401 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
401 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
On Monday March 2, RJ Mical (=RJ=) spoke at the Boston Computer Society
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meeting in Cambridge.
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Fortunately I was momentarily possessed with an organizational passion,
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and I took copious notes. I present them here filtered only through my
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memory and my Ann Arbor. My comments are in [square brackets]. What
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follows is a neutron-star-condensed version of about three and one half
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hours of completely uninterrupted discussion.
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PART 1 - The Rise and Fall of Amiga Computer Inc.
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==== === === ==== === ==== == ===== ======== ====
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The Early Days
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--- ----- ----
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Amiga Computer Inc. had its beginnings, strangely enough, RJ began, with
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the idea of three Florida doctors who had a spare $7 million to invest.
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They thought of opening a department store franchise, but (as RJ said) they
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wanted to try something a bit more exciting. So they decided to start a
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computer company. "Yeah, that's it! A computer company! That's the
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ticket! :-)"
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They found Jay Miner, who was then at Atari (boo hiss) and Dave Morse,
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the VP of sales (you can see their orientation right off..) they lifted
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>from Tonka Toys. The idea right from the start was to make the most killer
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game box they could. That was it, and nothing more. However Jay and the
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techies had other ideas. Fortunately they concealed them well, so the
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upper management types still thought they were just getting a great game
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machine. Of course the market for machines like that was hot hot hot in
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1982...
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They got the name out of the thesaurus; they wanted to convey the
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thought of friendliness, and Amiga was the first synonym in the list. The
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fact that it came lexically before Apple didn't hurt any either, said RJ.
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However before they could get a machine out the door, they wanted to
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establish a "market presence" which would give them an established name and
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some distribution channels - keep thinking "game machine" - which they did
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by selling peripherals and software that they bought the rights to from
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other vendors. Principal among these was the Joyboard, a sort of joystick
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that you stand on, and you sway and wiggle your hips to control the
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switches under the base. They had a ski game of course, and some track &
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field type games that they sold with this Joyboard. But one game the folks
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at Amiga Inc. thought up themselves was the Zen Meditation game, where you
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sat on the Joyboard and tried to remain perfectly motionless. This was
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perfect relaxation from product development, as well as from the ski game.
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And in fact, this is where the term Guru Meditation comes from; the only
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way to keep sane when your machine crashes all the time is the ol'
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Joyboard. The execs tried to get them to take out the Guru, but the early
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developers, bless 'em, raised such a hue and cry they had to put it back in
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right away.
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When RJ interviewed with Amiga Computer (he had been at Williams) in
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July 1983, the retail price target for the Amiga was $400. Perfect for a
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killer game machine. By the time he accepted three weeks later, the target
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was up to $600 and rising fast. Partly this was due to the bottom dropping
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completely out of the game market; the doctors and the execs knew they had
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to have something more than just another game box to survive. That's when
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the techies' foresight in designing in everything from disk controllers to
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keyboard (yes, the original original Amiga had NO KEYBOARD), ports, and
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disk drives began to pay off.
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The exciting part of the Amiga's development, in a way its adolescence,
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that magical time of loss of innocence and exposure to the beauties and
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cruelties of the real world, began as plans were made to introduce it,
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secretly of course, at the winter CES on January 4th, 1984(?).
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Adolescence
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-----------
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The software was done ten days before the CES, and running fine on the
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simulators. Unfortunately when the hardware was finally powered up several
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days later, (surprise) it didn't match its simulations. This hardware, of
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course, was still not in silicon. The custom chips were in fact large
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breadboards, placed vertically around a central core and wired together
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round the edges like a Cray. Each of the three custom `chips' had one of
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these towers, each one a mass of wires. According to RJ, the path leading
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up to the first Amiga breadboard, with its roll-out antistatic flooring,
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the antistatic walls just wide enough apart for one person to fit through
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and all the signs saying Ground Thyself, made one think of nothing so much
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as an altar to some technology god.
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After working feverishly right up to the opening minutes of the CES,
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including most everybody working on Christmas, they had a working Amiga,
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still in breadboard, at the show in the booth in a special enclosed gray
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room, so they could give private demos. Unfortunately if you rode up the
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exhibit-hall escalator and craned your neck, you could see into the room
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>from the top.
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The Amiga was, RJ reminisced, the hardest he or most anyone there had
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ever worked. "We worked with a great passion...my most cherished memory is
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how much we cared about what we were doing. We had something to prove...a
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real love for it. We created our own sense of family out there."
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After the first successful night of the CES, all the marketing guys got
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dollar signs in their eyes because the Amiga made SUCH a splash even though
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they were trying to keep it "secret."
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And so they took out all the technical staff for Italian food, everyone
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got drunk and then they wandered back to the exhibit hall to work some more
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on demos, quick bug fixes, features that didn't work, and so on. At CES
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everyone worked about 20 hours a day, when they weren't eating or sleeping.
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RJ and Dale Luck were known as the "dancing fools" around the office
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because they'd play really loud music and dance around during compiles to
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stay awake.
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Late that night, in their drunken stupor, Dale and RJ put the finishing
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touches on what would become the canonical Amiga demo, Boing.
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At last the true story is told.
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Money Problems
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----- --------
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After the CES, Amiga Inc. was very nearly broke and heavily in debt. It
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had cost quite a bit more than the original $7 million to bring the Amiga
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even that far, and lots more time and money were needed to bring it to the
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market. Unfortunately the doctors wanted out, and wouldn't invest any
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more. So outside funding was needed, and quick.
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The VP of Finance balanced things for a little while, and even though
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they were $11 million in the hole they managed to pay off the longest-
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standing debts and keep one step ahead of Chapter 11. After much
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scrounging, they got enough money to take them to the June CES; for that
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they had REAL WORKING SILICON. People kept peeking under the skirts of the
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booth tables asking "Where's the REAL computer generating these displays?"
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Now money started flowing and interest was really being generated in the
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media. And like most small companies, as soon as the money came in the
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door it was spent. More people were added - hardware folks to optimize and
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cost-reduce the design; software people to finish the OS. Even the sudden
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influx of cash was only enough to keep them out of bankruptcy, though; they
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were still broke and getting broker all the time. How much WOULD have been
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enough? RJ said that if he were starting over, he'd need about $49
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million to take the machine from design idea to market. Of course Amiga
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Inc. had nowhere near that much, and they were feeling the crunch. Every-
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body tightened their belts and persevered somehow. They actually were at
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one point so broke they couldn't meet their payroll; Dave Morse, the VP of
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Sales, took out a second mortgage on his house to help cover it, but it
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still wasn't enough.
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They knew they were going under, and unless they could find someone
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quick to buy them out they were going to be looking for jobs very shortly.
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They talked to Sony, to Apple, to Phillips and HP, Silicon Graphics (who
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just wanted the chips) and even Sears. Finally...they called Atari. (Boo!
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Hiss! [literally - the audience hissed at Jack Tramiel's name!]) Trying to
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be discreet, RJ's only personal comment on Jack Tramiel was (and it took
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him a while to formulate this sentence) "an interesting product of the
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capitalist system." Ahem. Apparently Tramiel has been quoted as saying
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"Business is War." Tramiel had recently left Commodore in a huff and
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bought Atari "undercover" so that by the time he left C= he was already CEO
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of Atari.
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Realizing that Commodore was coming out with their own hot game machine,
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Tramiel figured he'd revenge himself on them for dumping him by buying
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Amiga Inc. and driving C= down the tubes with "his" superior product. So
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Atari gave them half a million just for negotiating for a month; that money
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was gone in a day.
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Of course Tramiel saw that Amiga Inc. wasn't in a very good bargaining
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position; basically unless they were bought they were on the street. So he
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offered them 98 cents a share; Dave Morse held out for $2.00. But instead
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of bargaining in good faith, every time Morse and Amiga tried to meet them
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halfway their bid went down!
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"Okay, $1.50 a share.
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No, we think we'll give you 80 cents.
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How about $1.25?
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70 cents."
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And so on...
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Even Dave Morse, the staunchest believer in the concept that was the
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Amiga, the guiding light who made everyone's hair stand on end when he
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walked into the room, was getting depressed. Gloom set in. Things looked
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grim.
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Then, just three days before the month deadline was up, Commodore
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called. Two days later they bought Amiga Inc. for $4.25 a share. They
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offered them $4.00, but Dave Morse TURNED THEM DOWN saying it wasn't
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acceptable to his employees; he was on the verge of walking out when they
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offered $4.25. He signed right then and there.
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The Commodore Years
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--- --------- -----
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Commodore gave them $27 million for development; they'd never seen that
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much money in one place before. They went right out and bought a Sun
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workstation for every software person, with Ethernet and disk servers and
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everything. The excitement was back.
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Commodore did many good things for the Amiga; not only did they cost-
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reduce it without losing much functionality, they had this concept of it as
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a business machine; this was a very different attitude from what Amiga Inc.
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had been working with. Because of that philosophy, they improved the
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keyboard [ha! - garyo] and made lots of other little improvements that RJ
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didn't elaborate on.
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What could Commodore have given them that they didn't? The one thing RJ
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wanted most from them was an extra 18 months of development time. Unfortu-
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nately Commodore wasn't exactly rich right then either, so they had to
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bring out the product ASAP [and when is it ever any different?] Also, he
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said, they could have MARKETED it. (applause!). If he'd had that extra 18
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months, he could have made Intuition a device rather than a separate kind
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of thing; he could have released it much more bug-free.
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As far as marketing goes, the old ad agency has been fired; we should
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see some new Amiga ads real soon now.
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The Future
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--- ------
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RJ's advice for A1000 owners: "Keep what you've got. It's not worth it
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to trade up. The A1000 is really a better machine."
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This may be sour grapes on RJ's part, since the Amiga 2000 was designed
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in Braunschweig, West Germany, and the version of the A2000 being worked on
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in Los Gatos was rejected in favor of the Braunschweig-Commodore version.
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However the A1000 compares to the A2000, though, the Los Gatos 2000 would
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have certainly been better than either machine. C= management vetoed it
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because Braunschweig promised a faster design turnaround (and, to their
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credit, were much faster in execution than the Los Gatos group would have
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been) and more cost-reduction, which was their specialty. Los Gatos, on
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the other hand, wanted a dream machine with vastly expanded capabilities in
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every facet of the machine. The cruel financial facts forced C= to go with
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the Business Computer Group, who did the Sidecar in Braunschweig as well,
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and quickly and cheaply.
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So they fired more than half the staff at the original Los Gatos
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facility, one by one. That trauma was to some extent played out on the
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net; no doubt many of you remember it as a very difficult and emotional
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time. There are now only six people left in Los Gatos, and their lease
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expires in March, so thus expires the original Amiga group.
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And that's how RJ ended his talk; the rise and fall of Amiga Computer
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Inc. The future of the Amiga is now in the hands of Westchester and
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Braunschweig, and who knows what direction it will take?
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PART 2 - Technical Questions From the Audience
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==== === ========= ========= ==== === ========
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I'll just make this part a list of technical questions and answers,
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since that was the format at the talk anyway. This part is part technical
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inquiries and part total rumor mill; caveat emptor.
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Q's are from the audience, A's are =RJ=.
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............................................................................
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Q: When is 1.3 coming and what's in it?
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A: 1.3 (or maybe it'll be called 1.2A) will be mostly just 1.2 with hard
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disk boot; it'll look for Workbench on dh0: as well as df0:.
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No one is working on it right now, although there are people in West
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Chester planning it.
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Q: Can you do double buffering with Intuition?
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A: Pop answer: No. Thought-out: well, yes, but it's not easy. Use
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MenuVerify and don't change the display while menus are up. It's pretty
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hairy.
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Q: How big is intuition (source code)?
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A: The listings (commented) are about a foot thick, 60 lpp, 1 inch margins.
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Q: Where did MetaComCo come into the Amiga story?
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A: MCC's AmigaDOS was a backup plan; the original Los Gatos-written
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AmigaDOS was done with some co-developers who dropped out due to
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contract and money hassles when C= bought Amiga. Then MCC had to crank
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EXTREMELY hard to get their BCPL DOS into the system at the last
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possible minute.
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Q: Why isn't the Sidecar out?
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A: Who knows? It passed FCC in December...
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Q: Why no MMU?
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A: Several reasons. Obviously, cost was a factor. MMUs available at the
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time the Amiga was designed also consumed system time [this is what he
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said- I'm just the scribe]; although newer MMUs solve this problem they
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were too late for the Amiga.
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Second, the original goal of the Amiga was to be a killer game machine
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with easy low-level access, and an MMU didn't seem necessary for a game
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machine.
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Third [get this!] with an MMU, message-passing becomes MUCH MUCH hairier
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and slower, since in the Amiga messages are passed by just passing a
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pointer to someone else's memory. With protection, either public memory
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would need to be done and system calls issued to allocate it, etc., or
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the entire message would have to be passed. Yecch. So the lack of MMU
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actually speeds up the basic operation of the Amiga several fold.
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Q: Why no resource tracking?
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A: The original AmigaDOS/Exec had resource tracking; it's a shame it died.
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Q: How is your game coming? [??]
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A: It's just now becoming a front-burner project. It's number crunch
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intensive; hopefully it will even take over the PC part of the 2000 for
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extra crunch. It's half action, half strategy; the 'creation' part is
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done, only the playing part needs to be written. Next question. :-)
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Q: Will there ever be an advanced version of the chip set?
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A: Well, Jay Miner isn't working on anything right now... [RUMOR ALERT]
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The chip folks left in Los Gatos who are losing their lease in March
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were at one time thinking about 1k square 2meg chip space 128-color
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graphics, although still with 4 bit color DACs though... and even stuff
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like a blitter per plane (!!) They were supposed to be done now, in the
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original plans; the chip designers will be gone in March, but the design
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may (?) continue in West Chester. Maybe they'll be here two years from
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now.
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Q: What will happen to the unused Los Gatos A2000 design?
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A: ??????
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Q: Should I upgrade from my 1000 to a 20
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00?
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A: Probably not. The 2000 isn't enough better to justify the cost. Unless
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you need the PC compatibility, RJ advocated staying with the 1000.
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After all the 2000 doesn't have the nifty garage for the keyboard...:-)
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The A1000 keyboard is better built; you can have kickstart on disk; it's
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smaller and a LOT quieter, [maybe not than the old internal drives!!!]
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and uses less power; the 2000 has no composite video out, plus the RGB
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quality is a tad worse. Composite video (PAL or NTSC) is an extra-cost
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option with the 2000.
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Q: Have you ever seen a working Amiga-Live!?
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A: Yes, I've seen it taking 32-color images at 16fps, and HAM pictures at
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something like half that. [!!] It's all done and working. I don't know
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why it's not out. It sure beats Digiview at 8 seconds per image!
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Q: What do you use for Amiga development tools?
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A: DPaint and Infominder, Aztec C, Andy Finkel's Microemacs.
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Q: What's the future of the A1000?
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A: They aren't making any right now; they're just shipping from stock. But
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they do claim that they intend to continue making them.
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Q: Is MetaComCo's stuff all really slow, or what? :-)
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A: Yes, it is slow. But don't knock it, it works.
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Q: Who is the competition for Amiga right now?
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A: The new Macs are so expensive, they're not a threat to the 2000, much
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less the 1000. Atari's new stuff "doesn't impress me." [that's all he
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said.]
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Q: What can I do about lack of Amiga ads, and the quality of the ones that
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do exist?
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A: Write (don't call) Clive Smith in Marketing at Westchester and tell him
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they need better ads.
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Q: Why are the pixels 10% higher than wide?
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A: The hardware came out that way, and it would have been a pain to do it
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any other way due to sync-rate-multiple timing constraints.
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[that's all folks!]
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===========================================================================
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The preceding tome was produced entirely by placing my terminal cable just
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next to the microwave on high and wiggling it around like !*(&t%*h5i@!s, so
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don't take any of it too seriously. :-)
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Gary Oberbrunner
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--
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Remember, -Truth is not beauty;
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Information is not knowledge; / Beauty is not love; Gary Oberbrunner
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Knowledge is not wisdom; / Love is not music; ...!masscomp!garyo
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Wisdom is not truth; ----/ Music is the best. - FZ
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--
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--------------------------- Signature Version 1.2 ---------------------------
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| bear@bu-pub.bu.edu enge05c@buacca.bu.edu |
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| |
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| "Love is like oxygen. You get too much, you get too high. |
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| Not enough and you're gonna die. Love gets you high." |
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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