1260 lines
68 KiB
Plaintext
1260 lines
68 KiB
Plaintext
[Copied onto the net by lamontg@milton.u.washington.edu (Lamont Granquist),
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so all typos are probably mine.]
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NATIONAL DRUG REFORM STRATEGY
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February 1992
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The Drug Policy Foundation
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(C) 1992 by the Drug Policy Foundation
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Any part of this publication may be reproduced without express permission
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from the Drug Policy Foundation, so long as appropriate credit is given.
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The Drug Policy Foundation is an independent forum for drug policy
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alternatives. It is the leading organization dedicated to research,
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education and public information related to the international war on
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drugs. It is not a legalization organization, though some of its members
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support such an alternative to the current policy approach.
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The Foundation is a charitable corporation under the laws of the District
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of Columbia and section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. All
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contributions to the Foundation are tax-deductible. To maintain its
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independence, the Drug Policy Foundation neither seeks nor accepts
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government funding. It is supported by the contributions of private
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individuals and organizations.
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The Drug Policy Foundation
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4801 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 400
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Washington, D.C. 20016-2087 U.S.A.
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(202) 895-1634 - Fax (202) 537-3007
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President: Arnold S. Trebach
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Vice President: Kevin B. Zeese
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Public Information Officers: Kennington Wall, Dave Fratello
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CONTENTS
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Summary
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Introduction: What's Wrong with the War on Drugs?
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Recommendations:
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1. Reverse Drug Policy Funding Priorities
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2. Curtail AIDS: Make Clean Needles Available to Addicts
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3. Increase Drug Treatment Availability
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4. Stop Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Users
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5. Make Medical Marijuana Available to the Seriously Ill
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6. Appoint a Commission to Seriously Examine Alternatives to Prohibition
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Conclusion: Creating a Safer, Healthier America
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Appendix: A History of Impartial Reports Demands Reconsideration of
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Current Drug Policy
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DRUG REFORM STRATEGY SUMMARY
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o Reverse Drug Policy Funding Priorities
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The Bush administration should eschew the course set by the previous
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drug czar and give _highest_priority_ to drug education and treatment.
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Reversing the current 70 percent-30 percent funding disparity favoring
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law enforcement over drug prevention is a moral imperative.
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o Curtail AIDS: Make Clean Needles Available to Intravenous Drug Addicts
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President Bush and National Drug Control Policy Director Martinez
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should heed the advice of the National Commission on AIDS, which urged
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implementation of clean needle exchanges and other programs targeting
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addicts.
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o Develop a Plan for Drug Treatment on Demand, Allow Medicaid to Pay for
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Treatment for the Poor, and Expand the Variety of Treatment Options
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Available
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The drug czar should make a comprehensive assessment of drug
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treatment availability nationwide, then propose a target date and plan of
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attack for achieving treatment on demand everywhere in the United States.
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Mr. Martinez should also work with Congress on legislation allowing
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Medicaid to cover drug treatment expenses for our nation's poor.
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o Stop Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Users
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Director Martinez should use his national pulpit to urge states to
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cease the counterproductive practice of prosecuting pregnant drug users.
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Ending such prosecutions, while expanding drug treatment and prenatal care,
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will help reduce the problem of drug-exposed infants.
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o Make Medical Marijuana Available to the Seriously Ill
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The president should order the Food and Drug Administration and Drug
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Enforcement Administration to join in making marijuana available, by
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prescription, to the tens of thousands of seriously ill Americans who
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could benefit from its use.
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o Appoint a Commission to Seriously Examine Alternatives to Prohibition
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The national policy of drug prohibition has not reduced the supply
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of illegal drugs, but it has bred crime and violence on a massive scale.
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It is time to look honestly at the experiences of other nations with
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illegal drugs and at our own experiences with legal drugs to develop new,
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health-based policies for reducing substance abuse.
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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WAR ON DRUGS?
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President Bush launched his administration's war against drugs just
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over two years ago on September 5, 1989. The strategy announced by the
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president and his first drug czar, William Bennett, rubber-stamped the
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Reagan drug control approach. In addition it promised more money, better
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coordination and a full commitment from the commander-in-chief.
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President Bush has intensified the war, but recent National Institute
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on Drug Abuse statistics show that victory in the drug war is still far
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from a reality. Indeed, on many fronts the problems are getting worse.
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Meanwhile, the war on drugs is costing the states and federal government
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billions of dollars, overfilling our prisons, breeding crime and violence,
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and failing to treat those people who desperately want help.
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Drug War at an Impasse
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The drug war was the centerpiece of the administration's early
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domestic agenda. But as the months wore on, the drug czar became
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discouraged and abandoned his post, leaving the drug war adrift.
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Leadership at the Office of National Drug Control Policy has been slow to
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develop, and staff shakeups have hampered coordination and progress. The
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issue has fallen from the headlines even as many of the social problems
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related to illegal drugs have increased.
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Drug-related crime and violence have reached record level today. In
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1990, 23,438 Americans were murdered--a record figure fueled in part by
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drug trade- related violence. While final figures for 1991 are not
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available yet, all indications are that the homicide record will be broken
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again. The worsening of the highest priority drug-related problems is the
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paradoxical result of increased enforcement. As Nobel Laureate economist
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Milton Friedman has pointed out, the homicide rate has gone up in response
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to increase competition among drug sellers, much as it also climbed during
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alcohol Prohibition.
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AIDS continues its deadly spread in our society, with close to
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one-third of all cases traceable to the use of infected needles by
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intravenous drug users. The worst aspect of this gruesome situation is
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that the spread of AIDS via dirty needles could have been prevented all
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along. Federal drug war policy makers have refused to consider the single
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measure that could undeniably and immediately reduce the number of people
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contracting the disease through infected needles: sterile needle
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exchange. By shutting down the spread of AIDS among addicts, we would
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also reduce the incidence of the disease among their sexual partners and
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children, thus helping curb the disease among the mainstream population.
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Our courts and prisons are being flooded with drug cases, pushing
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federal, state and local courts to the breaking point. Over 1.2 million
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Americans now live behind bars, giving the United States the highest
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incarceration rate in the free world. In some cities, it is now virtually
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impossible to try a civil case because all the judges' dockets are filled
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with drug cases, many of which involve only small transactions or simple
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possession. What is worse, every drug dealer arrested is simply replaced
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the next day by someone else who needs money desperately enough to risk
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arrest by the police or death by competing traffickers.
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Drug use-related problems continue to escalate. Drug-related deaths
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have not declined during the last decade. Emergency room mentions of
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illegal drugs have fluctuated, but the most recent government figures
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indicate drug emergencies are on the increase again. And according to
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both the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Senate Judiciary
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Committee, so-called "hard core" drug use is also rising.
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Poor and Minority communities Have Been Disproportionately Affected by
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Enforcement Emphasis
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Because the illegal drug business thrives where legitimate economic
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opportunities are limited, drug enforcement has inevitably become focused
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on poor and minority communities. The result is a striking
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disproportionality in arrest and incarceration figures, where minorities
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are represented at two to three times their percentage in the general
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population.
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According to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, blacks make
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up 12 to 15 percent of the nation's illegal drug users. Yet in 1989, 41
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percent of those arrested on drug charges were black. According to the
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Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project, the United States has more
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young black men in jail than South Africa on a per capita basis. Blacks
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make up 46 percent of the U.S. prison population.
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The long-term impact of disproportionate drug enforcement on the
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livelihood of minority communities is still not well understood. But with
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statistics showing that nearly one in four young black males is either in
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prison, on parole or on probation, common sense says employment prospects
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for many minorities will be hampered well into the next generation.
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Having thousands of fathers in jail also hinders the development of strong
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family values. So long as the illicit drug business continues to operate
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in these communities and enforcement efforts target them with the same
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vigor, the prognosis is grim.
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Time for Change to Salvage the Future
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The president's war is failing to achieve its stated objectives, and
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is doing more harm than good. As our nation plans for the year 2000 and
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beyond, it is imperative that the mistaken approach to drugs that has
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dominated the last several decades be reconsidered seriously. It is time
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to turn the corner and focus on methods that work to reduce drug abuse and
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corollary social problems.
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It is time for drug czar Bob Martinez and President Bush to admit
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that our nation's drug policy needs a new focus, a new direction and a new
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conscience. To aid the development of a rational and humane alternative
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to the war against drugs, the Drug Policy Foundation hereby offers a
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reform agenda for 1992.
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Purpose of this Strategy
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As critics of the drug war, we have consistently been asked to
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produce a concrete, alternative plan to show our differences with
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administration policy. We have often made such proposals. This strategy
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represents a summary of those which could be immediately implemented.
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Our agenda has been formulated with an eye towards achievability.
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Each of the policy recommendations urged herein could be implemented by
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the Bush administration without significant changes in the drug laws.
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Each idea, however, could go far toward bringing a needed dose of
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compassion and pragmatism into the national anti-drug effort.
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Only slight statutory changes are recommended here. Some of the
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items would merely require voluntary reforms by the states. We at the
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Drug Policy Foundation have attempted to meet drug-war policy makers
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halfway by urging reforms that fit within the current legal framework.
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We hasten to add, however, that we feel the war on drugs is the
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result of fundamentally flawed assumptions about drugs and drug users.
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The drug war provides our nation little more than a course for disaster,
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because like all prohibition policies it ignores basic rules of economics.
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One of the cruelest ironies of our attempts to suppress drugs is that such
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efforts actually expand the illegal market, enriching villains and
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creating incentives for people to "push" drugs on others.
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Hence, the final recommendation that alternative policies be
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seriously examined. The Bush administration's strategy--stay the
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course--offers little hope of short- or long-term success.
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To date, the administration has avoided answering fundamental
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questions about long-term drug policy. We believe this great nation must
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now reform its current approach and consider finding new ways of thinking
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about drugs. We encourage all Americans to join us in helping a sensible
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and compassionate alternative to a permanent war, a war fought not to win
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but to prove the ideological zeal of those who fight it.
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MORE HOMICIDES, MORE PRISONERS
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Rates per 100,000 population
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110 11
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X X X Homicides (right scale) X
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100 X X | 10
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X | | | Prisoners (left scale) X X X |
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90 X X X X X X X X X|X| 9
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X X X X X X X X X X X |X|X|X
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80 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X|X|X|X|X 8
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X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X|X|X|X|X
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70 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X|X|X|X|X 7
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X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X|X|X|X|X|X
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60 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X|X X|X X|X|X|X|X|X 6
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X X X X X X|X X X X|X X X X X X X X X|X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X
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50 X X X X X|X|X|X X|X|X|X X X X X X | | | | X X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X 5
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X X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X
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40 X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X 4
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X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X
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30 X X X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|X 3
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States; Statistical Abstract of
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the United States
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This graph originally appeared in _The_Wall_Street_Journal_, March 7, 1991.
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[I had to hack the data for 1910-1920, and the translation to ASCII suffers
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a little -- lamontg@milton.u.washington.edu]
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1. REVERSE DRUG POLICY FUNDING PRIORITIES
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President Bush should eschew the course set by his first drug czar
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and give _highest_priority_ to drug education and treatment. Current drug
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control policy director Martinez should take the lead in this effort to
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refocus administration policy. Reversing the current 70 percent-30
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percent funding disparity favoring law enforcement over drug prevention is
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a moral imperative.
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Priorities Are in the Numbers
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When all is said and done, the Bush administration's drug-fighting
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priorities show clearly through the budget it proposes each year. Since
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the first national strategy in 1989, the administration has consistently
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pushed for more than twice the money for drug law enforcement than it has
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asked for drug treatment, prevention and education _combined_. Yet
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administration spokesmen repeatedly claim that declines in reported drug
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use are the result of successful education efforts. If that is the case,
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why doesn't the administration put its money where its mouth is?
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In a time of unprecedented budgetary crisis, the administration is
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still advocating that more than $7 billion a year go to dubious efforts at
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interdiction, crop eradication and other enforcement activities. Inverted
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priorities lead the administration to quibble with Congress over smaller
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drug-budget items, such as a $100 million dollar drug treatment program
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that was not fully funded last year. The massive waste represented by
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much of the drug enforcement budget could be averted and education and
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treatment programs fully funded if the administration reversed national
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anti-drug priorities. It is time to go with what works and stop wasting
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taxpayers' dollars.
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Every Law Enforcement Dollar Guarantees Bigger Prison Budgets in the Future
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Heavy funding of law enforcement, as urged by the administration, is
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truly a losers game. It is like hiring people to chase the horse after it
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has left the barn, rather than closing the door to prevent the horse from
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escaping. Taxpayers will get a better return on their dollars if our
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nation's top drug control priorities are prevention, education and
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treatment.
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Refocusing the drug war is not just the right idea, it is becoming a
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fiscal urgency as well. If we do not act now to de-emphasize law
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enforcement, it will soon be impossible to reduce that budget. Every
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dollar we spend now on drug enforcement is essentially an investment in
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the future--_of_our_prisons_.
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In each of the last three years, more than a million Americans were
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arrested for drug violations. Thousands will be serving mandatory minimum
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sentences of five years, ten years and more. Our prisons and jails are
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already overflowing, making it necessary to build more and more just to
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keep up. In 1991 the federal Bureau of Prisons estimated that
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construction costs could soon approach $100 million a week. Factoring in
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operating costs for completed prisons, the BOP estimates that total
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prison-related fiscal obligations could be almost double the current
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national deficit within five years.
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The only real options are to fund massive new prison construction
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projects or to stop flooding the prison system with small-time drug
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offenders. Funding more prisons is impractical at this time, with all
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governmental budgets under a squeeze. Thus reducing the annual number of
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drug convictions is virtually inevitable. This is yet another reason to
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focus less on enforcement and more on non-punitive approaches to drugs
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where possible.
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Some Immediate Budget Savings
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There are some specific steps that the administration should
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immediately take in changing federal drug control budget priorities.
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These would be both practical and symbolic changes evidencing a more
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humane approach to drug abuse:
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o An immediate moratorium should be placed on new prison construction.
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If there is one thing the last decade of rapid expansion of
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prisons has taught us, it is that more prisons do not mean less crime.
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o Reserve existing prison space for violent criminals--stop using
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incarceration in drug possession cases and for non-violent drug
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offenders.
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We should focus on keeping extremely dangerous criminals under
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lock and key, while utilizing alternatives to incarceration for
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nonviolent individuals who may yet be capable of productive
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livelihoods. Such alternatives would include intensive supervised
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probation, high school equivalency programs, community service programs
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and job training. Putting masses of young people in jail makes them
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less productive citizens in the long run, while training and educating
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them offers real options for the future.
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o Reduce prison sentences for people incarcerated for possession
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convictions and non-violent drug offenses.
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As many of these people are serving mandatory sentences, the
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administration should ask Congress to give judges discretion to
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release certain inmates before their scheduled mandatory terms
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expire. Money saved could be used to develop other programs within
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the prisons, such as drug treatment, training and education.
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o The President should order home all Department of Defense personnel
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and quasi-military representatives of federal agencies stationed abroad
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to fight drugs.
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The DoD is an expensive participant in the drug war, with a drug
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budget approaching $1 billion annually. Yet even with stepped-up
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participation by the military and DEA advisers, interdiction and
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eradication programs have remained a costly failure. We should
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withdraw those forces and also stop the use of DoD in drug enforcement
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within the United States.
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These are immediate first steps that the administration should take
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to begin reversing funding priorities. The remainder of this report
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suggests some specific changes which need to be made on broader policy
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issues.
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DRUG BUDGETS EMPHASIZE ENFORCEMENT
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XX -- Enforcement, Interdiction, Eradication
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OO -- Treatment, Prevention, Education
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100%
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XX XX
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75% XX XX XX XX XX
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XX XX XX XX XX XX
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XX XX XX XX XX XX
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OO XX XX XX XX XX XX
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50% OO XXOO XX XX XX XX XX XX
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XXOO XXOO XX XX XX XX XX XX
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XXOO XXOO XX XX XX XX XX XX
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XXOO XXOO XX XX XX XX XX XXOO
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25% XXOO XXOO XXOO XX XX XXOO XXOO XXOO
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XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO
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XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO
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XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO XXOO
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------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
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1970 1976 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
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Sources: U.S. General Accounting Office and National Drug Control
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Strategies of 1989 and 1991, NDCS figures reflect administration
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requests, not appropriated funds.
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[reasonably good ASCII translation -- lamontg@milton.u.washington.edu]
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2. CURTAIL AIDS: MAKE CLEAN NEEDLES AVAILABLE
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TO INTRAVENOUS DRUG ADDICTS
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The Bush administration and drug czar Martinez should heed the advice
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of the National Commission on AIDS, whose July 1991 report, "The Twin
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Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV," urged implementation of clean needle
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exchange and other programs targeting addicts. The report stated in part:
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We must take immediate steps to curb the current spread of HIV
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infection among those who cannot get treatment or who cannot stop
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taking drugs. Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges
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and distribute bleach not only help to control the spread of HIV,
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but also refer many individuals to treatment programs. Legal
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sanctions on injection equipment do not reduce illicit drug use,
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but they do increase the sharing of injection equipment and hence
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the spread of HIV infection.
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The AIDS Commission used figures from the Centers for Disease Control
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to calculate that 32 percent of known American AIDS cases began with a
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dirty needle. These cases do not just reflect drug-injecting addicts
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coming down with the disease, but also their sexual partners and children.
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Injecting addicts are a major vehicle for transmission of the HIV virus
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because their lack of access to clean needles forces them to share
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injecting equipment, which is tantamount to sharing blood.
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Needle Exchange is an Urgent Requirement for AIDS Policy
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There is no excuse for delaying needle exchange any longer. The
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nation is facing a public health crisis in the form of AIDS, and all
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measures to curtail the spread of the disease are urgent requirements in
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public policy. Recent reports from needle exchanges in Tacoma, Washington
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and New Haven, Connecticut--as well as most of Europe and Australia--show
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clearly and convincingly that providing addicts with sterile needles in
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return for used needles reduces the prevalence of AIDS and gets addicts
|
|
into drug treatment programs.
|
|
President Bush and drug czar Martinez have firmly opposed needle
|
|
exchange, even in the wake of the National Commission on AIDS report.
|
|
Like many Americans, they have a lingering fear that needle exchange might
|
|
appear to condone drug use, and they would rather addicts stop using drugs
|
|
than use them more safely with clean needles. This fear ignores the
|
|
studies that show needle exchange programs increase the number of addicts
|
|
seeking drug treatment. Such concerns argue forcefully for providing
|
|
expanded treatment options, but are insufficient to override the immediate
|
|
need for needle exchange. No one can avoid the underlying reality--_drug_
|
|
_addiction_is_rarely_fatal,_but_AIDS_always_is_. An addict who contracts
|
|
AIDS is ultimately lost forever, as are all the people he or she infects.
|
|
It is time to end the posturing against clean needles that results in
|
|
thousands of deaths every year, and will only add more casualties the
|
|
longer it persists. Continuing the present course will sow the seeds for
|
|
an even greater crisis in health care, as the cost of treating AIDS
|
|
patients will help bankrupt the already strapped health care system. The
|
|
administration must reverse its stand on needle exchange to send a clear
|
|
and urgent signal to the states and cities.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Repeal the Federal Ban on Needle Exchange Research
|
|
|
|
In addition, the drug czar should work with Congress to repeal the
|
|
federal ban on use of government funds to study needle exchange. U.S.
|
|
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) sponsored a successful amendment to a 1988
|
|
public health funding bill that prohibited many federal agencies and their
|
|
contractors from associating with or studying needle exchange programs.
|
|
After repeal of this cruel ban, studies can be commissioned looking at the
|
|
experiences of several American and foreign cities with underground and
|
|
legal needle exchanges. But such studies will be no substitute for
|
|
action--they must be undertaken concurrently with wider use of legal clean
|
|
needle programs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Action Now Will Help Shut Down a Major Source of HIV Infections
|
|
|
|
The administration has the opportunity to take the lead in shutting
|
|
down one major vehicle for transmission of HIV, one that has led to nearly
|
|
one third of American AIDS cases. Failing to take action would be a
|
|
dereliction of public health responsibility of the highest order.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AIDS Cases Traced to IV Drug Use, by Year
|
|
16
|
|
|
|
14 X
|
|
XXXXXX
|
|
12 XXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
10 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
8 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
6 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
4 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
0XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
|
|
|
|
Figures, _in_thousands_, represent total adult AIDS cases associated
|
|
with intravenous(IV) drug use. Graph does not include HIV-positive
|
|
cases where full-blown AIDS has not yet developed.
|
|
Sources: National Commission on AIDS and Centers for Disease Control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3. Increase Drug Treatment Availability
|
|
|
|
o Develop a Plan for Drug Treatment on Demand
|
|
o Allow Medicaid to Pay for Treatment for the Poor
|
|
o Expand the Variety of Treatment Options Available
|
|
|
|
The drug czar should take a comprehensive assessment of drug
|
|
treatment availability nationwide, then propose a target date and a plan
|
|
of attack for achieving treatment on demand everywhere in the United
|
|
States. Governor Martinez should also work with Congress on legislation
|
|
allowing Medicaid to cover drug treatment expenses for our nation's poor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Martinez Treatment Record Lacking
|
|
|
|
Drug czar Martinez claims to have changed his stripes since his one
|
|
term as governor of Florida, where he strongly emphasized law enforcement
|
|
and mass arrests to control drug abuse. Under his leadership, Florida
|
|
lagged one-fifth behind the average state in per capita drug treatment
|
|
funding and gave less than half what the average state gave to drug
|
|
education and prevention. This poor record on treatment and education
|
|
came despite Florida's desperate drug problem throughout the 1980s.
|
|
Mr. Martinez now admits the importance of drug treatment and has
|
|
vowed to make it a focus of his tenure as drug czar. His commitment could
|
|
not come at a more urgent time. Nationwide, waiting lists for treatment
|
|
programs are months long. Recent figures from the NIDA Household Survey
|
|
on Drug Abuse show a particularly acute need for treatment among hard-core
|
|
drug-using populations in the inner cities. Too many Americans seeking
|
|
help for their drug problems are finding it unavailable or finding they
|
|
cannot afford it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Make Treatment on Demand a Real Administration Commitment
|
|
|
|
Nineteen ninety-two must be the year that "drug treatment on demand"
|
|
is transformed from a mere slogan to a comprehensive program. To this
|
|
end, drug czar Martinez should order his office to undertake an assessment
|
|
of drug treatment availability and needs state-by-state, then work with
|
|
Congress to develop a plan to achieve treatment on demand by an
|
|
agreed-upon target date. Failure of the Office of National Drug Control
|
|
Policy to take the lead on such an initiative will indicate a purely
|
|
rhetorical commitment to providing urgently needed drug treatment
|
|
services.
|
|
Part of any plan to provide drug treatment more widely must be a
|
|
commitment to diversity in treatment methods and funding options. The
|
|
plan should include easier access to methadone programs, religious and
|
|
non-religious-based treatment and research on new treatment methods,
|
|
including other maintenance drugs. In light of evidence suggesting a
|
|
resurgence in heroin imports and usage, we must learn from our national
|
|
experience with heroin outbreaks in the 1960s and 1970s. Methadone
|
|
programs are one of the effective legacies of that experience, and they
|
|
must be strengthened in preparation for the new heroin surge.
|
|
Treatment should be non-coercive and user-friendly, not a new form of
|
|
punishment. Coercive treatment is particularly inappropriate when people
|
|
are waiting for treatment slots. In this regard we are especially
|
|
concerned about children abused in drug treatment programs. President
|
|
Bush should rescind his endorsement of Straight, Inc., the confrontational
|
|
youth treatment center found guilty of abuses and rights violations.
|
|
Reports of abuse continue to flow out of its centers across the country.
|
|
Whether a program is federally sponsored, state-sponsored, a
|
|
partnership or a private program, adequate funding should be made
|
|
available by state and federal authorities, subject to appropriate
|
|
conditions. This approach is the quickest way to expand treatment
|
|
availability without incurring great construction and startup costs, while
|
|
helping the private treatment business flourish.
|
|
|
|
|
|
President Should Tell HCFA to Arrange Medicaid Coverage of Treatment
|
|
|
|
Members of Congress and the General Accounting Office have recently
|
|
pointed out the great opportunities lost because Medicaid does not cover
|
|
most drug treatment services in most states. Our nation's poor, the
|
|
population which can least afford treatment and which contains many of the
|
|
hardest-to-reach drug abusers, would be the immediate winners if the
|
|
federal Medicaid guidelines were changed. The president and director
|
|
Martinez should work with the Health Care Financing Administration and
|
|
Congress now to develop a policy on the use of Medicaid funds for
|
|
substance abuse treatment, especially for pregnant women. This work will
|
|
also serve as a model for state health services departments to expand
|
|
treatment availability.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Florida Treatment, Prevention Lagged under Martinez
|
|
|
|
$8
|
|
$7.47
|
|
OOOOOOOO
|
|
OOOOOOOO Per Capita Spending
|
|
$7 OOOOOOOO 1989
|
|
OOOOOOOO
|
|
$6.29 OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
$6 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO XXXX Florida
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO OOOO average state
|
|
$5 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
$4 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
$3 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
$2 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO $1.41
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
|
|
$1 XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO $.61 OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO XXXXXXXX OOOOOOOO
|
|
Treatment Prevention
|
|
|
|
Sources: National Association of State Alcohol and
|
|
Drug Abuse Directors and the U.S. Census Bureau
|
|
|
|
|
|
4. STOP PROSECUTIONS OF PREGNANT DRUG USERS
|
|
|
|
|
|
At least 20 states have resorted to prosecuting women for using drugs
|
|
during pregnancy, often through convoluted interpretations of drug
|
|
trafficking laws. But this law enforcement practice is counterproductive
|
|
in the long run because it frightens drug-using women away from seeking
|
|
treatment and prenatal care once they become pregnant. Drug czar Martinez
|
|
should use his national pulpit to urge states to cease this practice, so
|
|
that pregnant women can fully utilize prenatal care and drug treatment
|
|
programs without fear.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Drug War is Bad for Medicine
|
|
|
|
In one of its most destructive intrusions, the drug war has moved
|
|
into the realm of medicine. Putting police and prosecutors in charge of
|
|
doctors has harmed health care in a number of ways. People are denied
|
|
medicines of proven efficacy, drug users and addicts are afraid to seek
|
|
medical treatment of any kind, and research on drugs with potential
|
|
medical uses is stunted. Doctors are afraid to prescribe adequate amounts
|
|
of powerful painkillers due to the threat of unwarranted prosecution. As a
|
|
result hundreds of thousands of innocent Americans live and die in pain
|
|
every year.
|
|
This recommendation focuses on one specific example of the perverse
|
|
effects that arise when drug war tactics are used to handle medical
|
|
problems. In short, the use of criminal prosecutions may have resulted in
|
|
more drug-exposed babies being born than would have existed otherwise. It
|
|
is now time to reverse this basic strategic error and reduce the damage
|
|
caused by criminalizing pregnant women.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Prosecutions: A counterproductive Reaction to the Crack Baby Problem
|
|
|
|
As the problem of crack babies has received wider national attention,
|
|
many states have tried to use criminalization to reduce the number of
|
|
babies born to drug-using mothers. Several women have been prosecuted
|
|
under a bizarre legal doctrine: "drug trafficking through the umbilical
|
|
cord." This theory holds that in the 30 to 60 seconds between birth and
|
|
the severing of the umbilical cord, a mother passes illegal drugs to her
|
|
baby, thereby trafficking drugs to a minor.
|
|
Several states have made pregnant drug use a violation of civil codes
|
|
with punishments ranging from fines to loss of custody of the mother's
|
|
children. In 1991, according to the ACLU, efforts were made in at least
|
|
seven states to create the new and separate crime of drug use during
|
|
pregnancy.
|
|
The problem is that such laws and prosecutions--aimed at deterring
|
|
pregnant women from using drugs--have the effect of discouraging
|
|
drug-using mothers-to-be from entering drug treatment programs or seeking
|
|
proper prenatal care. Thus laws targeting pregnant drug users risk
|
|
increasing the incidence of the very problem they were designed to
|
|
curtail. Surely the threat of law enforcement action contributes to the
|
|
fact that less than 11 percent of pregnant women who need drug treatment
|
|
actually get it, as estimated by the National Association of State Alcohol
|
|
and Drug Abuse Directors (NASADAD).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Drug Czar Should Support a Moratorium on Prosecutions
|
|
|
|
Drug czar Martinez can help reverse this trend by encouraging a
|
|
moratorium on prosecutions of pregnant women. That would be an essential
|
|
part of any genuine effort to reduce the crack baby problem. When women
|
|
caught up in the cycle of drug use and addiction become pregnant, they
|
|
must know they can get immediate help for themselves and for their babies
|
|
without risk of jail time or other harsh repercussions. Otherwise they
|
|
will avoid help or try, against all odds, to help themselves--with
|
|
disastrous results.
|
|
Supporting a moratorium on state-level prosecutions of pregnant women
|
|
should be consistent with stated administration views. In the 1991
|
|
National Drug Control Strategy (page 53), the ONDCP wrote:
|
|
|
|
Some states have brought criminal prosecutions against pregnant
|
|
addicts on the grounds of fetal endangerment. Such prosecutions,
|
|
however, have generally been unsuccessful, and the administration
|
|
views criminal incarceration of these women as a last resort.
|
|
|
|
From these words, it is not clear whether the administration merely
|
|
considers prosecutions too blunt an instrument or if it sees the genuine
|
|
dangers posed by a continuation of the criminal threat against women. But
|
|
it should resolve any uncertainty now and make an effort to stop this
|
|
trend. A message delivered by the drug czar to the National Association
|
|
of Attorneys General and the National Association of District Attorneys
|
|
could instantly halt the practice.
|
|
Until women get the message that a helping hand is available, the
|
|
nation risks creating more crack babies by means of laws aimed at
|
|
preventing them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5. MAKE MEDICAL MARIJUANA AVAILABLE TO THE SERIOUSLY ILL
|
|
|
|
|
|
Doctors, cancer therapists, opthamologists, and the Drug Enforcement
|
|
Administration's own chief administrative law judge agree that marijuana
|
|
has medical value. President Bush should order the Food and Drug
|
|
Administration and DEA to join in helping make marijuana available, by
|
|
prescription, to the tens of thousands of seriously ill Americans who
|
|
could benefit from its use. It is fully within the president's power to
|
|
take this action. There is no reason to delay this compassionate step for
|
|
one more day.
|
|
|
|
|
|
FDA Should Reinstate Its Medical Marijuana Program
|
|
|
|
Last July, the Public Health Service and FDA announced the shutdown
|
|
of the so-called "compassionate IND (investigative new drug)" program
|
|
which provided government-grown marijuana to sufferers of glaucoma,
|
|
cancer, multiple sclerosis and AIDS. The cancellation--announced but not
|
|
yet official--came at a time when even greater need for the program was
|
|
showing. Hundreds of applications had begun to flow in from AIDS patients
|
|
and their doctors, who understood the medical benefits marijuana has for
|
|
symptoms such as the "wasting syndrome" faced by late-stage AIDS
|
|
sufferers.
|
|
The reasons given by the administration for closing down the program
|
|
had little to do with science or medicine. PHS Director James O. Mason
|
|
cited his concern that wider use of the compassionate IND program might
|
|
undermine the administration's broader anti-drug effort. But such
|
|
reasoning is fallacious. Most Americans can easily see the difference
|
|
between medical uses of a drug and non-medical uses. Otherwise, cocaine,
|
|
morphine and other opium-derived drugs--all used medically--would be
|
|
perceived much differently today.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEA Urged to Transfer Marijuana to Schedule II By Its Own Chief Justice
|
|
|
|
The DEA has used the same reasoning to fight the reclassification of
|
|
marijuana for almost two decades. But at each critical juncture in the
|
|
battle, the agency has faced defeat in objective forums. Among these was
|
|
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia last April 26,
|
|
where a three-judge panel unanimously agreed DEA was being "unreasonable"
|
|
in its persistence in the medical prohibition. In 1988 the agency's own
|
|
chief administrative law judge, Francis L. Young, had urged that marijuana
|
|
be moved to DEA's Schedule II, allowing prescription of the drug by
|
|
doctors.
|
|
The most flaccid argument against medical marijuana is that it is not
|
|
medically effective, or that other drugs are as good or better. The
|
|
administration and its defenders should try telling that to the doctors
|
|
and patients who have found otherwise. Instead of taking the government's
|
|
word, they are going out and purchasing the drug through illicit channels,
|
|
risking arrest for relief. As a result, many have faced criminal
|
|
prosecution. Sufferers of any disease should not be forced to buy their
|
|
medicine on the street.
|
|
Every day tens of thousands of seriously ill Americans suffer
|
|
needlessly because of the Bush administration's intrasigence on medical
|
|
marijuana policy. Mr. Martinez can help eliminate the absurd stigma
|
|
preventing marijuana's legitimate medical usage by assuring the nation
|
|
that medical use and non-medical use of the drug are different. The
|
|
president should then order the responsible federal agencies to do
|
|
everything in their power to give patients with a demonstrated need access
|
|
to the drug.
|
|
|
|
Patients Enrolled in Government Medical Marijuana Program, by Disease
|
|
|
|
AIDS..................................11
|
|
Cancer.................................1
|
|
Chronic Pain...........................4
|
|
Glaucoma...............................5
|
|
Spasticity/Paralysis...................9
|
|
Other..................................4
|
|
----------------------------------------
|
|
Total Marijuana Approvals.............34
|
|
Current Recipients....................12
|
|
----------------------------------------
|
|
Estimated Applicants "On Hold".......300
|
|
|
|
Table describes patients who have gone through application process
|
|
for FDA's "Compassionate IND" program seeking marijuana cigarettes
|
|
for medical use. Applications listed as "on hold" were submitted but
|
|
had no government action taken on them before June 21, 1991
|
|
announcement of program cancellation.
|
|
Source: Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6. APPOINT A COMMISSION TO SERIOUSLY EXAMINE ALTERNATIVES TO PROHIBITION
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The national policy of drug prohibition has not appreciably reduced
|
|
the supply of illegal drugs, but it has bred crime and violence on a
|
|
massive scale. Education, prevention and treatment are going to be the
|
|
keys to reducing drug use whether drugs can be purchased legally or only
|
|
on the black market. It is time to look honestly at the experiences of
|
|
other nations with illegal drugs and at our own experiences with legal
|
|
drugs to develop new, health-based policies for reducing substance abuse.
|
|
We must also look at effective new measures to reduce the incentives for
|
|
crime, rather than focusing on punishment. Continued reliance on law
|
|
enforcement as the centerpiece of drug policy would be absurd in light of
|
|
its track record.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Prohibition's Failures Evident Everywhere
|
|
|
|
Efforts to stem the importation and distribution of illegal drugs
|
|
have been boosted in the last decade. But little effect has been noted
|
|
from these increasingly expensive and dangerous activities. The National
|
|
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), the leading federal
|
|
interagency drug intelligence group, estimates that 30,000 tons of
|
|
marijuana, 800 tons of cocaine and 350 tons of heroin were available to
|
|
American drug users in 1990. Interdiction attempts still fail to catch
|
|
anything more than 5 to 15 percent of all the drugs shipped to the United
|
|
States. In short, prohibition is not preventing drugs from coming into
|
|
the country, it is not preventing their distribution to all corners of the
|
|
nation and it is not preventing those who wish to use drugs from doing do.
|
|
Meanwhile, drug-related violence, crime and homicide rates have
|
|
reached record levels. The District of Columbia, once touted by drug czar
|
|
William Bennett as a "test case" for the national strategy, broke its
|
|
record for homicides for the third straight year with 489 citizens killed
|
|
in 1991. Much of this violence in D.C. and in other major cities is
|
|
traceable to fights among drug dealers and traffickers that would not
|
|
occur without prohibition. Innocent victims caught in the crossfire
|
|
compromise an increasing proportion of those killed. Many more Americans
|
|
are victims of petty thefts and property crimes directly related to the
|
|
high prices addicts pay for their black market drugs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Final Victory' Not Possible; Nation Needs a New Drug Policy Direction
|
|
|
|
It is interesting to note that only a few years into the Bush
|
|
administration's anti-drug effort, we have ceased to hear talk of a
|
|
"drug-free society." Perhaps this phrase--so popular in the 1988 campaign
|
|
and during 1989 as President Bush prepared to launch his drug war--was
|
|
never anything more than a rhetorical chimera. But its absence from the
|
|
current drug debate leaves some questions as to what the ultimate goal of
|
|
prohibitionist drug policy really is. If no one believes illegal drugs
|
|
can be completely eliminated, what will constitute the "final victory"
|
|
drug czar Martinez recently said he is committed to achieving?
|
|
We fear the reality is that the administration has chosen a path
|
|
favoring drug war forever, without regard to its impact on our society.
|
|
This path will unquestionably lead to greater financial costs, greater
|
|
violence, diminished health protection, creation of more potent and
|
|
dangerous drugs, and continued erosion of civil liberties. There are
|
|
alternatives to having a drug war forever. We urge the administration and
|
|
Congress to appoint a national commission to evaluate the available
|
|
options.
|
|
No serious alternative to prohibition would constitute abandonment of
|
|
the anti-drug mission. After decades of drug war, however, we ought to be
|
|
sensible enough to recognize which strategies work and which exacerbate
|
|
the problems they target. With this knowledge, we can reorient our
|
|
national drug policy to make it more cost-effective and less socially
|
|
harmful. Alternatives considered should span the following range of
|
|
options:
|
|
|
|
o A treatment and prevention emphasis aimed at reducing the
|
|
demand for drugs while imposing less of a burden on the
|
|
criminal justice system.
|
|
|
|
o Reduction or elimination of criminal sanctions for drug
|
|
possession and use, lessening the costs associated with
|
|
prosecuting individuals who pose no immediate threat to
|
|
others. Treatment offerings could be combined with civil
|
|
fines toward this end. reducing reliance on penalties
|
|
would include returning sentencing discretion to judges,
|
|
whose role has been undermined by statutory mandatory
|
|
sentences and mandatory sentencing guidelines.
|
|
|
|
o Eliminating the federal monopoly on drug policy and leaving
|
|
the states to decide which drugs, if any, to prohibit. States
|
|
would have maximum choice to tailor drug policy in various
|
|
cities and counties, as problems warranted. This model is
|
|
based on the repeal of Prohibition, which returned control
|
|
over the drug alcohol to state legislatures.
|
|
|
|
o Allowing some physicians to prescribe currently illegal drugs
|
|
to their addicted patients as part of a privatized treatment
|
|
regime. This strategy could ultimately bring more people into
|
|
treatment at less cost to taxpayers.
|
|
|
|
o Conversion of the unregulated black market in drugs to a legal
|
|
free market with moderate government regulation. This would
|
|
be part of a strategy to eliminate drug-trade-related crime and
|
|
thefts related to high prohibition-era drug prices. Such a
|
|
change would require us to look carefully at our current
|
|
policies towards legal drugs, such as alcohol and tobacco, where
|
|
success has been mixed.
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|
|
|
|
Develop New, More Comprehensive Measures of Progress
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|
|
|
While looking at alternatives to current policy, the commission
|
|
should also develop new standards for gauging drug policy progress. At
|
|
present, our nation's overall drug policy tends to be analyzed mainly in
|
|
terms of changes in the rates of drug use among various populations. If
|
|
certain rates go up, the drug war is viewed by some as a failure. If
|
|
other rates go down, drug policies are touted as a success.
|
|
More specific standards would help make a cost-benefit analysis of
|
|
drug policy possible. A cost-benefit framework based on hard
|
|
numbers--including better figures on drug usage levels, crime and homicide
|
|
rates, drug emergencies, data from the AIDS front, and treatment
|
|
availability--could help to drive wiser policy choices. With such a
|
|
framework in place, Americans will be assured that they are receiving the
|
|
best possible return on their tax dollars while effectively managing
|
|
drugs. New standards would also permit analysts to take all aspects of
|
|
the drug situation into account in producing an informed judgment on the
|
|
nation's overall drug policy.
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|
|
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|
CONCLUSION
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|
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|
We suspect--as many Americans do--that drugs are here to stay. Drugs
|
|
including everything from alcohol to Xanex, coffee to cocaine, tea to
|
|
cannabis, and tobacco to LSD have been around for years. they only
|
|
diminish or disappear when people lose interest in them, not when
|
|
governments decide to eradicate them. Given this most basic reality of
|
|
the drug situation, a sand drug policy must be one which focuses on
|
|
steering people away from harmful substances and harmful behaviors, and
|
|
toward productive lives. Government's primary concerns in the drug policy
|
|
realm should be protecting citizens from unnecessary crimes and
|
|
facilitating recovery from drug dependency.
|
|
For once, it would be good to see America's leaders attack a problem
|
|
without using the language and tactics of war. War tends to rally the
|
|
public passions and to equip the soldiers well, but too often at the
|
|
expense of not dealing with the root causes of the problems.
|
|
The drug war is an unconventional war being fought against an
|
|
unconventional enemy--ourselves. It is time now for all Americans to come
|
|
to a solemn realization: we cannot help our neighbor by fighting our
|
|
neighbor.
|
|
Drug czar Martinez, President Bush and the Congress have a historic
|
|
opportunity to learn from the last two decades of intense but failed drug
|
|
war. We can then make necessary changes in drug policy to help create a
|
|
safer, healthier America.
|
|
Or the administration can persist in repeating the mistakes of the
|
|
past.
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|
|
|
|
|
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|
APPENDIX
|
|
|
|
|
|
A History of Imparital Reports Demands Reconsideration of Current Drug Policy
|
|
|
|
The recommendations contained in this reform strategy are consistent
|
|
with the findings of many independent commissions that have evaluated drug
|
|
policy alternatives in the past. We urge the Office of National Drug
|
|
Control Policy to review these impartial scientific reports and rely on
|
|
them as we have.
|
|
Many of these reports come from the United States, but some of the
|
|
most insightful come from other countries. None calls for full
|
|
legalization of drugs or views any of the drugs, including marijuana, as
|
|
harmless, but each of the reports without fail calls for a gentle, humane
|
|
approach to dealing with drug users and abusers. None of these great
|
|
commission reports calls for a war on drugs, on users or on addicts. Some
|
|
countries, notably Britain and Holland, have followed much of the advice
|
|
of these non-partisan expert reports. Others, most notably the United
|
|
States, have consistently ignored them.
|
|
Following are the summaries of the key findings of these reports.
|
|
|
|
Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, _Marijuana_, 1893-94.
|
|
This 3,281-page, seven volume classic report on the marijuana problem
|
|
in India by British and Indian experts concluded: "Viewing the subject
|
|
generally, it may be added that the moderate use of these drugs is the
|
|
rule, and that the excessive use is comparatively exceptional. The
|
|
moderate use produces practically no ill effects." Nothing of significance
|
|
in the report's conclusions has been proven wrong in the intervening
|
|
century.
|
|
|
|
_The_Panama_Canal_Zone_Military_Investigations, 1916-1923.
|
|
After an exhaustive study of the smoking of marijuana among American
|
|
soldiers stationed in the zone, the panel of civilian and military experts
|
|
recommended that "no steps be taken by the Canal Zone authorities to
|
|
prevent the sale or use of Marihuana." The committee also concluded that
|
|
"there is no evidence that Marihuana as grown and used [in the Canal Zone]
|
|
is a 'habit-forming' drug."
|
|
|
|
Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, _Report_, 1926
|
|
(The Rolleston Report).
|
|
This landmark study by a distinguished group of British doctors,
|
|
appointed by the government, codified existing practices regarding the
|
|
maintenance of addicts on heroin and morphine by individual doctors and
|
|
recommended that they continue without police or medical society
|
|
interference. In coming to this conclusion, these physicians displayed a
|
|
humane regard for the addicts in their care, perhaps due to their view of
|
|
the nature of narcotic addiction: "the condition must be regarded as a
|
|
manifestation of a disease and not as a mere form of vicious indulgence."
|
|
The British addiction experts took pains to state that they did not agree
|
|
with the opinions of "some eminent physicians, especially in the United
|
|
States" that addicts "could always be cured by sudden withdrawal."
|
|
|
|
Mayor's Committee on Marihuana, _The_Marihuana_Problem_in_the_City_of_New_
|
|
_York_, 1944 (The La Guardia Report).
|
|
This study is viewed by many experts as the best study of any drug
|
|
viewed in its social, medical and legal context. The committee covered
|
|
thousands of years of the history of marijuana and also made a detailed
|
|
examination of conditions in New York City. Among its conclusions: "The
|
|
practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical
|
|
sense of the word." And: "The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine
|
|
or heroin or cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a market
|
|
for those narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana smoking."
|
|
Finally: "The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of marihuana
|
|
smoking in New York City is unfounded."
|
|
|
|
Interdepartmental Committee, _Drug_Addiction_, 1961 (The First Brain Report).
|
|
When the Brain Committee first met at the invitation of the Minister
|
|
of Health, its mission was to review the advice given by the Rolleston
|
|
Committee of 1926. That advice had been to continue to allow doctors to
|
|
treat addicts with maintenance doses of powerful drugs when the doctors
|
|
deemed it medically helpful for the patient. Brain I reiterated that
|
|
advice and in this first report recommended no changes of any significance
|
|
on the prescribing powers of doctors. This report expanded on one
|
|
important point alluded to in Rolleston: the authenticity of the
|
|
existence of "stabilized addicts." While many American experts doubt their
|
|
existence, this report explained, "careful scrutiny of the histories of
|
|
more than a hundred persons classified as addicts reveals that many of
|
|
them who have been taking small and regular doses for years show little
|
|
evidence of tolerance and are often leading reasonably satisfactory
|
|
lives." Six "case histories of known stabilized addicts" were included in
|
|
an appendix. They were mature, older patients, functioning normally on
|
|
what would be huge doses of drugs by American standards. "Mr. F.," for
|
|
example, a clerical worker, was receiving the equivalent of 200 milligrams
|
|
of morphine tablets each day. It is likely that these patients and their
|
|
doctors would be dealt with as criminals in the United States.
|
|
|
|
Joint Committee on the American Bar Association and the American Medical
|
|
Association on Narcotic Drugs, _Drug_Addiction:_Crime_or_Disease?, Interim
|
|
and Final Reports, 1961.
|
|
This report was the result of the only major combined study of drug
|
|
policy made by two of the most important professional societies in the
|
|
country. Chaired by attorney Rufus King of Washington,D.C., the committee
|
|
presented a direct challenge to the touch policies of Federal Bureau of
|
|
Narcotics Directory Harry Anslinger, a philosophical ancestor of the
|
|
previous drug czar, William Bennett. The blue-ribbon committee included a
|
|
senior federal judge and was advised by Indiana University's Alfred
|
|
Lindesmith, one of the most distinguished addiction scholars in history.
|
|
The report observed, "drug addiction is primarily a problem for the
|
|
physician rather than the policeman, and it should not be necessary for
|
|
anyone to violate the criminal law solely because he is addicted to
|
|
drugs." The report concluded that drug addiction was a disease, not a
|
|
crime, that harsh criminal penalties were destructive, that drug
|
|
prohibition ought to be reexamined, and that experiments should be
|
|
conducted with British-style maintenance clinics for narcotic addicts.
|
|
|
|
Interdepartmental Committee, Drug Addiction, _Second_Report_, 1965 (The
|
|
Second Brain Report).
|
|
Brain II has been consistently misinterpreted by leading American
|
|
scholars and officials. It did not recommend the dismantling of the
|
|
British prescription system nor the compulsory registration of addicts, as
|
|
has been claimed. Instead, Brain II urged that (1) doctors who wished to
|
|
prescribe "restricted drugs" to addicts for the purpose of maintenance be
|
|
required to obtain a special license from the Home Office, (2) treatment
|
|
centers be established for treating addicts who were to be regarded as
|
|
sick and not criminal, and (3) doctors and other medical personnel be
|
|
mandated to "notify" the Home Office when they encountered and addict in
|
|
the course of their professional work. Originally, the category of
|
|
restricted drugs included heroin and cocaine; now, dipipanone has been
|
|
added.
|
|
However, the core of the British system remains, and in recent years,
|
|
has been reinvigorated. Approximately 200 doctors with special licenses
|
|
are free to prescribe all drugs, including the restricted medicines, for
|
|
maintenance, including, for example, injectable morphine and methadone.
|
|
Brain II in the end was aimed at controlling a few overprescribing
|
|
doctors, not at adopting the American system of treating addicts as the
|
|
enemy.
|
|
|
|
Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, _Cannabis_, 1968 (the Wooton Report).
|
|
This study report on marijuana and hashish was prepared by a group
|
|
that included some of the leading drug abuse experts of the United
|
|
Kingdom. These impartial experts worked as a subcommittee under the lead
|
|
of Baroness Wooton of Abinger. The basic tone and substantive conclusions
|
|
were similar to all of the other great commission reports. The Wooton
|
|
group specifically endorsed the conclusions of the Indian Hemp Drugs
|
|
Commission and the La Guardia Committee. Typical findings included the
|
|
following. "There is no evidence that in Western society serious physical
|
|
dangers are directly associated with the smoking cannabis." "It can
|
|
clearly be argued on the world picture that cannabis use does not lead to
|
|
heroin addiction." "The evidence of a link with violent crime is far
|
|
stronger with alcohol than with the smoking of cannabis." "There is no
|
|
evidence that this activity...is producing in otherwise normal people
|
|
conditions of dependence or psychosis, requiring medical treatment."
|
|
|
|
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, _Drug_Use_in_America:_
|
|
_Problem_in_Perspective_, 1973.
|
|
This commission was directed by Raymond P. Shafer, former Republican
|
|
governor of Pennsylvania, and had four sitting, elected politicians among
|
|
its 11 members. The commission also had leading addiction scholars among
|
|
its members and staff. It was appointed by President Nixon in the midst
|
|
of the drug war hysteria at that time. While the commission supported
|
|
much existing policy, it produced two reflective reports, this being the
|
|
final comprehensive document, which recommended research, experimentation
|
|
and humane compromise. The first recommendations of the commission were:
|
|
"1. Possession of marihuana for personal use would no longer be an
|
|
offense, but marihuana possessed in public would remain contraband subject
|
|
to summary seizure and forfeiture.
|
|
"2. Causal distribution of small amounts of marihuana for no
|
|
remuneration, or insignificant remuneration not involving profit, would no
|
|
longer be an offense."
|
|
|
|
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, _An_Analysis_
|
|
_of_Marihuana_Policy, 1982
|
|
The NAS Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior was
|
|
composed of some of the leading American experts on medicine, addiction
|
|
treatment, law, business and public policy. These experts reviewed all of
|
|
the available evidence on every aspect of the marijuana question. The
|
|
committee then recommended that the country experiment with a system that
|
|
would allow states to set up their own methods of controlling marijuana as
|
|
is now done with alcohol. Under this approach, federal criminal penalties
|
|
would be removed and each state could decide to legalize the drug and
|
|
impose regulations concerning hours of sale, age limits and taxation.
|
|
In the same vein as all the previous major objective studies, this
|
|
report stated that excessive marijuana use could cause serious harm, that
|
|
such use was rare, and that on balance the current policy of total
|
|
prohibition was socially and personally destructive. The report placed
|
|
great emphasis on building up public education and informal social
|
|
controls, which often have a greater impact on drug abuse than the
|
|
criminal law. Regarding the possibility of disaster for our youth under
|
|
legalization, the report observed: "...there is reason to believe that
|
|
widespread uncontrolled use would not occur under regulation. Indeed,
|
|
regulation might facilitate patterns of controlled use by diminishing the
|
|
'forbidden fruit' aspect of the drug and perhaps increasing the likelihood
|
|
that an adolescent would be introduced to the drug through families and
|
|
friends, who practice moderate use, rather than from their heaviest-using,
|
|
most drug-involved peers."
|
|
|
|
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, _AIDS_and_Drug_Misuse,_Part_1_,
|
|
1988; _Part_2_, 1989.
|
|
"The spread of HIV is a greater danger to individual and public
|
|
health than drug misuse," declared the leading drug abuse and health
|
|
experts of the United Kingdom who sit on this distinguished
|
|
quasi-governmental advisory group. This concept operated as the guiding
|
|
principle in this commission report, one part issued in 1988, on in 1989.
|
|
In stark contrast to the Bush Administration's war plans the British
|
|
council provided a comprehensive health plan that seeks to prevent the use
|
|
of drugs, as is the American goal. However, the plan has realistic goals
|
|
regarding drug abusers: abstinence in the American mode, where possible,
|
|
but above all else, health and life. Thus, the Advisory Council accepted
|
|
the lessons of the "harm reduction" programs of the Liverpool area and
|
|
recommended that they be spread to the entire United Kingdom. Some of
|
|
these lessons involve needle exchanges and prescribed drugs for addicts.
|
|
The report even went beyond the Liverpool experience when these
|
|
leading British experts quietly observed "we believe that there is a place
|
|
for an expansion of residential facilities where drug misusers may gain
|
|
better health, skills and self-confidence whilst in receipt of prescribed
|
|
drugs." Thus, while the United States is planning more prison space for
|
|
drug addicts, the United Kingdom is contemplating more hostels where
|
|
addicts could be taught to live more healthy, more self-confident and more
|
|
productive lives in the community whilst in receipt of prescribed drugs.
|
|
|
|
_The_Twentieth_Annual_Report_of_the_California_Research_Advisory_Panel, 1989
|
|
This panel, appointed by the state legislature of California to
|
|
regulate all research on controlled substances, reviewed drug policy and
|
|
recommended that "the legislature act to redirect this state away from the
|
|
present destructive pathways of drug control." The report noted that we
|
|
had followed a path of prohibition over the last 50 years and concluded
|
|
this policy "has been manifestly unsuccessful in that we are now using
|
|
more and a greater variety of drugs, legal and illegal." In addition, the
|
|
failure of prohibition has resulted in "societal overreaction [that] has
|
|
burdened us with ineffectual, inhumane and expensive treatment education
|
|
and enforcement efforts." They recommend a move toward the formulation of
|
|
"legislation aiming at regulation and decriminalization" and the winding
|
|
down of the war on drugs.
|
|
The Research Advisory Panel made three specific recommendation for
|
|
initial legislative action. These were:
|
|
1. Permit the possession of syringes and needles.
|
|
2. Permit the cultivation of marijuana for personal use.
|
|
3. In order to project an attitude of disapproval of all drug use,
|
|
take a token action in forbidding the sale or consumption of alcohol in
|
|
state- supported institutions devoted in part or whole to patient care or
|
|
educational activity.
|
|
The panel recommended immediate and innovative action, concluding it
|
|
is "incontrovertible that whatever policies we have been following over
|
|
the past generations must not be continued unexamined and unmodified since
|
|
our actions to date have favored the development of massive individual and
|
|
societal problems."
|
|
|
|
The National Commission on AIDS, "The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV,"
|
|
July 1991.
|
|
This indictment of current drug policy focuses on the relationship
|
|
between the spread of HIV and drug use. The commission criticized the
|
|
federal government's failure to recognize that these are twin epidemics
|
|
and found that the "strategy of interdiction and increased prison
|
|
sentences has done nothing to change the stark statistics" showing spread
|
|
of AIDS by drug users. The commission singled out the Office of National
|
|
Drug Control Policy for ignoring AIDS and "neglect[ing] the real public
|
|
health and treatment measures which could and must be taken to halt the
|
|
spread."
|
|
The Commission put forward five recommendations:
|
|
1. Expand drug treatment so that all who apply for treatment can be
|
|
accepted into treatment programs.
|
|
2. Remove legal barriers to the purchase and possession of injection
|
|
equipment.
|
|
3. The federal government must take the lead in developing and
|
|
maintaining programs to prevent HIV transmission related to licit and
|
|
illicit drugs.
|
|
4. Research and epidemiologic studies on the relationships between
|
|
licit and illicit drug use and HIV transmission should be greatly expanded
|
|
and funding should be increased, not reduced or merely held constant.
|
|
5. All levels of government and the private sector need to mount a
|
|
serious and sustained attack on the social problems of poverty,
|
|
homelessness and lack of medical care that promote licit and illicit drug
|
|
use in American society.
|
|
The National Commission on AIDS could be described as the echo of the
|
|
British Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs in its report on AIDS and
|
|
Drug Misuse, as it made virtually the same policy recommendations. The
|
|
Commission concluded that "the federal government must recognize that HIV
|
|
and substance use is one of the issues of paramount concern within the
|
|
'war on drugs.' Any program which does not deal with the duality of the
|
|
HIV/drug epidemic is destined to fail." The Commission urged the federal
|
|
government to move away from a law enforcement approach in controlling
|
|
drugs toward a public health approach which to date has "been seriously
|
|
neglected." (End)
|
|
|
|
|
|
/ Ul by HeXOr
|