879 lines
67 KiB
Plaintext
879 lines
67 KiB
Plaintext
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1785
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INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
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by Immanuel Kant
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translated by W. Hastie
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DIVISIONS
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GENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
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I. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF
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DUTIES GENERALLY.
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1. All duties are either duties of right, that is, juridical
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duties (officia juris), or duties of virtue, that is, ethical duties
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(officia virtutis s. ethica). Juridical duties are such as may be
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promulgated by external legislation; ethical duties are those for
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which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter
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cannot be properly made the subject of external legislation is because
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they relate to an end or final purpose, which is itself, at the same
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time, embraced in these duties, and which it is a duty for the
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individual to have as such. But no external legislation can cause
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any one to adopt a particular intention, or to propose to himself a
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certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of
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the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a
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mental condition may be commanded, without its being implied that
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the individual will of necessity make them an end to himself.
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But why, then, it may be asked, is the science of morals, or moral
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philosophy, commonly entitled- especially by Cicero- the science of
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duty and not also the science of right, since duties and rights
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refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own freedom- from
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which all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all duties
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arise- only through the moral imperative, which is an immediate
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injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of
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putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out
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of it.
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2. In the doctrine of duty, man may and ought to be represented in
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accordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom, which is
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entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely
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according to his humanity as a personality independent of physical
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determinations (homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person as
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a man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence
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the conceptions of right and end when referred to duty, in view of
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this twofold quality, give the following division:
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DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE
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RELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY.
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I. The Right of Humanity.
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I. Juridical Oneself in our own person (juridicial
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Duties to or duties towards oneself) Perfect
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Others Duty
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II. The Right of Mankind.
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in others (juridical duties
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towards others.)
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III. The End of Humanity.
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II. Ethical Oneself in our person (eithical duties
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Duties to or towards oneself) Imperfect
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Others Duty
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IV. The End of Mankind.
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in others (ethical duties
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towards others.)
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II. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONS
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OF OBLIGATION.
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As the subjects between whom a relation of right and duty is
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apprehended- whether it actually exists or not- admit of being
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conceived in various juridical relations to each other, another
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division may be proposed from this point of view, as follows:
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DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OF
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THOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS, AND THOSE WHO ARE
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BOUND UNDER OBLIGATIONS.
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1. The juridical relation of man to beings who have neither right
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nor duty:
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Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings are irrational,
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and they neither put us under obligation, nor can we be put under
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obligation by them.
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2. The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights
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and duties:
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Adest. There is such a relation, for it is the relation of men to
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men.
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3. The juridical relation of man to beings who have only duties
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and no rights:
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Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings would be men
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without juridical personality, as slaves of bondsmen.
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4 The juridical relation of man to a being who has only rights and
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no duties (God):
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Vacat. There is no such relation in mere philosophy, because such
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a being is not an object of possible experience.
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A real relation between right and duty is therefore found, in this
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scheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found in
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No. 4 is because it would constitute a transcendent duty, that is, one
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to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and
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capable of imposing obligation. Consequently the relation from the
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theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a
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relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. But
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the conception of this object is not entirely empty. On the
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contrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the
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maxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice
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generally. And it is in this bearing that all the duty involved and
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practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies.
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III. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF
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DUTIES GENERALLY.
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According to the constituent principles and the method of the
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system.
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I. Principles I. Duties of Right I. Private Right.
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II. Public Right
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II. Duties of Virtue, etc.
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And so on, including all that
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refers not only to the
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materials, but also to the
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architectonic form of a
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scientific system of morals,
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when the metaphysical
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investigation of the elements
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has completely traced out the
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universal principles constituting
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the whole.
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II. Method I. Didactics
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II. Ascetics
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INTRODUCTION_TO_THE_METAPHYSIC_OF_MORALS
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
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I. THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE
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MORAL LAWS.
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The active faculty of the human mind, as the faculty of desire in
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its widest sense, is the power which man has, through his mental
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representations, of becoming the cause of objects corresponding to
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these representations. The capacity of a being to act in conformity
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with his own representations is what constitutes the life of such a
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being.
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It is to be observed, first, that with desire or aversion there is
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always connected pleasure or pain, the susceptibility for which is
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called feeling. But the converse does not always hold; for there may
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be a pleasure connected, not with the desire of an object, but with
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a mere mental representation, it being indifferent whether an object
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corresponding to the representation exist or not. And second, the
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pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always
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precede the activity of desire; nor can it be regarded in every case
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as the cause, but it may as well be the effect of that activity. The
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capacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the occasion of a
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mental representation is called "feeling," because pleasure and pain
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contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental
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activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could
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possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a
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knowledge of our own mental state. For even sensations,* considered
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apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the
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modifications of the subject- as, for instance, in reference to red,
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sweet, and such like- are referred as constituent elements of
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knowledge to objects, whereas pleasure or pain felt in connection with
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what is red or sweet express absolutely nothing that is in the object,
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but merely a relation to the subject. And for the reason just
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stated, pleasure and pain considered in themselves cannot be more
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precisely defined. All that can be further done with regard to them is
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merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain
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relations, in order to make the knowledge of them available
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practically.
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*The sensibility as the faculty of sense may be defined by reference
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to the subjective nature of our representations generally. It is the
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understanding that fir refers the subjective representations to an
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object; it alone thinks anything by means of these representations.
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Now, the subjective nature of our representations might be of such a
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kind that they could be related to objects so as to furnish
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knowledge of them, either in regard to their form or matter- in the
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former relation by pure perception, in the latter by sensation proper.
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In this case, the sense-faculty, as the capacity for receiving
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objective representations, would be properly called sense
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perception. But mere mental representation from its subjective
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nature cannot, in fact, become a constituent of objective knowledge,
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because it contains merely the relation of the representations to
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the subject, and includes nothing that can be used for attaining a
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knowledge of the object. In this case, then, this receptivity of the
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mind for subjective representations is called feeling. It includes the
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effect of the representations, whether sensible or intellectual,
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upon the subject; and it belongs to the sensibility, although the
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representation itself may belong to the understanding or the reason.
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The pleasure which is necessarily connected with the activity of
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desire, when the representation of the object desired affects the
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capacity of feeling, may be called practical pleasure. And this
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designation is applicable whether the pleasure is the cause or the
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effect of the desire. On the other hand, that pleasure which is not
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necessarily connected with the desire of an object, and which,
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therefore, is not a pleasure in the existence of the object, but is
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merely attached to a mental representation alone, may be called
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inactive complacency, or mere contemplative pleasure. The feeling of
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this latter kind of pleasure is what is called taste. Hence, in a
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system of practical philosophy, the contemplative pleasure of taste
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will not be discussed as an essential constituent conception, but need
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only be referred to incidentally or episodically. But as regards
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practical pleasure, it is otherwise. For the determination of the
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activity of the faculty of desire or appetency, which is necessarily
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preceded by this pleasure as its cause, is what properly constitutes
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desire in the strict sense of the term. Habitual desire, again,
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constitutes inclination; and the connection of pleasure with the
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activity of desire, in so far as this connection is judged by the
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understanding to be valid according to a general rule holding good
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at least for the individual, is what is called interest. Hence, in
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such a case, the practical pleasure is an interest of the
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inclination of the individual. On the other hand, if the pleasure
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can only follow a preceding determination of the faculty of desire, it
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is an intellectual pleasure, and the interest in the object must be
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called a rational interest; for were the interest sensuous, and not
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based only upon pure principles of reason, sensation would necessarily
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be conjoined with the pleasure, and would thus determine the
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activity of the desire. Where an entirely pure interest of reason must
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be assumed, it is not legitimate to introduce into it an interest of
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inclination surreptitiously. However, in order to conform so far
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with the common phraseology, we may allow the application of the
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term "inclination" even to that which can only be the object of an
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"intellectual" pleasure in the sense of a habitual desire arising from
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a pure interest of reason. But such inclination would have to be
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viewed, not as the cause, but as the effect of the rational
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interest; and we might call it the non-sensuous or rational
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inclination (propensio intellectualis). Further, concupiscence is to
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be distinguished from the activity of desire itself, as a stimulus
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or incitement to its determination. It is always a sensuous state of
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the mind, which does not itself attain to the definiteness of an act
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of the power of desire.
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The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with
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conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to
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action is found in the mind, and not in its object it constitutes a
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power acting or not acting according to liking. In so far as the
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activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of the
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action to produce the object, it forms an act of choice; if this
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consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a wish.
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The faculty of desire, in so far as its inner principle of
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determination as the ground of its liking or predilection lies in
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the reason of the subject, constitutes the will. The will is therefore
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the faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed not so much in
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relation to the action- which is the relation of the act of choice- as
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rather in relation to the principle that determines the power of
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choice to the action. It has, in itself, properly no special principle
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of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary
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act of choice, it is the practical reason itself.
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Under the will, taken generally, may be included the volitional
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act of choice, and also the mere act of wish, in so far as reason
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may determine the faculty of desire in its activity. The act of choice
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that can be determined by pure reason constitutes the act of
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free-will. That act which is determinable only by inclination as a
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sensuous impulse or stimulus would be irrational brute choice
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(arbitrium brutum). The human act of choice, however, as human, is
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in fact affected by such impulses or stimuli, but is not determined by
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them; and it is, therefore, not pure in itself when taken apart from
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the acquired habit of determination by reason. But it may be
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determined to action by the pure will. The freedom of the act of
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volitional choice is its independence of being determined by
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sensuous impulses or stimuli. This forms the negative conception of
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the free-will. The positive conception of freedom is given by the fact
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that the will is the capability of pure reason to be practical of
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itself. But this is not possible otherwise than by the maxim of
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every action being subjected to the condition of being practicable
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as a universal law. Applied as pure reason to the act of choice, and
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considered apart from its objects, it may be regarded as the faculty
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of principles; and, in this connection, it is the source of
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practical principles. Hence it is to be viewed as a law-giving
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faculty. But as the material upon which to construct a law is not
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furnished to it, it can only make the form of the form of the maxim of
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the act of will, in so far as it is available as a universal law,
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the supreme law and determining principle of the will. And as the
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maxims, or rules of human action derived from subjective causes, do
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not of themselves necessarily agree with those that are objective
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and universal, reason can only prescribe this supreme law as an
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absolute imperative of prohibition or command.
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The laws of freedom, as distinguished from the laws of nature, are
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moral laws. So far as they refer only to external actions and their
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lawfulness, they are called juridical; but if they also require
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that, as laws, they shall themselves be the determining principles
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of our actions, they are ethical. The agreement of an action with
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juridical laws is its legality; the agreement of an action with
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ethical laws is its morality. The freedom to which the former laws
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refer, can only be freedom in external practice; but the freedom to
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which the latter laws refer is freedom in the internal as well as
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the external exercise of the activity of the will in so far as it is
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determined by laws of reason. So, in theoretical philosophy, it is
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said that only the objects of the external senses are in space, but
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all the objects both of internal and external sense are in time;
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because the representations of both, as being representations, so
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far belong all to the internal sense. In like manner, whether
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freedom is viewed in reference to the external or the internal
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action of the will, its laws, as pure practical laws of reason for the
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free activity of the will generally, must at the same time be inner
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principles for its determination, although they may not always be
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considered in this relation.
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II. THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS.
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It has been shown in The Metaphysical Principles of the Science of
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Nature that there must be principles a priori for the natural
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science that has to deal with the objects of the external senses.
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And it was further shown that it is possible, and even necessary, to
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formulate a system of these principles under the name of a
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"metaphysical science of nature," as a preliminary to experimental
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physics regarded as natural science applied to particular objects of
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experience. But this latter science, if care be taken to keep its
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generalizations free from error, may accept many propositions as
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universal on the evidence of experience, although if the term
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"universal" be taken in its strict sense, these would necessarily have
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to be deduced by the metaphysical science from principles a priori.
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Thus Newton accepted the principle of the equality of action and
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reaction as established by experience, and yet he extended it as a
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universal law over the whole of material nature. The chemists go
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even farther, grounding their most general laws regarding the
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combination and decomposition of the materials of bodies wholly upon
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experience; and yet they trust so completely to the universality and
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necessity of those laws that they have no anxiety as to any error
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being found in propositions founded upon experiments conducted in
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accordance with them.
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But it is otherwise with moral laws. These, in contradistinction
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to natural laws, are only valid as laws, in so far as they can be
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rationally established a priori and comprehended as necessary. In
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fact, conceptions and judgements regarding ourselves and our conduct
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have no moral significance, if they contain only what may be learned
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from experience; and when any one is, so to speak, misled into
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making a moral principle out of anything derived from this latter
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source, he is already in danger of falling into the coarsest and
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most fatal errors.
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If the philosophy of morals were nothing more than a theory of
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happiness (eudaemonism), it would be absurd to search after principles
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a priori as a foundation for it. For however plausible it may sound to
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say that reason, even prior to experience, can comprehend by what
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means we may attain to a lasting enjoyment of the real pleasures of
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life, yet all that is taught on this subject a priori is either
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tautological, or is assumed wholly without foundation. It is only
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experience that can show what will bring us enjoyment. The natural
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impulses directed towards nourishment, the sexual instinct, or the
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tendency to rest and motion, as well as the higher desires of
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honour, the acquisition of knowledge, and such like, as developed with
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our natural capacities, are alone capable of showing in what those
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enjoyments are to be found. And, further, the knowledge thus
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acquired is available for each individual merely in his own way; and
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it is only thus he can learn the means by which be has to seek those
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enjoyments. All specious rationalizing a priori, in this connection,
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is nothing at bottom but carrying facts of experience up to
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generalizations by induction (secundum principia generalia non
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universalia); and the generality thus attained is still so limited
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that numberless exceptions must be allowed to every individual in
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order that he may adapt the choice of his mode of life to his own
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Particular inclinations and his capacity for pleasure. And, after all,
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the individual has really to acquire his prudence at the cost of his
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own suffering or that of his neighbors the form
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But it is quite otherwise with the principles of morality. They
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lay down commands for every one without regard to his particular
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inclinations, and merely because and so far as he is free, and has a
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practical reason. Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn
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from observation of oneself or of our animal nature, nor from
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perception of the course of the world in regard to what happens, or
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how men act.* But reason commands how we ought to act, even although
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no example of such action were to be found; nor does reason give any
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regard to the advantage which may accrue to us by so acting, and which
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experience could alone actually show. For, although reason allows us
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to seek what is for our advantage in every possible way, and although,
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founding upon the evidence of experience, it may further promise
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that greater advantages will probably follow on the average from the
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observance of her commands than from their transgression, especially
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if prudence guides the conduct, yet the authority of her precepts as
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commands does not rest on such considerations. They are used by reason
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only as counsels, and by way of a counterpoise against seductions to
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an opposite course, when adjusting beforehand the equilibrium of a
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partial balance in the sphere of practical judgement, in order thereby
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to secure the decision of this judgement, according to the due
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weight of the a priori principles of a pure practical reason.
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*This holds notwithstanding the fact that the term morals," in Latin
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mores, and in German sitten, signifies originally only manners or mode
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of life.
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Metaphysics designates any system of knowledge a priori that
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consists of pure conceptions. Accordingly, a practical philosophy
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not having nature, but the freedom of the will for its object, will
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presuppose and require a metaphysic of morals. It is even a duty to
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have such a metaphysic; and every man does, indeed, possess it in
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himself, although commonly but in an obscure way. For how could any
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one believe that he has a source of universal law in himself,
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without principles a priori? And just as in a metaphysics of nature
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there must be principles regulating the application of the universal
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supreme principles of nature to objects of experience, so there cannot
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but be such principles in the metaphysic of morals; and we will
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often have to deal objectively with the particular nature of man as
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known only by experience, in order to show in it the consequences of
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these universal moral principles. But this mode of dealing with
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these principles in their particular applications will in no way
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detract from their rational purity, or throw doubt on their a priori
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origin. In other words, this amounts to saying that a metaphysic of
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morals cannot be founded on anthropology as the empirical science of
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man, but may be applied to it.
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The counterpart of a metaphysic of morals, and the other member of
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the division of practical philosophy, would be a moral anthropology,
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as the empirical science of the moral nature of man. This science
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would contain only the subjective conditions that hinder or favor
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the realization in practice of the universal moral laws in human
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nature, with the means of propagating, spreading, and strengthening
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the moral principles- as by the education of the young and the
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instruction of the people- and all other such doctrines and precepts
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founded upon experience and indispensable in themselves, although they
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must neither precede the metaphysical investigation of the
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principles of reason, nor be mixed up with it. For, by doing so, there
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would be a great danger of laying down false, or at least very
|
|
flexible moral laws, which would hold forth as unattainable what is
|
|
not attached only because the law has not been comprehended and
|
|
presented in its purity, in which also its strength consists. Or,
|
|
otherwise, spurious and mixed motives might be adopted instead of what
|
|
is dutiful and good in itself; and these would furnish no certain
|
|
moral principles either for the guidance of the judgement or for the
|
|
discipline of the heart in the practice of duty. It is only by pure
|
|
reason, therefore, that duty can and must be prescribed.
|
|
The higher division of philosophy, under which the division just
|
|
mentioned stands, is into theoretical philosophy and practical
|
|
philosophy. Practical philosophy is just moral philosophy in its
|
|
widest sense, as has been explained elsewhere.* All that is
|
|
practicable and possible, according to natural laws, is the special
|
|
subject of the activity of art, and its precepts and rules entirely
|
|
depend on the theory of nature. It is only what is practicable
|
|
according to laws of freedom that can have principles independent of
|
|
theory, for there is no theory in relation to what passes beyond the
|
|
determinations of nature. Philosophy therefore cannot embrace under
|
|
its practical division a technical theory, but only a morally
|
|
practical doctrine. But if the dexterity of the will in acting
|
|
according to laws of freedom, in contradistinction to nature, were
|
|
to be also called an art, it would necessarily indicate an art which
|
|
would make a system of freedom possible like the system of nature.
|
|
This would truly be a Divine art, if we were in a position by means of
|
|
it to realize completely what reason prescribes to us, and to put
|
|
the idea into practice.
|
|
-
|
|
*In the Critique of Judgement (1790).
|
|
-
|
|
-
|
|
III. THE DIVISION OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS.
|
|
-
|
|
All legislation, whether relating to internal or external action,
|
|
and whether prescribed a priori by mere reason or laid down by the
|
|
will of another, involves two elements: First, a law which
|
|
represents the action that ought to happen as necessary objectively,
|
|
thus making the action a duty; second, a motive which connects the
|
|
principle determining the will to this action with the mental
|
|
representation of the law subjectively, so that the law makes duty the
|
|
motive of the action. By the first element, the action is
|
|
represented as a duty, in accordance with the mere theoretical
|
|
knowledge of the possibility of determining the activity of the will
|
|
by practical rules. By the second element, the obligation so to act is
|
|
connected in the subject with a determining principle of the will as
|
|
such. All legislation, therefore, may be differentiated by reference
|
|
to its motive-principle.* The legislation which makes an action a
|
|
duty, and this duty at the same time a motive, is ethical. That
|
|
legislation which does not include the motive-principle in the law,
|
|
and consequently admits another motive than the idea of duty itself,
|
|
is juridical. In respect of the latter, it is evident that the motives
|
|
distinct from the idea of duty, to which it may refer, must be drawn
|
|
from the subjective (pathological) influences of inclination and of
|
|
aversion, determining the voluntary activity, and especially from
|
|
the latter; because it is a legislation which has to be compulsory,
|
|
and not merely a mode of attracting or persuading. The agreement or
|
|
non-agreement of an action with the law, without reference to its
|
|
motive, is its legality; and that character of the action in which the
|
|
idea of duty arising from the law at the same time forms the motive of
|
|
the action, is its morality.
|
|
-
|
|
*This ground of division will apply, although the action which it
|
|
makes a duty may coincide with another action that may be otherwise
|
|
looked at from another point of view. For instance, actions may in all
|
|
cases be classified as external.
|
|
-
|
|
Duties specially in accord with a juridical legislation can only
|
|
be external duties. For this mode of legislation does not require that
|
|
the idea of the duty, which is internal, shall be of itself the
|
|
determining principle of the act of will; and as it requires a
|
|
motive suitable to the nature of its laws, it can only connect what is
|
|
external with the law. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes
|
|
internal actions also duties, but not to the exclusion of the
|
|
external, for it embraces everything which is of the nature of duty.
|
|
And just because just because ethical legislation includes within
|
|
its law the internal motive of the action as contained in the idea
|
|
of duty, it involves a characteristic which cannot at all enter into
|
|
the legislation that is external. Hence, ethical legislation cannot as
|
|
such be external, not even when proceeding from a Divine will,
|
|
although it may receive duties which rest on an external legislation
|
|
as duties, into the position of motives, within its own legislation.
|
|
From what has been said, it is evident that all duties, merely
|
|
because they are duties, belong to ethics; and yet the legislation
|
|
upon which they are founded is not on that account in all cases
|
|
contained in ethics. On the contrary, the law of many of them lies
|
|
outside of ethics. Thus ethics commands that I must fulfil a promise
|
|
entered into by contract, although the other party might not be able
|
|
to compel me to do so. It adopts the law (pacta sunt servanda) and the
|
|
duty corresponding to it, from jurisprudence or the science of
|
|
right, by which they are established. It is not in ethics,
|
|
therefore, but in jurisprudence, that the principle of the legislation
|
|
lies, that "promises made and accepted must be kept." Accordingly,
|
|
ethics specially teaches that if the motive-principle of external
|
|
compulsion which juridical legislation connects with a duty is even
|
|
let go, the idea of duty alone is sufficient of itself as a motive.
|
|
For were it not so, and were the legislation itself not juridical, and
|
|
consequently the duty arising from it not specially a duty of right as
|
|
distinguished from a duty of virtue, then fidelity in the
|
|
performance of acts, to which the individual may be bound by the terms
|
|
of a contract, would have to be classified with acts of benevolence
|
|
and the obligation that underlies them, which cannot be correct. To
|
|
keep one's promise is not properly a duty of virtue, but a duty of
|
|
right, and the performance of it can be enforced by external
|
|
compulsion. But to keep one's promise, even when no compulsion can
|
|
be applied to enforce it, is, at the same time, a virtuous action, and
|
|
a proof of virtue. jurisprudence as the science of right, and ethics
|
|
as the science of virtue, are therefore distinguished not so much by
|
|
their different duties, as rather by the difference Of the legislation
|
|
which connects the one or the other kind of motive with their laws.
|
|
Ethical legislation is that which cannot be external, although the
|
|
duties it prescribes may be external as well as internal. Juridical
|
|
legislation is that which may also be external. Thus it is an external
|
|
duty to keep a promise entered into by contract; but the injunction to
|
|
do this merely because it is a duty, without regard to any other
|
|
motive, belongs exclusively to the internal legislation. It does not
|
|
belong thus to the ethical sphere as being a particular kind of duty
|
|
or a particular mode of action to which we are bound- for it is an
|
|
external duty in ethics as well as in jurisprudence- but it is because
|
|
the legislation in the case referred to is internal, and cannot have
|
|
an external lawgiver, that the obligation is reckoned as belonging
|
|
to ethics. For the same reason, the duties of benevolence, although
|
|
they are external duties as obligations to external actions, are, in
|
|
like manner, reckoned as belonging to ethics, because they can only be
|
|
enjoined by legislation that is internal. Ethics has no doubt its
|
|
own peculiar duties- such as those towards oneself- but it bas also
|
|
duties in common with jurisprudence, only not under the same mode of
|
|
obligation. In short, the peculiarity of ethical legislation is to
|
|
enjoin the performance of certain actions merely because they are
|
|
duties, and to make the principle of duty itself- whatever be its
|
|
source or occasion- the sole sufficing motive of the activity of the
|
|
will. Thus, then, there are many ethical duties that are directly
|
|
such; and the inner legislation also makes the others- all and each of
|
|
them- indirectly ethical.
|
|
The deduction of the division of a system is the proof of its
|
|
completeness as well as of its continuity, so that there may be a
|
|
logical transition from the general conception divided to the
|
|
members of the division, and through the whole series of the
|
|
subdivisions without any break or leap in the arrangement (divisio per
|
|
saltum). Such a division is one of the most difficult conditions for
|
|
the architect of a system to fulfil. There is even some doubt as to
|
|
what is the highest conception that is primarily divided into right
|
|
and wrong (aut fas aut nefas). It is assuredly the conception of the
|
|
activity of the free-will in general. In like manner, the expounders
|
|
of ontology start from something and nothing, without perceiving
|
|
that these are already members of a division for which the highest
|
|
divided conception is awanting, and which can be no other than that of
|
|
thing in general.
|
|
-
|
|
-
|
|
IV. GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONCEPTIONS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED.
|
|
(Philosophia practica universalis).
|
|
-
|
|
The conception of freedom is a conception of pure reason. It is
|
|
therefore transcendent in so far as regards theoretical philosophy;
|
|
for it is a conception for which no corresponding instance or
|
|
example can be found or supplied in any possible experience.
|
|
Accordingly freedom is not presented as an object of any theoretical
|
|
knowledge that is possible for us. It is in no respect a constitutive,
|
|
but only a regulative conception; and it can be accepted by the
|
|
speculative reason as at most a merely negative principle. In the
|
|
practical sphere of reason, however, the reality of freedom may be
|
|
demonstrated by certain practical principles which, as laws, prove a
|
|
causality of the pure reason in the process of determining the
|
|
activity of the will that is independent of all empirical and sensible
|
|
conditions. And thus there is established the fact of a pure will
|
|
existing in us as the source of all moral conceptions and laws.
|
|
On this positive conception of freedom in the practical relation
|
|
certain unconditional practical laws are founded, and they specially
|
|
constitute moral laws. In relation to us as human beings, with an
|
|
activity of will modified by sensible influences so as not to be
|
|
conformable to the pure will, but as often contrary to it, these
|
|
laws appear as imperatives commanding or prohibiting certain
|
|
actions; and as such they are categorical or unconditional
|
|
imperatives. Their categorical and unconditional character
|
|
distinguishes them from the technical imperatives which express the
|
|
prescriptions of art, and which always command only conditionally.
|
|
According to these categorical imperatives, certain actions are
|
|
allowed or disallowed as being morally possible or impossible; and
|
|
certain of them or their opposites are morally necessary and
|
|
obligatory. Hence, in reference to such actions, there arises the
|
|
conception of a duty whose observance or transgression is
|
|
accompanied with a pleasure or pain of a peculiar kind, known as moral
|
|
feeling. We do not, however, take the moral feelings or sentiments
|
|
into account in considering the practical laws of reason. For they
|
|
do not form the foundation or principle of practical laws of reason,
|
|
but only the subjective effects that arise in the mind on the occasion
|
|
of our voluntary activity being determined by these laws. And while
|
|
they neither add to nor take from the objective validity or
|
|
influence of the moral laws in the judgement of reason, such
|
|
sentiments may vary according to the differences of the individuals
|
|
who experience them.
|
|
The following conceptions are common to jurisprudence and ethics
|
|
as the two main divisions of the metaphysic of morals.
|
|
Obligation is the necessity of a free action when viewed in relation
|
|
to a categorical imperative of reason. An imperative is a practical
|
|
rule by which an action, otherwise contingent in itself, is made
|
|
necessary. It is distinguished from a practical law in that such a
|
|
law, while likewise representing the action as necessary, does not
|
|
consider whether it is internally necessary as involved in the
|
|
nature of the agent- say as a holy being- or is contingent to him,
|
|
as in the case of man as we find him; for where the first condition
|
|
holds good, there is in fact no imperative. Hence an imperative is a
|
|
rule which not only represents but makes a subjectively contingent
|
|
action necessary; and it, accordingly, represents the subject as being
|
|
(morally) necessitated to act in accordance with this rule. A
|
|
categorical or unconditional imperative is one which does not
|
|
represent the action in any way immediately through the conception
|
|
of an end that is to be attained by it; but it presents the action
|
|
to the mind as objectively necessary by the mere representation of its
|
|
form as an action, and thus makes it necessary. Such imperatives
|
|
cannot be put forward by any other practical science than that which
|
|
prescribes obligations, and it is only the science of morals that does
|
|
this. All other imperatives are technical, and they are altogether
|
|
conditional. The ground of the possibility of categorical
|
|
imperatives lies in the fact that they refer to no determination of
|
|
the activity of the will by which a purpose might be assigned to it,
|
|
but solely to its freedom.
|
|
Every action is allowed (licitum) which is not contrary to
|
|
obligation; and this freedom not being limited by an opposing
|
|
imperative, constitutes a moral right as a warrant or title of
|
|
action (facultas moralis). From this it is at once evident what
|
|
actions are disallowed or illicit (illicita).
|
|
Duty is the designation of any action to which anyone is bound by an
|
|
obligation. It is therefore the subject-matter of all obligation. Duty
|
|
as regards the action concerned may be one and the same, and yet we
|
|
may be bound to it in various ways.
|
|
The categorical imperative, as expressing an obligation in respect
|
|
to certain actions, is a morally practical law. But because obligation
|
|
involves not merely practical necessity expressed in a law as such,
|
|
but also actual necessitation, the categorical imperative is a law
|
|
either of command or prohibition, according as the doing or not
|
|
doing of an action is represented as a duty. An action which is
|
|
neither commanded nor forbidden is merely allowed, because there is no
|
|
law restricting freedom, nor any duty in respect of it. Such an action
|
|
is said to be morally indifferent (indifferens, adiaphoron, res
|
|
merae facultatis). It may be asked whether there are such morally
|
|
indifferent actions; and if there are, whether in addition to the
|
|
preceptive and prohibitive law (lex praeceptiva et prohibitiva, lex
|
|
mandati et vetiti), there is also required a permissive law (lex
|
|
permissiva), in order that one may be free in such relations to act,
|
|
or to forbear from acting, at his pleasure? If it were so, the moral
|
|
right in question would not, in all cases, refer to actions that are
|
|
indifferent in themselves (adiaphora); for no special law would be
|
|
required to establish such a right, considered according to moral
|
|
laws.
|
|
An action is called an act- or moral deed- in so far as it is
|
|
subject to laws of obligation, and consequently in so far as the
|
|
subject of it is regarded with reference to the freedom of his
|
|
choice in the exercise of his will. The agent- as the actor or doer of
|
|
the deed- is regarded as, through the act, the author of its effect;
|
|
and this effect, along with the action itself, may be imputed to
|
|
him, if be previously knew the law in virtue of which an obligation
|
|
rested upon him.
|
|
A person is a subject who is capable of having his actions imputed
|
|
to him. Moral personality is, therefore, nothing but the freedom of
|
|
a rational being under moral laws; and it is to be distinguished
|
|
from psychological freedom as the mere faculty by which we become
|
|
conscious of ourselves in different states of the identity of our
|
|
existence. Hence it follows that a person is properly subject to no
|
|
other laws than those he lays down for himself, either alone or in
|
|
conjunction with others.
|
|
A thing is what is incapable of being the subject of imputation.
|
|
Every object of the free activity of the will, which is itself void of
|
|
freedom, is therefore called a thing (res corporealis).
|
|
Right or wrong applies, as a general quality, to an act (rectum
|
|
aut minus rectum), in so far as it is in accordance with duty or
|
|
contrary to duty (factum licitum aut illicitum), no matter what may be
|
|
the subject or origin of the duty itself. An act that is contrary to
|
|
duty is called a transgression (reatus).
|
|
An unintentional transgression of a duty, which is, nevertheless,
|
|
imputable to a person, is called a mere fault (culpa). An
|
|
intentional transgression- that is, an act accompanied with the
|
|
consciousness that it is a transgression- constitutes a crime (dolus).
|
|
Whatever is juridically in accordance with external laws is said
|
|
to be just (jus, instum); and whatever is not juridically in
|
|
accordance with external laws is unjust (unjustum).
|
|
A collision of duties or obligations (collisio officiorum s.
|
|
obligationum) would be the result of such a relation between them that
|
|
the one would annul the other, in whole or in part. Duty and
|
|
obligation, however, are conceptions which express the objective
|
|
practical necessity of certain actions, and two opposite rules
|
|
cannot be objective and necessary at the same time; for if it is a
|
|
duty to act according to one of them, it is not only no duty to act
|
|
according to an opposite rule, but to do so would even be contrary
|
|
to duty. Hence a collision of duties and obligations is entirely
|
|
inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur). There may, however, be
|
|
two grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), connected with an
|
|
individual under a rule prescribed for himself, and yet neither the
|
|
one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute an actual obligation
|
|
(rationes obligandi non obligantes); and in that case the one of
|
|
them is not a duty. If two such grounds of obligation are actually
|
|
in collision with each other, practical philosophy does not say that
|
|
the stronger obligation is to keep the upper hand (fortior obligatio
|
|
vincit), but that the stronger ground of obligation is to maintain its
|
|
place (fortior obligandi ratio vincit).
|
|
Obligatory Laws for which an external legislation is possible are
|
|
called generally external laws. Those external laws, the
|
|
obligatoriness of which can be recognised by reason a priori even
|
|
without an external legislation, are called natural laws. Those
|
|
laws, again, which are not obligatory without actual external
|
|
legislation, are called positive laws. An external legislation,
|
|
containing pure natural laws, is therefore conceivable; but in that
|
|
case a previous natural law must be presupposed to establish the
|
|
authority of the lawgiver by the right to subject others to obligation
|
|
through his own act of will.
|
|
The principle which makes a certain action a duty is a practical
|
|
law. The rule of the agent or actor, which he forms as a principle for
|
|
himself on subjective grounds, is called his maxim. Hence, even when
|
|
the law is one and invariable, the maxims of the agent may yet be very
|
|
different.
|
|
The categorical imperative only expresses generally what constitutes
|
|
obligation. It may be rendered by the following formula: "Act
|
|
according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a
|
|
universal law." Actions must therefore be considered, in the first
|
|
place, according to their subjective principle; but whether this
|
|
principle is also valid objectively can only be known by the criterion
|
|
of the categorical imperative. For reason brings the principle or
|
|
maxim of any action to the test, by calling upon the agent to think of
|
|
himself in connection with it as at the same time laying down a
|
|
universal law, and to consider whether his action is so qualified as
|
|
to be fit for entering into such a universal legislation.
|
|
The simplicity of this law, in comparison with the great and
|
|
manifold consequences which may be drawn from it, as well as its
|
|
commanding authority and supremacy without the accompaniment of any
|
|
visible motive or sanction, must certainly at first appear very
|
|
surprising. And we may well wonder at the power of our reason to
|
|
determine the activity of the will by the mere idea of the
|
|
qualification of a maxim for the universality of a practical law,
|
|
especially when we are taught thereby that this practical moral law
|
|
first reveals a property of the will which the speculative reason
|
|
would never have come upon either by principles a priori, or from
|
|
any experience whatever; and even if it had ascertained the fact, it
|
|
could never have theoretically established its possibility. This
|
|
practical law, however, not only discovers the fact of that property
|
|
of the will, which is freedom, but irrefutably establishes it. Hence
|
|
it will be less surprising to find that the moral laws are
|
|
undemonstrable, and yet apodeictic, like the mathematical
|
|
postulates; and that they, at the same time, open up before us a whole
|
|
field of practical knowledge, from which reason, on its theoretical
|
|
side, must find itself entirely excluded with its speculative idea
|
|
of freedom and all such ideas of the supersensible generally.
|
|
The conformity of an action to the law of duty constitutes its
|
|
legality; the conformity of the maxim of the action with the law
|
|
constitutes its morality. A maxim is thus a subjective principle of
|
|
action, which the individual makes a rule for himself as to how in
|
|
fact he will act.
|
|
On the other hand, the principle of duty is what reason
|
|
absolutely, and therefore objectively and universally, lays down in
|
|
the form of a command to the individual, as to how he ought to act.
|
|
The supreme principle of the science of morals accordingly is
|
|
this: "Act according to a maxim which can likewise be valid as a
|
|
universal law." Every maxim which is not qualified according to this
|
|
condition is contrary to Morality.
|
|
Laws arise from the will, viewed generally as practical reason;
|
|
maxims spring from the activity of the will in the process of
|
|
choice. The latter in man is what constitutes free-will. The will
|
|
which refers to nothing else than mere law can neither be called
|
|
free nor not free, because it does not relate to actions
|
|
immediately, but to the giving of a law for the maxim of actions; it
|
|
is therefore the practical reason itself. Hence as a faculty, it is
|
|
absolutely necessary in itself, and is not subject to any external
|
|
necessitation. It is, therefore, only the act of choice in the
|
|
voluntary process that can be called free.
|
|
The freedom of the act of will, however, is not to be defined as a
|
|
liberty of indifference (libertas indifferentae), that, is, as a
|
|
capacity of choosing to act for or against the law. The voluntary
|
|
process, indeed, viewed as a phenomenal appearance, gives many
|
|
examples of this choosing in experience; and some have accordingly
|
|
so defined the free-will. For freedom, as it is first made knowable by
|
|
the moral law, is known only as a negative property in us, as
|
|
constituted by the fact of not being necessitated to act by sensible
|
|
principles of determination. Regarded as a noumenal reality,
|
|
however, in reference to man as a pure rational intelligence, the
|
|
act of the will cannot be at all theoretically exhibited; nor can it
|
|
therefore be explained how this power can act necessitatingly in
|
|
relation to the sensible activity in the process of choice, or
|
|
consequently in what the positive quality of freedom consists. Only
|
|
thus much we can see into and comprehend, that although man, as a
|
|
being belonging to the world of sense, exhibits- as experience
|
|
shows- a capacity of choosing not only conformably to the law but also
|
|
contrary to it, his freedom as a rational being belonging to the world
|
|
of intelligence cannot be defined by reference merely to sensible
|
|
appearances. For sensible phenomena cannot make a super-sensible
|
|
object- such as free-will is- intelligible; nor can freedom ever be
|
|
placed in the mere fact that the rational subject can make a choice in
|
|
conflict with his own law-giving reason, although experience may prove
|
|
that it happens often enough, notwithstanding our inability to
|
|
conceive how it is possible. For it is one thing to admit a
|
|
proposition as based on experience, and another thing to make it the
|
|
defining principle and the universal differentiating mark of the act
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|
of free-will, in its distinction from the arbitrium brutum s.
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|
servum; because the empirical proposition does not assert that any
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particular characteristic necessarily belongs to the conception in
|
|
question, but this is requisite in the process of definition.
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|
Freedom in relation to the internal legislation of reason can alone be
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|
properly called a power; the possibility of diverging from the law
|
|
thus given is an incapacity or want of power. How then can the
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|
former be defined by the latter? It could only be by a definition
|
|
which would add to the practical conception of the free-will, its
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|
exercise as shown by experience; but this would be a hybrid definition
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|
which would exhibit the conception in a false light.
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|
A morally practical law is a proposition which contains a
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|
categorical imperative or command. He who commands by a law (imperans)
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|
is the lawgiver or legislator. He is the author of the obligation that
|
|
accompanies the law, but he is not always the author of the law
|
|
itself. In the latter case, the law would be positive, contingent, and
|
|
arbitrary. The law which is imposed upon us a priori and
|
|
unconditionally by our own reason may also be expressed as
|
|
proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver or the Divine will.
|
|
Such a will as supreme can consequently have only rights and not
|
|
duties; and it only indicates the idea of a moral being whose will
|
|
is law for all, without conceiving of him as the author of that will.
|
|
Imputation, in the moral sense, is the judgement by which anyone
|
|
is declared to be the author or free cause of an action which is
|
|
then regarded as his moral fact or deed, and is subjected to law. When
|
|
the judgement likewise lays down the juridical consequences of the
|
|
deed, it is judicial or valid (imputatio judiciaria s. valida);
|
|
otherwise it would be only adjudicative or declaratory (imputatio
|
|
dijudicatoria). That person- individual or collective- who is invested
|
|
with the right to impute actions judicially, is called a judge or a
|
|
court (judex s. forum).
|
|
When any one does, in conformity with duty, more than he can be
|
|
compelled to do by the law, it is said to be meritorious (meritum).
|
|
What is done only in exact conformity with the law, is what is due
|
|
(debitum). And when less is done than can be demanded to be done by
|
|
the law, the result is moral demerit (demeritum) or culpability.
|
|
The juridical effect or consequence of a culpable act of demerit
|
|
is punishment (paena); that of a meritorious act is reward (praemium),
|
|
assuming that this reward was promised in the law and that it formed
|
|
the motive of the action. The coincidence or exact conformity of
|
|
conduct to what is due has no juridical effect. Benevolent
|
|
remuneration (remuneratio s. repensio benefica) has no place in
|
|
juridical relations.
|
|
The good or bad consequences arising from the performance of an
|
|
obligated action- as also the consequences arising from failing to
|
|
perform a meritorious action- cannot be imputed to the agent (modus
|
|
imputation is tollens). The good consequences of a meritorious action-
|
|
as also the bad consequences of a wrongful action- may be imputed to
|
|
the agent (modus imputation is poneus).
|
|
The degree of the imputability of actions is to be reckoned
|
|
according to the magnitude of the hindrances or obstacles which it has
|
|
been necessary for them to overcome. The greater the natural
|
|
hindrances in the sphere of sense, and the less the moral hindrance of
|
|
duty, so much the more is a good deed imputed as meritorious. This may
|
|
be seen by considering such examples as rescuing a man who is an
|
|
entire stranger from great distress, and at very considerable
|
|
sacrifice. Conversely, the less the natural hindrance, and the greater
|
|
the hindrance on the ground of duty, so much the more is a
|
|
transgression imputable as culpable. Hence the state of mind of the
|
|
agent or doer of a deed makes a difference in imputing its
|
|
consequences, according as he did it in passion or performed it with
|
|
coolness and deliberation.
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|
-
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-
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-THE END-
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