did it first lacked the marketing creativity, so without much
|
||
thought, they simply quit and pulled out of the market.
|
||
|
||
America has stopped manufacturing things, but this does not mean that they
|
||
do not have the technology. The reason why the link between this technology
|
||
and business has not been firmly connected is because they lack the second and
|
||
third types of creativity, turning products made with the new technology into
|
||
a business. I feel that this is a big problem for them. This exact area
|
||
happens to be Japan's stronghold for the moment.
|
||
When I went to speak at the Bell Laboratories, I got the chance to look at
|
||
a lot of their research on advanced technology. I felt that they may well
|
||
come up with something new that was even more important than the transistor,
|
||
but since Bell Labs is a part of ATT, they are not thinking of anything except
|
||
telecommunications applications. There is not one person there who is
|
||
thinking about how to use the new technology they are developing as a
|
||
business. I think that this is one area where the U.S. comes up wanting. It
|
||
is my feeling that even though times are good in American now and employment
|
||
is up, the time will never again come when America will regain its strength in
|
||
industry.
|
||
There is a television network in the U.S. called CBS. CBS has a weekly
|
||
program which airs every Sunday evening called "60 Minutes," which has a very
|
||
high viewership rating. This is a news program which devotes segments just
|
||
under 20 minutes to various stories and opinion from around the whole world.
|
||
More than 10 years ago, I was on the program. This is a program that takes a
|
||
lot of money to produce. A crew followed me around Europe for about 6 months
|
||
to prepare the segment.
|
||
Now they want me to do another one. A cameraman followed me to London,
|
||
and when I went to Singapore, they followed me there too. the other day, a
|
||
famous and beautiful interviewer in the U.S., Diane Sawyer, came to Japan to
|
||
interview me for the program. We spent a long time in front of the TV
|
||
cameras, and the questions grew sharper. This made me mad and at the end, it
|
||
was like we were in a fight.
|
||
She asked me what I thought of Lee Iacocca. Since this is a program he
|
||
would be sure to see, I was frank in my statements. I said he was a disgrace,
|
||
and that he was unfair. Iacocca comes to Japan and says Japanese are unfair.
|
||
Very recently, he headed his sentence with, "Let me make myself very clear,"
|
||
and then he went on to slander Japan. I know he wrote that book which
|
||
labeled Japan as "unfair" but I think it is Iacocca who is unfair, and that
|
||
is what I said.
|
||
When I was asked why he was unfair, I answered clearly, in front of the
|
||
camera.
|
||
The president of a Chrysler company came to Japan. I had met this person
|
||
before. I knew he was involved in selling Chrysler automobiles, so I asked
|
||
him how sales were going. He turned to me and said quite plainly that he had
|
||
not come to Japan to sell cars, but he had come to purchase Japanese parts and
|
||
engines. He said he had come to Japan to buy Japanese products so they could
|
||
sell them in the U.S.
|
||
At the present time, the three big automobile manufacturers have purchased
|
||
250,000 automobiles from Japan in 1987. How many have they sold to Japan?
|
||
Only 4,000. They make no effort at all to sell their cars in Japan, and then
|
||
call Japan unfair because Japan sells too much in the U.S. and Japan will not
|
||
buy their products.
|
||
One of the reasons why U.S.-Japan relations are in such a mess is that
|
||
Japan has not told the U.S. the things that need to be said.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan Has Not Forced Its Sales on the U.S.
|
||
|
||
When I go to foreign countries, I hear that Japanese work too much. But why
|
||
is working too hard so bad? Our society cannot continue to eat unless we keep
|
||
producing products. People have to have products in order to live. They use
|
||
golf clubs, and drive automobiles. If they want these products and do not
|
||
wish to import them, they must manufacture them. I am a businessman. I am
|
||
not forcing my customers to buy things from me. We expend our energies on how
|
||
to make our products most attractive to the customer.
|
||
The Americans say that there is a U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, and it is
|
||
not because Japan is not buying U.S. products or because Japan is forcibly
|
||
selling the products. There are few things in the U.S. that Japanese want to
|
||
buy, but there are a lot of things in Japan that Americans want to buy. This
|
||
is at the root of the trade imbalance. The problem arises in that American
|
||
politicians fail to understand this simple fact. It could never be the case
|
||
that we are selling too much; it is not because we are exporting; the
|
||
imbalance arises as a result of commercial transactions based on preferences.
|
||
Therefore, the only thing that Americans or Europeans can do to correct
|
||
this imbalance is reassess themselves and make an effort to produce products
|
||
which are attractive to Japanese consumers. It is in this area where I would
|
||
like to see Japanese politicians get courage enough to expound abroad to our
|
||
trading partners.
|
||
Recently, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Verity brought representatives of 25
|
||
companies to Japan who wanted to sell their company's products in Japan. I
|
||
was the person responsible for welcoming this group, and I told them Japan
|
||
would do its best to help out. I remarked, however, that I had been doing my
|
||
best to sell Japanese products in the United States over the past 30 years.
|
||
Yet, not once had the Minister of International Trade and Industry accompanied
|
||
me and helped out in my efforts. I asked the Secretary of Commerce if it was
|
||
his intention to create an "America Incorporated." Secretary Verity smiled,
|
||
but everyone else laughed out loud.
|
||
The Government of Japan has, in both the good sense and the bad sense,
|
||
passed along various types of administrative guidance, which have been
|
||
criticized by foreign countries as being an alliance between government and
|
||
business -- even if the Minister of international Trade and Industry does not
|
||
go on trade missions.
|
||
One of the Americans in the group then asked me why the Japanese
|
||
government backed up Japanese industry. Let's think about it. Even though
|
||
the government does not own one share of my stock, I pay more than half of my
|
||
profits to the government in taxes. If my business does not do well, the
|
||
government does not receive more revenues. Thus, the government, we feel, is
|
||
a kind of partner. I asked them why American industries, which are paying
|
||
taxes to the government say, "the government is trying to control industry;
|
||
don't touch us." Your viewing of the government as the enemy seems strange.
|
||
During this visit, Secretary Verity did voice his support for cooperation
|
||
between government and business to sell products, but it is my feeling that
|
||
the establishment of a framework for this type of cooperation is still a long
|
||
way off.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Let Us Think About the Role Japan Should Play in the World
|
||
|
||
On the other side of the question, however, there are certainly aspects of
|
||
Japan which are "unfair" when viewed from the U.S. perspective. When you
|
||
consider what Japan has done for the world in the course of its becoming the
|
||
second largest economy, I think this is an area where Japan is in line for
|
||
some critical reflection.
|
||
Recently, since the time of Prime Minister Takeshita, Japan has been
|
||
making enormous efforts to become the second most open country in the world
|
||
for trading. The long-boiling problems over beef and citrus imports were
|
||
gradually resolved through efforts directed at those problems. However, from
|
||
the perspective of Americans, Japan has still not done what it should do. I
|
||
am not saying we should put more money in defense spending, but if we are not
|
||
to exceed 1% of GNP on defense, then the government should put more money into
|
||
Official Development Assistance (ODA) (foreign aid), which helps the other
|
||
countries of the world.
|
||
In addressing the ODA to GNP ratio, of the 18 countries in the world who
|
||
provide foreign aid, Japan is number 15. Also, if we look at the amount of
|
||
non-loan foreign aid for which there is no remuneration, Japan is number
|
||
eighteen of eighteen. I shrink when I am asked whether that record is
|
||
something Japan can be proud of.
|
||
Almost all U.S. corporations make donations of about 1 percent of their
|
||
pre-tax profits to the community -- using some of their money for the
|
||
community is a kind of custom with them. In Japan too, we also make some
|
||
contributions to return money to society, and at the current time many
|
||
Japanese companies are returning more than 1 percent.
|
||
But when Japan is looked at as a state, it is perceived as unfair by the
|
||
rest of the world because it is not returning some of the benefits it reaps
|
||
from the world back into the world society.
|
||
Therefore, when I speak before Japanese groups, I emphasize what is meant
|
||
when America says Japan is acting disgracefully. I tell them, "Shouldn't we
|
||
review what we are doing once again?" Japan should be bold in telling the
|
||
U.S. what it needs to be told, but at the same time, Japan must establish a
|
||
code of standards for the role it should be playing in the world.
|
||
Japan should open its markets to the extent where there would be no room
|
||
for their complaints, and money that Japan has should be provided to help
|
||
developing countries where people are not being oppressed. This would be a
|
||
magnificaent behavior on Japan's part, and I think that Japan needs to become
|
||
aware of its responsibilities.
|
||
Certainly the full opening of our markets and advancing large sums of
|
||
money for developing countries is very painful. However, things will not get
|
||
better in the world until the pain is shared more equitably. How much pain do
|
||
you think was involved during the Meiji Restoration where the privileged class
|
||
of samurai gave up their power, cut their special hair styles, and tossed out
|
||
their swords? It allowed a bloodless revolution to take place within Japan.
|
||
Mr. Ishihara has said there is a need for a reform of consciousness in
|
||
Japan. He is exactly on the mark. If we do not reorient our consciousness
|
||
from the perspective of being international people, then I do not feel Japan
|
||
will be able to continue to walk the globe as an economic power.
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE CRITICISM OF JAPAN AS AN IMITATOR IS OFF THE MARK (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
|
||
The America Which Closes Its Eyes to Its Own Unfairness, and Criticizes Japan
|
||
|
||
The more I hear Americans bellowing complaints that Japan is unfair, the
|
||
more I would like them to calm down and think. An example is a harsh exchange
|
||
between myself and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. It was a coincidence, but
|
||
at the time when Commerce Secretary Verity visited Japan, there had been an
|
||
agreement for an American company to participate in the second phase
|
||
construction at Haneda International Airport. Verity was in Japan, and his
|
||
mission included offering his thanks for this deal. However, I threw some
|
||
cold water on him by saying that this would be the only time I would permit
|
||
such a big commotion over such an issue.
|
||
The U.S. Congress had been criticizing Japan for having a "closed" market
|
||
in large construction projects. In fact, however, there was only one U.S.
|
||
construction firm that had been licensed to work in Japan - two, if you count
|
||
pending applications. They say that the barriers are too thick, but I think
|
||
that anyone wishing to do business in a foreign country has to make some
|
||
adjustments to correspond to the local conditions.
|
||
After we went back and forth along that line, I commented that Japan's
|
||
design for the Airport Building and the Shinkansen [bullet train] station,
|
||
including the interior was poor -- not refined enough and too idiosyncratic.
|
||
I went on to say that this might well be something which could be consigned to
|
||
a foreign country.
|
||
This was true of Narita International Airport too. I noticed the other
|
||
day that the pillars were painted with rust-proofing primer coat. When I
|
||
suggested to the person in charge that he get busy and have them painted, he
|
||
said, "Mr. Minister, did you just notice this? They have been that way since
|
||
the airport was completed." When I asked why, he replied that it was OK this
|
||
way because of the contrast between the red, white and black. When I asked
|
||
whose design that was, he calmly replied that the painting contractor had made
|
||
the determination.
|
||
Actually, there is not even a bar in the whole airport. One might like to
|
||
have a drink to ease one's tension about flying before the flight, or one
|
||
after to relax. Foreign airports always have a place where you can get a
|
||
drink. Day or night, there is a place where the customer can get a drink.
|
||
This is an integral part of air travel.
|
||
When I relayed these stories, Secretary Verity nodded his head, indicating
|
||
that he understood my point. You could tell he was the Commerce Secretary,
|
||
because when we went on to discuss the Kansai Airport, he said it would be a
|
||
great idea if American companies could do the design.
|
||
Just that would be nice, he went on, but after it is completed, he said
|
||
that the same number of U.S. aircraft should be permitted to fly from the
|
||
airport as was permitted by Japanese carriers. I replied sharply, "No, that
|
||
won't do." He turned colors and asked back, "Why not?"
|
||
There is an aviation treaty between the U.S. and Japan. It is a relic of
|
||
the occupation era. Not only is it not balanced, it is outright unfair.
|
||
Among the mutually agreed upon rights in this treaty is the right for air
|
||
transport to points in the signatory country, and for rights from those
|
||
airports to points beyond in third countries. These rights are all rights
|
||
held unilaterally by the U.S. side. American can fly into whatever Japanese
|
||
airport it pleases and then fly to anywhere else. In other words, it has
|
||
unlimited rights to fly through Japan to destinations beyond.
|
||
Japan, however, only has the right to navigate through limited airports,
|
||
the economically unprofitable routes from San Francisco->New York->Europe.
|
||
Actually, these routes are not even being used. During the U.S.-Japan Summit
|
||
in 1982, we were allowed two flights per week from Los Angeles to Rio and San
|
||
Paulo Brazil. One of the concerns on the Japan side is that Nippon Cargo
|
||
Airlines (NCA) was finally obtaining 9 flights weekly in 1985 on the
|
||
Tokyo->San Francisco->New York route.
|
||
However, in exchange for this, America got the right to land jumbo jets in
|
||
Japan, and then fly from there further in small cargo aircraft to Manila,
|
||
Taiwan, and Korea. The most profitable rights went to the U.S. in this
|
||
agreement too. In the midst of all this, Japan cannot get the right to fly a
|
||
cargo aircraft in and out of Chicago.
|
||
While points of origin are limited by land space, Japan is restricted to
|
||
just three points, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. America can fly to Japan from 19
|
||
airports. Looking at the number of flights, according to a study made in
|
||
November of 1988, Japan had 204.5 and the U.S. 371 passenger flights, and 60
|
||
cargo flights for Japan versus 170 for the U.S. This is really unfair of the
|
||
U.S. to be party to the U.S.-Japan Aviation Treaty which gives it so
|
||
overwhelming of an advantage.
|
||
American specialists are well aware of this situation, so they do not want
|
||
to engage in further negotiations. This type of situation continues while the
|
||
U.S makes selfish assertions.
|
||
I explained to the Secretary that since the U.S. maintained that attitude,
|
||
it was at fault. The Secretary said he knew nothing of these matters. I
|
||
pointed out to him that we couldn't even begin talking about getting
|
||
negotiations started if he knew nothing about these matters.
|
||
An official from the State Department was accompanying the Secretary on
|
||
his visit. He was an honest guy, and told the Secretary that the Treaty was
|
||
indeed unfair. Secretary Verity became troubled. It was a very strange
|
||
atmosphere between the Commerce Secretary and the official from the State
|
||
Department, standing there in front of me, a Japanese. America is not the
|
||
solid rock we thought it to be.
|
||
For example, relations are extremely poor between the Department of
|
||
Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative. Yeutter and Verity quarreled like
|
||
dogs and monkeys, they never got along and were always bad mouthing each
|
||
other. While none of these references about these two went on in front of me,
|
||
there was an official from the U.S.T.R in the delegation who was there to keep
|
||
an eye on things.
|
||
Anyway, once the potential for a scene between the Secretary and me had
|
||
quieted down, the "spy" from the U.S.T.R. caught my eye and said "Hang in
|
||
there." I laughed, thinking what an interesting country the U.S. was.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan, A Country Where Each Person Is Highly Creative
|
||
|
||
America closes its eyes to its own unfairness and criticizes others. I
|
||
think that it should not be forgotten what such a shifty country has done.
|
||
As Mr. Morita has pointed out, it is off the mark to say that Japan has
|
||
relied on the U.S. for the creativity to develop technology, and then has just
|
||
cleverly developed and marketed it. Americans and Europeans say that Japan
|
||
can do nothing but imitate, but it is not right for Japanese themselves to
|
||
begin to agree with such a statement. The Japanese people have been possessed
|
||
of creativity for ages.
|
||
There has been a gradual increase in the number of Americans and Europeans
|
||
who recognize creativity in the Japanese. The same can be said for cultural
|
||
creativity.
|
||
Take the field of literature. Some while ago, the French did not
|
||
recognize Japanese literature at all. They did not think it had any value.
|
||
More recently, however, the French have grown to appreciate Japanese
|
||
literature more and more. The reason for this is quite interesting; it came
|
||
about because of Japan's high technology. That is, foreigners who were
|
||
interested in Japan's high technology began studying the Japanese language and
|
||
started reading modern Japanese novels.
|
||
They recognized that modern Japanese literature was indeed quite
|
||
interesting. It was not their masters of literature or translators who
|
||
pointed this out, but the intelligentsia who were coming from scientific
|
||
backgrounds.
|
||
In any case, I do not think we should stand still and agree that outside
|
||
of literature, we are still nothing but imitators as the Americans say. It is
|
||
time that Japanese take pride in their own spontaneous creativity and march
|
||
forward.
|
||
Sony developed the transistor [possible ambiguity in translation -- as
|
||
Morita notes in essay 4, Sony licensed the transistor from Bell Laboratories
|
||
in 1953] and took it to the U.S. market and changed the way Americans thought.
|
||
In other words, they ripped apart the immutable principle of one radio per
|
||
each family. The concept of making radios a personal appliance was nothing
|
||
other than an exhibition of creativity on the order of that shown by Columbus.
|
||
The bountiful creativity of the Japanese is not something which can only
|
||
be seen in a few of the elite, but something which can be broadly witnessed
|
||
across the board in the general citizenry.
|
||
Japanese technology has found its way to the very heart of the world's
|
||
military forces. I think this the product of the integration of our
|
||
creativity.
|
||
Even if you have one creative genius, unless you can produce the product
|
||
of his creativity in a factory, it will not come to anything. It takes a
|
||
large number of excellent general technicians and excellent employees or one
|
||
will not begin to see the light of day.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Excellence of Japanese Products Relates to the Educational High Level of
|
||
the Employees
|
||
|
||
One can partially grasp the superiority of Japan's technological ability
|
||
in the low rate of break down in Japanese products. The vital element in the
|
||
excellence of technology and in tackling the problem of product break downs is
|
||
possible because of the excellence in abilities of the general employees.
|
||
The U.S. Boeing Corporation which was scrutinized due to an aircraft crash
|
||
was found to have problems with its employees' work methods, and they quickly
|
||
set about making improvements. Certainly the re-education of the management
|
||
could be undertaken quickly to the satisfaction of Japan and other countries,
|
||
but since the level of the general employees was so low, concern remains in
|
||
that area. When the president of Boeing's Seattle plant was asked: "How long
|
||
will it take after re-education has begun before the technological strength
|
||
[of your company] will begin bearing fruit?" His answer was seven years.
|
||
Seven years! How can we ride around in jumbo jets for seven years not knowing
|
||
what types of defects they might have?
|
||
As we learned from the tragic Boeing crash in Japan, all of those
|
||
responsible got off, bearing no criminal responsibility. The legal systems in
|
||
Japan and the U.S. are different: in Japan, a national inspector is sent out,
|
||
but in America, aircraft manufacturers are not held responsible. The Boeing
|
||
company did not even name the responsible persons. They say that it is better
|
||
to prevent a recurrence than to spend all of their energies in finding fault,
|
||
but the thinking that exemption from prosecution is the only way the truth can
|
||
be told is something that is very hard to take for the families of those
|
||
killed in the accident. According to an investigation by the Japanese police,
|
||
there were four Boeing employees who should have been further pursued to
|
||
assess their responsibility. The U.S. side acknowledges this.
|
||
The Boeing accident was nothing more than a worker's mistake -- it
|
||
happened well before the crash. There was no follow up after the crash except
|
||
to say that the maintenance operations were sloppily done. While the
|
||
specifications had called for three thick divider walls to be tightly bolted
|
||
on, it just was not done.
|
||
Bolts had been placed on the left and right, but they did not reach
|
||
through the three sheets, just to the second one. This caused a serious
|
||
weakening of the aircraft strength. This tells the story of the low level of
|
||
the people who are performing maintenance.
|
||
Despite the fact that they are employees of the Boeing Corporation, a
|
||
world-class manufacturer of aircraft, it would still take 7 years to
|
||
re-educate them. This is a story which could not be comprehended in Japan's
|
||
industrial circles.
|
||
The United States wants everyone to buy American-made semiconductors, and
|
||
these are even being used in Japan, but the number of defective ones is
|
||
amazingly high. When we complain, the answer is: Japan is the only country
|
||
that is complaining, nobody else has any complaints. It leads me to think
|
||
that there is no hope for the U.S.
|
||
The manufacturing defect rate in the United States has improved somewhat
|
||
recently, but it is still 5 to 6 times higher than that in Japan - it used to
|
||
be 10 times higher. The report by the task team in the Pentagon also admits
|
||
this.
|
||
To contrast this with Japan, I would like to insert the following episode.
|
||
This is an episode illustrating the exceptional knowledge and decision
|
||
making capability of one female employee of the Kumamoto plant of Nippon
|
||
Electric Corporation(NEC). For one reason or the other, the rate of rejects
|
||
at the Kumamoto plant had been higher than it was at other NEC plants. No
|
||
matter how hard they tried, they could not get the reject rate down. If it
|
||
could be done in other plants, why couldn't it be done in Kumamoto? There
|
||
were all-hands meetings with the plant supervisor daily on this problem.
|
||
One day, a female shift worker at the plant stopped at a crossing for the
|
||
Kagoshima Line which ran in front of the factory. This was on her way to
|
||
work. It was a rare event, but this day, she had to wait while a long freight
|
||
train passed. Rumbling vibrations were sent through her legs as the train
|
||
passed. The thought crossed her mind that these vibrations might have some
|
||
sort of adverse effect on the products made at the plant. While she was
|
||
working, she paid attention to the time and stopped when a train was scheduled
|
||
to pass by. In the factory, however, she couldn't feel anything unusual. She
|
||
still wondered, however, if the machines were not being affected. She
|
||
reported her concerns to the foreman, suggesting that the precision machinery
|
||
in the plant might be so affected.
|
||
The plant supervisor said, "That's it." He reacted immediately by digging
|
||
a large ditch between the plant and the railroad tracks and filling it with
|
||
water. The result was a drastic decline in the number of rejects.
|
||
That woman was 18 years old. This woman took pride in the products made
|
||
by her company and identified with it. It is my feeling that this type of
|
||
result is due to the vast differences in our formal education system.
|
||
In any case, when it comes to economics among the free world countries,
|
||
the basis for existence is economic warfare, or, if that is too harsh of [a]
|
||
word, in economic competition. It is probably natural, therefore, that
|
||
various cheerleading groups of the other party will rough you up by calling
|
||
you unfair, but we cannot stand still and be defeated just because our
|
||
adversary is making a lot of noise. This is exactly the position Japan is in
|
||
today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
IS AMERICA A COUNTRY WHICH PROTECTS HUMAN RIGHTS? (Morita)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Workers' Rights Are Ignored by American Companies
|
||
|
||
American demands of Japan may increase in the future but America has a
|
||
great many defects of its own, to which we must continuously direct its
|
||
attention.
|
||
My long observation of American corporations leaves me puzzled about
|
||
American human rights legitimacy. Human rights are held to be such high moral
|
||
values in America and it preaches on the subject continuously all over the
|
||
world. America has been criticizing and condemning nations such as South
|
||
Africa and Afghanistan on human rights issues; however, I must ask Americans
|
||
if they are applying these same standards to their own workers.
|
||
American corporations hire workers right and left and build new plants all
|
||
over whenever the market is bullish, in an attempt to maximize their profits.
|
||
Yet once the tide shifts, they lay off workers simply to protect company
|
||
profits. These laid-off workers have nothing to do with poor market
|
||
conditions.
|
||
American corporate executives are of the opinion that it is a corporate
|
||
right to pursue maximum profits and that fired workers should be able to live
|
||
on their savings. However, people do not work for wages alone. Work has more
|
||
meaning to most people than just as a means of subsistence. A Japanese worker
|
||
has a sense of mission in holding his job for his lifetime as well as
|
||
supporting the corporation which provides him with meaning to his life. This
|
||
may well not be the case in America. American workers may only expect a
|
||
comfortable wage for their work. However, this attitude could change. People
|
||
can easily develop loyalty to a group or to a company to which they belong,
|
||
depending upon conditions and guidance provided. This sense of loyalty to the
|
||
company is a formidable asset. Repetitive hiring and firing denies any
|
||
possibility of cultivating a sense of loyalty.
|
||
I must ask American executives if they regard workers as mere tools which
|
||
they can use to assure profits and then dump whenever the market sags. It
|
||
seems that workers are treated simply as resources or tools rather than as
|
||
human beings with inalienable rights. I would like to suggest that they
|
||
should first do something to protect the human rights of workers in America
|
||
before they start asking other nations to protect and enhance the human rights
|
||
of their citizens. There are good reasons why American labor unions must be
|
||
confrontational in protecting their members and attempting to assure maximum
|
||
wages during periods of employment since they have no assurance that the jobs
|
||
will continue. Attitudes of executives are not actually much different than
|
||
those of the union to the extent that they grab whatever they can - as much as
|
||
half the company's annual profits in the form of huge bonuses, claiming that
|
||
this is just since they were responsible for the profits.
|
||
A corporate chairman with whom I am acquainted, complained that he has no
|
||
use for all the money he receives. His company is doing well and his income
|
||
is in the multi-million dollar a year range. His children are all grown and
|
||
he and his wife already have vacation villas, a yacht and a private airplane;
|
||
he said they just have no way to spend any more money on themselves.
|
||
Japanese executives work morning to night to improve the position of their
|
||
companies, and yet the majority of their salaries are wiped out by taxes. The
|
||
income gap between American and Japanese business executives is astounding.
|
||
In Japan, even if one works very hard to increase his income to assure himself
|
||
of some of the amenities of life, there is no way that he could expect to
|
||
equal the luxuries enjoyed by American executives. Mr. Matsushita, probably
|
||
the wealthiest man in Japan, when traveling abroad with his secretary, uses
|
||
regular commercial flights. Having a private plane is simply out of his realm
|
||
of consideration.
|
||
There is some talk in Japan concerning levying taxes on profits generated
|
||
by the founder of a corporation. I am opposed to this proposal as I believe
|
||
the spirit of free enterprise must be protected. While an unbridled pursuit
|
||
of personal gain is not ideal, those who have created new business through
|
||
extraordinary effort and who have made this contribution to society, should be
|
||
rewarded financially to a certain extent as this will provide encouragement to
|
||
young people, motivating them to follow their dreams and create new
|
||
industries.
|
||
The current popular idea that everyone belongs in the middle class and the
|
||
wealthy are suspect may undermine the very basis of a free economy. The
|
||
Liberal Democratic Party, however, tends to accept this premise, as put forth
|
||
by the opposition for the sole purpose of parliamentary manipulation, which is
|
||
a shame since they have a 300-seat majority.
|
||
Japan has been a practicing free economy and a good majority of the people
|
||
do in fact belong to the so-called middle class, which I think is marvelous.
|
||
We have no real social classes and everyone is free to choose whatever
|
||
profession or occupation they wish.
|
||
Today in Japan, nearly all company executives dine out on company accounts
|
||
and ride in corporate-owned cars. As a child, I never saw this kind of lavish
|
||
living by corporate executives such as my father. He had a car and a
|
||
chauffeur, but they were financed directly by him, out of his own pocket. It
|
||
would be beyond his comprehension to use a company car and driver for his
|
||
personal use. I am not particularly opposed to such benefits enjoyed by
|
||
today's executives, as they can be correct rewards and incentives.
|
||
American corporate practices, from my personal observations, are extreme.
|
||
An example is the so-called "golden parachute," which is the ultimate
|
||
executive privilege. When one's reputation as an executive is well
|
||
established, and he is hired by another company, his contract may well contain
|
||
these "golden parachutes." The executive may demand a certain percentage of
|
||
corporate profits as his bonus, or perhaps some stock options. Upon
|
||
retirement, he may still receive his salary for a number of years. Should he
|
||
pass away during this period, his wife may be entitled to receive all or a
|
||
percentage of these benefits. Should he be fired, for whatever reason, he may
|
||
still collect his salary under his contract. A contract is a contract and
|
||
"golden parachutes" are a part of the system.
|
||
So even though the corporation may stall or crash, the executive is
|
||
equipped with his "golden parachute" and is thereby guaranteed to land safely
|
||
and comfortably. He may go to Florida and elsewhere to enjoy a rich
|
||
retirement life. Who suffers? Who suffers is America: the American economy
|
||
suffers from this outrageous system.
|
||
|
||
|
||
American Executives Prefer Immediate Rewards
|
||
|
||
Poverty is very visible all over America, particularly among blacks and
|
||
Hispanics. The minority issue is a crucial one in America. The gap between
|
||
rich and poor is enormous. Only one percent of the population controls 36% of
|
||
the national wealth, an outrageous condition that should somehow be corrected.
|
||
A free economy basically should assure profit to anyone who works. Yet if
|
||
an individual's gains go to the extreme, he becomes a celebrity and an
|
||
egotist. This is what I have seen to be the case in many corporations today.
|
||
Such individuals regard their employees as their own tools to enhance
|
||
their personal performance for which they collect all the rewards. Should one
|
||
fail and be fired, he will land comfortable on his feet, thanks to his golden
|
||
parachute. As an example of an extreme case of such, a friend of mine
|
||
mismanaged his company while he was its chairman. The company failed, but he
|
||
and his wife are leading a luxurious life, something that would never happen
|
||
in Japan. This man simply played the American game. He had no real intention
|
||
of remaining with that company in any case; he was only working to maximize
|
||
his personal income during that time.
|
||
I have been involved in a number of joint venture projects in America. I
|
||
make every effort to improve my joint venture situations. I want to close the
|
||
deal as quickly as possible whenever we are involved in substantial capital
|
||
investment. When we spend capital on facilities investment, we are entitled
|
||
to tax benefits. I like to utilize the extra profits generated by these tax
|
||
benefits to get rid of debt service. Whenever I suggest that, my partners ask
|
||
"why do we have to sacrifice our profits for people in the future?"
|
||
For me, the most crucial objective is to make the company healthy and free
|
||
of debt service, hoping that our successors will do the same for their
|
||
successors by availing whatever profits we get from repaying the debt, while
|
||
my joint venture partners feel that their personal gains should not be so
|
||
sacrificed. They have no intention of remaining with these companies for very
|
||
long and so they want to increase their personal income by maximizing
|
||
disposable company profits in the short run.
|
||
For example, they moved production facilities to Singapore or Japan when
|
||
the US dollar was high because they could not expect to maintain high profits
|
||
when production costs were high.
|
||
This is the case in the semiconductor industry as well. Production has
|
||
been moved out of the US, leaving production primarily with Japan. This has
|
||
deprived America of the capacity for anything other than 256 bit chips. It is
|
||
cheaper and easier to buy them from Japan rather than dealing with expensive,
|
||
unionized workers in America. These very same business executives have been
|
||
blaming the trade imbalance and the Japanese trade surplus for their
|
||
difficulties while at the same time choosing to import these products from
|
||
Japan. Japan has not forced them to buy its products, but it cannot begin to
|
||
catch up on orders placed by American firms.
|
||
|
||
|
||
A Japanese Corporation is a Community Bound Together by a Common Destiny
|
||
|
||
The fundamental principles which govern a Japanese corporation are
|
||
basically different from those of an American corporation, from the viewpoint
|
||
of both executives and workers.
|
||
The structure of pre-war Japanese corporations bear some resemblance to
|
||
American corporations today to the extent that the president could fire anyone
|
||
at his discretion. A variety of labor activities were implemented to meet
|
||
such situations. Taxes were low and executives were leading comfortable
|
||
lives, able to have company stock allocated, assuring themselves of a
|
||
comfortable retirement. A top executive was able to buy a house with just one
|
||
bonus. By the time he retired, he could have several houses for rental, which
|
||
alone would have ensured a luxurious life.
|
||
After the war, General MacArthur changed Japanese labor laws as well as
|
||
tax laws, among other things, which put Japanese business executives in a
|
||
different situation. First, they were now unable to fire employees at their
|
||
discretion, not even to reduce the size of their labor force. At times a
|
||
company must reduce the size of the work force if it cannot afford to keep
|
||
them or if they are unproductive.
|
||
When I first found that American companies can hire and fire and rehire at
|
||
will, I wondered perhaps if Japanese companies were more charitable
|
||
organizations than profit making institutions. However, Japanese managers
|
||
have developed a concept which, in essence binds the company, workers, and
|
||
management, into a community with a common fate or destiny. I have explained
|
||
to American corporate managers that in Japan, once an individual is hired, he
|
||
has been hired for life and unless he commits some serious offense, the
|
||
company cannot fire him. Americans want to know how in the world we are
|
||
capable of operating profitably. I say that since a Japanese company is a
|
||
community bound together by a common destiny, like the relationship between a
|
||
married couple, all must work together to solve common problems.
|
||
This concept of a fate-sharing community might sound particular to Japan.
|
||
However, recently, it appears to have had some impact on American
|
||
corporations, which are showing interest in the Japanese corporate management
|
||
system. They seem anxious to absorb some of the positive elements of the
|
||
Japanese system.
|
||
When I find an employee who turns out to be wrong for a job, I feel it is
|
||
my fault because I made the decision to hire him. Generally, I would invest
|
||
in additional training, education, or change of duty, even perhaps sending him
|
||
overseas for additional experience. As a result, he will usually turn out to
|
||
be an asset in the long run. Even if the positive return is only one out of
|
||
every five, that one individual's productivity will cover the losses incurred
|
||
by the other four. It is a greater loss to lose that one productive person
|
||
than to maintain the presence of the four incompetents.
|
||
In a fate-sharing corporation, one capable individual can easily carry a
|
||
number of other not-so-capable individuals. The confidence of Japanese
|
||
employees in their company, knowing that he is employed for life, means that
|
||
he will develop a strong sense of dedication to that company. For these
|
||
reasons, Japanese corporate executives are anxious to train their employees
|
||
well, as they will be their successors.
|
||
As the chief executive officer, it is my responsibility not only to pursue
|
||
profit, but also to create a community where those I have employed can
|
||
complete their careers 20-30 years from now with the feeling that he had truly
|
||
made a good life with the company.
|
||
Japanese company employees know that they are members of a community bound
|
||
together by a mutual fate for which they bear the hardships of today in
|
||
anticipation of a better future. There are many company presidents today in
|
||
Japan who at one time or another served as union leaders. This fact makes
|
||
present union leaders feel that they too may, sometime in the future, move
|
||
into management positions within their company, and therefore their long term
|
||
interests are closely tied to the company. They do not pursue short term,
|
||
myopic profits for the immediate future. When the company proposes a plan to
|
||
save a certain portion of profits for facility investment or to pool to the
|
||
following year, unions may well be willing to make compromises, because they
|
||
know that the future of the workers is tied to the future of the corporation.
|
||
I would like to ask presidents of American corporations if they ever heard of
|
||
any American union leaders who have become heads of corporations. Japanese
|
||
executives have a categorically different corporate philosophy than do
|
||
American executives, who are more anxious to demonstrate profitability to
|
||
please stockholders. I have asked Americans what, in their minds, is the
|
||
meaning of "company." In my mind, it is a group of people conforming where
|
||
interests are shared. I must point out that in the American interpretation of
|
||
company, this concept does not exist. It is my firm conviction that man is
|
||
created equal, irrespective of color of skin or nationality and it is natural
|
||
that my concept of company includes the employees of my overseas Sony
|
||
operations. My California plant opened in 1972, initially with 250 employees.
|
||
Soon after the plant opened, we were hit with the worldwide oil crisis, which
|
||
caused a recession. The California plant was not immune to this development
|
||
and the facility lost business and was unable to support its 250 employees.
|
||
The president of Sony America was, of course, an American and he came to
|
||
me saying that there was no other choice but to lay off some of the employees.
|
||
I refused his proposal, telling him that I would take the responsibility for
|
||
possible losses in order to retain the employees. We sent capital from the
|
||
Japanese headquarters to sustain the 250 person work force for some time.
|
||
During this period, there was not enough work to keep everyone busy, so we
|
||
developed educational programs, out of which grew not only a sense of
|
||
appreciation, but also a real emotional involvement with the company. They
|
||
began to feel that the plant was their home, and began to clean and polish the
|
||
facilities, and take care of their work sites on their own. These people
|
||
became the central core of the California plant, which now employs 1500
|
||
people. They don't even talk about unionizing themselves. American unions
|
||
are basically industrial, which means that there is always active union
|
||
leaders from outside who attempt to unionize our plant. Our workers had
|
||
tee-shirts made, with their own money, saying "WE DON'T NEED THE UNION."
|
||
The United Kingdom has a unique law which unionizes every company. Sony
|
||
UK is no exception. Yet our women union members insisted, in an interview on
|
||
the BBC, that their union is different than other, ordinary ones. This is a
|
||
positive demonstration of the feeling that we all share the same fate, no
|
||
matter where we are in the world.
|
||
In the US and the UK, most employees never have even seen their top
|
||
executives. When I go to one of our plants, I normally mingle with the
|
||
employees and eat together with them in the company cafeteria. This helps in
|
||
developing communication and trust. It may be a bit difficult to expect the
|
||
same response from foreign employees, but it is still the best approach. The
|
||
Japanese system is not completely applicable to the American system, of
|
||
course. Yet patient demonstration to show that the company truly wishes to
|
||
protect their interests, even when business is at its worst, will show
|
||
results. People tend to develop trust under these circumstances. The best
|
||
thing a company can do is to treat its employees as dignified human beings.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Japanese Approach Can Be Used Worldwide
|
||
|
||
European corporations appear to be treating their employees more humanely
|
||
than their American counterparts, although they are still far from the concept
|
||
of lifetime employment. Large corporations do not hesitate to lay off
|
||
employees whenever business is down; they even close operations without notice
|
||
or sell out, treating employees as if they were tools or equipment.
|
||
There is also obvious class discrimination within companies. Engineers,
|
||
for example, wear white collars, stay in their offices, and seldom show up in
|
||
the factories. They want to tell workers what to do, rather than donning
|
||
blues and showing them. In my company, all workers wear the same uniforms. I
|
||
also wear the same uniform, not only in the plants, but also at company
|
||
headquarters. All our plant managers do the same. Those who are in training
|
||
have been instructed to walk through the plant frequently, establishing
|
||
personal contacts with the workers. Those who become foremen or section
|
||
managers are encouraged to hold brief meetings each morning with their
|
||
subordinates to read their mood and detect problems in advance. They are
|
||
instructed to talk with those who seem ill or depressed, to find out if they
|
||
need medical care or if they are having family or personal problems. Should
|
||
this be the case, they should be allowed to take time off and deal with these
|
||
problems first, while the other workers cover for them. This also helps the
|
||
sense of togetherness among workers.
|
||
On the occasion of 20th and 25th anniversaries of Sony America, my wife
|
||
and I visited all our American plants, gave talks, had dinner with our
|
||
employees and shook the hands of all our workers. Since at some plants we had
|
||
three shifts, we had dinner three times in one day, with the night shift
|
||
taking their turn at 4:00a.m. I told everyone that we greatly appreciated
|
||
their contributions which helped make the 25th anniversary a celebration and
|
||
shook everyone's hand. I was able to feel their response even physically.
|
||
These employees told me that this experience was something they never would
|
||
have had in an American company. I felt our Japanese approach was not foreign
|
||
to them at all!
|
||
One episode made me particularly happy. I visited one of our rather small
|
||
laboratories, and said that I wanted to meet all of its members, [when] the
|
||
head of the lab asked if he could take my picture. He took his camera from
|
||
his desk drawer and took me to each member of his staff, introducing me to him
|
||
or her and taking our picture as we shook hands. There were almost 80 people
|
||
at this facility and he promised to make a print for each person. I was
|
||
surprised that this typically Japanese activity was taking place in a facility
|
||
where there were no Japanese! There again, I felt that we are all basically
|
||
the same, irrespective of national and cultural differences.
|
||
Our style and our efforts have a ripple effect and make other members of
|
||
our company feel the Sony spirit. I am not saying that whatever style and
|
||
customs we have developed are automatically good and acceptable everywhere.
|
||
What I am emphasizing here is that the basic attitude of a corporation and its
|
||
philosophy can be understood worldwide, and certain aspects of Japanese
|
||
tradition and style can be rooted overseas.
|
||
On the other hand, I recognize fully that certain aspects of American
|
||
business administration, such as numerical and analytical operations, are
|
||
excellent as we have sent many individuals from our company to American
|
||
business schools to learn such matters. Combining good traditions and
|
||
practices of both the Japanese and American systems will, I believe, make for
|
||
a very strong corporation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
LET'S BECOME A JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO (Morita)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Saying "No" Actually Represents a Deepening of Mutual Understanding
|
||
|
||
It is inevitable that Japanese companies have been establishing American
|
||
operations. America after the era of Reaganomics is now responding to that
|
||
trend with new Bush Administration policies. In response, Japan should now
|
||
begin to make it a habit to say no when its position is clearly negative. It
|
||
[is] the rule in the West to say "no" whenever one's position is clearly
|
||
negative. We are in a business environment where "well" or "probably" have no
|
||
place in normal business conduct. I have been saying "no" to foreigners for
|
||
the last thirty years. Clearly, the Japanese Government has missed many, many
|
||
opportunities to say "no."
|
||
Take the auto trade issue, for example. America forced Japan to limit its
|
||
auto exports to two million units per year under the guise of voluntary
|
||
restrictions. When the American market became more lucrative, and the number
|
||
of imported cars could have been increased, Anerican auto manufacturers
|
||
demanded that the quota be tripled. MITI and the Prime Minister gave in to
|
||
American demands.
|
||
In my opinion, this was a great mistake. Both the MITI minister and the
|
||
prime minister at that time should have taken the position that the American
|
||
demands were unfair. The Big Three had already increased their profits
|
||
enormously and individuals such as Lee Iacocca and Roger Smith were receiving
|
||
more than a million dollars each in bonuses. They simply demanded special
|
||
treatment in order to increase profits from the Japanese imports which they
|
||
sold under their company brands when they requested that the quotas be
|
||
tripled. That was the time for Japan to have said "you are being
|
||
hypocritical, criticizing others as unfair when in fact what you are demanding
|
||
is what is really unfair." The timing was crucial; unless one registers
|
||
opposition or negative reaction at precisely the right time, Americans take
|
||
the situation for granted and later insist that they were right as no
|
||
opposition was registered at the time of the demand. This has always been the
|
||
case in the past.
|
||
The trade imbalance is another case which should be scrutinized as to
|
||
whether or not American demands are based on fact and reality. I once asked
|
||
Americans to investigate what Americans had been importing from Japan.
|
||
American imports from Japan are mostly products which require a high tech
|
||
capacity to produce. Many of these products fall into the area of military
|
||
procurement, but it is true that even the private sector is buying Japanese
|
||
products which are technologically indispensable. Even some of the
|
||
inexpensive home electrical appliances may be obtained from Japanese
|
||
manufacturers within a short time frame if they require high technological
|
||
skills in the production process.
|
||
America has left the production responsibility with Japan, resulting in a
|
||
heavy dependency upon Japan. American politicians only talk about the results
|
||
of this situation, blaming Japan for the trade deficit to get votes. Yet it
|
||
seems that these same politicians don't even know specifically what it is that
|
||
America buys from Japan. If they took the time and the effort to seriously
|
||
investigate the matter, they could not condemn Japan so out of hand.
|
||
Japan should tell America that it may buy these quality products
|
||
irrespective of the exchange rates, even when the US dollar falls to the 100
|
||
[presumably yen] to 1 ratio. Artificial manipulation of the exchange rate
|
||
does not benefit the American economy. Such products as transistors, which
|
||
Sony originally marketed, may today be purchased anywhere outside Japan, and
|
||
so are not a matter of friction between the US and Japan. Products recently
|
||
developed in Japan are not as easily obtained elsewhere. There are some
|
||
things that can only be found in Japan and Japan cannot be blamed for
|
||
over-exporting. Those who say otherwise simply do not know the facts.
|
||
Computer terminals are in short supply and are being rapidly developed in
|
||
Japan. Japan should let America know what the situation is and make the US
|
||
realize that the relationship between the two nations is increasingly mutually
|
||
dependent.
|
||
My purpose in advocating saying "no" is to promote that awareness. "No"
|
||
is not the beginning of a disagreement or a serious argument. On the
|
||
contrary, "no" is the beginning of a new collaboration. If Japan truly says
|
||
"no" when it means "no" it will serve as a means of improving the US-Japan
|
||
relationship.
|
||
|
||
|
||
National Characteristics Which Make It Difficult for the Japanese to Say "No"
|
||
|
||
The question arises as to who should say "no?" Japan's Confucian
|
||
background makes it very difficult for its people to say "no" within the
|
||
context of normal human relationships. In a traditional hierarchy,
|
||
subordinates dare not say "no" to higher-ups without violating normal
|
||
courtesy. The higher-up takes a "no" from a subordinate as insubordination.
|
||
In a staff relationship, "no" is something to be avoided in order to maintain
|
||
smooth human relationships.
|
||
Living in a homogeneous society since childhood, we Japanese have grown up
|
||
without practical experience in quarreling and fighting in a heterocultural
|
||
environment. Many of us feel that others will eventually understand our true
|
||
feelings on an issue without [our] verbalizing them. In short, we expect a
|
||
lot when it comes to mutual understanding. Americans may go directly to their
|
||
boss to offer an explanation when they fell they are not properly understood.
|
||
Japanese, on the other fand, even if they feel they are not properly
|
||
understood, remain hopeful that they will eventually be understood or that the
|
||
truth will reveal itself sooner or later. They do the same with foreigners in
|
||
foreign countries. They feel that sincerity and effort should automatically
|
||
be reciprocated. In my mind, this can only happen in Japan, but never in
|
||
foreign countries. Wordless communication and telepathy will just not happen.
|
||
I admit that I may be more westernized than most Japanese, since I believe
|
||
that we should be more straightforward as we become closer, and that a serious
|
||
quarrel need not destroy a friendship. This may not be accepted in a
|
||
traditional Japanese relationship; we avoid serious confrontation by turning
|
||
away from the cold facts. Instead, we tend to make loose compromises. It is
|
||
quite simply not our tradition to say "no" to our friends.
|
||
We should not expect to find a similar understanding from foreigners
|
||
concerning this particular Japanese mentality. It is too easy to expect
|
||
understanding of one's opposition without using "no." I could say it is a
|
||
Japanese defect to expect something without using the rational verbal
|
||
procedures.
|
||
If you stay silent when you have a particular demand or an opposing
|
||
position to express, the other party will take it for granted that you have no
|
||
demands or opposition. When you close your mind to the outside, remaining in
|
||
a uniquely Japanese mental framework, you will be isolated in this modern,
|
||
interdependent world.
|
||
|
||
LET'S NOT GIVE IN TO AMERICA'S BLUSTER (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Statesmen Ought to Make Best Use of All Available Cards
|
||
|
||
America has renewed its bluster in the last year. Politicians must sense
|
||
that they will win more votes bashing Japan than bashing the Soviet Union.
|
||
Criticism of Japan by US politicians has taken on a rather hysterical tone
|
||
these days. I experienced it personally when I was there and met with
|
||
politicians who told me that there was a new power shift between the US and
|
||
USSR, as if this development should scare Japan somehow. These same
|
||
politicians indicated that since both Americans and the Soviets are white, at
|
||
a final confrontation, they might gang up against a non-white Japan.
|
||
Japan should never give in to such irrational threats. Japan also holds
|
||
very strong cards in high technology capabilities which are indispensable to
|
||
military equipment in both the US and USSR. Yet Japan has never played this
|
||
card to improve its position vis-a-vis the US. Japan could well have said
|
||
"no" to making available specific technology. Japan has substantial national
|
||
strength to deal with other nations, yet some of the powerful cards it holds
|
||
have been wasted diplomatically.
|
||
I happened to be in America at the time the US Congress passed a
|
||
resolution to impose sanctions on Japan on the semiconductor issue. Congress
|
||
seemed to be very excited, almost in the same mood as was the League of
|
||
Nations when it sent the Litton Mission to Manchuria to observe Japanese
|
||
activities there in relation to the Manchukuo incident.
|
||
I talked with members of Congress in this tense atmosphere, and I did not
|
||
feel they were conducting matters on a rational basis. Some Congressmen were
|
||
actually brandishing sledgehammers, smashing Toshiba electronic equipment,
|
||
with their sleeves rolled up. It was just ugly to watch them behave so.
|
||
I commented at that time that the US Congress is too hysterical to trust.
|
||
their faces turned red in anger and they demanded an explanation. I told
|
||
them: "Look -- only a few decades ago you passed the Prohibition Amendment.
|
||
No sincere Congress would ever pass such irrational legislation." They all
|
||
just grinned at me in response.
|
||
Yet I must admit, that it was Japan who aggravated the semiconductor issue
|
||
to such a low level, by not saying "no" on the appropriate occasions.
|
||
After he was elected to a second term, Mr. Nakasone promised America that
|
||
Japan would avail highly strategic technology without giving adequate thought
|
||
to the significance of that kind of commitment. The strongest card, which he
|
||
should have played, was virtually given away free to America. He probably
|
||
wanted to impress America, hoping for a tacit reciprocity from a thankful US.
|
||
Unfortunately, it was only Mr. Nakasone who recognized the value of that card
|
||
at the time. Both the Liberal Democrats and opposition parties overlooked the
|
||
significance of this issue. I assume that the leaders of those parties, such
|
||
as Takeshita, Miyazawa and Abe did not know it either. It is such a pity that
|
||
Japan's politicians are not aware of the political significance of Japan's
|
||
high technology capabilities.
|
||
In reality, Japanese technology has advanced so much that America gets
|
||
hysterical, an indication of the tremendous value of that card -- perhaps our
|
||
ace. My frustration stems from the fact that Japan has not, so far, utilized
|
||
that powerful card in the arena of international relations.
|
||
What Mr. Nakasone got out of the free gift was Reagan's friendship,
|
||
so-called. We all know that love and friendship alone cannot solve
|
||
international conflicts and hardships.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Nakasone Bungled the Relationship
|
||
|
||
I truly regret that Japanese diplomacy has been based on a series of
|
||
"yeses" instead of skillful manipulation of strong ace cards. Former prime
|
||
minister Nakasone has done a substantial disservice to Japan in terms of his
|
||
handling of relations with the US. These are among his most unfortunate
|
||
mistakes. He boasted of the so-called "Ron-Yasu" relationship as if he had
|
||
succeeded in bringing about a skillful policy toward the US. In reality, he
|
||
was simply a lowly yes-man to Reagan.
|
||
It was actually I who introduced Mr. Nakasone to Mr. Reagan. I asked one
|
||
of Mr. Reagan's assistants if he ever recalled a "no" from Nakasone to reagan.
|
||
He immediately replied he did not know of any, and Mr. Nakasone was a "nice
|
||
guy with a sardonic smile."
|
||
Former Prime Minister Nakasone was in a position to know that Japan's
|
||
leading edge technology was superior to that of the US; so much so that
|
||
Americans had become nervous concerning the magnitude of Japan's superiority
|
||
in the area. Yet he still did not say "no." Was he taken advantage of? Did
|
||
he have some weak spot as did the prime minister (Tanaka) at the time of the
|
||
Lockheed scandal during the Nixon Administration? Otherwise, Japanese leaders
|
||
who hold such high cards should be able to play them in dealing with American
|
||
demands.
|
||
The FSX, the next generation of fighters, developed by Mitsubishi Heavy
|
||
Industries during the Nakasone era, has become another source of controversy
|
||
in the US as it relates to defense matters. Further development of the FSX
|
||
appears to be quashed by the US. I am unaware of any deals made under the
|
||
table, but there is considerable frustration in Japan over the matter.
|
||
Mitsubishi Heavy industries is a conglomerate with a wide variety of
|
||
technology used in manufacturing advanced products. The chief engineer there
|
||
is a contemporary of mine who developed the most advanced land-to-air missile.
|
||
He is also the man responsible for the design of the next generation fighter
|
||
and he believes that Japan should have its own capacity to provide such
|
||
equipment, which of course astonishes Americans.
|
||
The FSX is a marvelous and formidable fighter. No existing fighter,
|
||
including the F-15 and F-16 can match it in a dog fight. I recall when
|
||
Secretary of Defense Weinberger became serious about quashing the FSX Japanese
|
||
development plan, simply out of fear.
|
||
Unfortunately, Japan has not yet developed a powerful enough jet engine,
|
||
although I advocated such development while I was a member of the Upper House.
|
||
Japan still must purchase jet engines, which are mounted on the F-15 and F-16.
|
||
If America gets really nasty, Japan could buy engines from france, which is
|
||
quite anxious to export military equipment (at the same time that that
|
||
country's president is advocating truces all over the world, I might add). If
|
||
France is reluctant to sell what we need, I would not mind going to the Soviet
|
||
Union, although the quality of the Russian engines is not particularly
|
||
impressive.
|
||
New Mitsubishi-designed jet fighters equipped with Russian engines may
|
||
only have a top speed of 95% of existing F-15 and -16 class fighters, so one
|
||
might think them inferior. On the contrary: their combat capability is far
|
||
superior in a dogfight situation. It can make a 380 degree turn [sic] with a
|
||
third of the diameter needed by other top fighters. The F-15 and -16 require
|
||
5000 meters; the Mitsubishi fighter only requires 1600 meters. Just think of
|
||
war as a game of tag. What is necessary is not maximum speed but great
|
||
maneuverability. Mitsubishi's FSX fighter can get right on an enemy plance
|
||
and send heat-seeking missiles with 100% accuracy. Incidentally, there are
|
||
two types of air-to-air missiles, heat-seeking and radar-controlled. The
|
||
radar-controlled type may even fail to hit a jumbo jet, while the heat-tracing
|
||
type can fine-tune its direction to head for the enemy's source of heat.
|
||
The FSX was a surprise to Americans, as were to Zero fighters at the
|
||
beginning of the Second World War. They never expected to see such an
|
||
advanced fighter as the Zero, which virtually controlled the air at the
|
||
beginning of the war. That such a formidable weapon as the FSX is in
|
||
production today outside the US came as a shock to Americans. The Japanese
|
||
FSX is equipped with four vertical fins, similar to a shark's fins. Each acts
|
||
as a steering mechanism, like the steering wheel of a four wheel drive
|
||
[four-wheel steering intended, presumably] automobile that can make a complete
|
||
turn in a small area without moving back and forth. Such a marvelous idea
|
||
probably is not the monopoly of Japan, but it was a Japanese manufacturer who
|
||
developed the idea to reality, thanks to Japanese advanced high technology.
|
||
Russian fighters are also equipped using Japanese know-how, especially in
|
||
the areas of ceramics and carbon fibers. Special paints on American
|
||
reconaissance planes which assist in avoiding radar detection are also made in
|
||
Japan.
|
||
Shocked by the high standards of the FSX, I guess that the US pressured
|
||
Mr. Nakasone, probably citing his earlier commitment on technology. His
|
||
submission to American pressure eventually caused the mothballing of the FSX,
|
||
to be replaced by future products of a joint US-Japan development plan. In
|
||
November 1988, the governments signed an agreement that set the course for the
|
||
joint development of the FSX; an agreement which leaves many unsolved problems
|
||
at the industry level.
|
||
One of the manufacturers involved, General Dynamics, was very anxious to
|
||
assume the initiative on the project, dividing it up among others. It met
|
||
with resistance from Mitsubishi, and General Dynamics came up with a plan that
|
||
would separate the development of the left and right wing -- a very peculiar
|
||
approach.
|
||
In short, America wants to steal Japanese know-how. They cannot
|
||
manufacture the most technologically advanced fighters without advanced
|
||
ceramic and carbon fiber technology from Japan. That is why America is
|
||
applying so much pressure, attempting to force Japan to come to American
|
||
terms. Some of Japan's industry representatives appear willing to deal with
|
||
the Americans under the table, probably with the good intentions of smoothing
|
||
US-Japan relations on the issue. I happen to disagree with such an approach.
|
||
We just cannot give in on this issue. We must be persistent -- to the maximum
|
||
degree. If America does not appreciate a rational division of labor on the
|
||
project, we should discontinue the project and start all over from scratch.
|
||
The joint development idea is a legacy of the Reagan-Nakasone era. Both
|
||
men are now out of power and we can retract the whole thing and tell the US
|
||
that we have decided to develop our own project without its participation. It
|
||
is our choice. We must bluff to counter American bluff, otherwise we will
|
||
continue to be the loser.
|
||
I brought this subject up the other day to Mr. Nakasone. He responded,
|
||
"Well, you had a pretty sharp interest in that issue at that time." I said
|
||
that I was "probably the only one concerned about the issue at the time." Mr.
|
||
Nakasone then insisted that he made the decision to compromise in order to
|
||
maintain good US-Japan relations. He also admitted that America was then
|
||
already very much afraid of further Japanese technical advances. Well,
|
||
compromise is fine, but in reality this was not a compromise: it was a
|
||
sell-out -- a simple sell-out of Japan's interests.
|
||
I don't regret it any less when we make the silly mistake of not saying
|
||
"no" especially when we hold the strong cards. Such freebies are now taken
|
||
for granted and America comes back with more bluff. On the record, USTR
|
||
Yeutter stated that the "application of high pressure is the best way to
|
||
manipulate Japan."
|
||
My position may draw some criticism in Japan, where it probably will be
|
||
said that I am playing with dynamite in dealing with America in this fashion.
|
||
It goes without saying that an equal partnership must be carried out without
|
||
humiliating pressure or compromise as the result of such pressure. This is
|
||
the reason I am advocating that Japan say "no." "No" is an important
|
||
instrument in the bargaining process.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Diplomacy Should Be Free of External Pressures
|
||
|
||
Diplomacy which lacks the "no" factor cannot be diplomacy for the benefit
|
||
of Japan. Japan has a solid basis for saying "no" on many occasions. All we
|
||
must do is play our cards wisely, playing our ace intelligently. Japan is
|
||
very poor at diplomatic tactics. It is a wonder too me that Japan has failed
|
||
to recognize that its initiatives are instrumental in the ultimate
|
||
decision-making process in the international arena.
|
||
Mr. Glen Fukushima, an American of Japanese descent in the office of the
|
||
USTR (Deputy Assistant USTR for Japan and China), who was acquainted with
|
||
Senator Aquino of the Philippines while both were at Harvard, is one of the
|
||
most capable Asian specialists. His wife is an intellectual Keio University
|
||
graduate, who prefers to live in Japan, forcing Glen to commute to Japan two
|
||
or three times a month.
|
||
On one occasion, I had dinner with him and asked him what America's next
|
||
Japan-bashing scenario would entail. He replied that the US would take up the
|
||
distribution issue since this cannot be rectified by Japanese politicians
|
||
without pressure from the US. I have to use American pressure in order to
|
||
accomplish a national objective, yet, I must admit that the distribution
|
||
system is one of Japan's biggest headaches today. There is no question that
|
||
the high prices in Japan are caused by the distribution system itself, which
|
||
is made worse by Japanese politicians.
|
||
There are domestic areas where we Japanese must say "no" also, even before
|
||
we say "no" to outsiders. The liberalization of rice is one such issue.
|
||
Opinions on the rice issue sharply divide politicians such as I, whose
|
||
constituents are urban, from those representing farmers.
|
||
Former Minister of Agriculture Sato is a good friend of mine, but his
|
||
advocacy of food security is becoming diminished. Inevitably, nutual
|
||
dependence is becoming more and more a reality in our world today. America
|
||
was not even able to place [a] ban on exports of grain to the Soviet Union
|
||
when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. There would have been too much
|
||
pressure from American farmers. If that is the case, it would probably be
|
||
practically impossible to put a ban on agricultural exports to Japan. The
|
||
rice issue has its sentimental aspects in Japan as well as its practical
|
||
aspects, which make the overall issue more complicated. Yet it is obvious
|
||
that we must liberalize the market. Such is also true of construction
|
||
projects. It is inevitable that we allow foreign construction firms to
|
||
participate in Japanese public construction projects. Japanese general
|
||
contractors have been maintaining prices as much as 40% higher in comparison
|
||
to foreign bidders, due to bid-rigging traditions to assure a monopoly on
|
||
business for themselves. There is no way these practices could ever be free
|
||
of foreign criticism.
|
||
In the course of my conversation with Glen Fukushima, I asked whom among
|
||
the Japanese negotiators he considers the best. He immediately came up with
|
||
the name of MITI's Kuroda, whom the Japanese press used to criticize for his
|
||
tough positions. The press claimed that his participation aggravated the
|
||
problems with the US. The Americans criticized him for being stubborn.
|
||
Strabgely, the American negotiator named him the most effective. He is
|
||
stubborn and is able to say "no" decisively whenever he should do so. The
|
||
Americans usually try to overpower negotiations by increasing pressure. But
|
||
Kuroda does not feel that he must say "yes" to American pressure. America is
|
||
a giant in many ways, and, in many ways, Japan is a dwarf. This obvious
|
||
contrast has been exploited by the Americans often in the past.
|
||
Mr. Kuroda kept pointing out that irrational pressure is not always the
|
||
result of reason or logic, and reinforced this position by withstanding
|
||
increased pressure. His "no" is not a no for its own sake; he always states
|
||
his reasons. This is the proper approach and attitude in negotiations. In
|
||
the past, there have been allegations that Japanese logic and opinions have
|
||
not made any sense to the other side.
|
||
When the opposing side points out that Japanese opinions and demands have
|
||
no logical basis, all of a sudden the illogical Japanese start saying "yes,
|
||
yes, yes..." in a panic. But these "yeses" do not necessarily mean yes in the
|
||
sense of positive assertion. At any rate, the other side then comes to the
|
||
conclusion that Japan will not take action unless pressure is placed on them.
|
||
This is a rather unfortunate situation for the people of Japan. The Japanese
|
||
image of being soft in the face of pressure does not help Japan's diplomatic
|
||
efforts at all.
|
||
I have often suggested that at least half of Japan's diplomats stationed
|
||
abroad be civilians. Those who are in business and other professions who have
|
||
dealt with foreigners are in a better position to represent the interests of
|
||
Japan than are career diplomats. Send Mr. Morita to America as our
|
||
ambassador: a brilliant idea! But it should not be just an idea. I truly
|
||
believe that it would be most beneficial to the US-Japan relationship to have
|
||
such an ambassador from Japan to the US.
|
||
s
|
||
submission to American pressure eventually caused the mothballing of
|
||
actually brandishing sledgehammers, smashing Toshiba electronic equipment,
|
||
with their sleeves rolled up. It was just ugly to watch them behave so.
|
||
I commented at that time that the US Congress is too hysterical to trust.
|
||
their faces turned red in anger and they demanded an explanation. I told
|
||
them: "Look -- only a few decades ago you passed the Prohibition Amendment.
|
||
No sincere Congress would ever pass such irrational legislation." They all
|
||
just grinned at me in response.
|
||
Yet I must admit, that it was Japan who aggravated the semiconductor issue
|
||
to such a low level, by not saying "no" on the appropriate occasions.
|
||
After he was elected to a second term, Mr. Nakasone promised America that
|
||
Japan would avail highly strategic technology without giving adequate thought
|
||
to the significance of that kind of commitment. The strongest card, which he
|
||
should have played, was virtually given away free to America. He probably
|
||
wanted to impress America, hoping for a tacit reciprocity from a thankful US.
|
||
Unfortunately, it was only Mr. Nakasone who recognized the value of that card
|
||
at the time. Both the Liberal Democrats and opposition parties overlooked the
|
||
significance of this issue. I assume that the leaders of those parties, such
|
||
as Takeshita, Miyazawa and Abe did not know it either. It is such a pity that
|
||
Japan's politicians are not aware of the political significance of Japan's
|
||
high technology capabilities.
|
||
In reality, Japanese technology has advanced so much that America gets
|
||
hysterical, an indication of the tremendous value of that card -- perhaps our
|
||
ace. My frustration stems from the fact that Japan has not, so far, utilized
|
||
that powerful card in the arena of international relations.
|
||
What Mr. Nakasone got out of the free gift was Reagan's friendship,
|
||
so-called. We all know that love and friendship alone cannot solve
|
||
international conflicts and hardships.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Nakasone Bungled the Relationship
|
||
|
||
I truly regret that Japanese diplomacy has been based on a series of
|
||
"yeses" instead of skillful manipulation of strong ace cards. Former prime
|
||
minister Nakasone has done a substantial disservice to Japan in terms of his
|
||
handling of relations with the US. These are among his most unfortunate
|
||
mistakes. He boasted of the so-called "Ron-Yasu" relationship as if he had
|
||
succeeded in bringing about a skillful policy toward the US. In reality, he
|
||
was simply a lowly yes-man to Reagan.
|
||
It was actually I who introduced Mr. Nakasone to Mr. Reagan. I asked one
|
||
of Mr. Reagan's assistants if he ever recalled a "no" from Nakasone to reagan.
|
||
He immediately replied he did not know of any, and Mr. Nakasone was a "nice
|
||
guy with a sardonic smile."
|
||
Former Prime Minister Nakasone was in a position to know that Japan's
|
||
leading edge technology was superior to that of the US; so much so that
|
||
Americans had become nervous concerning the magnitude of Japan's superiority
|
||
in the area. Yet he still did not say "no." Was he taken advantage of? Did
|
||
he have some weak spot as did the prime minister (Tanaka) at the time of the
|
||
Lockheed scandal during the Nixon Administration? Otherwise, Japanese leaders
|
||
who hold such high cards should be able to play them in dealing with American
|
||
demands.
|
||
The FSX, the next generation of fighters, developed by Mitsubishi Heavy
|
||
Industries during the Nakasone era, has become another source of controversy
|
||
in the US as it relates to defense matters. Further development of the FSX
|
||
appears to be quashed by the US. I am unaware of any deals made under the
|
||
table, but there is considerable frustration in Japan over the matter.
|
||
Mitsubishi Heavy industries is a conglomerate with a wide variety of
|
||
technology used in manufacturing advanced products. The chief engineer there
|
||
is a contemporary of mine who developed the most advanced land-to-air missile.
|
||
He is also the man responsible for the design of the next generation fighter
|
||
and he believes that Japan should have its own capacity to provide such
|
||
equipment, which of course astonishes America.
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE "INESCAPABLY INTERDEPENDENT" (Morita)
|
||
|
||
|
||
No Way To Avoid the Trade Frictions
|
||
|
||
Recently the expression, "inescapable interdependence" has been heard
|
||
quite often among Americans. If we dare to explain this concept in a more
|
||
extreme way, perhaps we can say it's a "fatal attraction". With this trend
|
||
now prevailing in the world, we have no choice but to live cooperatively.
|
||
Everyone on earth, not just the United States and Japan, is mutually dependent
|
||
and this is unavoidable. This is the times that we are facing now. What does
|
||
cooperation mean?
|
||
A Japanese tends to say, "Let's work together". But I often wonder whether
|
||
they really understand its meaning. This can be applicable to Americans as
|
||
well. We are at home using this expression but it seems to only be used as a
|
||
convenience. Furthermore it is out of the question to force "cooperation"
|
||
through threats.
|
||
To cooperate means to maintain harmony. It is not harmonious to force
|
||
your adversary. When they cope with you, you too, must cope with them. You
|
||
have to give up some of your interests; you must abandon something.
|
||
I tell people whenever I have a chance that we know what it is to be
|
||
selfish but hardly anybody is aware when he himself is being selfish. We say
|
||
that one is selfish but actually this person probably has no idea that he is
|
||
perceived as such. In this sense, Japan also can be thought a little bit
|
||
selfish by other countries, although we hardly have such ideas.
|
||
Looking for the reason, we are so perceived, the opening of the domestic
|
||
market can be one example. Everyone agrees that we should open our markets to
|
||
foreign traders, but when it comes to individual, this is hard to actualize
|
||
since someone says, "no, I cannot accept this", and then someone says, "no, I
|
||
cannot accept that." Although at summit meetings, Japanese leaders assure
|
||
others that they will do their best, and they actually do try to open the
|
||
market. In the end, however, this is never actualized since their promise
|
||
goes against domestic interest groups and they are forced to back down. Only
|
||
lip-service followed by no achievement might result in being called "liars"
|
||
and this is surely worse than "selfish".
|
||
The development of communication technologies means this is a shrinking
|
||
world and any country will be left alone if it does not talk frankly to its
|
||
people and friendly countries about the compromises that they must accept.
|
||
Free people in the free world ask for their freedom but at the same time
|
||
they respect the freedom of others. And I think it is genuine freedom to
|
||
think "we should abandon some so that we can respect others." It will simply
|
||
increase friction if we just look out for our own benefit, and put priority on
|
||
winning the race based on the premise that we simply can focus on our
|
||
interests alone since we are in the world of free economy.
|
||
We should also recognize that friction seldom occurs with those who are
|
||
far from you. Friction occurs as we move closer. We cannot escape from the
|
||
trade friction as long as we belong to the world of "inescapable
|
||
interdependence".
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan's Central Role is Asia
|
||
|
||
The closer we become, the harsher the friction can be. So it would be
|
||
wise for us to prepare for problems with neighboring Asian countries.
|
||
I went to Singapore recently to attend a ceremony marking the opening of
|
||
our new plant, and had a chance to talk with President Lee Kuan Yew who has
|
||
been a friend for a long time. He invited me to his home, we talked over
|
||
dinner and I stayed with him.
|
||
The plant our company opened this time in Singapore is operated
|
||
automatically by robots. We use materials Singapore supplies and employ able
|
||
engineers graduated from good schools in Singapore, producing special parts in
|
||
large numbers. The plant itself will be a foothold to supply the products all
|
||
over the world. When I proudly held forth my new plant, he was very pleased
|
||
and said that in the past when Japanese firms opened plants in his country,
|
||
they needed a large number of employees, where they in fact have never had
|
||
enough personnel. Because of the nature of his country, that is, Singapore is
|
||
a small island, this caused wage increases at a drastic pace. This is what
|
||
they had wanted; a plant with sophisticated technology.
|
||
Transferring our technologies, not teaching management, I believe, is the
|
||
best way to alleviate friction between Southeast Asian countries and Japan.
|
||
These countries, NICS, then NIES, are now the Four Tigers or Five Tigers. It
|
||
might be too much to say they developed thanks to the Japanese economy and
|
||
industrial technologies, but I believe we contributed to them in such a way
|
||
that contributed to their current prosperity. From now on Japan will need to
|
||
take a major role in Asia. You are already able to see this is happening when
|
||
you recognize that Tokyo has taken on a major role as a finance and money
|
||
center like New York and London.
|
||
In the past, we yearned to go to New York when we were young. Similarly,
|
||
the youth of Southeast Asia yearn to visit Tokyo or Disneyland in Japan. I
|
||
should avoid the expression, "leadership", but Japan has begun to assume that
|
||
role as a center in Asia.
|
||
To take on the role as an initiator means we must also be able to take on
|
||
the role of arbitrator. That is, we must think carefully what constitutes a
|
||
real leadership role in this mutually dependent world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
America, You Had Better Give Up Certain Arrogance
|
||
|
||
As you (Mr. Ishihara) mentioned before, rapprochement between the United
|
||
States and the Soviet Union and Japan's involvement in their military
|
||
strategies because of its highly-sophisticated technology directly affects new
|
||
trends on the world scene.
|
||
I do not think anybody imagined a decade ago that these two superpowers
|
||
would be mutually dependent on each other in a military sense and that there
|
||
would be a strange structure in the power balance among the United States, the
|
||
Soviet Union, and Japan. Nobody can deny that we are going to have a totally
|
||
new configuration in the balance of power in the world.
|
||
Facing this, most important to Japan in the practical sense is the
|
||
relationship between Japan and the United States. Japan needs the United
|
||
States. I think the United States need Japan as well. It is a bond we can
|
||
never cut, and this might be the "fatal attraction" between us. Since we can
|
||
never seperate, we had better look for the way to develop through cooperation
|
||
a healthy relationship through cooperation. And we want to ask you Americans,
|
||
"what is going on now in your country? Do Americans really understand the
|
||
meaning of 'freedom' and the role of Japan which is so necessary to the United
|
||
States?." When you see present conditions, it is obvious that the United
|
||
States is not strong enough in a fundamental and structural sense. So, I
|
||
think what is most important is that we ask them frankly as equal and not as a
|
||
subordinate, "Are you really sure that you are all right?" We will be in
|
||
trouble as will the whole world if the United States is not strong enough in
|
||
the fundamentals and this means more than talking about something that is
|
||
current. It must be recognized by Mr. Bush as well. In this sense, it is
|
||
important for Mr. Takeshita to deliver our message correctly at the coming
|
||
summit. In my understanding, however, these summit meetings are held
|
||
according to an itinerary prepared at the working level and they decided what
|
||
was supposed to be said by the leaders. In negotiations among business
|
||
leaders, we, top management hold discussions face to face, saying "yes" or
|
||
"no", or "if you do that we will do this." However, we have a tendency to
|
||
prepare answers for negotiations even in business world in Japan. Take my
|
||
case, for example. Once a chairman of a large Japanese firm was vistiting me
|
||
and I planned to talk to him face to face. Then, someone from that office
|
||
called us and asked what I was going to talk about when we met. "Our chairman
|
||
is going to say such and such. How will you respond?" They wanted to prepare
|
||
all answers beforehand. I do not think we need to have meetings if the
|
||
content is planned beforehand. I want Mr. Takeshita to say correctly how we,
|
||
Japanese, see the present situation in the United States and tell them clearly
|
||
what we want to do. I think we should tell them, "please do not cling to the
|
||
image that you are the superpower, but rather look for the way to get your
|
||
economy on the road to recovery." We should tell them, "we are going to back
|
||
up your dollar, so face the fact and issue yen-bonds, for example, as Carter
|
||
Administration issued pound-bonds." Americans have to abandon the idea, such
|
||
as, "our federal obligations do not bother us since we can print more green
|
||
backs." They have to change the way they think about their own economy. To
|
||
this end, we Japanese must deliver the message, "if you cannot make both ends
|
||
meet, we cannot either." We must do this even if it takes time to make them
|
||
understand.
|
||
It is high time to let them know we might go bankrupt together if things
|
||
are not worked. The United States and Japan relationship is in serious
|
||
trouble. Because of our historical discipline, Japan has adhered to the
|
||
principle that "silence is golden," but I believe Japan must insist that the
|
||
United States do what must be done. An outspoken person like me is easily
|
||
criticized from every corner and I am sure Mr. Ishihara has had the same
|
||
experience since he is also very outspoken. But to be silent and to put up
|
||
with things do not work at all in the West. As Ishihara has suggested, I
|
||
think we should say what we have to say. If not, I am afraid we will lose our
|
||
own identity as Japanese in the world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
JAPAN SHOULD LIVE IN HARMONY WITH ASIA (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Restrain America!
|
||
|
||
When the time comes when Japan does say "no" decisively on a particular
|
||
issue, there may be a dramatic reaction. It could come as a shock to the
|
||
Americans, and a number of different reactions would be possible. Even now,
|
||
some Americans suggest the possible physical occupation of Japan in case Japan
|
||
engages in semicondcutor trade with the Soviet Union.
|
||
Yet when the time comes, we may well dare say "no." The relationship
|
||
between Japan and the US, as Mr. Morita describes it, is unbreakable.
|
||
However, the whole world does not exist for the sake of Japan and the US.
|
||
Japan's relationship with the rest of the world does not exist only in
|
||
relation to or through the US. Should America behave unreasonably toward
|
||
Japan, Japan must open channels to deal with the rest of the world from a
|
||
different standpoint than on the basis of the US-Japan relationship and it
|
||
must show that it is doing this to the Americans.
|
||
America itself has already exhibited certain indications that it is
|
||
shifting towards a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, as Alvin Toffler
|
||
stated, insinuating that Japan will be threatened once the US establishes a
|
||
more collaborative realetionship with the Soviet Union similar to the case of
|
||
the US movement toward China, which burst forth in December 1978, there was
|
||
also an astonishing high technolgy demostration.
|
||
I for one had a chance to observe some of that demonstration. It began
|
||
with a set of satellte photos which Dr. Kissinger brought to China. At that
|
||
time Viet Nam was engaged in a military conflict with China, subsequent to the
|
||
fall of the Saigon government in April 1970 and the Cambodian war. The
|
||
Sino-Vietnamese war was recklessly provoked by Deng Shoa Ping, chief of staff
|
||
in China. In the initial encounters, China was severely defeated. The real
|
||
power behind Viet Nam was the Soviet Union. The Soviets provided Viet Nam
|
||
with detailed satellite photos illustrating the movements of the Chinese
|
||
military, the number of soldiers and divisions, the number of tanks unloaded
|
||
at Kuang Tong station and which direction all these troops took. Taking
|
||
adavantage of the superior information available to them, as provided by the
|
||
Soviet Union, Viet Nam was able to lure the Chinese troops deep into the
|
||
mountains, then desroy them with anti-tank missiles. This miserable battle
|
||
was all recorded by American satellites, which Dr. Kissinger presented to the
|
||
Chinese with the comment "what a silly war you have conducted."
|
||
Needless to say, it was a shock to the Chinese leaders to see how step by
|
||
step their military was demolished.
|
||
I assume that the Americans showed another series of satellite pictures
|
||
showing the horrible massacre of Chinese soldiers at the siege of Damansky
|
||
Island (in Russian) or Chin Pao Island (in Chinese), which is located in the
|
||
middle of the Amur (phonetic rendering) River. At first, only a small number
|
||
of Russian soldiers occupied the island and they were soon driven off by the
|
||
Chinese, who had many more troops than did the Russians. The Russians
|
||
returned in greater numbers and recaptured the island. Fianlly, the Chinese
|
||
sent the equivalent of a human wave of troops, almost flooding the island with
|
||
soldiers. As the Chinese shouted victory, the island was surrounded by a
|
||
sudden mist and eventually it was covered by a dense fog. The Russians
|
||
exploited this climactic assistance, surrounding the island with tanks and
|
||
opening a salvo. At dawn, there were a great many dead Chinese troops. The
|
||
Russians landed their tanks, rolling over the dead, wounded, and living,
|
||
reducing all to nothing.
|
||
The Americans showed clear pictures of the events, illustrating what had
|
||
taken place using satellite pictures, a great demonstration of the combination
|
||
of technology and intelligence gathering. China was shocked and disturbed
|
||
that it could not effectively counter a situation like that as they simply did
|
||
not have access to the technology required. They listened to the Americans,
|
||
and agreed to the development of a bilateral relationship with the US on
|
||
American terms. America had played its high tech card quite effectively.
|
||
The normalization of relations with China, by-passing Japan, set a
|
||
precedent and provided a basis for other such threats to Japan by the US.
|
||
America can bluff Japan by indicating that it can develop a similar
|
||
relationship with the Soviet Union, without consultation, so that Japan would
|
||
be less needed within the framework of US global strategy. But Japan has a
|
||
similar card to play, counter to the American bluff.
|
||
Some of Japan's business leaders have long had an interest in Siberian
|
||
development, which now appears to be a realistic possibility. Some of them
|
||
are of the opinion that Japan could go neutral, revoking the US-Japan Security
|
||
Treaty, if the Soviets will return the northern islands, granted that Japan
|
||
would be given the right to develop Siberian resources.
|
||
This may be a realistice choice from the Soviet point of view since some
|
||
critical technologies such as linear technology are available from Japan. The
|
||
US simply does not have them. Japan had better start sending some signals of
|
||
its own to America. My American friends comment that my behavior in the US is
|
||
too provocative; I feel that more of us should speak out like this more often.
|
||
Japan could have the Soviets formally request Japan's linear technolgy.
|
||
The COCOM would claim that it is illegal for Japan to provide this technology.
|
||
Japan would then mount a public relations campaign, appealing to the rest of
|
||
the world that the use of its linear technology is simply to enhance the
|
||
efficiency of the Soviet railroad system in Siberia so that travel time is
|
||
shortened and the whole thing will be rationalized as an attempt to restrain
|
||
American intervention. In fact, the UK and France are champions at this kind
|
||
of public relations game, in combination with diplomacy. We need more
|
||
skillful players in the game to counter the formidable American challenges in
|
||
the international arena.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan Is Not Getting a Free Ride on the US-Japan Security Pact
|
||
|
||
It goes witout saying that the US-Japan relationship is a vital one. The
|
||
security treaty has certainly been helpful to Japan. America, however, has
|
||
chosen to become involved for American interests; it did not want to see the
|
||
restoration of Japanese military power. However, the so-called American
|
||
nuclear umbrella as a deterent power for Japan is not as valuable as the
|
||
Americans have said. I verified this myself twenty years ago and put it into
|
||
the official record. The American nuclear umbrella is just an illusion as far
|
||
as the Japanese people are concerned. Also, the so-called "free ride" on the
|
||
US-Japan Security treaty is no such thing and has no earthly basis. I have
|
||
stated this repeatedly. The Japanese people have been forced to thank the US
|
||
for an illusion. Both the US and the USSR had to enter the INF agreement due
|
||
to the nature of a changing power shift in the world, which on the bottome
|
||
line, is inevitable in light of the high technology dominance by Japan. This
|
||
has been clearly seen by individuals such as Dr. Kissinger, who even foresaw
|
||
the situation today long ago, a position he has stated on a number of
|
||
occasions. Poor Japanese politicians have never studied these issues
|
||
systematically and therefore can never provide a rebuttal to American
|
||
allegations. Americans, for their part, seem to have emotional and
|
||
intellectual difficulties in admitting to changes and new developments.
|
||
A Pentagon task force sent a warning on electronics, with particular
|
||
emphasis on semiconductors, those who have nothing to worry about but Japan
|
||
[sic]. America is very seriously concerned about losing power of any kind to
|
||
Japan. Some Americans have been raising their voices in advocation of an
|
||
increased Japanese defense capacity. This may be a worthwile suggestion. We
|
||
should overhaul our current defense system, although I am not advocating an
|
||
abrupt cutting of ties with the US. We have accepted this absurd defense
|
||
formal [formula?] consisting of three defense forces. This system must be
|
||
completely overhauled to suit present realities, including a much greater
|
||
deterrent capacity, exploiting our high technology to the maximum. We should
|
||
develop the most persuasive and demonstratable deterrent formula which would,
|
||
without any doubt, show our adversaries that any attack on Japn will end with
|
||
unbearable damage to the aggressor from both a stategic and a tactical
|
||
viewpoint.
|
||
Production and maintenance of escort ships which can only exhaust their
|
||
missiles and ammunition in a few minutes, and then sit and wait for death is
|
||
absurd. Participation in RIMPAC with such equipment makes no sense. RIMPAC
|
||
has nothing to do with the concept of active defense.
|
||
In a lecture that the Defense College of Japan, the commander of the US
|
||
7th Fleet declared it 100% unlikely that Soviet forces could land on Japanese
|
||
territory. This is [an] honest -- but stupid -- comment. Some time ago we
|
||
invited a famous Israeli tank division commander named Tam (phonetic
|
||
rendering) to Japan. He kept annoying the Defense Agency by asking why Japan
|
||
was building tanks. He was considered to be one of the top tank strategists
|
||
in the world, and he told us that even on Hokkaido there is no need [for]
|
||
tanks for defense. He said that Soviet attacks would have to be destroyed at
|
||
sea. He also expressed doubt in the value of escort ships.
|
||
His points are absolutely valid. Tanks and escort ships were built and
|
||
maintained at the direction of the Americans. America has imposed its defense
|
||
formula for Japan on Japan, reproducing its own defense formula within Japan.
|
||
Thus, Japan has ended up with the defense system it has simply because of
|
||
one-sided, pro-American diplomacy: one in which Japan says only "yes."
|
||
I conducted my own cost analysis of Japanese defense systems and
|
||
discovered that the whole thing would be far less expensive if Japan developed
|
||
its own system in accordance with its own initiative and planning, in
|
||
comparison to the expenditures forced on us today by the US. Despite the
|
||
bowing under to American will by Japan, it is still the target of American
|
||
politicians such as McClosky who charge that "Japan is protected by American
|
||
blood shed in the Persian Gulf."
|
||
The time has come for Japan to tell the US that we do not need American
|
||
protection. Japan will protect itself with its own power and wisdom. This
|
||
will require a strong commitment and will on our part. We can do it as long
|
||
as there is a national consensus to do so. There may be some political
|
||
difficulties at this point in forming this consensus. From both a financial
|
||
and technological point of view, there are no barriers to accomplishing this
|
||
goal in the near future. We can develop a more effective and efficient
|
||
defense capability at less than we are paying today.
|
||
In reality, the abrupt cancellation of the security treaty is not
|
||
feasible. But it is a diplomatic option and a powerful card. Outright
|
||
refusal to consider such an option means giving up a valuable diplomatic card.
|
||
The fact remains that we do not necessarily need the security treaty and a
|
||
security system which will meet Japanese [needs] can be built by Japan alone.
|
||
Both the right and left on this issue tend to become fanatical on the
|
||
security treaty debate. It is most regrettable that we do not have a cool and
|
||
rational forum where the objective profit and loss aspects of the issue can be
|
||
analyzed. But the time will come when we will have to face this issue and this
|
||
time is in the near future.
|
||
The current state of the Liberal Democratic Party means that it cannot
|
||
afford a serious deliberation on this issue. Once the opposition parties
|
||
disassociate themselves from a one-sided pro Russian and Chinese policy and
|
||
demonstrate their capacity to be able to replace the LDP as alternative
|
||
political parties fully recognized by the voters, we will be in the position
|
||
to examine our options with greater flexibility.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan Should Live in Harmony With Asia
|
||
|
||
Japanese popular songs are heard all over Asia these days; it reminds me
|
||
of the time when Japanese became so interested in American pop music, which,
|
||
at the time, conditioned our psycho-emotional base so that post-war Japn
|
||
evolved into a consumer-oriented society. Structurally, there must be
|
||
similar powers during such social phenomena and I wonder what it is today.
|
||
As a matter of fact, it has always been some technological breakthrough
|
||
which has moved history into the next stage, during any given era, even as far
|
||
back as the stone age or the copper epoch. Technology has always set the pace
|
||
of civilization and cultures flourish on this basis. When we start seeing
|
||
only the pretty flowers that are the result of this flourishing, and forget
|
||
about the roots that nourish the blossoms, we soon experience the decline of
|
||
the civilization, as has been the case of nations in the past. This is the
|
||
way I interpret history, in cool and orthodox terms.
|
||
With respect to the development of commercial uses of the semiconductor,
|
||
materialized by Japan in Asia, I must say that we can easily understand the
|
||
reason why this happened. When the French minister of culture, Andre Malroux,
|
||
came to Japan, he pointed out the distinction between Western religious
|
||
artifacts and those of Japan. He told an audience that the Western expression
|
||
of a crucified Christ is bloody and even grotesque and might well discourage a
|
||
religious attachment to Christ. However, he said, the Miroku Buddha at the
|
||
Horiyuji Temple emits such a sublime beauty, beyond the barriers of race and
|
||
religion, that it is raised to the level of an eternal or ultimate object to
|
||
be revered.
|
||
What he meant was that the type of beauty and the impression given in such
|
||
an artifact as the Miroku Buddha or the Horiyuji Temple attract interest and
|
||
respect from all over the world, beyond national, racial, and cultual
|
||
boundaries. These are products of refinement from the Japanese people. The
|
||
original image of Buddha came from India, by way of China and the Korean
|
||
peninsula. The image of Buddha in Japan is the product of refinement of
|
||
Japanese art. The process has been constantly refined and it becomes a
|
||
product of Japanese intellectual processes, as the Minister explained, it is
|
||
clearly Japanese.
|
||
In my judgement, Japan has acquired this ability primarily because of the
|
||
particular geographical environment surrounding the Japanese archipelago. In
|
||
the long journey from West to East, Japan is located at a dead end; there is
|
||
nothing beyond except the Pacific Ocean. Japan is in no position to pass on
|
||
to other nations what it has received; it must live with what it receives for
|
||
the rest of history. Everything stops at Japan; the Japanese people refine
|
||
what has come their way; Japan is the last stop in cultural transition.
|
||
Among Japanese statesmen, Mr. Minoru Genda is one I truly respect. He
|
||
once said that Western swords were basically instruments of killing, although
|
||
there are some variations, such as those used in the sport of fencing. But
|
||
these swords are just tools and we cannot be impressed looking at Western
|
||
swords. Japanese swords make viewers feel they are looking at artifacts and
|
||
that they are being invited in the world of art and mystery. He went on to
|
||
say that the Japanese people have converted these awful tools, made originally
|
||
to butcher other people, into art objects.
|
||
Another time, Mr Genda told me: "Mr Ishihara -- after all, in the end,
|
||
Japan will be all right. It is able to defend itself." When I replied,
|
||
"how," he said that "Japan's technology can be the basis of Japan's defense."
|
||
What he pointed out was that Japanese technology, which has been refined and
|
||
polished to the ultimate extent, just like the swords, would provide the basis
|
||
for Japan's future existence.
|
||
Mr. Genda also affirmed the points I made, suggesting that in certain
|
||
crucial technological areas, Japan should move at least five years ahead of
|
||
other nations and if possible, further, to at least ten years. As long as
|
||
Japans maintains that ten year advance, it will be in a safe position for the
|
||
first twenty-five years of the 21st century. And this can be accomplished if
|
||
politicians use their ace card wisely.
|
||
I had an argument with an American correspondent recently. I asked him to
|
||
look at those developing nations which were under American auspices. The
|
||
Philippnes and those in Africa, Central and South America are all in hopeless
|
||
situations. Americans once called the Philippines "a showcase for democracy."
|
||
I said that Americans are mistaken.
|
||
While the Philippines may have felt more comfortable under American
|
||
administration than under Spanish colonial rule, and while they still listen
|
||
to America, the US never really imparted to them an understanding of genuine
|
||
democracy. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Southeast Asia once
|
||
suggested to me that the US and Japan should split the cost of financial aid
|
||
to the Philippines. I responded "You're kidding!" He said that money alone
|
||
cannot improve the situation in the Pilippines because of the internal
|
||
situation. The US does not even know where its aid money actually ends up.
|
||
And most fundamentally, social conflict in a nation cannot be solved with an
|
||
outsider's cash.
|
||
The most crucial task in the Philippines if to face the cause of social
|
||
turmoil there. The cause is the role of the landowners; Philippine landowners
|
||
have accumulated incredible power and wealth, syphoning everything from the
|
||
ordinary people. These landowners will get no sympathy from me. The
|
||
Philippines must act to redistribute the land and wealth in much the same
|
||
manner as took place in Japan after the war. Landowners cannot remain
|
||
landowners unless the country is stabilized. Should a military junta take
|
||
power, and decide upon a socialist economic policy, these landowners would be
|
||
wiped out.
|
||
Usurpers must be removed, otherwise there is no way the seeds of democracy
|
||
can be planted. This so-called "showcase of democracy" is empty. And pouring
|
||
additonal aid money into the hands of the landowners in the form of
|
||
compensation for losing their land is not only a utter waste of funds, but
|
||
also ruins any basis for self-help and self-motivation.
|
||
There is a chieftan in the Truk Islands, who speaks Japanese, and who said
|
||
that since the Japanese left, their children have only learned to be lazy as
|
||
the Americans give aid-money and things which spoil human beings. If you give
|
||
people lettuce seeds, they will learn to grow lettuce, but if you give them
|
||
money they will simply import lettuce and learn nothing.
|
||
America is reluctant to recognize the importance and value of local
|
||
cultures. Christian missionaries do not permit the natives to chant their
|
||
charms and they prohibit the use of herbs as medicine -- herbs that have
|
||
traditionally been used in healing sicknesses, found in certain localities and
|
||
used according to local customs. Local festivals are banned so that
|
||
traditional songs and dances are forgotten. Tradition is dismantled.
|
||
Americans force other cultures to give up their traditional value and impose
|
||
American culture upon them. And they do not even recognize that this is an
|
||
atrocity -- a barbaric act!
|
||
Natives who once had a traditional festival similar to Japan's ceremony of
|
||
tasting the fruits of the first harvest. (Our ancestors may well have come
|
||
from these southern islands, by the way). The festival was held on the night
|
||
of the full moon. Beating drums and dancing, the people indulged in open sex
|
||
as the festival had by its nature this element of fertility. Christian
|
||
priests prohibited these festivals and instructed the natives to bring the
|
||
fruits of the harvest to the church altar. One hour after this was done, the
|
||
priests ate the gifts. The chieftan, still speaking Japanese, complained "we
|
||
did not grow this to feed priests." This kind of misunderstanding goes on and
|
||
on and Americans don't even realize it.
|
||
Those Asian nations where the economy has been a success story, such as
|
||
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were all, at one time or another, under Japanese
|
||
administration. We are aware that some negative things happened under the
|
||
Japanese administration, but it cannot be denied that many positive changes
|
||
were left behind.
|
||
Among the resource-supplying nations, the only Southeast Asian nations
|
||
which have developed stable socio-economic systems are those where Japan has
|
||
cooperated as a fellow Asian country. I pointed this out to that
|
||
correspondent with whom I had the argument; in return he only kept silent.
|
||
In any case, these NICS are turning into NIES who are catching up to
|
||
Japan, which make Japan nervous. However, this is fine with me. Japan should
|
||
work more positively, basing its approach on the premise that we must live in
|
||
harmony with other Asian nations, developing constructive political strategies
|
||
to assist these countries economically and politically. Entering a new era --
|
||
the Pacific Age -- Japan cannot remain prosperous without the rest of Asia.
|
||
We need Asia more than we need America.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Japan Can Be Admitted to the World Community by Saying "No"
|
||
|
||
Japan is not quite the tiny country most Japanese think it is. We should
|
||
not be presumptuous or arrogant, ending up hated by others, but we should have
|
||
pride and dignity as a respected memeber of the world community.
|
||
Our world view appears to be very peculiar, conditioned in part by our
|
||
geography and our climate. In our mind, Japan and the rest of the world do
|
||
not exist in a concentric circle. The rest of the world has its center and
|
||
the center of Japan is somewhere outside this. I feel it is time to overhaul
|
||
this concept and enter into the concentric world.
|
||
We want to enter that arena not through the kind is individual performance
|
||
as given by Mr. Nakasone [sic], but rather by saying "no" decisively. The
|
||
Japanese people will define their position in facing the consequences and
|
||
significance of their "no" and will be able to join the world community in the
|
||
concentric circle as a true "adult" member. It is therefore imperative to
|
||
normalize our relationship with the US, so we can get on with becoming a true
|
||
member of the world community
|
||
I often suggested a G2 conference with the US. This would help establish
|
||
Japna's status and America might welcome the suggestion. When there are only
|
||
two parties meeting, Japan will have no choice but to say "yes" or "no"
|
||
without resorting to gray areas. Japan must be equipped with logic and reason
|
||
whenever it says "no." Best of all, by holding a G2, Japan will only have
|
||
itself and the US with which to be concerned, making it easier to stick to the
|
||
"no." No other nation will pay attention to Japan if Japan cannot say "no" to
|
||
the US. A good example is China.
|
||
Japan is flattered by many nations these days for no reason than its
|
||
wealth. Money is important, but Japan has many more valuable assets, such as
|
||
tradition, culture, creativity, as well as powerful high technology; this last
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item is one that even the US and USSR cannot afford to ignore. In order to
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make the rest of the world realize that Japan has much more to offer than
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wealth, we must develop the logic and reasoning to be able to say "no,"
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explain why, and stick to it at certain crucial moments.
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