756 lines
32 KiB
Plaintext
756 lines
32 KiB
Plaintext
From --
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F I D O N E W S -- | Vol. 9 No. 9 (2 March 1992)
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The newsletter of the |
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FidoNet BBS community | Published by:
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/ \ | "FidoNews" BBS
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/|oo \ | (415)-863-2739
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(_| /_) | FidoNet 1:1/1
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_`@/_ \ _ | Internet:
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| | \ \\ | fidonews@fidonews.fidonet.org
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| (*) | \ )) |
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|__U__| / \// | Editors:
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_//|| _\ / | Tom Jennings
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(_/(_|(____/ | Tim Pozar
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(jm) |
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----------------------------+---------------------------------------
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Joy of Handles
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Mahatma Kane Jeeves
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101/138.8
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David Lescohier
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101/138.0
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THE JOY OF HANDLES
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------------------
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or:
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EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT ME
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(but have no right to ask)
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--------------------------
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* * * * *
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We should never so entirely avoid danger as to appear
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irresolute and cowardly. But, at the same time, we should
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avoid unnecessarily exposing ourselves to danger, than
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which nothing can be more foolish. [Cicero]
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* * * * *
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Do you trust me?
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If you participate in computer conferencing, and you use
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your real name, then you'd better.
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"Why?", you ask. "What can you do with my name?" To start
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with, given that and your origin line, I can probably look
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you up in your local phone book, and find out where you
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live. Even if you are unlisted, there are ways to locate
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you based on your name. If you own any property, or pay any
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utility bills, your address is a matter of public record.
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Do you have children in the public schools? It would be
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easy to find out. But that's just the beginning.
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Former Chairman of the U.S. Privacy Protection Commission
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David F. Linowes, in his book "Privacy in America" (1989),
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writes of New York private investigator Irwin Blye:
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"Challenged to prove his contention that, given a little
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time and his usual fee, he could learn all about an
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individual without even speaking with him, Blye was
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presented with a subject -- a New Jersey
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newspaperman.... The result was a five-page, single-
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spaced, typed report which documented, though not always
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accurately, a wide sweep of the journalist's past, and
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was detailed to the point of disclosing his father's
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income before his retirement."
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Who am I? If I don't post, you might not even know I exist.
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I could be on your local Police Department, or an agent
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working with the IRS, or some federal law-enforcement
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agency. I could be a member of some fanatical hate group,
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or criminal organization. I might even be a former Nixon
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White-House staffer!
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I could be that pyromaniacal teenager you flamed last
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weekend, for posting a step-by-step description of how he
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made plastic explosive in his high-school chem lab. He
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seemed kind of mad.
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But you're an upstanding citizen; you have nothing to hide.
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So why not use your name on the nets? Trust me. There's
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nothing to worry about.
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Is there?
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* * * * *
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WHAT'S ALL THIS BROUHAHA?
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-------------------------
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Stupidity is evil waiting to happen. [Clay Bond]
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Not long ago in Fidonet's BCSNET echo (the Boston Computer
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Society's national conference), the following was posted by
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the conference moderator to a user calling himself "Captain
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Kirk":
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"May we ask dear Captain Kirk that it would be very
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polite if you could use your real name in an echomail
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conference? This particular message area is shared
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with BBS's all across the country and everyone else is
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using their real name. It is only common courtesy to
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do so in an echomail conference."
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One of us (mkj) responded with a post questioning that
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policy. Soon the conference had erupted into a heated
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debate! Although mkj had worried that the subject might be
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dismissed as trivial, it apparently touched a nerve. It
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brought forth debate over issues and perceptions central to
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computer communications in general, and it revealed profound
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disparities in fundamental values and assumptions among
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participants.
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This article is a response to that debate, and to the
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prevailing negative attitudes regarding the use of handles.
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Handles seem to have a bad reputation. Their use is
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strangely unpopular, and frequently forbidden by network
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authorities. Many people seem to feel that handles are rude
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or dishonest, or that anyone wishing to conceal his or her
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identity must be up to no good. It is the primary purpose
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of this article to dispel such prejudices.
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Let us make one thing perfectly clear here at the outset: We
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do NOT challenge the need or the right of sysops to know the
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identities of their users! But we do believe that a sysop
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who collects user names has a serious responsibility to
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protect that information. This means making sure that no
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one has access to the data without a legal warrant, and it
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certainly means not pressuring users to broadcast their real
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names in widespread public forums such as conferences.
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* * * * *
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SO YOU WANT TO BE A STAR?
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-------------------------
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John Lennon died for our sins. [anonymous]
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Andy Warhol said that "In the future, everyone will be
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famous for fifteen minutes". The computer nets, more than
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any other medium, lend credibility to this prediction. A
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network conference may span the globe more completely than
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even satellite TV, yet be open to anyone who can afford the
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simplest computer and modem. Through our participation in
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conferencing, each of us becomes, if only briefly, a public
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figure of sorts -- often without realizing it, and without
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any contemplation of the implications and possible
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consequences.
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Brian Reid (reid@decwrl.DEC.COM) conducts and distributes
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periodic surveys of Usenet conference readership. His
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statistical results for the end of 1991 show that of the
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1,459 conferences which currently make up Usenet, more than
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fifty percent have over 20,000 readers apiece; the most
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popular conferences are each seen by about 200,000 readers!
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Mr. Reid's estimate of total Usenet readership is nearly TWO
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MILLION people.
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Note that Mr. Reid's numbers are for Usenet only; they do
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not include any information on other large public nets such
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as RIME (PC-Relaynet), Fido, or dozens of others, nor do
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they take into account thousands of private networks which
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may have indirect public network connections. The total
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number of users with access to public networks is unknown,
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but informed estimates range to the tens of millions, and
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the number keeps growing at an amazing pace -- in fact, the
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rate of growth of this medium may be greater than any other
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communications medium in history.
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The special problems and risks which arise when one deals
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with a large public audience are something about which most
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computer users have little or no experience or
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understanding. Until recently, those of us involved in
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computer conferencing have comprised a small and rather
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elite community. The explosion in network participation is
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catching us all a little unprepared.
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Among media professionals and celebrities, on the other
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hand, the risks of conducting one's business in front of a
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public audience are all too familiar. If the size of one's
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audience becomes sufficiently large, one must assume that
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examples of virtually every personality type will be
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included: police and other agents of various governments,
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terrorists, murderers, rapists, religious fanatics, the
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mentally ill, robbers and con artists, et al ad infinitum.
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It must also be assumed that almost anything you do, no
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matter how innocuous, could inspire at least one person,
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somewhere, to harbor ill will toward you.
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The near-fatal stabbing of actress Theresa Saldana is a case
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in point. As she was walking to her car one morning near her
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West Hollywood apartment, a voice behind her asked, "Are you
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Theresa Saldana?"; when she turned to answer, a man she had
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never seen before pulled out a kitchen knife and stabbed her
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repeatedly.
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After her lengthy and painful recovery, she wrote a book on
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the experience ("Beyond Survival", 1986). In that book she
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wrote:
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[pg 12] "... Detective Kalas informed me that the
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assailant, whom he described as a Scottish drifter, had
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fixated upon me after seeing me in films."
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[pg 28] "... it was through my work as an actress that
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the attacker had fixated on me. Naturally, this made
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me consider getting out of show business ..."
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[pg 34] "For security, I adopted an alias and became
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'Alicia Michaels.' ... during the months that followed
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I grew so accustomed to it that, to this day, I still
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answer reflexively when someone calls the name Alicia!"
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Or consider the fate of Denver radio talk show host Alan
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Berg, who in 1984 died outside his home in a hail of
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gunfire. Police believe he was the victim of a local neo-
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nazi group who didn't like his politics.
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We are reminded of the murders of John Lennon and Rebecca
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Shaffer; the Reagan/Hinckley/Foster incident; and a long
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string of other "celebrity attacks" of all sorts, including
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such bizarre events as the occupation of David Letterman's
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home by a strange woman who claimed to be his wife! There is
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probably no one in public life who doesn't receive at least
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the occassional threatening letter.
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Of course, ordinary participants in network conferencing may
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never attract quite the attention that other types of
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celebrities attract. But consider the following, rather less
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apocalyptic scenarios:
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-- On Friday night you post a message to a public
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conference defending an unpopular or controversial
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viewpoint. On Monday morning your biggest client
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cancels a major contract. Or you are kept up all
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night by repeated telephone calls from someone
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demanding that you "stop killing babies"!
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-- You buy your teenage son or daughter a computer and
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modem. Sometime later you find your lawn littered
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with beer bottles and dug up with tire marks, or
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your home vandalized or burglarized.
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-- One day you are nominated to the Supreme Court. Who
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are all these strange people on TV claiming to be
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your friends? How did that fellow know your position
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on abortion? Your taste in GIFs?
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Celebrities and other professional media personalities
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accept the risks and sacrifices of notoriety, along with the
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benefits, as part of their chosen careers. Should computer
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conference participants be expected to do the same? And who
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should be making these decisions?
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* * * * *
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OTHER MEDIA
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When thou art at Rome, do as they do at Rome [Cervantes]
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Older media seem to address the problems of privacy very
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differently than computer media, at least so far. We are
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not aware of ANY medium or publication, apart from computer
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conferencing, where amateur or even most professional
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participants are required to expose their true names against
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their will. Even celebrities frequently use "stage names",
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and protect their addresses and phone numbers as best they
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can.
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When a medium caters specifically to the general public,
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participants are typically given even greater opportunities
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to protect their privacy. Television talk shows have been
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known to go so far as to employ silhouetting and electronic
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alteration of voices to protect the identities of guests,
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and audience members who participate are certainly not
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required to state their full names before speaking.
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The traditional medium most analogous to computer
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conferencing may be talk radio. Like conferencing, talk
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radio is a group discussion and debate medium oriented
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toward controversy, where emotions can run high. Programs
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often center around a specific topic, and are always run by
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a "host" whose role seems analogous in many respects to that
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of a conference moderator. It is therefore worth noting
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that in talk radio generally, policy seems to be that
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callers are identified on the air only by their first names
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(unless of course they volunteer more).
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Finally, of course, authors have published under "pen names"
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since the dawn of publishing, and newspapers and magazines
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frequently publish letters to the editor with "name and
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address withheld by request" as the signature line. Even
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founding fathers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John
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Jay, in authoring the seminal Federalist Papers in 1787 for
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publication in the Letters columns of various New York City
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newspapers, concealed their identities behind the now-famous
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psuedonym "Publius".
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What would you think if someone called a radio talk show
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demanding to know the identity of a previous caller? Such a
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demand would undoubtedly be seen as menacing and
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inappropriate in that context. Yet that same demand seems
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to arise without much challenge each time a handle shows up
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in a computer conference. The authors of this article feel
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that such demands should always be looked upon as
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suspicious, and that it would be beneficial for moderators
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to take upon themselves the responsibility of making sure
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that besieged handle-users are aware of their right to
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refuse such inappropriate demands.
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It is reasonable to assume that privacy policies in
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traditional media are the result of hard-won wisdom gained
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from long experience. Are we so arrogant that we cannot
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learn from others? It is not hard to imagine the sorts of
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problems and experiences which shaped these policies in the
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old media. Will we have to wait for similar problems to
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occur on the computer networks before we learn?
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* * * * *
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PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE
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------------------------
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In an effort to identify people who fail to file tax
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returns, the Internal Revenue Service is matching
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its files against available lists of names and
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addresses of U.S. citizens who have purchased
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computers for home use. The IRS continues to seek
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out sources for such information. This information
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is matched against the IRS master file of taxpayers
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to see if those who have not filed can be
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identified.
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[COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 1985]
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Date: Thu, 23 May 91 11:58:07 PDT
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From: mmm@cup.portal.com
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Subject: The RISKS of Posting to the Net
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-
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I just had an interesting visit from the FBI. It
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seems that a posting I made to sci.space several
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months ago had filtered through channels, caused the
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FBI to open (or re-open) a file on me, and an agent
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wanted to interview me, which I did voluntarily...
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I then went on to tell him about the controversy
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over Uunet, and their role in supplying archives of
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Usenet traffic on tape to the FBI...
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[RISKS Digest]
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Also frequent are instances where computers are
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seized incident to an unrelated arrest. For
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example, on February 28, 1991, following an arrest
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on charges of rape and battery, the Massachusetts
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state and local police seized the suspect's computer
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equipment. The suspect reportedly operated a 650-
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subscriber bulletin board called "BEN," which is
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described as "geared largely to a gay/leather/S&M
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crowd." It is not clear what the board's seizure is
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supposed to have accomplished, but the board is now
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shut down, and the identities and messages of its
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users are in the hands of the police.
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[CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEALING WITH ELECTRONIC
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FILES IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE, Harvey A.
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Silverglate and Thomas C. Viles]
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Most of us have been brought up to be grateful for the fact
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that we live in a nation where freedom is sacred. In other
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countries, we are told as children, people are afraid to
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speak their minds for fear they are being watched. Thank
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God we live in America!
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It would surprise most of us to learn that America is
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currently among the premiere surveillance nations in the
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world, but such, sadly, is indeed the case. Our leadership
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in technology has helped the U.S. government to amass as
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much information on its citizens as almost any other nation
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in history, totalitarian or otherwise. And to make matters
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worse, a consumer surveillance behemoth has sprung up
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consisting of huge private data-collection agencies which
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cater to business.
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As Evan Hendricks, editor of "Privacy Times" (a Washington
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D.C.-based newsletter) has put it: "You go through life
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dropping bits and pieces of information about yourself
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everywhere. Most people don't realize there are big vacuum
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cleaners out there sucking it all up." [Wall Street
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Journal, March 14, 1991].
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To get an idea of how much of your privacy has already been
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lost, consider the bits and pieces of information about
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yourself which are already available to investigators, and
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how thoroughly someone might come to know you by these clues
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alone.
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A person's lifestyle and personality are largely described,
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for example, by his or her purchases and expenses; from your
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checking account records -- which banks are required by law
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to keep and make available to government investigators -- a
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substantial portrait of your life will emerge. Credit card
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records may reveal much of the same information, and can
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also be used to track your movements. (In a recent case,
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"missing" Massachusetts State Representative Timothy O'Leary
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was tracked by credit-card transactions as he fled across
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the country, and his movements were reported on the nightly
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news!)
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Then there are your school records, which include IQ and
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other test results, comments on your "socialization" by
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teachers and others, and may reveal family finances in great
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detail. Employment and tax records reveal your present
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income, as well as personal comments by employers and co-
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workers. Your properties are another public record of your
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income and lifestyle, and possibly your social status as
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well. Telephone billing records reveal your personal and
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business associations in more detail. Insurance records
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reveal personal and family health histories and treatments.
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All of this information is commonly accessed by government
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and private or corporate investigators. And this list is
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far from exhaustive!
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Now consider how easily the computer networks lend
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themselves to even further erosions of personal privacy. The
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actual contents of our mail and telephone traffic have up to
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now been subjected to deliberate scrutiny only under
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extraordinary conditions. This built-in safety is due
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0primarily to the difficulty and expense of conducting
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surveillance in these media, which usually requires extended
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human intervention. But in the medium of computer
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communications, most surveillance can be conducted using
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automated monitoring techniques. Tools currently available
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make it possible and even cost-effective for government and
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other interests to monitor virtually everything which
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happens here.
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Why would anyone want to monitor network users? It is well
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documented that, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the FBI and
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other agencies of government, in operations such as the
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infamous COINTELPRO among others, spent a great deal of time
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and effort collecting vast lists of names. As Computer
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Underground Digest moderators Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer
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recalled in a recent commentary (CuD #3.42):
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"A 1977 class action suit against the Michigan State
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Police learned, through FOIA requests, that state and
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federal agents would peruse letters to the editor of
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newspapers and collect clippings of those whose politics
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they did not like. These news clippings became the basis
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of files on those persons that found there way into the
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hands of other agencies and employers."
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To get onto one of these government "enemies" lists, you
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often needed to do nothing more than telephone an
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organization under surveillance, or subscribe to the "wrong"
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types of magazines and newspapers. Groups engaged in
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political activism, including environmental and women's
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rights organizations, were commonly infiltrated. The sort
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of investi-gative reporting which uncovered these lists and
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surveillances back in the '60s and '70s is now rare, but
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there is little reason to assume that such activities have
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ceased or even slowed. In fact, progressive computerization
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of local police LEIU activities (Law Enforcement
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Intelligence Units, commonly known as "red squads") suggests
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that such activities may have greatly increased.
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Within the realm of computer conferencing especially, there
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is ample reason to believe that systematic monitoring is
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being conducted by government and law-enforcement
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organizations, and perhaps by other hostile interests as
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well. In a recent issue of Telecom Digest
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(comp.dcom.telecom), Craig Neidorf (knight@EFF.ORG) reported
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on the results of a recent Freedom of Information Act
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request for documents from the Secret Service:
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" ... The documents also show that the Secret Service
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established a computer database to keep track of
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suspected computer hackers. This database contains
|
|
records of names, aliases, addresses, phone numbers,
|
|
known associates, a list of activities, and various
|
|
[conference postings] associated with each individual."
|
|
|
|
But the privacy issues which surround computer
|
|
communications go far beyond the collection of user lists.
|
|
Both government and industry have long pursued the elusive
|
|
grail of personality profiling on citizens and consumers. Up
|
|
to now, such ambitions have been restrained by the practical
|
|
difficulty and expense of collecting and analyzing large
|
|
amounts of information on large numbers of citizens. But
|
|
computer communications, more than any other technology,
|
|
seems to hold out the promise that this unholy grail may
|
|
finally be in sight.
|
|
|
|
To coin a phrase, never has so much been known by so few
|
|
about so many. The information commonly available to
|
|
government and industry investi-gators today is sufficient
|
|
to make reliable predictions about our personalities,
|
|
health, politics, future behavior, our vulnerabilities,
|
|
perhaps even about our innermost thoughts and feelings. The
|
|
privacy we all take for granted is, in fact, largely an
|
|
illusion; it no longer exists in most walks of life. If we
|
|
wish to preserve even the most basic minimum of personal
|
|
privacy, it seems clear that we need to take far better care
|
|
on the networks than we have taken elsewhere.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* * * * *
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|
FREEDOM
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|
-------
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|
|
|
|
|
Human beings are the only species with a history.
|
|
Whether they also have a future is not so obvious.
|
|
The answer will lie in the prospects for popular
|
|
movements, with firm roots among all sectors of the
|
|
population, dedicated to values that are suppressed
|
|
or driven to the margins within the existing social
|
|
and political order...
|
|
[Noam Chomsky]
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|
|
|
|
In your day-to-day social interactions, as you deal with
|
|
employers, clients, public officials, friends, acquaintances
|
|
and total strangers, how often do you feel you can really
|
|
speak freely? How comfortable are you discussing
|
|
controversial issues such as religion, taxes, politics,
|
|
racism, sexuality, abortion or AIDS, for example? Would you
|
|
consider it appropriate or wise to express an honest opinion
|
|
on such an issue to your boss, or a client? To your
|
|
neighbors?
|
|
|
|
Most of us confine such candid discussions to certain
|
|
"trusted" social contexts, such as when we are among our
|
|
closest friends. But when you post to a network conference,
|
|
your boss, your clients, and your neighbors may very well
|
|
read what you post -- if they are not on the nets today,
|
|
they probably will be soon, as will nearly everyone.
|
|
|
|
If we have to consider each post's possible impact on our
|
|
social and professional reputations, on our job security and
|
|
income, on our family's acceptance and safety in the
|
|
community, it could be reckless indeed to express ourselves
|
|
freely on the nets. Yet conferences are often geared to
|
|
controversy, and inhibitions on the free expression of
|
|
opinions can reduce traffic to a trickle, killing off an
|
|
important conference topic or distorting a valuable sampling
|
|
of public opinion.
|
|
|
|
More important still is the role computer networks are
|
|
beginning to play in the free and open dissemination of news
|
|
and information. Democracy is crippled if dissent and
|
|
diversity in the media are compromised; yet even here in the
|
|
U.S., where a "free press" is a cherished tradition, the
|
|
bulk of all the media is owned by a small (and ever-
|
|
shrinking) number of corporations, whose relatively narrow
|
|
culture, interests and perspec-tives largely shape the
|
|
public perception.
|
|
|
|
Computer communication, on the other hand, is by its nature
|
|
very difficult to control or shape. Its resources are
|
|
scattered; when one BBS goes bust (or is busted!), three
|
|
others spring up in its place. The natural resiliency of
|
|
computer communications (and other new, decentral-ized
|
|
information technologies such as fax, consumer camcorders
|
|
and cheap satellite links) is giving rise to a new brand of
|
|
global "guerrilla journalism" which includes everyone, and
|
|
defies efforts at suppression.
|
|
|
|
The power and value of this new journalistic freedom has
|
|
recently shown itself during the Gulf War, and throughout
|
|
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as within the
|
|
U.S. Just think of the depth and detail of information
|
|
available on the nets regarding the Secret Service's recent
|
|
"Operation Sundevil" and associated activities, compared to
|
|
the grossly distorted, blatantly propagandistic coverage of
|
|
those same activities given to the general public through
|
|
the traditional media.
|
|
|
|
Historically, established power and wealth have seldom been
|
|
disposed to tolerate uncontrolled media, and recent events
|
|
in this country and elsewhere show that computer media are
|
|
sometimes seen as threats to established interests as well.
|
|
To understand the role of handles in this context, it is
|
|
useful to note the flurries of anti-handle sentiment which
|
|
have arisen in the wake of crackdowns such as Sundevil, or
|
|
the Tom Tcimpidis raid in the early 1980s. Although few
|
|
charges and fewer convictions have typically resulted from
|
|
such operations, one might be tempted to speculate that the
|
|
real purposes -- to terrorize the nets and chill freedoms of
|
|
speech and assembly thereon -- have been achieved.
|
|
|
|
In this way, sysops and moderators become unwitting
|
|
accomplices in the supression of freedom on the networks.
|
|
When real name requirements are instituted, anyone who fears
|
|
retaliation of any sort, by any group, will have to fear
|
|
participation in the nets; hence content is effectively
|
|
controlled. This consideration becomes especially important
|
|
as the nets expand into even more violent and repressive
|
|
countries outside the U.S.
|
|
|
|
We must decide whether freedom of information and open
|
|
public discussion are in fact among the goals of network
|
|
conferencing, and if so, whether handles have a role in
|
|
achieving these goals. As access to the networks grows, we
|
|
have a rare opportunity to frustrate the efforts of
|
|
governments and corporations to control the public mind! In
|
|
this way above all others, computers may have the potential
|
|
to shape the future of all mankind for the better.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* * * * *
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A CALL TO ACTION
|
|
----------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
The move to electronic communication may be a turning
|
|
point that history will remember. Just as in
|
|
seventeenth and eighteenth century Great Britain and
|
|
America a few tracts and acts set precedents for
|
|
print by which we live today, so what we think and do
|
|
today may frame the information system for a
|
|
substantial period in the future.
|
|
[Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Technologies of Freedom", 1983]
|
|
|
|
|
|
There was a time when anybody with some gear and a few
|
|
batteries could become a radio broadcaster -- no license
|
|
required. There was a time when anyone with a sense of
|
|
adventure could buy a plane, and maybe get a contract to
|
|
carry mail. Those early technological pioneers were
|
|
probably unable to imagine the world as it is today, but
|
|
their influence is strongly felt in current laws,
|
|
regulations and policies with roots in the traditions and
|
|
philosophies they founded and shaped.
|
|
|
|
Today the new pioneers are knitting the world together with
|
|
computers, and the world is changing faster than ever. Law
|
|
and ethics are scrambling to keep up. How far will this
|
|
growth take us? No one can say for sure. But you don't
|
|
need a crystal ball to see that computer communications has
|
|
the potential to encompass and surpass all the functionality
|
|
of prior media -- print, post, telegraph, telephone, radio
|
|
and television -- and more. It seems reasonable to assume
|
|
that computer communications will be at least as ubiquitous
|
|
and important in the lives of our grandchildren as all the
|
|
older media have been in ours.
|
|
|
|
It will be a world whose outlines we can now make out only
|
|
dimly. But the foundations of that world are being built
|
|
today by those of us exploring and homesteading on the
|
|
electronic frontier. We need to look hard at what it will
|
|
take to survive in the information age.
|
|
|
|
In this article we have attempted to show, for one very
|
|
narrow issue, what some of the stakes may be in this future-
|
|
building game. But the risks associated with exposing your
|
|
name in a computer conference are not well defined, and
|
|
various people will no doubt assess the importance of these
|
|
risks differently. After all, most of us take risks every
|
|
day which are probably greater than the risks associated
|
|
with conferencing. We drive on the expressway. We eat
|
|
sushi. To some people, the risks of conferencing may seem
|
|
terrifying; to others, insignificant.
|
|
|
|
But let us not get side-tracked into unresolvable arguments
|
|
on the matter. The real issue here is not how dangerous
|
|
conferencing may or may not be; it is whether you and I will
|
|
be able to make our own decisions, and protect ourselves (or
|
|
not) as we see fit. The obvious answer is that users must
|
|
exercise their collective power to advance their own
|
|
interests, and to pressure sysops and moderators to become
|
|
more sensitive to user concerns.
|
|
|
|
To help in that effort, we would like to recommend the
|
|
following guidelines for user action:
|
|
|
|
-- Bear in mind John Perry Barlow's observation that
|
|
"Liberties are preserved by using them". Let your
|
|
sysop know that you would prefer to be using a
|
|
handle, and use one wherever you can.
|
|
|
|
-- Try to support boards and conferences which allow
|
|
handles, and avoid those which don't.
|
|
|
|
-- When using a handle, BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY! There will
|
|
always be irresponsible users on the nets, and they
|
|
will always use handles. It is important for the
|
|
rest of us to fight common anti-handle prejudices by
|
|
showing that handles are NOT always the mark of an
|
|
irresponsible user!
|
|
|
|
-- Educate others about the importance of handles (but
|
|
NEVER argue or flame anyone about it).
|
|
|
|
To sysops and moderators: We ask you to bear in mind that
|
|
authority is often used best where it is used least. Grant
|
|
users the right to engage in any harmless and responsible
|
|
behaviors they choose. Protect your interests in ways which
|
|
tread as lightly as possible upon the interests of others.
|
|
The liberties you preserve may be your own!
|
|
|
|
In building the computer forums of today, we are building
|
|
the social fabric of tomorrow. If we wish to preserve the
|
|
free and open atmosphere which has made computer networking
|
|
a powerful force, while at the same time taking care against
|
|
the risks inherent in such a force, handles seem to be a
|
|
remarkably harmless, entertaining and effective tool to help
|
|
us. Let's not throw that tool away.
|
|
|
|
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|